Chapter 8 -- The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure

In September 1993, President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the heads of state of the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain requesting that they recognize the CFE Treaty's flank limits as a serious problem. Yeltsin asked for assistance in Russia's efforts to modify the treaty. Ten days later, Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kulebyakin presented a diplomatic démarche to all CFE Treaty states. Specifically, Kulebyakin asked that the Joint Consultative Group consider raising Russia's flank sublimits in the Leningrad Military District and in the Northern Caucasus Military District. In Vienna, Ukraine supported Russia on this issue, since the CFE flank rule required the Ukrainian army to base 60 percent of its forces on 40 percent of its territory. Ambassador Kulebyakin explained that "generally recognized common norms of international law provide for a possibility of suspending the effects of treaty obligations due to a radical change of circumstances...." He argued that the internal situation in the Northern Caucasus region warranted altering the CFE Treaty's flank limits.³⁴

The other CFE states did not respond formally to the Russian and Ukrainian requests. NATO nations, in the main, preferred the status quo. They indicated that while the treaty was being implemented, they would not support any changes in the negotiated and ratified treaty. Two NATO nations, Turkey and Norway, objected more strongly. Both nations bordered the Russian military districts in question. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin publicly stated that modifying the CFE Treaty would both interrupt its implementation and open up the possibility of an arms race in the Caucasus. Leaders of other NATO nations expressed their concerns about reopening the treaty, suggesting that some Eastern European nations--Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic-did not like the current treaty--mandated restrictions on stored weapons. Given this opposition, no other CFE Treaty state stepped forward in the fall and winter of 1993-94 to support the Russian and Ukrainian request to reconsider the CFE Treaty's flank limits.³⁵

Russia, however, did not let the issue die. In February 1994, two Russian general staff officers, General Dmitri Kharchenko and General Leonid Shevstov, briefed the JCG delegates in Vienna on precisely which TLE the Russian army intended to deploy in the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts and how that equipment would be used. Then, in March 1994, the Russian CFE Treaty delegate asked the JCG to consider modifying the CFE Treaty provisions on weapons and equipment stored in the two military districts. The Russian representative argued that the treaty restrictions on the number of CFE weapons a state could remove from storage were out of date and militarily cumbersome. The JCG took no action on these Russian requests. Throughout the remainder of 1994, Russia continued to raise these flank issues in Vienna, and Ukraine continued its support. The other CFE Treaty states, however, maintained their opposition to considering any changes. At the end of the second treaty reduction year, the CFE Treaty's flank limit problem remained unresolved.³⁶

On December 10, 1994, Russia launched a military assault on rebel forces in Chechnya, in the Northern Caucasus region. The Russian military sent personnel, tanks, ACVs, artillery, and other conventional equipment into the region to quell the rebellion. Within a month, more than 40,000 Russian military and police troops had deployed into Chechnya. Under the CFE Treaty, Russia was limited to a total of 700 tanks, 580 ACVs, and 1,200 artillery pieces in active units in the southern flank zone. By the spring of 1995, Russian deployments far exceeded these limits. If Russia did not reduce its deployments by November 17, 1995, the end of the third reduction year, it faced being designated as out of compliance with the CFE Treaty.

Here was a serious, consequential treaty problem. Quickly, the issue was elevated above the diplomatic realm into international politics. In May 1995, President Clinton discussed the flanks issue with President Yeltsin at the Moscow Summit. In late May, Turkey threatened to send its military to its northeastern border if Russia continued to station excess forces in the southern flank zone. Then, on June 1, the Russian High Command announced that the 58th Army would be organized and stationed in the Northern Caucasus Military District. During the summer months the rebellion abated as Chechen and Russian leaders signed a series of declarations that established cease-fire dates and set timetables for limited troop withdrawals. But these declarations proved short-lived, as one side or the other resumed fighting. In the fall of 1995, with the approach of the date for ending the treaty's reduction period (November 17), there was a flurry of diplomatic activity on the flanks issue.³⁷

President William J. Clinton.

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.

NATO nations presented a plan in mid-September for revising the treaty's flank zones. They proposed reducing the areas designated as flanks by excluding two military oblasts (districts) from Russia's southern flank and three from its northern flank. These exclusions would give the Russian High Command greater flexibility in deploying its conventional forces and equipment internally. In return for this treaty modification, Russia had to agree to remain in the treaty, accept a few additional inspections, and provide some additional information, especially on any TLE deployed in areas that were formerly located in the flank zones. The Russians rejected this proposal categorically. In fact, they rejected all offers of compromise in the fall of 1995. In those months, President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, and ACDA Director John Holum discussed various plans with their Russian counterparts. No common ground emerged. In Vienna, JGC representatives tried to work out an acceptable compromise that all nations could agree to. None worked. Consequently, when the November 17, 1995, deadline arrived, the 30 CFE states issued a joint statement identifying the states that had not met their treaty obligations. Russia, because of the excess TLE stationed in the southern flank zone and its failure to resolve the Black Sea Fleet issue, was not in compliance.³⁸

The next demarcation point for possible resolution was May 1996. The CFE Treaty contained a provision for a mandatory all-signatory states conference to be held 46 months after entry into force. The CFE First Review Conference was held in Vienna May 15-31, 1996. The flanks issue dominated the conference. The Russian representative, Ambassador Kulebyakin, stated and restated Russia's rationale for seeking relief from Article V and the flank limits. The U.S. delegation, led by Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, and Gregory G. Govan, U.S. Chief Delegate to the JCG, tried repeatedly to shape a compromise redefinition of the flanks that was acceptable to all 30 nations. Netherlands Ambassador Frank Majoor chaired the conference and intervened at key times to facilitate a solution. Negotiations on the flanks issue were very, very difficult, but in the final hours Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov signaled Moscow's acceptance of conference language and the agreement went forward. Russia and the other signatory states agreed in the Final Document that (1) Russia's flank zone areas would be redrawn, excluding certain military oblasts; (2) the total number of CFE equipment allowed in the Russian military districts-battle tanks, ACVs, and artillery--would be revised upward; (3) Russia would provide the other treaty states with force data more often; and (4) Russia would be liable for up to 10 additional declared site inspections annually in the flank zones.³⁹

During the difficult negotiations, four nations--Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan--expressed major concerns about Russia's future security intentions. In one way these nations were articulating new regional concerns; in another way they were expressing their fears about the possibility of large states' influencing small states and the significance of international law. In the conference's Final Document, each of these four nations submitted a separate annex statement explaining its concerns (see Appendix D). During the conference, some of the NATO nations, particularly France and Great Britain, supported these nations. France took the position that every state had to respect the national sovereignty of every other state, especially states that were parties to the CFE Treaty, the most important, modern, all-European multinational arms control treaty. With the positions of these four nations incorporated into the final statement, the delegates moved forward with language redefining the treaty's flank limits. Not all the details were ironed out. Subsequent diplomatic negotiations on the exact territorial demarcations and specific timetables for movement of the forces remained to be worked out in the Joint Consultative Group.

Verification agency leaders General-Major Yevgeniy Ivanovich Nikulin of Belarus, General-Major Vycheslav Aleksandrovich Romanov of Russia, and General-Major Nikolai Tikhonovich Honcharenko of Ukraine visit OSIA on July 31, 1995.