Chapter 1 -- The Treaty and the Mission

Safety briefings were particularly important at sites with rough terrain, harsh climate, and aging facilities.

Upon arrival at a declared site, the inspected state's escort team ushered the inspection team to a briefing facility, where escorts presented a site diagram to the inspection team. The site diagram showed the perimeter of the declared site, the boundaries of all OOVs on the site, major buildings and roadways, entrances to the declared site, and the location of an administrative area designated for the inspection team's use. Within 30 minutes of receiving the site diagram, the inspection team had to declare the OOV they would be inspecting.

Once the team chief announced the OOV for inspection, the inspected party gave a preinspection site briefing that "should" not last more than one hour. This briefing was important because it could, and often did, set the tone for the entire inspection. Included in this briefing was information on local safety and administrative procedures, communications and transportation systems, and holdings and locations of all CAEST on the site, including CAEST in any common areas. A common area was any area on the site that was not a part of an OOV, such as a parade ground, administrative facilities, equipment parking areas, and training areas. If the amount of TLE briefed varied from the most recent notification given by the inspected state, the inspected party was to provide explanations for the differences. Explanations would include information on where the additional equipment came from, when it arrived, how long it would be there, and the location of any temporarily absent equipment. The time from notification to the beginning of the actual inspection could be as short as 44 hours: 36 hours' notification, 1 hour at the POE prior to the site declaration, 6 hours' minimum time to prepare the site, and the 1-hour preinspection briefing. For challenge inspections the timeline was similar, except that the inspected nation had two hours to decide if it would accept the inspection. In theory and in fact, these treaty-mandated timelines left very little time to move or conceal large quantities of military forces or equipment.

While the declared site and challenge inspections confirmed the presence or absence of TLE, the reduction inspection allowed states to monitor the reduction of TLE excess to the treaty limits. There were no quotas for reduction inspections because all reductions were open to inspection. There was no right of refusal. Each state scheduled and conducted its reductions in periods that lasted for at least 30 days, but no longer than 90 days. These announced calendar reporting periods were not accountable schedules; instead, they reflected the reduction goals of a state for that period. The notification of a calendar reporting period, given not less than 15 days before reductions began, included the reduction site, the equipment to be reduced, the OOVs that had possessed the hardware, the reduction methods to be employed, the point of entry for the inspection team, and the last day for viewing the equipment before the actual reduction started.

Russian team inspects severed main guns of American M-47 tanks at Buccino, Italy.

A site logbook recorded reduction activity during a calendar reporting period.

During a CFE reduction, inspectors had the right to remain on-site and watch the entire process throughout the announced reduction period, and three days beyond that if necessary. If two announced reduction periods were less than four days apart, inspectors could remain on-site through the following period also. While inspectors had a right to remain on-site for the duration, it was an impractical and unnecessary expense. Typically, an inspection team arrived at the site at the beginning of the reduction period and exercised the treaty right to record serial numbers or to place markings on the equipment announced for reduction. The team also checked equipment serial numbers against the numbers recorded in a site logbook maintained by the reducing state. The inspection team might then view reductions of one or two pieces of equipment. An inspector's interest, however, was in the final results. The technology or techniques employed to achieve those results were more concerns for Joint Consultative Group (JCG) delegates or negotiators. Usually, the inspection team departed the site, and at the end of the reduction period, that team or a different team returned to confirm that the reductions met treaty requirements. At that time, they compared equipment serial numbers, or the inspector-applied markings, on the reduced components against their own lists or against the site's reduction log.

The final inspection type, certification, was similar to reduction inspections in several ways. The certification inspection allowed nations to certify that multipurpose attack helicopters and combat-capable aircraft had been reconfigured into support helicopters and trainer aircraft. Inspectors had access to cockpits and could demand the removal of panels to confirm that certain treaty-designated offensive weapons systems were no longer present. This inspection protocol required at least a 15-day notification prior to the date that the reconfigured helicopters would be available for certification by the inspection teams. There was no right of refusal nor quotas for these certification inspections.