INTRODUCTION

The world has changed with the demise of the Cold War. It has gone from a bipolar world that was dominated by two strategic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to a unipolar world that is dominated by the United States. Nineteen-eighty-nine saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event that strategic analysts did not foresee. This event went uncontested by the Soviet Union and other communist block countries. During this period and afterwards, relations between the two super powers became more cordial. The Soviet Union found it more and more difficult to maintain its status as a world strategic power, particularly when compared to the United States and the western nations.

The August 1991 coup attempt to overthrow the Soviet government and return the country back on the path of communism was ruthlessly put down by Gorbachev who capitalized on this event and spiraled the country on a democratic path. Perestroika, which refers to national rebuilding as it relates to a free economy, became the flavour of the day. Foreign countries saw the ex-Warsaw Pact economies, and specifically that of Russia, ripe for investment as they believed the only direction the economy could go was up.

Time has revealed a different story. Russia is in serious economic strife, and without serious financial aid this could lead to devastating results. Westerners underestimate the extent to which organized crime and corruption have hampered Russian political and economic reforms.[1] The populace and the military are becoming more and more disgruntled since all the promises that a capitalist society offered have not come to fruition. In addition, the military is facing serious rust-out of their equipment, and is facing a significant leadership challenge. All of these phenomenons affect Russia's strategic policies, as the people in power struggle to hold the government together.

Russian national strategy can be defined as the application of national resources to achieve national objectives. More specific to Russia, this would include political and diplomatic (including foreign policy), economic, and military policies.[2]

This paper will establish that Russia's current instability and national strategy pose a threat to Canada's security even though the Cold War is over. To achieve this goal, this paper will first look at Canada's security agenda and foreign policy goals. To understand Russia, one must first look at the cold war era and the events that have lead Russia to its current situation. This paper will then look at Russia's current strategic policies, specifically foreign, political, economic, and military. All of these policies are intertwined, and one cannot be reviewed without looking at the others. It will then be advocated that these policies pose a significant threat to Canada's security.

CANADA'S SECURITY CONCERNS

"The security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental."[3] These five domains operate together and are a way of ordering priorities in society. Canada's national security is a product of both domestic and international concerns.[4] The end of the Cold War and increases in regional tensions and conflicts have contributed to a rise in problems on an overall international level. "Canada, a charter member of the Atlantic Alliance, has long been an advocate and practitioner of an internationalist security policy, focusing on the peace and stability of the international environment as the prime guarantor of Canadian security."[5] For Canada, ensuring domestic security through international involvement is the cornerstone on which our security and foreign policies have been built. New security considerations include environmental concerns, mass migration, resource scarcity, societal security (human rights), and economic liberty. Societal security concerns the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.[6] As the moral superpower, it is perceived by Canadians that all countries of the world should have these same views, which is not always the case. Environmental security is concerned with the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all human enterprises depend.[7] Simply stated, security is about the pursuit of freedom from threat to any of these sectors. Any national or global threat to these sectors can be construed to be a threat to Canada.

COLD WAR ERA - HOW RUSSIA GOT TO WHERE IT IS TODAY

Recently, Russia and other Soviet satellites have opened their archives for research. The Soviet empire is now construed by some scholars to have been not as dark and dreary as it once seemed. The cold war was not a simple case of Soviet expansionism and American reaction. Ideology played an important role in shaping their perceptions, but Soviet leaders were not focused on promoting worldwide revolution. They were concerned mostly with configurations of power, with protecting their country's immediate periphery, ensuring its security, and preserving their rule. Governing a land devastated by two world wars, they feared a resurgence of German and Japanese strength. They felt threatened by a United States that alone among the combatants of WW II emerged from the war wealthier and armed with the atomic bomb.[8]

Soviet officials did not have preconceived plans to make eastern Europe communist, to support Chinese communism, or to wage a war in Korea. Soviet satellites could and did act in pursuit of their own interests, sometimes goading the Kremlin into involvement it did not want. United States' words and deeds greatly heightened ambient anxieties and subsequently contributed to the arms race and the expansion of the cold war into the third world. This attitude is what led the USSR's foreign policy - a bipolar world, a desire to balance the power of the Americans and to capitalize on their anticipated rivalries. Though some leaders of the Soviet Union had grand expansionist ideals, the terrible devastation of the USSR had always limited ambitions after WW II, as did the existence of the American atomic monopoly. Geopolitical considerations and perceptions of a threat shaped the eventual destruction of the sovereignty of Russia's neighbours.[9]

The Kremlin could never gain the respect and security to which it was entitled unless it convinced the Americans of the Soviet Union's power.[10] These attitudes contributed greatly to the spiraling arms race with the United States. During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Soviet leaders might have liked to stabilize the relationship and curtail the competition with the west, but the perceived threat emanating from the United States held them back.[11] This spiraling arms race and the inability of the Soviet Union to keep up with western technology aided in the downfall and disintegration of the Soviet Union.[12]

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

Soviet foreign policy was abruptly disrupted after the August 1991 coup attempt that resulted in the return of the Russian state. Those events had enormous impact on foreign policy in denunciation of communist ideology, economic restructuring in Russia, and the independence of the former republics.[13]

After the coup attempt in 1991, three main schools in Russian foreign policy thinking developed - liberal westernisers who favoured a market economy and held pro-western views; fundamental nationalists, who combined extreme nationalism with antipathy towards economic reform; and pragmatic nationalists, who sought to develop Russian foreign polices on the basis of nation interests while recognizing that those interests often differed and could even oppose the interests of western countries.[14] The current Russian hierarchy prefers to follow the third approach, while all three are still evident throughout the political structure.

It has been said that stability in Russia is tied to the heart beat of Yeltsin.[15] In December 1997, President Yeltsin was admitted to a Russian Sanitarium outside Moscow for what was described as a viral infection. President Yeltsin is renowned for his affliction for alcohol and a weak heart. Every time he is admitted to hospital or is not seen in public for a while, there is speculation that his opponents in the government will try to overthrow him in his time of weakness. Again during the week of 12 to 16 January 1998, Yeltsin was admitted to hospital for rest. It could be argued that Yeltsin is deemed to be the glue that holds his government together, and which prevents the fundamental nationalists from gaining power.

In the seven years that Boris Yeltsin has dominated Russian politics, he has crushed challenges from Mikhail Gorbachev, from his vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi, from the nationalist Valdimir Zhirinovsky, and from the reformed communist Gennady Zyuganov. The political achievement has been formidable, but there will eventually be a post-Yeltsin era, and already its likely leaders can be discerned.[16] As late as 23 March 1998, Yeltsin fired his entire cabinet and government in an effort to maintain power and maintain the country's path of economic reform. Political analysts said the dramatic move seemed aimed at least partly at demonstrating that Yeltsin, dogged for years by heart problems and other health scares, was firmly in control.[17] This has thrown the contest to succeed Yeltsin wide open when his term expires in the year 2000, destroying the assumption that one of his recently fired cabinet ministers would replace him.[18]

Russia's foreign policy is active in three main arenas. First, Russian foreign policy strives to keep Russia a great power and to protect Russians and their financial interests in the 'near abroad' (Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia).[19] To physically project power beyond this point unilaterally would be difficult to achieve at this time with the poor state of the economy within the country. The influence to achieve growth in industrial trade has become crucial and overrides any influence the military had in the past. Linked to the growth in industrial trade is the sale of surplus weapon systems which is seen as one main influx of foreign currency, and helps retain jobs in Russia's major military-industrial base. New to the development of foreign policy has been the influence of public opinion which now has become a factor in directing policy both at home and in the 'near abroad.'[20] This was one of the key factors that lead to the pullout of Chechnya.

Secondly, Russian foreign policy is concerned with the expansion of NATO. The Strategic Studies Institute believes that there is a consensus among officials in the Russian defense ministry and foreign ministry that Russia should oppose NATO expansion, unless given a veto over actions that would affect Russia in central or eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[21] Russia views NATO expansion as a threat on its boarders, which once lead to the westward expansion of the old Soviet regime in the 1950s and 60s.

Finally, Russia is seen establishing closer ties with China as part of their opposition to what China and Russia are calling "U.S. unipolarity." Neither country can compete independently, but may fare a chance if they combine resources.[22] This foreign policy move is aimed towards both economic growth and the re-establishment of Russia as a global influence.

HOW RUSSIA'S FOREIGN AND POLITICAL POLICIES THREATEN CANADA'S SECURITY

It is advocated that Russian foreign policy posses a threat to Canada's security in four main ways. First, Simon Dalby argues that Canada's foreign policy is about Canadian values which includes the consideration of environmental consequences. He states that the planet is too small for the kind of high energy consumption lifestyle lived by Canadians, thus we must reduce and consider the prospect of an authoritarian response to any threat to our lifestyle or to any other nation that poses a threat to the world ecosystem. In addition, the world will be faced with a renewable resource scarcity in the future, to which Canada will be looked upon as resource rich nation.[23] Russia, as it tries to create a new industrial base on which to build a new economy, has no environmental laws on which to prevent destruction of its and the world's environment. For example, its nuclear submarine fleet is decaying and creating a severe environmental hazard in the North Sea, yet Russia is doing nothing about this environmental disaster. Any environmental threat to the world poses a threat to Canadian beliefs and values.

Second, Russia's opposition to the expansion of NATO could lead to an accelerated modernization of its military to counter this threat. This could lead to even closer ties between Russia and China, raising them to a status as major threats to the western world. The western world, including Canada, having reaped the "peace dividend" have downsized considerably. Canada may now be in a position that it could not react fast enough as part of a coalition to a new Russian threat, or even worse, a joint Russian/Chinese threat.

The third major threat from Russia's foreign policy is that in search of foreign currency, they are contributing to the proliferation of weapons around the world. They appear willing to sell any and all technology. This does not bode well with Canada's vision of world stability and Canada's participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR, even though not a formal treaty, is intended to limit exports of missiles and related technologies. Being a party to the MTCR complements and strengthens Canada's commitment to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[24]

Finally, President Yeltsin cannot be expected to stay in power forever. There are those in his government, especially the fundamental nationalists, who would love to move the country back to the old communist system. As economic reform fails to produce any dividends, the support for these hard liners will continue to grow. If they obtain power, Canada would be facing the same threat as during the Cold War.

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY

At the end of the cold war, Russia realized that it could not survive solely on its military industrial base. It has tried to switch to a capitalistic economic structure based on its natural resources, and less on its military influence. This has not prevented Russia from selling its stockpile of weaponry for hard currency. It has relied on a policy of economic and diplomatic competition for business opportunities, vying with the United States' multinationals that have invested heavily in Russia and its former satellites. Russians see investment in Russia as favorable, but foreign investment in the oil rich regions in the Caucuses and central Asia, such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, is seen as competition. As it vies for natural resources, Russia has ceased its divide and conquer campaigns in the 'near abroad' in favour of brokered peace deals to end the conflicts. Another reason for peacemaking in this region is the requirement to reopen trade routes through the Caucuses that were formerly blocked by fighting.[25]

Suzanne Birgerson, a noted American strategic analyst, believes the evolution of Russian economic policy will seek to expand trade with the 'mini dragons' of southeast Asia whose economies are among the most dynamic in the world, or at least were. By expanding economic relations with the ASEAN states, Russia hopes to attract ASEAN investment in the Russian far east, thereby reducing their reliance on the West.[26]

Even with these noble attempts at directing economic strategy towards capitalism, and large influxes of money from the United States, the economic crisis is deepening across Russia. Some 25% of the population in Russia is living below the bare subsistence level. The economic strategy has left the monetary system is in disarray with firms increasingly resorting to barter and payments in kind to each other and to their workers. In several provinces, there are reports of famine.[27] Any uprising could spread like a wild fire and lead to the possible overthrow of the government. This would definitely lead to instability in Asia and concern over who would be in control, especially of Russian nuclear weapons.

The black-market and racketeering have become kings of the economy. Organized crime controlled as much as 40 percent of the turnover of goods and services by 1993, and it is speculated that this figure has grown since.[28] This organized crime wave is the most explosive force to emerge from the wreckage of Soviet communism. Stephen Handelman in his article "The Russian Mafiya" believes that Russia's crime syndicates constitute a serious threat to post-Soviet democracy.[29] He has interviewed numerous high level government officials and members of the Mafiya and has determined that what makes the Russian Mafiya distinctively menacing is its connection to key sections of the government bureaucracy.[30] No criminal organization of the complexity of that in Russia could succeed without the support and encouragement of government officials at every level.[31] "Russian authorities readily acknowledge that the mixture of unbridled capitalism, organized crime and official chicanery has produced a crisis of governance... He [Boris Yeltsin] complained it [the Russian mob] was destroying the economy, destablizing the political climate and undermining public morale...Russian policy makers committed a fundamental mistake: they tried to develop a free market before constructing a civil society in which such a market could safely operate."[32] In 1993 alone, forty-six military generals were to be court-martialed on corruption charges related to dealing with the Mafiya in the smuggling of weapons and sale of military equipment.[33] The question is - who are they selling these weapons and equipment to?

Shortages of currency recently lead the governor of the city of Ekaterinburg, a major industrial city in the central Urals, to issue a local script called the 'Ural franc'. This move was to meet the demand for money. There are reports that similar issues of scripts may occur in other regions of the country.[34] According to the Strategic Studies Institute in the United States, as the economy continues to decline the government has neither a strategy nor the capital needed to recover and grow.[35] Without a large influx of foreign aid, currency, major investment projects, capital programs, and a crack down on the far east Russian Mafiya, the future looks bleak and the economy may not recover.

HOW RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY THREATENS CANADA'S SECURITY

Russia's economic strategy threatens Canada's security in four ways. First, as perceived by Alvin and Heidi Toffler in their book War and Antiwar, the world is being trisected, divided into three types of nations. The First Wave sector supplies agricultural and mineral resources. The Second Wave sector provides cheap labour and does mass production. Third Wave nations rise to dominance based on the ways in which they exploit technology and knowledge. They foresee that this trisected world could trigger deep power struggles as each country tries to position itself within this three tiered structure. The Third Wave nations, such as Canada, sell information, innovations, management, culture, advanced technology, software, education, training, medical care, and financial and other services to the other nations of the world.[36] It could be argued that Russia would be classified as a Second Wave nation, providing cheap labour and mass production as they drive towards becoming an industrial nation. As they struggle to become a Third Wave nation, they may well become more and more frustrated eventually leading to clashes between themselves and those nations already established in the Third Wave. This would then pit Russia against the western nations, which includes Canada. In other words, the 'haves' versus the 'have nots.'

Secondly, the end of the Cold War and the reduction in the military security threat has allowed the West the luxury of addressing other non-traditional security threats such as transnational crime. "Transnational crime includes any form of activity undertaken across borders that is considered illegal by at least one of the countries in which it takes place."[37] The circumstances of the rapid fall of communism have favoured a spectacular increase in criminal entrepreneurship in former communist countries such as Russia. The Russian Mafiya are now active in North America, including Canada. The Russian Mafiya is highly sophisticated and involved in complex fraud and other paper crimes. This transnational crime is a security risk to Canada. It poses a threat to our environment as organized crime is used to dispose of industrial waste; it contributes to the proliferation of weapons sold around the world on the black market; it is a social-cultural threat as it creates deviant subcultures and ghettos that accelerate urban decay and class divisions; and it is an economic threat as businesses controlled by the Mafiya derive unfair competitive advantages through illegal means such as money laundering, extortion, fraud, industrial espionage and other commercial crimes.[38]

Thirdly, Russia competing with the United States in the Caucuses for oil could lead to a potential conflict. It could be argued that if the United States is threatened, Canada could be drawn into the conflict as a coalition partner with the United States.

Finally, without foreign investment, such as that which could be provided by the western nations to boost up the failing Russian economic strategy, there is a chance of a complete economic collapse. This would lead to a major instability in the region. This instability would easily spread and we could see the resurrection of the old Soviet Regime controlled by the military. Canada, being a member of the Atlantic Alliance, would be drawn into the conflict if it spreads to eastern Europe.

RUSSIA'S MILITARY STRATEGY

Russian forces have been reduced as part of the partition of the armed forces among the republics of the former Soviet Union, but Russia remains one of the world's leading military powers. Russian military strategy has lead to a reduction in the numbers of troops and weapons due to unilateral cutbacks, in accordance with treaties signed between Russia and the United States, and as a result of economic reality. Russia is still formidable in its military might. It is second only to the United States in nuclear weapons, and still has an active duty strength of its military of 1.4 million. Russian military strategists are faced with trading-off the reduction of their armed forces to the chaos that would be caused by an increase number of unemployed soldiers that would result from a force reduction program. The soldiers may not get paid regularly, but at least they are housed and fed, and there is some control over them.

Russian military strategy has been weak in addressing equipment concerns. The condition of first line equipment is good, but some weapon platforms such as their nuclear submarine fleet is literally rusting out. In addition, the question of accountability and control of all their nuclear warheads has raised concern in the United States.[39] This issue poses a significant threat to the world.

Michael Croft, in his article on Russian Peacekeeping Policy, Part II, sees Russian involvement in peacekeeping as necessary to continue to maintain any influence and prestige in the international community as a democratic and responsible member; its interventions in the 'near abroad' must be supported as a conceptual, legal and practical framework.[40] Russian leaders view participation in international peacekeeping as a primary element of both foreign policy and national security policy.[41] The Russian military genuinely seems to want the United States and other western nations to perceive its 'near abroad' peacekeeping activities as legitimate actions for the defence of Russian security and not as a pretext for rebuilding an empire.[42] Russia holds its participation in international peacekeeping at such a high level that it paid its $48 million United Nations annual dues in 1996 even though its domestic economic house was in shambles.[43]

Russian military strategy has been slow in addressing two critical issues facing the military. The first is the issue of readiness, and the second is the issue of command and control. The Strategic Studies Institute reports that in discussion with the Russian Defence Minister, General Igor Rodionov, not one regiment in the Russian army is combat ready. Further, there is a crisis in command and control of the military. They foresee a possible takeover of the government by the Russian military at some time in the next decade and possibly sooner as a result of the shaky government.[44]

During his address to the U.S. Army War College in April 1997, Dr Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chair of the Defense Committee of the Russian Duma, stated that the political and economic reform had largely failed, and that we could reasonably fear further turmoil in the Russian economy and accompanying political and military structures.[45] The lack of political control has produced confusion and mismanagement, complicating the much needed military reform efforts. In the absence of a consistent security policy or budgetary guidance from above, military reform has been implemented by adapting traditional military institutions, concepts, and functions, but without the required guidance and funding, chaos has been fostered. Dr. Arbatov states that the military is drifting towards an organization that is "large, technologically backward, and supported by a few hundred vulnerable nuclear weapons linked to an inadequate C3I systems. These forces would be lacking in mobility and, quite possibly, poorly trained... Russia's armed forces would not be capable of defending the nation from external threats. They may, indeed, become a major threat to Russia's own internal security and stability."[46]

HOW RUSSIA'S MILITARY STRATEGY THREATENS CANADA'S SECURITY

The Russian military strategy posses numerous threats to Canada's security. The first and most dangerous threat is the stability of those who control Russia's nuclear weapons, and how control is maintained. As discussed during the documentary On the Brink of Doomsday, shown on the Learning Channel on 12 April 1998, there have been some nuclear weapon close calls. As late as 1995, the Russian chain of command misinterpreted a launch of a Norwegian weather satellite fitted with an American rocket booster. The Russian Strategic Air Defence was not informed of this launch. From all indications provided by the Russian air defence computers, this was a United States submarine launched nuclear missile. President Yeltsin, even though stated to be inebriated at the time, waited longer than the prescribed six minutes required to ensure success of his counter-strike, during which time confirmation was made that this was actually the launch of a weather satellite.[47] This one incident demonstrates that the control and stability of those who launch Russian nuclear weapons pose a definite threat to Canada's security. In addition, the unaccountability of Russia's nuclear warheads leads to the question whether extremist groups in Russia and abroad may be able to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

Secondly, the Russian peacekeeping efforts on its southern border may once again lead Russian forces into protracted, inconclusive, unpopular and costly conflicts. If these wars spread, Russian analysts believe they could ignite a general anti-Russian uprising that could easily spread throughout the region leading to the instability of the country.[48] The ensuing chaos could result in a return to the Cold War scenario, and would see Canada involved in military operations as part of the Atlantic Alliance as the conflict spreads into eastern Europe.

Finally is the issue of whether or not Canada has downsized its military too far, thus leaving itself unable to adequately protect its interests. Russia's military is large, and if pushed to taking over the political structure due to economic or other reasons discussed previously, Canada will be facing the same threat as during the Cold War. Yet again, Canada would be in a position where it could not adequately defend its interests or be an effective partner in a coalition. The floods in Quebec and Manitoba and the ice storms of 1998 highlighted one of the Canadian Forces' most essential roles: protecting the lives and property of Canadians in times of crisis. But as iterated by the current Chief of Defence Staff, General Baril, during his January 1998 speech to the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, in the post-cold war world without rival superpowers, major conflict is still a very real and very dangerous reality. He also pointed out that the uncertain security muddle that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union underlined the need for real combat establishments just as critics were calling for their end; therefore, the Canadian Forces will maintain a multi-purpose, combat capable forces that will fight with coalition partners in any future conflict. The Canadian Forces will protect Canada's sovereignty, secure global interests, and cooperate with friends and allies in maintaining a stable, peaceful international system.[49] It is questionable that Canada would be able to participate as a credible member of the Atlantic Alliance if a Cold War scenario was re-established, due to our reduced combat capability. Ensuring Canada's domestic security through international involvement, which as previously discussed is the cornerstone on which our security policy has been built, would be compromised due to our small size.

CONCLUSION

Russia has come a long way since the demise of the Soviet Union. Russian efforts at re-integration of Russia into the world community as a major power will continue. This will continue even with the domestic economic problems within its borders, as long as President Yeltsin can hold onto power.

Russia's economic strategy threatens Canada's security through the spread of transnational crime, the proliferation of weapons, and the frustration that it will face as it moves from a second wave nation to a third wave nation, thus leading to possible clashes with the West. The expansion of the Russian Mafiya into Canada threatens the Canadian social-cultural way of life. The proliferation of weapons sold by this crime organization around the world disrupts Canada's view of world stability. Russia is now vying with United States multinationals in the 'near abroad' causing a major contention over the oil in the region. If Russia sees this oil and other resources as critical to its survival, it would lead to heavy tension with the United States. Any conflict in this region between Russia and the United States could possibly involve Canada as a United States coalition partner. Without foreign investment into Russia, there is a real threat of economic collapse within Russia. This would lead to instability in the region and the resurrection of the old Soviet Regime controlled by the military.

Foreign policy will be more directed towards trade than to military meddling outside its borders. As Russia tries to create a new industrial base on which to build its economy, it has no environmental laws on which to prevent destruction of its and the world environment. This environmental threat poses a threat to Canadian beliefs and values. Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO will continue and may lead to an accelerated modernization of its military to counter any threat from the west. This would likely lead to even closer ties between Russia and China, as they try to counter the 'unipolarity' of the United States. Western nations, including Canada, would be hard pressed to counter this threat due to the downsizing of there militaries as part of the 'peace dividend.'

The Russian military is still large, but facing a deterioration in the state of its equipment, and a crisis in command and control. The control and accountability of Russian nuclear weapons should be of major concern to the world. Russian peacekeeping efforts in its 'near abroad' could lead to Russia becoming involved in another protracted war causing major instability in the region. This could spread, drawing Canada into the conflict as a member of the Atlantic Alliance. If Russia's military is forced to take over the political structure as predicted by the Strategic Studies Institute, then Canada will be facing the same threat as during the Cold War.

Canada has downsized its military and has gone to a multi-purpose configuration. Is this new force structure still combat capable? As pointed out by General Baril, major conflict is still a very real and very dangerous reality. It is advocated that Russia's current strategic policies, specifically its foreign, political, economic and military policies, pose a significant threat to Canada's security.

Notes

     ¹Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafiya," Foreign Affairs, Vol 73, (Mar/Apr 1994), p 87. [ return ]

     ²Department of National Defence, SS/NSP/J/NSP/GEN/D-2 Notes on Definitions: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997). [ return ]

     ³Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (2nd ed; Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p 19. [ return ]

     ⁴Alex Morrison and Kevin A. O"Brien, NATO and Europe: How Relevant to Canadian Security?, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Publications, 1994, p. 10. [ return ]

     ⁵Ibid, p. 9. [ return ]

     ⁶Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post- Cold War Era, p 19. [ return ]

     ⁷Ibid, p 20. [ return ]

     ⁸Melvyn P. Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened," Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, (Jul/Aug 1996), p 121. [ return ]

     ⁹Ibid, p 125. [ return ]

     ¹⁰Ibid, p 126. [ return ]

     ¹¹Ibid, p 130. [ return ]

     ¹²Aleksandr G. Savelyev and Nikolay N. Detinov, ed. Gregory Varhall and trans. Dmitriy Trenin, The Big Five: ArmsControl Decision Making in the Soviet Union (Westport: Praeger, 1995), p 3. [ return ]

     ¹³Susanne Birgerson, "The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Russian Foreign Policy," Asian Affairs, An American Review, Vol 23, (Winter 1997), p 223. [ return ]

     ¹⁴Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p 356. [ return ]

     ¹⁵CBC News, 6 p.m. edition, 10 Dec 97. [ return ]

     ¹⁶Martin Walker, "Russian Leaders: The Next Generation," Europe, (March, 1997), p 12. [ return ]

     ¹⁷Mark Trevelyan, "Talks Set On Naming New Russian Government," TIME Daily, 24 March 1998, p 2. [ return ]

     ¹⁸Ibid, p 2. [ return ]

     ¹⁹Steve Marks, "The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly, Vol 112 (New York: Spring 1997), p 144. [ return ]

     ²⁰Ibid, p 145. [ return ]

     ²¹Stephen J. Blank, "Russia," World View: the 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute, (February 3, 1997), p 31. [ return ]

     ²²Ibid, p 31. [ return ]

     ²³Simon Dalby, "Canadian National Security and Global Environmental Change," Canada and the World: Non-Traditional Security Threats, (Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Publications, 1997), pp 21 -38. [ return ]

     ²⁴Jane Boulden and Davic Cox, "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," The Guide to Canadian Policy on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1992. [ return ]

     ²⁵Steve Liesman and Hugh Pope, "Conflict Cool in Former Soviet Regions, Raising Hopes - Moscow reduces Meddling, Enhancing Opportunities for Investment," Wall Street Journal (New York: Oct 22, 1997), p 1. [ return ]

     ²⁶Susanne Birgerson, "The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Russian Foreign Policy," Asian Affairs, An American Review, Vol 23, (Winter 1997), p 226. [ return ]

     ²⁷Blank, "Russia," World View: the 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute, p 29. [ return ]

     ²⁸Stephen Handelman, "The Russian Mafiya," Foreign Affairs, Vol 73, Mar/Apr 1994, p 83. [ return ]

     ²⁹Ibid, p 83. [ return ]

     ³⁰"Mafiya" is spelled in the Russian format to differentiate it from its Italian counterpart. There are no direct links to the Russian and Italian Mafias. [ return ]

     ³¹Handelman, "The Russian Mafiya," Foreign Affairs, p 84. [ return ]

     ³²Ibid, p 87. [ return ]

     ³³Ibid, p 89. [ return ]

     ³⁴Blank, "Russia," World View: the 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute, p 31. [ return ]

     ³⁵Ibid, p 29. [ return ]

     ³⁶Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 1993), p 22. [ return ]

     ³⁷Jean-Francois Rioux, "Transnational Organized Crime: A National Security Threat?," Canada and the World: Non-Traditional Security Threats, (Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Publications, 1997), p 58. [ return ]

     ³⁸Ibid, pp. 59 -66. [ return ]

     ³⁹Janne E. Nolan, "The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: Its Past, Its Future," The Brookings Review, (Spring 1994), p 32. [ return ]

     ⁴⁰Michael Croft, "Russia"s Peacekeeping Policy, Part II: Differences in Approach and Obstacles", Peacekeeping & International Relations, Vol 25 (Sep/Oct 1996), p 5. [ return ]

     ⁴¹Ibid, p 5. [ return ]

     ⁴²Benjamin S. Lameth, "Russia"s Wounded Military," Foreign Affairs, (Vol 74, No. 2: 1995), p 95. [ return ]

     ⁴³Croft, "Russia"s Peacekeeping Policy, Part II: Differences in Approach and Obstacles", Peacekeeping & International Relations, p 7. [ return ]

     ⁴⁴Blank, "Russia," World View: the 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute, pp 29 - 33. [ return ]

     ⁴⁵Alexei G. Arbatov, "The Russian Military in the 21st Century," Monograph prepared for the U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, (April 1997), p iii. [ return ]

     ⁴⁶Ibid, p 11. [ return ]

     ⁴⁷"On the Brink of Doomsday," The Learning Channel, aired Sunday 12 April, 1998. [ return ]

     ⁴⁸Anatoly Bolyatko, Major General (Retired), Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Two Views, (Strategic Studies Institute, May 1996), p 27. [ return ]

     ⁴⁹Maurice Baril, General, The Future of the Canadian Forces in the Post-cold War Era, Presentation to the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, January 30, 1998. [ return ]

Bibliography

Books

Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd ed. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.

Malcolm, Neil; Pravda, Alex; Allison, Roy; and Light, Margot. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Savelyev, Aleksandr G. and Detinov, Nikolay N. The Big Five: ArmsControl Decision Making in the Soviet Union. Edited by Gregory Varhall and translated by Dmitriy Trenin. Westport: Praeger, 1995.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-war: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. Toronto: Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 1993.

Articles in Journals and Magazines

Arbatov, Alexei G. "The Russian Military in the 21st Century." Monograph prepared for the U.S. Army War College Annual Strategy Conference, (April 1997).

Birgerson, Susanne. "The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Russian Foreign Policy." Asian Affairs, An American Review, Vol 23, (Winter 1997).

Blank, Stephen J. "Russia," World View: the 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute. Strategic Studies Institute Publication (February 3, 1997).

Bolyatko, Anatoly, Major General (Retired). Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Two Views, (Strategic Studies Institute, May 1996).

Boulden, Jane and Cox, Davic. "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)." The Guide to Canadian Policy on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1992.

Carothers, Thomas. "Democracy Without Illusions," Foreign Affairs, (January/February 1997), pp 85-94.

Croft, Michael. "Russia's Peacekeeping Policy, Part II: Differences in Approach and Obstacles." Peacekeeping & International Relations, Vol 25 (Sep/Oct 1996).

Dalby, Simon. "Canadian National Security and Global Environmental Change." Canada and the World: Non-Traditional Security Threats, (Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Publications, 1997) pp 21 - 38.

Handelman, Stephen Handelman. "The Russian Mafiya." Foreign Affairs, Vol 73, (Mar/Apr 1994).

Lameth, Benjamin S. "Russia's Wounded Military." Foreign Affairs, (Vol 74, No. 2: 1995).

Liesman, Steve and Pope, Hugh. "Conflict Cool in Former Soviet Regions, Raising Hopes - Moscow reduces Meddling, Enhancing Opportunities for Investment." Wall Street Journal (New York: Oct 22, 1997).

Marks, Steve. "The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War." Political Science Quarterly, Vol 112 (New York: Spring 1997).

Leffler, Melvyn P. "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened." Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, (Jul/Aug 1996).

Morrison, Alex and O'Brien, Kevin A. NATO and Europe: How Relevant to Canadian Security?. The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Publications, 1994.

Nolan, Janne E. "The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: Its Past, Its Future." The Brookings Review, (Spring 1994).

Rioux, Jean-Francois. "Transnational Organized Crime: A National Security Threat?" Canada and the World: Non-Traditional Security Threats, (Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Publications, 1997).

Trevelyan, Mark. "Talks Set On Naming New Russian Government." TIME Daily, 24 March 1998.

Walker, Martin. "Russian Leaders: The Next Generation." Europe, (March, 1997).

DND Documents

Canada, Department of National Defence, SS/NSP/J/NSP/GEN/D-2 Notes on Definitions: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War. Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997.

Manuscripts

Baril, Maurice, General. The Future of the Canadian Forces in the Post-cold War Era. Presentation to the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, January 30, 1998.

Television and Documentaries

CBC News, 6 p.m. edition, 10 Dec 97.

"On the Brink of Doomsday." The Learning Channel. Aired Sunday 12 April, 1998.