5.

IRANIAN NBC POLICY, CAPABILITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS

There are five methods of attacking with fire. The first is to burn personnel; the second, to burn stores; the third, to burn equipment; the fourth, to burn arsenals; and the fifth, to use incendiary missiles.¹

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

IRANIAN NBC POLICY

In the early post-revolutionary period, Iran's position on chemical and other weapons of mass destruction weapons was that they were contrary to Islam. During the Gulf War with Iraq, however, as Iraqi chemical weapons (CW) use became more frequent and more effective, and as the international community failed to respond, the Iranians changed their position, apparently even using chemical artillery rounds captured from Iraq. As the war continued, Iran developed its own chemical weapons capability; by the end of the war Iran had embarked on the production of biological weapons (BW) and probably had begun planning pursuit of nuclear weapons.

In September 1987, then Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani spoke to a group of "Personnel of the Chemical, Biological, and Radioactive Warfare Units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps," stating, "Muslims should equip themselves with a deterrent weapon to counter the arsenal used by world blasphemy against them" and vowed that "we declare that if we are invaded in any way, we will counter them the same way as ordered by the Koran."² The following year Rafsanjani stated to the Majlis, 

Chemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper.³

After he became Iran's President, Rafsanjani is quoted as having said, 

With regard to chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made very clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage; the world does not respect its own resolutions, and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed on the battlefield. . . . We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. ⁴

In April 1990, Fakhreddin Hejazi, a Majlis Defense Committee member was asked the following question: 

Iraq is being extensively armed with the most advanced weaponry (atomic and biological). In view of the fact that all of us know how the Ba'thist regime has been a great threat in the region, what steps have been foreseen in our country's five-year plan as far as the strengthening of our armed forces is concerned? ⁵

His answer was: 

What is important in a war now is first belief and faith, then strong manpower, and last technical and scientific strengths. As far as manpower is concerned, thank God we are strong. As far as faith is concerned, I can say that our faith is unprecedented in the world and we will never abandon the Koran, which is the source of our strength. As for arms, we are striving not to depend on foreigners for them. In our five-year plan, we have allocated budgets to arms and research. Of course I cannot go into details. ... We can say that we have achieved great success in the nuclear field. I should not go into more details on this. Of course we will never start a criminal war like the Iraqi regime. As an example, even though we have the equipment and the raw materials for biological and chemical weapons in hand, nevertheless, we never intend to arm ourselves with this weapon unless one day we have to do so to retaliate. But our war will never be inhuman. We want to give you the good tidings that our competent Iranian researchers and scientists are carrying out research both in the armed forces and in the (IRGC) Corps and they have scored successes which we will talk about in due course.⁶

Significantly, this relative openness if not outright pride regarding NBC programs changed abruptly in the aftermath of Desert Storm. Until UNSCOM dismantlement operations in Iraq showed Iran that the possession of such weapons could have burdensome international consequences, Iran made public references to its pursuit of NBC capabilities. After that, its statements, particularly those in English rather than Farsi, generally asserted that Iran abhorred such weapons and embraced arms control. In 1994, for example, an English language newspaper published an interview with IRGC Commander Rezai in which he scoffed at reports that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons, arguing on military grounds that Iran did not want nuclear weapons: "Political logic, morality, our own culture and above all the situation in today's world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons." He went on to add, "Of course, we are for traditional weapons and that too just for self-defense."⁷ Thus, Rezai tried to argue, Iran is not pursuing NBC capabilities, is pursuing only self-defense, and has no expansionary or offensive purposes for its military forces. While the Iranian definitions of self-defense are based on their interpretations of offensive versus defensive jihad, such a statement is blatantly contrary to available evidence.

A 1995 article in the English language version of Iran's official news agency denied on humanitarian grounds that Iran had ever used chemical or biological weapons and that it had any nuclear program: 

The Islamic Republic of Iran is itself one of the victims of chemical and biological weapons and has always expressed its severe opposition to production and use of such weapons of mass destruction and considers it as violation of humanitarian principles. Despite heavy casualties of Iranian combatants during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and its physical and psychological consequences which is obvious among those combatants who were exposed to such chemical attacks, Iran never resorted to use chemical and biological weapons against the Iraqi forces.⁸

Contrary to such assertions, which might lead to the conclusion or hope that Iran's religious beliefs would lead them to eschew the development and use of weapons of mass destruction, a decision was made to develop whatever means are necessary to further Iranian interests. Iran did indeed use chemical weapons against the Kurds, and it is believed that there was limited use against Iraq near the end of the Iran/Iraq war.

The decision to develop such weapons came reluctantly. In 1993, for example, Ayatollah Khamene'i told a ceremony for the air, land, and sea units of the IRGC, "The use of science in the service of force and deception is a bitter truth."⁹ "Science" here is a thinly veiled reference to NBC weapons. As recently as October 4, 1996, the First Deputy Speaker of the Assembly of Experts, said: 

How many times have I said this to you that any weapon that kills human beings is banned by Islam, mass destruction weapons in particular. Initially it has banned them. However, if someone has embarked on this banned activity and produced weapons, it is incumbent upon you to make more superior ones.¹⁰

Thus, Iran's public assertions that it is not pursuing and would not use NBC weapons are countered by statements more consistent with other pronouncements indicating a perceived need for NBC weapons and a willingness to use any means necessary to attain their objectives.

NBC AND MISSILE CAPABILITY

Information and misinformation in the public realm aside, Iran has indeed pursued the acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon capabilities. Their chemical weapons program began during the war with Iraq, as apparently did their biological weapons program. They also are likely to possess radiological weapons and have an active ballistic missile program. Iran is believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons.

Chemical Weapons

Iran has been actively engaged in chemical weapons production for over a decade. Iran was the target of Iraqi chemical weapon use during their war. Anthony Cordesman has described CW use in the Iran/Iraq war as follows:  

According to one estimate, Iraq used chemical weapons 195 times between 1983 and the 1988 cease-fire. . . . Iraq also developed the capability to use gas at least as effectively for tactical and strategic purposes as it did in using gas to produce casualties. Iranian forces often found that gas gave Iraq the tactical initiative or a dominant tactical position, and each successive Iraqi use of gas had a cumulative strategic effect in breaking Iranian morale.¹¹

As for the overall impact of chemical weapons on the war, even the highest estimate of the total number of casualties from gas weapons makes up less than 5% of the well over one million military and civilian casualties that resulted from the war. Nevertheless, chemical weapons had a critical effect on Iranian military and civilian morale by late 1987, and during the Iraqi counter-offensives and 'war of the cities' in 1988. Sheer killing power is not the key measure of success: it is rather the strategic, tactical and psycho-political impact of the use of such weapons. Even when troops are equipped with defensive gear, they often feel they are defenseless and break and run after limited losses. Populations which fear chemical attacks may well cease to support a conflict.¹²

The Iraqi chemical weapons use had two predominant effects on Iran. First, genuinely shocked at the lack of response by the international community, as indicated by Rafsanjani,¹³ Iran came to understand that international agreements and organizations such as the United Nations offered no substitute for military capability and weapons of mass destruction.¹⁴ Second, Iran concluded late in the war that it needed chemical weapons of its own, although Iran apparently did not use chemical weapons on a large scale. While it is believed that Iran used chemical artillery shells captured from the Iraqis during the Iran/Iraq war, Iranian use was far less extensive than the Iraqis', and even then primarily against the Kurds.¹⁵

While Iran began its chemical weapons production as a result of Iraqi use in the Iran-Iraqi conflict, it has not only continued its program in the face of UNSCOM degradation of the Iraqi CW program but has actually expanded chemical weapons production: 

Iran has been producing chemical agents at a steadily increasing rate since 1984, and has cumulatively produced at a minimum several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking agents. Tehran has weaponized some of these chemical agentsCa weapons stockpile to support ground combat operations. In addition, Iran could attempt to deliver chemical bombs against targets such as airfields, ports, or oil installations across the Persian Gulf.¹⁶

Iran is unlikely to terminate its CW program as a result of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). According to the CIA's Nonproliferation Center: 

Iran has continued to upgrade and expand its chemical weapons production infrastructure and chemical munitions arsenal, despite signing the CWC in January 1993. Iran produces a variety of chemical agents, including blister, blood, and choking agents. As part of this expansion, Iran is spending large sums of money on long-term capital improvements to its chemical warfare program, suggesting that it intends to maintain a CW capability well into the future.¹⁷

Biological Weapons

As with its CW program, Iran is believed to have begun its biological weapons program in the 1980s, during its war with Iraq. This production, which was initiated by the IRGC, was certainly underway by 1986, as evidenced in an April 1986 announcement by the Minister of the IRGC:  

The armament industries of the Corps have made notable progress in the missile, aircraft, biological, chemical, and nuclear fields as well as in construction of engineering equipment such as a variety of bridges, mortar-launchers, and rocket-propelled grenades (emphasis added).¹⁸

Official U.S. assessments of the Iranian offensive biological weapons program indicate a BW production and weaponization program:  

The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs. The United States Government reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.¹⁹

Biological weapons can be delivered in the same munitions that deliver chemical weapons, including "artillery shells, rockets, bombs, missile warheads, and covert devices."²⁰

Nuclear/Radiological Weapons

Iran is believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons under a program that reportedly began but was not completed under the Shah. The Iranians have sought significant German and Argentine technological support in several key aspects of its nuclear weapons effort,²¹ as well as Russian and Chinese assistance: 

In 1985 Iran purchased a "subcritical" experimental reactor from China, without declaring the purchase to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In July 1987 Iran purchased from China equipment that is used for enriching uranium. On January 21, 1990, Chinese and Iranian officials signed an agreement to build a twenty-seven-megawatt plutonium production reactor in Isfahan. U.S. satellite photographs taken in September 1991 documents major construction work at the site and the presence of large numbers of Chinese technicians. In 1991 Iran also attempted to purchase a research reactor from India and a nuclear fuel fabrication plant from Argentina.²²

The IAEA, however, has never acknowledged evidence of Iranian wrongdoing, and the Iranians have touted their IAEA clean bill of health and publicly thanked the IAEA. As recently as November 1995, Iran's permanent envoy to the United Nations expressed Iran's appreciation to the IAEA "for its efforts in promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects."²³ Russia, which has agreed to assist Iran's "peaceful nuclear program," has assured the international community that its assistance will be under the supervision of the IAEA. None of this guarantees, however, that the materials produced will not be part of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The CIA Nonproliferation Center's (NPC) March 1995 Report states: 

Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and, if significant foreign assistance were provided, could produce a weapon by the end of the decade. Tehran is devoting significant resources to its nuclear program. Foreign suppliers, including Russia and China, are key sources of necessary technologies not only for Iran's nuclear program but also for its other WMD capabilities.²⁴

While no convincing evidence has emerged to indicate that Iran now has nuclear weapons capability, the necessary material for a nuclear weapon, sporadic news reports²⁵ indicate that Iran may have actually sought sensitive nuclear materials, and even nuclear warheads, from the former Soviet Union. Such a possibility cannot be fully discounted. Iran may, in any event, have already acquired enough material for radiological weapons. Radiological weapons, or radiological dispersal devices (RDD), are defined as "any explosive device that is intended to spread radioactive material in detonation. An improvised nuclear device can also be an RDD if the explosion does not cause a nuclear yield, but 'fizzles,' spreading radioactive materials."²⁶ Iran reportedly possesses "stockpiles of uranium,"²⁷ and the assessment that they have pursued RDD is supported by the frequent training of Iran's "Shim-Mim-Re," the chemical, biological, and radiological units.

While little information is available on an Iranian radiological weapons program, some exists on the Iraqi radiological weapons program. According to Iraqi statements and reports given to UNSCOM inspectors and the IAEA, Iraq conducted experiments in 1987 to explore radiological weapons as a means of area denial but subsequently did not pursue the program beyond the initial phase. In August 1995, Iraq stated: 

A number of lead-shielded metal containers with irradiated zirconium oxide were exploded . . . each container, which weighed about 1 ton (because of extensive shielding), had from 0.5 to 1 kilogram of irradiated zirconium oxide.

In December 1995, additional information was provided: 

Three prototypes were made based on modified Nasser 28 aerial bombs. These prototypes had a gross weight of 1,400 kilograms and had a radioactive content of some two curies deriving mainly from the hafnium impurity present in the zirconium oxide that had been irradiated . . . all three bombs were exploded at test sites.²⁸

The Iranians may also see such weapons as offering area denial applicability or as weapons of terror. Radiological weapons could be used as a means to deny the United States access to key ports or air bases in somewhat the same manner as biological weapons, but probably with less loss of life, and could wreak havoc among civilian populations. There are limitations on the effectiveness of radiological weapons that would almost certainly make them less attractive to the Iranians than biological weapons or even chemical weapons, to include that their use could, with limited military utility, be perceived as "nuclear" and entail an escalation in conflict. While the radiation effects could likely be cleaned up rather expeditiously, the requirement to do so is cost associated with operating in a radiological environment. Clean-up operations could be further hindered with subsequent attacks.²⁹

Delivery Means

Iran appears to be pursuing both conventional and novel means of attacking its targets and to believe that both would be useful against U.S. forces. Among conventional forces, Iran has pursued options for ballistic and cruise missiles as well as more traditional strike fighters. Anthony Cordesman highlighted the effectiveness of modern strike fighters for delivery of chemical or biological agent:  

Most Middle Eastern states already have modern strike aircraftC many refuelableCthat can hit any city or target in neighboring countries. If such aircraft face a higher probability of intercept in a few countries like Israel, they can carry far higher payloadsCoften as much as eight to ten times the payload per aircraft of an extended range Scud. They also fly at speeds and altitudes that make the delivery of biological and chemical weapons far easier than the high reentry speeds of missiles.³⁰

Other conventional Iranian forces identified by Cordesman could be used as NBC delivery systems: 

• Old F4D/E aircraft, SU-24 and Mirage F-1 fighters acquired from Iraq. New Soviet aircraft may be on order.
• Possible order for PRC-made M-9 missile (280-620 kilometer range).
• Iranian made Iran-130 missile with 150+ kilometer range.
• Iranian Oghab (Eagle) rocket with 40+ kilometer range.
• New SSM with 125 mile range may be in production, but could be modified FROG.
• HY-2 Silkworm missiles.
• Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.³¹

Iran possesses an impressive arsenal of ballistic missiles and, particularly in light of the Iranian experience as the victims of ballistic missile attacks, understands their great political and military utilityCparticularly if the enemy is undefended. The CSS-8, provided by China, has a 150- km-range. The 320-km Scud B missile, with a 1,000-kg warhead, was sold to Iran by North Korea³² and gives Tehran the ability to threaten U.S. forces in the Gulf. The 500-km Scud C, with a likely 700- to 800-kg warhead and also acquired from North Korea, puts key oil installations and ports under threat of attack. If armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, these missiles, despite their inaccuracy, could present a major threat to U.S. and coalition forces in the area. While such warheads may, according to Cordesman, be "extremely difficult to engineer and require well planned testing efforts to produce predictable and effective results," they would, at a minimum, require that the United States and its allied forces consider employment of active and passive defenses and could thereby change logistics requirements as well as alter the pace and tempo of operations. More significantly, these weapons may be most effective as "political weapons," changing the higher level considerations, such as risk of military and civilian casualties, raising questions about allied support and the support of the American public, and, in turn, influencing the policy context in which a war is prosecuted.

Like Iraq in the late 1980s, Iran may be seeking to reduce the inaccuracy and extend the reach of its ballistic missiles and to enhance accuracy with more advanced cruise missiles. Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Velayati would neither confirm nor deny that during his visit to China in spring 1995 he "received missile control systems to increase the precision of Iranian Scuds,"³³ reported to be among the key purposes for his visit. The commercial availability of the Global Positioning System (GPS), particularly the follow-on or newer systems, will make it possible for the Iranians to enhance the accuracy of their ballistic missiles.³⁴ GPS also promises to enhance the accuracy of Iranian cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are "much cheaper to build than ballistic missiles, do not present the problem of high reentry velocities, and can strike a specific target within 10-20 meters." Their introduction with terminal command guidance promises to make Iranian biological and chemical weapons even more usable.³⁵ Iran reportedly possesses the HY-2 Silkworm cruise missile, and China is reported to have built a plant in Iran to assemble the Silkworm. China is also reportedly helping the IRGC to increase the Silkworm's range to over 400 kilometers³⁶. There is also evidence that Iran is deploying the Chinese C802 antiship cruise missile. The C802 has a 120-km range with an "adequate guidance system and a 700-km warhead." ³⁷

In addition to efforts to increase the accuracy of its missiles, Iran is seeking to extend the range of its ballistic missile inventory. Iran is expected to supplement its existing ballistic missile inventories with the purchase from North Korea of the 1,000- to 1,300-km Nodong, and, with North Korean and Chinese help, is seeking to develop and produce its own 3,000-km-range ballistic missilesCwhich could hold much of eastern and central Europe at risk.³⁸ The chart on the following page demonstrates the Iranian effort to expand its reach using ballistic missiles.

Iran has also pursued novel delivery means. In August 1987, for example, Mohsen Rezai, the Commander of the IRGC, announced that "the most formidable weapon in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards are motorized speed launches, loaded with explosives which are specially designed for offensive." He added: "In case the enemy attacks us during the maneuvers, thousands of such boats will be launched and we are sure that the enemy warships in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and Oman Sea will be destroyed by them."³⁹

In more recent years, Iran also began mass-producing remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).⁴⁰ RPVs offer a potentially accurate delivery mode that might be particularly useful for delivering biological agents. It takes a smaller quantity of biological weapons to inflict a given number of casualties than the quantity of chemical agent needed.⁴¹ Again, this sort of novel delivery mode could give the advantage of surprise to the attacker; RPVs in particular, while unlikely to be capable of carrying large quantities of agent, would present unique challenges to defenses. The quantity of agent delivered and the challenge posed to U.S. defenses could be multiplied by launching swarms of RPVs. Iran may want to maintain its novel delivery means as more than interim capabilities as improvements in accuracy and precision in warhead delivery enhance the military effectiveness of its ballistic missiles for delivering NBC, thereby further complicating U.S. defense efforts.

Such an approach's unconventionality could enhance surprise and other measures of effectiveness, particularly if U.S. forces are not prepared to confront such novel threats as a thousand motorized speed launches loaded with radiological, biological, or chemical weapons on suicide missions. The Iranian pursuit of a robust ballistic missile capability would be consistent with a reasonable desire to keep the conflict as far away as possible from the Iranian homeland and to be able to extend the reach of the Revolutionary Guard. The value of a ballistic missile program was not undermined by Iraq's defeat in Desert Storm and likely has been reinforced by the lessons from that conflict: 

First, unlike aircraft bombing, missile penetration was not so dependent on the skills of a pilot and the range was much greater. Second, the terrorizing effect Iraqi missile attacks had on Israel was out of all proportion to any possible military utility. Third, even the odd, chance missile hit could amplify this terror. Fourth, mobile missiles were survivable, effective if well deployed, and difficult to locate.⁴²

Ballistic missiles, novel delivery means, NBC weapons and an emphasis on naval forces all reinforce the proposition that the primary target for Iranian forces will not be regional neighbors but rather the United States. Iranian forces are thus assessed to be deployed to strike at the primary symbol of U.S. power projection, the U.S. Navy, with its large carrier battle groups. Other targets are also likely, however, as will be discussed later.

EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

Would Iran use NBC? How would they use it? Do they have a strategy or employment doctrine? Some have hypothesized that such weapons would be used only as a weapon of last resort and that countries like Iran certainly have no formal doctrine for their employment. Iran's official position since Desert Storm has been that it does not seek or possess NBC weapons and would not use them. Evidence, however, supports a different assessment: that Iran has sought NBC capabilities and has given weighty consideration to such questions, sees NBC weapons as usable and as means to counter-balancing U.S. military strengths, and has prepared to operate in an NBC environment, almost certainly of their own making.

Military Education

In 1986 the IRGC opened Imam Hosein University, which offers "advanced studies in military sciences, engineering, management, and even medical sciences."⁴³ In addition, the Guard also founded a military think-tank that supports it, the Academy of Multilateral Defense and Strategy of the Revolutionary Guard.⁴⁴ While the products of these higher military education programs are not available publicly, the existence of these programs lends weight to the proposition that the IRGC has considered questions related to military doctrine. Further, given that the IRGC has also led the Iranian pursuit of biological and chemical weapons and would have the lead in their use, it is logical to assume that their military university and their academy devote some consideration to such questions as how and when NBC weapons can be threatened or used to advance Iranian interests.

Exercises and Maneuvers

Iran has exercised its BW and CW capabilities in tactical maneuvers and exercises that explicitly train the "Shin-Mim-Re," or "chemical, biological, and radiological units." While it is possible that these exercises are "defensive," in the sense that their purpose is to prepare Iranian forces to operate in an NBC environment created by hostile forces, it is even more likely that such training prepares them for an NBC environment of their own making. Most of these exercises are offensive, involving assaults on enemy positions. Before Desert Storm, when the Iranians tended to be more direct about their NBC intentions, official language made this quite clear. But despite the defensive spin added since 1991, the offensive character of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons related training may still be discerned.

Several unclassified descriptions of Iranian force exercises support the probable offensive purpose of Iranian exercises and the probable exercise of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons forces. Table 1 highlights a number of such exercises since 1987. The first, in August 1987, was Iran's "Martyrdom" maneuver, a 3-day naval action by the Revolutionary Guard. The first stage of the exercise included four divisions and the launch of Iran's first home-made submarine. Guard leader Mohsen Rezai clarified the purpose of the maneuver: 

Ground-to-air, ground-to-ground and ground-to-sea missiles were aimed at mock targets but would not be fired during the maneuvers. However, if the enemy takes action in the Gulf, the Guards' missile maneuvers will become a real military operation.⁴⁵

Consistent with this paper's discussion of delivery systems that Iran could against the United States, Rezai also said at the time:

The most formidable weapon in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards are motorized speed launches, loaded with explosives which are specially designed for offensive. In case the enemy attacks us during the maneuvers, thousands of such boats will be launched and we are sure that the enemy warships in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and Oman sea will be destroyed by them.⁴⁶

Iran's Persian news service described the June 1989 "Bey'at Operational Exercise" as including offensive operations: 

The following units took part: the 15th Ramazan Corps, the Imam Khomeyni Battalion, the Special Martyrdom Battalion, the Engineering Equipment Battalion, the Air Defense Unit, and some Shin-Mim-Re [chemical, biological, and radioactive warfare] units. They used combat tactics on two axes and in three phases performed guerrilla operations using light-and medium-weight weapons. The forces attacked predetermined objectives and a hypothetical enemy. After destroying the enemy's trenches and crossing his canals, earthworks, and minefields they captured the heights of the hypothetical enemy.⁴⁷

The May 1990 "Sahand" naval exercise was also reported by the official Iranian news agency. The Iranians announced that Sahand would be conducted to test: 

the assault capability of submarines manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy against the surface units of a hypothetical enemy. In this stage of the maneuvers, naval vessels passed through channels which had been cleared of mines and, engaging in special naval battles in special naval formations, they repulsed the air attacks of the hypothetical enemy with the support of air defense units.⁴⁸

The fourth stage of the Sahand maneuvers, which were held in the presence of the Commander of the Iranian Navy, Captain Sham'khani, and a number of other high-ranking navy commanders, included: 

tracking fighter-bombers over the sea, guiding helicopters in anti-surface operations, carrying out exercises of electronic warfare, launching attacks by fighter-bombers against surface naval targets-as well as Shin-Mim-Re operations and anti-germ attacks on light and heavy naval vessels.⁴⁹

Before Iran's January 1991 Grand Fajr military exercises, the commander of the Iranian Ground Forces reported on Tehran radio, "During these month-long exercises, the Air Force's capability to provide combat and defense support to the ground forces and, ultimately, the readiness of the ground forces' chemical and biological unit will be assessed."⁵⁰ These maneuvers, along Iran's border with Iraq, tested the SA-2 and SA-6 missiles "as well as other weapons." It is not known if these anti-aircraft units were trained in a defensive or offensive mode, but the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards said they were "directly linked to the presence of foreign forces" in the region,⁵¹ that is, at the U.S.-led Desert Storm coalition. The Fajr exercises were also announced to be for the purpose of testing: "The combat readiness of the special forces of the IRGC in the face of likely enemy attacks, performance of air assaults in taking the bases of the joint aggressive enemy, and the cooperation between the IRI armed forces Airforce and the Special Forces of the IRGC, so that special tactics and operational techniques are put into practice."⁵²

These special tactics and techniques probably included offensive use of biological and chemical weapons because these maneuvers focused on the chemical and biological units.

In August 1995, the Iranians held the "Beyt-ol-Moqaddas" operational maneuver, the stated purpose of which was to "strengthen the combat readiness of security units" and "display the combat capabilities in the face of possible conspiracies by the enemies of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran."⁵³ The Commander of the maneuver said: 

Infantry, armored and air units, as well as Shin-Mim-Re defense units, of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Army ground force will be taking part in the maneuver which will be carried out in five stages with delay and defense operations and assaults on the positions and fortifications and breaking through the attack of the hypothetical enemy-with full coordination and unity-in order to achieve the predetermined aims. A number of helicopters and aircraft will also be used in this military maneuver to bomb the hypothetical enemy's axes and fortifications."⁵⁴

In April 1996, the Iranian Navy held an exercise that included "naval units, including missile-launching frigates, support personnel-carrying and logistic warships."⁵⁵ Iranian descriptions indicate that the Shin-mim-re often participates with the exercises and maneuvers. The maneuvers included "loading and disembarking of forces on the coast in attack position."⁵⁶ U.S. Navy sources have confirmed that Iranian naval exercises "often emphasize naval blockade and amphibious assault, the kinds of issues about which the U.S. Navy is most concerned. This year's exercise (Victory 6) included chemical and biological warfare defense exercises."⁵⁷

Thus, Iran, and the Iranian Navy in particular, has exercised its BW and CW capabilities in tactical maneuvers that explicitly train the IRGC's Shin-mim-re units. Most of these exercises involve offensive assaults on fixed enemy positions. Thus, they are not strictly defensive. References to the "defense" aspect of the Sin-Mim-Re units began only after Desert Storm, when Iran began denying its possession and pursuit of NBC weapons.

The Shin-mim-re and naval forces in particular have exercised numerous times against hypothetical naval forces that certainly represent those of the United States. Some have speculated that, even though Iran might indeed use NBC weapons offensively, it would do so only against other regional states and not the more powerful United States. This assertion is not supported by the evidence. In fact, considerable evidence indicates that U.S. forces, and especially U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, are the most likely target of Iran's offensive preparations. The Deputy Commander of Iran's naval forces, Rear Admiral Abbas Mohtaj, said on November 24, 1994, "The presence of alien forces in the Persian Gulf, especially the Americans, is tantamount to a basic threat against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iran's naval unit should be capable of repelling it."⁵⁸ The following March, Mohtaj called the U.S. presence in the region illegal,⁵⁹ and in December 1995 he reiterated that Iran's only potential threat was the United States.⁶⁰

The frequent exercise of the Shin-Mim-re units cannot be to protect Iranian forces against a U.S. NBC attack, because Iran must certainly know that the United States has not possessed biological or radiological weapons for decades and is eliminating its entire chemical weapons stockpile. The more credible explanation is that Iranian forces are training to operate in an NBC environment of their own creation.

Iran's Analysis of Desert Storm

The Iranians watched Desert Shield and Desert Storm carefully, and their published assessments yield two strategically interrelated conclusions. First, Iran believed that Iraq would certainly use battlefield chemical and biological weapons. Second, Iranian observers viewed the United States as politically and strategically vulnerable should the war involve high Iraqi civilian casualties, an extended engagement, or high U.S. military casualties.

On January 17, 1991, for example, on the first day of Desert Storm, Ettela'at assessed the Iraqi situation: 

There will be the vast use of chemical and biological weapons, which Iraq has explicitly stated it will use. Of course the Americans have said that they have deprived Iraq of this weapon with their aerial bombings. This propaganda-military argument has pushed the area into 'military hysteria' in which a comparison of the capability of both sides in a war in which technical calculations are based on military materiel and war techniques shows that the Americans will succeed in a 'phased war' and that Iraq will suffer a severe defeat. Only by considering the possibility that the war will be prolonged, by considering Saddam's inflexible stand and refusal to withdraw from Kuwait, and by considering the political-ideological developments that can come about with Israel's entry into the war can we see that the conditions of the current crisis speak of the transition from a phased war to an all-embracing regional and international political-military crisis.⁶¹

The Iranian Domestic News Service contained the following January 1991 assessment of U.S. and Iraqi wartime objectives and possible NBC use in the early days of Desert Storm: 

America has not rejected even the use of the atomic weapon, and Iraq, too, considers it its duty to use its chemical and biological weapons if the need arises. The two sides are continuing the war with two different strategies. America is still thinking of a limited time factor and the geography of the battle in order to avoid a protracted conflict, which would have psychological, political, and economic repercussions. It is using everything at its disposal to prevent an extension of the war, which could create a deep schism between its allies and the stands of the Arab countries that are siding with it. An example of this effort can be seen in America's request of Israeli authorities to refrain from responding to Iraqi attacks on Israel. But Iraq has aimed all its efforts at a war of attrition and is trying, by various means, to extend the battle arena.⁶²

Another article reaffirms Iran's assessment that Iraq was producing biological weapons:

The smoke-filled air over Kuwait and the coast of Saudi Arabia, resulting from the blaze in the oil wells and the bombardment of the nuclear research center in Baghdad and factories manufacturing chemical and biological weapons, has raised fears about environmental contamination.⁶³

In a February 1991 Iranian press assessment, unnamed military experts are quoted as both criticizing the Iraqi tendency to pay excessive attention to fixed defense while neglecting other routes of penetration during the war with Iran, and also the likelihood that the Iraqi leaders would ignore such risks ("Iraqi infantry does not have a very brilliant reputation for resistance under such circumstances.") The article then adds: 

The Iraqi Armed Forces now find themselves in a situation where they do not benefit from satellite information, as they did before [in the Iran-Iraq war] and lack air security. Thus, finding a way of stationing the coalition forces behind Iraqi forces should not be too difficult or impractical, especially since these forces enjoy special engineering facilities for crossing the region's marshlands or quicksand. On the other hand, even if the leaders of Iraq, without paying attention to these problems, persist in not evacuating Kuwaiti territory and the multinational forces begin land operation in the way just mentioned, Iraqi infantry does not have a very brilliant reputation for resistance under such circumstances. The deployment of chemical or biological weapons by the Iraqi Armed Forces will be effective on a limited scale and will not raise the soldiers ability to resist to the extent that Iraqi commanders expect.⁶⁴

Other Iranian assessments of Desert Storm address the importance of effective propaganda. For example, one article focused in the early stages of Desert Storm on "the inefficiency of Iraq's propaganda to whip up the necessary support for its occupation of Kuwait," and highlighted the importance to the United States of minimizing civilian casualties and obtaining a swift victory, on grounds that the war had "reopened the Vietnam dossier."⁶⁵

Since Desert Storm, Iran has continued to apply these lessons to its geopolitical situation and military preparedness. In a September 1995 interview with IRGC Commander Rezai, for example, we learn several indicators of Iran's strategy, from a decidedly Iranian standpoint. Consistent with a shift in Iranian public statements after Desert Storm in which the Iranians, who once made fairly open public statements regarding pursuit of NBC capabilities, vehemently deny pursuit of these weapons, Rezai states emphatically that "the Western propaganda that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons is an outright lie." He argues, in response to a question about how Iran would respond if Israel attacked Iran's nuclear instalations, that Israel will not carry out a threat to do so, because "if they were they would not have announced the threat in the first place," but also that "anyone who delivers the slightest threat or commits the slightest violation against use will receive a much stronger answer." After noting that Iraq did not use nuclear or biological weapons, and used only chemical weapons against Iran, he says that the "international code of behavior shows that the weapons that were manufactured after World War II and were relied upon for decades are obsolete. We are pusuing other things and seek to base our defense potential on other factors." In this interview, quoted at length below, Rezai speaks of moving to what he calls a deterrent strategy: 

Resalat: In view of your long record on the battlefields, how do you assess Iran's military capabilities? If there were heavy attacks like the ones of 30 Shahrivar 1359 [Iraq's September 21,1980 invasion of Iran's western border] against our country today, would we be ready to defend ourselves?

Rezai: Our country has higher readiness now than it did then. Now we consider the 30 Shahrivar 1359 assault to have been of the simplest kind that we could encounter. Not only can we resist that magnitude of threat, we have even prepared to counter more serious threats. We are currently taking a more important step: Transitioning from being able to triumph to being able to deter. Previously we concentrated on our ability to conquer and repulse the enemy in even of war. But now we are trying to prevent any war from occurring-something much better and greater than conquering the enemy. It is true that we will defeat the enemy. But when the enemy occupies our territory, destroys our land and our economic capabilities, even if we oust them we will still have suffered heavy losses. Therefore, today we are striving to achieve a deterrent capability. Of course, we do not want to move toward strategic weapons; and the Western propaganda that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons is an outright lie. But we are trying to create an 'Ashura force that will actually be a rapid reaction force. We have in mind the creation of an organized force with modern equipment that will be able to deploy with lightening speed wherever we want. Such an immense force would be equivalent to a strategic and deterrent force. The 'Ashura maneuvers were the first exercises of this force; and they were successful, thank God. . . . If something like America's war against Iraq takes place, at least 20,000 American forces will be taken captive by us before America can attack us. But America will be ready to sit down at the negotiating table even with the first 1,000 captives. So our defense system is very different and we ourselves have discovered these rules of war, which, we think, are extremely effective.⁶⁶

The reference to an "'Ashura force" is noteworthy. 'Ashura marks the anniversary of the battle at Karbala referred to earlier between Hossein and 72 of his followers and a much larger army in the year 680.⁶⁷ This event marks the core value placed on martyrdom and the elevation of the small against the mighty. Moreover, in December of the same year, the Iranian news agency cited an editorial as stating, "As a basic rule, there are ten factors that affect the outcome of a war . . . having more sophisticated weapons is only one such factor." IRNA then reported:  

Although the Iranian navy enjoys superiority over the Americans in at least six or seven of these factors, it is doing all it can to improve its defense capabilities and increase its chances for superiority in the ten factors. It is also going ahead with its strategy to ensure Iran's leadership and superiority in the Persian Gulf.⁶⁸

There is likely some relationship between the strategy referred to and Iran's assessment of the factors that determine the outcome of war and reports that emerged in November 1995 of a new "modern war plan" that was begun in 1989 and which would be completed "within the next few years."⁶⁹ One explanation would be a combination of novel delivery modes for NBC weapons along with the threat of NBC use to "deter." It is also noteworthy that the focus of these efforts is defeat of U.S. forces in the Gulf.

EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS

The following scenarios are suggested by either actual Iranian statements, exercises, force deployments or a combination of these. Any or all of these use concepts could be executed should the IRGC determine that conditions call for action.

Terrorism

On July 8, 1987, IRGC Commander Rezai was cited as having said that: 

Lots of letters from Islamic States and world Muslims had reached Iranian authorities asking permission to attack the U.S. interests and embassies but that the Iranian officials had yet withheld permission.⁷⁰

This statement could foretell a strategy to blackmail the United States with Iran's terrorist allies or surrogates.

An October 1995 Iranian editorial reminded readers that Iran's sympathizers could respond to the United States and admonished that the United States should not label the sympathizers of the Islamic republic as "terrorists, radicals, or hijackers." It stated, 

Iran was not alone and while its sympathizers would not hold the American public responsible for the crimes of its leaders, they would definitely retaliate against the anti-Islamic plots of Washington.⁷¹

By such statements, Iran threatens the United States but does so in such a way that "sympathizers" and not Iran itself would undertake retaliation against the United States for its opposition to Iran. Iran would then likely seek to take "credit" with its allies for the act but without full or unambiguous culpability. The introduction of such ambiguity provides a cover that could be sufficient to avoid any U.S. sanction or retaliation. Such an approach has been identified by one U.S. analyst as an important Iranian lesson from Desert Storm. Hardcastle has suggested that Iran might:  

challenge U.S. interests incrementally and ambiguously. . . . Iraq and Iran will have learned to settle for gains that do not provide clear justifications for U.S. retaliation or intervention. While it has demonstrated the ability to respond to unambiguous threats, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its difficulty responding to ambiguous threats to its interests, a lesson also reinforced in peacekeeping operations since the 1991 Gulf War.⁷²

A terrorist strike directed or encouraged from Tehran could include use of a chemical, biological, or radiological weapon and in the future could possibly include a nuclear weapon. The targets could vary, as could the means of delivery. If the United States does not respond to Iran, or is capable only of a response that Iran believes is less than the perceived benefits associated with the action, Iran will credit itself as having won the battle or at least with strategic progress. On the other hand, should the United States respond, Iran may be prepared to counter the U.S. conventional military superiority directly with its own NBC weapons in the region, and would be clearly fighting in a self-rationalized defensive jihad.

Attacks on U.S. Forces in the Gulf

In policy statements and exercises, Iran appears to have put great emphasis on enabling Iranian forces to confront the United States by attacking U.S. forces in the Gulf. Such a confrontation could include either closing the Strait of Hormuz and holding its chemical,⁷³ biological, or radiological options in reserve to deter a U.S. response or a less subtle, outright preemptive attack.

Closing the Strait while threatening NBC use could fulfill Rezai's threat to take "at least 20,000 American forces" captive. The threat or actual use of NBC weapons against the first "1000 captives" if the United States takes any response would complete the scenario predicted by Rezai. Under this scenario, whose purpose is to force the United States to "sit down at the negotiating table," one could imagine Iran demanding a U.S. force drawdown in the Gulf or reversal of the U.S. embargo on Iran. Such a strategy applies Iran's deterrence and defensive jihad principles. Indeed, an attack that marked the anniversary of the downing of the Iranian airbus by the USS Vincennes would likely be considered to be a defensive act. The Iranians have held that the July 3, 1988, accident in which an Iranian airliner with 290 persons aboard was purposeful.⁷⁴

Of course, Iran could also attack U.S. forces outright (preemptively or in response to some "oppression") and seek negotiations later. In response to U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1988, Rezai announced on Iranian television that "the plans of the Islamic Republic Army and IRGC to confront the U.S. plots in the Persian Gulf were approved by the Supreme Defense Council." He explained that Iran had duplicated "missiles (Scuds) . . . and reproduced them with some changes," adding that "if Iran had launched one of these missiles at the USS Stark while the warship was being escorted out of the Persian Gulf waters last Friday, it would have been cut in two."⁷⁵ Thus, even when Iran's military capabilities were quite limited, the IRGC thought in terms of a strike against U.S. forces. While this could have been rhetoric, the proposition that their intention was to consider such a risky option seriously is supported by subsequent actions that would make such an attack more deadly, including continued expansion of their NBC/M programs and their exercises and maneuvers.

Today, with deployed chemical, biological and possibly radiological forces in the Gulf, there are several plausible scenarios in which Iran could use these weapons against U.S. forces. The effect of such a dramatic act, in an era of instant international television reporting, would, from the Iranian perspective, serve Iran's strategic purposes, even if U.S. casualties were limited in number. It is not without insight that Iran defines the will of the people to support military operations as a U.S. center of gravity. Beyond Vietnam in the 1970s and Beirut in the 1980s, after all, the United States withdrew its forces from Somalia after gruesome footage of one dead American body was portrayed on global TV screens. How much more endurance would a calculating adversary expect in response to the use or threat of use of NBC weapons?

From the perspective of Iranian leadership, and the IRGC in particular, the advantages of a strike or threat of strike on U.S. forces could include the "image exaltation" they would immediately draw from other radical states and groups opposed to the United States. This easily anticipated result would be possible, from their perspective, whether the United States responded diplomatically or militarily. Diplomatic response would elevate Iran in global terms, and military confrontation with the United States may be a "win-win" situation. The IRGC is physically dispersed (and certainly would be even more so should they take provocative action); war consolidates power within Iran for the IRGC; and, Iranian leaders define "victory" in a way that need not exclude large numbers of Iranian casualties. It is useful to recall the words of the Iranian Army Chief of Staff: "Whether we kill or are killed, we are the victors. Others do not think this way."⁷⁶ Iranian war calculations, therefore, must be affected to persuade Iran that its objectives are unlikely to be attained and that they will not be attained at an acceptable cost. The consequences of acting on such a calculation need to be costly for the IRGC, who would most likely lead the decision to use biological, radiological, or chemical weapons rather than the population as a whole, who would likely be unaware that such a decision had been made and may not support such a decision.

Attacks on Nonmilitary Gulf Shipping, GCC States, or Israel

Attacks on nonmilitary Gulf shipping, a GCC state, or Israel could advance Iranian claims to regional hegemony. Striking out against Israel would serve Iran's self-image as the defender and vanguard of Islam. Moreover, given the quiescent international response to Iran's confiscation of Abu Musa island, Iran could well believe that a series of incremental attacks will, over time, substantiate its claims to hegemony. Attacks, or threats of attacks, particularly with NBC weapons, could be used by Iran to force the GCC states to withdraw their support for U.S. operations, bases, and presence in the Gulf.

Response to U.S. or Israeli Attacks

Iran could use NBC in response to an attack on its territory. Indeed, Iran would almost certainly prefer that war's initiation be, as in the case of the Iran/Iraq war, attributable to others. If Iran believed that an open conflict with the United States or Israel would move Iran or the Islamic Revolution closer to its goals at acceptable costs, they might wish to achieve the benefits they have in operating in an war that is clearly (to them) defensive. Therefore, Iran might even conclude that there are adequate incentives to provoke the United States and/or Israel to strike first, thus "necessitating" (internally if nowhere else) its NBC "response."

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