CHAPTER ONE: Pre-deployment
- The 1940s
The decade of the 1940s, from the surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941 to the Soviet Union's first atomic detonation
in 1949, set the stage for the formation of ARADCOM. Significant
refinements to air warfare and, concurrently, to air defense were
realized during the Second World War. Then, in the latter half
of the decade, the threat posed by the Soviet Union's aggressiveness
and its success with nuclear arms produced the Cold War. The United
States responded by deploying, over the following decades, a vast
air defense network to protect its population centers, industrial
base and strategic forces from air attack.
The primary event that led the United States into
World War II, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, left
an imprint on nearly every American. Many Americans believed the
attack resulted from a lack of strategic vigilance, and for decades
afterward, they sought to prevent a recurrence. The most immediate
reaction to the threat of air attack against the North American
continent came in the form of mobilized civilians who, during
World War II, volunteered to watch the skies over the United States.
One and a half million volunteers of the Ground Observer Corps
provided early warning in case enemy aircraft should attack. The
Ground Observer Corps, together with newly activated antiaircraft
units, fighter squadrons and radar sites, comprised all the major
components of the vast air defense network that would be developed
in the years to come.
During the war, the overseas battlefield became a
part of the larger weapons laboratory. As aircraft technology
improved, allowing planes to fly higher and faster, and new strategic
weapons of terror and mass destruction fell on England, concomitant
improvements were made to antiaircraft weaponry. Significant to
the history of ARADCOM was the introduction and improvement of
gun directors during the war. These gun directors linked the technologies
of rudimentary computers, range finders and radars. These devices
enabled antiaircraft batteries to destroy hostile aircraft, even
when those who operated the guns could not see their targets.
The directors provided a continuous stream of fire control data
that was transmitted electronically to the guns. These calculations
predicted a likely intercept point, if the target continued on
the same course. These combinations of guns, directors and radars
(plus the variable time [VT] fuse [see Chapter Two]) were most
effective against targets that could not maneuver, such as the
German V-I "Buzz Bomb."
However, when engaged, maneuverable targets would
dive, climb, turn, speed up, slow down or perform a combination
of moves. Since the shells fired from antiaircraft guns could
not maneuver, the logical next step was to find a projectile that
could.
Even before the end of the Second World War, major
research firms conducted feasibility studies to determine if ground-launched
guided missiles could intercept aircraft. Initially they used
the same fire control equipment perfected during the war. Another
event that would significantly impact on ARADCOM happened during
the last months of World War II, when Germany introduced the first
ballistic missile, the V-2.
The V-2 was a formidable weapon by any standard.
This 46-foot tall, l4-ton behemoth could travel from its launch
sites in Nazi-occupied Holland and impact in downtown London in
five minutes, reaching speeds of 3,500 miles per hour on the way.
Planning on countermeasures to the new ballistic-missile threat
started almost immediately. However, ARADCOM would never realize
a defense against ballistic missiles, even though it would be
heavily involved during the '60s and '70s in the study, development
and fielding of America's first and short-lived antiballistic
missile system.
The Soviet Threat
In the latter half of the 1940s, as America and the
rest of the world began to recover after the war, the portents
of yet another war loomed on the horizon. Communism expanded from
the Soviet Union westward into Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria,
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Berlin Blockade, which
the United States countered with the Berlin Airlift, was another
example of Soviet aggression. And in the Far East, the Communist
forces under Mao Tse-tung wrestled U.S.-backed nationalist forces
under Chaing Kai-shek for China.
The leader of the oldest communist nation, Joseph
Stalin, maintained that world peace was impossible under the capitalistic
development of world economy. The Soviets adhered to the Marxist
view that conflict between capitalism and communism was inevitable.
By the end of World War II, the Soviets had lost
millions of people and witnessed the virtual destruction of many
of their cities. But they had gained in the ability to wage modern
warfare through the acquisition and reproduction of modern weaponry
like the Tu-4 "Bull" bomber, a copy of the U.S. B-29;
the capture of German scientists, who would help them develop
atomic weapons and missiles; and the conduct of scientific and
industrial espionage. The impact on the United States would be
two fold: first, the Tu-4 gave the Soviets the capability to strike
the United States by flying over the North Pole, and second, once
they developed the atom bomb, they could visit massive destruction
on the United States with just a few sorties, as the United States
had done to Japan with its bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Nation
After World War II, most Americans were preoccupied
with cashing in on the postwar economic boom. For those whose
loved ones had fallen in battle, the sacrifices had been great,
but on the whole, the United States had emerged from the war in
much better shape than it had entered the war. Riding on the crest
of victory, most Americans considered the United States invulnerable
and were slow to respond to the ill-defined postwar threat. For
several years America had no defense at all from air attack. Not
until the threat became better defined would American citizens
deviate from their single-minded pursuit of prosperity and affluence.
The following passage from History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense - 1945-1955, prepared by the Braddock, Dunn and McDonald (BDM) Corporation for the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of Defense, describes America's post-World War II posture:
The postwar national strategy saw the United States
abandon its tradition of isolationism for collective security
through the United Nations and continued cooperation with its
war-time allies in the occupation of the lands of their former
enemies. It was generally accepted in 1955 that the key elements
of future U.S. strategy would be: (1) support for the United Nations
. . ., (2) forward deployment in both the Atlantic and Pacific,
(3) relatively strong Air and Naval forces in being, (4) continuation
of the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons..., (5) a small Regular
Army and (6) a large well-organized reserve of citizen soldiers.
This strategy fit the mood of the American people
at that time and, indeed, it is doubtful if any more militant
strategy could have been possible in face of the overwhelming
desire to buy the cars and build the houses and raise the families
that wartime conditions had precluded. There was a widespread
feeling among Americans that all enemies were defeated in World
War II, and that the prestige that American military might had
accrued in the war would deter any future enemies.
At the national level in the United States, the decision
makers were hardheaded realists who recognized that the overwhelming
concern of the American people was for their own economic and
domestic policies. President Harry Truman placed a budget ceiling
on the cost of the U.S. armed forces and adamantly refused to
raise it despite repeated requests from his key national security
advisors. He did not concern himself overmuch with the way the
military services divided up that budget or what they bought with
it, as long as they carried out the strategy and remained within
the austere budgetary limitations he imposed.
Due to the austere military budgets and reliance
on the mobilization system, there was little thinking or planning
for any future war except the "big war." Military planners
and leaders were oriented toward a major war in Europe. They expected
to employ strategic air power with nuclear weapons and project
mobilized U.S. military strength overseas to fight another total
war. It was not anticipated that the Soviet Union would develop
atomic weapons until 1952, 50 the postwar strategy was believed
to be valid for some years. U.S. military forces were not ready
for the events that occurred after 1947.
The Military
While the civilian population was content to return
to normalcy, military leaders looked at lessons learned from the
war as a guide for the future. Two major lessons were that a surprise
attack must not be allowed and that air defenses were effective
against air attacks.
One of the first orders of business after the war
was a detailed and highly publicized investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
Among the results of the investigation was the revelation that
radar had successfully detected the approach of the Japanese air
fleet, but that administrative failure and breakdown had negated
the value of that tactical warning. The principal lesson learned
was "don't be surprised!" National defense strategists,
as a result, worked under the assumption that World War III, like
World War II, would start with a surprise attack.
The study of World War II also concluded that, although
air attack could seriously damage the war-making infrastructure
of a country, as in the case of Japan, an effective air defense
could keep a country's capability intact, as demonstrated by Britain
and Germany. The British survived massed bomber attacks during
the Blitz and, later in the war, weathered Hitler's V-I and V-2
rockets while maintaining and improving their industrial capacity,
principally because Germany targeted Britain's population centers
rather than its industrial capacity.
British and American strategic bombers devastated
the German heartland during the great bomber offensives that served
as a prelude to the Allied invasion of the continent, but at a
very high cost to Allied aircrews. The German air defense of the
homeland contained some basic flaws, but by the end of 1944, was
the most formidable the world had ever seen. The German mix of
antiaircraft guns, interceptors and night fighters inflicted casualties
that approached unacceptable levels.
Surprisingly, postwar surveys revealed that Germany
actually increased production during 1944 and 1945, while its
industrial centers were under the massed attacks of the greatest
bomber forces ever assembled. The German air defense example left
the U.S. air defenders with the belief that it was possible to
organize an air defense system that could protect the industrial
base and inflict unacceptable losses on an attacking strategic
force.
The strategic air attack on Japan presented the "worst
case" example of just what can happen to a civilian population
and an industrial base when an effective air defense is absent.
Japan spent its air power far from the home islands. When U.S.
B-29s arrived in strength over the home islands, they were virtually
unopposed in the air. In fact, the leader of B-29 forces stated
that the air over Japan was safer than that over training bases
in the United States. The air defenders in the U. S. military
forces took the lesson of Japan to heart.
World War II, then, encouraged a belief in a global
war started by surprise attack and strongly implanted a relatively
new belief in the necessity of providing effective defenses for
the industrial base in the continental United States.
Those entrusted with national defense struggled with
many difficult decisions, not the least of which was the role
each service would play in peacetime. The Army Ground Forces and
the Army Air Forces battled over the ownership of antiaircraft
artillery (AAA). The Army Air Force argued that since it was responsible
for controlling the skies, any weapons used in aerial warfare
should belong to it, especially for command and control reasons
to prevent fratricide. The Ground Forces countered that antiaircraft
provided defense of ground targets from air strike and would therefore
be employed more effectively by those it was to protect. Antiaircraft
guns also had the additional capability of being used as field
artillery to support the ground forces. The Ground Forces had
spent more of its resources developing antiaircraft weaponry;
moreover, antiaircraft units were linked by lineage and tradition
to the old Coast Artillery branch, resulting in well-established
ties and loyalties to the Army's ground forces. Even after the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) rejected
the then newly-formed Air Force's demand for AAA at the Key West
Conference in March 1948, the debate lingered and continued into
the 1950s. It finally devolved into a control issue once it was
clear that the Army would retain AAA forces.
The military establishment worried about the growing
Soviet threat in the last half of the 1940s. The intercontinental
capability of the Bull bomber had a minor impact on U.S. air defense
strategy compared to the announcement in August 1949 that the
Soviets had detonated their first atomic bomb, three to four years
ahead of the schedule anticipated by U.S. defense planners. The
Bull and the bomb meant the Soviets now possessed the capability
of causing mass destruction within the United States.
In the years preceding this detonation, the national
leadership had taken some pro forma measures to defend
against air attack. In 1946, the Air Force formed the Air Defense
Command. Although it was initially overshadowed by the Strategic
Air Command (SAC) and the Tactical Air Command (TAC), it grew
in importance in proportion to the Soviet threat. However, it
did suffer at the hands of those SAC proponents who argued that
the best defense was a potent offense.
In mid-1948, an economic recession caused a budget
deficit of $2 billion. As the congressional purse strings tightened,
the Air Force concentrated on building up SAC at the expense of
the other missions. To make the best use of all air resources
in the continental United States (CONUS), rather than divide them
among several commands, the Continental Air Command (ConAC) was
established. ConAC received command of the six air forces formerly
assigned to Air Defense Command and TAC, the Air National Guard
and the Air Reserve. The Air National Guard's participation included
55 fighter squadrons flying P-51 Mustangs and P-47 Thunderbolts
and nine light bomber groups flying A-26 Invaders. ConAC also
actively pursued the establishment of an early warning system.
Army Air Defense
The Army's portion of continental air defense in
the late '40s consisted mostly of National Guard units. In 1948,
the National Guard was called upon to furnish 123 antiaircraft
battalions to be ready by 1952. The greatly expanded National
Guard AAA force, when fully organized, would have 809 separate
units with 77,822 men deployed throughout 27 states, Puerto Rico
and the District of Columbia.
By 1948, four states (Alabama, Maine, Rhode Island
and Texas) and the District of Columbia had organized all the
antiaircraft units allotted them. Throughout the country, there
were a total of 534 federally recognized antiaircraft units, or
66 percent of the 809 units in the entire troop base. They had
an aggregate strength of more than 21,000 men, or 27 percent of
their ultimate projected strength.
Project NIKE
Fortunately, back in 1945, the Army's Ordnance Corps
had asked Bell Telephone Laboratories to study the likelihood
of developing an antiaircraft system incorporating guided missiles.
Since Bell Labs had produced the gun directors and radars that
were so successful during the war, they naturally capitalized
on that knowledge for Project NIKE.
On May 14, 1945, representatives of the Bell Telephone
Labs gave a verbal report on the results of their study of a new
AAA system that "envisioned development of a 1,000-pound
guided missile, 19 feet long and 16 inches in diameter, with an
effective range of 20,000 yards and an effective altitude of 60,000
feet. It was to be powered with an acid-aniline, liquid fuel rocket
motor and was to attain a maximum velocity of 23,000 feet per
second at the end of burning. The control system was to contain
two radars - one tracking the target and the other tracking the
air defense missile - and a computer for comparing the data from
the radars." Amazingly, given the new technologies that would
have to emerge, the NIKE AJAX system fielded just eight years
later closely resembled this initial study.
Bell Lab's History of Engineering and Science explained their engineering approach to this project:
…development should not await the results of
research projects that were still in a stage of uncertain success,
such as those on ramjet engines, radically new fuels, and drastically
flew guidance or homing techniques. Another axiom of the system
design philosophy was that the expendable projectile should be
as simple and inexpensive as possible, leaving the more complex
and more expensive equipment on the ground.
Thus, the development of the many new or improved
technologies required in rocketry, guidance and control would
not use the building-block approach, perfecting one stage before
going on to another. Rather, developers would work along parallel
tracks, betting on each research field to come up with solutions
to problems prior to integration of the entire system. This approach
paid off in 1950 when the nation called upon the Army to protect
vital areas in the United States from air attack. The Army needed
only three years to deploy a NIKE missile system.
Summary
A passage from History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense -1945-1955, prepared by the BMD Corporation for the Office, Chief of Military History, Department of Defense, summarizes the events of this decade:
The period from the end of World War II until the
outbreak of the Korean War saw the development of the Cold War
with Russia, which split the world into two hostile groups. The
United States concentrated on the development of its economy and
its monopoly of the atomic weapon at the expense of conventional
military strength. However, even with the scare effect of the
Russian atomic bomb, it is doubtful if the American public would
have supported the increased taxes and spending that such an increase
would demand. That public reluctance was significantly reduced
after the Communists committed open aggression against South Korea.
The Korean War provided the event that U.S. national leaders needed
to raise U.S. armaments to the level that the world situation
required.
The children of the Baby Boom were not, as their
fathers who defeated Germany and Japan had imagined, destined
to grow up in a non-threatening world. At home, their parents
built backyard bomb shelters they would later convert into fallout
shelters. During air raid drills, schoolchildren left their classrooms
to huddle in darkened hallways. Announcements that "This
station is about to conduct a test of the National Early Warning
Broadcast System" interrupted the innocent melodies of the
"Hit Parade." The Cold War had arrived, bringing with
it the threat of undreamed horrors. It was to last nearly half
a century, and for the greater part of the struggle, antiaircraft
artillery men were to serve as front-line soldiers.
Chapter One