On behalf of the United States, President Bush signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty at the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris on November 19, 1990. The Treaty, together with eight Protocols, was transmitted to the Senate on July 9, 1991, and referred the same day to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
The committee held public hearings on the Treaty in late March, and throughout July. During the hearing process, the committee received testimony from dozens of top administration officials. Outside witnesses and experts also provided their views in writing to the Committee. The following witnesses testified:
The Hon. Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of State.
The Hon. Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
The Hon. Steven Hadley, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, Department of Defense.
Panel I:
Panel II:
Panel I:
Panel II: (Closed Session)
General John R. Galvin, USA, Commander-in-Chief, European Command
Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF Director, On-Site Inspection Agency.
The Hon. R. James Woolsey, U.S. Representative to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
The Hon. Ronald F. Lehman II, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
After the August revolution in the former Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of that country, Chairman Biden asked Secretary Baker, Secretary Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Powell, and the Director of Central Intelligence to review their testimony in light of the events in the former Soviet Union. Each of these officials sent letters to the committee confirming their original conclusions about the Treaty and providing additional information. Those letters are contained in the Appendix to this report.
The committee began markup of the Treaty on Tuesday, November 19, 1991. The same day, the Resolution of Ratification, as amended by the four declarations and five conditions adopted by the committee, was ordered favorably reported to the Senate by a vote of 1990. The committee conditions and declarations are described in Section VI. Those voting in the affirmative were Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Sanford, Moynihan, Robb, Wofford, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, McConnell, Brown, and Jeffords.
Summary: There is a major conceptual flaw in the proposed Conventional Forces in Europe-CFE-Treaty which requires a condition with regard to the declared data provided by the Soviet Union. This condition, which is Condition No. 2 in the Committee resolution, requires some additional analysis in depth.
This conceptual flaw concerns the fundamental obligation of the proposed CFE Treaty, and it has two elements.
The fundamental obligation of the proposed CFE Treaty is the obligation to reduce conventional forces. The first element in this conceptual flaw arises from the Soviet declaration of false data on their conventional forces. Secondly, it stems from the fact that some officials in the Executive Branch mistakenly propose to use this false Soviet data as the baseline to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce its forces.
The precise terms of the CFE Treaty are explicit on how to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce their conventional forces. In the event that the data provided by the Soviets at the time of signature is found to be false, then data on Soviet forces derived from U.S. Intelligence must be used to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation.
According to unclassified testimony to the committee, the fact of gross Soviet data falsification at the signing of the CFE Treaty is indicated by conclusive U.S. intelligence evidence. In addition, due to the fact that subsequently the Soviets slightly corrected their CFE data provided at the time of Signature, they have in effect admitted in diplomatic channels that their data declared at Treaty signature was false. Moreover, the President is required by law to report to Congress every year by the First of December on Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties, and such a report on the Soviet data falsification in the CFE Treaty is already being prepared. Finally, testimony to the Committee indicates that the magnitude of the Soviet data falsification is militarily significant.
The fact that the Soviets provided false data on the day of signature of the CFE Treaty, which shortly will be confirmed by a Presidential report, means that the Soviets violated their obligation under the CFE Treaty to provide accurate data at signature. Thus the Soviets have violated the CFE Treaty even before it is ratified.
As a matter of principle, the Soviets should not be allowed to benefit from this attempted fraud. Indeed, a basic principle of both domestic law and international law is that a party to a contract or a treaty should not benefit from fraud. Yet if this false Soviet baseline data is used for the reduction calculation, the Soviet obligation to reduce will be minimized-it will be cut to about half of what it should be.
Unfortunately, most officials in the Executive Branch nevertheless advocate using this fraudulent Soviet data in order to calculate this minimized Soviet reduction obligation. The Executive Branch wants to accept the false Soviet data apparently because it believes that extensive further diplomatic efforts would be required to achieve Soviet compliance with their full obligation to reduce. And the unspoken premise of the Executive Branch is that these additional negotiations might still fail to achieve full Soviet compliance.
But the Senate must solve this problem. This solution is simple, and is proposed as Condition No. 2 in the committee resolution.
The false data that the Soviets declared at signature is technically not a legal part of the Treaty, and it was not part of the formal and official CFE Treaty documents originally sent to the Senate. It still has not been formally sent to the Senate. Therefore, the Senate should require, as a condition of its advice and consent to ratification, then the false Soviet-declared data should not be used to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation.
In the event of the impending Presidential Report confirming a Soviet violation of the obligation to declare accurate data at Treaty signatures violation which has in fact already occurred-the correct interpretation of the CFE Treaty clearly requires that data on the number of pieces of Soviet Treaty-Limited Equipment actually present in the Treaty zone of application at signature must be derived from U.S. National Technical Means of verification. The Treaty's provisions explicitly indicate quite clearly that this data on Soviet forces derived from U.S. National Technical Means of verification should instead be used as the baseline to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation.
The precise provisions of the CFE Treaty require that U.S. National Technical Means of verification be used to verify all Soviet locational and numerical declarations, to validate all Soviet data, and most significantly, to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation in order to ensure compliance.
Using this data obtained from U.S. National Technical Means results in a Soviet reduction obligation that is almost double the obligation based on the false Soviet data.
The Senate should not allow the Soviets to benefit from their attempted fraud. But unless the Senate fixes this conceptual flaw by attaching a Condition to its resolution of ratification consenting to the CFE Treaty, the Senate will be approving the erroneous use of deliberately false Soviet data in order to calculate a minimized Soviet reduction obligation.
A grave matter of principle is therefore at stake for the Senate in addressing this major conceptual flaw in the proposed CFE Treaty. The Soviets have violated the Treaty even before its ratification by providing false data. The Senate should avoid approving a resolution of ratification which implies acceptance of this fraudulent Soviet data which violated the Treaty. The United States must have a political will to interpret the CFE Treaty in accordance with its precise terms, to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation, and to enforce full Soviet compliance. Unless the Senate demonstrates this political will by approving a Condition fixing this conceptual flaw, the Senate will be an accomplice in a major Soviet deception, and the proposed CFE Treaty could fail to achieve its intended objectives.
Here is the proposed Senate Condition No. 2 on Data:
"(2) Data.-Whereas data supplied by the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to Article XIII and
the Protocol on Information Exchange, regarding its equipment
holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area as of November 19, 1990,
differed from United States estimates of such equipment, the
United States shall-
"(a) continue to seek clarification of those holdings of Treaty-limited equipment as of November 19, 1990; and
"(b) seek to obtain additional reductions of equipment in Treaty-limited categories in the event the President determines that
actual holdings of Treaty-limited equipment by any state party exceeded its declaration concerning its holdings of such equipment as
of November 19, 1990."
This Condition to the Resolution of Ratification will solve the problem of Soviet violation of the CFE Treaty at signature.
The following chart on the Soviet obligation for conventional force reduction under the CFE Treaty illustrates the major conceptual flaw in the CFE Treaty. The chart shows the magnitude of the attempted Soviet fraud. It shows that the Soviet-declared fraudulent data is a maneuver designed to cut their obligation to reduce their conventional forces almost in half. The Senate should act to prevent the Soviets from succeeding in this deception. The Condition to the Resolution of Ratification can correct this Soviet fraud.
End Summary.
According to unclassified testimony to the committee derived from National Intelligence Estimates, U.S. Intelligence has conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union deliberately falsified its declared data on the day of signature of the CFE Treaty, November 19, 1990.
The Acting Director of Central Intelligence testified publicly to the Committee on Foreign Relations on July 17, 1991, that:
[W]hen the Soviets tabled their figures on Treaty-Limited Equipment holdings as of 19 November, 1990, there were major discrepancies between those figures and our most recent estimates available at that time . . . We have confirmed that some of the weapons being moved east of the Urals did not arrive at their destination until a month or so after signature . . . We also know that a number of items that the Soviets claimed to have eliminated by 19 November were still in the zone.The public intelligence judgments based upon our National Intelligence Estimates clearly indicate that the Soviets deliberately falsified their initial data declaration at Treaty signature. It should be reemphasized that these unclassified judgments are derived from the classified National Intelligence Estimates.
Since the signing of the CFE Treaty on November 19, 1990, the Soviets have even admitted their data falsification in diplomatic channels, when confronted with them by U.S. negotiators, thus confirming that the deliberate falsification occurred.
The Chief U.S. CFE negotiator, Ambassador James Woolsey, even termed this false Soviet. data declaration flagrant "fraud." This assessment of fraud can only be interpreted to mean that Ambassador Woolsey believes that the Soviets violated their obligation under the CFE Treaty to declare accurate data at Treaty signature. Moreover, the executive branch is already preparing a non-compliance report for the President to deliver to Congress in December, 1991, on the Soviet CFE data falsification. The Presidential Report is required because the Soviet data declaration was clearly inaccurate, and the Soviets clearly violated their obligation to declare accurate data upon signing the CFE Treaty.
The intelligence evidence that the Soviets grossly under-declared their forces at the time of Treaty-signature is conclusive. There is "smoking gun" evidence that thousands of pieces of Soviet Treaty-Limited Equipment were present in the zone of Treaty application and yet were not declared on the day of signature.
Indeed, our best intelligence indicates that the Soviets had about 18,000 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) inside the zone of application that they did not declare at the time of Treaty signature. Originally, just after CFE Treaty signing on November 19, 1990, U.S. Intelligence concluded that the "major discrepancy" between U.S. evidence and the Soviet data declaration was as large as a Soviet under-declaration of 35,000 to 40,000 pieces of TLE. But after a thorough restudy of all the U.S. evidence collected during 1990, which is described in more detail below, U.S. Intelligence concluded that the "major discrepancy" was about 18,000 pieces of undeclared TLE.
Within this block of 18,000 pieces of undeclared Soviet TLE, there is conclusive, "smoking gun" evidence of about 4,000 undeclared pieces of TLE within the zone on the signature date.
Indeed, the Chief U.S. CFE negotiator has testified publicly that about 4,000 undeclared pieces of TLE were clearly still inside the zone on the date of signature, and that a total of about 18,000 TLE are estimated to have been in the category of undeclared but inside the zone on date of signature.
Ambassador Woolsey, the U.S. Chief CFE negotiator, testified to the Committee in open session on July 25, 1991, as follows:
We believed, based on information that had been provided to us by the Intelligence Community, that there were . . . data problems . . . with respect to the aircraft, there was approximately 1,000 aircraft . . . that the Soviet . . .did not declare. And we raised this issue in the Joint Consultative Group, and after discussions there they increased their notified holdings by between 100 and 200 aircrafts. There were still 800 or so aircraft that they did not notify . . . There was also about 1,000 pieces of ground . . .based equipment which we believe . . . [with] reasonably good confidence were not declared properly . . . Now in addition to this approximately 800 or so aircraft and 800 or so pieces of ground equipment, there are another, let us say in the very low thousands, pieces of equipment that, I believe it is fair to say we believe we have some evidence to suggests were not destroyed in time and/or alternatively did not get out in time, that is, were not destroyed by November 19th or did not get out by November 19th.Thus we have public testimony from the U.S. CFE negotiator to the committee that there is hard evidence that at least about 4,000 Soviet pieces of TLE were clearly in the zone of Treaty application, but were not declared.
The evident Soviet purpose in their data falsification was to avoid having to destroy the full 18,000 undeclared pieces of TLE in the zone. In the months following the signature date of November 19, 1990, all of these 18,000 pieces of undeclared TLE have evidently been removed from the CFE Treaty zone of application, and by being East of the Urals, they are not immune from destruction under the Treaty.
Testimony to the Committee from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quoted in detail below, also shows that the magnitude of this deliberate Soviet data falsification is so large that it must be regarded as "militarily significant."
Testimony therefore shows that the Soviets have committed a militarily significant, fundamental violation that goes to the heart of their most significant obligation of the Treaty, even before the Treaty is ratified. The gross Soviet data falsification at signature is a violation of the CFE obligation to provide accurate data. Moreover, the obligation to reduce TLE is the central obligation of the Treaty, and the data upon which this obligation is based is the cornerstone of the central obligation. Since the data (either declared by a State Party to the Treaty or derived from U.S. National technical Means) is so important to calculating the central obligation of the Treaty-the reductions, the Soviet data falsification could be viewed as defeating the object and purpose of the Treaty.
Indeed, this gross Soviet data deception is more that "bad faith" or simple "fraud." Under international law, it is "fraud in the inducement" to sign the CFE Treaty, that is to say fraud intended to induce the other party to accept unequal terms. Thus Soviet "fraud in the inducement" could give the United States the right to refuse to ratify the Treaty, or to withdraw from it.
The proposed CFE Treaty, of course, requires the NATO group of nations and the former Warsaw Pact group of nations to reduce their conventional forces to agreed-upon levels for each group. The Soviet obligation is to reduce its forces along with its former Warsaw Pact allies to the agreed level.
The question then arises -- what is the starting point for calculating the Soviet obligation to reduce? Is this starting point the level of forces which the Soviets declared at Treaty signature, or is it the level which U.S. National Technical Means of verification detected that the Soviets actually had in the zone on the day of signature?
Most officials in the executive branch are seeking to minimize the Soviet obligation to reduce. These official's hold that the Soviet reduction obligation should be calculated from the level of forces that the Soviets declared at Treaty signature. Under this method of calculation, the Soviet obligation to reduce would be only 19,670 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment. The probable reason for this attempt to minimize the Soviet reduction obligation is the presumed difficulty of the diplomatic effort it would take to achieve Soviet compliance with their full reduction obligation.
However, this Soviet-declared data is not a legal and integral part of the CFE Treaty; in fact, this Soviet-declared data has not even been officially and formally submitted to the Senate with the Treaty as part of the official documents included in the Treaty; and finally, U.S. Intelligence has established that it is grossly inaccurate.
The correct interpretation of the CFE Treaty, according to its precise provisions to be quoted below, shows that Soviet-declared data is only a supplement to the data gathered by U.S. National Technical Means of verification for calculating the Soviet reduction obligation.
The Treaty's terms precisely state that U.S. National Technical Means of verification are required for "validation" of the Soviet-declared data. Moreover, there are locational and numerical constraints in the Treaty that can only be verified by National Technical Means. Finally, the Treaty explicitly states that U.S. National Technical Means of verification are to be used for "ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty." This means that U.S. National Technical Means of verification must be used to calculate the compliance obligation-the Soviet obligation to reduce.
In a circumstance in which the Soviets have clearly violated their obligation under CFE to provide accurate data at Treaty signature, only U.S. National Technical Means of verification can establish the baseline of how many pieces of Soviet TLE were in the zone on the day of Treaty signature. This view was provided in answer to one of my questions which was agreed to by an inter-agency group.
In sum, the Treaty clearly establishes that the Soviet obligation to reduce must be calculated from data on Soviet forces actually in the zone of application on the date of Treat signature, as established by U.S. National Technical Means of verification.
Under this correct method of calculation, the Soviet reduction obligation would be the sum of the 19,670 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment, plus the 18,000 pieces that the Soviets did not declare, or a total of 37,670 pieces-almost twice as much.
Thus we must also double the Soviet reduction obligation.
A fundamental principle of both civil and international law is that a contracting party should not be able to benefit from false declarations in a contract or a treaty. This principle's practical effect in this case is that if we know from U.S. National Technical Means of verification that Soviet-declared data is grossly false, then we must use our own NTM data on actual Soviet forces in the zone in order to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce.
D. SENATE SHOULD NOT APPROVE USE OF FRAUDULENT SOVIET DATA
The committee and the Senate must resolve the related problems of the grossly inaccurate Soviet-declared data, and how to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation.
Otherwise, if the Senate does not solve this problem, the Senate will face the anomaly of having to vote to approve the grossly inaccurate Soviet-declared data being erroneously used to calculate the fundamental obligation of the Treaty. A Senate vote for the CFE Treaty, in the hope that on-site inspections (after ratification) can solve the data problem, would be like buying a "pig in a poke," or consummating a deal without knowing what we are getting into.
There is an acceptable way to solve the Senate's problems with the CFE Treaty, in the form of Senate Condition No. 2 to the Resolution of Ratification, which will be proposed during Committee mark-up on the Treaty. (End Introduction.)
Russian President Boris Yeltsin recently stated that the Soviet Union has provided false data in arms control negotiations. Yeltsin recently told a group of 72 Senators and also a press conference at the White House in June, 1991, according to two transcripts and two translations, that Soviet hardliners falsified the numbers of Soviet weapons systems, and engaged in deception, throughout the last 30 years of arms control treaty negotiations with the West. Yeltsin's assessment is consistent with the facts of Soviet data deception in arms control negotiations long known to U.S. Intelligence.
In September, 1988, then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze finally admitted that the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar was a clear violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Schevardnadze also conceded that for years the Soviets had falsely denied their violations of arms control treaties to the world, thereby authoritatively conceding the magnitude of Soviet arms control falsification and deception.
Presidential reports to Congress since 1984 have confirmed several cases of Soviet data falsification and deception in SALT 1, SALT II, and the INF Treaty.
There is a long history of Soviet data falsification and deception, dating beck to the first strategic forces arms control agreements signed in 1972. This history suggests that the Soviet Union has engaged in "fraud in the inducement" since arms control involving strategic forces began.
In the SALT I Interim Agreement of 1972, the Soviets falsely declared that they did not intend to replace light ICMBs with heavy ICBMS, when in fact they had precisely such intentions and later proceeded to execute them.
Moreover, the Soviets falsely declared that they needed to be compensated for the short range of their SLBMS, by being allowed a higher total of SLBMS, when in fact they had already developed a long-range SLBM to overcome their "geographical asymmetry."
Finally, the Soviets declared a false number of the submarines that they then possessed. This false number we used in the negotiations and in the agreement to calculate a favorable weapons "replacement" quota for them, increasing their advantage in submarines and SLBMS.
The President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control concluded in 1984 that the Soviet negotiating deception resulting in the Soviet replacement of light ICBMs with heavy ICBMS, when SALT I's Article II prohibited such replacement, was a circumvention of SALT I which defeated its object and purpose.
A 14-year-old CIA study also confirmed that the Soviets falsified their number of submarines, and hid the long range of an SLBM designed to overcome their "geographical asymmetries" until after the agreement entered into force.
Thus there is official confirmation that the Soviets negotiated deceptively in SALT I, provided some false information on their intentions and capabilities, and provided some false data.
The United States agreed to this false Soviet-declared data at the time, it was included in the agreement, and the United States therefore in effect became a complicit party to the Soviet data deception.
In the SALT II Treaty of 1979, the Soviets declared much more data on their strategic forces, and this data declaration was in the form of a "Memorandum of Understanding" which was linked directly to the Treaty. In fact, it was considered to be tantamount to a protocol to the Treaty. Moreover, the United States stated in the "Memorandum of Understanding" that it "agreed" with the Soviet-declared data. This "agreed" Soviet-declared data was sent to the Senate as an official part of the unratified SALT II Treaty.
However, it later turned out that the Soviet-declared SALT 11 data was false in several ways. The eight Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Treaties beginning in 1984, together with the Defense Department series begun in 1981 entitled Soviet Military Power, have officially confirmed the following Soviet SALT II data falsifications:
The fact that we later discovered that in SALT II the Soviets falsified data that was part of the Treaty and which the United States 11 agreed" to had an important effect. Ever since SALT II, the United States has been reluctant to agree to the accuracy of Soviet-declared data or to including Soviet-declared data in arms control treaties.
In the case of the 1987 INF Treaty, the Soviet-declared data was not agreed to by each side, and it was not included in the Treaty. But the Soviet-declared data was nevertheless sent to the Senate as if it was part of the Treaty, even though it was not a legal and integral part of the Treaty. And during the ratification process the State Department vigorously defended the accuracy of the Soviet-declared INF data, even though the Treaty said that only the Soviets were responsible for the accuracy of their own data.
Just as happened in SALT I and SALT II, later it turned out that the Soviets had again falsified some of their INF data. The State Department was embarrassed by the discovery later that some Soviet-declared INF data was false, because the State Department had repeatedly vouched for its accuracy in public when advocating the Treaty. But defending the accuracy of Soviet-declared data again turned out to be a losing proposition. These Soviet falsifications of their data declared for the INF Treaty have been confirmed by several National Intelligence Estimates and Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet Non-compliance with Arms Control Treaties. The most important unclassified examples of Soviet INF data falsification, and there are many more than those listed below, are the Soviet failures to declare:
We have not yet mentioned the fourth case, the 1973-1989 aborted negotiations on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, in which the main obstacle to agreement was long-standing Soviet falsification of their force data.
According to press reports, a spy for the CIA who later defected to the West, Polish Army Colonel Roman Kuklinski of the Polish General Staff, has given the United States voluminous documentary evidence of the systematic data deception that the Soviet General Staff engineered throughout the MBFR negotiations.
According to several reports, a U.S. Intelligence study, reportedly based upon Colonel Kuklinski's evidence, stated:
We believe Soviet officials deliberately under-stated the number of Warsaw Pact military servicemen in Central Europe that would be subject to an MBFR agreement.Thus we have four major case studies of Soviet data deception -- SALT 1, SALT II, INF, and MBFR.
In sum, we have the following history of false Soviet-declared arms data:
A good case can be made that the Soviet data falsification was so significant that the Soviet Union engaged in "fraud in the inducement" in SALT I, SALT II, MBFR, and the INF Treaty.
There are reports that the Soviets have also again falsified some of their declared data in the proposed START Treaty, as a 65 page CIA study points out.
In view of this history, the Senate should be aware of the non-legal status of the Soviet-declared CFE data, and whether or not it is accurate. In the most recent case-the INF Treaty-on May 26, 1988, the Senate gave its advice and consent for the President to ratify a Treaty which used for its compliance and implementation Soviet-declared data that can now be demonstrated to be partially false.
In the case of the proposed CFE Treaty, the Senate would be wise to avoid a situation in which it gives its advice and consent for the President to ratify a treaty which either makes use of false Soviet-declared data, or depends upon false Soviet-declared data for compliance and implementation. Otherwise, the Senate could even yet again a fourth time become a complicit party to Soviet data deception.
As noted, according to public, unclassified testimony and press reports, U.S. National Technical Means of verification have detected about 18,000 more pieces of Soviet Treaty-Limited Equipment-TLE-in the Treaty zone of application at date of Treaty signature on November 19, 1990, than the Soviets declared. This inescapable conclusion was reached after an intensive re-study by U.S. Intelligence of all the evidence of Soviet forces in the CFE zone during 1990. Further, we have seen that the original "data gap" was as large as 35,000 to 40,000 pieces of Soviet undeclared TLE. Finally, as further noted, there is hard evidence of this Soviet under-declaration of data. The only discernible purpose for this under-declaration is to minimize the Soviet obligation to reduce.
Within this block of 18,000 undeclared TLE, there is positive, conclusive evidence that a batch of about 4,000 combat aircraft TLE and ground TLE were not declared by the Soviets, even though they were clearly in the zone at the time of Treaty signature. The evidence in these cases is "smoking gun" quality-hard evidence from U.S. National Technical Means of verification on the day of Treaty signature. These 18,000 pieces of Soviet undeclared TLE, including the 4,000 "smoking guns," are clearly a violation of the CFE Treaty.
As noted, this judgment of the magnitude of undeclared Soviet TLE-18,000 pieces including the 4,000 "smoking guns"-is thus based upon hard intelligence evidence and sound analytical methodologies. An intensive restudy of all the evidence on Soviet forces in the CFE zone of application throughout 1990 was conducted by U.S. Intelligence.
One methodology reportedly entailed macro-counting Soviet equipment in the 900 or more "Objects of Verification" in the Atlantic to the Urals zone. The second methodology reportedly entailed micro-counting Soviet equipment being stockpiled and stored at scores of Soviet military depots East of the Urals. These two "macro-micro" methodologies can be compared to counting first the "bean pods" in the military bases inside the Treaty zone (because most Soviet equipment there is under cover inside sheds), and then counting the "beans" themselves in mostly open storage concentrations in the depots East of the Urals.
The Intelligence Community is thus confident that this hard evidence and the two counting methodologies show that the Soviets grossly under-declared their data by about 18,000 pieces of TLE, and that the Soviet purpose in this was clearly to minimize their reduction obligation. This Soviet purpose is confirmed by the strong likelihood that all of this undeclared Soviet TLE has probably been moved East of the Urals by now, where it will not have to be reduced under the terms of the Treaty.
What is the legal status of this Soviet-declared CFE data? In the case of the CFE Treaty, the Senate has not even formally and officially been sent the Soviet-declared CFE data, surely because the State Department does not believe that it is legally part of the CFE Treaty or that it is an integral part of it.
Indeed, Ambassador Woolsey has authoritatively told Committee staff that he does not regard the Soviet-declared CFE data to be a legal and integral part of the CFE Treaty. But there seems to be a more fundamental reason why the Senate has not been formally and officially sent the CFE data that the Soviets declared at signature. Perhaps the real reason that the Soviet-declared data was not sent was because the State Department does not once again want to have to vouch for the accuracy of false Soviet-declared data, especially Soviet-declared data which this time is so grossly and deliberately inaccurate. Thus the Senate should also be cautious with
regard to the Soviet-declared CFE data. There is thus an anomalous situation with regard to the CFE Treaty. Unlike the INF Treaty, which simply banned all the types of INF missiles and the missiles themselves that were declared, (as it turned out we have confirmed that the number of Soviet INF missiles was falsely under-declared), there is a more fundamental problem with the Soviet-declared CFE data. The Soviet-supplied CFE data is not part of the Treaty, even though the Executive Branch believes that this data must be used to calculate the key obligation of the CFE Treaty.
But is it reasonable to use a set of data which is not legally and integrally part of the CFE Treaty, and which was not officially and formally furnished to the Senate, in order to calculate the fundamental Soviet obligation of the Treaty--the Soviet reduction obligation?
More significantly, is it reasonable to use this data for such a calculation even when we clearly know it to be grossly and deliberately inaccurate?
The CFE Treaty contains numerical and locational constraints on "Treaty-Limited Equipment" or TLE. The Treaty is also supposed to be monitored by National Technical Means of verification. Indeed, the numerical and locational constraints on the TLE contained in the Treaty can only be verified by National Technical Means. Moreover, even the CIA has stated that verification of the baseline data is crucial to having parity after the reductions, and National Technical Means of verification are the only means to verify the Soviet baseline data.
Thus this Soviet under-declaration of 18,000 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment goes to the heart of the fundamental Soviet obligation under the Treaty-the obligation to reduce to equal levels of forces for the groups of nations.
Finally, as is discussed in more detail below, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified to the committee that illegal TLE numbering more than 15,000 pieces would be a "militarily significant" violation.
The Soviets thus have under-declared their CFE data on November 19, 1990, by at least 18,000 pieces of TLE, which is a militarily significant amount.
This "data gap," or under-declaration problem is therefore an important case of Soviet "fraud in the inducement" to the CFE Treaty, a violation at the signature of the Treaty serious enough to allow the United States to withdraw from the Treaty or refuse to ratify it. This Soviet data fraud must be considered as part of the problem of calculating the Soviet reduction obligation under the terms of the Treaty.
According to Ambassador James Woolsey, the U.S. chief negotiator, and also to most other Executive Branch officials, the way to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce is to simply subtract the allowed Soviet TLE holdings contained in the Treaty's statement of permitted holdings at the end of the 40 month period from the Soviet data declared at Treaty signature. The result is supposed to be the total number of TLE that the Soviets are obligated to destroy. The State Department and most other Executive Branch officials agree with this method of calculating the Soviet obligation to reduce.
Using this methodology, the Soviets would have to reduce by 19,670 pieces of TLE.
Thus it can be argued that the Soviet data declaration at Treaty signature is the most important input, indeed, the only input, for calculating the Soviet reduction obligation. But this Soviet-declared data is not a legal, integral part of the Treaty; it has not even been officially and formally furnished to the Senate; it is clearly grossly false; and a proper interpretation of the Treaty shows that it can be the only input into the calculation.
Moreover, the fact that the Senate does not even officially and formally have the Soviet data declaration is significant, and needs re-emphasis.
The Soviet-declared data has not even been formally and officially sent to the Senate as part of the CFE Treaty. The Soviet data was only sent informally and unofficially to the Committee on Foreign Relations long after the Treaty itself was submitted to the Senate, and it was only sent because of repeated staff requests for it.
If the Senate does not officially have the Soviet-declared data, then the Senate can not calculate the Soviet reduction obligation under the proposed Treaty, even using the method suggested by Ambassador Woolsey and most Executive Branch officials. But even if the Soviet-declared data had been formally and officially sent to the Senate, it is not regarded by the Executive Branch to be an integral or legal part of the Treaty.
In sum, if the Soviet data declaration is not before the Senate and is not legally an integral part of the Treaty, and is deliberately and grossly false, then clearly there must be another input for calculating the Soviet obligation to reduce. We must seek to interpret the Treaty to determine the proper method of calculating the Soviet reduction obligation.
A fundamental principle of both civil and international law is that a contracting party should not be able to benefit from false declarations in a contract or a treaty. This principle's practical effect in this case is that if we know from U.S. National Technical Means of verification that Soviet-declared data is grossly false, then we must use our own NTM data on Soviet forces in the zone at signature in order to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce.
The top official in the Executive Branch with explicit responsibility for verification believes that what follows is a description of the proper, correct method for calculating the Soviet reduction obligation.
A full and careful study of the relevant provisions of the proposed CFE Treaty shows that the correct method for calculating the Soviet CFE reduction obligation is as follows:
For full compliance with the intended reduction obligations, a State must:
Provide complete and accurate data on the numbers of all of it's armaments and TLE that are in the zone of the Treaty, and their location, as of the dates of signature and entry into force. The quantity of such TLE that must be declared as a state's reduction obligation and reduced by the Treaty-specified procedures by 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty must not be less than: the difference between the higher of the actual number of TLE present in the zone at the date of signature or entry into force, and the state's declared maximum holdings.Three provisions of the CFE Treaty provide the basis for this conclusion that data on Soviet TLE actually present in the zone at the date of signature or entry into force are the main determinant of the Soviet obligation to reduce. These three provisions are as follows:
For example, Sections II. and III. of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information state that:
Each State Party shall provide to all other States Party information on -- overall numbers and the numbers by type of its holdings of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery limited by the Treaty in each of the areas [of application of the Treaty] . . . each State Party shall [also] provide to all other States Parties the following information-the designation and peacetime location . . . specifying the geographic name and coordinates [of its] battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters . . .This Treaty language clearly implies that U.S. National Technical Means of verification will be used to validate the Soviet data declaration.
For example, Article XIII 3 of the Treaty states that:
Each State Party shall be responsible for its own information; receipt of such information and of notifications shall not imply validation or acceptance of the information provided.This Treaty language clearly means that U.S. National Technical Means of verification are required to validate the Soviet data declaration.
Article XV of the Treaty states:
For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, a State Party shall have the right to use national or multinational technical means of verification * * *Thus the precise provisions of the CFE Treaty require that U.S. National Technical Means of verification be used to verify all locational and numerical declarations, to validate all data, and most significantly, to calculate the reduction obligation in order to ensure compliance. In sum, these provisions of the CFE Treaty clearly indicate that U.S. National Technical Means of verification showing evidence of actual Soviet TLE holdings in the zone at the time of signature and entry into force must be the fundamental determinant of the Soviet reduction obligation.
Moreover, even the Intelligence Community stated in a document dated October 17, 1990, that "baseline verification" is one of the three main verification tasks of the CFE Treaty.
The Intelligence Community emphasized, regarding baseline verification, that:
We must be confident that the starting figures, from which the required reductions in TLE will be calculated, are correct. Otherwise there is no assurance that reductions will result in parity.Thus even this Intelligence Community statement also strongly implies that U.S. National Technical Means of verification will be used as an important input into determining the Soviet obligation to reduce.
Using the correct methodology to calculate the Soviet reduction obligation thus would add the 18,000 pieces of Soviet undeclared TLE to the 19,670, resulting in a total Soviet obligation to reduce of 37,670 pieces of TLE. This is almost a doubling of the Soviet obligation to reduce.
As noted, according to press reports and to open testimony, the Soviets have clearly under-declared their CFE data on the date of Treaty signature by about 18,000 pieces of TLE.
This "data gap" or under-declaration problem is therefore an important case of Soviet "fraud in the inducement" to the CFE Treaty. More significantly, this Soviet misbehavior goes to the heart of the fundamental obligations of the CFE Treaty.
The next question is whether the 18,000 pieces of TLE, of which the 4,000 "smoking gun" cases are only a part, are "militarily significant."
On July 16, 1991, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, testified to the Committee as follows:
* * * Senator Helms, 15,000 treaty-limited pieces of equipment that had been covertly infiltrated back into the ATT. [Atlantic to the Urals zone of the CFE Treaty] in violation of this Treaty, that indeed is militarily significant.Now General Powell was speaking hypothetically of the infiltration of illegal TLE into the zone, but what is important here is the level of illegal TLE, whether infiltrated or covert or undeclared, that is assessed as "militarily significant." If 15,000 illegal TLE that are infiltrated are assessed as "militarily significant," then it is reasonable to conclude that 15,000 covert or undeclared TLE would also be "militarily significant."
Finally, because the prevailing Executive Branch calculation of the Soviet reduction obligation has the Soviets reducing by about 19,670 pieces of TLE under the Treaty, if 18,000 undeclared TLE is not "militarily significant," then the ostensible 19,670 TLE reduction is also not "militarily significant." Thus if 18,000 pieces of TLE are not militarily significant, then the entire CFE Treaty may therefore not be "militarily significant." And if CFE is not militarily significant, then it may be judged to be irrelevant.
But the most logical and correct interpretation, based upon General Powell's testimony, is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assess both 18,000 pieces of TLE and 19,670 pieces of TLE as being militarily significant.
In conclusion, here is how we must describe the false Soviet data declaration gap at Treaty signature:
Thus by violating their CFE Treaty obligation to provide accurate data at signature, the Soviets have already violated the CFE Treaty in a militarily significant way, even before ratification.
Finally, use of the correct methodology to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce would almost double the number of pieces of Soviet TLE required to be dismantled by adding in the 18,000 Soviet undeclared pieces of TLE to the 19,670, resulting in an obligation to reduce 37,670 pieces of TLE.
The United States has been deeply worried about the potential of the Soviet Union to circumvent the CFE Treaty with the 57,300 or more TLE that they have withdrawn behind the Urals prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. The United States has therefore tried to get the Soviets to agree to further reductions of their forces beyond the Urals, outside the Treaty. This was the purpose behind the Soviet statement of June 14, 1991.
On June 14, 1991, the Soviet Union made the following "political commitment." The Soviets stated that between 1991 and 1995, they would:
* * * destroy or convert into civilian equipment no less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles, and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories beyond the Urals * * *These additional, pledged reductions would total 14,500 pieces of TLE. The United States would be notified about the timing and location of these reductions, and the United States would use National Technical Means of verification to observe these reductions, rather than on-site inspections.
This is thus a Soviet political commitment to reduce a total of 14,500 pieces of TLE, or about 25 percent of the 57,300 Soviet pieces of TLE that they have admitted withdrawing behind the Urals in 1989, 1990, and 1991. It is significant that a total of 14,500 pieces of TLE is approximately equivalent to the 18,000 pieces of TLE that U.S. Intelligence believes was undeclared at signature.
In sum, it would be possible to solve the inter-related Soviet data falsification problem and the problem of establishing the correct methodology for calculating the Soviet reduction obligation, by conditioning the Senate's advice and consent to the resolution of ratification to say that the Soviet political commitment to dismantle these 14,500 pieces of TLE are an approximate equivalent to the 18,000 under-declaration, and are thus an adequate compensation to the United States for the Soviet under-declaration.
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION,
November 18, 1991.
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: In response to your request on behalf of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am transmitting a
statement endorsing the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty and urging the Senate to act promptly in providing
its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty. The statement
has been agreed to by thirty-three former senior U.S. government
officials and military officers who have had special knowledge and
responsibility relating to the subject matter of the Treaty.
I hope you will find this statement useful in the Committee and
Senate action on this very important Treaty.
Sincerely yours,
SPURGEON M. KEENY, JR.,
President and Executive Director.
We, the undersigned, believe that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, concluded last year between the 22 nations of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, will make a substantial contribution to the continuing security interests of the United States and its Western allies and should be ratified as soon as possible.
Recent events in the Soviet Union, including and subsequent to the failed hard-line coup, have not only underscored the dangers of delay in implementing the CFE Treaty but have demonstrated the importance of having a place a structured set of obligations on the successor state or states of the Soviet Union. The CFE Treaty will require the successor state(s) to make deep, asymmetrical cuts in European-based conventional weapons to levels that will essentially eliminate the threat of a conventional attack on Europe. The existence of a formal Treaty with extensive on-site verification provisions will also provide an unprecedented degree of access to, and information about, military activities on the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals.
In the face of an uncertain political future, the security interests of the United States will be much better served under the Treaty than without it. Nothing will be gained by delaying the ratification process. Moreover, if ratification is delayed, the rapidly evolving political situation might require the Treaty's renegotiation which would be far more difficult than adapting an existing Treaty to subsequent political changes.
For these reasons, we urge the United States Senate to act expeditiously to provide its advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty.
| Hon. Harold Brown | Gen. Robert E. Pursley |
| Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski | Amb. Stanley R. Resor |
| Hon. McGeorge Bundy | Hon. John B. Rhinelander |
| Gen. William F. Burns | Hon. Elliot L. Richardson |
| Hon. Frank C. Carlucci | Amb. Rozanne L. Ridgway |
| Hon. William E. Colby | Hon. Eugene V. Rostow |
| Adm. William J. Crowe | Hon. Dean Rusk |
| Hon. Lloyd N. Cutler | Hon. James Schlesinger |
| Amb. Jonathan Dean | Hon. George P. Shultz |
| Amb. Ralph Earle II | Amb. Gerard C. Smith |
| Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster | Gen. W.Y. Smith |
| Gen. David C. Jones | Adm. Stansfield Turner |
| Hon. Max M. Kampelman | Hon. Cyrus R. Vance |
| Hon. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. | Gen. John W. Vessey |
| Hon. Melvin R. Laird | Amb. Paul C. Warnke |
| Hon. Robert S. McNamara | Gen. John Wickham |
| Gen Edward C. Meyer |
November 15, 1991.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Washington, DC, November 15,1991.
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: A classified response to the questions you posed in your letter of October 28, 1991 was provided by Acting DCI Kerr in his letter of November 6, 1991. It is now my understanding that you also wish, to the degree possible, an unclassified summary of the Intelligence Community's views on these issues.
The effect on the Community's ability to monitor conventional forces in one or more of the smaller former, Soviet republics--e.g. Moldova, Armenia, Georgia or Azerbaijan-if it chose not to participate in the CFE Treaty would depend on whether a centrally controlled "union" military continued to exist and maintained forces on the territory of such newly independent states. If on-site inspection of "union" forces were arranged along the lines envisaged in the Baltic states, there would be little or no impact on our monitoring confidence. If inspections were unavailable, our confidence would be reduced but the overall effect would not be significant.
It is my understanding that Secretary Baker and others have communicated to you the importance the administration attaches to the participation in the CFE Treaty of major republics such as the Ukraine. The forces of a large, well-armed, independent State not taking part in the treaty regime would be a major intelligence concern but not a monitoring issue since they would not be subject to the agreement. The further effects of an independent Ukraine or other large former republic refusing to participate would depend on the degree of access allowed to any residual union forces on their territory. If large amounts of union equipment remained in place, our monitoring confidence would be reduced should the Ukraine or any other large former republic refuse inspections.
Despite the lack of familiarity on the part of many republic defense and foreign ministries with specific obligations under the treaty, most republic governments have moved quickly to reassure the West of their favorable intentions. On balance, we believe that the major republics-e.g. the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia-conclude that from a diplomatic and security standpoint, they would be better off participating in the treaty regime than refusing to take part.
If I may be of any further assistance in meeting the Subcommittee's needs for information regarding the CFE Treaty, please do not hesitate to call.
Sincerely,
ROBERT M. GATES.,
Director of Central Intelligence.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, DC, November 15,1991.
Senator JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Washington, DC
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to respond to your letter of 23 October 1991 requesting my assessment of the impact of the revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union on the CFE Treaty. I am also pleased to provide you answers to your additional questions on the Treaty and related issues. You have also raised the question whether I wish to amend my July testimony in light of the August coup attempt. Although there have been many changes in the intervening period, I still believe that the fundamental tenet of my testimony--that is, that the Treaty is solid and should be ratified-remains valid.
I wish to underscore that full implementation of the CFE Treaty is greatly to the advantage of the United States and the West, even given the great changes underway in the Soviet Union. We have much to gain from CFE implementation, gains that are clear, perhaps particularly because uncertainties persist about our Soviet counterparts. The Treaty's provisions, including mandated reductions, legally binding limitations on equipment holdings, information exchange on military forces, and on-site inspection, are of great benefit to the United States and its allies. Since the Soviets or their successors will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe, these constraints will help ensure the long-term stability of the region. I stress as well that the Administration believes that the Treaty can be ratified safely as written, and any required adjustments can be dealt with after entry into force.
Prompt ratification of the CFE Treaty is critical. The CFE regime will help provide a firm basis for European security during a time of dramatic political transformation. Many CFE signatory nations look to us for leadership in the CFE ratification process. Delay in ratification would have wide repercussions and send the wrong signal to the democratic forces we hope to encourage in the East.
I urge the Senate to consent promptly to ratification of the CFE Treaty.
Sincerely,
DICK CHENEY.
Question. In your formal testimony, you said that CFE will push the Soviet threat east and "the time required for the Soviets to reconstitute the kind of threat we have seen in the past would provide NATO sufficient time to respond and regenerate its own forces."
Assuming full CFE implementation, how much time would NATO have to regenerate its forces before the Soviet threat to Central and Western Europe could be reconstituted?
Answer. Residual Soviet conventional armed strength in Europe is now and will remain formidable by any continental or global standard. Because the Western nations too are virtually certain to decline in military strength and expenditures in the CFE and post-CFE eras, we must continue to closely scrutinize the Soviet military, its union and republic forces. In particular we must focus attention on force generation-their ability to mobilize existing forces, create new units, deploy them to combat areas and shift forces from one region to another. Although we accept that their specific requirements to expand and create new units are now reduced (and likely to be more so), their proven capabilities in this area prompt continued, objective analysis.
From the Soviet Perspective
Prior to the failed August coup, we estimated that post-CFE Soviet forces would require [deleted] of buildup and training to conduct offensive operations with limited strategic objectives in NATO. For deeper strategic objectives inside NATO territory, we estimated sizable additional forces would be required through mobilization and other force generation processes. We believed some of these additional units could be available in [deleted], but most would require [deleted] to become fully ready for combat. Our assessments were based on the view that the majority of existing units would be maintained at low manning levels with less than their full wartime equipment and would be expanded in wartime using former conscript reservists. New and larger units would be created using the approximately [deleted] armored combat vehicles and [deleted] artillery pieces stored east of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region.
The current political, social and economic turmoil within the former USSR have made such assessments more difficult, although it almost certainly serves to reduce the threat further. We now believe that the Union armed forces will be smaller than predicted in our pre-coup attempt estimates and that associated force generation capabilities will be downsized to conform prevailing economic realities. The armaments stored east of the ATTU may also be viewed differently. Prior to the coup these were probably instrumental in mobilization and expansion plans. Now, because of production cutbacks, greater number of these armaments may be needed to replace peacetime attrition and to maintain active force size. Funding constraints may preclude maintenance of this equipment.
From the Western European Perspective
Non-U.S. NATO nations will possess the capability to regenerate their military forces in the event of a resurrected Soviet threat. The time required to generate those forces and their quality once generated will vary substantially based upon a number of factors as well as the time available to train. [Deleted]
NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) is developing new readiness categories which anticipate significantly increased warning time and stretch "availability" [deleted].
A scenario of concern to NATO Military Authorities is one in which the warning of Soviet military preparations is vague and ambiguous. In a scenario such as this it is difficult for political authorities to correctly assess developments [deleted].
[deleted].
Question. In your testimony, you indicated that the CFE Treaty will help detect an increased Soviet threat. Do CFE inspections and data exchanges significantly increase warning time of a Soviet effort to regenerate forces beyond those indicators we would receive through national technical means?
Answer. CFE inspections and data exchanges as well as notification of force changes would likely increase warning time of Soviet efforts to regenerate their forces within the Atlantic-to-the Urals (ATTU) zone.
Answer. The continuing erosion of Soviet state authority presents a new set of potential security challenges to the United States and our allies. Although the chances of an offensive Soviet ground attack against NATO are lower now than at any point since the second World War, and although a Soviet ground attack into Eastern Europe also does not seem likely, various consequences of the continuing decomposition of Soviet power nonetheless could potentially be damaging to United States national security interests.
Among the potential new security threats might be the militarization of ethnic or political conflict within the Soviet Union (as is taking place in Yugoslavia), with the possibility that military conflict could spread over international borders; loss of central control over weapons of mass destruction; or the creation of hundreds of thousands (or more) Soviet refugees.
I do not wish to imply that we necessarily believe that these developments are going to take place. Obviously we hope they do not. Rather, the point is that the momentous changes in the Soviet Union have created potential new security challenges, and we need to try to anticipate how our interests might be affected.
Question. What are the positive and negative features of the recent French-German proposal to create a new European armed force?
Does this force affect NATO in any way?
Answer. The October 14, 1991 Franco-German proposal suggests the possibility of using the existing Franco-German brigade as a nucleus for a larger European unit to which other Western European Union (WEU) member nations could contribute forces.
We have long made it clear to our allies that we understand and support the process of European integration. We also understand and support European interest in a security and defense dimension to the integration process.
With that being said, we also believe firmly that NATO continues to be the foundation for North Atlantic security; that NATO is the mechanism by which the United States has been involved and will stay involved in questions of European security; that NATO provides the integrated command that is essential to effective employment of the forces that we assign to NATO. And it is our strong feeling that whatever is done within the arena of developing the European security identity should not detract from, or undermine, or in any way weaken or erode the cohesion and the coherence of the NATO structure that has been so successful for us for forty years. We have made this very clear to our allies and they understand our position.
We cannot offer a judgment as to the positive and negative features of the proposal until a number of questions are answered: the mission of the force; whether it is for deployment within NATO, or out-of-area; how it would relate to NATO forces; whether or not the mission of this new force would overlap with the core security functions of NATO; whether or not the German forces assigned to that entity would continue to be primarily responsible to NATO; whether or not the forces within this new entity, if assigned from other NATO members, would in fact be part of the NATO integrated military command.
It is answers to those kinds of questions that will allow us to make a judgment about whether or not this proposal, or any other proposal that may be put forward, is consistent with the fundamental principle that we believe must be adhered to, and that is the proposition that the bedrock of North Atlantic security and of U.S. involvement in European security questions should continue to be NATO.
Question. Does the elimination of the Soviet conventional threat to Europe, as codified by the CFE Treaty, reduce U.S. strategic nuclear force requirements in any way?
Answer. U.S. nuclear requirements are affected by a number of factors, including Soviet nuclear and conventional warfighting capabilities. Although the CFE treaty will significantly reduce Soviet conventional capability-while also reducing the conventional threat to Europe and extending warning time in the event of a crisis-significant military capabilities will remain in place even after full treaty implementation. We believe the United States will continue to require a robust, credible strategic nuclear deterrent.
Question. Does the elimination of the Soviet conventional threat to Europe, as codified by the CFE Treaty, reduce U.S. tactical nuclear force requirements in Europe in any way?
Answer. It has long been NATO policy to maintain only the minimum level of nuclear forces required to preserve peace and stability. As a result of the improved security environment in Europe and the recent steps toward democracy in the Soviet Union, NATO Defense Ministers decided at their Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting on 17-18 October that the Alliance could reduce significantly its reliance on nuclear weapons. They thus welcomed President Bush's initiative to withdraw and destroy all U.S. nuclear weapons associated with ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles and artillery based in Europe. NPG Ministers also decided to greatly reduce the number of European-based air-delivered weapons-these decisions will result in a roughly 80 percent reduction to the European stockpile from the current level which itself is far lower than our level of a decade ago. At the same time, they agreed that nuclear weapons will continue for a foreseeable future to fulfill their essential role in the Alliance's overall strategy, since conventional forces alone cannot ensure war prevention.
Question. Precisely what military mission will be served by the tactical nuclear bombs in Europe the Administration intends to continue basing in Europe?
Answer. Due to their sensitivity, we do not discuss the details of any of our military plans. However, in general, we can confirm that nuclear weapons, albeit at greatly reduced levels, will continue to serve their essential political function of assisting in preserving peace by deterring all forms of aggression. Nuclear systems will be postured to provide widespread participation by our European Allies as a demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment; they will have the necessary flexibility, penetrativity, survivability, and flexibility to be perceived as a credible and effective deterrent against any potential aggressor. The Soviet Union still retains large numbers of nuclear forces which could potentially threaten Europe.
Question. How many tactical nuclear bombs will be retained in Western Europe, where will they be located, and what aircraft will be assigned to deliver such weapons?
Answer. While the precise numbers and locations of nuclear weapons are classified, we can say that all NATO countries currently involved in nuclear roles will continue to be committed to these roles.
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
Washington, DC, November 6,1991.
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman Subcommittee on European Affairs, US. Senate, Washington DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to respond to your recent letter, which requested my assessment of the military aspects of political events occurring within the Soviet Union and my views on a wide range of nuclear weapons issues. At the request of your staff and to facilitate your CFE deliberations, I am enclosing a rapid response to your questions concerning the CFE Treaty. I will provide answers to the remaining questions in due course.
As a general comment, I would like to stress that despite the political changes occurring in the Soviet Union full implementation of the CFE Treaty is more advantageous to the United States today than ever before. The United States and other western nations can only gain from CFE implementation, even if uncertainties persist about the Soviet Union. Treaty reductions, limits, information exchanges, and on-site inspections will impose few constraints on us while placing major ones on Soviet successors who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe. I am also convinced that the Treaty can safely be ratified as written and that any required changes can be dealt with after entry into force.
However, time is critical. We need the CFE Treaty in place as a framework for security decisions during this time of dramatic political transformation. Moreover, the Treaty is a complex agreement among 22 nations. The longer it remains unratified, the greater the temptation for one or another signatory to tinker with it. Prompt US ratification could be a critical factor in keeping this treaty on track.
Once again, thank you for your interest in my views on CFE and other national-security-related issues. I look forward to joining you when the Foreign Relations Committee begins its consideration of the START Treaty.
Sincerely,
COLIN L. POWELL,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The answers respond to CFF-related questions in your cover letter and its attachment. Questions have been repeated for clarity.
Question. Specifically, I would be interested in your assessment of the military effect of a decision by smaller republics, such as Moldavia, Armenia, Georgia, or Azerbaijan, not to join the treaty regime, as well as the military effect of a decision by Ukraine or Belorussia not to join the Treaty regime.
Answer. There are no advantages to holding up U.S. ratification based on these concerns. The central government, as Treaty signatory, will be held accountable for fulfilling Treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics. Those republics that opt out of the union and accede to the Treaty as sovereign states can be held separately accountable for obligations under the Treaty.
Obviously, I would prefer to see all newly emergent states on the European territory of the USSR remain accountable under the CFE Treaty. However, from a military perspective, if the small republics opt out of a new union, it is unlikely that the amounts of Treaty-limited equipment which they might hold would be militarily significant. In any event, we would need to ensure that all Treaty-limited equipment remaining under the control of the central government but still located on the territories of the newly independent republics remains subject to Treaty provisions and associated agreements.
We have already obtained in Vienna, among the 22 signatories, a Soviet commitment covering Soviet equipment located in the Baltic states. A similar commitment could likely be secured for central government equipment in other newly independent republics. The United States is addressing CFE with officials of the Baltic states with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment within their territories. Similar understandings could be arranged with other small republics that opt out of the Soviet Union and chose not to accede to the Treaty.
With regard to the Ukraine and Belorussia, my assessment is that if either or both of these large republics retain significant amounts of equipment in Treaty-limited categories, their participation in the CFE Treaty would be necessary. Because this Treaty is seen by European states as the cornerstone of a new European security system, I believe that there would be powerful political, military, and economic incentives for both of these republics to participate in CFE.
Question. In the aftermath of the failed coup in August, and the subsequent disintegration of the central government, could you please state your views as to the ability of the central government to mount an offensive threat to NATO and to East European countries? Has that threat increased or decreased?
Answer. As I testified in July, I believe the CFE Treaty achieves the primary U.S. goals of (a) establishing a stable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels; (b) eliminating serious disparities in forces; and (c) eliminating the capability for surprise attack and diminishing to the lowest point in 40-plus years the possibility of a major war in Europe. Although it is too early to fully assess the impact of the failed Soviet coup on military capabilities. I believe that our goals are secure. Further, I would stress that without the Treaty, each of these goals is threatened. It has been said many times, in testimony before the SFRC and other congressional committees, that the CFE Treaty will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations in Europe. Such a structure is particularly important in unsettled times and serves as a basis for further cooperative developments in the security sphere.
Question 3. Does the elimination of the Soviet conventional threat to Europe, as codified by the CFE Treaty, reduce US strategic nuclear force requirements in any way?
Answer. As the President said in his 27 September announcement of US nuclear initiatives, "the prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe launched with little or no warning time is no longer a realistic threat * * * (and) as a result, we now have an unparalleled opportunity to * * * dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons." It was specifically in the context of the changed environment in Europe, as codified by the CFE Treaty, that the President was able to (a) change the alert posture of a significant number of strategic systems and announce early elimination of others; (b) cancel the development of US mobile ICBM programs; and (c) suggest negotiations to eliminate ICBMs with multiple warheads-the systems that are most vulnerable and contribute to strategic instability. With a clearer understanding of the Soviet force structure and which modernization programs will continue under the Joint Nuclear Initiatives, the United States may be able to consider further reductions in strategic systems.
Question 4. Does the elimination of the Soviet conventional threat to Europe, as codified by the CFE Treaty, reduce US tactical nuclear force requirements in Europe in any way?
Answer. As a result of the reduction of the Soviet conventional threat to Europe, as codified in the CFE Treaty, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO conducted a strategy review that concluded nuclear weapons are indeed "weapons of last resort." NATO also approved a nuclear stockpile reduction and consulted on the withdrawal of short-ranged nuclear force weapons systems from Europe. Last month, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) welcomed President Bush's nuclear initiative and reaffirmed that nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring aggression against the Alliance. The NPG further emphasized a greater flexibility, smaller size, and increased adaptability for nuclear forces in the future. NATO's new strategic concept takes full account of recent events in the Soviet Union and provides the foundation for dramatic reductions in the size of NATO's nuclear force structure and supporting nuclear stockpile. President Bush's initiative to eliminate the US inventory of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear LANCE warheads means that NATO's European-based tactical nuclear forces will be composed entirely of dual-capable aircraft supported by US and UK air-delivered nuclear weapons.
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, European Affairs Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your recent letters and for your continued support for the Treaty on conventional Armed Forces in Europe. I fully agree with you that the CFE Treaty serves the security interests of the United States and of all of Europe. These benefits can best be ensured by prompt advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty.
My recent trip to Moscow has convinced me that all those engaged in transforming what was formerly the Soviet Union are committed to proceeding with ratification and carrying out Soviet obligations under the CFE Treaty. In particular, they are focusing on central control of the military in a manner that should facilitate the implementation of the CFE Treaty. In addition, the Treaty is unusually well structured to accommodate the historic events that have taken place. Because it was negotiated in a time of unprecedented political transformation, it contains the mechanisms needed to ensure its continued relevance in a changing Europe- without in any way mitigating its rigorous destruction and verification requirements.
Indeed, it is a measure of the value of the CFE Treaty that it remains more crucial than ever during this pivotal time. As nations re-emerge, or are metamorphosed, a predictable pattern of security arrangements will unquestionably be a stabilizing factor. The Treaty's maximum force levels and the assurances provided by inspections and exchanges of information should contribute not only to future planning, but to allaying fears of arms buildups or an imbalance of power. Moreover, its emphasis on consultation and cooperation, through the continuation of negotiations and creation of bodies such as the Joint Consultative Group, fosters the interaction that will be needed as we all help to shape a new Europe.
It is likely to be quite some time before we know the ultimate configuration and nature of the entity or entities that will succeed the Soviet Union, but we have carefully analyzed a range of possible outcomes. Many of them would require no changes to the Treaty regime at all; others would require only minimal changes. We are convinced that the Treaty can safely be ratified as written and any required changes dealt with after entry into force.
Three nations, the Czech Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, have already ratified the CFE Treaty. All our NATO Allies have also expressed their commitment to moving quickly toward ratification and full implementation. Even in this time of confusion and competing priorities, Soviet leaders have taken care to express their continued support for the obligations undertaken in the CFE Treaty. The U.S. should be in the forefront of this movement to reaffirm the importance of lower levels of armaments and a reliable European security structure, and to express support for CFE as the best vehicle for ensuring this outcome.
It is our strong conviction that the valuable contribution the CFE Treaty makes to the security of the United States and its allies can be sustained. We are fully confident that the advice and consent of the Senate to the CFE Treaty continues to be in the national security interest of the United States.
However, we take a serious risk if we do not move quickly. The Treaty's many advantages cannot be realized until it is ratified and implemented. The temptation for signatories to tinker with it may also increase as time goes on-and some important provisions that are favorable to the United States and our Allies could be lost. In addition, if momentum slows now, the leaders who have heretofore expressed their determination to abide by the Treaty may become preoccupied with other concerns or lose power to those who have opposed its measures. We need to act decisively in the Treaty's favor if we are to lock in its benefits.
As you know, I have departed for the Middle East for the eighth and most intense round of discussions in an effort to move toward a comprehensive peace settlement. I have asked Reginald Bartholomew to go up an discuss with the Senate our views on how to proceed, and explain why we consider it important to do so. I will be happy to come up to the Hill to discuss this subject when I can on my return. You will also be receiving in the near future responses to the questions you included with your October 9 letter.
Again, I want to express my appreciation for your support of this important agreement. I look forward to working with you to ensure CFE's ratification as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
JAMES A. BAKER, 111,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C, October 22, 1991.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed please find responses to the questions you sent to Secretary Baker on October 9 concerning the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).
We of course stand ready to respond to any further queries you may have.
Sincerely,
JANET G. MULUNS,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs.
Question 1. At the current time, what entity will act to ratify the CFE Treaty on behalf of the former Soviet Union and when do you expect that action to be taken?
Answer. The new Supreme Soviet is empowered to ratify the CFE Treaty. It is expected to consider the Treaty shortly after reconvening on October 21, placing it at or close to the top of their agenda. We understand there is strong support for the Treaty, and for rapid ratification, both among officials of the central government and the republics.
Question 2. Assuming the Council of Republics (new Supreme Soviet) acts to ratify the CFE Treaty, will that action place a binding obligation under international law on all members of the Council to guarantee compliance with the CFE Treaty?
Answer. Ratification by the new Union will place a binding obligation under international law on the Union to comply with the CFE Treaty. It will be up to central Union authorities to see that Treaty obligations are fulfilled-throughout the territory which comprises the Union.
Question 3. Should the United States insist that central authorities announce a plan, agreed to by all the republics, for achieving compliance with the CFE Treaty and establishing accountability for potential non-compliance?
Answer. We will hold the central government accountable for fulfilling all Treaty obligations. It will be up to central government authorities to work out arrangements with republics which are part of the new union or confederation to achieve compliance with the Treaty.
Question 4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of delaying U.S. ratification until central authorities in the former Soviet Union announce an acceptable plan agreed to by all the republics for compliance with the CFE Treaty and accountability for noncompliance?
Answer. There are no advantages to holding up U.S. ratification, since such a Union-Republic plan might indicate good intentions, but would do nothing else for other Treaty signatories in terms of ensuring compliance with Soviet Treaty obligations. The central government, as Treaty signatory, will be held accountable for fulfilling Treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics; it cannot transfer that accountability to constituent republics. Only the successor state or states to the former USSR and those republics which might choose to opt out of the new union and accede to the Treaty as sovereign states can be held separately accountable for obligations under the Treaty.
Delaying U.S. ratification carries with it significant disadvantages. It is important to ratify as soon as possible. The Treaty's reductions, limits, information exchanges and on-site inspections will impose minimal constraints on us, but major ones on Soviet successors who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe. Above all, it will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. Such a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a basis for further cooperative developments in the security sphere. The U.S. and its allies can only gain from CFE and its many advantages will not be realized until the Treaty enters into force and is being implemented.
The Treaty is an intricate web of hard-fought compromises among 22 states; despite the fact that the political and military circumstances of many of those signatories changed during the negotiation and have continued to change, we are convinced it continues to be viable, and, indeed, is more valuable now than ever.
The longer entry into force is delayed, however, the greater will be the temptation for one or another signatory to revisit some of those compromises or to pursue other changes. As a result, the whole Treaty might be unravelled.
Question 5. Please explain what effect a decision by the former Soviet Union to establish military districts that correspond directly to each Republic would have on the zones of application envisaged by the CFE Treaty? Would the Treaty zones need to be renegotiated?
Answer. The new Union might decide to redraw the boundaries of its military districts to correspond to the boundaries of each Republic, but that would have no effect on the Treaty sublimits or other Treaty obligations. The military district boundaries for purposes of the Treaty were set as of Treaty signature. At that time, the USSR submitted to the Treaty depository a map of its military districts. The purpose of this submission was to assure that Treaty obligations could not be unilaterally altered by district redrawing.
While the Treaty could be amended to redraw those boundaries, in our view this is not necessary, and could provoke a complete renegotiation of sublimits. Even if more sovereign states were to emerge from the former USSR and were to accede to the Treaty, they can be accommodated under the existing zonal scheme. The zonal sublimits established by the Treaty effect a redistribution of equipment throughout the area of application so as to prevent unstable force concentrations-particularly on the flanks and in central Europe. That principle is still valid.
The military districts of the Soviet Union-as defined pieces of territory-were used along with independent countries as elements in the zonal scheme. Even if those pieces of territory are no longer part of the Union, they can continue to be elements in the zonal sublimit system. That applies as well if a new state includes more than one military district and has territory in more than one sub-zone.
The territory of the Baltic states, which are non-Treaty signatories, is no longer part of the area of application. The Baltic Military District, however, also includes a small portion of the Russian republic, and this portion would remain part of the Treaty zonal scheme. By agreeing that Soviet equipment stationed on Baltic territory will be subject to the Treaty, the Soviet Union is also undertaking to count this equipment against the sublimits established for the zone which includes the Baltic MD (4.3). (It is possible, however, that all such equipment will have been withdrawn by the end of the reduction period, when ceilings come into force.)
Question 6. Have the Baltic States indicated to the United States or other CFE states parties whether or not they wish to become a party to the CFE Treaty?
Answer. Baltic officials told a visiting U.S. delegation recently that they were not now inclined to seek accession to the Treaty but indicated at the same time that they had not yet fully considered this issue.
Question 7. If the Baltic States wish to become parties to the CFE Treaty, what form would new agreements take? Would those agreements be amendments subject to Senate consent? Would any changes be needed that would be subject to Senate consent?
Question 8. If the Baltic States wish to become parties to the CFE Treaty, what form would new agreements take? Would any changes be needed that would be subject to Senate consent? Answer. The accession of the Baltic States to the Treaty would require relatively few changes to the Treaty text, and those changes would be minor in nature. The changes that would be required are as follows:
Preamble: the names of the Baltic states would be added to para. 1; "and having conducted this negotiation" would be replaced with "which was conducted" in para. 2. (Presumably the name of the USSR would also be changed here, and in the other places in the Treaty text where the names of participants appear.)
Art. II. Add names of Baltic states to Eastern Group of States Parties with language adapted to take account of their not being signatories to the Warsaw Treaty.
Art. IV. Add names of Baltic States. Protocol on Existing Types: Equipment lists for Group of Six would have to be updated if the new states held any type of armament subject to the Treaty which is not now on the list. This is unlikely.
JCG Protocol: The new states would have to be added to the scale of distribution of expenses.
Such changes could be handled in the Joint Consultative Group as improvements relating only "to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature" (Article XVI, para. 5, of the Treaty). Since the changes above are straightforward and minor in scope, the Administration does not believe that they would constitute amendments to the Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Similarly, Senate advice and consent is not required when new states accede to other multilateral treaties, e.g., the Nonproliferation Treaty. However, any final judgment could not be made until the exact amendments were known.
Other steps required By Baltic accession (in accordance with existing Treaty provisions):
Each new State Party would have to provide notification of its maximum levels of holdings to other signatories, pursuant to Article VII. Unless the new states decide to hold no TLE, such new notifications would require decreases in previously notified maximum levels of one or more of the group of six-presumably those of the Soviet Union. All such changes, provision for which is made in the Treaty, would have to be notified to other signatories.
New states would have to provide data as required by the Information Exchange Protocol, and to make various other notifications, such as those as required by Art. VIII, the Protocol on Reclassification of Aircraft, the Reduction Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol (notification of active quotas, lists of inspectors and transport crew members, languages to be used by inspection teams, and standing diplomatic clearance numbers).
Question 9. If the Baltic States choose to remain outside the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made, in what form those changes would be made, and whether such changes would be subject to Senate consent?
Answer. A decision by Baltic states to remain outside the Treaty regime would require no changes to the Treaty text. That part of the Baltic military district that still exists contains only a small portion of Russia. This portion, however, contains considerable TLE.
Although it requires no changes to the Treaty text-as long as Union equipment remains on Baltic territory and the Baltics do not accede to the Treaty regime-it will be necessary to ensure that this equipment is subject to the Treaty. The legally binding agreement which was agreed in Vienna on October 18, 1991 makes it clear that -Soviet equipment in Treaty categories stationed on Baltic territory is subject to all provisions of the Treaty, its associated documents and the June 14 Soviet commitments which resolved the counting rules dispute. This will ensure that Soviet equipment located on Baltic territory will count against the aggregate ceilings and subceilings established pursuant to the Treaty for the Group of Six and be subject to the sufficiency rule. It will also provide assurance that notified maximum levels for holdings (Art. VII of the Treaty, which reflects intra-Group allocations) are respected.
The U.S. is also in the process of addressing CFE with officials of the Baltic states, with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment on their territory. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the Treaty enters into force.
Question. 10. Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldavia. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia or Moldavia become independent states and wish to join the CFR Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFR numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations? Would such changes be subject to Senate consent?
Answer. Any State wishing to accede to the Treaty would be expected to accept all limits and other obligations as written. Any of these republics which join as an independent state would be expected to join the existing group of six (this would also be the case for the Baltic states), which is the group to which the USSR belongs. Presumably one or more of the new signatories would want to hold equipment in categories subject to the Treaty. This would require a reallocation of the group of six entitlements-a procedure which is already provided for in the Treaty. Presumably their portion would come out of the existing entitlement of the Soviet Union. The new states and the state or states for which allocations had changed would then so notify the other signatories.
The new states would also be required to provide a data set on their existing equipment holdings in Treaty categories. This would establish one of the bases for calculating their eventual reduction obligations-if any. They would also be required to make a number of other notifications, e.g., those required by the Protocol on Reclassification of Aircraft, the Reduction Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol (notification of active quotas, lists of inspectors and transport crew members, languages to be used by inspection teams, and standing diplomatic clearance numbers).
The accession of new states to the Treaty would require relatively few changes to the Treaty text, and those changes would be minor in nature. The changes that would be required are as follows:
Preamble: the names of the new states would be added to para. 1; "and having conducted this negotiation" would be replaced with "which was conducted" in para. 2. (Presumably the name of the USSR would also be changed here, and in the other places in the Treaty text where the names of participants appear.)
Art. II. Add names of the new states to Eastern Group of States Parties with language adapted to take account of their not being signatories to the Warsaw Treaty.
Art IV. Add names of new states.
Protocol on Existing Types: Equipment lists for Group of Six would have to be updated if the new states held any type of armament subject to the Treaty which is not now on the list. This is unlikely.
JCG Protocol: The new states would have to be added to the scale of distribution of expenses.
Such changes could be handled in the Joint Consultative Group as improvements relating only "to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature" (Article XVI, para. 5, of the Treaty). Since the changes above are straightforward and minor in scope, the Administration does not believe that they would constitute amendments to the Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Similarly, Senate advice and consent is not required when new states accede to other multilateral treaties, e.g., the Nonproliferation Treaty. However, any final judgment could not be made until the exact amendments were known.
Question. 11. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia or Moldavia become independent states and choose not to join the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations.
Answer. The Administration would prefer to see all newly emergent states on the European territory of the USSR included in the CFE Treaty regime. However, if small republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldavia decide to opt out of a new union, there would be no reason to insist on their accession to the Treaty regime unless they hold such substantial amounts of TLE that other signatories would be uneasy.
We would need to ensure, however, that all equipment in categories subject to the Treaty and under the control of the new Union remains subject to Treaty provisions and associated agreements -- whether located on the territories of its member republics or on the territories of newly independent states which choose not to join the union. A legally binding statement covering Soviet equipment in the Baltic states was agreed to in Vienna among the 22 signatories on October 18, 1991. A similar commitment could be secured with regard to other newly emergent states where the Union will station forces.
The U.S. is also in the process of addressing CFE with officials of the Baltic states, with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment on their territory. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the Treaty entered into force. Similar arrangements could be made with other small republics which opt out of the union and choose not to accede to the Treaty -- but on whose territory union forces are stationed.
Question. 12. If these four republics stay in a new Union but choose to defy that new Union by taking actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty, who will the United States and other CFE Treaty parties hold accountable for possible non-compliance?
Answer. We would hold the new Union government responsible for fulfilling Treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics. As they would not be Treaty signatories, there would be no legal basis for holding individual republics accountable in cases of non-compliance. Of course that would not prevent the U.S.---under certain circumstances---from pressing representatives of recalcitrant republics, as well as compliance problems are resolved.
Question. 13. Does implementation of the CFE Treaty provide incentives for any of these four republics to stay in the Union or to become independent? Would adherence to the CFE Treaty by any of these republics prejudice their ability to become independent in the future?
Answer. In our view, while we believe there are incentives for republics which have decided to leave the union to accede to the Treaty (such as participation in the European security system the Treaty will establish), we believe that a republic will base its decision whether or not to stay in the union on other factors, since participation in the Treaty regime is possible either as a constituent republic or as an independent state. We do not believe that constituent republics which support continued Treaty adherence by the Union would be prejudicing their ability to become independent in the future, since the Treaty regime would not be endangered by a further shrinking of the union---unless a republic holding significant amounts of equipment, such as Ukraine, were to withdraw and refuse to accede to the Treaty as an independent.
Question. 14. Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia. If Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia become independent states and wish to join the CFE Treaty, please detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations? Would such changes be subject to Senate consent?
Answer. For the Russian republic to "become an independent state", i.e., to withdraw from the union, would mean the disintegration of the union as we know it. We do not expect this to happen. However, if the union did completely disintegrate, the Russian republic presumably would assume the international obligations of the former USSR. The following responses, therefore, deal with Ukraine and Belorussia only.
Any state wishing to accede to the Treaty would be expected to accept all limits and other obligations as written. Any of these republics joining as an independent state, would be expected to join the existing group of six, which is the group to which the USSR belongs. A reallocation of group of six entitlements -- a procedure which is already provided for in the Treaty -- would have to be made. Presumably their portion would come out of the existing entitlement of the Soviet Union. The new states and the state or states whose allocations had changed would then so notify the other signatories. The new states would also be required to provide a data set on their existing equipment holdings in Treaty categories. This would establish one of the bases for calculating their eventual reduction obligations. They would also be required to make a number of other notifications, e.g., those required by the Protocol on Reclassification of Aircraft, the Reduction Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol (notification of active quotas, lists of inspectors and transport crew members, languages to be used by inspection teams, and standing diplomatic clearance numbers).
The accession of new states to the Treaty would require relatively few changes to the Treaty text, and those changes would be minor in nature. The changes that would be required are as follows:
Preamble: The names of the new states would be added to para. 1; "and having conducted this negotiation" would be replaced with "which was conducted" in para. 2 (Presumably the name of the USSR would also be changed here, and in the other places in the Treaty text where the names of participants appear.)
Art. II. Add the names of the new states to the Eastern Group of States Parties with language adapted to take account of their not being signatories to the Warsaw Treaty.
Art. IV. Add names of new States.
Protocol on Existing Types: Equipment lists for Group of Six would have to be updated if the new states held any type of armament subject to the Treaty which is not now on the list. This is unlikely.
JCG Protocol. The new states would have to be added to the scale of distribution of expenses.
Since the changes to the Treaty text noted above are straightforward and minor in scope, the Administration does not believe that they would constitute amendments to the Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Rather, such changes could be handled in the Joint Consultative Group as improvements relating only "to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature" (Article XVI, para. 5, of the Treaty). Provisions already exist in the Treaty to permit the other steps which would have to be taken in the wake of accession to the Treaty by new states (reallocation of equipment, e.g.).
Question. 15. If Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia become independent states and choose not to join the CFE Treaty regime, would the administration still seek to maintain the CFE Treaty or would the Administration propose to withdraw from the Treaty?
Answer. In order to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for all three of these republics, as they are likely to retain significant amounts of equipment in Treaty categories, to participate in CFE. Given the fact that the CFE Treaty is seen by European states as the cornerstone of a new European security system, we believe that there would also be powerful political, military and economic incentives for all three republics to participate in CFE.
If these republics should become independent states and choose not to participate in the Treaty, the U.S. and its allies would consider an appropriate response. The Treaty contains mechanisms for withdrawal should this be necessary.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, L)C, November 19, 1991.
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is to inform you that the Administration will not oppose the inclusion of the attached language in the Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
Sincerely,
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER.
Enclosure: Senate CFE Resolution.
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),That the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), with protocols on existing types (with annex), aircraft reclassification, reduction, helicopter recategorization, information exchange (with annex), inspection, the Joint Consultative Group, and provisional application; all signed at Paris on November 19, 1990 (Treaty Doc. 102-8), provided that the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the Executive, and the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
(a) Conditions
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, November 18, 1991.
SSCI No. 91-5514
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman,
Hon. JESSE HELMS,
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, US. Senate, Washington,
DC.
DEAR SENATOR PELL and SENATOR HELMS: In order to assist the Committee on Foreign Relations and the full Senate in their consideration of whether to advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has undertaken a thorough review of the ability of U.S. intelligence to monitor the compliance of the signatories with the provisions of that Treaty. In particular, the Committee has addressed issues surrounding the interpretation and implementation of the Protocol on Inspection, the effectiveness of the on-site inspection regime, the counterintelligence and security implications of the Treaty, and the ability of U.S. intelligence to detect politically and militarily significant violations of the Treaty.
The Committee began its work in March 1989, with the beginning of the CFE negotiations. Both members and staff received regular briefings on the objectives and progress of the negotiations. The Committee's arms control staff also visited the negotiators in Vienna immediately prior to signing of the Treaty to keep abreast of the final details. Staff counterintelligence specialists visited military units in Germany to review preparations for CFE inspections. The Committee held eight on-the-record staff briefings and reviewed hundreds of documents and answers to questions. It also held two closed hearings, where it received testimony from senior officials within the Departments of State and Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
In anticipation of the Treaty, the Committee wrote to Judge Webster, the then-Director of Central Intelligence, and General Colin Powell, Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requesting a National Intelligence Estimate on the ability of U.S. intelligence to monitor Treaty compliance. The Committee requested that Chairman Powell identify for the Intelligence Community those levels of cheating that he would consider militarily significant, and asked the Intelligence Community to assess its monitoring capabilities in light of the Chairman's concerns. The Estimate provided to the Committee and a subsequent Memorandum to Holders of the Estimate have been, in our view, highly useful and relevant.
The Committee also received several briefings on the problems associated with the Soviet data submitted at the time of Treaty Signature on November 19, 1990. Based on the Committee's assessment of the issue, we, along with other members of the Senate, wrote to Secretary Baker and urged him not to send the Treaty forward for Senate consideration until these issues were resolved. We believe that the prompt action of the Senate helped to contribute to the June 14 agreements which have allowed the Senate to proceed with the Treaty ratification process.
This letter reflects the views of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee as they pertain to the subjects discussed below.
Monitoring Judgments
We believe that by a combination of on-site inspection, National Technical Means and cooperative measures, U.S. intelligence will be able to monitor the destruction or conversion of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region with high confidence. For the 14,500 pieces of equipment to be destroyed or converted east of the Urals and not subject to on-site inspection (pursuant to a political agreement of June 14, 1991), the ability of U.S. intelligence to monitor Soviet compliance will depend upon the form of cooperative measures that the Soviet Union has pledged to undertake to make the destruction visible to national technical means of verification. The specific cooperative measures are to be agreed upon by the signatories.
We also believe that U.S. intelligence is justified in having high confidence that it could detect any violation of the Treaty in which the Soviets attempted to move large quantities of TLE (i.e., thousands of pieces of equipment) as whole divisions, combat wings, or partial units back into the ATTU in a short period of time-weeks to months. U.S. intelligence would detect such cheating well before it reached the levels identified by the Joint Staff as militarily significant. Similarly, the formation of new, combat ready divisions within the AITU from covert production facilities would also be detected before it achieved militarily significant levels by the Joint Staff's criteria.
While we believe that U.S. intelligence will detect any cheating that could threaten NATO forces (e.g., activity associated with combat ready units) before it becomes militarily significant, it will be more difficult to detect the covert transport and storage of equipment that is not integrated into combat units and to accurately characterize it as a CFE Treaty violation in a timely manner.
For example, the continued inability to resolve the issue of differences between the Soviet declaration of TLE holdings in the ATTU when the CFE Treaty was signed and the U.S. Intelligence Community's figures on Soviet holdings illustrates how difficult it can be to understand suspicious activity and to determine whether it is actually a violation. The Intelligence Community has detected numerous examples of equipment that appeared to have been improperly omitted from the Soviet data declaration. But even a year later, uncertainties remain regarding the amount of TLE that was improperly omitted and the possible impact of such omissions on the Soviet Union's equipment destruction obligations. It should be noted, however, that a major source of these ambiguities was the large-scale dislocation of Soviet forces as a result of equipment withdrawals and reductions preceding Treaty signature. Had the information exchange and on-site inspection provisions of the CFE Treaty been in place at the time, the Intelligence Community would have been better able to track the specifics of these changes.
The data discrepancy issue is discussed in detail in the classified attachment to this letter. We endorse continued efforts to arrive at an accurate accounting of what TLE the Soviet Union had in the ATTU on November 19, 1990, and to gain agreement to destruction obligations proceeding from such an accounting.
The movement of TLE east of the Urals underscores the fact that the CFE Treaty does not apply to the Asian portions of the Soviet Union. This puts a burden on U.S. intelligence to guard not only against the covert reinsertion of Soviet equipment into the ATTU region, but also against a force build-up east of the Urals that could threaten either a breakout from the Treaty or an aggressive movement on the U.S.S.R.'s eastern or southern borders. We will urge the Intelligence Community to devote whatever resources are needed to accomplish this task.
We must also emphasize that U.S. intelligence will have difficulty detecting small-scale violations of the Treaty. Such violations would not pose a significant military threat to NATO, but are politically significant for two reasons. First, they can weaken, over time, the integrity of the Treaty regime, thus paving the way for larger-scale violations. Second, such violations may, in fact, be militarily significant to a small, neighboring state whose TLE allocation is not large. With the end of the Cold War, the territorial integrity of many such states-from Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republic to the Baltic states and possible new states in the Soviet Union-could potentially become an element of U.S. national interest sometime in the future. We therefore will urge the U.S. Intelligence Community to vigorously develop monitoring strategies and allocate resources to monitor compliance with small-scale violations in potential trouble areas.
Compliance Issues
The Treaty imposes two regimes -- a disarmament regime lasting forty months after entry into force, and an arms control regime which regulates the distribution of this lower level of forces in perpetuity. Overall, we believe that the Treaty and related protocols are well-crafted and create a useful on-site inspection regime which will help to deter cheating and, in concert with National Technical Means, to detect it if it occurs. Nevertheless, we believe that, given the complexity of this Treaty and its protocols, there are likely to be compliance issues regarding interpretation which, though not of a magnitude to require changes to tire Treaty or conditions to the resolution of ratification, should be brought to your attention for consideration in the report accompanying the resolution of ratification.
First, the definitions and provisions in paragraph 1 of Article II regarding armored combat vehicles include several gaps that could result in compliance disputes. For example, armored ambulances and armored vehicles that are not intended to transport troops, such as armored communication vans or ammunition trucks, are not limited. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of Section I of the Protocol on Existing Types permits certain lightly armored vehicles (the MT-LB) to be "exceptionally modified" into armored personnel carrier look-alikes (the MG-LB-AT) at locations other than reduction sites, rendering them no longer subject to Treaty limits, although paragraph 32 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection does provide for visual inspection of the interior of such a vehicle from outside the vehicle.
Second, the counting rules in Article III that except certain otherwise Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) are not well-defined. Equipment may be excluded if it is in the process of manufacture or manufacturing related testing; used exclusively for purposes of research and development; part of historical collections; awaiting disposal; awaiting export or re-export; held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; or in transit within the ATTU for no longer than seven days. In the absence of further definitions, all these rules invite monitoring difficulties or compliance disputes.
Third, the ability of any state party to increase its TLE in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATM) zone during the 40-month reduction phase is unrestricted. In most instances such changes would be reportable within five days if they exceeded a unit's reported holdings for a category of TLE by 10 percent or more, pursuant to Article XIH and to subparagraph l(B) of Section VIH of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information. There is no obligation, however, for TLE produced in the zone and attached to units that re not a "permanent change in the organizational structure of * * * forces within the area of application" pursuant to subparagraph I(A) of Section VIII to be reported until the next annual report on holdings. Although non-permanent units may be interpreted to be those units in transit through the zone and thus subject to the seven-day transit rule, this is not made explicit in the Treaty or Protocol text. Thus, the discovery of an undeclared unit with TLE in the ATTU zone during the reduction phase may or may not indicate a violation has taken place. It could be a non-permanent unit, and the length of time it can stay in the ATTU without being reported could be as long as a year.
Aside from strict Treaty interpretation issues, we note that the pace and quantity of reductions required by the Treaty, the lack of restrictions on units and TLE in the ATM zone during the reduction phase and the many notification requirements suggest that this phase of the Treaty's implementation will be confusing. In our view, information overload is likely to occur during the reduction phase and may reduce the effectiveness of notifications and inspections, although the experience gained through the INF Treaty and the lengthy period of preparation and planning for CFE will help to offset likely information exchange, logistic and coordination problems.
The level of confusion during the reduction phase will depend in part on the future status of Soviet republics that have recently become independent or are seeking new status. The Baltic states, which have not signed the CFE Treaty and therefore are now outside the ATTU region, continue to host TLE on their territory which the Soviets have agreed to limit according to the terms of the Treaty. Arrangements must be made to insure that the inspection provisions of the Treaty will be adequately implemented in co-operation with the Baltic states; we understand that such arrangements are forthcoming. Decisions taken by the Ukraine, however, particularly with respect to the creation of its own military, may complicate or delay implementation of the inspection regime and of data exchanges.
Finally, we note that the Treaty text does not discuss the status of U.S. or other NATO-member forces deployed to the territory of a member of the Group of Six at the latter's request. Such a deployment would be subject to the Treaty ceilings for the subzone to which forces are deployed, as well as for the whole ATTU region. Consequently, the flexibility of NATO countries to move forces into the recipient state without abrogating the Treaty would depend on whether they could do so without exceeding the subzone ceilings. This would not be a problem if the forces were already in the sub-zone (e.g., being deployed from Germany to Poland). To move forces into the subzone, however, would require that the total already in the subzone be less than its prescribed ceiling. If such leeway did not exist, it could be achieved by reducing some other forces within the zone. Any force deployed onto the territory of a member of the Group of Six would also be subject to on-site inspections by other CFE signatories.
Treaty Implementation
Compared to other arms control treaties, the implementation and security costs for the CFE Treaty will be relatively small. Because the CFE Treaty covers only the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals, the United States will not be required to host any on-site inspections on its own territory. Because the number of objects of verification declared by the Soviet Union was much lower than had been anticipated, the number of on-site inspections that the United States will conduct on Soviet territory will be significantly reduced.
The On-Site Inspection Agency projects costs of $16 million in fiscal year 1992, $12 million in FY i993, and significantly lower costs beginning in FY 1996. Total Executive branch costs directly attributable to CFE implementation and security should be about $25 million per year in the early years of the Treaty.
Some officials have questioned whether the U.S. Government would be able to field sufficient numbers of on-site inspection personnel with the needed linguistic capabilities and/or substantive background. The Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency,assured the Committee that sufficient numbers of linguists have been found and trained for the inspection role, and that sufficient numbers of substantive experts have been identified and are available for service on inspection teams.
Counterintelligence and Security
As with the INF and TTBT agreements, inspections under the CFE Treaty will allow foreign governments access to U.S. facilities and personnel that were previously denied on national security grounds. Unlike earlier bilateral Soviet-U.S. inspection regimes, however, CFE may give such access to the governments of various countries whose future military objectives are uncertain. While the Cold War threat of a conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact war is gone, U.S. military capabilities and activities in Europe will continue to require substantial protection against disclosure to foreign governments of information not required for verification of compliance with the Treaty. The Gulf war demonstrated that U.S. and allied forces in Europe may be called upon to deter conflicts and conduct military operations worldwide. Security for the most sensitive capabilities deployed in Europe remains integral to U.S. military strength.
We are satisfied that the relevant inspection provisions are appropriately balanced to meet U.S. security needs as well as verification requirements. The parties are allowed to restrict access to buildings with doors narrower than two meters, to shroud sensitive features of weapons systems, and to declare "sensitive points" that may not be inspected. The Executive branch plans to exercise these rights so as to limit disclosure of sensitive information that is not necessary for verification of compliance.
In addition, we found that the Executive branch is preparing effective security countermeasures to protect sensitive facilities as permitted by the Treaty. Commanders of military installations must have operational security (OPSEC) safeguards that are tested by mock inspections, and Army and Air Force counterintelligence units in Europe will assist the commanders. The Committee has been assured that, despite overall drawdowns and restructuring of U.S. forces, the Defense Department's counterintelligence components will maintain resources in Europe needed to deal with attempts by foreign governments to exploit the CFE inspection process for intelligence purposes contrary to U.S. interests.
Sincerely yours,
DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman.
FRANK MURROWSKI,
Vice Chairman.
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, November 18,1991.
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Hon. JESSE HELMS,
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Committee on Foreign Relations, US. Senate, Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATORS PELL, HELMS and BIDEN: The Committee on Armed Services has completed its review of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and has concluded that the Treaty promotes the national security interests of the United States, our allies in NATO, and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. The Committee recommends that the Committee on Foreign Relations report the Treaty favorably to the Senate, Subject to certain conditions.
First, the Committee believes that the CFE resolution of ratification should condition the Senate's advice and consent on its understanding that the June 14, 1991 side agreement resolving the naval infantry dispute has the same legal force and effect as the Treaty itself. In a February 5, 1991 letter to Secretary Baker, the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence urged the Administration not to submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate until the naval infantry dispute and certain other post-signing discrepancies were resolved. In a March 7 reply, Secretary Baker stated that the Soviet interpretation of the application of the Treaty to naval infantry units "flatly contradicts the language of the Treaty and has no basis in the negotiating record." Secretary Baker's letter also stated: "This is an issue of principle, a clear-cut case of the Soviet Union failing to fulfill a Treaty obligation. We have repeatedly made clear to Soviet officials, at very high levels, that they should abandon this wholly unsupportable position."
Notwithstanding its original demand that the Soviet Union recant its unacceptable interpretation of Article 111, the Administration elected to deal with this problem through the mechanism of a side agreement that establishes obligations outside the framework of the Treaty. While that approach will result in Soviet equipment holdings under CFE at the same level as if they had never asserted that naval infantry equipment was exempt, the decision to resolve this dispute through a separate side agreement has the disadvantage of leaving the Soviet Union in disagreement with the 21 other CFE signatories over the interpretation of a key provision in the Treaty. As noted in the State Department's Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty: "* * * it should be noted that the Soviet Union, in contrast to the other 21 Signatories to the Treaty, does not subscribe to the analysis of the scope of Article III counting rule described above."
It is highly unusual for an administration to submit a treaty for advice and consent by the Senate with an open acknowledgment that the parties are in disagreement over a fundamental point of treaty interpretation. This anomaly is only tolerable to the Senate due to the corrective effect of the June 14, 1991 side agreement; however, this makes it all the more important that the Senate act within the resolution of ratification to ensure that the side agreement is afforded the same legal force and effect as the Treaty. A Condition making this explicit will help guarantee that any Soviet action inconsistent with or in violation of the June 14, 1991 side agreement is treated by the United States with the same gravity as any Soviet action inconsistent with or in violation of the Treaty.
The June 14, 1991 side agreement raises another point of concern to the Committee: the Executive Branch's continuing practice of using legally binding side agreements and political commitments to establish obligations outside the framework of an arms control treaty. President Bush's July 9 letter of transmittal for the CFE Treaty describes the June 14 side agreement on naval infantry as "associated with, but not part of, the Treaty." The practice of relying upon agreements and commitments outside the framework of treaties began with the Soviets' "political commitment" on Backfire bomber issues in SALT II, was repeated in the case of various definitional and verification issues in INF, and has now been repeated with regard to a variety of issues related to CFE and START. The Committee believes that the practice of relegating "too hard to solve" negotiating issues to side agreements, rather than resolving them within the confines of the treaty proper, threatens to detract from the Senate's role under the Constitution as a co-maker of treaties. Absent a change in approach, the Committee believes that it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the resolution of ratification that predicate the Senate's advice and consent to arms control treaties upon the understanding that the various side agreements have the same legal force and effect as the treaties.
Second, the Committee recommends that the CFE resolution of ratification also condition the Senate's advice and consent on its understanding that the October 18, 1991 side agreement dealing with the accountability and inspectability of Soviet forces in the independent Baltic nations has the same legal force and effect as the Treaty. The Committee recognizes that this side agreement responds to a development (the Soviet Union's formal recognition of Baltic independence) that arose well after the Treaty was signed. Nonetheless, the Committee would note that the Administration chose to address this development through the mechanism of a side agreement that established obligations outside the framework of the Treaty, rather than as an amendment or protocol to the Treaty that would have required formal approval by the Senate. As with the naval infantry side agreement, failure to affirm the legal force and effect of this side agreement in the resolution of ratification would detract from the Senate's Constitutional role in the treaty-making area.
Third, the Committee recommends that the resolution of ratification include a Condition addressing the possibility that the Ukraine or some other republic of the former Soviet Union with large military forces or a significant military potential might achieve independence and elect not to be bound by or accede to the Treaty or for other reasons remain outside the CFE regime. In response to a question we submitted in advance of our first hearing, Secretary Baker stated:
It is the view of the Administration that in order to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for Ukraine and Byelorussia, if they were not bound as part of the USSR or any successor state, and retained significant amounts of equipment in Treaty categories, to accede to CFE.During our November 4 hearing, Ambassador Woolsey testified that should such a scenario play out, it would provide grounds for U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty: "Certainly a country the size of the Ukraine, if it had substantial military forces, could, I would think, also be regarded as a fundamental change of circumstances under the Treaty, the old doctrine of 'rebus sic stantibus.' "
The Committee recognizes that there have been many signals emanating from the Ukraine, including the October 30 Kiev communiqué between the Ukraine and Russia, indicating that the Ukraine intends to observe the CFE Treaty. Nonetheless, many issues remain unsettled, including the question of which current CFE state or states in the Group of Six would yield entitlements of Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) to the Ukraine to establish Ukrainian TLE allotments in the event the Ukraine joins CFE as a sovereign state.
The Committee believes the uncertainties in the current situations are such that the resolution of ratification should include a Condition requiring certain actions in the event former republics become independent and decline to be bound by the CFE Treaty or, assuming that they are not bound under international law in the absence of any action on their part, decline to accede to the Treaty. In such a Condition, such developments with respect to the Ukrainian, Belorussian or Russian republics would be recognized as a militarily significant changed circumstances point that was acknowledged in our hearings by numerous Administration witnesses.
In the event of such developments with these three republics, the Condition should require the President to consult immediately with the Senate as to whether the United States should exercise its withdrawal rights under the Treaty. If, after such consultation, the President elects not to exercise withdrawal, the Condition should, at a minimum, require him to request the Treaty Depository to convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties pursuant to Article XXI, with representatives of the new state in question invited, to assess the continued viability of the Treaty and whether amendments are necessary and appropriate to deal with these changed circumstances.
If, following such a conference, the new state in question still refuses to accede to or be bound by the Treaty, the Condition should require the President to immediately transmit to the Senate an amendments agreed to during such conference, or if no suck amendments have been agreed to, a recommendation as to whether the United States should continue to be bound by the Treaty or to withdraw from the Treaty and his explanation of his reasons for such recommendation.
Finally, we would note that we have reviewed the draft legislation on CFE "cascading" that has been negotiated between the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Department, and we have no objection thereto assuming it is not amended. We recognize that the CFE implementing legislation, which would amend the Arms Export Control Act to permit certain specified weapons transfers within NATO for the purpose of modernizing our allies equipment, is under the jurisdiction of your committee, but we would recommend that you act on this matter before the Senate adjourns.
We have consulted with all Members of the Committee on the recommendations outlined above and no objection has been raised. However, certain Members of the Committee have identified in the attached Additional Views other proposed Conditions, including one on the issue of the Soviet declaration of TLE in the area of application on November 19, 1990-a declaration that is disputed by U.S. intelligence. While the other Members of the Committee agree that this is an issue of serious concern, they have deferred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in making recommendations to our Committee on an appropriate Condition on this subject.
Sincerely,
SAM NUNN,
Chairman.
JOHN W. WARNER,
Ranking Minority Member.
We agree with the Committee's letter report on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and endorse the recommended conditions to any Senate approval of ratification of the CFE Treaty in at least the specific areas addressed in the letter. We believe, however, that further recommendations are necessary to protect the Senate's Constitutional prerogatives in the Treaty-making process and to assure future U.S. national security interests.
Specifically, the inaccuracy of Soviet data declarations of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) in the area of application at the time the CFE Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990 is a serious concern. While the Administration has attempted to resolve this issue, significant differences still exist between the Soviet data declaration and U.S. intelligence estimates of the number of Soviet TLE in the area of application. These differing estimates range in the thousands of pieces of TLE above the amount included in the Soviet declaration.
We believe this discrepancy represents a significant question about Soviet probity and good faith with respect to their obligations under the terms of the CFE Treaty. While the Administration has expressed its intention to continue to work to achieve a resolution of this data dispute, it has not yet been able to do so. The June 14, 1991 resolutions of the Article III dispute and the issue of Soviet equipment transferred to locations east of the Urals do not resolve this issue.
We do not believe this is necessarily an issue over the military significance of the unreported Soviet equipment, and we make no judgment as to the military significance of this equipment or which U.S. intelligence estimate of unreported TLE is most accurate. Instead, we believe there is a very important principle associated with this issue with respect to maintaining the integrity of the arms control process, particularly as it might set a dangerous precedent for START. Consequently, we believe this issue must be resolved before the United States assumes responsibility for its obligations under the terms of the Treaty.
In order to resolve this issue in a manner consistent with U.S. national security interests and what we view as the national interests of other State Parties to the Treaty, we propose the following reservation to the CFE Treaty which should be included in the resolution of ratification. The reservation would read as follows:
"Whereas, data supplied by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to Article XIII and the Protocol on Information Exchange, regarding its equipment holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area as of November 19, 1990, differed from United States estimates of such equipment, the United States shall not be bound by the terms of the Treaty unless and until-
We believe that the resolution of ratification should provide for very specific procedures to be followed in the event that the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Russian Republics were to become independent and not agree to be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Administration officials consistently testified that, if such a circumstance should arise, it would amount to a militarily significant changed circumstance and would seriously bring into question the continued validity of the Treaty. While we recognize the possibility exists that other Soviet republics might well become independent in the future and might, for whatever reason, not agree to be bound by the provisions of the CFE Treaty, it is less likely that such situation would amount to militarily significant changed circumstances.
Therefore, we suggest that the Foreign Relations Committee include in the resolution of ratification two conditions dealing with the creation of new states in the Treaty area of application: one condition applicable with respect to the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and the Russian Republics, and another condition applicable with respect to the creation of new states in any other area. Furthermore, we suggest that the Foreign Relations Committee include a condition relating to creation of new states in the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or the Russian Republic that might go so far as to mandate U.S. withdrawal unless the President resubmits to the Senate for its advice and consent the Treaty or amendments to the Treaty which are designed to deal with the changed circumstances.
JOHN WARNER.
DAN COATS.
BOB SMITH.
STROM THURMOND.
BILL COHEN.
CONNIE MACK.
MALCOM WALLOP.
TRENT LOTT.
We, as members of the Armed Services Committee, have reviewed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and share the view of our colleagues that, with the inclusion in the Resolution of Ratification of certain conditions to the Senate's advice and consent, the Treaty would promote U.S. national security interests. In our opinion, however, further clarification on a variety of issues is needed before the Senate discharges its constitutional prerogatives.
We recognize that the Administration considers prompt ratification of CFE an urgent priority. It is neither our wish nor intent to prevent timely disposition of this matter. However, the Warsaw Pact dissolution and subsequent disunion of the USSR are extraordinary transformations which have injected great uncertainty into the legal, political, and military foundations of the Treaty. We are concerned that precipitant consideration, prior to resolution of technical discrepancies, and ongoing political proceedings among the Group of Six, particularly the former Soviet Union, could severely undermine the Senate's province and contribution to the ratification process.
For instance, with respect to treaty limited equipment (TLE) within the ATTU zone, there exist significant disparities between U.S. intelligence estimates and the Soviet data declaration provided at this time of Treaty execution. Although numerical estimates of unreported TLE differ among elements of the intelligence community, there is consensus that some TLE, and quite possibly a substantial amount, was not reported. Under-reporting of TLE would significantly diminish Soviet reduction obligations under the Treaty, and could prove to be militarily significant. Yet, to our knowledge, this matter remains unresolved. In our opinion, ratifying CFE prior to resolution of data base discrepancies would imperil Treaty efficacy and set a dangerous precedent for consideration of the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty.
Furthermore, the abortive August 1991 coup has triggered unprecedented political and military discord within the former Soviet Union. Rising nationalism and sovereignty claims among the republics have eroded internal symmetry, and shifted the power balance within the Group of Six. At present, it is unclear how these developments will transform the Soviet political and military framework, and whether the individual republics will, in fact, accede to the Treaty. Both Secretary Baker and Ambassador Woolsey have affirmed that Treaty viability hinges on participation by the republics, particularly Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia. We share this view, and believe it would be premature for the United States to act on the Treaty prior to the impeding referendums on independence in Ukraine and Belorussia.
Moreover, we are concerned that, in the wake of the Warsaw Pact dissolution, the bipolar structure of the Treaty may actually jeopardize the long term security interests of emerging East European democracies, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. It merits note that many East European nations have expressed interest in affiliating with NATO. It is not inconceivable that, in the future, there nations may determine a need to argument their armed forces in response to unforeseen regional security threats. However, within the existing bloc-to-bloc Treaty structure, larger TLE holders, such as the Russian republic or some other former Soviet state system, could exercise a de facto veto over such augmentations by refusing to lower their own equipment allocations. We believe this matter warrants consideration.
The fundamental objective of the Treaty has always been to eliminate the massive disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels, and to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large scale offensive action against Western Europe. This imperative has been largely accomplished, irrespective of CFE, through the demise of the Warsaw Pact and disunion of the USSR. Nonetheless, we believe that, with the inclusion of certain conditions, the Treaty would retain a degree of flexibility and efficacy necessary to promote U.S. and NATO security interests.
In our opinion, the national security interests of the United States, and our NATO allies, would be best served by resolving the aforementioned issue prior to ratification. While we understand the Administration's desire to secure prompt approval of the accord, it should be noted that formal transmittal and subsequent Senate action were unduly delayed because of Soviet Article III violations. Given present uncertainties regarding the legal, political, and military foundations of the Treaty, we recommend the Senate defer action until these questions are resolved. However, should the Senate elect to proceed with ratification at this time, we believe the suggested conditions of the Republican Armed Services Committee members should be wholly incorporated to condition Senate advise and consent.
MALCOLM WALLOP.
BOB SMITH.
CONNIE MACK.
Request. In your written testimony, you indicated that you saw no reason to believe that the Soviets intend to violate the terms of the CFE Treaty. Please provide, in an unclassified statement if possible, the rationale behind this judgment.
Response: First of all, the trends in Soviet conventional forces indicate that they are moving out of Eastern Europe and reducing their forces. These trends, begun in 1988 with Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral Soviet reductions and withdrawals and continuing today, go beyond and are not directly connected to events governed by Treaty obligation. These trends argue against Soviet cheating.
Secondly, even if the Soviets were tempted to reverse these trends, the appreciation by their military leadership of U.S. capabilities to detect possible treaty violations serves as a powerful deterrent against cheating. They have little hope of being able to retain in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone militarily significant amounts of combat equipment coveted by the treaty in excess of Treaty limits and avoid detection by U.S. intelligence. Risks of detection are increased by treaty provisions for on-site inspection and by the increasing openness in Soviet society brought about by Gorbachev's campaign for glasnost (such as a freer press and an increasingly independent legislature).
Thirdly, with economic difficulties bedeviling the Soviet Union, one of their few hopes for recovery is access to Western credits, trade and technology. Prospects for that much-needed access would not be enhanced were the Soviets found to be cheating on CFE.
Finally, on the basis of logic alone, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would take substantial unilateral arms reduction measures and accept additional reduction requirements in accordance with CFE Treaty provisions only to cheat in order to restore a level of military capability far less than they originally possessed and which they abandoned at great expense in terms of both treasure and internal turmoil among the military-a sector of Soviet society heretofore treated as an elite.
On balance, therefore, we judge that the potential gains do not warrant the attendant risks and conclude that the chances of deliberate Soviet cheating are low.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, November 1, 1991.
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your staff has requested answers for the record to a series of questions concerning the authoritative character of Executive Branch testimony on the CFE treaty. Our answers are enclosed. They have been reviewed and approved by the Legal Adviser.
Sincerely,
JANET G. MULLINS,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs.
Attachments: As stated.
Question 1. When Secretary Baker and other key officials, such as Secretary Cheney, testify before this Committee on the CFE Treaty, can we assume that they are speaking for the Executive Branch?
Answer. Yes.
Question 2. When Secretary Baker and other authoritative officials testify on this Treaty, and explain it to us, do you believe that this testimony is contributing to a "shared understanding"-between the Executive and the Senate-as to the meaning of the Treaty and the way the United States will interpret it?
Answer. Yes, that is our intention.
Question 3. Do you believe that it is necessary for the Committee to interrogate Executive Branch witnesses-and debate with them-on each clause of the Treaty in order to establish beyond doubt our "shared understanding" of the Treaty's meaning? Or would you agree with the operating premise that if Executive Branch witnesses speak and the Committee does not take issue with such statements, that those statements contribute substantially to our "shared understanding"?
Answer. The answer to the first question is no. The answer to the second is yes, that is our intention.
Question 4. In order for the Senate to establish its expectation-and to establish in law-that the Executive Branch will interpret the Treaty as its witnesses have presented it, do you regard it as necessary for the Senate to take each and every provision of the Treaty which it regards as significant, to commit the interpretation to writing, and to convert that interpretation into a formal condition of Senate consent? Or can the Senate act on the assumption that it can rely on the Executive Branch and act in accord with the Executive Branch's presentation of the Treaty's terms even without going through the ritual?
Answer. The Senate can rely on this Administration to interpret the Treaty in accordance with our testimony.
Question 5. Finally, do you regard it as necessary for the Senate to examine the entire negotiating record of this Weaty in order to establish that there is nothing in that record inconsistent with the terms in the text and your interpretation of those terms? Or does the text, and the interpretation of those terms? Or does the text, and the interpretation of that text articulated by the signatories of the Treaty, take precedence over the various bureaucratic memoranda that constitute the so-called "negotiating record"?
Answer. The answer to the first part of your question is no. As to the second part of the question, the text of the Treaty takes precedence over anything inconsistent in the negotiating record. As to whether interpretation of the text articulated by one or more signatories take precedence over the negotiating record, the question cannot be answered in the abstract, but only upon analysis of the specific statements in question.
Question 6. To summarize, if the Treaty text and your presentation of the Treaty's meaning are clear and mutually consistent, then can we expect the Executive Branch to act in accordance with that interpretation even if the Senate does not explicitly state in the resolution of ratification that we are re ding u n you to do so?
Answer. Yes, the Senate can rely on this Administration to interpret the Treaty in accordance with our testimony.
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