Chapter 4 -- Standing Up the Unit

EASTERN MOCK INSPECTIONS

The United States participated in mock inspections with Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria before the treaty entered into force in July 1992. A major reason for the success of those missions was Germany's participation as the host state. As a stationing state, the United States needed the cooperation and permission of the German government to bring in Eastern inspection teams. Germany was to be a major player during treaty implementation because there were more than 900 declared sites in the newly unified Germany, including the sites of stationing states such as the United States, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom. These mock inspections offered Germany's Zentrum für Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) an opportunity to test many aspects of implementing the treaty as a host state--these included procedures at the POE, transportation to the declared site, and providing lodging and food when required.

The first of these inspections occurred on October 8, 1991, when a Czechoslovakian inspection team came to Germany to inspect U.S. forces at Camp Vilseck and the Merrill Barracks. Major Elmer G. (Guy) White, USA, the escort team chief, noted that the drawdown of U.S. forces, coupled with the deployments to the Gulf War, had dramatically changed U.S. forces in Europe. Consequently, the information exchanged at treaty signature was no longer accurate. Because there would be no exchange of data until 30 days after the treaty's entry into force, OSIA escorts would be busy explaining differences between the old data and the status of forces during the initial days of baseline.

Major White also highlighted a communications problem between his team and Headquarters EUCOM. This problem would recur later during other mock inspections, and it came up during the treaty's baseline phase. One of the duties of U.S. escort team chiefs and liaison officers was to communicate the inspection team's status to EUCOM, which in turn initiated a series of notifications to U.S. forces in Europe. Because of limited phone lines or poor connections through various phone systems, and the compressed time during an inspection, OSIA team chiefs and liaison officers were sometimes unable to contact EUCOM. Instead, they passed the information on to OSIA's European operations center at Rhein-Main. From the operations center, team status was passed to Headquarters EUCOM. It worked, but it was not the way that it had been envisioned. Communications in the future would routinely go through OSIA's operations center and then on to EUCOM.

The next mock inspections with an Eastern nation, and the first opportunity to train outside a NATO nation, were to occur in January and February of 1992, following preliminary discussions in December 1991.¹⁴ As Christmas 1991 approached, Colonel Kelley and Major Henry J. Nowak, USA, traveled from Frankfurt to Moscow, accompanied by Lt. Colonel Peer Schwan of the ZVBW, the German treaty verification organization, to arrange tri-national mock inspections at CFE facilities in both the Soviet Union and Germany. Again, Germany's cooperation was pivotal. As a stationing state, the United States owned none of the territory in the ATTU; consequently, it turned to the sovereign host state before arranging a visit by Soviet inspection teams. Major Griffith S. Hughes, USA, of the Arms Control Implementation Unit of the American Embassy in Moscow, accompanied Colonel Kelley, Major Nowak, and Lt. Colonel Schwan in Moscow. On December 18, 1991, these four officers met a Soviet delegation of 10 officers led by General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, head of the Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Jointly, they planned two mock inspection missions.

Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.

General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, Director, Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.

The first mission was scheduled for January 1992 in Germany. The inspection sites were the German Artillery Branch School at Idar-Oberstein, the U.S. Air Force's 52d Tactical Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, and the U.S. Army's 200th Theater Army Materiel Command (TAMC) at the Germersheim Army Depot. The second mission, planned for February 1992, would be held in the Leningrad Military District. There, the designated sites were the Soviets' 67th Bomber Regiment at Siverskiy Air Base and the 457th Howitzer Artillery Regiment at Pushkin.

The parties then turned to discussing the ground rules for these mock inspections. These included planning administrative breaks to allow for discussion of possible technical difficulties as they occurred. This provision contributed to a major aspect of these training missions--allowing key treaty participants time to iron out problems before the real inspections took place. The parties also modified treaty inspection timelines to allow for overnight stays. Another deviation from treaty requirements was designating Frankfurt as the single POE for the Soviet mission into Germany. Normally Frankfurt could not be a POE for the three declared sites selected for the inspections. The officers determined that the Soviets would fly into Rhein-Main Air Base and be bussed across the shared runway to Frankfurt International Airport. There German escorts would exercise host state POE procedures; Americans would test their liaison officer procedures; and the Soviets would perhaps avoid airport fees by landing at Rhein-Main. The conferees also discussed notification procedures, the number of inspectors/observers, team composition, inspection languages, dining schedules, equipment markings, and distribution of expenses.

These detailed planning discussions in Moscow, as had been the case with all planning sessions, prevented problems that would have detracted from the quality of training during the mock inspections. For example, Colonel Kelley reminded the Soviets that U.S. inspectors occasionally skipped lunch when conducting inspections, and that escorts were obliged to assist inspectors in carrying out an inspection, even if that meant a missed meal. Other discussions confirmed the U.S. intent to record all external markings of TLE. The Soviets stated that there would be no access to the interior of any equipment for the purpose of recording serial numbers. The planning agendas for both inspection series were reviewed, and both sides agreed to hold postinspection discussions ("hotwashes") at each site to clarify points they had discussed during each inspection. The group also agreed to discuss any problems encountered during the two missions and to pursue how each nation planned to conduct its inspections.

During this conference several issues arose that were beyond the authority of the conferees and required resolution by their respective governments. A change of inspection dates for the mock inspections in the Leningrad Military District required U.S. government approval. Lt. Colonel Schwan, the ZVBW representative, turned to the German government for approval of a Soviet request to allow a Soviet military aircraft to use Sperenberg Air Base in transit, either before or after dropping off the Soviet inspection team in Frankfurt. Sperenberg Air Base would provide the Soviets an opportunity to refuel their aircraft without purchasing fuel in Frankfurt, which had been a common practice during the INF Treaty implementation. Once those decisions were made, and despite the fact that the Soviet Union had collapsed as a nation on Christmas Day 1991, only seven days after this meeting, planning for the tri-nation mock inspections moved forward.¹⁵

For OSIA, these mock inspections in Russia differed from all previous CFE mock inspections. Colonel Kelley elected to forgo the usual team structure. Instead, he formed teams using only team chiefs and deputies, with the one exception of Technical Sergeant Joseph A. Amen, USAF. He did this because many of the American team leaders had never been in the Soviet Union. As Kelley put it:

"I wanted very badly to avoid a situation in which our team leaders would be rendered ineffective for the first several hours, if not a day, after their entry into the former Soviet Union for the first time, by virtue of awe. They had to get over that awe. The best way to do it was to do so at some time other than when they were performing a real inspection."

Colonel William R. Smith checks the serial number on an ACV.

"I wanted very badly to avoid a situation..."

-- Col. Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC
Chief of Operations, OSIA European
Operations Command

Captain David R. Carter coodinating a mock inspection at the Operations Center.

Colonel Kelley wanted to be certain that team leaders realized that military superpower status did not equate with a strong economy; that they held no misconceptions as to whom and what they would be dealing with in the Soviet Union. If team leaders were going to be distracted by their surroundings, Colonel Kelley wanted it to happen in a benign environment, during a mock inspection. When the CFE Treaty entered into force, he wanted the team leaders to be focused on the actual inspection. Kelley thought that this would probably be the only opportunity for team chiefs and deputies to enter the Soviet Union before baseline started-it was a one-shot deal. The team chiefs and deputies would then share their experiences with their teams in preparing them for baseline inspections.¹⁶

A total of 13 American team chiefs or deputies got firsthand exposure to Russian CFE inspection/escort techniques during these mock inspections. Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director of OSIA, was an observer on both missions. Five OSIA team chiefs and three deputies were on the escort team in Germany, January 27-31, 1992, when the Russians visited Spangdahlem Air Base and Germersheim Army Depot. In addition to augmentees and observers, five U.S. team chiefs and two deputies were assigned to the American team that inspected Russian forces at Siverskiy Air Base and at Pushkin, February 10-14, 1992. These nation-to-nation mock inspections revealed differences in treaty interpretation that simply would not have been uncovered except for these exercises.

Captain David R. Carter, USAF, of the Plans Branch at OSIA European Operations, coordinated the effort among USAFE, USAREUR, the German ZVBW, and OSIA to bring about the Russian/German/U.S. mock inspections. The official U.S. escort team chief was Lt. Colonel Donald C. Snedker, USA, and his deputy was Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, USA. The liaison officers for this mission were Majors Richard J. O'Shea, USAF, and Keith A. Oatman, USA. Major Oatman was an excellent resource for facilitating these inspections because he spoke German and Russian, a benefit derived from the emphasis placed on language skills when manning the unit. Technical Sergeant Joseph A. Amen, USAF, the only enlisted member of the team, was the logistics coordinator, a position usually referred to as the "bagman." Technical Sergeant Amen's role was to make certain that inspectors and escorts were billeted and fed when it was the U.S. government's responsibility to do so. Before departing on the mission, he withdrew funds from the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing accounting and finance center to cover anticipated expenses. He arrived with the escort team at the declared site ahead of the inspectors. There, he made arrangements and paid for billeting or hotel rooms if the teams were spending the night. He also paid for all meals.¹⁷