Chapter 8 -- The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure

COST OF TLE REDUCTIONS

A persistent problem of a different nature arose shortly after the CFE Treaty entered into force. Several nations complained publicly and in treaty forums that the treaty's reduction protocols required destruction methodologies that were too specific and too expensive, given the thousands of weapons and pieces of equipment that had to be reduced within the treaty-mandated 40 months. They suggested less costly, alternative methods. Only one month after the treaty entered into force in July 1992, General-Lieutenant Ivan Oleynik, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Armaments, stated publicly that destroying T-54 tanks was too expensive. To destroy one tank, according to General Oleynik, the Ukrainian government had to spend over 7,000 rubles. Destruction of just one armored personnel carrier, he maintained, would cost over 4,000 rubles. Under the CFE Treaty, Ukraine was responsible for the destruction of 2,450 tanks, 2,222 APCs, and 550 aircraft. To accomplish this work, the Ukrainian government had to set up reduction sites at Zhitomer, Kiev, Lvov, Nikolayev, and Kharkov.¹⁶

U.S. inspection team recording data on T-54 tank reductions in Ukraine.

Poland's eight-ton ball crushed TLE efficiently and economically.

Other states with substantial reduction liabilities agreed with Ukraine. In December 1992, Germany, Russia, and Belarus joined Ukraine in petitioning the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group to consider new, less costly procedures for reducing treaty-limited equipment.¹⁷ Russia had 10 reduction sites, Germany 6, and Belarus 4. From December through March, the JCG discussed Ukraine's petition. Then in April 1993, Russia invited observers from the other treaty nations to witness a demonstration reduction of tanks using the new procedures. At a military base outside Saint Petersburg, Russian army warrant officers demonstrated how disabling one side of a tank's drive system--rather than two, as prescribed in the treaty--would render it militarily ineffective. They also demonstrated that making partial rather than complete cuts would effectively disable the tank's major components: the turret rings and gun barrels. At this demonstration, representatives of the other treaty states observed the recommended modifications, and in Vienna, following discussions and comments, the JCG representatives accepted the Russian proposal. The new procedures became acceptable ways to reduce tanks under the treaty.¹⁸ Less than a month later, the JCG agreed to a German proposal for modifying the procedures for reducing lightly armored vehicles. The German delegates proposed that these weapons be destroyed by crushing them in a large compactor. Known as the "cheese slicer" or "cookie cutter," this compactor worked well in field demonstrations. After further negotiations in Vienna, the JCG approved its use in June 1993.¹⁹

Poland had a large reduction liability under the CFE Treaty: 1,120 tanks, 246 armored combat vehicles, 705 artillery pieces, and 49 aircraft. In 1993, Poland recommended and the JCG approved a modification of the treaty protocol for destroying artillery pieces. According to Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Director of the Polish Verification Center, the new method called for a very large, heavy steel wrecking ball to be lifted high in the air and dropped on the weapons, thereby "smashing the gun components until they were visibly cracked or bent." Colonel Malinowski added that this method was "not very costly" but was "very efficient."²⁰

Even with these procedural changes, the cost of reducing the excess TLE was a burden for some of the smaller successor states. Belarus is a small nation of 10 million people. At Tashkent it had received a large portion of the Soviet Union's CFE Treaty conventional weapons: 3,457 tanks, 3,824 ACVs, 1,562 artillery pieces, and 390 aircraft. Belarus's total reduction liability was more than 3,750 weapons. To destroy these treaty weapons within the 40-month reduction period, Belarus set up reduction centers at Borisov, Lesnaya, Baranovichi, and Stankovo. When its economy collapsed in 1992-93, Belarus said that the cost of carrying out CFE Treaty reductions was excessive. In December 1992, Belarus joined Russia, Ukraine, and Germany in petitioning the JCG to modify the treaty's reduction protocols. In June 1993, Belarussian senior officials stated that the government was under such financial pressure that it might not be able to meet its CFE Treaty reduction obligations. General-Major Viktor Vakar, Director of the Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspection, raised the issue with the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee in November 1993. Other Belarussian senior officials took the issue before the state parties at the Joint Consultative Group; still others raised it in diplomatic exchanges with the United States. In the latter instance, Belarus requested that Nunn-Lugar funds be obligated to assist it in its CFE Treaty reductions. Here was a new problem. Belarus was not requesting further modifications to the treaty's reduction protocols; instead, it was asking for direct foreign aid to pay the cost of reducing the weapons. Belarus estimated that it would cost $33 million to reduce its 3,758 pieces of CFE Treaty TLE.²¹

Reduction costs caused Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Germany to petition the JCG to modify reduction procedures.

Minister of Defense Pavel Kozlovskiy of Belarus and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin following the signing of a funding agreement under the Nunn-Lugar program.

When the United States did not respond (to avoid setting a precedent of paying for TLE destruction for all the successor states), Belarus took another tack. It called for the treaty states to set up a voluntary CFE Treaty Support Fund. Among the treaty nations, only Russia and Ukraine actively supported establishing such a fund. Nevertheless, Belarus kept the concept alive. In March 1994, senior government officials said they would be forced to declare a force majeure in further treaty reductions if economic conditions did not improve. In late March, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Perry stated that the United States would commit $5 million each to Belarus and Ukraine to support their CFE Treaty reduction efforts. At the same time, Perry pointed out that Belarus had already been granted $70 million, and Ukraine $270 million, under the United States' Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.²²

This action was sufficient for Belarus to continue its CFE reduction program through 1994. Then in February 1995, President Aleksander R. Lukashenka suddenly announced that Belarus would suspend all reduction efforts. Declaring that the cost of destroying the CFE weapons was "economically unjust," Lukashenka said that he had made a unilateral decision to shut down the reduction operations. Here was a direct threat to treaty compliance. Lukashenka's announcement came a few weeks before Russian President Boris Yeltsin threatened to pull out of the treaty if Russia did not receive some relief from the treaty's flank limit restrictions and if NATO expanded into Central Europe.²³

Lukashenka's announcement and Yeltsin's threat had the effect of forcing this problem out of treaty forums and into the realm of international politics. Resolution of Russia's flank limit problem will be discussed later; resolving Belarus's financial problem took more than 15 months. Within a few days of Lukashenka's February 23, 1995, announcement, Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Tsepkalo explained that Belarus was prepared to resume destruction of weapons if sufficient funding was forthcoming immediately. When no other nation came forth with funds, Belarus continued its suspension throughout the spring, summer, and into the fall months. The CFE Treaty's November 17, 1995, reduction deadline approached; nations with excessive TLE would not be in compliance. In late August, German Defense Minister Klaus Kinkel flew to Minsk and discussed the issue with the Belarussian president and his ministers. As he left, the German defense minister made no commitments, but he conceded that the Cold War's termination had created great suffering for Belarus and the other successor nations.

In September 1995, Belarus announced that it would resume its reduction activities but indicated that for economic reasons it would not meet its treaty reduction obligations. The following month, James Collins, Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, flew to Minsk for consultations. No direct action followed until November, when the deadline came for all treaty states to meet their reduction liabilities. On November 17, 1995, all 30 nations issued a joint statement from Vienna identifying nations that were not in compliance with the treaty. Belarus was not in compliance. Apparently this statement and the promise of the United States and Germany to provide financial assistance were sufficient motivation for Belarus to commit to a definite plan for completing its TLE reductions. Ten days after Belarus was singled out for noncompliance, its representatives submitted a plan to the JCG for destroying all of the state's remaining TLE by April 26, 1996. The plan was quickly approved, and the pace of reductions proceeded to meet the schedule. Belarus, in fact, did not meet the April 1996 deadline, which meant that it was still not in full compliance with the CFE Treaty's reduction quotas.²⁴