Chapter 4 -- Standing Up the Unit

At the first Russian/American/German CFE mock inspection, January 27-31, General Parker greeted the incoming inspectors and briefly spoke of the importance of this series of inspections. He welcomed the opportunity for joint training, continued cooperation, mutual trust, and most important-developing a "key blueprint for the CFE verification regime."

On January 27, 1992, little more than a month after the Soviet Union had collapsed, a Russian inspection team arrived in Frankfurt to conduct mock inspections, thus maintaining continuity in arms control treaty implementation. The Russian inspection team and six Russian observers underwent POE procedures with the host German escort team. The U.S. liaison team, General Parker, and Colonel Kelley were also there. The Russians declared their first inspection site, Idar-Oberstein, and departed with the German host state escorts. After an overnight administrative hold, the Russian inspectors arrived at Idar-Oberstein at 0830 for the mock inspection. Following the inspection, the two teams held an informal discussion, reviewing the procedures and inspection issues. Then, the Russian team chief followed treaty protocol procedures and declared a sequential inspection at Spangdahlem Air Base. Finally, again following treaty protocols precisely, the two team chiefs signed the inspection report. While the Russian inspectors and observers, the U.S. liaison team, and General Parker and Colonel Kelley spent the night at Idar-Oberstein, the U.S. escort team traveled ahead to Spangdahlem Air Base. There they made final, last-minute preparations for the next day's inspection.

Upon leaving Idar-Oberstein, the German escort team continued their responsibilities for the Russian inspection team and transported them to the next inspection site. The U.S. escort team greeted the Russian and German teams upon arrival at Spangdahlem Air Base and once again assumed escort responsibilities from the Germans. After providing refreshments and the site diagram to the Russians at the Officers' Club, Lt. Colonel Snedker and his team waited 30 minutes for the Russians to declare the OOV to be inspected. The Russian team chief declared the 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing, and the Americans began the site briefing.

Following this briefing, the entire Russian inspection team participated in a bus ride around the base. Colloquially known as a "windshield tour," this bus ride gave the inspection team a chance to compare the site diagram with the actual facilities, a practice that many nations would later adopt in escorting inspection teams. After the windshield tour the Russian team broke into three subgroups, which departed immediately for different areas on the base to begin their inspections. The Russian inspectors requested access to all doors that exceeded the treaty's two-meter limit and were satisfied with visual access if they could readily determine there was no TLE present in a building. If the inspectors could not immediately determine that there was no TLE in a facility, the American escorts provided them access as far into a facility as necessary to confirm there was no TLE there, or until they encountered doors that did not exceed two meters.

Mock inspections develop a "key blueprint for the CFE verification regime."

-- Maj. Gen. Robert W. Parker

U.S. escorts confirm a two-meter opening during a mock inspection at Lakenheath Air Base, England.		When one subgroup requested access to the Munitions Storage Area, Lt. Colonel Snedker responded that the area was a sensitive point with limited access. He offered the inspectors an option to select four of the bunkers within the storage area for visual access only. The inspectors however, wanted either total access or no access to the area. Lt. Colonel Snedeker referred to the treaty definition of a sensitive point as allowing total, limited, or no access. At that point the Russian inspectors declined the American offer for limited access and proceeded to inspect other areas. By evening, the Russian team had finished its inspection, conducted a briefing, declared the sequential inspection (the 200th TAMC at Germersheim Army Depot), and completed the inspection report. After a dinner at the NCO Club, all teams left for Germersheim, where they remained overnight. The next day the Russians conducted their inspection, participated in a briefing, completed their report, and departed promptly for Rhein-Main, where they remained overnight before returning to Moscow the next day.¹⁸ Several issues arose during the inspections of the two U.S. sites. Photography was a point of contention on several occasions, specifically, the framing of photos. The U.S. escorts insisted that inspectors photograph an entire object, not just a part of it. U.S. escorts stated that an inspection team's photos were a tool in counting equipment, not a means to focus on an aspect of a specific piece of equipment or the area around it. Subsequently, in February 1992, during the U.S. mock inspection at Siverskiy Air Base, Russian escorts reciprocated by changing the framing of U.S. photos of Russian aircraft. Announcing when inspectors were going to take a picture also became an issue when the Russians declared that, under the treaty, they were required to announce their intention to take photos only once. In December 1991 at Vienna, however, General Medvedev had stated that an announcement should be made prior to each photo. Later, Russian escort officials concurred with that position during a U.S. mock inspection at Pushkin.

Because the treaty does not define a container, differences of interpretation arose during the mock inspections at U.S. facilities. The inspection protocol allows for the inspection of any container that exceeds two meters in all dimensions. The Russian inspectors defined a container as anything that "contains," to include the trailer of a tractor trailer rig or a communications vehicle. The U.S. position was that the back of a truck was a piece of equipment, and if the vehicle was not a piece of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST), inspectors had no right to inspect the vehicle. Later, in April 1992, Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance on containers allowed inspectors to view the interior of cargo vehicles or tractor trailers. Other vehicles that had been modified for other uses, such as communications vehicles, called for different procedures. If the modification to the vehicle were not readily apparent, an effort would be made to show that it was a modified piece of equipment and did not contain TLE.¹⁹

Another question was sparked by the presence of two Egyptian F-4 fighters at Spangdahlem. The Russian inspectors felt the fighters should have been declared as CAEST; the U.S. response was that since Egypt was not a signatory to the treaty, the Egyptian fighters were not subject to the treaty, and the United States would not report it during a site briefing or through formal CFE reporting channels.

U.S. site escorts open a container during a mock inspection.

SU-24 parked outside aircraft shelter at Siverskiy Air Base, Russia, during mock inspection in February 1992.

Shortly after these Russian mock inspections in Germany were complete, a nine-man American inspection team led by Lt. Colonel Gallagher conducted the mock inspections in Russia. The inspection team and six observers departed Rhein-Main on an Air Force C-141 on February 10, 1992. They arrived in Moscow around noon and, after a brief greeting, the Russians immediately initiated POE procedures. After Gallagher declared Siverskiy Air Base to be the first inspection site, the teams agreed to stop the inspection clock. The team--along with General Parker, Colonel Kelley, and other observers--remained overnight in Moscow. The following morning all departed for Siverskiy Air Base, where they conducted the first inspection. The American team departed for Pushkin the next day, where it conducted its inspection of the Russian Army artillery site over the next two days. After completing the second inspection on the 13th, Lt. Colonel Gallagher's team spent the night in Pushkin, returning to Moscow the next morning and then to Rhein-Main to complete the mission.

Photography again proved to be a source of questions during these inspections. One situation dealt with the number of photographs inspectors were allowed to take of CAEST. Escort officials questioned the need to take more than one photo of any piece of CAEST. Lt. Colonel Gallagher countered that photos were allowed to account for CAEST. He added that there was no way of determining how many subteams had photographed a piece of equipment and that treaty-authorized use of video cameras made the question moot. This issue was resolved when the Russian escorts reluctantly agreed that there was no limit. Reciprocity, which was an element of operations under INF inspections, also came into play during these CFE mock inspections when the Russians required U.S. inspectors to frame photos of SU-24s, just as U.S. escorts had required Russian inspectors to frame F-16 photos in January.

In addition to photo questions, a site diagram issue arose during the inspection at Pushkin. Russian escorts presented to the American inspectors a site diagram that did not indicate common areas, only the areas specific to the two OOVs at Pushkin. The American team chief, Lt. Colonel Gallagher, asserted that the diagram was not complete because it did not show the extent of its manmade external boundary. This limited the inspection team's access on the site. The Russian escorts did not agree with his interpretation of the treaty and did not alter the boundary of the site on the diagram. Lt. Colonel Gallagher noted the problem on the inspection report. It was a problem that would resurface during the baseline period and become the focus of a concerted allied effort to change the Russian interpretation.²⁰

The February 1992 mission to Russia was the first CFE mock inspection deployment into the Eastern group of states. Following that mission, from March 15 through May 9, OSIA teams conducted mock inspections in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland before the treaty entered into force in July 1992. The final OSIA mock inspection with an Eastern nation before the treaty's entry into force occurred on May 11, 1992, when Bulgarian inspectors deployed to Belgium. Each of these missions uncovered problems that were corrected on the spot, or noted and passed on for resolution by the U.S. government. One problem that inspectors could not correct was the presence of look-alike equipment in Czechoslovakia that was not included in the protocol on existing types of conventional armaments and equipment.

Site diagrams also proved to be a problem at several locations. In Czechoslovakia, an escort team gave a thorough site briefing using wall charts; however, the site diagrams provided to the inspection team were not as accurate. The Czech escorts believed that the treaty requirement to provide a site diagram was satisfied by the wall charts and that giving diagrams to the inspectors exceeded treaty requirements. The Czechs later changed their view on this issue. In Romania, escorts presented a site diagram that included the entire town adjacent to the military installation. The American inspection team discussed treaty requirements for site diagrams with their hosts, whereupon the Romanians narrowed the scope of their site diagram. In several states the U.S. teams experienced difficulties communicating with the U.S. Embassy. National phone systems were sometimes inadequate, and often U.S. Embassy personnel were not yet aware of notification requirements mandated by the treaty.

In all, from May 14, 1991, through July 5, 1992, OSIA inspection teams deployed on 44 mock inspection missions. During these missions, OSIA inspectors participated in nearly 100 mock inspections. American inspectors trained with inspectors from 18 nations and shared their knowledge with representatives or units from USAREUR, USAFE, and U.S. Navy Europe. Typically, a mission lasted for several days and involved two or more mock inspections. Although the stay at any one location was brief, the mock inspections provided an understanding of how U.S. teams would conduct an inspection and how U.S. teams would work with foreign teams inspecting U.S. forces. In addition, these inspections familiarized U.S. inspectors with the environment of the Eastern states, which would prepare them for contingencies that might arise during an actual inspection mission. These missions also tested the efficiency of the logistics system used to prepare and transport U.S. teams. One group that did not benefit from this series of mock inspections, however, was the U.S. liaison personnel, who would not be ready to perform until days before the treaty entered into force.