DESTRUCTION COMMITMENTS EAST OF THE URALSIn 1990, during the final months of CFE Treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union transferred more than 50,000 pieces of TLE to military bases and depots east of the Ural Mountains. This was a legal movement of military equipment, since neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation had signed the unfinished treaty. Nevertheless, once the treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990, the Soviet Union's initial TLE figures disturbed the other treaty states. They were concerned with the sheer size of the transfers, and some observers concluded that the Soviet military might be trying to circumvent the treaty, since no other nation had transferred any conventional weapons or equipment outside its borders. At the time of the treaty's signature in Paris, the Soviet Union's data revealed a transfer of 6,289 CFE Treaty TLE items to units of the naval infantry, coastal defense, civil defense, and Strategic Rocket Forces. This transfer was considered a serious breach of the treaty-so serious that many nations, including the United States, suspended ratification actions until the Soviet Union pledged to account for and destroy a large portion of the transferred equipment. As explained in Chapter 3, "Ratification Delayed," intense diplomatic negotiations led the Soviet Union to pledge in a legal declaration to the Joint Consultative Group in June 1991 that it would destroy or convert 6,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and 1,500 ACVs (14,500 total) located east of the Urals by December 31, 1995. At the same time, the Soviet Union obligated itself to remove from the treaty's territorial zones 1,492 pieces of naval-related equipment. This equipment would also be destroyed by the end of 1995. None of the reductions would be subject to inspection; however, Moscow pledged to provide sufficient visible evidence to indicate that the equipment had been destroyed or converted.28 |
Kharchenko discounted military threat...weather rendered equipment useless. |
During the CFE Treaty's 40-month
reduction period, the treaty states individually
monitored Russia's progress in keeping its pledge to
reduce its TLE east of the Urals. There was little
reduction activity in 1992-93; only a slight increase in
1993-94; and a steady low state in 1994-95. In January
1995, the U.S. Congress was informed in a published Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) report that
"serious concern persists over the pace and
validation of the [Russian] reductions." In July
1995, the agency raised the issue before Congress again,
criticizing Russia's slow pace of destruction or
conversion.29 Then, just six
weeks before the December 31, 1995, deadline, Russian
General Dmitri Kharchenko announced to the JCG that
Russia would be unable to meet its commitments, citing
the expense of reducing such a large number of
conventional weapons. He asked for an extension to
December 1998. General Kharchenko discounted any military
threat from the massed equipment, stating that weather
exposure and lack of maintenance had rendered it
effectively useless.30 Russia's request was discussed in the JCG in Vienna, but there was no agreement. However, in May 1996, at the CFE Treaty Review Conference, all the signatory states accepted a new Russian declaration on the issue. In that conference's Final Document (see Appendix D), Russia declared that it would proceed with reductions of all the committed weapons and equipment and would provide documentary evidence of its destruction and conversion. All battle tanks and armored combat vehicles that had been exposed to the weather would be displayed with the "hatches and covers of engines" opened. A group of experts, at their own expense, would be invited to the reduction sites to examine the equipment prior to its final disposal through scrapping. Finally, Russia established the year 2000 as the new deadline for completing all reductions east of the Urals.31 REDEFINING THE TREATY'S FLANK LIMITSThe problem of the treaty's flank limits was both consequential and controversial.32 During negotiations the treaty states accepted a two-part flank zone that contained limits on the number of active and stored conventional weapons. In the diplomatic end game leading to treaty signature, President Gorbachev and the Soviet Union accepted these zone limits and restrictions. The CFE Treaty's Article V stipulated that each group of states could possess no more than 4,700 tanks, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 5,900 ACVs in the flank zones. Originally, the flank zones included the following national territories: Iceland, Norway, Greece, and parts of Turkey (NATO flanks) and Romania, Bulgaria, and four military districts in the Soviet Union (WTO flanks). For the Warsaw Treaty Organization, these military districts were located on the northern and southern flanks of the alliance (see table 8-1). The intent of treaty negotiators was to limit, through absolute numerical ceilings and storage and active sublimits, the number of offensive weapons in these military districts. |
Table 8-1. CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment in the WTO Flank Zones
Tanks | Artillery | ACVs | Total | ||
Russia (2 military districts)1 | 700 | 1,280 | 580 | 2,560 active | |
600 | 400 | 800 | 1,800 storage | ||
Ukraine (1 military district)2 | 280 | 390 | 350 | 1,020 active | |
400 | 500 | -- | 900 storage | ||
Moldova (1 military district)2 | 210 | 250 | 210 | 670 active | |
0 storage | |||||
Georgia3 | 220 | 285 | 220 | 725 active | |
0 storage | |||||
Azerbaijan3 | 220 | 285 | 220 | 725 active | |
0 storage | |||||
Armenia3 | 220 | 285 | 220 | 725 active | |
0 storage | |||||
Total former USSR | 2,850 | 3675 | 2,600 | 9,125 active and storage | |
Total former USSR | 1,850 | 2,775 | 1,800 | 6,425 active only | |
Bulgaria4 | 1,475 | 1,750 | 2,000 | 5,225 active | |
0 storage | |||||
Romania4 | 1,375 | 1,475 | 2,100 | 4,950 active | |
0 storage | |||||
WTO flank total5 | 4,700 | 6,000 | 5,900 | 16,600 active only | |
1The flank zone included the Soviet
military districts of Leningrad and Northern Caucasus, part of
Russia.
2Ukraine contained the Soviet military districts of
Kiev, Carpathia, and Odessa, but only Odessa was included in the
flank zone. The Odessa Military District also contained Moldova.
3Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan made up the Soviet
Transcaucasus Military District.
4Bulgaria and Romania belonged entirely within the WTO
Flank Zone.
5As determined by Article V of the CFE Treaty.
Source: Dorn Crawford, "Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE)," ACDA. 1993.
In 1990, when the Soviet Union accepted these flank zone limitations, no one anticipated the nation's collapse in 1991 and the emergence of 15 new states so quickly. During the first six months of 1992, Russia agreed to partition the former Soviet Union's military forces and to ratify the CFE Treaty, including its flank zone restrictions. The treaty entered into force on July 17, 1992; on-site inspections began immediately, and all the treaty's provisions were in effect. Under Article V, Russia was allowed to have approximately 10 percent of its total treaty entitlements in the northern and southern flank zones in active units; more than 85 percent had to be placed in storage. These treaty restrictions on Russia's conventional force deployments irritated senior military leaders. Only Ukraine had similar restrictions. In June 1993, Russian Minister of Defense Grachev declared categorically that the CFE Treaty's flank limits had to be revised. Grachev said the Russian general staff needed to remove 400 tanks, 2,420 ACVs, and 820 artillery pieces from the flank limits in order to field an additional mechanized division.33 |