Chapter 4 -- Standing Up the Unit

ROLE OF THE LIAISON OFFICERS

During treaty negotiations, U.S. delegates were satisfied that proposed escort provisions would protect American interests when Eastern teams conducted CFE inspections at U.S. installations. It wasn't until late in negotiations that the United States recognized that there were many U.S. facilities, equipment, and personnel throughout Western Europe that were not subject to the treaty but were nonetheless vulnerable to CFE inspections. These forces were located on allied installations or at separate locations, not on U.S. installations. They were vulnerable during challenge inspections of specified areas or inspections of allied forces. Consequently, the United States insisted that the treaty contain a provision requiring a liaison officer's presence during any inspection of a nation's forces. OSIA's European Operations Command was not manned to carry out these liaison duties. The manning document allowed for two liaison officers; however, their planned duties did not include deployments throughout Western Europe whenever Eastern teams conducted CFE inspections.

The first American liaison officer (LNO), Major Richard J. O'Shea, USAF, arrived at OSIA's European Operations Command in February 1991. One of O'Shea's first tasks was to develop a list of the locations of American forces throughout Europe. OSIA LNOs needed to know exactly what U.S. interests could be vulnerable to an Eastern CFE Treaty inspection team. The list proved difficult to start and impossible to complete. No single headquarters in Europe maintained a list of all U.S. forces in Europe. Lists of major units--units that would be reportable under the treaty as well as non-CFE units--were readily available from USAFE and USAREUR. Determining the whereabouts of the many small groups of U.S. military people and equipment, however, proved extremely difficult. Within a few months, Major O'Shea determined that his list encompassed more than 1,200 locations throughout the NATO treaty area; in Germany alone there were 140 U.S. OOVs as well as 741 U.S. facilities that were not on U.S. declared sites. In addition, the drawdown of U.S. forces from Europe caused movements of people and equipment, much of which were not reportable under the CFE Treaty. This made it difficult to maintain a current list.

Major Richard J. O'Shea, first U.S. Liaison Officer.

OSIA inspectors inside bomb bay of B-52 bomber during mock START inspection.

Two NCOs assigned to the Plans Section--Technical Sergeant Ronald S. Fox, USAF, and Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Bradley, USAF--assisted Major O'Shea by designing and building a computer database nicknamed "Big Hog" to identify U.S. forces, declared sites, and POEs throughout Europe. The numerous locations made the list difficult to compile; the locations of classified programs made it impossible to complete. The JCS placed responsibility for the CFE liaison mission on OSIA; however, OSIA was not privy to ongoing classified programs. Consequently, the "working" list that Major O'Shea developed provided OSIA liaison teams the most reliable and current information available in Europe. It was clear, however, that U.S. teams could be called to protect U.S. interests, whatever they might be, at any place and at any time within the NATO states.²¹

Although the JCS guidance on the OSIA liaison mission spelled out what was to be accomplished, manpower to carry out that mission was not addressed. The JCS guidance required that a U.S. liaison team be available to the NATO states' escort team whenever Eastern inspectors arrived at a POE to conduct CFE inspections. Each U.S. liaison team would arrive ahead of the inspection team and remain available to the host escort team throughout the Eastern team's mission in case U.S. interests were involved. By October 1991, OSIA European Operations did not have sufficient manning to accomplish the liaison mission during baseline, and Major O'Shea remained the lone LNO assigned. Colonel Kelley turned to Headquarters to press for a solution. He indicated that 13 temporary duty two-person teams would be required during the 120-day baseline period. Kelley recommended 13 teams based on the inspection quotas of the U.S. and the NATO allies, travel time to all NATO POEs compared to notification times, and the assumption that the Eastern states would conduct all inspections available to them in Western Europe. He also pointed out that following the baseline period, OSIA would require four officers to carry out the continuing liaison mission; therefore, three additional officers should be assigned permanently. Colonel Kelley emphasized the importance of experience with life in Europe and a proficiency in a European language--German, French, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, Greek, or Portuguese (in that order)--when selecting officers for liaison duty.²²

The issue of who would supply the 13 temporary teams was not resolved until the summer of 1992. Headquarters and other OSIA locations had sufficient personnel to execute the CFE liaison mission. However, many of these people were preparing to implement other treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. When the issue of CFE liaison support arose, Headquarters personnel pointed to the possibility that these treaties might enter into force simultaneously, requiring a maximum effort from Headquarters to implement these other treaties. Outside OSIA, an increasingly smaller USAREUR also balked at providing teams for the 120-day temporary duty. In February 1992, Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director of OSIA, decided that unless START and CFE entered into force simultaneously, OSIA would provide the temporary liaison support. By June 1992, it became apparent that in the following month the CFE Treaty would enter into force, and it was equally clear that START, stranded in the ratification process, would not enter into force. The liaison teams would come from OSIA.²³

On each team, the temporary liaison team members, one officer and one enlisted, were knowledgeable and experienced in one of the other arms control treaties, but not the CFE Treaty. All would require training on the CFE Treaty and on the specific duties and responsibilities of a U.S. LNO. In addition to LNOs, two additional temporary teams for escort and reduction inspections would receive CFE Treaty training at the same time. Major O'Shea recommended that European Operations conduct the training at Rhein-Main so that students would be free of the distractions of Headquarters and home. At Rhein-Main the future team members could focus on their upcoming duties.

During the course Major O'Shea provided more than a third of the classroom treaty instruction and nearly all the liaison-specific instruction. Throughout the course he stressed activities expected to occur in Germany. Other treaty experts taught equipment familiarization and demonstrated an escort mission, while representatives of the German and the British verification agencies provided their agencies' perspectives on liaison operations. Three days after the CFE Liaison (7-11 July) and CFE Treaty (13-16 July) courses, half the graduates were in place throughout Europe awaiting Eastern inspection teams, while the rest returned to their duty sections. Midway through baseline, at the end of 60 days, the two groups would rotate positions.²⁴

Headquarters OSIA near Washington, D.C., was the primary source for liaison officers during CFE baseline.

The concentration of American and NATO forces in Central Europe dictated that the U.S. liaison mission focus on Germany. Conversely, the flanks or outlying areas, such as Portugal, held far fewer U.S. or NATO forces, would be subject to fewer Eastern inspections, and therefore would require fewer American LNOs. The primary consideration in team placement was response time. Six liaison teams in Germany could operate effectively from Rhein-Main to meet inspection teams in Germany, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece. Commercial airline schedules were not timely enough, and military airlift was too limited to support LNO missions that could be unpredictable and possibly frequent in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Spain, or Portugal. To satisfy the U.S government policy to have a liaison team available for each Eastern inspection team, two teams deployed to the United Kingdom while two teams traveled to Turkey, and one team deployed to Spain to stand by to carry out liaison operations. The single team in Madrid was also prepared to respond to an Eastern team in Portugal.

Luxembourg, Iceland, and France were exceptions for U.S. liaison operations. There were no U.S. forces in France, only six M47 tanks. In the unlikely event of an inspection of those tanks, the U.S. would forgo its right to be present at the inspection. Luxembourg and Iceland had no OOVs of their own, but there were U.S. OOVs and declared sites located on their territory. When an Eastern state announced its intent to inspect in one of these nations, an entire U.S. escort team would deploy because the inspection had to be on a U.S. declared site.²⁵