Abandoned TLE presented accountability problems in the Transcaucasus nations.

  

ACCOUNTING FOR TLE AMONG THE SUCCESSOR STATES

Eight signatory states--Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakstan--did not exist as nations during CFE Treaty negotiations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states received portions of its vast arsenal in the Tashkent Agreement of May 1992. During ratification, they committed to the CFE Treaty's provisions and protocols. However, when it came time for implementation, some of the successor states found it difficult to meet their treaty commitments. The situation in the Transcaucasian region was chaotic. Nations were ensnared in a web of civil wars, revolutions, ethnic conflicts, and internal governmental chaos. Implementing the CFE Treaty was not a pressing commitment for these states. To complicate matters, the Russian army, which had inherited the USSR's forces and equipment before Tashkent, was now withdrawing from some parts of the region. Under the Tashkent Agreement, the Russian army was responsible for turning over to the other successor states their "agreed-upon" portion of the former USSR's arsenal. Under the CFE Treaty, those nations would be responsible for the treaty-limited equipment and for destroying excess weapons. However, much of the Russian army's military equipment in the Transcaucasian region was old and unusable. When transferred, it was rejected. This rejection, which included several hundred tanks, ACVs, and artillery pieces, caused problems for the other signatory states monitoring compliance with the CFE Treaty.

In the Transcaucasian region, all three states--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia--experienced major difficulties in complying with the CFE Treaty. When the treaty entered into force in July 1992, Armenia reported almost no data on its conventional equipment, despite having been authorized at Tashkent 258 tanks, 641 ACVs, 357 artillery pieces, and 7 helicopters. Furthermore, Armenia did not admit to the JCG that it had any reduction liabilities in the first or second treaty reduction years. In January 1993, Armenia did submit its TLE listings, but it stated that some of the CFE equipment left by the departing Russian army lacked parts, critical elements, and functioning units. Armenia implied that it would not account for or reduce this unacceptable CFE equipment. Russia, in its CFE Treaty charts, had reported the equipment as transferred to Armenia. However, Armenia, on its treaty charts, did not report the same numbers. This caused a discrepancy, which the JCG discussed but could not resolve.

 

Azerbaijan, when the treaty entered into force, submitted its TLE data, but they were incomplete and inaccurate. The problem with the Azerbaijani data stemmed from the same cause: the departing Russian army had left tanks, ACVs, and artillery that were in such poor shape or so stripped down that Azerbaijan refused to accept and account for them. In addition, the Azerbaijanis were involved in a lengthy ethnic war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and they asserted that losses of conventional equipment in that conflict could not be accounted for or reported. Azerbaijan did accept one U.S. CFE inspection team in November 1992, thus indicating a certain willingness to participate in the treaty. But Azerbaijan did not report any CFE equipment or weapons reduction liabilities to the JCG as required at the end of either the first or the second treaty reduction year. Georgia, as a new nation, had major problems. An intense civil war threatened the existence of the government. Under these circumstances, Georgia's compliance with the CFE Treaty was problematical. At the end of the third reduction year, the JCG issued a statement declaring that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were not in compliance with the treaty.25  

In November 1992, an American team conducted a declared site inspection in Azerbaijan.

 

U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Perry, NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner, and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev at NATO Headquarters, March 29, 1993.

   Ukraine and Russia were also not in compliance with the CFE Treaty. They did not meet their quotas for reducing excess treaty-limited equipment assigned to the Black Sea Fleet's naval infantry and coastal defense units. This treaty problem was part of a much larger issue: the Black Sea Fleet's partition by Russia and Ukraine. At Tashkent, Russia agreed to cede to Ukraine a certain portion of the former Soviet Union's weapons, units, and sites. Since these weapons fell under the numerical and zone restrictions of the CFE Treaty, Ukraine agreed in its articles of ratification to reduce any excess TLE within 40 months of entry into force. As of November 17, 1995, Ukraine was in compliance with all its treaty reduction quotas, except for the weapons and units assigned to the Black Sea Fleet. In 1995, the fleet had approximately 48,000 naval and marine personnel, 14 submarines, 31 surface ships, 43 patrol and coastal ships, 125 combat aircraft, and 85 helicopters. Equipment covered by the CFE Treaty included one coastal defense division with 175 tanks, 450 armored infantry fighting vehicles, and 72 artillery pieces. The fleet also contained a naval infantry brigade with 50 tanks, 218 ACVs, and 45 artillery pieces. Based in the Odessa Military District in the Crimea, this fleet was manned predominantly by Russian sailors and officers. The fleet's Russian commander and its senior officers resisted any partition and transfer to Ukraine.26

Partitioning the fleet proved to be to difficult at Tashkent; consequently, the issue was left to bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. In June 1993, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement that essentially split the fleet in half, beginning in September 1993 and reaching completion in 1996. No sooner had this agreement been announced than it fell apart. Russian naval officers objected to any transfer, and Ukrainian military leaders objected to any loss of territory from the naval bases slated for transfer. The Black Sea Fleet agreement was renegotiated in September 1993, again in April 1994, and once again in February 1996. Two months later it fell apart again. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stopped the division because of controversy over where the Russian fleet would be based. Throughout these indecisive negotiations and inconclusive agreements, neither Ukraine nor Russia destroyed any of the weapons or equipment assigned to the naval infantry and coastal defense units of the Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, the two nations were not in compliance with the CFE Treaty, and until the fleet had been divided successfully, they would remain in that status.27

 

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