7.

ENHANCING U.S. DETERRENCE

The reaction of most readers, including those with expertise in Middle Eastern issues or military analysis, may be that this assessment greatly overstates the Iranian threat. Other reactions may assert that this assessment presents the challenge of deterring Iran as far too complex, because many believe that Iran is and will remain deterred from NBC use by the threat of U.S. conventional or nuclear retaliation. Yet others may believe that the recommendations are far too simplistic, because deterrence is complex.

It is difficult for any Western analyst to project onto another state actions clearly beyond the realm of the possible, yet other states frequently behave in ways that make little or no sense from a Western perspective.

Iraq was not deterred from invading Kuwait, but perhaps this miscalculation of U.S. will and intent was a one-time error. Throughout Operation Desert Shield, however, the United States sought, through both words and deeds, to communicate clearly what Iraq had to do to avoid a U.S. attack-and still Iraq did not behave as they '"should" have. The United States did attack, Iraq was defeated, and an international coalition is conducting the most intrusive inspection regime in history designed to discover and eliminate the Iraqi NBC threat. Despite this execution of a threatened response and imposition of tremendous burdens for Iraq, the Iraqi regime remains intact and appears to be successfully thwarting international efforts to eliminate its NBC capability. Iraq's capability to conduct war is greatly diminishedCbut it is not yet deterred.

Can the United States expect more "reasonable" behavior from Iran? Iran has much to lose, and any potential benefit of attacking the United States, particularly with NBC weapons, would appear to "sensible" minds to be dwarfed by the risks of a U.S. response. The sensible approach would view Iran's pursuit of NBC weapons as either pursuit of status or as defense against lesser threats such as Iraq, because it would not be "sensible" for Iran to pursue NBC for use; to train to use radiological, chemical, or especially biological weapons offensively; or to consider using NBC against the United States. It could therefore be asserted that Iran's NBC capabilities must be overstated, their Shin-mim-re forces must be for strictly defensive purposes, and the only threat against which Iran might consider offensive NBC use, if it were to be so "unreasonable" as to consider offensive use, would be against states other than the United States or its allies, namely, states such as Iraq.

Iran is a large country rich with potential, in both its population and natural resources. It is strategically located. It has much to lose. Yet Iran today, with its pursuit of NBC and its support for terrorism, has taken positions and followed policies that carry costs well beyond the apparent benefits of such actions. Even when relations with Germany and other European states were on better terms, Iran's pursuit of its political enemies abroad put a serious upper limit on the extent of relations and trade. To what benefit? Indeed, should Iran abandon policies and activities so contrary to international norms, it could almost certainly take a lead role in the political and economic world of the coming century. Why, one wonders, does Iran not take its place among the emerging economic powerhouses? What role could it play if its offers of regional leadership were not tinged with threats? This approach, however, has been rejected by Iran for almost two decades.

The reason can be explained only by Iran's revolutionary dogma and institutions. To change its policies of exporting the revolution, of sponsoring and supporting terrorism, and of hostility toward the United States would require a redefinition of the regime and, in essence, its demise. Moderation in its external relations and abandonment of its pursuit of military means to attack the United States has not been adopted as Iranian policy for just this reason.

While it is hoped that moderation and redefinition of the regime will be part of the future history of Iran, the United States must address the NBC threat of the current regime. Under the current religious and political structures, and with the continuing influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Iran's political and religious culture and personality will make Iran violent and extremely difficult to deter, particularly unless the United States better focuses its efforts. Iran has an active biological and chemical weapons capability, may have radiological weapons, and has exercised its forces, particularly IRGC forces, for operations in an NBC environment. NBC weapons offer Iran an indirect approach of countering the United States because they provide a means of leveraging its strengths (terror, use of ambiguity, a cult of martyrdom and death, and high risk tolerance) against the vulnerability (nonacceptance of high casualties in battle and an inability to act in the face of ambiguity) of the United States, the world's most powerful military.

While the U.S. hopes for or seeks moderation in the Iranian regime, highest priority should be placed on deterring and defending against Iranian NBC use. The approach recommended is neutralizing Iranian NBC capability through a combination of active and passive defenses and counterforce capabilities reinforced with the credible threat of putting Iran's centers of gravity in jeopardy.

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