ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY TEXT

bbbb The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( START Treaty") consists of the main Treaty text and nine associated documents:

- the Annex on Agreed Statements ("Agreed Statements Annex");

- the Annex on Terms and Their Definitions ( "Definitions Annex");

- the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; ( "Conversion or Elimination Protocol");

­ the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 12 annexes, ( "Inspection Protocol");

­ the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; ( "Notification Protocol");

­ the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Throw-weight Protocol");

­ the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Telemetry Protocol");

­ the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (" Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Protocol"); and

­ the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with 10 annexes ("Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)").

bbbbbb All Protocols, Annexes and the Memorandum of Understanding are integral parts of the Treaty.

bbbbbb Associated with the START Treaty are four related, separate agreements signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. The first three separate agreements, all signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, include:

­ The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms.")

This Agreement will allow extensive exhibitions to confirm the technical characteristics specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for existing ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and long-range nuclear ALCMs required under the Treaty to take place prior to entry into force of the Treaty

­ The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors and Aircrew Members Proposed for Inspection and Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( Agreement on the Proposed for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities.")

This Agreement will allow the Parties to exchange and approve the lists of inspectors and monitors before entry into force of the Treaty and thus allow inspections and continuous monitoring to begin promptly upon entry into force of the Treaty.

­ The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( "Agreement on Exchange of Coordinates and Site Diagrams").

This Agreement provides a listing of geographic coordinates of facilities subject to the Treaty and includes the site diagrams. This Agreement is classified and will not be released to the public.

bbbbbbThe fourth separate agreement, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, is:

This Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercise ("Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises"). This Agreement provides for the advance notification of one major strategic forces exercise that includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

bbbbbbAlso associated with the START Treaty are seven legally binding letters, each of which has the status of an executive agreement. Each of these letters was signed by the Heads of Delegation in Moscow on either July 30 or 31, 1991. They include:

­ An obligation to eliminate at least 22 Soviet heavy ICBM launchers each year during the seven-year reduction period.

­ Detailed provisions for verifying that silo launch control centers are not converted into silo launchers.

­ Detailed provisions to provide confidence that the B-1 bomber is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

­ An obligation to provide photographs of certain equipment before Treaty signature and a list of the photographs of strategic offensive arms to be provided at and after Treaty signature.

­ Procedures to deal with expended mobile ICBM launch canisters to help verify that they do not contain ICBMs.

­ Provisions for dealing with the Soviet naval airplane designated Bear D (Soviet designation TU-95RTs). The 37 existing Bear D airplanes will not be covered by the Treaty. The letters provide Soviet assurances, verified by exhibitions, that they are equipped exclusively for maritime operations; the letters also place basing restrictions on the airplane.

­ An obligation to provide certain engineering data before Treaty entry into force in order to facilitate establishment of continuous monitoring sites soon after Treaty signature.

bbbbbbThere are also a variety of supporting documents related to the Treaty. These include certain correspondence between Ministers on the topics of third-country basing, long-range ALCMs with multiple nuclear warheads, the Tacit Rainbow system, and the relocation of heavy ICBM silos. The supporting documents also include 12 joint statements and 20 other statements made by the Parties. Most of these statements were made at the final plenary meeting of the START Delegations, on July 29, 1991, in Geneva, but the fact that a statement was or was not made at the final plenary does not have any particular significance. The texts of the various statements and correspondence specified above are included herein, and all are analyzed in this analysis.

bbbbbbFinally, also included are two independent, politically binding declarations made by the Parties, one concerning the TU-22 Backfire bomber and the other concerning the planned deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The texts of these declarations and an analysis of them are attached.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

bbbbbb The title of the Treaty is the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." The phrase reduction and limitation" is significant because the Treaty reduces, and does not merely limit, strategic offensive arms.

bbbbbbThe term "strategic offensive arms" is undefined. "Strategic" indicates that, in general, the forces covered are those of intercontinental range, in contrast to shorter-range and intermediate-range weapons which are covered by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles (INF Treaty)1. During the negotiations the United States rejected proposals by the Soviet Union to treat so-called forward-based systems" (e.g., aircraft based in Europe or on aircraft carriers) as strategic offensive arms. As a result, the Parties agreed not to include constraints on such systems in the Treaty. Offensive" is in contrast to defensive strategic arms, such as anti-ballistic missile systems.

bbbbbbThe Preamble serves as an introduction to the Treaty and sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms. The first line of the Preamble sets forth and defines the Parties" to the Treaty, that is, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The next three paragraphs of the Preamble state the Parties' considerations upon entering into the Treaty. These paragraphs state first, that the Parties are conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity. They also state, drawing from a statement by former President Reagan, that such a war cannot be won and must never be fought. Furthermore, these paragraphs state that the Parties are convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, and that the Parties recognize that their interests and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability.

bbbbbbThe final preambular paragraph makes reference to three other commitments of the Parties with regard to strategic offensive arms. These references include, first, Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of July 1, 19682; which provides, in part, that the NPT Parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

bbbbbb The second reference is to Article XI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 19723; in that Article the United States and Soviet Union undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Note that this is the only direct reference in the START Treaty to the ABM Treaty, and it refers only to Article XI, which is the portion of the ABM Treaty concerned with continued negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

bbbbbbThe third reference is to the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, which includes a joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and on further enhancing strategic stability.

Article I

bbbbbbArticle I sets forth the general undertaking by each Party to reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding. Provisions that are comparable to Article I are found in paragraph 1 of Article I of the ABM Treaty and Article I of the INF Treaty. Note that Article XVII of the START Treaty provides that the Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding are integral parts of the Treaty.

bbbbbbAlthough the Parties did not agree on a definition of the term "strategic offensive arms," they overcame any need for such a definition by listing the specific types of systems to be limited and by defining those systems so as to capture their modernized replacements. As a practical matter, the strategic offensive arms" constrained by the Treaty are nuclear-capable. If a non-nuclear arm were to fall within a definition established by the Treaty, however, it would be captured. For example, if an ICBM or SLBM were to have a non-nuclear rather than nuclear warhead, it would still be an ICBM or SLBM for purposes of the Treaty.

bbbbbbRegarding "new kinds" of weapons systems, the Parties understand that new kinds of nuclear arms that are comparable to strategic offensive arms would be subject to the Treaty, even though, as new kinds," such arms would not fall within any existing definition established by the Treaty. The Parties did not reach agreement, however, on the applicability of the Treaty to future non-nuclear systems. During the negotiations, the United States stated its view that a future non-nuclear system could not be considered a new kind of strategic offensive arm and, thus, would not be subject to the Treaty. The Soviet Union did not accept this view.

bbbbbbThe Parties agreed, in the Second Agreed Statement, that, if "new kinds" of arms emerge in the future and if the Parties disagree about whether they are strategic offensive arms, then such arms would be subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Of course, if one Party deploys a new kind of arm that it asserts is not subject to the Treaty, and the other Party challenges this assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is, however, no obligation to delay deployment pending such resolution. (See the discussion of new kinds of strategic offensive arms in the analysis of the Article XV of the Treaty and the Second Agreed Statement.)

ARTICLE II

bbbbbbArticle II consists of three paragraphs setting forth the central numerical limits of the Treaty. It specifies the numbers of deployed offensive delivery systems and accountable heavy bomber and ballistic missile warheads allowed to each Party at the end of each of the three phases of the reduction period. It also specifies the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ballistic missiles allowed to each Party at the end of the reduction period.

bbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article II sets forth the limits that will be reached following the seven-year period of reductions. It provides the following limits, as counted in accordance with Article III of the Treaty:

(a) a total of 1600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their associated launchers, deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers. This limit is sometimes referred to as a limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles," SNDVs," deployed strategic offensive systems," or strategic delivery vehicles," although none of those terms is used in the Treaty.

(b) 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers. As a practical matter, this limit applies only to the Soviet Union, since the United States has no heavy ICBMs, and the deployment of new types of heavy ICBMs is prohibited by paragraph 2 of Article V.

(c) a total of 6000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Within this total of 6000, there are sublimits of:

(i) 4900 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(ii) 1100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(iii) 1540 warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

bbbbbb Note that Article II cross-references Article III; this is significant because that Article, as is discussed below, provides the rules for how the arms subject to reduction and limitation are to be counted. The definitions of these arms are found in the Definitions Annex. Note also that warhead" is not a physical object, but a unit of account under the Treaty. (See analysis of paragraph 4 of Article III, below.)

bbbbbbDue to these counting rules and the fact that the Soviets, because of their larger forces, generally must make greater reductions under the Treaty, no single percentage value can give an accurate representation of the reductions that are required by the Treaty. An examination of percentage reductions is best done on a category-by-category basis.

bbbbbbThe following data from the Memorandum of Understanding, based on the agreed Treaty counting rules, are effective as of September 1, 1990, and will be updated 30 days after the Treaty enters into force:

As a result of the Treaty, the above values will be reduced by the following percentages:

bbbbbbThe table above refers to accountable warheads and accountable ballistic missile warheads. Due to START warhead accountability rules for heavy bombers and ballistic missiles, the actual number of weapons deployed will be different. As regards throw-weight, each Party is limited to 3600 metric tons of throw-weight in paragraph 3 of Article II.

bbbbbbThe Treaty prohibits the Parties from producing, flight-testing, or deploying an ICBM or SLBM with more than the number of warheads that are attributed to it; however, in certain cases the attributed number of warheads may be greater than the number actually deployed. (See the discussion of subparagraphs 4(b) and 4(d) of Article III, below). Conversely, because the Treaty's counting rules have the effect of discounting" bomber weapons, the number of heavy bomber weapons actually deployed almost certainly will be higher than the attributed number.

bbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article II sets forth the three phases whereby the levels listed in paragraph 1 are to be reached. The first phase ends 36 months after entry into force; the second phase ends 60 months after entry into force; while the final levels (those specified in paragraph 1 of this Article) must be attained no later than 7 years (84 months) after entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbbbIntermediate levels to be achieved at the end of each of the first two phases are provided for total delivery vehicles, for total warheads, and for total ballistic missile warheads. No intermediate levels are provided for ballistic missile warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs, since neither Party exceeded the ultimate limit at the time of Treaty signature.

bbbbbb Although no intermediate levels are provided for in the Treaty for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers or for ballistic missile warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, the phasing of reductions of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers is provided for in an exchange of letters dated July 30, 1991. These letters, signed by the U.S. and Soviet Heads of Delegation, specify that the deployed heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the 154 limit is reached. In addition, the letters specify that the reduction of heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be through elimination, not conversion. In a separate letter signed on July 31, 1991, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh confirmed that the Soviet commitments on the phasing of reductions of heavy ICBMs are legally binding. It should be understood that certain other letters in which agreements were made concerning the START Treaty are also legally binding. The reason that a separate letter was needed to confirm this for the Soviet commitment on the phasing of heavy ICBM reductions is that the language of the commitment, which had been negotiated earlier than those other letters, was ambiguous as to whether the commitment was in fact legally binding.

bbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article II limits the aggregatethrow-weight of each Party's deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. This limit provides that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter, such aggregate throw-weight may not exceed 3600 metric tons (a metric ton is 1000 kilograms). This level would reflect a reduction to approximately 54 percent of the current Soviet level. There are no intermediate limits on aggregate throw-weight during the seven-year reductions period.

ARTICLE III

bbbbbbArticle III consists of ten paragraphs that describe how to count the launchers, ballistic missiles, bombers, and warheads that are subject to the Treaty limits set forth in Article II. It establishes when newly-constructed strategic offensive arms become subject to the Treaty. Article III also lists the types of strategic offensive arms that are considered to be existing types as of Treaty signature, and provides limits for reducing the number of warheads on missiles (sometimes referred to as downloading").

bbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article III provides one of the most fundamental counting rules. It states that each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit, that each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit, and that each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. This rule is the foundation upon which subsequent counting rules operate.

bbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article III sets forth the rules for counting deployed missiles and launchers.Subparagraph 2(a) states that, for the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated launchers, each deployed launcher of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively. This means that when a Party observes a deployed launcher of an ICBM or SLBM of the other Party, the launcher is considered, for counting purposes, to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM, respectively, even if the missile has been removed from the launcher.

bbbbbbSubparagraph 2(b) of Article III provides a rule to avoid a situation where an ICBM is double-counted as both a deployed and a non-deployed missile while removed from its launcher. Since, under subparagraph (a), the launcher is assumed to contain an ICBM, under subparagraph (b), if a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, the ICBM that has been removed from the launcher continues to be considered to be contained in that launcher, provided it is located at that ICBM base. Thus, the combined effect of subparagraphs (a) and (b) is that a Party is precluded from claiming that deployed ICBM launchers should not count as containing an ICBM because they are empty, but at the same time an ICBM that has been removed will not be double counted.

bbbbbbSubparagraph 2(c) of Article III provides a similar rule for a deployed SLBM removed from its launcher. If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Subparagraph (c) also contains a locational restriction on such an SLBM removed from its launcher. Such an SLBM may be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located, as listed in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, or be in movement to such a facility.

bbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article III provides the counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs, and launch canisters. The rules reflect the fact that, for maintenance, storage, and transportation, some missiles are found in stages, others as assembled missiles without launch canisters, and others as assembled missiles in launch canisters. The Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides locational restrictions on canisterized ICBMs outside of their launch canisters, and on the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles (with or without launch canisters).

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 3 provides that, for ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be, for counting purposes, an ICBM or SLBM of that type.Subparagraph (b) provides that, for ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. Subparagraph (c) provides that, for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type. For the United States, all existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are considered to be maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For the Soviet Union, all existing types of ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, except for the SS-13, which is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. For the Soviet Union, all existing types of SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters. (The Soviet SS-N-6 SLBM has only one stage.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 3 provides a counting rule for launch canisters of ICBMs. It provides that each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it, until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. It also provides an exception, in that a launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or if it has been placed on static display. Note that training models of missiles are not subject to the same locational restrictions as actual missiles­i.e., there is no requirement that they be located only at declared facilities. This raises the possibility that a Party might observe, through national technical means, a launch canister containing a training model of a missile at an undeclared facility. This could lead to compliance concerns, since a Party cannot discriminate by national technical means between canisters with real missiles and canisters with training missiles. Such a situation could be raised in the JCIC. The Party possessing the missile would be expected to make efforts (which could include offering a special access visit) to demonstrate that the canister did not contain a real missile. Note that the definition of a training model of a missile requires that such a missile differ from a real one on the basis of functional and external differences visible during inspections.

bbbbbbb Note finally, that subparagraph (d) of paragraph 3 provides a distinguishability rule, by requiring that launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.) Also, subparagraph 13(b)(iii) of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol obligates the inspected Party to demonstrate, in certain circumstances, that the launch of a mobile ICBM of a new type cannot be carried out from a launch canister for a mobile ICBM of an existing or previously declared new type, and vice versa.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs (c) and (d) reflect Soviet elevation to the level of a fundamental principle the association of a launch canister with its missile. Throughout the negotiations, Soviet negotiators insisted that the launch canister was an inseparable part of an ICBM; they based their negotiating position in a number of areas on this principle. Consequently, the provisions on launch canisters throughout the Treaty and its associated documents were crafted as a compromise between the U.S. desire for effective verification and the Soviet insistence that this principle be preserved.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 4 of Article III sets forth rules to be used for the purposes of counting warheads. The term warhead" is used as the unit of account for the purpose of the 6000 limit in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II, whereas the term reentry vehicle" is used elsewhere in the Treaty text to describe the physical object carried by a missile. Each of these terms is defined in the Definitions Annex. Also note that this paragraph is written in terms of attributing" a certain number of warheads to a missile or heavy bomber; it is the number attributed that counts for purposes of Treaty ceilings.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 4 provides that the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. This means that the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types (i.e., those types deployed at the time of Treaty signature) is established, and will not need to be further calculated. All warhead attributions for existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs were agreed in the Joint Summit Statement of December 1987, except for the attribution for the SS-N-18 SLBM of the Soviet Union, which, by agreement, was subsequently changed, as is explained in the analysis of subparagraph 5(c) below. By signing the Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties have agreed on the number of warheads that will be attributed to each existing type of ICBM or SLBM. (This agreement is stated in the first unnumbered paragraph in the text above the signature block of the Memorandum of Understanding, and it is discussed in the analysis of that Memorandum.) Note that the Parties have a limited right to "download" or reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs, and are prohibited from increasing the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs. This is discussed below in the analysis of paragraph 5 of Article III and paragraph 12 of Article V, respectively.

bbbbb Since the number of warheads to be attributed to new types of ICBMs and SLBMs (that is, types of ICBMs and SLBMs that come into existence after Treaty signature) cannot be stipulated now, rules have been agreed for attributing warheads to such types if and when they are created over the life of the Treaty. Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 states that the number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. Subparagraph (b) also contains a rule for warhead attribution for the case in which a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of a new type that has been tested with a certain number of warheads but that is capable of carrying more. This rule provides that the number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles (regardless of whether they are independently targetable), or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. This is often referred to informally as the 40 percent rule". (For example, in the hypothetical case of a new type of ICBM with accountable throw-weight of 1100 kilograms, for which the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested weighed 100 kilograms, the minimum number of warheads attributed would be determined by dividing 100 into 40 percent of 1100. The result­4.4­would be rounded down to the next lower integer, or 4.) The purpose of the 40 percent rule" is to prevent a side from attributing an unrealistically low number of warheads to a new type of ballistic missile by significantly under-demonstrating its reentry vehicle-carrying capability. For modern ICBM and SLBM designs, roughly half of the missile's throw-weight capability is used for reentry vehicles. The rest is used for fuel, the self-contained dispensing mechanism, guidance devices, and other items. Since some inefficient Soviet missile designs may result in their being able to use less than half their throw-weight for reentry vehicles, the Soviet Union insisted that the Treaty use 40 percent to avoid any possibility of over-attributing warheads.

bbbbbbbIn the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of afundamentally new design that carries multiple reentry vehicles, the question of the applicability of the 40 percent rule" to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

bbbbbbbIn order to avoid a situation in which an ICBM or SLBM of a new type can exist, even temporarily, without an attribution, subparagraph (b) of paragraph 4 also provides that until agreement has been reached regarding the counting rule that will apply to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. This subparagraph also stipulates that the number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as the Treaty remains in force.

bbbbbbb In this regard, it should be noted that the Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides clarification of what is meant by a front section of a fundamentally new design." Such a front section would not have the essential features that are characteristic of any existing design of a front section with multiple reentry vehicles that has been deployed or tested on any ICBM or SLBM as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. (See the analysis of Agreed Statement 24 below.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 4 provides the rule that the number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. This means that even if no reentry vehicles were actually released, the number of reentry vehicles with which that ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to have been flight-tested shall be equal to the number of such procedures. This rule does not apply to procedures for dispensing penetration aids, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 4 provides that each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead. Thus, a reentry vehicle," used to describe the physical object, always counts as a warhead," which is the unit of account. The terms are not equivalent, however, because under rules such as that of subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, more warheads may be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM than there are reentry vehicles actually on the ICBM or SLBM. It should also be noted that the Third Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, provides an exception to subparagraph 4(d) for the SS-11 ICBMs of the Soviet Union. The SS-11 is the only existing type of ICBM or SLBM of either Party that is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable. Some SS-11 ICBMs are deployed with three such reentry vehicles. But, in light of the fact that the three reentry vehicles cannot be independently targeted, an SS-11 is only attributed with one warhead for purposes of the limits in Article II. If a Party develops a new type of ICBM or SLBM that is equipped with multiple reentry vehicles that are not independently targetable, however, it will be attributed with warheads in accordance with subparagraphs 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) of Article III.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs (e) and (f) of paragraph 4 provide the counting rules for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., respectively. The different limits that are applicable to each Party reflect the differing practices of the sides and compromises that were reached in the course of the negotiations.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) provides that, for the U.S., each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each U.S. heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped. Taken together, these two provisions mean that 150 U.S. heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will count at ten warheads each, regardless of the number of such ALCMs with which they are equipped, while such bombers in excess of 150 count as having a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of such ALCMs for which that type/variant has actually been equipped. (For example, any B-52G declared to be over the 150 threshold would count as 12 warheads. On the other hand, because some B-52Hs are equipped for 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs and some for 20, any B-52H over the 150 threshold will be attributed with 20 warheads. If the United States declared separate variants of what is now declared simply as B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, such separate variants over the 150 threshold would then count as 12 or 20 warheads, respectively.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) also provides that the U.S. will specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The as equipped" rule for U.S. heavy bombers in excess of 150 is a compromise intended to ameliorate Soviet concerns that the basic heavy bomber warhead attribution rule undercounts the actual number of long-range nuclear ALCMs carried by a heavy bomber. It should also be noted that in paragraph 20 of Article V of the Treaty, the United States is limited to no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs on an existing or future heavy bomber.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (f) of paragraph 4 sets forth the counting rules for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of the Soviet Union. It states that each such heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. This is in contrast to the attribution of 10 warheads to each U.S. heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This difference is due to the fact that Soviet heavy bombers are equipped to carry fewer long-range nuclear ALCMs than U.S. heavy bombers. Subparagraph (f) also provides rules for heavy bombers of the Soviet Union in excess of these 180 bombers. It provides that each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of that type/variant is actually equipped. Subparagraph (f) requires the Soviet Union to specify its heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. It should also be noted that in paragraph 21 of Article V, the Soviet Union is limited to 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs on an existing or future heavy bomber. (Note that the U.S. limit of 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs on 150 existing and future heavy bombers and the Soviet limit of 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs on 180 existing and future heavy bombers result in a roughly comparable number of potentially unaccountable warheads on heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs: 1500 for the United States and 1440 for the Soviet Union.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (g), the final subparagraph of paragraph 4, addresses "categories" of heavy bombers. (A term defined in the Definitions Annex.) Subparagraph (g) provides that for each Party, each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. With specified exceptions, subparagraph (g) also provides that all heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. Thus, the general rule is that heavy bombers will be counted under the Treaty, either as being equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and having a number of warheads attributed pursuant to the other subparagraphs of paragraph 4, or as being equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and being attributed with one warhead. The specified exceptions to this general rule, are for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. Also, note that former heavy bombers" are not considered to be heavy bombers" and do not count under the central limits. Former heavy bombers are reconnaissance, tanker, or jamming airplanes converted from heavy bombers or initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing heavy bomber. They must not be equipped for air-to-surface armaments.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article III limits the extent to which a Party can "download" or reduce the number of warheads attributed to its ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types. (No downloading is permitted on new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.) It provides that each Party has the right to be credited with such reductions up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time. Subparagraph (a) provides that the 1250 aggregate shall consist, for the United States of America, of the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types. Subparagraph (a) also provides that the 1250 aggregate shall consist, for the Soviet Union, of four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs of the SS-N-18 type, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

bbbbbbb As regards the SS-N-18, it should be understood that the United States and the Soviet Union had attributed seven warheads to this missile in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987. In late 1990, representatives of the Soviet Union stated that they had reduced all SS-N-18s to three warheads and had destroyed all the reentry vehicle platforms for the SS-N-18 that were designed to hold seven reentry vehicles. In addition, in a December 30, 1990, letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary of State Baker, the Soviet Union offered the explicit assurance that it had retired front ends for the SS-N-18 SLBM with seven reentry vehicles, that the stockpile of such front ends had been destroyed entirely, that the Soviet Union no longer produced and did not intend to produce such front ends, and that all SS-N-18s are equipped with front ends that carry three reentry vehicles and that are designed so that carrying more than three reentry vehicles would be impossible. As part of the overall agreement on downloading, the Parties thereafter agreed to handle the SS-N-18 as a special case. It is attributed with three warheads in the Memorandum of Understanding, which means that it is already listed at the reduced level of warheads for purposes of the Treaty. But the four warheads that have already been reduced on the SS-N-18 count as part of the Soviet Union's 1250 permitted downloading" aggregate, which is why subparagraph 5(a) provides that the 1250 limit will consist, in part, for the Soviet Union, of four times the number of deployed SLBMs of the SS-N-18 type. The Soviet Union is not permitted to take further credit for additional downloading" the SS-N-18, since part (ii) of subparagraph (a) is explicit that downloading is permitted only on two other" existing types.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 5 provides three rules for reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs. First, Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. Second, any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty. Third, the reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. (See the analysis of subparagraph 5(c) of this Article for a discussion of the phrase reentry vehicle platform.")

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 provides six rules for reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III, that are to be applied to downloading after entry into force. Since the downloading of the Minuteman III has not yet occurred, the phrase other than the Minuteman III" is necessary. Because the Soviets have said that the downloading of the SS-N-18 has already occurred, no comparable phrase is necessary for that missile. Nevertheless, these rules would never be applied to the SS-N-18, since, as is explained above, subparagraph 5(a)(ii) prohibits further downloading of the SS-N-18.

bbbbbbb The first rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that the additional reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party. This is a rolling" aggregate, meaning that if ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types (other than Minuteman III or SS-N-18) that a Party has downloaded to make up all or part of the 500 limit are removed from accountability under the central numerical limits, then additional ICBMs or SLBMs of those two existing types can be downloaded up to the 500 limit, provided that all the other limitations of paragraph 5 are met. The second rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that, after a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type. Third, the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

bbbbbbbThe fourth rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. Fifth, SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean. This means, for example, that if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads attributed to its SS-N-23 SLBMs, all such SLBMs must be downloaded because they are deployed at bases adjacent to one ocean. If SS-N-23s were deployed at bases adjacent to two oceans, then the Soviets could download a portion of the force. But all downloaded SS-N-23s would have to be based adjacent to one ocean. The sixth and final rule of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5 is that, if the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. The phrase reentry vehicle platform" is not defined in the Treaty nor was any attempt made during the negotiations to reach any more detailed understanding of exactly what needed to be destroyed. As a result, each Party is free to determine exactly what to destroy, taking into account the design of the specific ICBM or SLBM to be downloaded. There are no verification measures associated with the destruction of reentry vehicle platforms.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 5 provides that a Party shall not have the right to deploy ICBMs of a new type to which is attributed a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5. A Party shall not have the right to deploy SLBMs of a new type to which is attributed a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of paragraph 5. This subparagraph would thus constrain the number of warheads on future ICBMs or SLBMs of new types should a Party reduce the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type. It means, for example, that if a Party downloaded an existing type of ICBM so that it was attributed with six warheads, that Party could not deploy any new type of ICBM to which more than six warheads are attributed. A similar ceiling would apply for future types of SLBMs if an existing SLBM were downloaded. Because these ICBM and SLBM warhead ceilings apply only to downloading carried out pursuant to subparagraph (c), the warheads with which the Minuteman III and SS-N-18 are attributed are not relevant to these ceilings.

bbbbb1bb Paragraph 6 of Article III sets forth the initial accountability" provisions, which stipulate when newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Note that Section VII of the Notification Protocol requires notification of strategic offensive arms of new types. The phrase subject to limitation" is used in paragraph 6 to mean that once a strategic offensive arm that is in process of being constructed reaches a certain step in this process, it will begin to be subject to numerical and other restrictions on that type of arm. Subparagraph (a) provides that an ICBM will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility. Subparagraph (b) provides that a mobile launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Subparagraph (c) provides that a silo launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation when both the excavation for that launcher and the pouring of concrete for the silo have been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier. The Parties understand that the term excavation begins" means the time when ground is first broken.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 6 provides that a silo launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation, for the purpose of limits on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed ICBM when both excavation for that launcher and the pouring of concrete for the silo have been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier. Subparagraph (d) also provides that a mobile launcher of ICBMs will be subject to limitation, for the purpose of limits on deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility. Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV allows each Party to retain no more than two non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 6 provides that an SLBM will be subject to limitation when it first leaves a production facility. Subparagraph (f) provides that an SLBM launcher will be subject to limitation when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched. Subparagraph (g) provides that an SLBM launcher will be subject to limitations, for the purpose of limits on deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, by being considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched.

bbbbbbb It is possible that a silo launcher or a ballistic missile submarine ultimately intended to hold a new type of ICBM or SLBM could become accountable before the ICBM or SLBM it is intended to hold has been flight-tested. The Treaty does not directly address accountability in such cases. Since the launcher is deployed, it must be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM. It cannot be considered to contain the new, untested missile, however, since there are no provisions for attributing a number of warheads or for determining accountable ballistic missile throw-weight for a type of ICBM or SLBM that has never been flight-tested. Thus, unless the Parties were to agree otherwise, the only way to meet the requirements of the Treaty would be to declare the launcher to contain an existing type of ICBM or SLBM and subsequently to convert it (which requires only a notification) to a launcher of the new type.

bbbbbbb If a silo launcher or a ballistic missile submarine ultimately intended to hold a new type of ICBM or SLBM became accountable after the ICBM or SLBM it is intended to hold has been flight-tested, but before the eighth flight test (when accountable throw-weight is determined), the owning Party could elect to declare that the new missile was deployed. As provided for in the Thirty-second Agreed Statement, the Parties would agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for establishing throw-weight accountability in such a case. The warhead attribution in such a case would depend on the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which the new type of ICBM or SLBM had been flight-tested, subject to the 40 percent reentry vehicle counting rule; this number could not subsequently be altered. (If, however, a Party wished to declare that the new launcher was considered to contain an existing type of ICBM or SLBM and subsequently to convert it to a launcher of the new type, the Treaty would not prohibit such an approach.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (h) of paragraph 6 provides the initial accountability rules for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. Former heavy bombers" are defined in the Definitions Annex as reconnaissance, tanker, or jamming airplanes that are not equipped for nuclear armaments, or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that have been converted in accordance with the procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol or that meet the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol. Such airplanes may be newly constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bomber, or they may be converted from a heavy bomber.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (h) provides that a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber becomes subject to limitations when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. This means that the accountability of a new heavy bomber is tied in all cases to the appearance of the completed airframe. Note that while there is an initial accountability rule for heavy bombers, there is no such rule for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This is because such ALCMs are not directly accountable under the Treaty. Rather, warheads are attributed to heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs under agreed attribution rules, once such heavy bombers become accountable under the Treaty.

bbbbbbbParagraph 7 of Article III first provides the general rule that ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Apart from this general rule, paragraph 7 also provides the specific rules for accountability of converted launchers; that is, the rules for when launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of one type, which are in the process of conversion to being launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, shall begin to be considered as being launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the different type. Such changed accountability for a silo launcher of ICBMs that is in the process of conversion begins when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first. Such changed accountability for a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is in the process of conversion begins at a point that would be agreed by the Parties, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such accountability for an SLBM launcher that is in the process of conversion begins when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of the different type and the submarine begins sea trials. Subparagraph (c) also clarifies that a submarine begins sea trials when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

bbbbbbbParagraph 8 of Article III sets forth the rules for accountability of converted heavy bombers; that is, the rules for when heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers. Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 8 states that, for a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the converted bomber is counted as being so equipped when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Subparagraph (b) provides that, for a heavy bomber of one category that is converted into a heavy bomber of another category or into a former heavy bomber, the converted bomber is counted as being of the different category or being a former heavy bomber when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires. Note that the rules for converting a heavy bomber of one category into a heavy bomber of another category are provided for in paragraphs 9-12 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. There are no procedures for converting heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; when permitted, such conversion is accomplished by notification in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. No procedures for such a conversion are required, because there is no cheating scenario in such a conversion.

bbbbbbbParagraph 9 of Article III contains the " type rules," which are rules that are necessary to associate an individual item with others of its "type," and to distinguish between types.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 9 provides that a ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply. Thus, missiles for defense against ballistic missile attack or for air defense are not subject to Treaty limitations provided that they are developed and tested solely for defensive purposes. This provision parallels paragraph 3 of Article VII of the INF Treaty.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 9 provides the type rule for ballistic missiles as weapon-delivery vehicles. A weapon delivery vehicle" is defined in the Definitions Annex as meaning, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Subparagraph (b) provides that if a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Subparagraph (c) provides the type rule for cruise missiles as weapon-delivery vehicles. It provides that if a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 contains a two-part type rule for launchers other than soft-site launchers. ( Soft-site launchers" are defined as fixed, land-based launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs other than silo launchers.) It provides first that, if a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. Note that this provision, as well as the rest of the Treaty, refers to an ICBM or SLBM of a type," but does not use the words a launcher of a type." This was done to avoid suggesting that two dissimilar launchers of the same type of missile would be treated as different types under the Treaty; it was agreed that the type" of a launcher is the type of the missile that is associated with that launcher. Note also that in the Sixteenth Agreed Statement, in the Agreed Statements Annex, the Parties agree that, with respect to this provision, each ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbbbb Second, subparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 provides that, if a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted. Thus, launchers can be converted from being launchers of one type of missile into launchers for another type. Finally, this provision has the effect of exempting soft-site launchers from the general rule that launchers are associated with only one type of ICBM or SLBM. Thus, soft-site launchers, located only at test ranges or space launch facilities, are permitted by the Treaty to launch several different types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 9 contains the heavy bomber type rule. It provides that, if a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The term distinguishable" is defined in the Definitions Annex. In this context, it means that the heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs must be different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means (NTM) of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection. This means, for example, that although some B-52 bombers of the United States are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and some are not, the ones that are not so equipped will not count as being equipped, so long as they are distinguishable." If they are not distinguishable, they will count as if they were equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Subparagraph (e) also provides that if long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This means, for example, that, so long as long-range nuclear ALCMs are not flight-tested from the B-2 heavy bomber of the United States, no B-2 bombers will be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs for purposes of Treaty limitations. Subparagraph (e) also provides that, within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (f) of paragraph 9 contains the long-range nuclear ALCM type rule. It provides that any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. This means that if a long-range ALCM, whether it is a non-nuclear or nuclear-armed ALCM, was first flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, then it will be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Long-range ALCMs first flight-tested from a heavy bomber after this date are treated differently, however. The second sentence of subparagraph (f) provides that any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs. This means that the long-range non-nuclear Tacit Rainbow system of the United States (now cancelled, but which was first flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988), would not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM, provided that it is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, according to the distinguishing features that would be provided as part of the notification required by Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (g) of paragraph 9 sets forth the type rule for mobile launchers of new types of ICBMs. It provides that mobile launchers for each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers for other new types of ICBMs. Subparagraph (g) also provides that such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (h) of paragraph 9 sets forth the type rule for mobile launchers of one type of ICBM that are converted to launch another type of ICBM. This provision parallels subparagraph (g). Subparagraph (h) provides that mobile launchers of one type of ICBM converted into launchers of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of the previous type of ICBM. Not only must the converted launchers be distinguishable, they must be distinguishable while their associated missiles are installed. (See the discussion of the term "distinguishable" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

bbbbbbbThe final provision of subparagraph (h) provides that any conversion of a mobile launcher must be carried out in accordance with procedures that would be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Mobile ICBM launchers may not be converted prior to procedures being agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This provision amounts to a de facto veto right over the conversion of mobile ICBM launchers.

bbbbbbbParagraph 10 of Article III lists the existing and former types of ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs as of the date of signature of the Treaty. Because a Party may sometimes designate a system of the other Party by a name other than that used by the other Party, the designations used by each Party for various systems are included to avoid any ambiguity. The Parties agree that the lists are complete as of the date of signature. Thus, systems such as the Titan II missile, which is not listed as either an existing or former type, are effectively exempted from all provisions of the START Treaty, provided that they are not subsequently deployed and that they do not subsequently meet the criteria to be considered a new type or a variant of an existing type of ICBM or SLBM. With regard to the Titan II, U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts on April 26, 1990, that the Titan II had been retired from service and that all launchers for the Titan II had been eliminated except for a single launcher located at Green Valley, Arizona. This single launcher is unable to launch missiles, and is being maintained as a museum display.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) lists the Parties' existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The technical characteristics for each of these ICBMs and SLBMs are listed in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding. The list does not include the Soviet SLBM designated as RSM-45, known to the United States as the SS-N-17, even though technical characteristics for this SLBM are listed in Annex F. This is because the data in the Memorandum of Understanding are data effective as of September 1, 1990, and the SS-N-17 was removed from operational service between that date and the date of signature.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. For the United States of America, this includes the Peacekeeper ICBM. Peacekeeper ICBMs are treated as mobile ICBMs under the Treaty, despite the fact that they have not been tested or deployed in a mobile mode. Peacekeeper ICBMs that are deployed in silos, however, do not count under the limit of 1100 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. The U.S. Small ICBM is not listed in subparagraphs (a) or (b) since it is still a "prototype," as that term is defined in the Definitions Annex. If it becomes accountable, it will fall under those provisions of the Treaty regulating new types of ICBMs.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' former types of ICBMs and SLBMS. The purpose of listing former types of ICBMs and SLBMs is to allow them to be used in flight tests involving reentry vehicles, without being treated as new types or variants of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs. The U.S. Minuteman I and Polaris A-3 are listed. The Soviet Union has no ballistic missiles listed as former types. Note that the Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement specifies that the STARS (Strategic Target System) booster is not the Polaris A-3 SLBM and is thus not subject to any of the provisions of the Treaty. Note also that the Definitions Annex describes retired types" as ICBMs or SLBMs deployed at the time the Treaty enters into force, but that subsequently become non-deployed due to conversion or elimination of all launchers for that type, except those launchers at test ranges and space launch facilities. In comparison, former types" are listed types that were once deployed, but none of which are deployed as of entry into force of the Treaty.

bbbbbbbThe Polaris A-3 is considered a former type of SLBM, rather than a deployed type, despite the fact that two ex-Polaris submarines, USS John Marshall and USS Sam Houston, each equipped with 16 Polaris A-3 SLBM launchers, were in service during the Treaty negotiation. However, U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts on April 26, 1990 that these submarines had been converted to special purpose submarines; that the launchers had not been removed for reasons of cost, but that equipment to support launch was removed; that these submarines were unable to launch missiles; and that both submarines would be retired during the seven-year period of reductions under START. The method of retirement was not specified and the United States is not obligated to use START procedures in retiring these submarines.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of heavy bombers. Heavy bombers are also classified by category (based on armament) and variant (based on distinguishable differences within a particular category/type combination). The terms category," variant," and distinguishable" are each defined in the Definitions Annex. For each type of heavy bomber, the Memorandum of Understanding includes data on the numbers of all categories of heavy bombers and the numbers of former heavy bombers. Note that the Twelfth Agreed Statement and the letters exchanged by Heads of Delegation concerning Bear D bombers exempt certain Bear airplanes that might otherwise count under Treaty limits.

bbbbbbbNote that two types of Soviet airplanes are not listed: Bison and Backfire. Although, years ago, there were many Soviet Bison (designated by the Soviet Union as M" or Myasishchev") airplanes that would have met the definition of heavy bombers, only limited numbers of Bison airplanes exist today. The Parties' agreement regarding the Bison is recorded in the Sixth Agreed Statement. It excludes from the Treaty three particular Bison airplanes converted to transport oversize cargo (e.g., the Soviet space shuttle), and it specifies that the remaining Bisons will be considered to be former heavy bombers, since these were converted to serve as tankers. The Soviet Tu-22M bomber, known to the United States as the Backfire, is not listed. On July 31, 1991, the Soviet Union provided a politically-binding declaration concerning the Backfire bomber, which provides the basis for the Parties not to limit Backfires as heavy bombers under START. (See discussion below in the "Declarations" section of this analysis.)

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (e) of paragraph 10 lists the Parties' existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs.

bbbbbbb In regard to paragraph 10, it should be noted that no sea-launched cruise missiles are listed, nor are such missiles subject to any Treaty limitation. On July 31, 1991, the Parties exchanged politically-binding declarations concerning their long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. (See discussion below in the Declarations" section of this analysis.)

ARTICLE IV

bbbbbbb Article IV of the Treaty text provides a variety of limitations other than the central limitations found in Article II. These limitations include limits on non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges, non-deployed mobile launchers, test launchers and training launchers, bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, training heavy bombers, test heavy bombers, space launch facilities, launchers at space launch facilities, and locational restrictions on non-deployed ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article IV provides a variety of limits for ICBMs and SLBMs other than the central numerical limits of Article II. Such limitations complement the central limits of the Treaty. They are intended either to inhibit rapid reload of deployed launchers or to limit the Parties' ability to augment the deployed force with launchers and associated missiles not counted against the central limits. Thus, for example, since ICBMs at test ranges could be used to augment the deployed force, their numbers are limited to those appropriate for testing purposes.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 limits the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 250 non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of which no more than 125 may be non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Subparagraph (a) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the limitations of subparagraph 1(a) do not apply to retired mobile ICBMs attributed with only one warhead. (Such a "retired type," pursuant to the Definitions Annex, would be ICBMs of a type that is deployed when the Treaty enters into force, but all of which type are subsequently rendered non-deployed by virtue of the conversion or elimination of their launchers, other than test launchers, launchers at space launch facilities, or launchers on special purpose submarines.) Since the SS-25 is the only single- reentry vehicle mobile ICBM that was deployed at the time of signature of the Treaty, this provision applies, in effect, only to it. ICBMs of retired mobile types would be subject to all other Treaty restrictions on non-deployed missiles, such as locational restrictions. Retired mobile ICBMs of types which have ever been attributed with more than one warhead continue to count under the 250/125 limits. Note that the limit in this subparagraph is the only provision in the Treaty which actually requires destruction of any ballistic missile. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs must be eliminated pursuant to procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol if their retention would cause these limits to be exceeded. Since retired mobile ICBMs attributed with only one warhead are not subject to the 250/125 limits, the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement also exempts them from the elimination procedures in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 are designed to limit the potential for rapid reload of ICBM launchers. In the case of mobile ICBMs, the number of non-deployed ICBMs at an ICBM base is limited by subparagraph (b) to no more than two for each type of mobile ICBM deployed at that base. In the case of silo-based ICBMs, subparagraph (c) gives each Party a choice (which can be different for each base) of either two non-deployed ICBMs and six sets of emplacement (silo loading) equipment, or four non-deployed ICBMs and two sets of emplacement equipment. These options for silo-based ICBMS are included to accommodate existing Soviet practices. Current United States' practices are to have only two non-deployed ICBMs of a type at a base. Since rapid reload requires both spare ICBMs and equipment to load them, either option serves to limit the capability to conduct such reload. (See the analysis of paragraph 16 of Article V for a discussion of rapid reload.")

bbbbbbbIn addition to the numerical limits, subparagraph 1(b) requires separate storage for non-deployed mobile ICBMs and non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility. This provision, along with the numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs and the companion limit in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV on the number of non-deployed mobile launchers at an ICBM base, forms a constraint against the rapid augmentation of the deployed force. The provision also ensures that the non-deployed mobile launchers permitted at ICBM bases are genuinely non-deployed.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 limits ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges. There is a parallel limit on the number of test launchers in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 2. The test launcher limit is decreased after seven years. The limit on ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges is reduced in parallel. Note that subparagraph (b) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the limitations of subparagraph 1(d) of Article IV shall not apply to ICBMs and SLBMs of retired and former types except for retired mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article IV provides a variety of limits for ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers. Like the limits on ICBMs and SLBMs in paragraph 1, these limits are designed to reduce the potential for non-deployed mobile launchers and other launchers to complement the force of deployed launchers.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 110 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. Within this limit, no more than 18 can be non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Included within these aggregate limits are the categories of non-deployed mobile launchers mentioned in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d) below.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 limits the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at maintenance facilities at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two for each type of ICBM at that ICBM base. As noted above (subparagraph 1(b)), these launchers must be stored separately from non-deployed mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 2 limits non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs at training facilities to no more than 40. Subparagraph (c) also creates an operational restriction on such launchers by providing that each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile, and by providing that such non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside the training facility. The Fifteenth Agreed Statement provides an additional numerical limit on such launchers at the Plesetsk ICBM training facility.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 2 limits test launchers to 45 (25 fixed and 20 mobile), dropping to 40 (20 fixed and 20 mobile) after seven years. There is a parallel limit on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1, which also decreases after seven years. Note thatsubparagraphs (h) and (i) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provide that launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type at test ranges count against these limits, except for a single Minuteman I test launcher located at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 2 limits the combined number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. In the Thirteenth Agreed Statement, the Parties agree that no more than four engineering models of silos may be located at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and that such engineering models of silos will count against the numerical limits of subparagraph (e).

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) also creates operational restrictions on training launchers by providing that ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers, and that each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Note that the ban is on silo training launchers containing or launching an actual ICBM, not on having the capability to launch; such launchers could have a launch capability, and we could not verify, even at a high level of intrusiveness, whether in fact an individual launcher has such capability. In contrast, mobile training launchers are prohibited from being capable of launching ICBMs. Such mobile training launchers must differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article IV limits heavy bombers, other than those counted against the central limits, and former heavy bombers. As in the case of paragraphs 1 and 2, such bombers are limited in order to constrain their potential to undermine the effectiveness of the central Treaty limits. Subparagraph (a) limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 75 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. (Certain bombers are exempted from this limit, including 3 Bison bombers exempted pursuant to the Sixth Agreed Statement, and certain Bear bombers exempted for maritime operations pursuant to theTwelfth Agreed Statement.) Subparagraph (b) limits each Party to no more than 20 test heavy bombers. The former are subject to restrictions on the weapons they can carry, while test heavy bombers may be capable of delivering nuclear arms.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article IV provides limits on ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. The Parties recognized that such use of ICBMs and SLBMs is valid and economical, but they also recognized that such use must be limited because such missiles could also be used for their original purpose of weapons delivery. In order to limit the potential for breakout, paragraph 4 limits each Party to no more than five space launch facilities," which are defined as specified facilities from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. Paragraph 4 also provides that these facilities may not overlap ICBM bases (subparagraph (a)); limits each Party to a total of no more than 20 ICBM or SLBM launchers at those facilities, of which no more than ten may be silo and mobile launchers, unless otherwise agreed (subparagraph (b)); and limits the number of ICBMs or SLBMs at a given space launch facility to no more than the number of launchers at that facility (subparagraph (c)). Space launch facilities are not subject to inspection.

bbbbbbbSince the Parties recognize that their future space launch requirements are difficult to predict, both subparagraphs (a) and (b) provide for increases or decreases if the Parties agree. Such changes would not require an amendment to the Treaty.

bbbbbbbFinally, note that, as is discussed above in the analysis of subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV, subparagraph (h) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that launchers of a former or retired type shall be subject to the numerical limits of subparagraph 4(b) of Article IV, except for the single Minuteman I launcher at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Notwithstanding this, subparagraph (b) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that subparagraph 4(c) of Article IV shall not apply to retired and former types of ICBMs and SLBMs, except for retired mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article IV limits the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Restricting transporter-loaders constrains a Party's ability to reload mobile launchers rapidly after they have been fired. For road-mobile ICBMs with a single warhead, the Treaty allows two transporter-loaders per type per deployment area or test range, and a total of six transporter loaders in other areas, provided that the total does not exceed thirty. Note that paragraph 7 of Article V of the Treaty bans transporter-loaders for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs with multiple warheads and for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 6 of Article IV limits each Party to no more than two ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base. Since ballistic missile submarines in dry dock are exempted from reentry vehicle inspections by subparagraph 13(g) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol, this limit is designed to prohibit a Party from circumventing the inspection regime by keeping an excessive number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 7 of Article IV limits ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that are placed on static display after signature of the Treaty, and the number of heavy and former heavy bombers that are converted to ground trainers after signature of the Treaty. Static displays are essentially museum pieces, while ground trainers are non-flyable aircraft used for training (for example, in weapons loading). Neither term is defined in the Treaty, although procedures for placing items on static display or converting airplanes to ground trainers are provided in Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Static displays and ground trainers existing at Treaty signature are not included in the limits, but are listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, to avoid ambiguity with later conversions.

bbbbbbbParagraph 8 of Article IV limits each Party to an aggregate of no more than 50 storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs. The numerical limit on ballistic missile storage and repair facilities is to ensure the integrity of quota-based, on-site inspections. If the sides were free to declare an unlimited number of ballistic missile storage sites, there would be no hope that a quota-based inspection regime would provide confidence that non-deployed missile limits were being observed. As of September 1, 1990, neither Party had more than ten such facilities. Storage and repair facilities are listed in Annexes A and B to the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbbbbParagraph 9 of Article IV provides a large number of locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms. These restrictions are designed to enhance the overall Treaty verification regime by limiting the places where strategic offensive arms are permitted to be located.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) of paragraph 9 first lists the only allowed locations for non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs and specifies that such non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs may also be in transit. The transit rule allows the non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to move between the listed locations. The subparagraph includes three special provisions:

­ Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs (i.e., those which have not yet become accountable) are banned from maintenance facilities of ICBM bases and from submarine bases. This avoids the suspicion that covert deployment has occurred.

­ Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. This allows for the routine replacement of silo-based missiles (since otherwise there would be no legal way for the replacement missile to move from its authorized location at a maintenance facility to the silo without having to issue a transit notification).

­ Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes are considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based, regardless of their actual location. This is a bookkeeping convenience, since such tenders and cranes may be located outside of the base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of the Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement provides that the locational restrictions of subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of mobile ICBMs.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 9 provides the locational restrictions for non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs. It also permits such launchers to be in transit, so that they can be moved between the permitted locations. As subparagraph (a) does for prototype ICBMs, subparagraph (b) bans mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs from maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, once again to avoid any implication of unannounced or covert deployment.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 9 provides the locational restriction for test launchers. The basic rule is that test launchers may only be located at test ranges. There is an exception allowing rail-mobile test launchers to conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range. Such movements may be conducted, provided that four requirements are met: first, each such movement must be completed no later than 30 days after it begins; second, each such movement must begin and end at the same test range and must not involve movement to any other facility; third, movements of a total of no more than six rail-mobile launchers may be conducted in each calendar year; and fourth, no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers may be located outside test ranges at any one time. Movements count on a one-per-launcher basis; thus, a train moving three launchers counts as three movements.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 provides a special rule for situations where a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile relocates to a test range. Such a launcher and missile may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of Article IV. In the case where the launcher and missile continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits, they can remain at the test range for an uninterrupted period not to exceed 45 days. Furthermore, a Party may not have more than three such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time, nor more than three such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 9 restricts the location of silo training launchers to ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. Subparagraph (e) also limits the number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (f) of paragraph 9 restricts the basing of test heavy bombers to heavy bomber flight test centers and production facilities for heavy bombers. It also provides that training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers. These restrictions cover permanent basing, and do not preclude visits to other facilities.

bbbbbbbParagraph 10 provides locational restrictions for solid rocket motors, with or without nozzles attached, for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. These provisions are designed to aid in assuring that mobile ICBMs or first stages for such ICBMs are not being covertly assembled by limiting the locations where solid rocket motors, with or without nozzles attached, which are essential components of such ICBMs, can legally be located. (Note that paragraph 30 of Article V reaffirms the locational restrictions on solid rocket motors with nozzles attached, which are even closer to being assembled ICBMs, and outlines the limited cases where solid rocket motors with nozzles attached can be removed from the production facility.) The specific locations where solid rocket motors with or without nozzles shall be permitted are listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. Solid rocket motors without nozzles attached also may be moved between these locations. None of these locations is subject to declared facility on-site inspection, although production facilities where ICBMs of mobile launchers of ICBMs are assembled are subject to continuous monitoring. Instead, inspections at other locations help to verify the absence of solid rocket motors with or without nozzles attached for first stages of mobile ICBMs at locations where they are not permitted. Detection of a single solid rocket motor with or without nozzles attached at such a location would constitute a violation of the Treaty.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 11 of Article IV sets forth locational restrictions on facilities. (The term facilities" is defined in the Definition Annex.) The bulk of these restrictions are intended to hinder rapid reload by separating non-deployed ICBMs from ICBM launchers.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) requires that specified facilities at which ICBMs of a particular type are located be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from other facilities at which launchers for that particular type of ICBM could be present. For existing facilities, the prohibition is type specific; there is no bar, for example, for storage facilities for ICBM type A" being co-located with launchers for ICBM type B". The Fourteenth Agreed Statement grandfathers two existing Soviet storage facilities for ICBMs located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, thus allowing these existing facilities to be separated by less than 100 kilometers from deployment areas where ICBMs of the same type are deployed.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (a) also requires that specified new facilities, including those at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located and storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. This prohibition is not type specific. There is an exception to this rule, concerning existing storage facilities that had previously been used for intermediate-range missiles. (These missiles have now been eliminated pursuant to the INF Treaty.) Such facilities that are located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (b) of paragraph 11 stipulates additional locational restrictions that are applicable to specified facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It requires that specified facilities, including production facilities, repair facilities, and storage facilities, for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each particular type, be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of paragraph 11 requires that test ranges and space launch facilities be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from ICBM bases and deployment areas. This provision is intended to constrain rapid reload. It is needed since a significant number of ICBMs (i.e., potential reloads) can legally be present at test ranges or space launch facilities. By separating these test ranges and space launch facilities from ICBM bases, these potential reloads are separated from the launchers at the ICBM bases. Without this rule, the utility of numerical limits on non-deployed ICBMs at ICBM bases would be severely undercut.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 11 requires that training facilities for ICBMs be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from any test range. This provision restricts the ability to use the 40 non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers allowed at training facilities to launch the ICBMs that are allowed at test ranges. (The 40-launcher limit is in subparagraph 2(c) of Article IV.) The Fifteenth Agreed Statement provides an exception to this locational restriction for the existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, allowing it to be located less than 100 kilometers from an existing test range.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (e) of paragraph 11 requires that storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments and storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs be separated by no less than 100 kilometers from air bases of various categories. Neither storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments nor storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. This provision has little practical effect and was included at Soviet insistence for parallelism with the restrictions on ICBMs. Note that the restrictions on storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments" would not preclude nuclear weapons for other strategic or tactical systems from being stored within the 100 kilometers specified. There is no specific provision in the Treaty for verification of this restriction.

bbbbbbbThe final paragraph of Article IV, paragraph 12, sets a time limit of 30 days for transits between permitted locations. Transit" is a defined term in the Definitions Annex and refers to one-way movement of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, or mobile launchers of ICBMs.

ARTICLE V

bbbbbbb Article V of the Treaty sets forth the activities and systems that are prohibited by the Treaty. By adhering to these prohibitions, the Parties will channel their future modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms in more stabilizing and predictable directions.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article V provides the important general rule that, except as prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. This rule is closely based on provisions in earlier arms control agreements. It reflects the standard principle that activities which are not specifically prohibited by the provisions of a treaty are allowed.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article V sets forth prohibitions in regard to heavy ICBMs or SLBMs. Such ICBMs or SLBMs are defined in the Definitions Annex as those with a launch weight exceeding 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight exceeding 4350 kilograms; both values are based on the Soviet data for the SS-19 ICBM as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. Subparagraphs (a) through (d) ban: new types of heavy ICBMs; increases in the launch weight or throw-weight of existing heavy ICBMs (i.e., of the Soviet SS-18, the only existing heavy ICBM); heavy SLBMs; mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; or additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for certain permitted replacements.

bbbbbbbThe Fifth Agreed Statement further clarifies that the replacement of silo launchers pursuant to this subparagraph can only be done in the case that launchers are destroyed by accident or in the case of other extraordinary circumstances. In a December 6, 1990, letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Defense Minister Yazov, it was explained that such extraordinary circumstances could be in particular due to the internal political processes taking place in our country." The Soviet Foreign Minister subsequently communicated with the U.S. Secretary of State again on December 30, 1990, in a letter addressing a series of issues that had arisen out of the Houston Ministerial of December 1990. In that letter, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze reconfirmed the conditions of new heavy ICBM silo construction. Specifically, he reconfirmed that construction of new heavy ICBM silos could be undertaken only to replace heavy ICBM silo launchers destroyed in an accident or to relocate such launchers threatened by internal political emergencies. Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister concluded that the replacement of heavy ICBM silo launchers did not include the possibility of extensive new silo construction.

bbbbbbbAdditional prohibitions in subparagraphs (e)-(g) include a prohibition on converting launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs; a ban on launchers of heavy SLBMs; and a ban on reducing the ten warheads attributed to the SS-18 existing heavy ICBM. Note that the letter exchanged by the Heads of Delegation on the phased reduction of heavy ICBMs provides a related prohibition by banning the Soviet Union from reducing their heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers to the limits of 154 through conversion; rather, such reductions must be accomplished by means of launcher elimination procedures specified in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After the central limit on heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers is reached, any additional heavy ICBM launcher reductions may be by either elimination or conversion.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 3 of Article V bans deployment modes for ICBMs other than in silos, on road-mobile launchers or on rail-mobile launchers. It also bans the production, testing, or deployment of ICBM launchers other than silo launchers, road-mobile launchers or rail-mobile launchers. This means that movable" ICBM systems other than road-and rail-mobile systems are prohibited, such as systems involving moving an ICBM in a launch canister between a number of vertical emplacement holes. Soft-site launchers also are banned by paragraph 9 of Article V at locations other than test ranges and space launch facilities. The Nineteenth Agreed Statement provides that mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers would be allowed provided that a variety of conditions are met; such boosters would not be considered ICBMs and would not be prohibited by paragraph 3 regardless of their basing mode.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article V prohibits deploying an ICBM on a mobile launcher of ICBMs if the ICBM was not declared as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. This provision is necessary since the notification cited triggers the right to establish perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, necessary to verify the limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs given in paragraph 1 of Article IV. Consistent with the view that single-warhead systems represent a lesser threat, the paragraph provides an exception allowing rebasing of such single-warhead systems, but only if the Parties agree to do so within the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Therefore, a Party has a veto right over such redeployment by the other Party if it cares to exercise it.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 also provides that a new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs. This provision means, for example, that if the United States initially declares the new Small ICBM to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of a new type in order to protect our option to base it as a mobile ICBM, and if we subsequently decide not to base it as a mobile ICBM, then the United States would have the right to cease treating the Small ICBM as a mobile ICBM for Treaty purposes, provided that no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher. This provision applies only to new types; thus, it does not apply to the U.S. Peacekeeper ICBM, which is considered to be an existing type of mobile ICBM.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article V bans deployment of ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM, and SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM, if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. It also provides that ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs, and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs, shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. The effect of these two provisions is to prohibit ICBM and SLBM launchers, other than soft-site launchers, from being capable of launching more than one type of ICBM or SLBM, respectively, without conversion.

bbbbbbbThere is no standard in the Treaty for assessing a launcher's capability (or the lack thereof) to launch more than one type of ICBM or SLBM, no procedures for verifying a lack of such capability, and no requirement to develop such procedures. At a minimum, however, this means that a launcher must not contain or launch a missile of a type other than the type for which the launcher is specified. In addition, for mobile ICBM launchers, while no inspection procedures are specified in the Treaty for determining launch capability, the inspecting Party may be able to acquire information pertinent to assessing launcher capability during exhibitions and inspections. Except as provided for in Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol, ICBM silo launchers and SLBM launchers are not subject to exhibitions or inspections under the Treaty. Of course, if a Party were to raise a concern that the other Party had deployed a dual-capable launcher, the Party owning the launcher would be obligated to attempt to resolve this concern. The Sixteenth Agreed Statement, although not specifically referring to this paragraph, stipulates the Parties' agreement that the provisions of this paragraph are met for all ICBM and SLBM launchers existing at time of signature.

bbbbbbbbbbbbbbParagraph 6 of Article V prohibits converting SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. It also prohibits loading SLBMs on, and launching SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs. This prohibition helps to make the limits on mobile ICBMs and non-deployed missiles more effective. Note, however, that deploying SLBMs in silo launchers of ICBMs is not prohibited, nor is loading SLBMs in such launchers, or launching SLBMs from such launchers prohibited. (The re-basing of SLBMs is further addressed in the discussion of the term "new type" in the analysis of the Definitions Annex.)

bbbbbbbParagraph 7 of Article V prohibits the production, testing, and deployment of transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead. This means that the Parties cannot have transporter-loaders for mobile launchers of ICBMs if the launchers are rail-mobile, or if the launchers are road-mobile and its ICBMs are attributed with more than one warhead. The number of transporter-loaders for single-warhead road-mobile ICBMs is limited to no more than 30 by paragraph 5 of Article IV.

bbbbbbbParagraph 8 of Article V prohibits locating deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs. Deployed silos are limited to specified areas to facilitate silo accountability; such limitations are consistent with similar provisions on launchers at test ranges, training facilities, and space launch facilities. Each Party's ICBM bases for silo launchers are listed in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbbbbParagraph 9 of Article V bans soft-site launchers other than at test ranges and space launch facilities. Each Party's test ranges and space launch facilities are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 9 also requires that existing soft-site launchers outside test ranges or space launch facilities be eliminated no later than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty. The only such soft-site launchers belonging to either Party that are outside of test ranges or space launch facilities, however, are six launchers in Florida that are specifically exempted from destruction by the Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement.

bbbbbbbParagraph 10 of Article V contains prohibitions relating to flight testing and production of former and retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Subparagraph (a) is an undertaking not to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type other than from test launchers specified for such use or from launchers at space launch facilities. It also provides that, except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed. This means that ICBMs and SLBMs of former and retired types may only be flight-tested from specified test launchers or from launchers at space launch facilities; it also means that such launchers are further restricted, because if even a single ICBM or SLBM of a type is deployed, no ICBM or SLBM of that type may be flight-tested from such launchers, unless the launcher is a soft-site launcher. Subparagraph (b) prohibits the production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 11 of Article V prohibits converting silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. As a practical matter, this provision affects only the Soviet Union, since the U.S. has no such silo launch control facilities. An exchange of letters between Heads of Delegation on July 31, 1991 established an agreement on the implementation of this prohibition. (See the analysis of the Letters Exchanged by the Heads of Delegation.)

bbbbbbb Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article V set forth prohibitions that create maximum limits for reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs. The net effect of these rules is to prohibit a Party from increasing the number of reentry vehicles on an ICBM or SLBM above the number of warheads that have been attributed to such a missile. This undertaking is expressed in paragraph 13, which provides that each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. The expression of the rule also is found in the subparagraphs of paragraph 12. Subparagraph (a) is an undertaking not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles. This provision applies to new as well as existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Subparagraphs (b) and (c) prohibit flight-testing or deploying an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. Thus, while a missile's warhead attribution may be greater than the number of reentry vehicles actually tested or deployed on a missile, a Party is not allowed to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more reentry vehicles than have been attributed. For an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, subparagraph (b) also prohibits flight-testing with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type. Subparagraph (d) prohibits increasing the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type. Thus, such ICBMs or SLBMs may not, during a flight test, dispense or simulate the dispensing of a number of reentry vehicles that exceeds the number of warheads with which it is attributed. In addition, new types of ICBMs and SLBMs may not be flight-tested with an increased throw-weight and/or lighter reentry vehicles if such testing would result in an increase in warhead attribution pursuant to paragraph 4(b) of Article III. As for former types, the Treaty is silent.

bbbbbbbAlthough paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article V have no legal effect before the Treaty enters into force, U.S. and Soviet negotiators confirmed in March 1990 their common understanding that the Parties would neither test nor deploy ICBMs and SLBMs with more reentry vehicles than the number recorded in the U.S. - Soviet Joint Summit Statement of December 10, 1987. Except for the Soviet SS-N-18 SLBM (attributed with seven warheads in December 1987 but only three warheads in the Memorandum of Understanding) the warhead attribution values listed in Section I of the Memorandum of Understanding correspond to those listed in the U.S. - Soviet Joint Summit Statement. For the SS-N-18, the Soviets provided assurances in a December 30, 1990, letter from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the Secretary of State that only front ends with three reentry vehicles exist. Thus, the Parties have undertaken a commitment not to test or deploy ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles in excess of the number of warheads attributed to such missiles in the Memorandum of Understanding, pending entry into force.

bbbbbbbParagraph 14 of Article V is a prohibition on flight-testing from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles. The purpose of this constraint is to reduce the potential for a Party to circumvent data denial provisions in a way that would allow it to develop forbidden military capabilities, while allowing former and retired types of ICBMs or SLBMs to be used for commercial and scientific space launch purposes. Note that space launch facilities are not subject to inspection.

bbbbbbb In paragraph 15 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties. Such existing international obligations include, for example, Article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)4, which prohibits placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. ICBMs and SLBMs may be used for ABM tests, provided that such tests are otherwise consistent with the ABM Treaty. This provision is included for emphasis and imposes no new legal obligation on the Parties.

bbbbbbbIn paragraph 16 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload. Rapid reload" is defined in the Definition Annex as reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours, after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher. A number of the provisions of Articles IV and V complement the ban on rapid reload.

bbbbbbbParagraph 17 of Article V prohibits installing SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines. Thus, for example, SLBM launchers cannot be installed on submarines originally constructed as attack submarines.

bbbbbbbParagraph 18 of Article V consists of five subparagraphs that prohibit various types of relatively exotic strategic offensive arms that are not now in existence. These provisions are largely carried over from the SALT II Treaty. Subparagraph (a) provides for a ban on the production, testing and deployment of: ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. Thus, for example, SLBMs may not be installed on surface ships. Subparagraph (a) makes it explicit, however, that this obligation does not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices. This allows for the current U.S. practice of transporting SLBMs by specially configured ships. Missile tenders and storage cranes are support equipment" for purposes of the Treaty.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. Subparagraph (b) provides that this obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971 (The Seabed Arms Control Treaty)5. The effect of this provision is to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the Parties; and to extend its obligations to include production and testing in addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Parties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coastal seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the territorial sea. The reference to Articles I and II of The Seabed Arms Control Treaty means the obligation applies to all geographic locations covered by that Treaty.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of any Earth orbit. It may be noted, in this regard, that Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty already bans the orbiting of nuclear weapons, and that Article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water6, already prohibits nuclear explosions in space. Also, this provision would prohibit a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), such as that tested years ago by the Soviet Union.

bbbbbbb bbbbbbbSubparagraph (d) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). The term air-to-surface ballistic missile" is defined in the Definition Annex as a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft. In the Fourth Agreed Statement the Parties agreed that the term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path. This statement was agreed at U.S. insistence to protect the option to develop hyper-velocity weapons that, if launched from aircraft, might otherwise have been considered to be ASBMs, depending on their operational characteristics.

bbbbbbbIn the Thirtieth Agreed Statement, the Parties agreed that the issue of whether to modify subparagraphs 18(a) and 18(d) to permit using airplanes or waterborne vehicles other than submarines (e.g., barges) to launch ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space may be addressed in the JCIC. Unless and until such an agreement is reached, such uses are banned.

bbbbbbb Finally, subparagraph (e) of paragraph 18 prohibits the production, testing and deployment of long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons. (See the exchange of letters concerning ALCMs with multiple warheads, discussed below in the Section on Certain Correspondence Related to the Treaty.)

bbbbbbbParagraph 19 of Article V prohibits equipping various kinds of aircraft" for nuclear armaments. Aircraft" is a defined term meaning, in essence, not only airplanes," but virtually any manned machine that flies.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph 19(a) bans nuclear-armed aircraft that have a rangeof 8000 kiometers or more and are not airplanes. Range is defined in the Definitions Annex in terms ofa specific payload (7500 kiograms) and a specific method of calculation.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph 19(b) bans giving a nuclear capability to airplanes not initially constructed as bombers but having the range and planform characteristics of heavy bombers. Thus, for example, a Party could not convert a passenger or cargo airplane to deliver nuclear weapons. Since this provision is a ban on airplane conversion and not airplane construction, a Party could construct a new heavy bomber, from the ground up, on the design of an existing passenger or cargo airplane. There would be two possible ways to deal with such a situation under the Treaty. First, a Party could consider the new heavy bomber to be the same type airplane as the passenger or cargo airplane on which its design was based. In this case, all existing passenger or cargo airplanes of that type would be considered to be heavy bombers. Alternatively, a Party could assert that modifications to the fundamental design during the construction process resulted in the heavy bomber being a new type of airplane, different from the passenger or cargo airplane on which its design was based. The Treaty has no definition for what constitutes a new type" of heavy bomber, and the Parties never discussed how to proceed in such a case. Thus, whether such an assertion would be considered to be consistent with a Party's obligations under the Treaty would depend on the nature and extent of the design modifications involved. (While it does not apply directly to the case of a heavy bomber built on the basis of a non-bomber design, the definition of a heavy bomber allows exempting maritime airplanes only in cases where such airplanes do not have designs that are essentially identical to those of a heavy bomber.)

bbbbbbbSubparagraph 19(c) bans aircraft that are not airplanes or airplanes not initially constructed as bombers from being tested or equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs. In contrast to the provisions of subparagraphs 19(a) and 19(b), this prohibition applies regardless of the range of the aircraft or airplane involved.

bbbbbbbParagraphs 20 and 21 provide the maximum long-range nuclear ALCM loading limits for each of the Parties. These limits work in conjunction with the long-range nuclear ALCM attribution rules of subparagraphs 4(e) and 4(f) of Article III to limit overall long-range nuclear ALCM loadings. For the United States of America, existing or future heavy bombers may not be equipped for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, existing or future heavy bombers may not be equipped for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

bbbbbbbIn paragraph 22 of Article V each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. The specific categorization of each air base for each of the Parties is listed in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding.

bbbbbbbParagraph 23 of Article V provides a rule whereby heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments will be based at separate air bases. Once again, the specific categorization of each air base for each of the Parties is listed in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding. This provision is intended to enhance confidence that heavy bombers that are not heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are not being covertly deployed with such ALCMs. Note that former heavy bombers may be co-based with any of the three listed categories of heavy bombers.

bbbbbbbParagraph 24 of Article V prohibits certain types of conversions of heavy bombers. The Treaty establishes an effective hierarchy among relevant airplanes: those equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, those equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, those equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. While there is an important exception insubparagraph (a), the general effect of these rules is to prevent a heavy bomber that is at one level in this hierarchy from being converted into a bomber that is at a higher" level. Note that test heavy bombers are not listed here; they can fall at any level within this hierarchy. Note also that the rules are applied bomber by bomber, and are not type rules.

bbbbbbbIn subparagraph (a), heavy bombers that have the status under the Treaty of being heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Thus, "reconversion" to the status of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs is prohibited. This means that a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs can be converted for such ALCMs if that individual bomber was not previously equipped for them. This preserves the United States' right to convert B-1 heavy bombers to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs (since none were declared to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G of the Memorandum of Understanding).

bbbbbbbIn subparagraph (b), heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

bbbbbbb In subparagraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 25, training heavy bombers are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers of another category; and former heavy bombers are prohibited from being converted into heavy bombers.

bbbbbbbIn paragraph 25 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines. Such facilities, often referred to as submarine tunnels," could be used to circumvent provisions for reentry vehicle inspection. Neither Party claims to possess underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines, but three such facilities were, at one time, under construction in the Soviet Union, and were the impetus behind this prohibition. To aid in the verification of the ban in paragraph 25 of Article V, the Twenty-third Agreed Statement commits the Soviet Union not to make these three facilities accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement. That Agreed Statement also makes it clear that accessible" includes submerged access. (Each Party made statements concerning such underground structures. These statements, dated July 29, 1991, are discussed in the "Declarations and Statements" section.)

bbbbbbbParagraph 26 of Article V contains a prohibition on locating railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars. The required degree of change in these dimensions is not specified.

bbbbbbbParagraph 27 of Article V prohibits certain activities at facilities that have been eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and it restricts the strategic offensive arms that may be located at such eliminated facilities. Specifically, it prohibits engaging in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, if notification of the elimination of the facility has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Note that specific facilities that are subject to the Treaty are required to be listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, and that paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol is the provision that provides for notification of any changes to these lists.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 27 also provides that strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities, except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. (In a joint statement, the Parties agreed that support equipment" includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.) Finally, paragraph 27 provides that missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

bbbbbbbIn paragraph 28 of Article V, each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty outside its national territory. For the United States, national territory" includes Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands, in addition to the territory of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Eighth Agreed Statement amplifies and clarifies paragraph 28, making it clear that the ban does not affect the rights of the Parties under international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines (including ballistic missile submarines) to ports of third states and allowing the Parties to station temporarily, heavy bombers outside their national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. Such purposes could include military operations against a third state.

bbbbbbbFor almost thirty years, the United States has operated ballistic missile submarines from Holy Loch, Scotland. In a letter dated July 31, 1991, addressed to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Baker stated that, while the United States does not regard its operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, it is prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty, and that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be established in the future. In his response, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh stated that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and provided assurance that the Soviet Union did not have, and would not establish in the future, arrangements involving ballistic missile submarines, analogous to those currently being carried out at Holy Loch.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 29 of Article V prohibits using naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders, to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Paragraph 29 also provides that such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base. Supporting ballistic missile submarines in other locations is allowed, provided it does not involve transporting, storing, or loading SLBMs.

bbbbbbbParagraph 30 of Article V prohibits removing solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stage of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from production facilities for such ICBMs, unless the motors are part of an assembled first stage (for missiles maintained, stored, and transported in stages), part of an assembled missile, or part of a missile that is removed for a technical characteristics exhibition pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI. This can be compared with the counting rule for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs set forth in subparagraphs (a)-(c) of paragraph 3 of Article III. In essence, paragraph 30 means that no solid rocket motor with a nozzle attached can be removed until it has been made part of an assembled item that counts as an ICBM for mobile launchers, except that it need not have been placed yet in a canister, if appropriate, and except for a removal of a motor for purposes of an exhibition. Note that the production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers are required to be listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, and that such facilities are subject to perimeter and portal continuous monitoring pursuant toparagraph 14 of Article XI. Note finally that paragraph 30 complements the locational restrictions on solid rocket motors with nozzles for first stages of mobile ICBMs. Paragraph 10 of Article IV restricts such solid rocket motors with nozzles attached, to production facilities and locations where testing of such motors occurs. Paragraph 30 of this Article sets forth a limited number of cases where such solid rocket motors with nozzles attached can be removed from production facilities.

ARTICLE VI

bbbbbbbArticle VI sets forth restrictions on the location of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles. This regime is necessary because the mobility of such launchers makes it difficult to verify the numbers of them that are deployed. Note that in many cases, there are different rules for road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers and their associated missiles, since the different kinds of launchers are deployed in different ways.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article VI applies to deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. It provides that such missiles and launchers may be based only in restricted areas." This is defined in the Definitions Annex as an area within a deployment area, limited in size, in which deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are based and in which fixed structures for housing road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 stipulates four rules for restricted areas: first, that a restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size; second, that restricted areas shall not overlap one another; third, that no more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area; and fourth, that a restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article VI establishes rules for the fixed structures within a restricted area. It requires that the number of fixed structures within each restricted area be limited so that such structures will not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than is specified for that restricted area (this specification is listed in the Memorandum of Understanding).

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article VI requires each restricted area to be located within a deployment area. A deployment area" is defined in the Definitions Annex as an area, limited in size, within which routine movements and exercise dispersals of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are conducted. Paragraph 3 specifies that a deployment area shall not be larger than 125,000 square kilometers and shall not overlap another deployment area. It also specifies that a deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Because neither side intended to have more than one such base per area, this prohibition was the simplest way to avoid hypothetical verification questions concerning the association of a launcher with a base.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article VI applies to deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. It provides that such missiles and launchers shall be based only in "rail garrisons." The term "rail garrison" is defined in the Definitions Annex as an area in which one or more parking sites for rail-mobile launcher trains are located and an associated maintenance facility may also be located. A parking site," is a location, within a rail garrison, at which deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. The remainder of paragraph 4, as well as paragraphs 5 - 8, specify further restrictions on rail garrisons. Paragraph 4 provides that each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons, and that no point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article VI stipulates that each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits, and that each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails).

bbbbbbbParagraph 6 of Article VI limits the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Train of standard configuration" is defined as a train consisting of a specified number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and launch-associated railcars. Trains of standard configuration are specified in Annex F of the Memorandum of Understanding. Paragraph 6 also limits each rail garrison to no more than five parking sites.

bbbbbbbParagraph 7 of Article VI limits the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. It also provides that each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 8 of Article VI provides that each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

bbbbbbbParagraph 9 of Article VI provides the central rules that restrict the movements of both road- and rail-mobile launchers and their associated missiles. The general effect of this provision is that deployed mobile-launchers and their associated missiles are allowed to leave restricted areas and rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals. "Routine movement" and "relocation" are both defined in the Definitions Annex. A "routine movement" is the movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that begins and ends at the same restricted area or rail garrison and does not involve movement to any other declared facility, except movement to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison. A "relocation" means the one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from one declared facility to another declared facility, or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility, or from any location during a routine movement to a declared facility other than to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3(b) of Article VIII requires that notifications be given concerning these movements, in accordance with the Notification Protocol. Except for deployed road-mobile launchers and their associated missiles that are engaged within a deployment area in a routine movement, notification of the beginning and end of each of these movements is required. Notification of the beginning and end of routine movements of deployed rail-mobile launchers and their missiles is required in paragraphs 4 and 6 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Notification of the beginning and end of relocations, for road- or rail-mobile launchers and their missiles, is required by paragraphs 9 and 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Notifications of the beginning and end of an exercise dispersal, for road- or rail-mobile launchers and their missiles, are required by paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Notification of operational dispersals must be given in accordance with the provisions of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbbbbParagraph 10 of Article VI places additional restrictions on relocations. It requires that relocations be completed within 25 days and limits the size of relocations. Specifically, no more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

bbbbbbbSince there are no geographical limits on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles during a routine movement, paragraph 11 of Article IV provides that no more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time. There is no corresponding limit for road-mobile ICBM launchers, because such launchers must remain within a deployment area during a routine movement.

bbbbbbbParagraph 12 of Article VI sets forth a variety of rules concerning the trains that are used to transport rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. These rules require such trains to be configured in such a way that they will be more easily identified. Specifically, paragraph 12 provides that all trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. It also provides that all such trains must conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Paragraphs 13 and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol address the case of a variation from standard configuration for certain movements to the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison, and paragraph 14 addresses the case of any variation from standard configuration for routine movements and relocations.

ARTICLE VII

bbbbbbb Article VII sets forth the fundamental Treaty regime for the conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms. The details of this regime are set forth in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article VII provides the basic rule that conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and using procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. A "facility" is defined in the Definitions Annex as an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, rail garrison, maintenance facility, restricted area, parking site, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, space launch facility, or static display site. Paragraph 1 also provides for the verification of conversion and elimination.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article VII provides the general rule that ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article VII sets forth a companion rule to paragraph 2, providing that both ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. Thus, a Party eliminating such missiles can use whatever procedures it wants to eliminate them, as long as such elimination meets the standards set forth in this paragraph. The absence of specific elimination procedures is appropriate since there are no limits on the numbers of ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs or on SLBMs and thus no requirement ever to eliminate such ICBMs or SLBMs by any means.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article VII specifies the location where certain of the items subject to paragraph 2 shall be eliminated. An exchange of letters between Heads of Delegation on July 31, 1991, provides additional procedures with respect to the elimination of launch canisters for mobile ICBMs. (Such canisters are currently possessed only by the Soviet Union.) These procedures provide, in part, that the elimination of such launch canisters will be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. In addition, the Twentieth Agreed Statement allows the United States and, if it changes its current practices, the Soviet Union to refurbish and reuse launch canisters following launch.

ARTICLE VIII

bbbbbbb The six paragraphs of Article VIII provide the basic rules for data to be provided in the Memorandum of Understanding and for notifications to be provided pursuant to the Notification Protocol.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 stipulates that the data base pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. In the Memorandum of Understanding, data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty are listed according to categories of data. (See the discussion of the Joint Statement Regarding Data Updates with Respect to Categories of Data, in the Joint Statements Section of this analysis.)

bbbbbbbParagraphs 2 and 3 of Article VIII set forth the basic Treaty regime in regard to notifications. Paragraph 2 provides the general obligation to provide notifications, and references the various documents pertaining to notifications. Paragraph 3 lists the ten categories of notification required by the Treaty. They include notifications concerning:

(a) data for updating the Memorandum of Understanding (eighteen different notifications are listed in Section I of the Notification Protocol);

(b) reports on the movement of items, both pre-notified and post-notified (seventeen different notifications are listed in Section II of the Notification Protocol);

(c) ICBM and SLBM throw-weight, tied to specific flight tests (four different notifications are listed in Section III of the Notification Protocol);

(d) plans for, the initiation of and the completion of conversion or elimination (seven different notifications are listed in Section IV of the Notification Protocol);

(e) cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification (five different notifications are listed in Section V of the Notification Protocol);

(f) flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information (the two sets of notifications are combined since notifications on flight tests provide information to assist in collecting telemetry) (five different notifications are listed in Section VI of the Notification Protocol);

(g) new types and new kinds of strategic offensive arms (sixteen different notifications are listed in Section VII of the Notification Protocol, all but one relating to new types rather than new kinds of strategic offensive arms);

(h) changes in the content of information already notified, including the rescheduling of activities (general rules and two specific notifications are listed in Section VIII of the Notification Protocol);

(i) inspections and continuous monitoring activities (although there is a brief reference to such notifications in Section IX of the Notification Protocol, the twenty five specific notifications themselves are found in Section III of the Inspection Protocol, consistent with a decision by the Parties to place all material on inspections and continuous monitoring in a single document); and

(j) operational dispersals (seven different notifications are listed in Section X of the Notification Protocol).

bbbbbbb Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article VIII specify certain procedures for notifications. Paragraph 4 stipulates that the Parties will use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. The Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, were established by the 1987 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. In some cases, such as when hard copies of documents or when photographs are needed, the Treaty specifies that notifications will be provided through diplomatic channels.

bbbbbbbParagraph 5 of Article VIII avoids confusion by codifying the current practice of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers with respect to specifying dates and times. It stipulates times will be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time, and that the dates that are listed will be the date at Greenwich.

bbbbbbbParagraph 6 of Article VIII provides for most of the data associated with the Treaty regime to be releaseable to the public. Specifically, all of the data listed in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Moscow (that is, the data base current as of September 1, 1990), including photographs, may be released to the public by either Party. The United States has released this data through its publication of the Treaty text. The Parties agreed, however, that geographic coordinates and site diagrams shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. While such information concerning U.S. facilities is normally unclassified, the Soviet Union wanted to deny public access to this information. Accordingly, such coordinates and diagrams were placed in a separate agreement associated with the Treaty, the Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991. By agreement between the Parties, each Party shall take steps to ensure that the site diagrams and geographic coordinates contained in this Agreement shall not be released to the public; however, this agreement does not preclude the U.S. from releasing information about its own facilities that is normally in the public domain.

bbbbbbbIn regard to data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII (for example, updates to data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding) or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty, the Parties agreed to hold consultations on whether such data can be released. Paragraph 6 stipulates that none of the restrictions on releasing data are intended to affect the official use of the data to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

bbbbbbb Article IX addresses the use of national technical means of verification to monitor Treaty compliance. "National technical means" is a term used in a variety of arms control treaties; it refers to those systems for collecting information useful in such monitoring. Examples include reconnaissance satellites, ships and aircraft that are used to monitor missile tests, and ground stations, such as the U.S. radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 provides that, for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law (such principles would include, for example, the right of a state not to have its airspace violated). This paragraph is closely based on similar provisions in earlier arms control agreements, such as paragraph 1 of Article XII of the INF Treaty.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article IX is adopted verbatim from paragraph 2 of Article XII of the ABM Treaty and is essentially identical to subparagraph 2(a) of Article XII of the INF Treaty. It prohibits each Party from interfering with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IX. This means, for example, that a Party cannot destroy, blind, jam, or otherwise interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party that are used in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. Note that while paragraph 2 of Article IX prohibits interference with national technical means, the prohibition on interference with inspectors during inspections is in the Inspection Protocol.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article IX prohibits the use of concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. This includes the obligation not to use concealment measures at test ranges that impede verification, such as measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The restriction on concealment measures at test ranges will better allow the Parties to monitor each other's testing programs, to ensure that the capabilities of tested systems are consistent with Treaty provisions, and to associate an ICBM or SLBM with its launcher. The obligation not to use concealment measures that impede verification of compliance does not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article IX provides that, to aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier. A unique identifier is a non-repeating, alpha-numeric production serial number, or a copy of such a serial number. It will be applied by the owning Party, using its own technology. Detailed provisions concerning unique identifiers are set forth in Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol.

ARTICLE X

bbbbbbb Article X addresses access to telemetric information from flight texts of ICBMs and SLBMs." Telemetric information" is defined in the Definitions Annex as information that originates on board a missile during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery. Access to telemetric information provides useful information about the capability of missiles being tested that assists in verification of Treaty provisions concerning, for example, throw-weight and the number of reentry vehicles. Additional detailed provisions are contained in the Telemetry Protocol. In Article X, the Parties agree to make on-board technical measurements during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM; to broadcast this information using unencrypted telemetry, with limited exceptions; and to exchange copies of telemetry tapes, acceleration profiles, and interpretive data from all flight-tests.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article X provides the basic requirement that, during each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test will make on-board technical measurements and will broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. This not only means that measurements made on-board will be on the tape, if obtained, it also means that a Party cannot claim that it has flight tested a missile and not provided a telemetry tape on the grounds that it did not broadcast any telemetric information. Although each Party will decide for itself what measurements to make during a flight test, whatever information is obtained from measurements must be broadcast, with limited exceptions that are provided for in paragraph 6.

bbbbbbbParagraph 2 of Article X bans any practice that is intended to deny full access to the telemetric information. A variety of practices are specifically prohibited, including the use of encryption, jamming, narrow directional beaming, and encapsulation of telemetric information. Encryption (a practice that gives telemetric information a random character to prevent unauthorized access), encapsulation (a recording for subsequent recovery of information during the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM) and jamming (creating interference on broadcast frequencies) are all defined in the Definitions Annex. A joint statement, made at the final START Plenary meeting on July 29, 1991, specifies that the ban on narrow directional beaming (a practice allowing the signal to be received only at very limited locations) in subparagraph 2(c) is intended to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals. Also, on July 29, 1991, the Parties made reciprocal statements, pledging as a gesture of goodwill to cease all encryption and jamming during flight-tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature, for a period of one year or until entry into force, whichever is sooner.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article X prohibits broadcasting telemetric information from a reentry vehicle that pertains to the functioning of the missile boost stages or the functioning of the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM. This is important, since, unlike booster and self-contained dispensing mechanism telemetry, reentry vehicle telemetry may be encrypted or encapsulated, within certain limits, and is exempt from the requirement to provide the interpretive information. This provision prohibits covert co-mingling of booster or self-contained dispensing mechanism data with the telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a reentry vehicle. This provision, coupled with the provisions of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol (which amplify the limited provisions for encryption and encapsulation of telemetric information), is intended to ensure that the provisions pertaining to booster and self-contained dispensing mechanism telemetry are not circumvented covertly.

bbbbbbbParagraphs 4 and 5 of Article X set forth the basic provisions for the sharing of telemetric information through an exchange of telemetry tapes; the detailed provisions concerning this are set forth in the Telemetry Protocol.

Paragraph 4 requires each Party conducting a flight test to provide, in accordance with the Protocol, telemetry tapes to the other Party that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during flight tests. Paragraph 5 requires that the Party also provide, in accordance with the Protocol, interpretive data to facilitate the analysis of the telemetric information. These data will identify the channels that contain the missile acceleration data, stage and RV separation commands and times. In addition, each Party will provide a profile of the missile's acceleration during its flight and other information concerning the format of the telemetry frame and channels without identifying the specific elements of each channel.

bbbbbbbParagraph 6 of Article X provides limited exceptions to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2. Each Party has the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements from only the missile's front section or elements of the front section, including reentry vehicles, during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs each year. Amplifying provisions are found in Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Taken together, paragraph 6 of Article X and Section III of the Telemetry Protocol provide the following restrictions on the eleven allowable instances of encryption and encapsulation:

­ No more than four encrypted or encapsulated flight tests may be conducted with each type of ICBM or SLBM that has ever been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

­ Encapsulation is only allowed for measurements made during the plasma phase of flight tests, except for Minuteman II, for which encapsulation of reentry vehicle information is allowed throughout the flight test. The Minuteman II exception was necessary, because encapsulation is the only technique used to recover reentry vehicle measurements made throughout the missile's entire flight.

­ Encryption of information related to the front section, or its elements, including reentry vehicles, is only allowed on (a) flight tests of former and retired types of ICBMs and SLBMs and (b) no more than two flight tests per year on only one existing type of ICBM or SLBM.

­ Only information relating to the front section or its elements may be encrypted,and then only after that front section or its elements have separated from the final stage or self-contained dispensing mechanism, if the missile is so configured.

-- If a Party chooses to both encapsulate and encrypt in a single flight test, that test will count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in paragraph 6.

-- The Thirty-first Agreed Statement excludes from the Article X provisions on encryption and encapsulation objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs into the upper atmosphere or space after such objects are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity.

ARTICLE XI

bbbbbbb Article XI deals with inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring. This general Article establishes the right to conduct the twelve different types of on-site inspections (three of them associated with exhibitions), states the purpose for each type of inspection, and provides the authorization and rationale for continuous monitoring activities. Amplifying details are found in the Inspection Protocol and its Annexes and, for conversion or elimination inspections, in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

bbbbbbbParagraph 1 of Article XI establishes the basic right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and the basic obligation to conduct exhibitions.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article XI provides for baseline data inspections. Baseline data" refers to the data to be exchanged no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. These data will consist of data current as of the date of entry into force. The inspections will help to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified as being located at given facilities. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth detailed provisions relating to baseline data inspections, which will be conducted between 45 days and 165 days after entry into force.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article XI provides for data update inspections. Fifteen such inspections are allowed annually, beginning 165 days after entry into force (that is, after the period for baseline data inspections). No more than two such inspections may be conducted at any one facility in each year. ( Each year" is a defined term and is associated with the anniversary of entry into force.) Paragraph 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol calls for an updated version of the Memorandum of Understanding to be issued every six months, while paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol provides for notifications of changes as they occur. Data update inspections will help confirm the accuracy of information contained in these notifications. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to data update inspections.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for new facility inspections. Paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol requires each Party to notify the other of new facilities, including numbers and types of items at the facility. The new facility inspections, essentially identical to baseline data inspections, will help confirm the accuracy of the data specified in these notifications. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to new facility inspections.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 5 of Article XI provides for each Party to conduct suspect-site inspections. The purpose of such inspections is to help confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. Suspect-site inspections may be conducted at the facilities listed in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (that is, the Ogden, Sacramento and Magna facilities of the United States; and the Zlatoust, Bershet' and Petropavlovsk facilities of the Soviet Union). In addition, facilities at which continuous monitoring has ceased and facilities not subject to continuous monitoring which in the future produce ICBMs or SLBMs as large as or larger than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs will be added to the list of facilities in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VIII of the Inspection Protocol. Suspect-site inspections count against the quota of 15 data update inspections per year. They were included under this quota to allow more effective use of quotas under future conditions that are not known, and to avoid splitting the quota of 15 between one very large list of facilities and one list that is very small. Section VII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to suspect-site inspections.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides for reentry vehicle inspections to help confirm that deployed ICBMs and SLBMs contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them. Section IX of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to reentry vehicle inspections. Ten such inspections are allowed annually, beginning 165 days after entry into force.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 7 of Article XI provides for post-exercise dispersal inspections to help confirm that the mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base, including any that have not returned to the base after the dispersal, are properly accounted for. Section X of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to post-exercise dispersal inspections. Two exercise dispersals may be conducted in any two-year period (see paragraph 1(h) of Article XIII of the Treaty); up to forty percent of the bases involved are subject to inspection following each such dispersal.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 8 of Article XI provides for conversion or elimination inspections to help confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms. Section XI of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to conversion or elimination inspections. The specific items whose conversion or elimination is subject to inspection are listed in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 9 of Article XI provides for close-out inspections to help confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed. Section XII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to close-out inspections

bbbbbbb Paragraph 10 of Article XI provides for formerly declared facility inspections to help confirm that facilities whose elimination has been notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A total of three such inspections are allowed annually. Section XIII of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to formerly declared facility inspections.

bbbbbbbParagraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Article XI provide both an obligation to conduct certain exhibitions and the right to conduct inspections during exhibitions conducted by the other Party. Technical characteristics exhibitions provided for in paragraph 11 and distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs provided for under paragraph 12, will, for items existing at time of signature, be conducted within 240 days of signature under the provisions of the Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991. Subsequent exhibitions and inspections will be conducted under the provisions of the Treaty as new types and variants of strategic offensive arms are produced.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 11 of Article XI provides for technical characteristics exhibitions of ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers. Each variant of each type of an ICBM or SLBM, and each version of each type of mobile launcher, must be exhibited. ( Variants" and versions" refer to different models" of ICBMs/SLBMs and mobile launchers, respectively. Both terms are defined in the Definitions Annex.) The purpose of such exhibitions is to help the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of such items correspond to the characteristics that have been specified for them in the Memorandum of Understanding. Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions relating to technical characteristics exhibitions.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 12 of Article XI provides for distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs. Section XV of the Inspection Protocol and Annex 4 to that Protocol set forth the detailed provisions concerning such exhibitions. The paragraph is organized into three subparagraphs merely as a means of presenting a complex subject. The subparagraph structure of paragraph 12 does not represent the need for separate exhibitions for the items discussed therein. In fact, for initial distinguishability exhibitions required to be conducted within 240 days after Treaty signature in accordance with the Agreement on Early Exhibitions, items from each of the subparagraphs are required to be exhibited together (see the analysis of the Related Agreements).

bbbbbbb Paragraph 12 provides for the following exhibitions:

(a) Subparagraph (a) requires exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in order to help confirm that their technical characteristics correspond to those specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed a maximum of 20 for bombers of the United States, or a maximum of 16 for bombers of the Soviet Union. (These maximum limits are provided for in paragraphs 20 and 21 of Article V of the Treaty.) Under this subparagraph the U.S. B-52Gs and B-52Hs and the Soviet Tu-95MSs (Bear Hs) and Tu-160s (Blackjacks) that are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be subject to exhibition.

(b) Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 12 requires that there will also be exhibitions for each type of heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. One of each variant of other categories of heavy bombers, including heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and training heavy bombers, are required to be exhibited to demonstrate both that they are distinguishable from one another and that variants equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from variants that are not so equipped. Within a type, airplanes of different categories must be different from one another, and within a single category, single variants must be distinguishable from one another. One former heavy bomber must also be exhibited and be distinguishable from all other airplanes of that type. (For heavy bombers, variant" only has meaning as a sub-classification when both the type and category are specified.) The Seventeenth Agreed Statement specifies that each Party shall determine for itself the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, although, if the other Party considers such distinguishing features insufficient, it may raise the issue in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Under this subparagraph the U.S. B-52G and B-1 and the Soviet Tu-95U (Bear T) training heavy bomber, and several variants of the Tu-95 (Bear) heavy bomber will be subject to exhibition. The U.S. B-52C, B-52D, B-52E and B-52F heavy bombers (all no longer operational and awaiting elimination at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base) are specifically exempted by theTenth Agreed Statement.

One special provision associated with this subparagraph currently applies only to the U.S. B-1 heavy bomber. Normally, test heavy bombers are not subject to exhibition. If, however, there is no deployed heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type from which such ALCMs have been flight-tested, a test heavy bomber from which such an ALCM has been flight-tested must be exhibited. While written in general terms, this provision applies only to the B-1, since that is the only currently deployed type of aircraft that fits this description. Thus, one of the two test B-1 heavy bombers that were once tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs must be displayed pursuant to this provision.

(c) Subparagraph (c) provides for exhibitions of long-range nuclear ALCMs in order to help confirm their technical characteristics. In the future, such exhibitions will also demonstrate the differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance withparagraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that makes long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. There is no requirement that these differences preclude a hypothetical capability to physically install a nuclear warhead in the long-range non-nuclear ALCM. The Soviets sought provisions precluding such capability; the United States rejected them. Thus, the Parties agreed that the verification of long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishability would be limited to the procedures of Section IV of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol. Neither Party had, at time of signature, any such long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. The Tacit Rainbow, a radar-suppression air-to-surface missile, was cancelled before it reached the point at which it would have had to be declared as a long-range non-nuclear ALCM.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 13 of Article XI provides for baseline exhibitions, between 45 and 165 days after entry into force, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers existing at entry into force and listed in the initial exchange of data provided under paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Section XV of the Inspection Protocol sets forth the detailed provisions concerning such exhibitions, whose purpose is to demonstrate that such airplanes are equipped as they have been declared to be equipped. These provisions complement paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol which provides for inspection of each heavy bomber converted after entry into force into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 13 also provides that a baseline exhibition will be conducted after a heavy bomber type is first tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs. The inspecting Party at such an exhibition will have the right to inspect 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such a type that are equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers, in order to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that airplanes that are not supposed to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are in fact not so equipped. The language in paragraph 13 would apply to the U.S. B-2 heavy bomber, which is the only existing type of heavy bomber not subject to exhibition or inspection under any provisions of the Treaty, and to any future penetrating bombers not initially outfitted as long-range nuclear ALCM carriers. The B-2, or such a future penetrating bomber, would be subject to exhibition under this paragraph only if and when it is tested with a long-range nuclear ALCM. Note that the same event also requires a distinguishability exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Article.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 14 of Article XI provides each Party the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBM in order to help confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced. The facilities subject to such monitoring are listed in paragraph 3 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (that is, the Thiokol Strategic Operations Peacekeeper Final Assembly Facility in Promontory, Utah for the United States, and the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Votkinsk, Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic and the Pavlograd Machine Plant, Pavlograd, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the Soviet Union). Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol and Annex 5 to that Protocol set forth the detailed provisions concerning continuous monitoring activities.

ARTICLE XII

bbbbbbb Article XII addresses cooperative measures, which are special actions that a Party will take, upon request, to assist the other Party in its verification efforts using reconnaissance satellites. Article XII provides for cooperative measures applicable to road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and heavy bombers. Section V of the Notifications Protocol provides for the notifications related to these cooperative measures.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 1 of Article XII contains the basic requirements to conduct a cooperative measure in response to a request. Requests for a cooperative measure must be made in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 addresses cooperative measures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Upon appropriate request, each Party is required to display in the open the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of such launchers to be displayed for each request is limited in that a request may not specify a total number of restricted areas at which are based more than ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party. The launchers that may be specified in such a request must be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMS. The display will be accomplished by opening the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs for the duration of a display, for each specified restricted area. (This provision, in effect, requires that roofs must be designed to be capable of being opened.) The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area will be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures. The term fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs" is defined in the Definition Annex as a unique structure, within a restricted area, that can contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 address cooperative measures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Upon appropriate request, each Party is required to display in the open the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. The launchers will be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train elsewhere within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each request will include all the launchers located at up to eight parking sites, although no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites will include the designation for each parking site. Although subparagraph l(b) specifies that these site designations are listed in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding, they are not. The designations were removed from Annex A during the final stages of negotiations as part of the agreement to place geographic coordinates in the separate Agreement on Exchange of Coordinates and Site Diagrams, thus protecting them from public disclosure. Since the coordinates for specific sites were no longer included in Annex A, the Parties agreed to place the names of parking sites on site diagrams. Through an oversight, Article XII was not corrected to conform with this new arrangement. The United States will raise this matter in the JCIC, so that the numerical designations will be added to Annex A during the initial update of data, which, pursuant to paragraph l of Section I of the Notification Protocol, will be provided 30 days after entry into force.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 1 addresses cooperative measures for heavy bombers. Upon appropriate request, each Party is required to display in the open all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. The heavy bombers and former heavy bombers will be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations will be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification will be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article XII provides for procedures concerning cooperative measures and limits the number of such measures. It requires that the items displayed pursuant to paragraph 1 be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. It stipulates that each Party will have the right to make seven requests for displays each year, but that it cannot request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than twice each year. In paragraph 5 of Article XIV, a Party is given the right to two additional requests in the event of an operational dispersal, which do not count toward the quotas above. In any single request, a Party may ask only for a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display will begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and will continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. Paragraph 2 also addresses the situation where a display cannot be conducted due to circumstances brought about by force majeure. Force majeure is generally understood to mean forces beyond one's control. In such circumstances, the requested Party will provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, the display will be cancelled, and the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled will not be reduced.

bbbbbbb Finally, paragraph 3 of Article XII sets forth rules to prevent a cooperative measure and an inspection from being conducted simultaneously at a facility.

ARTICLE XIII

bbbbbbb Article XIII provides special provisions to deal with exercises involving mobile ICBMs and heavy bombers­specifically, exercise dispersals" of mobile ICBMs and major strategic exercises" involving heavy bombers. In the case of exercise dispersals of mobile ICBMs, the number of such dispersals is limited by subparagraph 1(h). In the case of major strategic exercises involving strategic bombers, a Party can hold as many such exercises as it wants, but only in the one exercise notified annually, pursuant to the Agreement on Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises (see the analysis of the Related Agreements), do the provisions of Article XIII apply. In both the cases of exercise dispersals and the one notified major strategic exercise, the duration of the exercise is limited, some inspection rights are suspended during the exercise, and additional verification provisions are provided following the exercise. For exercise dispersals of mobile ICBMs these additional verification provisions are not included in Article XIII but are found in paragraph 7 of Article XI, which provides a right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections following each exercise dispersal.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 1 of Article XIII deals with exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. The paragraph provides rules for the conduct of such exercise dispersals. Exercise dispersals result in the temporary suspension of some of the Treaty's verification provisions regarding mobile ICBMs. If an exercise dispersal has been notified, the other Party may not designate an ICBM base involved in the dispersal for a data update or reentry vehicle inspection, nor request cooperative measures at such a base. In the case of road-mobile ICBMs, restrictions on movements during an exercise dispersal are similar to those imposed on the routine movements of such launchers and missiles on a day-to-day basis, i.e., there are no restrictions on the number of launchers and missiles that may be outside of their restricted areas, but all such movements are confined to the deployment area. In the case of rail-mobiles, however, an exercise dispersal suspends constraints on the number of launchers and missiles that may otherwise be outside of their rail garrisons on routine movements and relocations.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) specify the date and time at which the exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun and to have been completed, while subparagraph 1(c) provides for identifying the ICBM bases which will be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal.

bbbbbbb Subparagraphs 1(d) and 1(e) prescribe the treatment of mobile ICBMs engaged in routine movements or relocations when an exercise dispersal begins. Both routine movement" and relocation" are defined in the Definitions Annex. Aroutine movement is a movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that does not involve formally changing facility locations. A relocation is a one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile between facilities (or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility). Mobile ICBM launchers engaged in routine movement are considered part of an exercise dispersal; mobile ICBM launchers engaged in relocation are not.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph 1(f) supplements subparagraphs 1(d) and 1(e) for movements beginning after the start of the dispersal. It provides that all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs departing a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base involved in the dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base.

bbbbbbb Subparagraphs 1(g) and 1(h) limit the duration and frequency of exercise dispersals. Subparagraph 1(h) also bans exercise dispersals during the period provided for baseline data inspections (i.e., from 45 days to 165 days after entry into force) and bans dispersals from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired. This ensures that the initial conditions at an ICBM base will be known to the other Party before an exercise dispersal is conducted. Finally, subparagraph (h) ensures that exercise dispersals cannot be used to circumvent the inspection regime by banning such dispersals from bases which have been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection until completion of such an inspection.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph 1(i) suspends the right of the other Party to conduct data update inspections, reentry vehicle inspections, or cooperative measures at ICBM bases already involved in an exercise dispersal. As noted above, if a base has been designated for inspection prior to the notification of an exercise dispersal, the inspection will be conducted.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph 1(j) mandates that deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have returned to the normal Treaty regime before a Party can declare the end of the exercise dispersal.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article XIII deals with the specificmajor strategic exercises involving heavy bombers about which notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises. Its structure parallels that of paragraph 1. The Agreement requires notification no less than 14 days in advance of one such exercise per year. For the United States, this exercise has been the annual Global Shield exercise.

bbbbbbbSubparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) specify the date and time at which the exercise shall be considered to have begun and to have been completed, while subparagraph 2(c) requires the identification of the air bases that will be considered to be involved in the exercise.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph 2(d) limits the duration and frequency of major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers about which a notification is given pursuant to the Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notifications of Major Strategic Exercises. While a Party may have more than one exercise if it wants, it is required to give notice of only one exercise annually. Any additional exercises would not be notified or subject to the exemptions and constraints of paragraph 2. Thus, this provision limits to one the number of major strategic exercises during which there is no right of the other Party to conduct inspections, but it does not limit the overall number of such exercises.) Subparagraph 2(e) bans such a notified major strategic exercise during the period provided for baseline data inspections(i.e., from 45 days to 165 days after entry into force).

bbbbbbbSubparagraph 2(f) bans inspections of air bases involved in the exercise. Inspections may be conducted three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph 2(g) allows an additional cooperative measure, outside the annual quota of seven per year, at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. The request for this cooperative measure must be made within 30 days. Note that, while there is a three-day waiting period before inspections may resume, the request for a cooperative measure may be made any time after notification of the completion of the exercise has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XIV

bbbbbbb Article XIV provides a mechanism for the Parties to suspend significant provisions of the Treaty when required to ensure the survivability of their strategic forces. Although such a suspension is termed an "operational dispersal," it should not be confused with the exercise dispersal" provided for in Article XIII. Operational dispersals are far broader and can involve the entire strategic forces (i.e., SLBMs and heavy bombers, as well as ICBMs) of a Party. In view of the central importance of preserving the survivability of their strategic forces, the Parties were unwilling to place any restrictions on the number, frequency, or duration of operational dispersals. In the Seventh Agreed Statement, however, the Parties specify that such operational dispersals shall only be conducted for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces. The Seventh Agreed Statement further expresses the agreement of the Parties that, in practice, operational dispersals will occur rarely.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 1 of Article XIV establishes the right to conduct operational dispersals and specifies that there shall be no limit on the number and duration of such dispersals nor on the number or type of forces involved. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party are considered to be part of the dispersal. Subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) specify that the beginning and end of an operational dispersal will be established based on the notifications provided in accordance withparagraphs 1 and 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The timing of the beginning and the end of such dispersals is thus entirely at the discretion of the dispersing Party.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article XIV lists the Treaty provisions that may be suspended during an operational dispersal. A Party need not suspend all of these provisions; the individual subparagraphs of paragraph 2 may be applied independently of each other. The selection of the provisions that may be suspended was based on the agreement of the Parties that the specified provisions could endanger survivability of strategic forces or provide militarily significant information to the other Party. Note that the provisions of this paragraph apply equally to each Party. The Party not conducting the dispersal has the same right to suspend provisions of the Treaty, and need not declare an operational dispersal in order to exercise this reciprocal right.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph 2(a) allows suspension of nearly all notifications. Notification of flight tests of ballistic missiles are not suspended since, in the tension surrounding a period of crisis, such flight tests could be misinterpreted as hostile acts. In addition, if conversion or elimination is to continue, the relevant notifications must be given.

bbbbbbb Subparagraph 2(b) allows suspension of the right to conduct inspections. Note that the right to conduct continuous monitoring may not be suspended under Article XIV.

bbbbbbb Subparagraphs 2(c) and 2(d) allow suspension of the right to request cooperative measures and suspension of conversion and elimination processes for strategic offensive arms. Cooperative measures already in progress would not be completed and, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XIV, would not count toward annual quotas. If conversion and eliminations are suspended, the number of converted and eliminated items must correspond to the number actually converted and eliminated as of the time of the start of the operational dispersal. This precludes a Party from claiming, after the dispersal, that it had eliminated items during a dispersal without the other Party having the opportunity to verify their elimination.

bbbbbbbParagraph 3 of Article XIV provides time frames for the resumption of notifications and for the resumption of inspections. It also specifies that inspections or cooperative measures in progress when a Party suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count under the appropriate annual quotas. Paragraph 5 of Section X of the Notification Protocol requires that, when notifications resume, a Party that suspended notifications must provide all of the information that the other Party would otherwise have received had notifications not been suspended. These provisions are intended to ensure that the Parties have the same information upon completion of an operational dispersal that they would have had if the operational dispersal had not taken place.

bbbbbbbParagraph 4 of Article XIV specifies the required disposition of certain strategic forces at the time an operational dispersal is completed. A dispersing Party may not declare the completion of the dispersal until these conditions have been met. As noted above, the decision as to when to declare that a dispersal is complete is entirely at the discretion of the Party conducting the dispersal.

bbbbbbb Subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) ensure that mobile ICBMs will once again be in compliance with the normal Treaty regime prior to declaring the end of an operational dispersal. Subparagraph 4(c) requires heavy bombers to have returned to within national territory and to have resumed normal operations". Normal operations" are not further defined. Subparagraph 4(c) was included to provide reassurance to the Soviet Union that heavy bombers would not remain in close proximity to Soviet territory following an operational dispersal. If heavy bombers remain outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, diplomatic consultations must be undertaken so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 5 of Article XIV gives a Party not conducting the operational dispersal the right, within 30 days following the dispersal, to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. These requests will not count in the annual quota of seven requests established in paragraph 2 of Article XII, and are not subject to the limit of two requests per base each year. These additional cooperative measures aid in ensuring that the Parties have all of the information at their disposal that they would have had if the dispersal had not occurred.

ARTICLE XV

bbbbbbb Article XV establishes the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) and sets forth the responsibilities of that Commission in terms of promoting the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Except for the addition of subparagraph (c), on applying the provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, the language of Article XV is parallel to the language of Article XIII of the INF Treaty, establishing the INF Special Verification Commission. Provisions governing the operation of the Commission are found in the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

bbbbbbb Article XV establishes the JCIC as the framework within which the Parties would resolve any question related to compliance with the Treaty and agree on any additional measures that might be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

bbbbbbbSubparagraph (c) of Article XV assigns the Commission the duty to resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Once such a notification has been provided, there can be no question that the new kind of strategic offensive arm is subject to the Treaty. The question of how the Treaty is to be applied, however, whether by regulating the new arm, along with the related question of how any limits will be applied, or whether to ban such a system, is to be settled within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

bbbbbbb Neither Party may veto the deployment of the other Party's new kind of strategic offensive arm if the Parties are unable to agree within the Commission on the application of the relevant provisions of the Treaty. If, however, deployment by one Party results in disagreement about whether that Party is complying with Treaty limits, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is no obligation to delay deployment pending such resolution. (See the discussion of new kinds of strategic offensive arms in the analysis of Article I of the Treaty and of the Second Agreed Statement.)

bbbbbbb In accordance with Section IV of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, Article XV of the Treaty and the entire Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission are applied provisionally from the date of Treaty signature. This procedure is necessary to establish a forum for agreeing upon a number of implementing details required prior to entry into force. These details include:

­ Agreement on procedures for tape demonstrations prior to an initial demonstration both of telemetry tapes and of the appropriate equipment for playing back the telemetric information recorded on such tapes. (Telemetry Protocol, Section I, subparagraph 4(h)). ­ Agreement on the content of an example illustrative of interpretive data and missile acceleration profile to be provided through diplomatic channels or during the initial tape demonstration. (Telemetry Protocol, Section II, paragraph 3).

­ Agreement on procedures for additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of Soviet SLBMs. (Inspection Protocol, Annex 11, paragraph 5).

­ Agreement on maximum weight of equipment and supplies hand-carried on one airplane for a monitored facility. (Inspection Protocol, Section IV, paragraph 14).

­ Agreement on technical specifications for U.S. PPCM equipment listed in Annex 9 to the Inspection Protocol. This agreement is required prior to first in-country use. (Inspection Protocol, Section VI, paragraph 17).

­ Agreement on technical specifications for Soviet equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, once the Soviets have provided names of manufacturers and models for such equipment. This agreement is required prior to first in-country use. (Inspection Protocol, Section VI, paragraph 17).

­ Agreement on additional procedures for the use of satellite positioning equipment and radiation detection equipment prior to first use of such equipment. (Inspection Protocol, Annex 8, Section VI, subsections E and F).

­ Agreement, prior to the start of monitoring and site surveys of facilities subject to continuous monitoring, on cargo inventory lead times and on procedures for repacking equipment inspected at the point of entry. (Inspection Protocol, Annex 7, paragraphs 1 and 6). Monitoring and site surveys of facilities subject to continuous monitoring may begin 30 days after entry into force.

ARTICLE XVI

bbbbbbb Article XVI bars the Parties from assuming any international obligations or undertakings in conflict with the Treaty and commits them to consultations within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission if ambiguities arise. The phrase obligations or undertakings" covers both formal written agreements and informal arrangements between governments. The First Agreed Statement, which obligates the Parties not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty to third states, should be read in conjunction with this Article.

bbbbbbb The first two sentences of this Article simply restate customary international law and the responsibilities already prescribed for the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in Article XV. They are thus redundant. The significance of the Article lies in the final sentence, which specifies that patterns of cooperation, including obligations, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third state are exempt from the obligations of Article XVI. The only such pattern of cooperation by either Party existing at the time of Treaty signature is the longstanding pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.

bbbbbbb The phrase "pattern of cooperation," while not defined, is broader than any specific, currently existing sales or cooperation agreement. On July 29, 1991, in the final plenary meeting of the START negotiations, the United States made a formal statement with regard to the scope of its longstanding pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The United States stated that it attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace, and that the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. The United States further stated that this is what it referred to as the "existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom, which currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system. The Soviet side took written note of this statement and explicitly acknowledged that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently" consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. Thus the Parties understand that "pattern of cooperation" refers to maintaining an independent deterrent and not to any specific weapon system or any specific category of strategic offensive arms. The Soviets tried to limit the pattern of U.S.-U.K. cooperation to the Trident II, then, failing that, to SLBMs only. The U.S. rejected categorically any such constructions of the U.S.-U.K. pattern of cooperation. (See the additional discussion in the analysis of the First Agreed Statement.)

bbbbbbb The Soviet Union made a formal statement, dated July 31, 1991, that it does not have any such patterns of cooperation with other countries. (The U.S. and Soviet statements, titled Statements on Non-Circumvention," are addressed in detail in the Other Statements" section of this analysis.)

ARTICLE XVII

bbbbbbb Article XVII consists of three paragraphs covering ratification, entry into force, duration, extension, and withdrawal.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 1 of Article XVII formally incorporates all Treaty Annexes, Protocols, and the Memorandum of Understanding as integral parts of the Treaty. Paragraph 1 also specifies that the Treaty is subject to ratification prior to entering into force. As specified in the Telemetry Protocol and the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, however, some Treaty provisions are provisionally applied as of the date of signature. These provisions include:

­ Article XV, establishing the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

­ The Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

­ Subparagraph 4(a) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, which provides for a demonstration of equipment for playing back telemetry tapes within 120 days of signature;

­ Paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, which provides notification of a request to acquire such equipment following the demonstration; and

­ Paragraph 3 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, which provides for an exchange of illustrative interpretive data and acceleration profile within 120 days of signature.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 2 of Article XVII provides a duration of 15 years for the Treaty (unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms), allows extension in five-year increments, and mandates a meeting between the Parties no later than fourteen years after signature to consider whether to extend the Treaty. Extension is not automatic but must be agreed between the Parties; such an extension would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty and would not be subject to ratification. Extension in other than five-year increments would require amendment to the Treaty and would be subject to ratification. The 15-year duration was a U.S. proposal accepted by the Soviet Union. It was based on the recognition that 10 years would be too short, given the length of time required to negotiate START and the seven-year period of reductions. At the same time, 20 years would be too long, given unpredictable political developments and technological changes which inevitably occur over time.

bbbbbbb Paragraph 3 of Article XVII, identical in content to paragraph 2 of Article XV of the INF Treaty, provides each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty on six-months notice if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty (i.e., to strategic offensive arms) have jeopardized its supreme interests. The statement of the United States concerning the START/ABM relationship, and the statement of the Soviet Union concerning the interrelationship between the reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty, demonstrate that the Parties hold diverging views on whether the START withdrawal clause can be invoked on the basis of certain strategic ballistic missile defense activities. (See discussion in the "Other Statements" section below.)

ARTICLE XVIII

bbbbbbb Article XVIII provides for amendments to the Treaty. Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified in Article XVII. The START Treaty, like the INF Treaty, contains a provision at the end of each of the Protocols and, unlike the INF Treaty, at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding, that permits the Parties to agree on additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty." This authority is circumscribed by means of a follow-on statement that changes that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty shall be agreed upon in the JCIC, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty." Thus, this provision clarifies that, while substantive rights and obligations cannot be changed absent an amendment to the Treaty, minor matters of an administrative or technical nature relating to the detailed procedures of the Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding may be altered through agreement of the Parties.

bbbbbbb The reason that a provision permitting such changes in the Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding is required is the likelihood, given the highly complicated verification-related procedures contained in those documents, that such procedures would have to be modified or changed to improve their viability and effectiveness, as a result of lessons learned in the course of their implementation. Such changes will thus facilitate the subsequent implementation of the Treaty regime.

bbbbbbb Examples of measures envisioned under this provision are changes to the content of notifications, replacement of placeholder" provisions with agreed language (e.g., weight limits for equipment and supplies for monitors, see paragraph 14 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol), changes in categories of data, changes in elimination procedures, types and quantities of equipment and the method of use of such equipment, and changes in JCIC rules of procedure.

bbbbbbb Changes to the Treaty, the Agreed Statements Annex, and the Definitions Annex are not covered by the provision concerning measures to improve the "viability and effectiveness of the Treaty." Accordingly, any changes to texts in those documents, except to make technical corrections in the text, and except in the limited number of special cases noted below, could only be made as amendments and, thus, would be subject to ratification.

bbbbbbb In several cases, the Parties made an exception to this general rule. Recognizing that modifications to a limited number of specific provisions of the Treaty, Agreed Statements Annex, or Definitions Annex could be required in the normal course of events, the Parties included provisions explicitly authorizing such changes be made by mutual agreement. The changes so authorized include the following:

­ Agreeing on when a converted mobile launcher of ICBMs becomes accountable as containing a different type of ICBM (subparagraph 7(b) of Article III).

­ Agreeing to change the number of allowed space launch facilities, the number of launchers allowed at such facilities, or the aggregate number of silo and mobile launchers allowed at such facilities (paragraph 4 of Article IV).

­ Agreeing to allow rebasing a silo-based single-warhead ICBM in a mobile basing mode (paragraph 4 of Article V).

­ Agreeing to allow the public release of geographic coordinates of START facilities or of site diagrams for those facilities (paragraph 6 of Article VIII).

­ Agreeing not to treat a specific ICBM or SLBM as one maintained, stored, and transported in stages, notwithstanding the fact that a separate first stage for such a missile (or an uncanisterized ICBM) has been discovered at a prohibited location (Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement).

­ Agreeing to allow launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes for space launch purposes (Thirtieth Agreed Statement).

­ Agreeing not to consider a specific type of bomber as a heavy bomber even if it fulfills the criteria in the heavy bomber definition (Definitions Annex, Heavy Bomber definition).

In each of these cases, the Parties elected to give themselves the option to make specific modifications to the Treaty provisions in the future. Electing to exercise those previously authorized options would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

bbbbbbb Article XIX provides standard provisions from international law for registration of the Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The decision to place geographic coordinates (which will not be released to the public) in a separate agreement, and to append site diagrams (which are also not released to the public) to that separate agreement, avoids the need to preserve any part of the Treaty as confidential. Thus the entire Treaty, including all Protocols and Annexes and the Memorandum of Understanding, can be registered with the United Nations.

FINAL PROVISION

bbbbbbb The final paragraph of the Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Footnotes:

1 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, United States-U.S.S.R. S. Treaty Doc. No. 11 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.; 28 ILM 90

2 Threaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London and Moscow July 1, 1968, entered into force March 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161

3 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System, signed at Moscow May 26, 1972, entered into force October 3, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503

4 Treaty on the Principles Governingg the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial bodies, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967, entered into fore October 10, 1967, 16 U.S.T. No. 6347.

5. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Dstruction on the Seabead and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, signed at Washington, London and Moscow February 11, 1971, enterred into force may 18, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337

6. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and underwater, signed at Moscow August 5, 1963, entered into force October 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433.