6.
DETERRING IRAN
Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack.1
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
UNRELIABILITY OF CURRENT
U.S. Position
Iran is developing and deploying the capability to inflict massive casualties on civilian and military personnel in the region. U.S. naval forces provide a lucrative target for NBC, particularly if employed in novel ways. The minimal ballistic missile defense capability available to the United States and its allies in the region leaves cities and military forces vulnerable to attack by missile, potentially with NBC warheads. Because Iran's understanding of military victory differs from that of the West, and because, consistent with its emphasis on matyrdom and righteousness, its own Army Chief of Staff draws no distinction between killing and dying as a means to the achievement of war aims, traditional threats of conventional force or even nuclear retaliation will likely pay minimal returns toward deterrence.
It is very likely that Iran has calculated that, if it holds U.S. forces and regional civilian populations at risk with NBC, it will be able to dictate terms that fulfill at least some of its strategic objectives. If so, Iranian leaders may well calculate gains from the threat or use of NBC, leaving only the secondary question of how to best minimize the cost of U.S. retaliation. Steps Iran seems to have taken to diminish such costs are therefore of non-trivial concern.
Iran has probably calculated that as long as the extent and location of its NBC capabilities are ambiguous, the United States would be unlikely to launch a disarming pre-emptive strike. Two factors result from enemy possession of NBC weapons. First, even if the United States had high confidence in the ultimate success of a counterforce attack against the enemy's NBC/M forces, the deadly force of NBC weapons increases the priority that must be assigned to the destruction of the NBC and missile forces, which will divert U.S. forces from other targets. Second, the high priority assigned to NBC targets and the possible requirement to operate in an NBC environment will require changes in U.S. operations and, at a minimum, alter the tempo of operations. Even if the United States had the political will and counterforce capability to diminish significantly Iran's NBC capabilities, the probability of high confidence in total or even moderate success is low. Mobility, cover and concealment efforts, hardening facilities and putting them underground, and expanding the variety of possible NBC delivery modes, both traditional and novel, all enhance the survivability of Iran's forces. These steps take advantage of and exacerbate limitations in U.S. intelligence and in the capabilities of U.S. counterforce weapons to destroy NBC weapons. Counterforce alone, therefore, can never foreclose the possibility of Iranian strikes using NBC. The small quantity of NBC weapons, particularly biological weapons, needed to inflict significant casualties, raises the consequences of any surviving Iranian NBC weapons.
Thus, the United States will have significantly less freedom of military action against Iran until it has developed and deployed effective active and passive defenses in the region. In the absence of such defense, Iran may calculate that the risks associated with NBC acquisition or even use against smaller states are tolerable and that U.S. interference or intervention will itself be deterred. Indeed, Iran may well calculate that the United States will be deterred from retaliation by the complexity of countering a country so risk tolerant and that possesses such an array of offensive NBC/M capabilities. If the only option for meaningful response to Iranian biological or chemical weapons use were nuclear retaliation, the standard of evidence decisionmakers would require of the intelligence community (as to whether BW or CW had indeed been used, whether use was intentional, and whether the use had been sanctioned by the Government of Iran) would be so high that, as a practical matter, no timely judgment of use is likely, further limiting the probability of a U.S. response and the variety of available U.S. response options.
In other words, the threat of nuclear retaliation against Tehran is not likely a reliable deterrent to NBC use by Iran. For one thing, in the eyes of Iran's religious leadership, including the IRGC, "the revolution" could continue or perhaps even be facilitated if the United States struck Tehran with a nuclear weapon. For another, the IRGC may be capable, independent of a political decision in Tehran, to employ NBC. For example, should they believe that the political leadership was moving away from the religious standards of which they hold themselves to be a vanguard, they may be willing to use NBC. The IRGC leadership would be dispersed from Tehran-and therefore likely to survive-if such a decision were implemented.2 Finally, the Iranians may assign a relatively low probability that the United States would weigh any regional interests worthy of the public and international censure such a strike would invoke. The strike could cause massive civilian casualties, would raise the threshold of violence, and possibly lead to still greater follow-on use of NBC by Iran. Would the United States, Iran might wonder, undertake such an action in response even to its own NBC- related military casualties, let alone the civilian casualties in another state?
While the United States may have been able to persuade Iraq that use of NBC raised the possibility of a U.S. nuclear retaliation, the subsequent revelations by senior Bush administration decisionmakers, including former Secretary of State Baker, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, and President Bush himself, have publicly indicated that these veiled threats were bluff.3 It is unlikely that the same indirect ambiguous threats will communicate a credible threat to Tehran. Thus, while Tehran may be aware that the use of NBC entails some risk of nuclear retaliation, it is hardly self-evident that that such a threat is highly credible, that the risk would be considered unacceptably high, or that such retaliation would necessarily inflict damage Iranian leaders would regard as unacceptable.
DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
The most direct U.S. option that enables the United States to deny Iran its goals is to deploy robust active and passive defense combined with greater counterforce capabilities. Until the active and passive defense portions of the denial equation are available, the United States must increase its ability to conduct surgical counterforce operations against Iranian NBC capabilities.
Counterforce Alone is Inadequate
The United States should seek the ability to destroy NBC/M even when facilities are hardened and underground or when missiles are mobile. Further, more robust capabilities to attack such targets without wide dispersal of NBC effects will expand the utility of such capabilities. Counterforce capabilities alone, however, are unlikely to be sufficiently credible or pervasive enough, particularly in the face of a determined aggressor's tactics, to deter NBC use or to diminish the threat and consequence of NBC employment. Iran has clearly anticipated the counterforce option and has sought to reduce its vulnerability through adopting novel NBC delivery capabilities, such as RPVs. In combination with more traditional NBC delivery modes and mobility, concealment, and hardened structures, such novel delivery systems, dispersed widely, radically diminish the contribution of counterforce alone to deterrence of Iranian NBC and denial of their intended effects.
Active Defense
Because ballistic missiles have become an NBC delivery means of choice for Iran, which is seeking increasingly longer range capabilities, even a moderately effective active defense capability would have a deterrent multiplier effect, particularly when combined with improved passive defense and counterforce capabilities:
Passive Defense
Biological weapons may lend the advantage to the offense, but the employer may be uncertain as to the precise effectiveness of protective measures and could find the employment of biological or toxin agents difficult to plan, especially when the cost of employment includes escalation of the defender's war aims. The military advantage of employment of biological, toxin, or chemical agents will be easier to assess, however, if the offense is confident that there will be no defense at all. Perceptions of U.S. and allied vulnerability to BW and CW have probably been instrumental in encouraging Iran's pursuit and acquisition of BW and CW and could greatly increase the probability of their use and incentives to use them against U.S. forces or allied populations. Thus, the employment of passive defense complicates the requirements associated with using BW, reduces the attacker's confidence that BW and CW use will further his objectives, and thus can greatly contribute to deterrence of biological, toxin, or chemical weapon use. The absence of passive defense contributes to the likelihood of its use.
DETERRENCE BY JEOPARDY
Until the United States is able to deploy active and passive defenses and counterforce capabilities to deny Iran the ability to pose a meaningful and credible threat of NBC use, the best available option will be to credibly threaten retaliatory actions that would make use of NBC appear "too costly" to the Iranian leadership. These actions should be credible and unambiguous and should put in jeopardy Iran's centers of gravity. Once denial strategies are in place, these may take on a lesser role but should remain viable to enhance deterrence.
The United States needs to emphasize both the tools of denial and the capability to jeopardize Iran's centers of gravity. The credible threat to do so will greatly enhance deterrence. If the United States can credibly put Iran's centers of gravity at risk while protecting its own through active and passive defense and counterforce, then Iran will more likely be deterred.
Credibility must be enhanced, because Iran has almost certainly been attentive to indicators that U.S. will and resolve are weakened. Revelations by former Bush administration officials that the U.S. threatened option for nuclear response to Iraqi biological or chemical weapons use was more bluff than real, U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, and the very limited U.S. retaliation against recent Iraqi violation of the Northern no-fly zone have likely reduced U.S. credibility to carry out significant responses to Iranian actions. Credibility, however, might be enhanced by even so small an effort as providing demonstration videos to Iran of U.S. tests of those forces designed to implement U.S. denial strategies, such as capabilities for deep underground facility destruction. Destruction of two centers of gravity will have different effects and thus, priorities, at different phases of our ongoing conflict with Iran.
Revolutionary Guard Survival/Legitimacy
Because the Iranian entity most likely to advocate or execute use of NBC is the IRGC, which provides the focal point for NBC acquisition, employment, and Iranian state terrorism, the United States must be able to hold the IRGC itself unmistakably at risk. In a crisis or outbreak of hostilities, the United States must have the ability to ensure the swift destruction of the IRGC. How much of the IRGC would need to be destroyed is an important question. With the destruction of the IRGC, however, the probability of NBC use would decrease dramatically, making it a national center of gravity, particularly during war.
Psychological Operations/Information Warfare: Prior to an outbreak of hostilities, the United States should consider options to undercut the IRGC's legitimacy as a means of undermining its survival. Undercutting IRGC legitimacy could include psychological operations that, for example, draw comparisons between the IRGC and its operations and that of SAVAK, the Shah's secret police. An additional approach could be informing the Iranian population that its government's denial of pursuing NBC is false. At a time when the economy is declining and the population's economic needs are not being met, such information could be meaningful. The population might also react negatively to the type of war the IRGC could involve it in because of the NBC weapons the IRGC has acquired but has been denying since 1991. Seeking to dismiss criticism, the Iranian Government has warned its population that the enemies of the regime are likely to undertake psychological operations against it.
This paper does not seek to identify plans for such psychological operations, which does have associated risks, but notes that they should be explored and a plan devised.4 As noted earlier, the IRGC might respond to its impending demise by initiating war and NBC use as a means of enhancing or consolidating power. Thus, the other option that must be available to decisionmakers is the physical destruction of the IRGC as an entity.
IRGC Destruction: IRGC destruction will be a difficult task in light of its physical dispersal and decentralized command structure. While it is possible that destruction of IRGC personnel would render its NBC forces unusable, the highest priority of the counterforce effort should be made to eliminate the NBC forces as well. Destruction of the military capability of the Guard, particularly their NBC capabilities, would leave Iran vulnerable to attack, especially from Iraq, and thus threaten both their ability to achieve their war aims and their ability to survive, let alone reconstitute, in the postwar period.
An additional advantage to targeting the IRGC is that if the IRGC is destroyed or de-legitimized, the resulting political regime may be far more moderate. Although no opposition group stands out as a self-evident alternative at this time, serious consideration should begin now as to what type of post-war Iranian regime the United States would like to see emerge if a war could not be averted. Efforts to establish communications with Iranians within and outside of Iran5 begun now can only increase the probability of identifying and potentially shaping a better relationship with the next Iran. The IRGC has earned enemies among the educated, Westernized upper and middle classes in Tehran, perhaps the clerics,6 and maybe some of the masses who paid the price of Iranian radicalism, including manning the fronts of the human wave attacks in Iran's last war, bearing the burden of international sanctions, and serving as the anvil of the state's political and religious repression. Valid concerns are frequently expressed about certain of the larger opposition groups, and it would be prudent to avoid "support" for any particular group or individual. Receptivity to contact and openness in communicating U.S. long-term goals and interests in the region, and a U.S. willingness to establish positive relations with a future Iran more disposed toward the United States could be a low-cost investment that could offer dividends in the long term.
Deny Iran Ambiguity: Ambiguity is Iran's ally against the United States. The United States should deny Iran this by taking a two-pronged approach: better intelligence and a reinvigorated capability to respond in the face of ambiguity. The requirements for better intelligence regarding Iran are fairly straightforward:
The requirements for the second prong are more complex but critical to enhanced deterrence.
No intelligence information is likely to be sufficient to provide absolute certainty of activities if another state seeks to cover and conceal the information. Alternative explanations are always possible, if not probable or even sensible. For this reason, standards of evidence are established in, for example, a court of law or in compliance assessments or in the sanctions process. In previous years the United States has not required "proof" or other unattainably high standards of evidence. For example, despite lack of releasable data, the U.S. population was convinced by the President's judgment that Libya was behind terrorist acts and that Libya should be attacked. Further, it also believed that the Government of Granada was Marxist and that Granada should be invaded. A standard of evidence that requires proof "beyond a shadow of a doubt" is almost certain to cripple the U.S. ability to respond to Iran. A "preponderance of evidence" standard would be a high standard but is attainable.
Whatever standard is adopted, the question of whether, under what circumstances, and how the United States can and should respond to Iran should be considered prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Advance consideration would aid decisionmakers who will face Iranian surrogates or other ambiguous attacks on U.S. or allied interests in the Gulf. Options could then be developed that would clarify for Iran how the United States will respond to assessments that Iranian leaders are responsible for any terrorist actions involving NBC that are linked to Iran. Such signals could render surrogate use less appealing as a means of creating ambiguity and also give Iranian decisionmakers, particularly the IRGC, further incentives to prevent terrorist NBC use against U.S. or allied interests or to ensure that the United States is convinced of Iranian innocence.
Improving U.S. ability to respond in the face of ambiguity will enhance our overall ability to respond to some of the options the Iranians have probably considered for attacking the United States, and thus will enhance our ability to deter such actions in the first instance.
Economic Vulnerabilities
A second national center of gravity is the access the Iranian economy and specifically its oil revenues, without which the state of Iran almost certainly cannot survive.
Iran is vitally dependent on oil production for internal use and export. Oil exports account for more than 95 percent of its foreign exchange revenues, without which it be even less able to import food for its exploding population.7 Should Iranian ability to produce oil, or to access its oil reserves be interrupted, its economy would be further crippled. All Iran's oil exports currently go through the Gulf, offering specific targets for impeding their access to revenues from their oil resources. While the rest of the world is dependent on oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz, options for interrupting Iran's exports should be developed, particularly those that minimize the impact on Iran's oil customers.
Iran is also vulnerable "in the extreme" to price fluctuations. Lower oil income resulting from either price decreases with the same quotas or lowered oil quotas makes it very difficult for Iran to meet the demands of its rapidly expanding population. This problem is challenging Iran today and it is for this reason that "Iran depends on keeping oil prices as high as possible and on maintaining some form of price stability within an OPEC cartel capable of influencing if not dictating prices."8 While this option may seem fairly easy to implement compared to the challenges associated with destroying the IRGC, the dependence of other states (including allies of the United States) on Iranian oil will complicate execution of this option.
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