Under Article XIV and the Protocol on Inspection, each state has the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, on-site inspections of declared sites to verify the compliance of other parties with the treaty. The stated purposes of the verification regime include inspections to monitor compliance with the ATTU ceilings and zonal subceilings on the five categories of treaty-limited armament. Given the size of the geographic area and the numbers of treaty-limited items involved, this will be done "on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange." Inspections will also help ensure that the process of armament reduction is carried out in accordance with the prescribed procedures, and monitor the recategorization of helicopters and reclassification of aircraft.
Each state is obliged to receive a "passive" quota of declared site inspections. This quota describes the number of inspections that a state is obligated to receive, and is based on the number of Objects of Verification (OOV's) that is reported in its data submission. The number of OOV'S, in turn, is based on the number of regiments, air wings, separate battalions/squadrons, storage areas, reduction sites, training areas, etc., that each state maintains in its conventional air, air defense, and ground conventional forces. (Land-based naval and coastal defense forces, and internal security forces are excluded from the OOV count and these forces are not subject to inspection without refusal, as is the case with declared sites.)
During the first 120 days after the treaty enters into force (the baseline validation period), each state is obligated to accept a quota of inspections equal to 20 percent of its OOV count. In each of the next 3 years (during which the armament reductions are to occur), each country must accept a quota of inspections equal to 10 percent of its OOV count. Throughout this 3-year period, each country is also obligated to permit on-site verification of its armament reduction, conversion, and reclassification processes, with no right of refusal (these inspections do not count against the quota). Then, during the 120 days following the 3-year reduction period (the residual validation period), the quota is again 20 percent. For the duration of the Treaty, each country is subject to annual "residual period" quota of inspections equal to 15 percent of its remaining OOV count.
The number of "active" inspections that each country may conduct is determined by its group of states. The active quotas of each state may vary from year to year, just as the passive quotas will also change. In general, the active quota for one group of states will be equal to the passive quota for the other group of states. It should be noted, however, that each state is permitted up to five "active" declared site inspections per year of any countries within its own group of states. Hence, a group of states' passive quota may be greater than the actual active quota of the other group of states.
Within these overall quotas, states also have the right to conduct challenge inspections of undeclared sites. The maximum number of challenge inspections that either group of states may conduct against any member of the other group is a percentage (15 percent during the baseline, reduction, and validation periods; 23 percent thereafter) of the inspected party's passive quota. The inspected party has a right of refusal. But if access to an area is denied, the party that refuses the inspection must provide all reasonable assurance that the designated inspection area does not contain conventional armaments and equipment limited b the treaty. Any inspection of land-based naval forces, internal security forces, etc., would be by challenge inspection.
Under Article XV, each state has the right to use national or multinational technical means to verify compliance with the treaty. Countries may not interfere with such means and may not use concealment measures that impede verification of compliance. Article XIV also provides for an agreed number of aerial inspections, the number and provisions to be determined in follow-up "CFE 1A" negotiations. Finally, the treaty calls for the use of helicopters (to be provided by the inspected state) during the conduct of declared site and challenge inspections where the inspection site is larger than 20 square kilometers. Night vision goggles, dictaphones, cameras, and other equipment may also be employed by inspection teams.
10. Implementation and Future Negotiations
Article XVI establishes the Joint Consultative Group (JCG). Its broad mandate includes addressing questions of compliance, resolving ambiguities, considering measures to enhance the treaty's effectiveness, or, on request of any country, addressing any matter of dispute arising out of treaty implementation. The JCG may make decisions only by consensus, and is required to meet at least twice each year.
Article XVIII of the Treaty requires that the parties to the CFE agreement continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the aim of achieving further arms control measures, including limits on troop strength and provisions for aerial inspection, in time for the Helsinki meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCEI. The Helsinki CSCE is scheduled for March 1992. The follow-on "CFE 1A" negotiations are now in progress, but it is not yet clear whether the negotiations will produce any agreements by March. If not, CFE 1A negotiations will continue beyond Helsinki.
Article XXII establishes that the Treaty will enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification from all signatories have been deposited with the government of the Netherlands, which is designated as the depository. The Treaty did, however, include a Protocol on Provisional Application, which established-among other things-the requirement for the data exchange at Treaty signature. It also established the Joint Consultative Group. Other Treaty provisions, including those concerned with on-site inspection, will not enter into force until the Treaty enters into force. The ATW ceilings, zonal sub-ceilings, and national maximum entitlements for each zone, will not take effect until the end of the 40th month after the Treaty has entered into force.
11. Withdrawal Clause
Under Article XIX, each country has the right to withdraw from the treaty if its supreme interests are jeopardized. This article provides that a country has the right to withdraw if another party increases its arsenal of treaty-limited weapons outside the scope of the treaty in such proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces in Europe. Notice of intent to withdraw must be given 150 days in advance. This article also establishes that the CFE treaty is of unlimited duration. Article XXI prescribes periodic treaty review conferences, and extraordinary conferences to deal with matters such as an announcement by a state that it intends to leave its group of states and to join the other group.
12. Political Declarations
Associated with the Treaty, although not a formal part of it, are several political declarations, in addition to the Soviet declaration on the disposition of equipment moved beyond the Urals. The declaration with respect to land-based naval aircraft permits each group of states to field up to 430 permanently land-based combat naval aircraft, outside the agreement's limits, of which no more than 400 may belong to one country.
A separate declaration pledges the 22 parties not to increase the total peacetime authorized personnel strength of their armed forces in the area of application. As stated, this pledge will extend for the duration of the follow-up negotiations referred to in Article XVIII. In connection with this statement, Germany in a third declaration announced that it will reduce its armed forces to 370,000 ground, air, and naval troops within 3 to 4 years, beginning with the treaty's entry into force.
A primary source of East-West tension since World War II has been the Soviet Union's huge numerical advantage in conventional forces stationed in Europe. This superiority, which threatened Western security and prosperity for many years, was integral to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Soviet conventional superiority also fueled the nuclear arms race. In every strategic doctrine adopted by NATO for 40 years-from massive retaliation to flexible response-nuclear weapons were intended to compensate for the Soviet edge in conventional arms.
At the heart of U.S. foreign and defense policy throughout the cold war period was the policy of containment in Europe-a policy that provided a defensive shield behind which free-market democracy could take firm root until the Soviet Union was prepared to enter the community of democratic nations.
After World War 11, a half million Soviet troops remained in Germany and Eastern Europe, with substantial backup forces stationed in the Western Soviet Union. Until NATO was formed in 1949, the West maintained only about 10 loosely coordinated European divisions.
At the peak of the cold war in the 1950's, the Soviet Union and Western nations made proposals to end the division of Germany, and such proposals inevitably included arms control aspects. But in the deeply mistrustful political environment of the time, there seemed Iittle chance for serious negotiations. troop reductions in the negotiations.
In the 1960's, however, two major events dramatized the danger of the East-West confrontation and the context for arms control began to change. In 1961 East Germany constructed the wall separating East and West Berlin, and in 1962 the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba. The fact that the West did not use force to challenge the wall's construction symbolized its political acceptance of Germany's division-at least for the foreseeable future. The Soviet deployment of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, which led to the brink of war, focused worldwide attention on the danger of nuclear war. The United States and the Soviet Union became more serious about the need to regulate their nuclear relationship. This led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and subsequently to U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).
In addition, the Soviet Union, in spite of its intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, began trying to show a more benign face to the West. The less belligerent Soviet approach called for a European security conference and created growing expectations about the possibilities for improved East-West relations. The NATO countries, responding to a period of détente, adopted the "Harmel Report" in 1967 asserting that NATO would not only continue to prepare to defend against and hopefully deter aggressive Warsaw Pact behavior, but in the future would also actively seek to expand cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As part of this new NATO approach, the allies subsequently proposed mutual and balanced reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. NATO argued that real improvements in East-West relations required that the Warsaw Pact remove the military threats that remained the major cause of East-West tension.
1. MBFR and CSCE
In secret bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union conducted by President Richard Nixon's national security advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, the West signaled its willingness to arrange a security conference if the Soviets would help complete a new quadripartite agreement on Berlin and take part in preparatory talks aimed at reducing military forces in Central Europe. Preparations for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) open in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1972.
In January 1973, representatives of 12 NATO and all 7 Warsaw Pact states gathered in Vienna, Austria to start negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe (MBFR). France refused to participate, claiming that the negotiations were likely to intensify rather than overcome the division of Europe into competing military blocs.
MBFR was seen as a potentially important element of the then-dawning era of détente. The West German Government in particular saw MBFR as a logical extension of its policy of normalizing and improving relations with the East. The potential for MBFR talks was also used in the late 1960's to discourage some of the European allies from going ahead with their plans for unilateral troop reductions. Later, the Nixon administration used the initiative in the early 1970's to counter Senator Mike Mansfield's proposals for unilateral U.S. troop cuts in Europe, arguing that such withdrawals would undercut efforts to obtain Soviet and East European troop reductions in the negotiations. The allies hoped that success would reduce the Soviet military threat to Western Europe and thus ease pressures on NATO defense spending.
The Pact countries also presumably saw some potential military benefits in limiting the U.S. military presence in Western Europe. Some of the East European countries probably hoped that troop cuts in central Europe would diminish Soviet troop presence and influence in their own affairs.
In proposing the MBFR talks, NATO claimed that the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a substantial numerical conventional advantage in central Europe. The Pact disagreed, and differences over Warsaw Pact force levels deployed in the area became a central issue hindering the negotiations. As was the case in other arms control talks, verification revisions and on-site inspections emerged as another key area of disagreement.
In August 1975, the 35 CSCE participants reached agreement on a non-binding "Final Act," also referred to as the "Helsinki Accord," setting out a variety of principles intended to govern relations among states in Europe as well as to guide human rights practices within participating states. The Final Act included a variety of "confidence building measures" to make the military practices of signatories more predictable and transparent to others. In 1984, as part of the CSCE process, the 35 countries opened a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm, intended to enhance such measures. They agreed in September 1986 on a more comprehensive package of measures for notifications of military maneuvers, exchanges of information on military forces, and observation of maneuvers in broader geographic scope than the MBFR reduction area, applying instead to all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Since the Stockholm Document's measures went into effect in January 7, 1987, on-site inspections have been conducted throughout the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) area, including on Soviet territory. Reports indicate that implementation has gone well. The Soviets reportedly have admitted inspectors to the areas to be inspected in a timely fashion and allowed them to observe the activity scheduled for inspection.
In spite of progress toward developing the outline of an accord in the MBFR talks, which dealt primarily with military manpower, disagreement over how many forces the Warsaw Pact maintained in the reduction area remained the major obstacle blocking agreement. In December 1985, the West proposed that this "data dispute" be put aside, initial small U.S.-Soviet cuts taken, and intensive monitoring measures implemented to help establish an agreed data base. The Pact did not accept the West's proposal, arguing that the intrusive inspection measures were excessive for such a limited reduction accord. Instead, in June 1986 the Warsaw Pact, meeting in Budapest, Hungary, unveiled a "comprehensive approach" to the reduction of nuclear and conventional arms in rope based on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals. The "Budapest Appeal" called for cuts in virtually all categories of military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. The proposal allowed for the possibility of on site inspection by an international consultative commission with the participation of NATO, Warsaw Pact, and neutral countries.
In December 1986, the NATO foreign ministers, responding to the Budapest Appeal, issued the so-called Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control supporting new negotiations on "conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." As a consequence, the members of both alliances agreed that conventional arms control negotiations should not focus just on central Europe, as had MBFR, but should include the entire territory of the participants covered by the mandate of the CSCE, most importantly to include the western Soviet Union.
Early in 1987, the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact nations began meeting to discuss establishing a new forum, separate from MBFR and CDE, to handle troop reductions in the ATTU. France became an active participant in the new negotiations. On January 10, 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed on a mandate for new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to be held in Vienna, dealing with conventional force issues. This new forum was set within the "framework of the CSCE process", but was largely autonomous. The CDE moved into its second phase of negotiations on confidence and security building measures (CSBM's). After 16 years of talks without an outcome, MBFR negotiations were discontinued on February 2, 1989.
Two themes ran through Western preparations for the new negotiations. First, there was general agreement that the new negotiations should shift away from MBFR's focus on manpower reductions toward reductions and constraints on military equipment that could be central to Warsaw Pact offensive operations against NATO. Second, a consensus developed that the West would require Warsaw Pact reductions substantially larger than those taken by NATO (by an asymmetrical ratio in cuts of roughly 5-1 in tanks, for example), and that NATO should only make minimal reductions.
NATO consultations in 1988 produced general agreement that the principal Western aims for the CFE talks would be to reduce the potential for the Warsaw Pact to mount a short-warning attack on the West and to inhibit Warsaw Pact ability to mount an attack on Western Europe by mobilizing overwhelming forces from within the Soviet Union. After months of discussions, the NATO allies on December 8, 1988, announced their initial position for the new negotiations. The allies said they would propose reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks, armored troop carriers, and artillery. The Western framework for the negotiations was based on a complex concept designed to accommodate French desire to avoid a "bloc-to-bloc" formula for reductions. Overall limits would be set on total holdings of armaments in Europe by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries but references would be to "GROUPS" rather than to alliances. No country could deploy more than 30 percent of the total equipment permitted in the ATTU zone, or 60 percent of its group's holdings. The proposal, which became known as the "sufficiency rule," was primarily designed to reduce the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.
The NATO countries also proposed specific limits on stationed forces and regional sub-limits to prevent concentrations of forces in any one particular part of Europe. The allies further promised to propose "stabilizing measure of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, movement, and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces," and said they would require a "rigorous and reliable regime for monitoring and verification." The allies additionally proposed that the 35 participants in the CSCE seek to improve transparency of military activities in Europe through parallel negotiations on CSBMS, to continue the work of the Stockholm CDE.
1. Gorbachev's Speech at the United Nations
In a major speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said that by the end of 1990 the Soviet Union would reduce the numerical strength of Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men and withdraw six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and disband them. In addition, Gorbachev promised: to withdraw offensively oriented forces from Eastern Europe; to reduce Soviet East Europe" forces by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks; to restructure forces remaining in Eastern Europe toward a "clearly defensive" structure; to cut Soviet forces in the ATTU area by a total of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft; and to reduce "significantly" Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia.
Gorbachev placed his initiative outside the context of the CFE talks, but it nonetheless had an important political impact on the talks. Moscow's allies followed the Soviet move with promised unilateral reductions of their own.
On March 6, 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze revealed the Warsaw Pact's approach to the CFE negotiations. Shevardnadze proposed a three stage process of reductions and restructuring of military forces in Europe. In the first stage, NATO and the Pact would reduce troops and conventional armaments including tactical fighter aircraft, tanks, combat helicopters, armored personnel carriers, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars-to new levels 10 percent to 15 percent below the lowest levels currently held by either side. In a second stage, troops and weapons systems would be cut a further 25 percent. In a third stage, the military forces of each side would be "given a strictly defensive character, and agreements would be reached on ceilings limiting all other categories of arms."
Shevardnadze expressed Warsaw Pact willingness to negotiate far-reaching cooperative verification measures including inspections without the right of refusal, aerial inspections, and verification at key military communications points such as rail yards and road intersections. He said, "There is no verification measure which we would not be ready to consider and accept on a reciprocal basis." Shevardnadze also raised several issues on which the Soviets had differences with the West, arguing the importance of naval forces to the military balance in Europe, the need to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and the high priority that should be given to aircraft reductions. Naval forces per se were not included in the CFE mandate, nor were tactical nuclear weapons. The West claimed that aircraft were not critical to seizing and holding territory, as was the other hardware considered for reductions in the initial western proposal.
During the committee's hearings on the Treaty, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell testified that "The initial NATO CFE proposal would have set limits of 20,000 tanks, 28,000 armored combat vehicles and 16,500 artillery pieces for each side ***. The actual limits in the Treaty signed 20 months later *** [go] well beyond our initial proposal, which was deemed sufficient to ensure NATO Security. In short, we achieved even more in the Treaty than we were originally seeking."
During Secretary of State Baker's visit to Moscow in early armored vehicles, and artillery down to levels paralleling those proposed by NATO. When the new position was presented in Vienna during the week of May 22, the Pact approach not only reflected the Soviet accommodation on residual overall ceiling in these three categories, but also accepted in principle NATO's proposal to specifically restrict the proportion of the final ceiling that could be maintained by any one nation. This limitation was aimed at requiring drastic cuts by the Soviet Union because of its preponderant position in the Warsaw Pact.
The Warsaw Pact countries accepted in principle the Western concept of using geographic zones to govern the distribution of remaining military forces in the European area. But even after the Pact had modified its zonal concept to bring it closer to NATO's approach in June 1989, the Pact approach posed a number of potential political and force posture difficulties for NATO in the Central Region. The geographic and political limitations on alternative locations for U.S. forces in Europe were such that the Pact zones might require that U.S. equipment be removed to the United States while Soviet equipment could remain concentrated, in the Soviet Union's Western military districts neighboring Eastern Europe.
2. The NATO Initiative
A. U.S. initiative presented at a NATO summit meeting in Brussels on May 29, 1989, further stimulated progress in CFE. The initiative reiterated the Western position on reductions of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery while for the first time accepting in principle the inclusion of aircraft, helicopters, and manpower in a reduction accord-points demanded by the three Warsaw Pact countries. The NATO countries on July 13, 1989, in Vienna submitted an amended proposal based on the U.S. initiative. The proposal called for reduction in combat aircraft to a total of 11,400 in the ATTU (5,700 for each side) and in helicopters to 3,800 (1,900 for each side). In addition, the United States would cut its "combat manpower" in Europe to around 275,000 while requiring the Soviet Union to reduce its forces stationed in Eastern Europe to the same level (down from approximately 600,000). No other CFE participants would be required to limit their troops. Reduced equipment would be destroyed and manpower would be demobilized.
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries submitted draft treaties in December 1989. The two drafts were roughly parallel in style and coverage, reflecting agreement on the general goals of the negotiations as well as the areas of outstanding differences. The NATO draft avoided references to alliances and instead talked of each alliance as a "group of parties" to the accord. The entire reduction scheme was premised on establishing a final numerical balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Late in 1989, as the East European revolution began to overturn most standard assumptions about Europe's immediate future, Gorbachev proposed a summit meeting of the CSCE countries to discuss future European security arrangements. The NATO countries eventually accepted while, at U.S. insistence, requiring that a CFE Treaty be ready for signature at such a meeting. The Soviets accepted the condition. The outstanding major CFE issues were resolved in meetings between U.S. Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York early in October 1990. The CFE treaty was signed at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris on November 19, 1990.
3. Major Negotiating Issues
The following summarizes major issues in the negotiations that had to be resolved before a treaty could be signed. In each of the major weapons categories, the definition of the category was a critical factor in determining the extent of reductions required to reach common ceilings for the two alliances.
Tanks. The limits on and definitions of battle tanks and armored vehicles-a central CFE issue-were finally agreed on June 27, 1990. The two sides originally agreed on a common ceiling of 20,000 for NATO and the Pact, but disagreed on the definition of a tank, based on weight and armaments. Original proposals left a grey area between tanks and armored troop carriers (now referred to as "armored combat vehicles") that could have omitted some categories of "light tank" from reductions and provided opportunities for future circumvention of the agreement's intent. In January 1990, it was reported that the two sides were working toward an agreement on new definitions that would close the gap. The Western participants redefined tanks to capture those of 20 metric tons (originally having proposed 26 metric tons) and having a gun of at least 75mm caliber. The East advocated including anything over 16 metric tons. In June 1990, the negotiators announced agreement on defining tanks as tracked or wheeled armored vehicles with a gun of 75mm or greater and weighing 16.5 metric tons or more.
Armored combat vehicles. The NATO/Pact armor compromise of June 1990 set a ceiling of 30,000 for each side on all armored personnel carriers, armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV's) and heavy armament combat vehicles (HACV's) other than tanks. No more than 18,000 could be AIFV'S, and of these, no more than 1,500 could be HACV's.
Artillery. NATO originally proposed a ceiling of 16,500 artillery pieces. The Pact proposed 24,000, but subsequently came down to 20,000. During the Third Round of negotiations, agreement was reached to include all artillery pieces of a diameter of 100mm or greater in reductions. The New York CFE meeting in early October 1990 set a final level of 20,000, this satisfying the Soviet request.
Aircraft. While NATO originally sought to exclude aircraft from reductions, the Warsaw Pact argued that attack aircraft should be included. However, the Pact wanted to exclude from reductions aircraft intended for defensive or training purposes, in which it had substantial holdings, as well as land-based naval aircraft and strategic bombers deployed in the ATTU. Within its definition, it proposed an alliance-wide ceiling of 4,700. Following President Bush's May 1989 initiative, NATO proposed inclusion of all combat aircraft under a 5,700 ceiling. In a compromise approach, it later accepted the 4,700 goal and proposed creating a separate ceiling of 500 for interceptors and exempting basic trainers that could not easily be fitted for offensive operations. The Soviet Union, however, insisted on keeping a higher 1,500 ceiling on interceptors and adding a 1,500 ceiling on combat trainers. In a working paper submitted July 4, 1990, in Vienna, it narrowed the gap between its position and NATO's by reducing the ceiling on combat trainers to 750, including its medium range Backfire bomber among the treaty-limited items and seemingly endorsing an earlier compromise to limit strategic bombers under the START Treaty.
The divisive issue of land-based naval aircraft, which many had feared would have to be deferred to subsequent negotiations, was resolved at the New York high-level discussions in early October. It was agreed to deal with the issue in a side agreement to the Treaty. This approach cleared the way for signature of a comprehensive agreement in November. Moscow dropped its insistence on constraining NATO carrier-based aircraft, which it considered equivalent to its own land-based naval aircraft. NATO had consistently resisted such an approach-which would have involved equipment based outside the agreed area of application-because it would imply an indirect commitment to naval arms control. In return, a separate political commitment was made not to increase holdings of land-based naval aircraft beyond 430 within each alliance, of which no more than 400 could belong to a single nation. This provision was designed to keep the Soviet Union from recategorizing treaty-limited aircraft from its air force to its navy. Another part of the compromise had NATO agree to increase the overall ceiling for combat aircraft to 6,800 for each group of states while Moscow dropped its demand for separate subceilings on interceptors and combat trainers.
Helicopters. The Pact accepted NATO's distinction of "attack helicopters" (all armed helicopters that employ anti-armor or air-to-air guided weapons through an integrated fire control and aiming system) and "combat support helicopters" (those armed with self-defense and area suppression weapons). Only the former are limited, whereas the latter are subject to information exchanges and on-site inspections. The ceiling for attack helicopters had originally been set at 1,900, but in a compromise reached in early October, NATO accepted the Soviet request for a 2,000 ceiling. There were disagreements on which helicopters to classify in each category, on the scope of the allowed recategorization of certain attack helicopters to support ones, and on the number of inspections. However, because helicopters can play an important role in combat support as well as in civilian missions, the sides agreed to permit extensive recategorization.
Manpower. The Warsaw Pact originally proposed an overall ceiling for military personnel in Europe, including ceilings on stationed troops and a collective 700,000-750,000 ceiling for each group of states in Central Europe. NATO first tried to avoid any manpower component in the negotiations because of the great difficulty agreeing what forces should be included and of verifying ceilings. In response to President Bush's 1989 proposal that U.S. and Soviet stationed forces be limited to 275,006, the Soviet Union proposed an overall limit of 350,000 for all stationed forces. In his January 31, 1990, State of the Union address, President Bush, following consultation with the NATO allies and a telephone discussion with Soviet President Gorbachev, proposed that the total of U.S. and Soviet forces stationed in Central Europe be limited to 195,000 with the United States permitted an Additional 30,000 troops stationed elsewhere in Europe, primarily in the United Kingdom,, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Soviet Union accepted the proposal on February 13. Some observers questioned the wisdom of including limits on Soviet stationed forces when most East European governments wanted all Soviet troops to return to the Soviet Union. Other observers questioned the wisdom of limiting U.S. forces outside Central Europe to 30,000, thereby potentially restricting U.S. Flexibility for redeployment, particularly if all U.S. forces had to leave Germany in the future.
Failure of the negotiations to make much progress in the spring of 1990 was due in large part to Soviet concern about the disintegration of the Warsaw pact, and particularly the possible unification of Germany and the future size of its armed forces. The post-reduction balances that had been projected by both sides had been based on the assumption of East Germany's continued participation in the Warsaw Pact. Once German unification became inevitable, outcomes based on such calculations became disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. Perhaps more important was Moscow's desire for some limit on the overall size of the armed forces of a united Germany This desire collided with the fact that the West had been unwilling to include nonstationed manpower in the CFE treaty as well as the German desire not to be "singularized" in any way in the treaty
During Chancellor Kohl's visit to the Soviet Union in July 1990, this problem was resolved in principle by Kohl's pledge to President Gorbachev that German Armed forces would be reduced to 370,000 over the next few years, roughly in parallel with the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Germany. This commitment was endorsed in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed on September 12 by the two Germanys and the four previously occupying powers. U.S. Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnardze agreed in a September meeting to take the U.S./Soviet personnel issue off the CFE agenda, because the earlier agreement to limit U.S. and Soviet foreign-deployed forces in the area had been overtaken by Soviet plans to pull all of its forces out of Eastern and Central Europe.
Stored equipment. NATO wanted to protect the right to store military equipment in Central Europe after an accord; the Pact originally opposed the idea. Both sides maintain equipment in storage in Europe, but stored equipment is more important to NATO because so much of NATO's reinforcement potential is based on U.S. forces returning to Europe and joining up with equipment stored there. Agreement was finally reached on per-group and subzonal limits on equipment in active units. Equipment in excess of these ceilings had to be kept at special storage sites.
Destruction of equipment. The West maintained that reduced equipment should be destroyed. The East wanted to convert whatever possible for non military use. Elimination procedures were agreed upon for aircraft, helicopters, and artillery, but disagreements remained on the number of tanks and armored vehicles that the Soviets would be able to convert up until the final stages of the negotiations. Agreement was reached to permit conversion on small amounts of tanks and ACV'S, but military utility had to be eliminated. The Soviets apparently also tried to deal with part of the destruction problem by transferring substantial quantities of treaty-limited-equipment (TLE) east of the Ural Mountains.
Sufficiency rule. The West proposed that no single nation cold maintain more than 60 percent of its alliance's holdings in any of the treaty-limited equipment (or 30 percent of the CFE total). Such a limitation was accepted in principle by the Warsaw Pact but the Soviet Union demanded a higher, 35 to 40 percent level. The discrepancy between the NATO and Soviet figures became more acute following the demise of the Warsaw Pact. The loss of a Pact member through the unification of Germany and the reduction of Eastern European militaries left the Soviet Union with an even greater percentage of its alliance's total. In addition, Moscow considered that its forces alone should be balanced against the capabilities of NATO collectively. Thus, the Soviets called for a sufficiency level of "at least" 4O percent. NATO, unwilling to accept such a limit, was joined in September 1990 by Eastern European countries because a higher level of Soviet forces would have implied a lower residual limit on their own forces. The October New York compromise set an average sufficiency level closer to NATO's proposal (slightly less than 34 percent) at the expense of raising the overall totals for artillery, helicopters, and aircraft. This satisfied Moscow's desire not to reduce its holdings below an absolute level it considered unacceptable.
Regional sub-limits. The difficulty of defining regional subzones and agreeing on the corresponding equipment sublimits was compounded by the prospect of a complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. From early on, Soviet zonal sublimits were aimed at limiting force levels in the center of Europe, where both alliances maintain their greatest military forces. Late in the negotiations it appeared that CFE ceilings would allow NATO to maintain approximately twice as many tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery systems in the center as the Warsaw Pact would keep de facto. This discrepancy generated a new Soviet proposal, presented August 30, to limit tanks to 4-5,000 armored personnel carriers to some 6,000 and artillery pieces to 3,500 in the Central European zone. in addition to severely constraining NATO forces in Central Europe, the proposal increased the fear of Northern and Southern flank nations that Soviet forces might be redeployed,near their borders. This proposal was not accepted, and in addition, the CFE Treaty includes special constraints designed to mitigate concerns of the flank countries.
Verification and compliance. Both sides presented verification and compliance proposals in 1989. The proposals were similar in structure and included many areas of agreement. Initially, the greatest difficulties were within NATO, as the United States originally sought a provision for inspections at production sites and transit points that was opposed by other allies. A number of the allies were troubled that such inspections would impose constraints on them but not on the United States and Canada, whose territory is outside the reduction area. The original Pact proposal included provisions for continuous monitoring at key transit points, airfields, and exit/entry points. Both proposals included short-notice inspections on the ground and from the air, but the rules to govern such inspections and the number to be allowed were left open for negotiation.
The NATO countries submitted a detailed verification protocol at the beginning of the sixth CFE round on March 15, 1990, and the Pact countries submitted a protocol covering inspection measures at the end of that round in April. The Pact dropped its suggestions for permanent inspection sites, falling back to the more intrusive inspection approach taken by the Western participants. Whereas the West produced complex inspection provisions, the Pact countries left these provisions to be filled in later. The Soviets proposed a quota system based mainly on numbers of military units (objects of verification or "OOV's"), as opposed to the West's proposal for quotas based on land area and amounts of military equipment, which would have yielded particularly large quota requirements for the Soviet Union. The quota system in the Treaty is based on objects of verification, a Western concession to the Soviet approach. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union still will be vulnerable to more inspections than any other participant (with a quota approximately three times larger than, Germany's, the next largest). There will be no CFE inspections on U.S. or Canadian soil, nor Soviet soil east of the Urals.
In the end, the CFE participants failed to agree on the rules to govern aerial inspections. That aspect of the compliance system as well as the issue of manpower limitations were left over for follow-on CFE-1A talks intended to wrap up loose ends under the CFE mandate before a new mandate for further security talks within the CSCE framework is prepared for agreement at the CSCE Helsinki Summit conference scheduled for March 1992.
The CFR negotiations took place against a backdrop of the most dynamic European events in decades. Earlier in the 1980's, pressures for political change gradually mounted in Eastern Europe due to worsening economic and social conditions and frustration with decades of Soviet oppression. These pressures finally let loose under Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika. Institutions created by forced adherence to the Kremlin's line crumbled quickly and dramatically across Eastern Europe in 1989. In a few months of that year, revolutionary changes occurred in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Rumania.
Since 1989, Eastern Europe has been struggling to throw off the vestiges of the communist system and foster democracy and open markets. Free elections have been held in most nations, and it appears that the public and governmental commitment to creating democratic institutions is strong. Nonetheless, each of the emerging democracies is handicapped by desperate or near-desperate economic circumstances that often dominate public affairs and concerns.
During and after the CFE negotiations, the East European participants severed the cold war ties that had bound them to one another and the Soviet Union. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was formally dissolved in June 1991, and the Warsaw Pact was terminated as a military alliance in March 1991 and abolished finally in July.
Several of the former Warsaw Pact members began searching for ways to tie their security to the West and to enhance their regional stability. Czechoslovakia led the way in demonstrating an interest in closer relations to NATO. NATO, beginning in 1990, took unprecedented steps to include East European and later, Soviet representatives in alliance meetings and to regularize contacts between its members an East European states.
Several Eastern and Western European nations pressed for the "institutionalization" of CSCE, the only security organization with virtually every European country as a member. The United States had traditionally been reluctant to upgrade the role or profile of the CSCE, fearing it would diminish the primacy of NATO and believing consensus decision-making among 35 nations was too awkward for sensible policy-making With final U.S. acquiescence, however, CSCE began to establish its own institutions, such as a conflict mediation center and an office for free elections, in 1990 and 1991.
East European nations also began to establish new relations among themselves. Hungary and Rumania agreed to a bilateral "open skies" regime, while Czechoslovakia, Hungary Yugoslavia, Austria and Italy created the "Pentagonale" group to foster cooperation in environmental, cultural and other fields between the five neighboring countries.
A critical part of the East European transition and the backdrop to the CFE negotiations was the negotiation of bilateral agreements between Moscow and the Easf European states regarding the future of Soviet forces in the respective countries. Czechoslovakia and Hungary reached agreements with the Soviet Union while the CFE talks were underway and all Soviet forces were withdrawn from those countries by June 1990. Some tensions over the withdrawal of Soviet troops remained, however, as the "host" nations demanded Soviet assistance in cleaning up environmental damage caused by the Soviet military presence.
Poland and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral troop withdrawal treaty on October 26, 1991, which required all battle troops to be withdrawn by November 1992 and all remaining units by the end of the 1993. The Soviet-Polish negotiations were hampered by a number of disagreements. The parties disputed control over and payment for Soviet use of "Soviet" rail lines in Poland necessary for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. The Soviets also claimed that the financial and logistical demands of withdrawing forces from the region were taxing the military to the fullest; they could not sustain the added pressure of withdrawing troops from Poland simultaneously.
Most important in the context of CFE and European security, these many changes made it impossible for the Warsaw Pact to mount a coordinated attack against the West. This fact unfolded during the negotiation of the CFE Treaty. In time, the major, public, Western goal for the negotiation shifted from eliminating the Eastern ability to mount an offensive operation to institutionalizing and making legally-binding the separate and de facto Soviet departure from Eastern Europe. Few arms control Negotiations have occurred in such an auspicious historic framework. Treaty provisions reflecting this evolution include a prohibition on stationing without the host state's consent, and the establishment of individual national equipment entitlements.
The central symbol of the European Revolution was the crumbling of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. Intense discussions on the unification of Germany followed the end of the division of Berlin. On February 13, 1990, in Ottawa, the Four Powers (the United States, France, Britain and the Soviet Union) and the two German states agreed on a framework to set the course for unification. Under this "two-plus-four" process, the Federal Republic (FRG) and the German Democratic-Republic (GDR) addressed the internal process of unification while the four Powers handled the external issues arising from World War II and its aftermath.
The outcome of the two-plus-four negotiation, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, was a milestone in European history as well as arms control. The Treaty was signed on September 12, 1990, and the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the Treaty on October 10, 1990, 7 days after German unification. Under the Treaty, the united Germany pledged: to renounce aggressive war and any intention to manufacture, possess, or control nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; to reduce its armed forces to 370,000 troops; and to adopt a constitution that reflects principles of peace. In exchange, the Soviet Union committed to removing its forces from Germany by 1994, thus disbanding the major Soviet occupation force in Eastern Europe.
Moscow insisted on linking the CFE process to agreement on the future military status of the united Germany. Negotiations on that issue were resolved to the West's satisfaction duang a Soviet-FRG summit meeting in July 1990. Specifically, article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Pinal Settlement with Respect to Germany refers to an 'FRG statement of intent to reduce the troop strength of a unified Germany to 370,000 within 3 to 4 years. The same paragraph declares that this "reduction will commence on the entry into force of the first CFE agreement." Germany repeated its commitment of troop levels in a political statement associated with the CFE Treaty.
Subsequent to the signing of the German Treaty, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a bilateral agreement regarding troop withdrawal. The scheduled departure of Soviet forces from Germany is underway. It has been slowed at some points because of Soviet claims that the nation cannot provide an adequate amount of housing for the returning soldiers. The Soviets have requested that Germany, which is financing much of this housing in the Soviet Union, provide more funds to ensure a timely withdrawal.
The German Treaty has significant implications for NATO strategy. In the Treaty, Germany retained the right to full NATO membership, but agreed to station only German, not NATO, forces on former GDR territory. NATO forces, however, may carry out small-scale maneuvers on GDR territory once Soviet forces depart.
The European revolutions seemingly culminated in the failed August 19, 1991, coup against Soviet President Gorbachev. The aborted coup led to radical internal transformations, the centerpiece of which was the transfer of authority from the central Soviet government to the individual and increasingly autonomous governments of the republics.
The coup was apparently precipitated by the imminent signing of a union treaty defining a new relationship between the republics and the center. On the eve of the signing, Soviet Vice President Gennady Yanaev took over as acting President and created a Committee for the State of Emergency for the U.S.S.R. Claiming that President Gorbachev was ill, the committee placed him under house arrest at his vacation home in the Crimea. Within 3 days, however, in the face of growing Russian resistance and worldwide condemnation, the coup collapsed and Gorbachev returned to Moscow.
Gorbachev returned, however, to discover that his former authority was dramatically diminished. By shortly after his return, each republic had declared its independence and each took varying steps to act on that declaration. The three Baltic states achieved full independence and were recognized by the world community as separate nations. Like most of the rest of the former communist bloc, the Soviet Union found itself in desperate economic straits with little likelihood of improving circumstances rapidly. An economic union treaty, which had been considered in various forms for over a year, was finally signed in October, but few observers believed it would have much effect on the national economic situation. It remains to be seen what sort of political accord might be reached among the remaining republics, and indeed, which of those republics will remain bound in some form of a union.
A hallmark of the republics' post-August independence drives was the move to establish armed forces separate from those controlled by the central Soviet government. These attempts, strongly discouraged by Soviet President Gorbachev, made it even more apparent that the former Soviet Union would be unable to mount a coordinated attack against Western Europe. However, the obvious instability and uncertainty throughout the former Soviet empire did raise concerns about responsible control over armed forces.2
The CFE Treaty was hailed as a landmark agreement by all 22 participating states. In the West, the Treaty has received widespread praise. Even the French Government, which had been the most skeptical of all NATO participants, welcomed the Treaty enthusiastically. When the Treaty was signed at the Paris summit in November 1990, President Mitterrand praised the Treaty as a key achievement signaling the end of the bloc-to-bloc relationship that had dominated the post-war order. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called the Treaty "the most comprehensive and most far-reaching agreement in the history of disarmament and arms control." Kohl said that "the foundation of a security architecture that comprises all of Europe has been laid. In short, peace and security in Europe will be implemented with fewer weapons in the future." And Margaret Thatcher, in one of her last acts as British Prime Minister, told the House of Commons that the CFE Treaty was "the most substantial and far-reaching agreement for the reduction of armaments which has yet been achieved."
East European leaders also greeted the Treaty with words of praise. For example, Hungarian Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Hungarian CFE delegation, characterized the outcome of the Treaty as "very favorable for Hungary," adding that it would "lay the foundations for a new European cooperative security system which will help prevent a 'security vacuum' coming about in Central-East Europe after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact."
1. Initial Ratification Delay
CFE signatories, including non-Soviet members of the former Warsaw Pact, have shared U.S. concerns over a number of issues pertaining to Soviet compliance with the Treaty. Difficulties with Soviet interpretation of key Treaty provisions, with Soviet data declarations, and with massive pre-Treaty Soviet transfers of weapons east of the Ural mountains held up the ratification process in all signatory countries. A solution to those problems, worked out between U.S. and Soviet Foreign Ministers in Lisbon on June 1, 1991, and endorsed by all Treaty parties on June 14, cleared the way for the ratification process to begin in a number of countries.
Most national parliaments were scheduled to consider the Treaty during their fall 1991 session. However, the August 1991 Soviet coup and its aftermath created some uncertainty. The breakdown of central order raised the danger that the Soviet Government could not be held accountable for the actions of seceding or autonomy-seeking republics. At the same time, the genuine desire of the Soviet Union as a whole, and most of its constituent parts, to establish friendly relations with the West helped to mitigate some past concerns over possible Soviet attempts to cheat or circumvent the Treaty.
2. Ratification Timetables3
Belgium: Ratification of the CFE Treaty was the last act of Parliament before its dissolution, following a government crisis in the middle of October 1991. A declaration expressing reservations about Soviet forces in the Baltics was attached to the ratification instrument. Belgian officials, however, express their full satisfaction with the October 18 arrangement, which was reached only a few days after Belgian ratification.
Canada: Canadian law first requires Cabinet signature for the Ratification of international treaties. The Canadian Cabinet has given its consent to the Treaty, including the June 14 arrangement settling differences between the Soviet Union and the other Treaty parties (see above). The October 14 arrangement about the Baltics will be examined by the Cabinet on November 7, 1991. The final official step in Canadian ratification requires the deposit of the ratification instrument at the official CFE depository in the Hague. That transfer is in process at this writing.
Denmark: The ratification process has begun and is expected to be completed before the end of the year. No major difficulties are anticipated. The satisfactory settlement of the Baltic case should lead to a ratification without reservations.
France: At the beginning of September, the decision was made by the government to proceed with ratification before the end of the year. The Treaty is widely expected to be accepted by the National Assembly. The possibility that reservations may be attached to the ratification is not excluded.
Germany: The Bundestag approved the Treaty on November 7. The Bundestag is scheduled to take it up on November 29. That chambers' consideration is pro forma only. Final ratification is expected by early December. No rejections or reservations are anticipated, although Foreign Minister Genscher is reportedly seeking assurances from individual Soviet republics (in particular Ukraine) that they would proportionately assume the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Treaty.
Greece: The ratification process has not begun yet, but rapid action is excepted once parliament takes the treaty up.
Iceland: The Treaty is expected to be ratified in early 1992. No ratification problems are foreseen.
Italy: The ratification process has begun but may not be concluded until early 1992. The requirement that the Treaty be voted upon by both chambers may cause some slight delay, but the Treaty is expected to be approved without reservations.
Luxembourg: Ratification is expected by the end of the year.
Netherlands: The Treaty was ratified on November 6.
Norway: The Treaty was sent to the joint Foreign Relations Committee of the two chambers in mid-October 1991. No difficulties are expected in ratification and it may occur by November 19. Norwegian officials say that concerns about the disposal of Soviet forces were lifted by the October 18 arrangement on the Baltics.
Portugal: The October 6 parliamentary elections have postponed consideration of the Treaty both at government and parliament level. The Treaty is not yet on the agenda of the competent chamber, the Assembly of the Republic. Ratification may not occur until early 1992.
Spain: The ratification process began in the middle of October, and will presumably lead to a vote by the beginning of January. Because all political forces, on the right as well on the left, had been very supportive of the Treaty at the time of signature, it is widely expected to be ratified without reservations.
Turkey. Parliamentary elections on October 20 postponed the ratification process. The Turkish Government will forward the Treaty to the legislative branch as soon as the new Parliament convenes, and hopes for an early approbation. No reservations or conditions are expected to be attached to the ratification.
Britain: The Treaty was ratified on November 19.
U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. Constitution stipulates that ratification of international treaties requires approval by the Supreme Soviet. Constitutional amendments adopted September 5, 1991, however, substantially changed the structure of the Supreme Soviet. The upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet of Republics, is vested with authority to approve or reject international treaties. Examination of the Treaty by competent committees has begun. However, because of the recent scrapping of the U.S.S.R. State Constitution and changing structure of the Supreme Soviet, parliamentary scrutiny is in a state of flux. The new State Council is expected to approve it. The Treaty also has a much lower level of priority than economic reform in the immediate future. The removal from power of the conservative groups that had opposed the Treaty after the August coup, and the repeated pledges of the central government and individual republics that they intend to abide by the commitments made by the former Soviet state, suggest that ratification will not encounter major stumbling blocs.
Hungary: The Hungarian Parliament approved the CFE Treaty on September 10, 1991. The instrument of ratification was later deposited at The Hague which constituted the full Hungarian Ratification.
Czechoslovakia: The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was the first to ratify the CFE Treaty on July 12, 1991. No reservations were made and Czech law does not provide for parliamentary conditionality.
Poland: The Treaty will be transmitted to Parliament once a new legislature has been constituted, following the October 27, 1991, elections. Ratification is expected to be noncontroversial and to occur before the end of the year.
Bulgaria: Bulgaria ratified the CFE Treaty on September 13, 1991. The Treaty was approved by an overwhelming majority of parliamentarians. No reservations were made, and no conditionality was raised, despite some Bulgarian misgivings about the balance of forces between Turkey and Bulgaria to result from the Treaty.
Romania: The Treaty has not been ratified yet for two main reasons: (1) a desire to keep in schedule with the main CFE signatories; (2) an overcrowded parliamentary agenda including, among others, the adoption of a new constitution. No problems are expected for ratification.
The Committee heard testimony on the military effects of the CFE Treaty from the Honorable Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense; General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff, Air Force; Admiral Frank B. Kelso 11, Chief of Naval Operations; General John R. Dailey, Assistant Commandant, Marine Corps; General J. Reimer, Vice Chief of Staff, Army; General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR, NATO); Mr. Richard Kerr, Acting Director, Central Intelligence and Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and other witnesses from the Intelligence Community.
Secretary of Defense Cheney summarized the Treaty's military impact as follows:
Administration witnesses cited several factors unrelated to the CFE Treaty that have helped to create a more favorable military situation for NATO than existed only 4 years ago:
In general, after CFE NATO will have fewer armed forces to defend more territory. But the threat it faces will be drastically reduced and warning time of any serious offensive action will be measured in months or years rather than days.
1. Treaty Limits
The CFE Treaty sets equal ceilings on five categories of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) for each of the two "Groups of States Parties"; i.e., for the 16 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the six members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The limits for each Group of States Parties are:
Each party to the Treaty is responsible for reducing its current TLE holdings in each of these categories to a level not to exceed its "maximum levels for holdings," i.e., its national maximum entitlements. (See table 1.) Within each Group of States Parties, the sum of the national entitlements may not exceed the limits noted above. Although the national entitlements can be modified by mutual consent, their existence relieves the East European governments of any requirement to associate themselves further with the Warsaw Treaty Organization or the Soviet Union insofar as compliance with treaty ceilings is concerned. That is, each state party will be held individually accountable for compliance with its own national TLE ceilings.
Although Article VI of the treaty does not mention the USSR by name, the Article does promulgate the so called "sufficiency rule," which prohibits any one nation from having more than roughly one-third of the total quantity of TLE to which the WTO and NATO are collectively entitled. Thus, the TLE holdings of the Soviet Union are legally capped at the following levels (and at the following percentages of the total TLE of that type permitted in the ATTU):
As a result of the Soviet national maximum entitlements to which the U.S.S.R. agreed on November 3, 1990, the Soviet share of the WTO ceilings in two TLE categories, tanks and artillery, are set at levels below the Treaty's sufficiency limits. The U.S.S.R. may not have more than 13,150 tanks, or 13,175 artillery pieces. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet TLE entitlements will be further subdivided as Soviet republics gain independence. The CFE Treaty also constrains the concentration of Soviet TLE in the western military districts of the U.S.S.R., and on NATO's flanks.
2. Net Effects
As table 3 shows, before the CFE negotiations began, the WTO had about 2.7 times more TLE in the ATTU region than did NATO. The Soviet Union by itself had an advantage over NATO of about 2 to 1. Following implementation of the Treaty, however, the Soviet Union will be at a disadvantage on the order of 0.7 to 1. Further, that ratio fails to take into account the possibility that the East Europeans would be on the other side in a conflict with the U.S.S.R. or any Soviet successor state.
Total amount of TLE in the ATTU for three different dates: (1) January 1989 (the unilateral data announcement of the Soviet Union), (2) November 19, 1990 (notified at Treaty signature), and (3) the TLE ceilings which must be achieved by the end of the 40-month TLE reduction period after entry into force.
General Powell told the committee that after treaty implementation, NATO would be the dominant military power under single control in the ATTU. While retaining the right to deploy as many forces as all of the former Warsaw Pact countries combined, NATO would remain a viable alliance, a single military entity, whose most significant potential opponent had withdrawn within its own borders and was legally restricted to only two-thirds of NATO's capabilities. The intrusive monitoring and verification regime, Powell continued, should vastly improve NATO's ability to evaluate opposing forces in the region. In short, while some reductions are required, NATO's military position will be vastly improved as a result of the Treaty.
Secretary Cheney told the committee that the reduction in the Soviet threat will enable the United States to cut back its military forces in Europe. He also indicated that successful implementation of the CFE Treaty would give further confidence that the United State could embark upon this course of action prudently.
According to Secretary Cheney, over the next 5 years, the administration plans to cut back its personnel by 25 percent from 2.1 million to 1.6 million personnel, to reduce Army divisions from 28 to 18, to cut back tactical fighter wings from 36 to 26, and cut 100 Navy ships from the current total of 550.
1. Manpower
On July 25, 1991, General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) told the committee that U.S. military personnel in Europe would be reduced to 150,000 by 1995 (down from 326,414 less than 4 years before). He argued that a troop level of 150,000 would provide the United States the minimum force necessary to lead NATO and fight effectively.
The CFE Treaty does not cover manpower, but this issue is under negotiation in the follow-on CFE 1A negotiation. The administration plans to accomplish these manpower reductions over the next 4 years. Forces assigned to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) will be reduced from about 52/3 Army divisions to 2 Army divisions (plus some independent regiments) and from about 8 Air Force wings to 31/2 wings. Despite the magnitude of these cuts, many observers have called for even lower limits.
When pressed on the advisability of cutting U.S. troops levels in Europe to roughly 75,000 personnel, General Galvin responded:
You would not, with 75,000, be able to keep the kind of structure that would allow the air and ground and sea [components] to operate together. * * * You would not be able to operate with other NATO units * * * below the corps level. * * * You could not fight the air-land battle * * * The other nations will be able to operate together, and we would not. * * *
The committee believes a 150,000 man EUCOM force is more than adequate in the new security environment, while reserving judgment as to General Galvin's contention that a much smaller force (75,000-100,000 personnel) would be inadequate.
2. US. Reduction Requirements
Because the Treaty permits the United States to transfer ("cascade") TLE to other NATO nations if those nationals agree to reduce older equipment, the United States will not be required to actually "destroy " any equipment as a result of the Treaty. The United States plans to transfer most of its excess TLE to Turkey, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.
Table 4 below summarizes (1) the U.S. data declarations of November 1990 (as amended), (2) the U.S. CFE entitlements, and (3) U.S. reduction obligation under CFE (before cascading):
Current NATO cascading, plans call for the transfer by the United State of 1993 tanks, 636 ACV's and 339 pieces of artillery to other Allies. Provided the transfer is completed before the end of the first year of the reductions period (i.e., 16 months after entry into force of the Treaty), the United States would not be required to destroy any equipment. However, the United States plans to destroy some 640 old M-47 tanks by choice not because of treaty reduction obligations.
3. NATO's Reduction Requirements
NATO has begun military drawdowns that anticipate, and in many cases exceed, CFE requirements. To Comply with the TLE ceilings called for in the CFE Treaty, NATO as a whole will have to reduce its TLE inventory by about 13 percent, for a total of about 12,000 items of ground equipment. Of course, this includes about 10,000 pieces of former East German equipment acquired by Germany that will be destroyed leaving only about 2,000 actual NATO TLE that must be destroyed. No combat aircraft or helicopters will have to be destroyed. In fact, NATO could add 954 combat aircraft and 281 helicopters without exceeding its CFE ceilings. Although NATO will have to alter little of its force structure to comply with CFE equipment ceilings, the United States and the European NATO members are undertaking military reductions beyond those required by CFE. For example, as part of the German unification treaty, Germany committed to reducing the combined German Army by 100,000 personnel down to 370,000, no more than 345,000 of which can be in ground and air forces. The United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium have stated that they will also undertake military force reductions separate from CFE. General Galvin estimated that by 1995, NATO forces deployed in the central region will be reduced by 50 percent, with approximately the same national proportions as today. There will be little change in NATO's northern flank (Norway, Iceland), or in NATO's southern region (Turkey, Greece).
2 For a complete discussion of the legal implications for the CFE Treaty of the Disintegration of the Soviet Union, see Section VI. [Return]
3 Based on discussions with officials in the relevant embassies in Washington and Bush Administration office in late October / early November 1991. [Return]
