LETTERS SIGNED BY U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES

PHASED REDUCTIONS OF HEAVY ICBMS [ABA]

July 30, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed to state the following:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.

Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

If this statement is acceptable, I propose that this letter, together with your response, be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the Soviet Union and United States.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of the Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Negotiationson Nuclear and Space Arms

Moscow, July 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I should like to confirm that the provisions set forth in the letter signed on July 30, 1991 by our ambassador concerning the stage-by-stage reduction of deployed heavy ICBMs in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are legally binding.

Respectfully,

[s]Bessmertnykh

His Excellency
James A. Baker III
Secretary of State of the United States

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS
ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

July 30, 1991

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the Negotiationson Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

BBBBBOn behalf of the United States of America, I am authorized to state that the United States accepts the formal assurances set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads as follows:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.

Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

BBBBBThe United States agrees that this response, together with your letter, shall be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and Soviet Union.

BBBBBThis reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

BEAR D [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to inform you of the following. From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the Tu-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under the proposed agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.

(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.

(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.

(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to acknowledge the information set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads:

From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under this Agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the terms set forth above. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

B-1 [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.

(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.

(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.

(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept your proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

SILO LAUNCH CONTROL CENTERS [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;

(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or

If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.

The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;

(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

LAUNCH CANISTERS [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.

(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of such a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.

(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

ENGINEERING SITE SURVEYS [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;

(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;

(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;

(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;

(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and

(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;

(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;

(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;

(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

PROVIDING PHOTOGRAPHS [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.

(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.

(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.

(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment [ MMII / MMIII / PK ]

B-1 unique support equipment [ 1 / 2 / 3 ], pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment [ SS-11 / SS-13 / SS-17 and SS-19 / SS-18 / SS-24 (silo) ]

Driver Training Vehicles

Launch-Associated Support Vehicles

Launch-Associated Railcars [ 1 / 2 ]

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM

MMIII without front section and without SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)

POSEIDON first stage

TRIDENT I first stage

TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129

B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section

SS-13 first stage

second and third stages as a unit

SS-17 in launch canister without front section

SS-18 in launch canister without front section

as a unit without front section and without self- contained
dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister)

first stage

SS-19 in launch canister without front section

SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section

(for silo launcher) first stage

SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section

(for rail-mobile launcher) first stage

SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"

Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs

Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers

Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section

SS-N-8 as a unit with front section

SS-N-18 as a unit with front section

SS-N-20 as a unit with front section

SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear T training heavy bomber

Bison A former heavy bomber

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM

AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

__________

*To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
**To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage

SS-N-18 first stage

SS-N-20 first stage

SS-N-23 first stage

__________

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks

Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.

(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin

Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and
Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment

B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment

Driver Training Vehicles

Launch-Associated Support Vehicles

Launch-Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM

MMIII without front section and without SCDM

MMII first stage

MMIII first stage

PK first stage

PK second stage

PK third stage

PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)

TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)

POSEIDON first stage

TRIDENT I first stage

TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129

B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B

B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B

Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section

SS-13 first stage second and third stages as a unit

SS-17 in launch canister without front section

SS-18 in launch canister without front section as a unit without front section and without self- contained dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-19 in launch canister without front section

SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section (for silo launcher) first stage

SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section (for rail-mobile launcher) first stage

SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"

Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs

Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers

Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section

SS-N-8 as a unit with front section

SS-N-18 as a unit with front section

SS-N-20 as a unit with front section

SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs

Bear T training heavy bomber

Bison A former heavy bomber

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM

AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage

SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

__________

To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage

SS-N-18 first stage

SS-N-20 first stage

SS-N-23 first stage

__________

* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE TREATY

THIRD COUNTRY BASING [ABA]

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Minister:

Our strategic arms control negotiators in Geneva have continued the discussions which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I began in New York last year on prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I believe a solution to this problem is possible, and would like to offer some concrete thoughts on how this issue could be resolved.

Let me remind you of the many steps that we have already taken to meet your concerns:

First, we have agreed to your proposal to ban the basing of strategic offensive arms outside national territory. That ban will take effect immediately upon entry into force of the START Treaty.

Second, while we do not regard our operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, we are prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Third, I can reaffirm our commitment, which I gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze orally, that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be carried out in the future.

Finally, I can formally reaffirm that the United States does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory.

But, as I explained in New York, we cannot accept a Provision in the START Treaty for inspections outside national territory. At the same time, with respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject, incorporated in the Agreed Statement Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following paragraph thereof:

The Parties agreed that . . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances in this letter and your response, the Agreed Statement and the relevant Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Sincerely,

[s] James A. Baker, III

His Excellency
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I agree that your letter of this date provides a basis for solving the problem of prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I accept the proposals which you made in that letter.

We note that the arrangement which you have in Holy Loch, Scotland will be terminated and that all your ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. For our part, I would like to state that, as we have indicated in the past, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and does not carry out any arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines similar to that currently existing in Holy Loch and commits itself not to carry out such arrangements in the future.

With respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject incorporated in the appropriate Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following provision:

"The Parties agree that. . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits."

I agree that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in your letter and this response, the Agreed Statement and the agreed Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Mr. Secretary, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s] Alexander A. Bessmertnykh

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

His Excellency
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the
United States of America

ALCMs WITH MULTIPLE WEAPONS [ABA]

December 6, 1990

Dear Eduard,

Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple weapons. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well.

As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit the START Treaty to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, let me make the following points:

First, under the START Treaty, the United States will comply with its obligation not to produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMS with multiple weapons.

Second, in abiding by this obligation, the United States will not produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs.

Finally, in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty, each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the other side's compliance with its Treaty obligation to ban long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons.

Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way.

I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns. You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues.

Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s] James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
New York

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear James,

In response to your letter on long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons, please allow me to inform you that desiring to rapidly reach agreement on the START Treaty, we are ready to accept the solution, which you propose in your letter. For its part the Soviet Union will adhere to the following:

Under the START Treaty, the USSR will comply with the obligation not to produce, test or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Under this obligation, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States will produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring in the future the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor will the Soviet Union convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

The START Treaty must contain provisions on how to distinguish long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections. As I understand it, the two sides agree that those provisions be applied to long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, each side would be confident that the other side is complying with the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Finally, I note our common understanding that in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to questions raised by the other side regarding ambiguity or concerns related to the other sides compliance with its Treaty obligations regarding the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. I hope that an equally constructive and mutually acceptable solution will be found for all other outstanding questions related to the preparation of the START Treaty for signature.

There is not much time left until that signing, therefore it is very important that everything necessary be done now to conclude this historic agreement.

Respectfully,

[s] E. Shevardnadze

His Excellency James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

* As written, should be "XV"

TACIT RAINBOW [ABA]

May 19, 1990

Dear Eduard,

I have just finished meeting with my arms control experts, who tell me that we are still some distance from completing an overall agreement on the question of air-launched cruise missiles because of continuing differences over the issue of Tacit Rainbow. In particular, my experts have reported your concerns and the three elements of your proposal.

I have had an opportunity to study your ideas, and am persuaded that Tacit Rainbow need not be an obstacle to resolving the ALCM issue. In this message, I would like to give you a response that I believe offers a constructive means of resolving this matter. Let me make the following points:

First, the December 31, 1988 cutoff date to distinguish between current and future ALCMs is of course acceptable to me. This makes clear (as President Gorbachev agreed) that Tacit Rainbow will be treated as a future non-nuclear ALCM -- which it is -- and will thus be subject to the provisions in the Treaty that will enable both sides to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

Second, I am able to confirm that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, and as such would be covered by our proposals of May 12, 1990 on how the START Treaty would identify non-nuclear ALCMs and distinguish them from nuclear ALCMs. In particular, I want to draw your attention to the language we proposed in the Notification Annex* we recently presented in Geneva. (A copy is attached.) Under this provision we would formally notify you at least six months in advance that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, would tell you about its distinguishing features and would propose a date on which you could come for an exhibition of this missile.

We have no plans to convert Tacit Rainbow to a nuclear ALCM. But if a non-nuclear ALCM were ever converted to a nuclear ALCM, that missile would then become subject to all of the START Treaty restrictions on nuclear long-range ALCMs.

Third, on your concern about range. I am advised that its range is less than 800 km. As you know Tacit Rainbow only became an issue when we considered accepting your proposal for a 600 km ALCM range threshold. Under our preferred position of 800 km, Tacit Rainbow was not an issue.

I believe that these points are responsive to your questions. You should feel free to share these points with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to come over to meet with you now to finalize this and any other issues.

Eduard, I would like to conclude by reminding you that you gave me every reason to believe that if I could move to your position on ALCM range, we would finally put the ALCM issue behind us. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s] James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

*As written, should read "Protocol"

RELOCATION OF HEAVY ICBM SILOS [ABA]

[No Date]

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I received information from the head of our START Delegation in Geneva that the US Delegation had been instructed by Washington to suspend work which involves introducing changes into the Treaty in accordance with the agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York. In this context, the US side refers to the fact that allegedly I, in my conversation with you, said that the Soviet side did not intend to construct new silo launchers for heavy missiles.

I believe there is a misunderstanding here. In this connection, I would like to once again set forth the Soviet position, on the basis of which agreement was reached in New York. The essence of the matter is that in modernizing its heavy ICBMs the Soviet Union will construct new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs simultaneously with the elimination of such silo launchers, i.e., staying within the 154 limit. Thus, the Soviet side does not have plans of constructing an additional number (in excess of 154) of heavy ICBM silo launchers.

I wish to emphasize that our position is part of the New York agreement on heavy ICBMs, which we reaffirm in its entirety.

In conclusion, I would like once again to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that our meetings and discussions have given me a feeling of profound satisfaction, and express confidence that our useful dialogue and contacts will be continued in the interests of our two countries.

Respectfully,

[s] D. Yazov
Minister of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union

The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense of the
United States
Washington, D.C.

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear Sirs,

In view of the doubts you had with regard to the issue of constructing new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs - in the context of the broader agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York in October 1990 - we deem it expedient to provide the following additional clarifications.

First of all, we would like to reiterate with full clarity that under that agreement new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs would be constructed solely for replacing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs eliminated according to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which means that their number will remain within the Treaty limits. As we understand it, you may have a question as to what would require such construction. An answer to this question should be sought in situations which might arise in real life.

We hope you agree with us that such accidents unfortunately cannot be fully ruled out, where - in particular, due to long period of operation of silo launchers - their further operation would be impossible. Incidentally, this has been taken into account in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which as the two sides have already agreed upon, provides for a special procedure for notifying and removing from Treaty accountability strategic offensive arms, including ICBM silo launchers, in case of their accidental loss or disablement beyond repair. Naturally each side would have the right in such cases to compensate for the systems removed from accountability - within the appropriate Treaty limits. This of course, applies to heavy ICBMs as well. At least for this reason, the possibility to construct new silo launchers for them should not be precluded.

Also, situations must not be ruled out where it would be necessary to relocate silo launchers, including those for heavy ICBMs, which means that they would be closed in one area of the country and constructed in another, for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country. Relocations of silo launchers might be required either during or after the period of reductions under the Treaty. A timely consideration of non-military factors by simply changing our current plans is difficult to realize.

At present we have no plans to relocate silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Although such relocation, if required in the future, would incur additional great expenses and would be a hard step to take, we cannot, as you may understand, exclude such a possibility.

We hope these additional explanations remove completely the misunderstanding that has arisen and make it possible, at least, to reaffirm the New York agreements on heavy ICBMs and finally close this issue.

Respectfully,

[s]E. Shevardnadze [s] D. Yazov

His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

His Excellency
Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

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