The United Nations Special Commission supervised destruction of 48 Scuds plus additional components and found evidence that Iraq unilaterally destroyed at least another 83 missiles unsupervised.[166] However, many estimates point to a substantial residual Scud inventory. Some data points from various sources include:
In 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that Iraq retained "perhaps hundreds" of missiles, and his successor estimated the residual force at 100-200 missiles.[167]
Israeli sources indicated Iraq may have as many as 100 Scuds of all versions.[168]
In 1995, Iraq eventually admitted to the United Nations Special Commission that in 1987 it had begun a full-scale program to indigenously manufacture Al Hussein Scuds largely from scratch and had established specialized factories for this purpose. Iraq planned eventually to produce 1,000 missiles, but it claimed that by January 1991 they had failed to produce a single operational missile.[169]
In mid-1996, a general officer defector from Iraq said that he believed Saddam Hussein had retained some 40 Scud-type missiles.[170]
By 1996, UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-like missiles indigenously that inspectors could not locate.[171] After UNSCOM unwillingly withdrew from Iraq in 1998, some estimated that Iraq could resume production of Al Hussein missiles within one year.[172]
According to a United States government white paper in 1998, Iraq maintained a small force of Scud-type missiles and may have pieced together Scuds by integrating original guidance and control systems it concealed from UNSCOM with parts produced in Iraq.[173]
The results of our Scud missile research and analysis can be summarized as follows:
During the Gulf War, Iraq attacked with approximately 88 Scuds, almost all of them Al Hussein models, with 46 striking in the KTO and 42 in or near Israel. Several more firings probably resulted in early in-flight failures within Iraq.
An internal working paper produced and released to veterans by the Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) included 179 entries appearing to involve approximately 344 missiles. In it, CURR listed each variation in attack detail, however minor, as a separate Scud attack entry. For example, if separate reports covered an attack, one using coordinated universal (Z) time and the other using local time in the KTO (C time - three hours difference) the CURR report generated two entries, one for each time, even if all the other details coincided. The officer that prepared the compilation knew the entries involved duplications, but CURR released the list before they could scrub it to consolidate different reports of the same incident. Our analysis of CURR’s incident record revealed massively redundant counting based on various second-hand accounts of individual attacks and included false alarms where Iraq launched no Scuds. When we subtracted these duplications and false alarms, the total number of attacking Scuds very closely matched the counts published by other expert sources. See an accounting of the CURR list at Tab D.
Iraq worked to develop extended-range Scud variants capable of delivering both chemical and biological warfare agents. As of early 1991, they had produced and filled such warheads on Scuds. However, the evidence suggests that they could not carry out an effective attack with these weapons because of fusing and flight stability problems.
We uncovered no convincing evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological agent warheads at Coalition forces or Israel. Technical problems, threats of retaliation, and risk-benefit considerations may have affected Iraq’s decision not to employ them.
A substantial proportion of the Al Hussein Scud models spontaneously broke up on reentry, probably due to faulty design and unstable flight characteristics.
During disintegration on reentry or impact, some Scuds released a yellow, red, or brown cloud containing corrosive inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Observers sometimes mistakenly believed these releases of oxidizer were releases of chemical warfare agents. While not nearly as toxic as chemical warfare agents, IRFNA and accompanying nitrogen oxide decomposition products can cause, as described previously, distressing symptoms in exposed people.
The extended-range Scuds fired by Iraq demonstrated even poorer accuracy than the original Soviet design but had modest success as a terror weapon against large population concentrations. As the Scud attacks progressed and it became apparent that Iraq had used no chemical or biological agent warheads, the missiles became less effective as a terror weapon.
Iraq probably retains some Scud-type missiles and may be able to produce more.
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