Chapter 1 -- The Treaty and the Mission

Liaison Officer Requirement

As a consequence of the Cold War, nations of the NATO and WTO alliances had stationed hundreds of thousands of their military personnel, weapons, and facilities on military sites throughout Europe. The United States, for instance, had nearly 325,000 U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel deployed throughout Europe in 1990. The Soviet Union had 17 army divisions and 363,700 military personnel stationed in East Germany and another 337,000 stationed on military bases in the other Central European countries. Under the CFE Treaty, nations that stationed conventional forces and equipment outside their own state, but within the ATTU, were considered "stationing states." Stationing state forces were subject to the provisions of the CFE Treaty and to inspection. The treaty recognized the sovereignty of a stationing state, authorizing it to escort CFE inspectors during an inspection of its forces. The treaty specifically required an inspecting state to notify the stationing state as well as the "host state" of an impending inspection. This notification gave the stationing state sufficient time to assemble and dispatch an escort team to the site, as a host state would if an inspection team had selected one of its declared sites for inspection. Under the CFE Treaty, the United States initially had 169 OOVs that were subject to declared site inspections.

A significant problem for the United States was that U.S. European forces, equipment, and facilities were located at more than 1,500 sites throughout Europe. Some of these sites contained sensitive or classified programs. Most of these programs were located on U.S. military sites, but a number had been placed on military bases or sites owned by the host state. Under early drafts of the treaty's inspection protocol, all U.S. stationed forces and facilities were subject to inspection. Here was a serious issue for the United States. In treaty negotiations, the United States supported the inclusion of a comprehensive, intrusive, on-site inspection regime for monitoring the treaty, but at the same time it recognized that it had to protect classified programs and facilities critical to combat readiness and military operations of the U.S. forces in Europe. To resolve this dilemma, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed a thorough review in early 1990. Out of that intensive evaluation, key American officials concluded that the existing, tabled inspection protocol had to be modified.³⁶

Sergeant First Class Gilbert Sierra, Jr. and David Carter document the reduction of ACVs.

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, and Major Henry T. Storey discuss the inspection with Russian escorts under a canopy of tank barrels in Maykop, Russia.

In early March 1990, the United States introduced a new NATO-endorsed inspection protocol. It provided procedures to deal with sensitive points, authorized the shrouding of non-TLE items, and inserted a two-meter access rule. This rule preserved the treaty right of the inspection team to observe, count, and record the CFE Treaty's TLE-tanks, artillery, APCs, fighters, and attack helicopters-without entering and inspecting every building, barracks, container, and shrouded object. Doors to buildings could be opened for visual inspection, but inspectors could enter only when the doors exceeded two meters. The two-meter rule also came into play when dealing with shrouded sensitive items or containers. If none of the width, length, height, or diameter measurements of a shrouded item or container exceeded two meters, the inspectors had no right to access because there was no TLE that measured less than two meters. These changes were discussed and approved by the treaty negotiators in the spring and summer months of 1990. They were incorporated into the final CFE Treaty's inspection protocol.³⁷

Another critical concept, the right of the inspected party to declare a "sensitive point," was part of the final treaty. Under this concept an inspected state could declare equipment, locations, or structures sensitive to its security. This declaration allowed the inspected state to delay, limit, or deny inspectors access to or overflight of the sensitive point. An inspected state could also shroud a sensitive piece of equipment while still providing an inspection team access to a facility. Although a state could declare a sensitive point, it also had to declare whether the sensitive point contained any TLE. If TLE was present, the escort team had to either display the equipment or take steps to satisfy the inspection team that only the declared amount and type of TLE was present.³⁸

A third, significant concept developed in the final stages of negotiations. As explained previously, the United States had military units and equipment that were not subject to the treaty but were located on host states' military bases and facilities. The United States wanted its trained, treaty-knowledgeable escort officers to be present at inspections in host states to protect American rights and interests. In addition, the United States had other forces and facilities that were not on a declared site of any state but that were still vulnerable to being inspected during challenge inspections of a host state area. Protecting U.S. rights in these situations was a major concern for the U.S. government. In the last few weeks of treaty negotiations, U.S. representatives developed a new provision that allowed for a liaison officer.

This concept required the stationing state party, prior to an inspection, to designate a liaison officer to serve on the host state's escort team. Liaison officers were to be available to represent their government during an inspection in case the inspection team came upon any of the stationing state's forces or facilities. Because the treaty protocols provided little guidance on how to carry out this liaison function, the United States negotiated bilateral agreements with the host states, outlining procedures for U.S. liaison and host escort officers during CFE Treaty inspections. These bilateral agreements varied from nation to nation, ranging from extensive interaction in Germany to minimal contact in other states. To reinforce the liaison officer provision, the treaty stipulated that a representative of a stationing state must be present for an inspection of any of its forces or facilities.

The CFE Treaty required nations to reduce their massive holdings of TLE across Europe.