NOVEMBER 19 (legislative day, November 13), 1991.-- Ordered to be printed


Mr. BIDEN, on behalf of Mr. Pell, from the Committee on Foreign
Relations, submitted the following


together with

[To accompany Treaty Doc. 102-81]

The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), with protocols on existing types (with annex), aircraft reclassification, reduction, helicopter recategorization, information exchange (with annex), inspection, the Joint Consultative Group, and provisional application, all signed at Paris on November 19, 1990, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon subject to conditions and declarations set forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of ratification and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof.


I. Object and Purpose
II. Obligations of the CFE Treaty

A. Executive Summary
B. Treaty Terms

1. Definitions
2. Exceptions
3. Group of States Ceilings
4. Flank Limits
5. The Sufficiency Rule
6. National Entitlements Reductions
8. Information Exchange
9. Inspections and Verification
10. Implementation and Future Negotiations
11. Withdrawal Clause
12. Political Declarations

III. Background on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

A. European Negotiations During the Cold War

1. MBFR and CSCE

B. CFE: The New Forum

1. Gorbachev's Speech at the United Nations
2. The NATO Initiative
3. Major Negotiating Issues

C. The European Revolutions

1. German Unification
2. The August Revolution

D. European Attitudes Toward Ratification of the Treaty

1. Initial Ratification Delay
2. Ratification Timetables

IV. Military Implications of the Treaty

A. Military Effect

1. Treaty Limits
2. Net effects

B. NATO and U.S. Forces in Europe

1. Manpower
2. U.S. Reduction Requirements
3. NATO's Reduction Requirements

C. Soviet Force Reductions
D. Equipment Transfer and Exports

1. Cascading
2. Exports

E. Budget Implications

V. Verification and Compliance

A. The Administration on Verification
B. The Meaning of Effective Verification

1. The Process
2. Choosing the Right Verification Standard
3. Military Significance

C. The CFE Verification Regime

1. National Technical Means
2. Onsite Inspections
3. Inspection Modalities

D. Scenarios for Noncompliance

1. Equipment East of the Urals
2. Modernization and Export

E. Compliance Diplomacy: The Joint Consultative Group
F. Aerial Inspections
G. Inspection Costs

VI. Key Ratification Issues

A. Is the CFE Treaty Still Necessary?
B. The Disintegration of the Former Soviet Union

1. New States That Join the Treaty Regime
2. New States That Stay Outside the Treaty
3. Military Districts and Republic Boundaries

C. Impact on the Baltic States

1. Pre-Recognition Period
2. Baltic Independence and the Treaty
3. Committee Condition

D. Article III

1. Equipment Involved in the Article III Dispute

E. Equipment East of the Urals
F. Data Discrepancy
G. The Treaty Power

1. Treaty Interpretation
2. Treaties Versus Executive Agreements

VII. Other Interpretation and Implementation Issues

A. Definitions

1. Artillery
2. Combat Aircraft and Attack Helicopters
3. Armored Combat Vehicles
4. Decommissioning
5. Conclusions

B. Verification

1. Declared Site
2. Inspection Quotas

C. Force Structure

1. Reduction Liability
2. TLE Storage Sites
3. In Service
4. Peacekeeping Forces

D. The Future of Conventional Arms Control

VIII. Committee Action

IX. Resolution of Ratification

X. Additional Views

XI. Appendix

A. Letters in Support of CFE Treaty Ratification:

- Former Cabinet members and Administration Officials
- Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence
- Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense; with questions posed by
- Senator Biden and responses thereto
- Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; with questions posed by Senator Biden and Responses Thereto
- James A. Baker, Secretary of State; with questions posed by Senator Biden and Responses Thereto
- Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State

B. Letter from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

C. Letters from the Senate Committee on Armed Services

D. Unclassified Responses from Lieutenant General Soyster, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

E. Questions on the Binding Character of Executive Branch Testimony



The CFE Treaty marks a watershed in European history. If ratified by its 22 signatories, the Treaty will eliminate a fundamental cause of tension in Europe since the end of World War II: the huge numerical advantage of Soviet conventional forces. This superiority threatened the security and prosperity of the West, and was integral to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

This superiority also fueled the nuclear arms race. In every strategic doctrine adopted by NATO and the West-from massive retaliation to flexible response--nuclear weapons were intended to compensate for the Soviet edge in conventional arms. Indeed, the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons we have deployed to support those strategies have all had, as a principal purpose deterring the Soviet Union from overrunning or threatening Western Europe.

Military Implications.--The CFE Treaty has been widely described as having historic significance. But few accounts have underscored how dramatic is the Treaty's achievement and how favorable are its terms from a Western perspective. The Treaty will not only end Soviet conventional superiority in the European theater; it will reverse it by limiting Soviet forces in the theater to a level well below the combined forces of NATO. By eliminating the shadow of Soviet military supremacy in Europe, the CFE Treaty chips away a final foundation-stone of the Cold War.

For the United States, then, the Treaty's original purposes--to establish a secure conventional balance in Europe, to eliminate disparities in armaments, and to eliminate the capability for initiating large-scale offensive action--have been achieved.

At the same time, the Treaty's immediate effect will be far less than some had originally anticipated. It bears emphasis that the Treaty has to some extent been overtaken by the events of the last 18 months. These events-the fall of the Berlin Wall the revolutions that swept the erstwhile Soviet satellites, the unification of Germany, the unilateral Soviet withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union--have propelled us, more quickly than anyone could have anticipated, into a future toward which the CFE Treaty was originally meant only to light the way.

Even before the Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union did withdraw tens of thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles to storage sites east of the Ural Mountains. This occurred in part because of Soviet unilateral reductions; in part because of Soviet bilateral agreements with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany; and in part because the Soviet defense establishment sought to avoid the destruction requirements of the CFE Treaty itself.

For this reason, the Treaty will not require the Soviet Union to destroy some 100,000 pieces of equipment, as administration officials predicted to the committee last year. More than half of this equipment has been moved out of Europe and only a fraction of the equipment so moved will be destroyed.

Instead, Soviet reductions required by the Treaty will total about 23,000 pieces of equipment. In describing this phenomenon, the committee is not assigning blame. The only practical alternative would have been to accelerate the negotiations so that less equipment could have been transferred prior to the Treaty's signing.

To dwell on the fact that the West was unable to require the de struction of Soviet forces retreating from Eastern Europe-and from the Cold War itself-would be tragic folly. Instead the focus should be on the welcome developments that have given rise to this problem. If it is bad news that we did not achieve wholesale destruction of Soviet forces during their hasty retreat, the committee believes that it is good news that this is the kind of bad news we must now cope with.

As far as U.S. equipment is concerned, if transfers of U.S. equipment to NATO allies proceeds according to current plans, the United States would not be required to destroy any equipment as a result of treaty obligations. Such a ratio of Soviet to U.S. reductions (23,000 to zero) has never before been accomplished in arms control and probably never will be again.

Verification.--In addition to codifying NATO superiority over Soviet forces in Europe, the Treaty entails extensive onsite inspections to confirm this stunning new reality. In combination with U.S. national technical means to monitor conventional forces in Europe, the Treaty's inspection and information exchange regimes should be more than adequate to detect militarily significant non-compliance in time to implement an effective response.

Beyond the adequacy of verification, the committee believes that the Treaty regime can change the way nations relate to each other. The verification system established by this Treaty should create continuing, systematic consultations that inspire mutual confidence, preempt the suspicions that so easily fuel an arms race, and reorient defense establishments toward participation in a cooperative multinational regime rather than preparations for war.

The Disintegration of the Former Soviet Union.--The fact that the United States will not be required to absorb any reductions cannot be overestimated. It is this fact that convinced the Committee to recommend Senate consent to the Treaty despite the uncertain political situation in the former Soviet Union.

While President Mikhail Gorbachev retains some power as head of the new Union government in Moscow, clearly the fate of the Treaty now lies in the hands of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia. The Committee is optimistic that leaders of the three largest republics-Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia-will choose to accept the obligations of the Treaty. Nevertheless, it is possible that, notwithstanding current pledges by republic leaders, new states will be formed in the former Soviet Union, and that those new states will not join the treaty regime.

Because the Treaty imposes no real constraints on the United States, the committee believes the downside risk of new states refusing to join the Treaty regime is virtually nil. By contrast, if new states choose to join the Treaty, the European balance between East and West-and between nations in the East-will be improved. Equally important, the treaty process itself, with its myriad inspections and exchanges of information, will help reduce tensions between states, and establish predictability in military planning heretofore unimaginable. Finally, the cooperation and consultation that will be required to implement the Treaty should promote the shaping of a more stable and peaceful Europe. In one sense, the security and confidence-building regimes created by the Treaty should be more important in maintaining stability in the new Europe than in the old.

In short, despite the uncertainty in the former Soviet Union that could unravel the Treaty, the United States has little to lose by not ratifying the accord. By contrast, successful implementation of the Treaty will serve a primary U.S. security goal since the end of World War II: the creation of a Europe free from the threat of a dangerous East-West military imbalance.

Implications for Nuclear Weapons.--The achievement of the long- standing American effort to improve the conventional balance in Europe through the Treaty and accompanying unilateral actions will have profound implications for U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure. Already, President Bush has announced the virtual elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear forces in Europe, in Asia, and at sea. And Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, has confirmed to the committee that the elimination of the conventional military threat in Europe is what has made possible the Bush Administration's decision to change the alert posture of U.S. strategic forces, cancel future ICBM modernization programs, and propose further reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

The administration deserves praise for acting to reduce U.S. strategic forces as the European military balance improves. As the purposes of the CFE Treaty are further realized in the months and years ahead, the committee believes that further steps to scale back U.S. strategic forces can and should be taken.




The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed November 19, 1990, is an agreement among the 16 member states of NATO and the six members of the former Warsaw Pact. Its provisions apply to the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains, known as the AIM. Within the ATTU, the Treaty establishes equal ceilings for "each group of states" (i.e., for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) in five armament categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Quantities of these armament types located in the ATTU, in the forces of either group of states, and in excess of the ceilings, must be eliminated or modified in a prescribed manner that will render them unusable as offensive weapon systems.

The Treaty also limits the maximum armament holdings that any single country may have in each category. In practice, this affects only the former Soviet Union1, which must reduce more than 20,000 weapons systems. The Treaty further requires that each group of states divide the quantities of armaments permitted under the Treaty into national entitlements. The sum of these national entitlements may not exceed the group ceiling in any category. No country may increase its entitlement unless another country in the same group of states agrees formally to reduce by an equal amount in the same category.

The Treaty describes four geographic zones within the ATTU, and prescribes limits on the number of battle tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles that may be located by either alliance in each of these four zones. No later than 40 months after the Treaty enters into force, all of the tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles that have not been eliminated or modified must be distributed geographically in accordance with these zonal sublimits. This requirement prevents unstable concentration of armaments.

Each group of states must place roughly 20 percent of the tanks, artillery pieces, and armored combat vehicles in "designated permanent storage sites." No more than a fraction of the stored weapons may be removed from storage at any time, and then only for a maximum of 42 days. The Treaty also prohibits any country from stationing forces on the territory of another state without the permission of the host government. Significantly, as a result of this provision and agreements reached between the U.S.S.R. and the individual East European governments, the Kremlin will withdraw all Soviet military forces to Soviet territory by 1994 or sooner.

The Treaty also includes provisions for numerous onsite inspections, exchanges of detailed information on armament holdings and military force structure, and other measures to increase transparency and ensure verification of compliance with treaty provisions. Over time, these unprecedented inspections and information exchanges will yield a firm understanding of the armament holdings, force structures, modernization rates, and readiness conditions of the military forces remaining in the ATTU. Finally, the Treaty establishes a Joint Consultative Group, and mandates periodic review conferences in order to resolve ambiguities and. consider amendments to the Treaty.

The key effect of the Treaty is to force the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe, reduce the major armament holdings in its European-based forces by more than half, destroy a large quantity of these weapons, place 20 percent of the remaining weapons in storage, and distribute the rest geographically in order to comply with all ceilings and four zonal subceilings. Reductions by other members of the former Warsaw Pact also are required; these reductions will improve substantially the military balance that currently exists among the various countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

The CFE Treaty provisions will not require NATO members to reduce armament holdings in a substantial way. Even NATO's armament storage requirement can be met without any major modification to existing U.S. POMCUS (Prepositioned Material Configured to Unit Sets). NATO will be entitled to quantities of weapons in each category equal to the quantities in all of the former Warsaw Pact states, and the Soviet Union will be entitled to one-third fewer weapons in each category than will NATO.

Once the Treaty ceilings on conventional armaments have entered into force they will effectively eliminate the capacity of either alliance-or any government-to launch a short warning, large-scale offensive operation in Europe. Equally important, the Treaty verification an information exchange regimes will increase military transparency and predictability to a degree unprecedented in international relations. Finally, the Treaty establishes fora in which future problems can be addressed quickly and pointedly. In each of these respects, there is every reason to believe that the CFE objectives of ever greater stability and security will be achieved as Treaty implementation proceeds.


1. Definitions

Each of the five armament categories limited by the Treaty are defined in Article II. Battle tanks are tracked, heavily armored vehicles weighing at least 16.5 metric tons and equipped with a 360-degree traverse turret and gun of at least 75 millimeters caliber. A small number of light tanks that do not conform to this definition are included in the Armored Combat Vehicle category. Vehicles with wheels rather than tracks, but which otherwise meet the criteria of a battle tank, are counted as tanks.

The Armored Combat Vehicle (ACV) category applies to combat vehicles that are more lightly armored than tanks, including armored personnel carriers (APC's), armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV's), and heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs). APCs are designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad. They may carry a gun with a caliber less than 20 millimeters. AIFVs are similarly configured, but carry a cannon of at least 20 millimeters caliber and have the capability to deliver fire from inside the vehicle. RACVs are armored vehicles weighing at least six tons and carrying a gun of 75 millimeters caliber or greater. HACVs do not necessarily provide a means of infantry transport.

Artillery is defined as large caliber systems capable of engaging ground targets by delivering primarily indirect fire. This category includes gum, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars and multiple racket launchers, with a caliber of 100 millimeters or greater. Any future large caliber direct fire system that has a secondary indirect fire capability also counts against artillery ceilings.

Combat aircraft are planes armed and equipped to engage targets with missiles, bombs, or other weapons. The definition also includes all other models or versions of such aircraft-including reconnaissance planes and electronic warfare aircraft. Primary trainer aircraft are exempt from treaty limits, as are carrier-based aircraft not permanently based on land. The treaty and a politically binding declaration attached to it also provide special exemptions for combat-capable trainers (CCT), land-based naval aircraft, and certain types of non-operational aircraft.

The combat helicopter category is defined so as to permit all countries to convert enough attach helicopters to support roles and avoid destruction requirements. Specialized attack helicopters are designed primarily to employ guided weapons. These count against treaty limits and may not be reclassified to combat support roles. This category includes three NATO helicopters (the Mangusta, Cobra, and Apache) and most versions of one of the former Warsaw Pact's helicopter (the M-24 Hind). Multipurpose attack helicopters, which cover most of each group of states' helicopters, count against treaty limits but may be converted and reclassified to combat support roles and excluded from treaty ceilings. Combat support helicopters may carry self-defense and area suppression weapons, but not guided weaponry, and as such are exempted from reduction requirements.

2. Exceptions

Article III, the Treaty's main counting rule, provides for exceptions to the treaty limits. These include weapons: "in the process of manufacture;" used exclusively for research and development; in historical collections; awaiting export; ACV's and multipurpose attack helicopters held by "peacetime internal security" forces; and weapons in transit through the treaty zone en route to an area outside Europe. An exception also is made for a limited number of weapons that have been "decommissioned;" i.e., taken out of service as the result of replacement. Decommissioned weapons may be removed from the ATTU, and need not be destroyed or converted. Any weapon that is not covered by one of these exceptions "shall be subject to the numerical limitations" contained in the treaty.

The Soviet Union initially disagreed with other states parties over the interpretation of this article of the treaty. Moscow contended that the article did not cover ground weapons assigned to naval units since, according to the Soviet interpretation, all naval forces were outside the treaty's limits. The United States, its allies, and all the Eastern European states said that all ground systems permanently based in the ATTU, even those assigned to naval forces, were subject to CFE limits if not specifically listed as exceptions.

On June 14, 1991, at an extraordinary conference of the 22 signatories, the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its forces in Europe--on top of the reduction it had already accepted--by the number of ground systems assigned to its naval forces. This settlement was contained in a legally binding statement that is associated with, but not a formal part of the treaty. Under the terms of this agreement, the Soviet Union agreed to destroy or convert to nonmilitary purposes half of the disputed weapons inside the treaty area in accordance with the treaty's elimination provisions. The other 50 percent will be pulled back beyond the Ural Mountains, where "an equivalent number will be destroyed or converted," within the treaty's 40-month reduction period.

To prevent future misunderstandings, the Soviet statement also included a no-increase pledge on all ground forces in the Soviet navy, and a statement that "all armaments based in the ATTU irrespective of assignment will be subject to all numerical limitations envisaged by the treaty." Finally, the Soviet Union offered a political declaration on June 14 at a special session of the JCG in Vienna. This declaration detailed the status of weapons withdrawn from the CFE area before the treaty was signed. Moscow declared that the withdrawn equipment "will not be used to create a strategic reserve * * * and will not be stored in a way permitting their rapid return" to the treaty area. Moscow also said it would eliminate "no less than" 14,500 of the withdrawn weapons, including 6,000 tanks, within 40 months of the treaty's entry into force.

3. Group of States Ceilings

Article IV sets ceilings for each group of states. Within the area from the Atlantic to the Urals, neither group may field more than 20,000 tanks 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. Of the 30,000 permitted ACV'S, no more than 18,000 may be AIFV's or HACV'S, and no more than 1,500 may be HACV'S. Within the overall limits, no more than 16,500 tanks, 27,300 ACV'S, and 17,000 artillery may be in active units; the remainder must be placed in designated permanent storage sites. Any treaty-limited weapon that is not located in a designate storage site shall be deemed to be in an active unit.

The removal of stored weapons from the designated sites is severely constrained. No more than 550 tanks, 1,000 ACV'S, and 300 artillery pieces may be removed by the members of a group at any one time, and then only for a maximum of 42 days.

Article IV also provides for sublimits on weapons in three concentric zones in Europe. These sublimits apply only to ground weapons in active units. The three concentric zones are comprised of successively larger areas, so that each zone includes the previous one. The smallest zone includes the territories of Belgium, Germany. Luxembourg , and the Netherlands for NATO, and Czechoslovakia, Hungry, and Poland for the former Warsaw Pact. In this zone, each group of states is permitted no more than 7,500 tanks, 11,250 armored combat vehicles, and 5,000 artillery pieces in active units.

Expanding outward, the next zone includes the territories listed above, plus Denmark, France, Italy, and Britain for NATO, and the Baltic, Byelorussia, Carpathian, and Kiev military districts (MD's) for the former Warsaw Pact. In this zone, each group is permitted a total of 10,300 tanks 19,260 ACV's, and 9,100 artillery pieces in active units. Within the Kiev MD, the total number of weapons in active units and designate storage sites may not exceed 2,250 tanks, 2,500 ACV's and 1,500 artillery pieces.

Finally, the third zone includes the territories listed above, plus Spain and Portugal for NATO, and the Moscow and Volga Ural military districts for the former Warsaw Pact. In this zone, each group is permitted a total of 15,300 tanks, of which no more than 11,800 may be in active units; 24,100 ACV's, of which no more than 21,400 may be in active units; and 14,000 pieces of artillery of which no more than 11,000 may be in active units.

4. Flank Limits

Article V establishes separate limits for the so-called flank areas of Europe, which comprise Greece, Norway, and Turkey, as well as Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Leningrad, Odessa, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus military districts. In these areas, the limits on weapons in active units are 4,700 tanks, 5,900 ACVs, and 6,000 artillery pieces. Article V also provides that each group of states may exceed temporarily these limits, provided that such excess armaments do not amount to more than 459 tanks, 723 ACV's, and 420 artillery pieces. There also are limits on the quantities of weapons that may be placed in designated permanent storage sites located in the Leningrad and Odessa MDs.

5. The Sufficiency Rule

Article VI sets limits for any single country. This is known as the "sufficiency rule." No single country may exceed the following levels for each of the five categories: 13,300 tanks; 13,700 artillery; 20,000 ACVS; 5,150 aircraft; and 1,500 helicopters. In practice, because no other country's armed forces are large enough to reach these ceilings, this rule will constrain only forces of the former Soviet Union. These levels permit the Soviet Union to field an average of 68 percent of its alliance's total holdings. The effect of this will be to limit Soviet weapons to levels approximately one-third lower than NATO's totals.

As a result of negotiations among the former Warsaw Pact states, in two cases-tanks and artillery-the Soviet Union is actually permitted to field somewhat fewer weapons (13,150 tanks and 13,175 artillery) than the CFE treaty itself would allow. The lower ceilings result from the "maximum levels for holdings"--i.e. maximum national entitlements, which were determined by each group of states. The Warsaw Pact's declaration of maximum national entitlements was formalized in a treaty signed on November 3, 1990, in Budapest. NATO's entitlements were agreed informally among its 16 members in Brussels shortly before treaty signature.

6. National Entitlements

Article VII requires each county to consult with the other members of its group of states to ensure that the sum of each group's holdings does not exceed the permitted levels. At treaty signature, each country was required to notify all other parties of the portion of the alliance ceiling in each armament category to which it would be entitled after all CFE armament reductions had been implemented. The announced national ceilings also were its maximum entitlements. Although currently binding, these national ceilings can be changed. To increase its maximum entitlement in any category a country must provide 90 days' advance notice to all other parties. The notification must be accompanied or preceded by an announcement of an equal reduction in the maximum entitlement of another state belonging to the same group of states. At no time may any party have more treaty-limited weapons in any category than its maximum entitlement for that category.

Article VII makes clear that no state will be entitled to more than its announced maximum just because some other state retains fewer weapons than the maximum to which it is entitled. Further, no country can be required to accept a lower maximum entitlement; the East European states are thereby freed from any obligation to coordinate their future entitlements with the Soviet Union, or with each other. Finally, unless the agreed maximum levels are changed, each state is required to reduce its current armament holdings by an amount equal to the difference between what it had in the ATTU at the time of Treaty signature or entry-into-force (whichever amount is greater), and its maximum authorized levels. This national reduction obligation can also be adjusted by transferring equipment, i.e. cascading, among the members of a group.

The requirement to notify other parties of the maximum entitlements helped resolve concerns about the size of the Soviet reduction obligation. The option to transfer equipment, on the other hand, makes it possible for NATO to replace the older armaments held by some allies. That is, newer armaments in excess of the national maximum levels of some Alliance members may be transferred to members with older equipment, and only the oldest armaments in each category need be destroyed.

7. Reductions

All of the excess equipment in the Atlantic to the Urals area at the time of treaty signature must be destroyed, converted, recategorized, or reclassified. It may not simply be moved outside the ATTU. Article VIII outlines the timetable for the reductions. Within 16 months of the treaty's entry into force, at least one-quarter of each state's reduction obligation in each of the five categories of weapons must be completed. One year later, 60 percent of the reductions must be undertaken. After 40 months, all cuts must be completed. It should be noted, however, that the ceilings (per se) do not take effect until 40 months after treaty entry-into-force.

The Protocol on Reduction details various procedures for the destruction of excess equipment. The permitted methods for battle tanks are representative: they may be cut up, blown up, deformed, or smashed with a heavy steel wrecking ball. Reduction of weapons must be carried out by each state at a maximum of 20 sites simultaneously, and notified in advance in accordance with the protocol on information exchange.

Each country may convert to civilian use up to 5.7 percent of its maximum tank holdings, or 150 tanks, whichever is greater. For ACVs, conversion is permitted for 15 percent of the maximum holding or 150 ACVs, whichever is greater. Conversion requires, in the case of tanks, removal of the onboard armament systems; removal of the turret; welding of the gun breech block; and severing of the gun tube, among other measures. The conversion provision is designed to permit the use of some converted tanks and ACVs as bulldozers, firefighting vehicles, cranes, and ice breakers.

Up to 550 combat-capable trainer aircraft are eligible for "reclassification * * * into unarmed trainer aircraft." The Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification lists the seven Soviet-built aircraft types eligible. In order to be reclassified and thus exempted from limitations, the aircraft must be totally disarmed, meaning that weapon control and guidance systems and other provisions rendering the plane combat-capable must be removed. Reclassified aircraft are subject to onsite inspection in which inspectors are permitted to inspect the aircraft cockpit and remove access panels covering areas where components and wiring systems were removed.

8. Information Exchange

To enhance verification of treaty compliance, Article XIII and the Protocol on Information Exchange require each country to notify all other states regarding its conventional armaments at the time of treaty signature, (with corrections permitted within 90 days after the treaty signing), 30 days after the treaty enters into force, after the 40-month implementation period of the treaty is concluded, and annually on December 15 of each year. The information to be provided includes:

1 Given the uncertainty about the proper name of the former Soviet Union, for the remainder of this report the old name "Soviet Union" will be used unless otherwise noted. [Return]

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