JOINT STATEMENTS : EXCHANGED AT THE FINAL PLENARY (JULY 29) [ABA]

JOINT STATEMENT ON NEW MISSILE PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PROCESSES [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that:

(a) Procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms have been agreed upon taking into account the fact that, in manufacturing stages for such missiles, both Parties currently use the technology of casting the solid propellant directly in the case of the solid rocket motor so that the cured propellant cannot be removed non-destructively.

(b) If in the future either Party begins to produce stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, employing so-called "insertable cartridges" or any other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant from motor cases, that Party shall inform the other Party thereof at the next session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties shall decide within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission what, if any, additional verification and elimination procedures are necessary, taking into account the new technology for manufacturing missiles.

JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING DATA UPDATES WITH RESPECT TO CATEGORIES OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the Notifications Protocol Relating to this Treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty, regardless of the Party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding.

JOINT STATEMENT ON COSTS RELATED TO THE CONVENING OF A SESSION OF THE JCIC ON THE TERRITORY OF ONE OF THE PARTIES [ABA]

July 29, 1991

In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the Commission on the territory of one of the Parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BAN ON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AT ELIMINATED FACILITIES [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in Paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NARROW DIRECTIONAL BEAMING [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TERM "TON" [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the English words "metric ton" and the Russian word "ton" mean 1,000 kilograms.

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHARTER FLIGHTS [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING CURRENCY OF PAYMENT FOR COSTS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE START TREATY [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either Party, for subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the Treaty and to other U.S.- Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations.

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING INTERPRETIVE DATA [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.

JOINT STATEMENT ON WEAPON STORAGE AREAS [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the formulation "weapon storage area" as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

JOINT STATEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF SITE DIAGRAMS [ABA]

July 29, 1991

Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base Relating to this Treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the Treaty.

JOINT STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH PROCEDURES FOR CONFIRMING LAUNCH WEIGHT [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM. The Parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.

UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE B-2 HEAVY BOMBER [ABA]

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B-2 heavy bomber. This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding.

The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber.

The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range ALCM from a B-2 heavy bomber will require that : B-2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; B-2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; and all other provisions of the Treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested apply to B-2 heavy bombers.

The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the Treaty referred to in this statement will also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

U.S. STATEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

U.S. STATEMENT ON LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLES AND DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLES [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet sides statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLES AND DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLES [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility.

U.S. STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

SOVIET STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom.

It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION [ABA]

July 31, 1991

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby confirms that it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation that include the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms.

U.S. STATEMENT ON THE SS-N-23 [ABA]

July 29, 1991

Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throw-weight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM-54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS-N-23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the Throw-weight Protocol.

The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS-N-23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method. While the U.S. side believes the SS-N-23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS-N-23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE SLBM SS-N-23 [ABA]

July 29, 1991

In connection with the U.S. Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS-N-23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54).

U.S. STATEMENT ON ATTACHMENT JOINTS [ABA]

July 29, 1991

With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber.

SOVIET STATEMENT CONCERNING THE PURPOSES OF INCLUSION IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF DATA ON THE DISTANCE BETWEEN JOINTS FOR ATTACHING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs. Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the Treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon and distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher are included in Annexes G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped. The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a non-mandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (ii) and (iii) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding.

U.S. STATEMENT ON UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES [ABA]

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint.

UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES ADJACENT TO WATERS IN WHICH BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES OPERATE [ABA]

July 29, 1991

Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagelnaya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means.

The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force.

STATEMENTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF START AND ABM READ AT A MEETING BETWEEN U. S. AMBASSADOR BROOKS AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OBUKHOV ON JUNE 13, 1991. [ABA]

STATEMENT BY THE U.S. SIDE AT THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS CONCERNING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following:

This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.

The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV1 of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach.

1 As written, understood to mean "Article XVII". Two Treaty Articles were included after the statement was made, but before the Treaty was signed.

STATEMENTS EXCHANGED AT A MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AMBASSADOR BROOKS AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN ON JULY 27, 1991.

STATEMENT OF THE U.S. SIDE CONCERNING THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE TSSAM CRUISE MISSILE [ABA]

The U.S. side notes the statement of the Soviet side and believes that the concern it expresses about the impact of the new Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is totally unfounded.

The TSSAM is a non-nuclear, short range cruise missile that is not subject to START and that will have no impact on the integrity, stability, or durability of that agreement. The U.S. side stands by the Houston Agreement, which emphasized that the United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. The TSSAM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, and the Treaty is clear that its potential use on a B-2 would in no way imply that a B-2 is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START.

The U.S. believes that no START provisions will apply based on the potential equipage of the B-2 with TSSAM.

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING THE INFORMATION OF THE U.S. SIDE ABOUT THE TSSAM CRUISE MISSILE FOR INCLUSION IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD [ABA]

The Soviet side is gravely concerned over the plans to develop and mass produce in the United States of America a new TSSAM cruise missile, which follows from the information about the cruise missile presented by the U.S. side at the START negotiations on June 14, 1991. The concern of the Soviet side is due to the fact that deployment of large numbers of such missiles will have adverse implications for the durability of the START Treaty, confidence in its integrity and stability that it provides.

Among our concerns is the fact that the multi-purpose suspension joints will be used for that missile on B-52 and B-2 heavy bombers, as follows from the explanations provided by the U.S. side. Because of that, in case of testing of TSSAM missiles from a B-2 heavy bomber the bomber might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Our concern increases in view of the fact that under certain circumstances B-2 heavy bombers are not subject to exhibitions and inspections.

The Soviet side reserves the right to return to these questions subsequently.

DECLARATIONS [ABA]

DECLARATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING ITS POLICY
CONCERNING NUCLEAR SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES [ABA]

July 31, 1991

The United States of America, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The United States of America will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The United States of America will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The United States of America will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the United States of America will also provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

DECLARATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING ITS POLICY
CONCERNING NUCLEAR SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the United States of America will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide the United States of America information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the United States of America to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also provide the United States of America annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.

DECLARATION BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING THE TU-22M MEDIUM BOMBER [ABA]

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the TU-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire. This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding.

The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling.

The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes. The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200.

In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic offensive arms, Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.

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