The Revolution in Military Affairs
Chang Mengxiong Numerous facts show that we are in the midst of a new revolution in military
technology in which electronic information technology is the central technology.
This technology provides unprecedented applications for the development of new
weaponry. Information acquisition will be the main distinction of 21st-century
military forces. Military battles during the 21st century will unfold around the
use of information for military and political goals.
Chang Mengxiong serves on the Committee of Science, Technology and
Industry of the System Engineering Institute. This paper first appeared in China
Military Science (Spring 1995).
The term information-intensified weapons may inspire a search for weapons
that make full use of information. Foreign "smart land mines" and "smart water
mines" may automatically head toward and destroy a target after acquiring
information about it. Reactive armor on tanks also actually uses information
acquired from attacking weapons and detonates them at once. In the 21st century,
all weapons, with the exception of rifles and machine guns, will be information
intensified.
Combat methods will consequently change: accurate over-the-horizon firepower
attacks may become the primary form of firepower attacks; blind firing and
carpet bombing will become antiquated combat methods whose cost-benefit ratio is
not high; and damage outside the combat target area will also be greatly
reduced.
Information-intensified soldiers will be able to receive all sorts of
information about combat to receive highly concentrated commands and, when
necessary, orders directly from a division commander. Because of this enhanced
information, they will have the ability to make their own decisions about enemy
bases in combat plans.
In addition to making full use of information about one's own side and the
enemy, information-intensified platforms will also be fully able to counter the
use of information about them by the enemy; they will have electronic warfare
equipment that has detection, jamming, and deception capabilities.
Stealth technology will prevent the adversary from obtaining information
through the use of radar and infra-red detection. Stealth aircraft and surface
vessels already exist, and other stealth combat platforms will also appear.
Robot troops, vehicles possessing a certain amount of
information-acquisition, information-processing, and lethal firepower, are a
kind of unmanned information-intensified combat platform. As electronic
information technology develops, these will develop into unmanned
information-intensified combat platforms. Early in the next century, robot
sentries, robot engineers, robot infantrymen, and even unmanned smart tanks may
appear under some battlefield conditions.
Information-intensified combat platforms are bound to bring about major
changes in operational concepts. Because the distance over which these platforms
can fire accurately is vastly greater than the distance their operators can see,
the scale, range, and accuracy of their coordinated operation will greatly
exceed the level that non-information-intensified platforms can attain in the
20th century. It is foreseeable that by 2010 the conventional combat methods of
the past several decades of groups of short-range fighter planes will be rare,
as will attacks by tanks and simultaneous firing of thousands of artillery
pieces. It is also possible that large aircraft combat groups will no longer be
useful. Robot troops will be used in real warfare in large numbers.
Satellite space telecommunications, reconnaissance, monitoring, navigation,
and locator systems are the important component parts of the C3I. With
improvement of the entire C3I system and satellite performance and widening of
satellite applications, by 2010, high-level commanders may be able to know at
once about events occurring on any spot on the earth. This will enable pilots
and tank drivers, as well as ordinary soldiers, to know accurately their own
location on the earth at all times, and it will permit contact with higher-level
command organizations anywhere. It will also provide real-time, continuous,
accurate guidance information for pinpoint guidance of missile to targets as
much as 1,000 kms away. The use of airplanes as carriers of highly mobile radar
detection, command and control, electronic warfare, and telecommunications relay
equipment or systems holds many advantages. The C3I system of the future will
have increased shared information among those engaged in combat, which most
likely will develop into an integrated national defense information system.
There are two ways to integrate the C3I system into the "high-speed information
highway" of individual countries: by resource sharing on the two-way
communications portion of a network, and by serving as an integral part of the
latter operating in coordination with it. Because the C3I system has such an
extremely important position in information-intensified weapons and military
units, attacking and protecting the satellites that are an integral part of the
C3I system, airborne early-warning and electronic-warfare aircraft, and ground
command sites and telecommunications hubs will all become important forms of
combat.
On an information-intensified battlefield, many events are transparent.
Information about installations of major military value to both sides, such as
military bases, information hubs, and command centers, will be stored in a
combat data bank to provide information about possible targets against which
precision guidance weapons will be aimed. Military movements will find it
difficult to fool an adversary's intelligence system. These movements will be
reflected in real time in the adversary's data bank. If there is a gap between
the information capabilities of the two sides, many events will be transparent
only to one side. A statement by Sun Tzu in The Art of War applies to the one
who has the strongest information capability: "By knowing the enemy and knowing
yourself, you can fight a hundred battles and win them all."
The strategy, tactics, and campaigns suited to the information-intensified
battlefields of the 21st century will differ from those of today. The
distinction among the three will become blurred, and specific ingredients of
each will change.
A realistic point of view on combat methods of information-intensified troops
in the 21st century can be provided only after thorough study, and this article
can make only some guesses. An analogy can be made about the major changes that
will come about: Information-intensified combat methods are like a Chinese boxer
with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees
with a minimum of movement. By contrast, non-information-intensified combat
methods are like fights between villagers in which heads are broken and blood
flows, but it is hard to distinguish the winner from the loser.
Information warfare and firepower are closely linked. Information warfare is
used to find and attack targets for firepower. Full use of information warfare
is a prerequisite for full use of firepower. This is expressed clearly in
precision guided weapons, as well as in the tracking, aiming, reconnaissance,
and fire control of all guns. Information warfare includes countering C3I
systems and ensuring the security and accessibility of ones own lines of
communications, the effective operation of ones own detection equipment, making
sure that it is not jammed or damaged; and the normal operation of ones own
numerous combat command computers, protecting them from damage by computer
viruses. At both the strategic and campaign levels in information warfare, it is
important to decipher and analyze information and to prevent information from
being obtained and deciphered.
A newly conceived weapon that will appear in the 21st century is the
high-performance microwave weapon that will use powerful electromagnetism to
destroy the opponent's electronic equipment and electronic telecommunications
systems, thereby rendering enemy weapons ineffective. This is a special kind of
information-intensified weapon for waging information warfare.
"Information capability" includes information support for command,
operations, precision strikes, and logistical support that military units need
to carry out missions. The equipment that supports this capability is the C3I
system, electronic warfare systems, and precision-guided weapons. A military
unit's information capability equals its combat capability. Like
precision-strike capability or an air- defense capability, it is absolutely
indispensable to high-technology warfare and may be the most important combat
capability.
The term "information superiority" means the party that has the strongest
information capability between two opposing parties in combat. In future
high-technology warfare, not only will we have to gain air and sea superiority,
but even more important, we will have to win information superiority first of
all. Possibly new military terms like "contain information power," and "contain
electromagnetic power" may appear.
Information warfare will be the most complex type of warfare in the 21st
century, and it will decide who will win and who will lose the war.
"Information deterrence" may appear in the future. Because all weapons used
in warfare and the various branches of warfare depend closely on electronic
information technology, the power that has a strong information capability and
holds the electronic information technology advantage has an overall advantage
over the weaker information power. Moreover, if the power with a weaker
information capability can deliver a crippling attack on the information system
of the power with a stronger information system, it can likewise greatly
decrease the capability of the adversary's war machine. In other words, even if
two adversaries are generally equal in hard weapons, unless the party with a
weaker information capability is able effectively to weaken the information
capability of the adversary, it has very little possibility of winning the war.
Conversely, if one side can effectively weaken the information capability of the
other side, even if its capability in other ways is less, the other side will
dare not take any ill-considered action. These two situations constitute
"information deterrence." It can prevent war from breaking out. Adroit strategic
employment of one's own information deterrence capabilities constitutes an
information deterrence strategy.
Combining High Centralization With High Initiative The existence of
centralized command, decentralized command, echelon-by-echelon command,
transechelon command, and combined command are all recognized to be necessary,
but centralized command and echelon-by-echelon command are the basic forms of
command. The Gulf War attests that Iraq's highly centralized command system was
unsuited to high-technology warfare.
The former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General J.W.
Vessey, said: "Our command and control are based on the following principle:
Make decisions at the lowest possible level. This not only gives flexibility to
the on-the-ground commanders, but it also gives them resources, authority, and
responsibility, thereby enabling maximum effective use."
Information-intensified weapons systems create the material conditions for
highly centralized combat command at a high level. It enables theater commanders
to do across-the-board planning of their tactical moves. During the Gulf War,
plans for the daily 2,000-sortie aerial combat missions of the allied forces
were drawn up by the U.S. Air Force information system, and assigned to each
country and to each branch of service for implementation. This capability and
trend continue to be strengthened. Information-equipped weapons systems enable
independent combat commands. Dispersed C3I systems will be highly resistant to
destruction. They will ensure that lower level commanders receive the detailed
combat information that they need. This will enable them to make on-the-spot
decisions about dealing with ad hoc situations on the basis of the overall
combat plans of higher headquarters, thereby gaining maximum combat results.
Combat command during the 21st century is certain to be a combination of high
centralization and high independence, the number of echelons is bound to
decrease, and existing command systems and doctrine are destined to be revised.
Required key technology is electronic information technology, including
virtual reality technology, which employs computer technology to create a
simulated imaginary world and uses computers to generate a simulated world and a
three-dimensional visual environment. Operators can visually wander around in
this visual virtual world, and operator actions can change this visual virtual
world in real time. This world may be a weapon, a battlefield, a factory, etc.
This environment is very helpful when examining a large volume of problems
requiring assistance from visual thinking (including visual memories and visual
associations). Virtual reality technology has broad prospects for military
application.
Further development of the "synthetic environment" that Americans have
conceived will provide a unified environment for virtually all military
activities including setting requirements for designing and producing prototype
machines and manufacturing weaponry; troop training and war preparations;
drawing up joint combat doctrine; drafting emergency plans; post-mortem
evaluations; and historical analysis. This synthetic environment will help
create a relatively smooth transition from virtual (imaginary) weapons and
virtual (imaginary) battlefields to real weapons and real battlefields and thus
have far-reaching effects on military activities.
Because information-intensified military units make full use of all kinds of
information, the intensity concept must be introduced. So-called intensity means
the number of events occurring within a certain time and space. The history of
warfare shows that real military superiority really means only superiority at
certain times and in certain places, or superiority in a unit of time or a unit
of space. When one has this superiority, one is victorious within these limits.
Firepower and Destruction Intensity However, the intensity of destruction is a more direct and more basic concept
than the intensity of firepower. It connotes the amount of damage done to an
attacked target per unit of time and space.
The intensity of firepower and destruction of information-intensified
military units made up of information-intensified weapons, soldiers, combat
platforms, and weapons systems tied together by a C3I system is unprecedentedly
great. The total firepower that a non-information-intensified military unit can
bring to bear may also be very great, but in terms of "intensity," such a unit's
firepower and the damage it causes is very small.
Mobility Intensity Information Intensity Supply Intensity
In the future information society, everything will be affected by the extent
to which society uses information. Weapons will become information-intensified
weapons; military units will become information-intensified units; and combat
will become information-intensified combat. The destructiveness of weapons will
increase greatly, but their numbers will decrease. The combat effectiveness of
military units will increase greatly, but their numbers will also decrease.
Warfare in general will not only become more a mental than a physical contest in
which the technology content is high, but this will also be the case in limited
warfare and even in soldier-to-soldier combat. This means that the education and
technical skills of military officers in the future information society will
have to be higher than that those of civilians; otherwise, even with
information-intensified weapons, defeat in war will be possible.
The contribution of electronic information technology to weaponry is
manifested in the following:
However, information-intensified weapons do not rule out the application of
other new conventional technologies. New technical capabilities will be added.
Information-intensified weapons require the support of aerospace, naval, ground,
and nuclear technology. One cannot concentrate on electronic information
technology to the neglect of other technologies, nor can one proceed with all
equally without any particular emphasis.
Naval Captain Shen Zhongchang The war between Greece and its dependency, Corfu Island, in 664 BC was the
first naval battle with a reliable recorded history. Since then, naval warfare
has gone through the wooden-warship age, the sail-warship age, the steamship and
large-ship cannon age, and the guided missile warfare age. The seas and oceans
always having been directly tied to mankind's vital interests, they are going to
be tied even closer in the 21st century. In the last decade or two, ever-growing
numbers of countries have been realizing the importance of the seas and oceans
as a "21st-century resource" for human survival and development. As all
countries gain a stronger sense of the values, rights, and interests of the seas
and oceans, disputes over matters such as maritime economic zones, continental
shelves, and sea-area boundaries are likely to intensify, thus making it hard to
prevent sharper conflicts and even outbreaks of war. Today, on the eve of the
21st century, we need to study naval warfare history and experience to determine
the naval warfare development track of the new century.
Naval Captain Shen Zhongchang is the Director of the Research and
Development Department of the Navy Research Institute, Beijing. Naval Lieutenant
Commander Zhang Haiying and Naval Lieutenant Zhou Xinsheng serve as staff
officers at the Navy Research Institute. This paper is from China Military
Science (Spring 1995).
As the 21st century is also going to be an age of rapid scientific change,
with certain cutting-edge technologies likely to be applied first to naval
warfare, we need to forecast and explore 21st century naval warfare from the
perspective of the coming trends of the scientific and technological revolution.
Future naval warfare will display the following types of engagements:
In short, on the 21st-century naval battlefield, undersea space, outer space,
and electromagnetic space will all become complicated technical fields. Their
mutual independence and limitations, with mutual impact and roles, will make
future naval battlefields ones of integrated sea-land, sea-air,
surface-undersea, and sea-space combat operations, putting the combat activity
of sea-land, sea-air, surface-undersea, and sea-space confrontations into a
state of alternating and intricate military struggle.
The appearance of this new equipment will certainly pose a grim challenge to
traditional marine strategies, naval warfare campaigns, tactical theory, and
naval warfare patterns. On the 21st-century naval battlefield, there will be
more long-range that short-range combat, more missile combat than gun battles,
electronic warfare across the whole battlefield, and both combatants making full
use of smart weapons and drawing on modern command methods of fighting. In
future naval warfare, the multidimensional battlefield will reveal naval targets
and the marine battlefield perspective, making it impossible for surface ships
without air force cover to operate in high-threat maritime zones. Deep strikes
by shipboard aircraft will also be unable to do without support and safeguards
in the fields of outer space, the atmosphere, and electromagnetism, with a
particular need to organize thorough electromagnetic convoys. As future naval
forces will be stereoscopically surrounded by air, surface, undersea, space, and
electromagnetic threats, naval warfare will put more emphasis on diversified,
three-dimensional, and composite service arms, which will constitute the basic
form of 21st-century naval warfare. No matter how powerful the isolated service
arms, ship types, and power systems, they will be victorious only by luck in the
coming highly electromagnetic and high-threat environment.
In 21st century naval warfare, tactics will change sharply, with new tactical
concepts proliferating and being used more flexibly and changeably. The concept
of using tactical mobility of all weapons-delivery platforms to first seize
advantageous positions and then attack will likely become obsolete or even
disappear, with long-range battle concepts such as "remote grappling" and
"over-the-horizon strikes" becoming the key forms of battle in future naval
warfare (such as attacks against surface ships, missile defense, air defense,
and strikes on land- or space-based targets). From the local wars since the
1980s, particularly the high-tech Gulf War, it is not hard to see that trend. In
future naval warfare, long-range battles will become the major form of battle
mainly because:
High-tech weaponry is dozens or even hundreds of times costlier than ordinary
weaponry. In 21st-century naval warfare, while the use on the naval battlefield
of large amounts of high-tech weaponry will raise troop operational efficiency,
the material input and expenditure will also be unprecedentedly higher. In the
recent Gulf War, the multinational forces headed by the United States used over
20 new types of missiles and nearly 10 types of precision-guided bombs, with
guided weapons undertaking almost 80 percent of the assault missions, for ideal
combat success. The expenditures on both sides were enormous.
In the next century, as technologies such as electronics, lasers, and new
materials are further improved and developed, directional weapons such as
lasers, particle beams, and microwave beams will also be employed in naval
warfare, so that naval warfare weaponry movement and development rates will be
faster, strike precision higher, and lethality greater. With much weaponry being
guided, personal, and smart, and command and control being automated, mobility
and strike precision will be easier. The high input, high expenditure, and
destructiveness of warfare will force coming naval warfare to be more time
effective, shortening sustained time, speeding up the rhythm, and making
battlefield conditions sharply changeable. The content of both sides' forces in
naval warfare will change quickly, with belligerent stances also changing in a
short time.
S&T developments are making the world smaller. As growing world economic
integration more easily subjects naval warfare to economic, political, and
diplomatic limitations, shorter battle times and controlled belligerency scales
are bound to become new requirements for future naval warfare. When a naval war
starts, there will be an attempt to end the fighting before the other side makes
an all-out military response, in order to avoid subjecting national human and
financial resources to the huge battle expenditures of sustained combat. So
21st-century naval battles will break out much faster, with suddenness likely to
play a decisive role in winning wars. Lightning attacks and powerful first
strikes will be more widely used in coming naval battles. As both sides will
strive to make lightning attacks and raise their first-strike damage rates,
while doing all possible to organize a rapid and effective counterattack, speed
against speed will become the crux of future naval victory.
In the age of peace and development, the limited objectives of future naval
warfare will restrict the scale of battle. The high input, high expenditure, and
time effectiveness of naval warfare will all make control of the scale of future
naval warfare not only possible but also essential, so it will be very hard to
see in future naval battles the past grand scenes of "decisive fleet
engagements." As the forms of battle change, there will be few naval engagements
beyond the scale of battles; instead, there will be ever-growing numbers of
medium and small conflicts with high-tech, small forces.
But that certainly does not exclude the future possibility of large-scale
naval warfare. This is because the following conditions will still exist in the
next century:
Future high-tech developments will bring a crucial change to naval
composition, with the naval force structure being sharply adjusted to meet naval
warfare needs:
In the 1970s and 1980s, the emergence of precision-guided weapons,
high-efficacy bombs, "smart" bombs, and "ingenious" bombs brought a sharp rise
in the "hard casualty" capability. "Soft casualties," characterized mostly by
electronic jamming, also showed new might. At present, studies and applications
are developing rapidly in the use of high-tech methods such as biochemical and
electronic, radio frequency, and secondary waves for "soft casualties" against
weapons systems and personnel "internal organizations." Ever-diversifying "soft
casualty" means in the 21st century are likely to become even more perfected,
with their antipersonnel effects making it ever-harder for certain hard-strike
weapons to keep up, as well as making protection correspondingly more difficult.
The widespread use and efficiency of "soft casualty" weapons in coming naval
warfare will have a crucial impact on war at sea.
Modern, high-tech, local wars often start with an electronic battle, and also
occur in a dense, complex, and changeable electromagnetic environment. Future
combat systems, especially command and weapons systems, will grow ever more
dependent on electronic technology. Many international figures hold that the
development of electronic technology in future wars will be no less important
than that of the atomic bomb during World War II. A comprehensive overseas study
weighing all S&T factors affecting overall military combat capability, which
were the eight criteria of deterrence, interchangeability, economics,
comprehensiveness, long-term effectiveness, possibility, technology and
capacity, and adaptability, noted that electronic technology has the most
impact. At present, the more advanced naval ships and aircraft are equipped with
electronic warfare instruments, in some cases forming a comprehensive electronic
warfare system.
Maintaining efficient communications with and effective command over troops
is a prerequisite for the use of naval force. Because using guided weapons to
attack enemies is a basic means of naval attack, the "electromagnetic" advantage
will become the focus of rivalry between opponents. The Gulf War showed that
electromagnetic dominance is a prerequisite for control of the air, sea, and
battlefield. The more electronic and smarter naval equipment, combat command,
and information controls of the 21st century will pose very high demands on
electromagnetic dominance. Steadily developing "electronic warfare technology"
equipment and new means of electronic confrontation will push electronic warfare
at sea to new heights. Before long, systems such as the C3I multi functional
confrontation system, comprehensive combat ships, and enormously powerful
electronic confrontation neutralization aircraft and computer "coded virus"
confrontation systems will play a joint role in the electronic confrontations of
naval warfare.
"Secondary wave radiation" casualties and "beam-capable weapon" casualties
are "soft casualty" categories now under development. As such beam-capable
weapons are now being developed very quickly, they are expected to be put into
the testing stage early in the next century. With future "soft casualties" not
only coming in many forms, but also being easy to use, the defensive difficulty
will grow steadily. The ingenious "soft casualties" of naval warfare combined
with fierce "hard strikes" is an unavoidable development trend.
Twenty-first-century naval warfare will be a coordinated operation of
triphibious, comprehensive, and multiservice operations. Therefore, naval
commanders will have to have an overview of the whole battle, be able to quickly
learn about ever-changing battle conditions, and then computerize, analyze, and
judge data to make a quick response, as well as command troop coordination in a
timely and accurate way. This will tie command, control, communications, and
intelligence systems into a tightly connected whole, giving it advantages such
as remote operation, good communications secrecy, and fast data processing. It
can then be applied to both strategic command and battle-tactics command, and
even command of individual ships, planes, and troops, thus ensuring
battlefield-command efficiency, continuity, stability, and flexibility. This
will play a crucial role in the rivalry over naval dominance.
Since the C I system was established in the early 1980s, it has played an
enormous role in several recent local wars. In future naval warfare, on the one
hand, the participating forces will be more complex in makeup, putting high
demands on overall coordination, and even higher demands on better centralized
command and better controlled overall command efficiency. On the other hand, the
development of C I systems has provided a powerful means for better command
efficiency, thus driving battlefield command and control to develop in the
direction of more automation. While this will speed up the integration of
command, control, communication, and intelligence systems, along with raising
command and control efficiency, it will also increase command and control
complexity:
The enormous destructiveness of future naval warfare, with its extensive
spatial limits, diversified participating service arms, and its rapid tempo,
will make it more dependent on logistics security:
Naval Captain Shen Zhongchang Anew military revolution refers to the historical military trend in which
warfare is changing from a war of mechanization to a war of information. The
Navy is a force that requires high technology. The new military revolution will
inevitably have an important impact on sea warfare and naval construction.
Naval Captain Shen Zhongchang is the Director of the Research and
Development Department of the Navy Research Institute, Beijing. Naval Lieutenant
Zhou Xinsheng and NavalLieutenant Commander Zhang Haiying serve as staff
officers at the Navy Research Institute. This paper originally appeared in China
Military Science 1 (1996).
Control of Information Is Important
Second, changes of naval combat doctrine and concepts will inevitably impel
more effective use of the navy. Development of platforms and weapon systems
depends both on the fusion of combat concepts and techniques and on the
development of these concepts into a comprehensive combat doctrine. New doctrine
will ultimately employ naval technical revisions to improve combat power. Future
naval combat doctrine and concepts will abandon the old and obsolete elements
and replace them with new and improved ones to suit naval combat requirements.
Therefore, doctrine will adapt to the need for more effective firepower.
Third, the establishment of a high-quality navy during the new military
revolution will provide a solid foundation for improvement of joint combat
effectiveness. To meet the needs of information warfare, countries with a strong
navy are reforming the entire naval system. The steps include:
Another character of quality navy restructuring is the emphasis on
establishing rapid deployment forces, among which naval forces are an important
component. The U.S. rapid deployment forces have aircraft carriers and
amphibious ships; the British task force and Japanese fleet both have rapid
deployment forces.
One requirement of winning information combat is to strengthen the "soft"
systems in vessels and aircraft, including systems of reconnaissance,
monitoring, communication, navigation and meteorology. These systems can create
favorable conditions in the information war to control information and help one
survive. In information war, the efficiency of vessels, aircraft and equipment
is largely determined by the quality of soft systems. Without the assistance of
such systems, ships and aircraft cannot carry out tasks. Today, soft systems are
becoming an important symbol of estimating the combat force of vessels.
Consequently, during the development of modern vessels, soft systems, especially
communication facilities, target- determining installations, and electronic war
systems are increasing and becoming more complicated. In designing and building
ships, the U.S. Navy gives priority to electronic equipment, installing
electronic jamming facilities in many vessels in order to enhance their defense
capability. The tactical information data system is a sound comprehensive combat
system installed in large vessels. The system can not only command all weapons
in the vessel, but also coordinate and command weapon control systems in other
vessels in the formation through a data chain. It can integrate the entire
formation into one unit. It can be foreseen that the naval C I system based on
satellite and computer technologies will be developed as an important soft
system during the military revolution and will become compatible with the C I
system of the air and land forces.
To prepare for information war, weapons used in the navy will be produced
more precisely and with advanced intelligence. These weapons include intelligent
missiles, shells and torpedoes. Missiles are the main weapons not only for
modern sea war but also for future sea information war. The character and rule
of missile operation will dominate the developing trend of sea warfare. Today,
there are more than 120 types of missiles in the world that can be used in
marine operations. These missiles will be upgraded with information processing
technology. Antivessel missiles will be updated to travel at supersonic speed,
function at minimum altitude, be precision guided, and use anti-interference
features. Air defense missiles will have air defense and antimissile features
and have a combination of long, medium and short ranges. Hence, the flexibility
of weapons can be improved.
Various combat platforms will be featured with new characters, one of which
is the concealing technology. In digitized sea battlefield, platforms face the
dangers of being monitored, detected, and attacked from space, air, land, sea,
and submarine. It is thus particularly important for vessels and aircraft to
conceal themselves well. It is vital to develop and apply stealth technology and
upgrade the covertness of navy platforms. Navies in each country have already
shown concern about this issue. Another feature is the development of submarine
forces, which have higher covertness. It is difficult to determine if
information technology will be developed to detect submarines effectively.
Therefore, submarines will receive less impact from reconnaissance technology
than other platforms. In addition, submarines have a greater attacking power
under water. Accordingly, it is an important aspect of navy restructuring to
develop and maintain submarine forces. Countries will choose to develop vessels
according to situations in neighboring countries and national conditions larger
countries will place importance on developing aircraft carriers and amphibious
ships; medium-size and small countries will increase destroyer, corvette,
minesweeper and minelayer capabilities. However, each country will give
attention to developing submarine forces.
China's neighboring countries are already focusing on purchasing and
developing submarines for instance, Korea will buy 11 submarines from Germany.
Indonesia will increase the number of its submarines from 3 to 5, and Australia
plans to build 6 submarines. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are also
establishing submarine forces. After the Cold War, Russia and the United States
downsized their submarine forces but strengthened the modernization of the
troops in order to maintain their operational ability. We can conclude that
during the First World War, the dominant vessel was the battleship, and in World
War II, it was the aircraft carrier. In future global wars, the most powerful
weapon will be the submarine. In addition, the navy and other armed forces will
develop some new equipment, such as directional weapons, subsonic radiate
weapons, high-energy electromagnetic wave weapons and computer virus, to
increase the power of weapons.
With the development and broad application of information technology, it is
necessary for navy personnel to upgrade their education and improve professional
skills. The new technological revolution has doubled and redoubled the navy's
combat capacity; indeed, such is the result of human talent. The navy is a
special arm with intensive knowledge and techniques, and navy personnel must be
empowered by updated skills. Navy officers must have the ability to command in a
high-tech war, and be familiar and coordinate operations with the other
services.
To narrow the gap between training and actual operation, future training of
navy personnel will be conducted through computer simulated systems, which can
simulate sea battles. Such simulated training can replace large-scale maneuvers,
save materials and money, and effectively improve the skills and command ability
of navy personnel.
In the last decade of the 20th century, along with other grand changes in the
international situation and patterns of war, the air battlefield will become
decisively significant.
Air warfare weapons and equipment in the 21st century mainly will be smart
ammunition, thinking operational platforms and integrated automatic C3I systems.
Colonel Ming Zengfu serves at the Air Force Command Institute, Beijing.
This paper is from "New Changes in Air Defense Operations," in Chinese Military
Science (Spring 1995).
Informationized Platforms Equaling 50 to 60 percent of the total cost of common aircraft (or over 60
percent of the total cost of stealth planes), information equipment aboard
fourth-generation aircraft holds a far more outstanding position. For example,
there are more than 700 computers on a B-2 bomber. For this reason
fourth-generation aircraft have become intellectualized operational platforms,
which have three apparent advantages: they can extensively collect information;
they can deal with all kinds of information; and they can carry all kinds of
ammunition. With the help of the fire-control system, they can automatically
distribute targets and control a number of warheads to attack simultaneously.
Their electronic warfare system can authoritatively judge the threatening
sources and provide the pilot with conduct methods for him to select.
Additionally, their operations assisting system can help drive the aircraft.
Nowadays, modern aircraft has become an information-dominated weapon. Compared
with that of WWII, the efficiency of the battle aircraft of the 21st century
will increase more than 100 times.
Integrated and Automated C3I Systems
Air Deterrence High-tech conventional deterrence is a new mode of deterrence developed after
nuclear deterrence. Although the effect of nuclear deterrence is very strong,
its actual value has decreased because of the height of the "nuclear threshold."
High-tech warfare requires deterrence strength capable not only of maneuvering
rapidly in vast battle space, but also of moving about freely and quickly within
hostile borders. It further requires the deterrent force to be able to attack
and withdraw quickly after destroying the enemy's strategic targets. Air power
happens to possess these characteristics. Air deterrence has three advantages:
No-Fly Zones
Characteristics. Characteristics.
Characteristics.
Characteristics.
Characteristics.
Along with the further development of the operational mode, joint air strikes
were invented. In the Gulf War, a typical daytime strike group of aircraft of
the multinational forces comprised 60 aircraft, in addition to the stealth
aircraft. The daytime strike formations included 24 F16-A/Cs, "Tornados," and
A-10s, escort formations of 12 F15Cs and Mirage-2000s, accompanying jamming
formations of EA-6Bs, EF-111As and one EC-130H, and finally hard-target
electronic warfare formations of F-4Gs and A-6Fs equipped with antiradiation
missiles. There were also some airborne early warning aircraft and air refueling
aircraft participating in actions. Joint air strikes became the main operational
mode the multinational forces used in the Gulf War.
As the basic operational mode, joint air strikes completely alter the
operational state of air battle space. Thus, joint air strikes have the typical
characteristics of nonlinear operations. What may be pointed out is that the way
air battlefields were dominated by air power completely changed in the Gulf War.
Participants in air operations also included army helicopters, navy Tomahawk
cruise missiles, reconnaissance satellites, communication satellites, and global
positioning systems comprising over 30 satellites. This change lifts the joint
air operation to a new height, unlike previous small joint operations. While a
great number of digitized troops are going to be established and a large number
of digitized battlefields are taking shape, the three-dimensional air strikes
that developed in the Gulf War will become a basic mode of air operations in the
future.
Global Strike and Global Reach Over-the-Horizon Air Combat In the Gulf War, most planes of the multinational forces belonged to the
third generation. These planes are of advanced performance, their airborne
fire-control radars are capable of surveilling a distance of more than 100 km,
simultaneously tracking quite a number of targets from scores of kilometers
away, and carrying out attacks over a wide range of altitudes. These
capabilities provide a reliable launching platform to make beyond-the-horizon
attacks. According to materials the U.S. Defense Department released after the
Gulf War, 38 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed in air combat, among which 28 were
destroyed by Sparrow AIM-7M mi-range missiles; 10 were shot down by Sidewinder
AIM-9L short-range missiles; and the rest were ruined by aircraft guns. The Gulf
War was the first rather large-scale regional war in which the number of
aircraft destroyed in beyond-the-horizon air combat exceeded those destroyed in
visual air combat. It indicates that beyond-the-horizon air combat technology is
maturing.
Deep-Strike and Stand-Off Munitions Stealth Penetration All-Weather and Round-the-Clock Air Strikes According to systematic opinions, modern military strength is entirely
composed of various services and various weapon systems with different
functions. Joining various weapons is decisive in the operational system. We
call this striking the seams and ripping the fabric in order to "take down" the
enemy's operational system, to weaken or even to paralyze it by way of precisely
attacking the system or its crucial positions with a certain number of weapons.
It was by way of attacking the seams of the Iraqi air-defense system that the
multinational forces ripped the fabric of the Iraqi air-defense system in the
Gulf War. The multinational forces took the Iraqi C3I system as the main target
to assault. Twenty hours before the first air raid, electronic warfare began to
jam and neutralize the Iraqi C3I system. In the first air raid, Iraqi targets
such as command and communication centers were heavily attacked by Tomahawk
cruise missiles and F-117 stealth fighters of the multinational forces. Because
Iraq's C3I system had been violated, even though it had preserved a great deal
of weapons and equipment with the help of advanced defense systems, its
anti-aircraft guns could merely fire separately, its ground-to-air missiles
could only be launched without aim, and its operational aircraft could not take
off. It is predicted that the operational concept of assault on the seams and
fabric violation will be commonly used in the air battlefields of the 21st
century.
The new military revolution has brought about changes to the entire military
sphere, particularly to the reforms in the air force. To study the impact of the
revolution on contemporary air power is of momentous significance to China's
defense modernization and air force development.
Since the 1950s, information technology has been developed worldwide.
Automatic control and artificial intelligence technology have advanced quickly.
Modern information technology was first applied in air weapons. Because of
computers, automatic equipment and artificial intelligence, weapons have been
invented, such as precision-guided weapons, telemetry and remote-sensing
systems, electronic confrontation technology, and automatic C I systems. Air
weapons have become the epitome of contemporary information technology. The
special requirements of developing air weapons are the incentive for developing
information technology. The mutual acceleration and simultaneous development of
air weapons and information technology have resulted in the following
accom-plishments:
Major General Zheng Shenxia is President of the Air Force Command College,
Beijing; Senior Colonel Zhang Changzhi is an Assistant Professor at the Air
Force Command College, Beijing. Their essay is from China Military Science,
(Spring 1996).
After the Gulf War, the U.S. military gradually increased research centered
on information combat. U.S. Defense Secretary Perry put forward the proposal of
"military revolution" in early 1994, which officially confirmed the existence of
the revolution. A special group was organized to conduct research on how the
Pentagon can obtain and maintain decisive military superiority within the next
two and three decades. Therefore, modern high technology, the key to the new
military revolution, has caused the development of contemporary air power. The
application of air power in Desert Storm, on the other hand, is the "trigger" of
the new military revolution. It is predicated that future air strength will have
much greater development under the influence and acceleration of the revolution.
From the viewpoint of electromagnetic combat, armed strength in ground and
marine battlefields will be greatly heightened by electromagnetic domination
obtained through integrated electronic combat. Air and space are the major
fields of electromagnetic confrontation in modern war. Air electronic
confrontation equipment, compared to that on the ground, can cover a wider space
and have a higher fighting efficiency. The U.S. Army has developed more than 600
electronic combat devices, of which 70 percent is installed in aircraft.
Electronic combat in air raids can use electronic devices to reconnaissance,
interfere, search, position and monitor an opponent's targets, as well as to
cope with enemy electronic mechanisms, in combination with automatic command
system and electronic suppression and deceiving devices. Thus, enemy
communication will be cut off and radar and guided weapons disabled. Losses on
one's own side will be reduced to minimum.
As for firepower, the destruction power has seen great improvement because of
the combination of space electronic measures, firepower, and application of
weapons with high precision and coverage. One prominent change is the growing
proportion of air firepower in modern war. According to statistics, the U.S.
Army's air munitions have increased dramatically. Today's stockpile is four
times that of WWII, three times that of the total ammunition used in the Korean
war, twice that of the Vietnam War, and a fifth more than that used in the Gulf
War. In addition, 70 percent of casualties and injuries to enemy troops in the
Vietnam War was caused by U.S. air firepower. Half the Arab tanks damaged during
the fourth Middle East War was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force. During the
Falkland Islands war between Britain and Argentina, 90 percent of the 29 vessels
that were lost was due to air strikes. All the above indicates that with the
rapid development of air weapons, the focus of modern war is gradually shifting
to the air. Air firepower is becoming the backbone of joint military forces.
An important feature of information combat is the speed. Strategic air
transport serves as the key to releasing and expanding the operational potential
of strategic mobility. Speed and strength are the two core elements of measuring
the combat effectiveness of strategic mobile force. In contemporary conditions,
the contrast of strategic strength is not determined by the military force in a
certain area but by the strength of strategic mobility. In modern times, partial
wars break out quickly in a vast space, which allows very limited time to carry
out an effective reaction. Only through speedy delivery of combat forces to
favorable positions can decisive impact be exerted. Among various delivery
measures, air transport is the most effective action because of its strong
mobility, fast speed, and less restrictive geographic conditions. Air transport
in modern times has a greater effect because of its capability of delivering
force in large freight size, over a long distance, and at a fast speed between
continents. To a certain extent, air transport is the amplifier of the combat
strength of the strategic mobile forces of military powers and is an important
condition in winning an information war.
This analysis shows that strengthening the air force is an inevitable outcome
of the development of the new military revolution, and the changes in war format
and the world nuclear situation. Further development of the air force will
eventually increase the struggle among nations in fighting for air superiority.
Future information war will rely more and more on air superiority. The air force
will no longer be an important independent strategic force but an effective
conventional campaign force that all services will depend upon. Each service
will own a troop of airmen. Such a trend will further spur the
conventionalization of high-tech equipment, development of information war and
nonlinear operation of combat modes, therefore, strengthening the polar position
of air force in modern military strategy.
After the Gulf War, each key country adjusted its military strategy and the
structure of its armed forces to adapt to the transformed military threat and to
ease the tension between demand and possibility of armed force establishment.
The core of the adjustment is to promote quality military establishment. As a
high-tech-equipped service, the air force will be given these considerations:
Regarding weapons installation, all countries will focus on developing and
applying precision-guided technology. The United States and Western European
countries are jointly developing the AIM-120 medium-range, air-to-air missile
and the AIM-132 short-range, air-to-air missile. The AGM-129 air-launch cruise
missile has a range of more than 10,000 kilometers. The new generation of
antiradiation missiles will have more intelligence that will allow it to search,
trace, and attack targets automatically. Antitank missiles will feature improved
attacking power beyond vision and precision.
From the very beginning of the 20th century to the end of 1980s, one of the
most remarkable features of military revolution was the application of the
results of the industrial revolution. With a beginning marked by the appearance
of tanks, aircraft, and other weaponry, military firepower and its mobility have
created a relatively perfect combination. They provide a powerful assault
ability to forces and give rise to various theories on mechanized or mobilized
operations such as the "surprise attack" of the Germans, the "deep strike" of
the Soviets, and the "joint air and land operation" of the U.S. Army. By the end
of 20th century, the arrival of the information revolution and the application
of computers, sensors, and other information techniques in the command and
control activities of the armed forces, together with long-range guided weapons
and automatic, informational and intelligent weapons that have been developed
will lead to profound changes in the operational concepts, fighting, and command
methods of the 21st century.
Colonel Xiao Jingmin and Major Bao Bin work at the Strategy Department,
Academy of Military Science, Beijing. This paper appeared in China Military
Science (Spring 1995).
The fighting capabilities of modern weaponry have been greatly increased,
making it possible for armed forces with modern weapons to fight in great depth,
in multidimensions and in multidirections. Operations can be carried out against
an enemy target not only from a short range, but also from a long range, super
long range or even from any corner of the globe. An important developing trend
for the land battle is the interlacing of fighting in the far and near
distances. Operations will be carried out on the land, on the sea surface, under
the water, in the air, or even in space. The attacking weapons at different
levels of altitude will be able to strike land targets from optimum altitude.
Air strikes and mobility have become the main methods of cooperation with land
operations.
The differences of front, rear, and side will be mitigated, the front and
rear of the battle field will be attacked simultaneously, and important
facilities of the strategic rear area might be the first target of attack. The
battle front will not be fixed, the fight will be waged in all directions, and
outer space will be a battlefield. All spaces will be full of intense combat.
The expansion of land battlefields has greatly surpassed the firing range of
guns and attacks by infantry and tanks. Bombers and tactical missiles can cover
a fighting radius of several hundred or thousands of kilometers. Confrontation
in outer space can be elevated to tens of thousands of meters or even kilometers
high. The interlinking of battlefields far and near, or high and low in space,
is unprecedented and will make people rethink land-battle concepts, and strategy
for future land operations.
Modern science and technology have greatly improved the fighting capabilities
of weaponry, and the concept of time and speed on the land battlefield has
greatly changed. Time equals force, and speed is power. Time on the battlefield
has been shortened, and operational activities will become faster. Modern
weapons make the speed of the operational activities much faster. Armed forces
use the high efficiency and high-speed mobile transportation tools not only for
fast tactical and campaign mobility, but also for strategic mobility. Various
kinds of weapons will shorten the time of reaction and in very short time will
carry out fire power mobility and support and transfer, replacing manpower to a
large degree. The C3I battle command system can have quasi real-time and fast
analysis of all kinds of information and will increase the level of command
control of the battlefield, armed forces, and weapons systems.
Operational activities will become all-weather, all-time, and continuous
activities. Modern optics, electronics and other sensor equipment have become
popular and are widely used, which greatly increases the fighting capability of
weaponry and forces at night or in unfavorable weather conditions. Different
army corps and their main weapons systems will have high-level and continuous
fighting ability at all times and in all weather conditions. Operational
activities will proceed at an unprecedented speed over all battle areas. In
future land warfare, those who have gained time will have the upper hand on the
battlefield, and those who have increased speed will have gained more power.
Major General Wang Pufeng
Andrew Marshall of the Pentagon believes the information era will touch off a
revolution in military affairs, just as the cannon in the 15th century and the
machine in the past 150 years of the industrial era touched off revolutions.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan holds that the information era
is changing the army and will change the means of war fundamentally. U.S.
Secretary of the Army Togo West says, "We place the stakes of winning a victory
in the next century on digitization." The U.S. Army believes that the assessment
of an army's combat capability used to depend on how good its munitions were,
but in the 21st century, it will depend on the operational capability of the C3I
system based on information technology. The U.S. Army has presented the concept
of Force 21 and makes it clear that it should be armed for information warfare
and become a digitized army. Its plan is to build a digitized brigade in 1996
and expand it to a division in 1997. The U.S. Army has taken these actions to
prepare for future information warfare.
Major General Wang Pufeng is a former Director of the Strategy Department,
Academy of Military Science, Beijing. His paper was excerpted from China
Military Science (Spring 1995).
In the near future, information warfare will control the form and future of
war. We recognize this developmental trend of information warfare and see it as
a driving force in the modernization of China's military and combat readiness.
This trend will be highly critical to achieving victory in future wars.
There is a question of how to use weakness to defeat strength and how to
conduct war against weak enemies in order to use information superiority to
achieve greater victories at a smaller cost. It must be confirmed that
information and weapons are all controlled by people. People are the main factor
in combat power. However, it must also be confirmed that the functions of people
and weapons will primarily be determined by the control of information, because
information can play an important role in warfare. Hence, the flow of
information, under the control of people, is injected into the flow of manpower,
capacity, and materials, and will influence the form of warfare and determine
victory or defeat. During the industrial age, the combat power of a military was
measured primarily by how much capacity that military held and could utilize.
During the information age, the efficiency of capacity utilization is even more
important. Generally speaking, a military with capacity but no means to use it
cannot become a true combat power. If capacity is used to no effect, it will
only cause unnecessary damage and waste and will not have practical significance
to victory or defeat in the war. A military can become a truly effective combat
power only if it can use its capacity effectively. Capacity utilization
controlled by information technology can successfully solve this problem. In
this way, the thrust of China's military construction and development of weapons
and equipment will no longer be toward strengthening the "firepower
antipersonnel system" of the industrial age, but toward the strengthening of
information technology, information weapons systems, and information networking.
Our sights must not be fixed on the firepower warfare of the industrial age,
rather they must be trained on the information warfare of the information age.
This must be the starting point from which to propel China's military
construction forward and raise that construction to a higher grade and standard.
Theory is the new guide to action, and information warfare theory is a new
warfare theory. We must understand it, study it, and use it to guide military
construction and combat. China's military, which has always had advanced Marxist
and Maoist warfare theory, absolutely must not fall behind the times. We must
use a practical combination of information warfare and Marxist and Maoist
military thought to guide information warfare and issues in military
construction. In light of the fact that the military lags behind its strong
enemies in information technology and information weapons, the military must
emphasize the study of ways to use inferior equipment to achieve victory over
enemies with superior equipment. "Using the inferior to overcome the superior"
is a tradition of China's military. However, "using the inferior to overcome the
superior" in information warfare is definitely much different in content and
form from the techniques of war used in the past. The question of how to conduct
a people's war in information warfare also requires study. The people's war of
the past was conducted in tangible space, but information warfare, in addition
to occurring in tangible space on the ground, on the sea, and in the air, is
conducted even more in intangible space, such as in electromagnetic fields. It
is not only a battlefield in which guns and bombs proliferate, but also a
"computer battlefield" in sheltered laboratories and control rooms. There are
many new issues here we need to explore.
A Reliable Reconnaissance and Remote-Sensing System Information Weapons Systems Computer Technology and Battlefield Information Networks
Preparation and Defense with Attacking and Fighting Organize Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare Fighter aircraft were then sent to launch counterradiation guided missiles to
destroy Libya's air defense radar stations, then fighter aircraft were sent to
launch precision-guided bombs to attack five important targets. The information
offensives in this raid included: 1) information reconnaissance to gain
information on targets of the raid and to study the target in detail; 2)
electronic interference to paralyze the opponents's communications and blind the
opponent's air defense guided missiles; 3) information suppression by using
counter radiation guided missiles to destroy air defense radar stations, and 4)
information attack by using precision-guided warheads to attack pre-set targets.
During the Gulf War, the information offensives of the multilateral forces
were even more representative. In addition to the four types listed above at
least the following should be added: 1) Computer viruses were used to destroy
the computer systems of Iraq's air defense system and thus paralyze it, and 2)
stealth aircraft were used to launch precision-guided bombs against the
communications building and the command center, thus achieving information
suppression.
In situations of information defense, we must strive for an active approach
in a reactive situation and use every means possible to destroy the opponent's
information superiority and transform our inferior position in information. We
must pay attention to:
In wars of the future, China will face the enemy's more complete information
technology with incomplete information technology. Because sometimes superior
tactics can make up for inferior technology, China will still carry out its
traditional warfare method of "you fight your way, I'll fight my way," and use
its strengths to attack the enemy's weaknesses and adhere to an active role in
warfare. To do this, it appears that we must pay even more attention to:
Combat personnel must also be familiar with the technical and strategic
aspects of the weapons and equipment in their hands and must be very well versed
in the operation of those weapons and equipment. They must be able to understand
accurately the combat plan and resolutely and flexibly utilize weapons and
equipment to wipe out the enemy. The combat personnel of information warfare are
not only the warriors who charge enemy lines for face to face struggles of life
or death, but sometimes are the operating technical personnel who sit before
computers and instruments. They stand at the first line in electronic warfare
and in the resistance against C4I systems and on the front line in information
technology conflicts.
Rear support and technical support are very important in information warfare.
Information technology relates to a number of high-technology groups of people
and touches on new energy, new materials, artificial intelligence, space travel,
marine engineering, systems engineering, and other high-technology subjects. The
demands for the technical level of support personnel are quite high. They are
required to be able to guarantee that weapons and equipment are always kept in
excellent condition. While carrying out rear and front-line support, the use of
information technology is a support method just like other methods. In
information warfare, the support of information technology penetrates the
contents of information resistance and is also one method of warfare support.
The main methods of cultivating talent are study and training. In addition to
conducting training in politics, ethics, and psychology, there must also be
study of high-tech knowledge and the fundamental knowledge of and warfare
techniques related to information warfare. If conditions permit, we want to
create as much as possible the conditions necessary for implementing simulation
training. We can first consider creating stimulated battlefields with
information in key areas of the army, navy, air force, and artillery, and,
second, conducting rotational training of cadres and key troops. Colleges and
universities should also establish curriculae in information warfare. Scientific
research institutions should also engage in research on information warfare.
The large-scale importation of information technology deep into the field of
warfare will inevitably bring about a military revolution. This revolution has
actually already started. Those who perceive it first will swiftly rise to the
top and have the advantage of the first opportunities. Those who perceive it
late will unavoidably also be caught up in the vortex of this revolution. Every
military will receive this baptism. This revolution is first a revolution in
concepts, then it is a revolution in science and technology, equipment, troop
strength, strategy, and tactics as well as a revolution in training. Thus, the
issue of how to adapt to and achieve victory in the information warfare which we
will face from now on is an important question which we need to study carefully.
While the military officials of all countries have not yet defined
information warfare (IW) authoritatively, military experts in many countries
have delimited its implications. While such definitions may be imperfect and
even somewhat biased, they are certainly of great benefit to our understanding
of the innate features of information warfare.
In Army magazine (1994), Lieutenant General Cerjan, former U.S. National
Defense University President, notes, "Information warfare is a means of armed
struggle aimed at seizing the decisive military superiority and focused on the
control and use of information." General Sullivan, U.S. Army Chief of Staff,
holds that "information is the most crucial combat effectiveness," with the
essentials of "battlefield information warfare" being to "collect, process, and
use enemy information, and to keep the enemy from acquiring and using our
information." A U.S. combat theory analyst sums up the substance of information
warfare in six points:
We hold that information warfare has both narrow and broad meanings.
Information warfare in the narrow sense refers to the U.S. military's so-called
"battlefield information warfare," the crux of which is "command and control
warfare." It is defined as the comprehensive use, with intelligence support, of
military deception, operational secrecy, psychological warfare, electronic
warfare, and substantive destruction to assault the enemy's whole information
system including personnel; and to disrupt the enemy's information flow, in
order to impact, weaken, and destroy the enemy's command and control capability,
while keeping one's own command and control capability from being affected by
similar enemy actions.
The essential substance of information warfare in the narrow sense is made up
of five major elements and two general areas. The five major elements are:
Information offense means attacking enemy information systems. Its aims are:
destroying or jamming enemy information sources, to undermine or weaken enemy
C&C capability, and cutting off the enemy's whole operational system. The
key targets of information offense are the enemy's combat command, control and
coordination, intelligence, and global information systems. A successful
information offensive requires three prerequisites: 1) the capability to
understand the enemy's information systems, and the establishment of a
corresponding database system; 2) diverse and effective means of attack; and 3)
the capability to make battle damage assessments [BDA] of attacked targets.
Information warfare in the broad sense refers to warfare dominated by
information in which digitized units use information [smart] equipment. While
warfare has always been tied to information, it is only when warfare is
dominated by information that it becomes authentic information warfare.
Information warfare in the broad sense has many manifestations, as follows:
This picture is dynamic, changing with the movements of both combatants and
changes in terrain and weather. A digitized battlefield is a prerequisite for
information warfare. The establishment of a digitized battlefield has many
advantages. For instance, information sharing clarifies the position of the
enemy and one's own units, sharply lowering accidental injuries; it enables
battlefield commanders to amass key units at crucial sites at critical times; it
can effectively coordinate short-distance, in-depth, and rear operations,
providing intelligence support for all-out, in-depth, simultaneous offensive
operations. As all come to know the battlefield conditions, subordinate
commanders can bring their initiative into play, acting promptly at their own
discretion in line with their superiors' intentions; it makes logistics support
"very accurate," for such activities as material provision variety and quantity
"accuracy," logistics support provision-time "accuracy," and wounded treatment
"timely accuracy."
The establishment of a digitized battlefield is a sort of systems
engineering. Many U.S. military specialists claim that this project is more
challenging than the Manhattan Project. To carry out this project, the United
States is taking many steps.
In line with Clinton's Presidential Order #29 issued in September 1994, the
U.S. Defense Department has set up the National Security Policy Commission and
the National Information System Security Commission. The former is charged with
formulating military security policy and digitized battlefield establishment
principles, while the latter is responsible for controlling the security and
secrecy of classified and sensitive information on the military information
superhighway and the digitized battlefield. The U.S. Army set up in January 1994
the Army Digitized Special Taskforce under the direct leadership of the Army's
first deputy chief of staff. In June 1994, that taskforce was expanded into the
Army Digitized Office, and charged with the design and establishment of the
digitized army battlefield. In July 1994, the U.S. Navy set up the Theater of
Operations Information Warfare Center; in January 1995, it established the Fleet
Information Warfare Center. Their joint responsibilities are to study and design
the technology and software needed for the digitized naval battlefield. The U.S.
Air Force Information Warfare Center was set up in October 1993, and charged
with establishing a digitized air battlefield.
To build a digitized land, sea, and air battlefield, the computer system
structures, operating programs, program design languages, software applications,
database languages, and communications rules of all information systems must be
standardized and interchangeable throughout all branches of the military. Thus
the U.S. military is now pursuing two information resource standardization
plans: 1) the all-service command, control, communications, computer, and
intelligence system standardization plan, which will set up a global military
information database and a global joint network system, thus deploying
throughout the world global information sharing for the U.S. military; and 2)
the defense information control standardization plan, which is aimed at
upgrading the interchangeable software technology of all Defense Department
information systems, to eventually make information control and usage
standardized and interchangeable.
To achieve battlefield digitization for all arms of the service, the U.S.
military is now pursuing a diversified C&C digitized joint-network plan. For
instance, the U.S. Army has seven plans:
An informationized army is a brand-new "information-based" military category,
with its combat theory, system establishment, personnel quality, and weaponry
being completely suited to IW needs. The U.S. informationized military
establishment plans are in two stages, which are estimated to be completed by
the mid-21st century.
In the first stage, the U.S. Army will first be digitized. While digitized
units will be essentially the same in authorized strength and structure as units
with ordinary equipment, they will be units with digitized communications
technology; integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence; smart
weaponry; and networking of all operating systems. The major signs that a unit
is digitized will be that its main outfits will be equipped with digitized
communications equipment, second-generation forward-looking radar,
identification friend-and-foe [IFF] equipment, and the global positioning system
[GPS]. Such equipment will include M1A2 tanks, M2A2 fire support vehicles, M2A3
fighting vehicles, Black Eagle command helicopters, Apache attack choppers,
Kiowa Brave reconnaissance choppers, M109A6 Warrior self-propelled guns, and
M106A2 mortars. The U.S. Army now has a digitized battalion and will have
established a digitized army by 1999, with all Army units digitized by 2010.
To test the combat capability of digitized units, the U.S. Army has conducted
repeated simulated tests and live-troop confrontation exercises between
digitized task forces and nondigitized units. The simulated tests show that
digitized technology can shorten the time of choppers going into action from 26
minutes to 18 minutes, while raising the hit rate of antitank missiles from 55
percent to 90 percent. The live-troop exercises show that using conventional
communications means to send on-site reports to battalion headquarters takes 9
minutes, while digitized communications means takes only 5 minutes; that the
repetition rate is 30 percent for (telegram) text sent by conventional means,
but only 4 percent for that sent by digitized means; and that the completion
rate of on-site reports is only 22 percent by phone, but as high as 98 percent
by digitized means. Through repeated demonstrations the U.S. Army has reached
the initial conclusion that "digitized units have enormous combat potential,"
with their combat effectiveness being "about three times that of ordinary
units."
In the second stage, the U.S. Army will grow more informationized on that
digitized foundation, as well as build the entire U.S. military, including the
Navy and Air Force, into a fully informationized force. After 2010, the U.S.
Army will probably be the first to draw up "IW theory," as well as act in line
with that theory to reform its system establishment, carry out military
training, and develop weaponry, to informationize its units. For two reasons
this will probably take about three decades, with completion by 2040:
Alvin Toffler noted recently that in the information age, "as the winning of
wars will rely on military quality, not quantity, the military will shrink in
size." Therefore IW in a certain sense is "precision warfare," with objectives
achievable without using large amounts of troops or arms.
The military makeup will change. To adapt to IW needs, changes in military
makeup will experience the following trends: In the balance of army, naval and
air force might, the ratio of army troops will decline, while that of naval and
air force troops will grow; in support units, technical support will grow, while
logistics support will decline; in the officer-to-men ration, there will be more
officers and less men; in the officer makeup, there will be more technical
officers and less commanding and ordinary staff officers. Also, there are likely
to be new service arms such as a space force and computer soldiers.
The unit establishment will tend to be smaller, more integrated, and more
multifunctional. While Western nations have not yet determined the IW unit
establishment, they hold that these units will have the following features: "The
best combination of men and machines," with quality personnel and high-tech arms
both being as efficient as possible; flexible mobility suited to command,
control, and information flow; light equipment that is easy to deploy; high
combat effectiveness, fewer command levels, multifunctional commanders, and
crack commanding organs.
There are two implications for smaller units. 1) Unit might at all levels
will be smaller. For instance, U.S. Army divisions will be cut from 18,000 to
12,000 troops each, with British and French Army divisions likely to be reduced
from 12,000 to under 10,000 troops each; 2) The status and role of units at all
levels will be obviously higher. For instance, the U.S. military plans to raise
the role of the army in campaign planning to the group army level, replacing the
division with the brigade as the basic tactical operations unit equipped with
all sorts of combat and support platoons. The Russian military is also planning
to institute an "army brigade system." The factors in the appearance of such a
situation include higher-quality officers and men, weaponry advances, and
robot-equipped units.
Unit integration means that composite units will reach new heights, with a
transition from composite service arms to composite armed forces. For instance,
the U.S. military is considering the establishment of two units, one being a
composite army-air force unit the "flying tank" or "air mechanized unit," and
the other a land, sea and air "joint task force." This latter unit will be made
up of an army brigade task force, an air force fighter squadron, a naval fleet
unit, and a marine expedition platoon, suited to countering low-force conflicts
and breakouts overseas.
Multifunctional units will mean that units at all levels will have to fulfill
diverse combat missions in wars on all combat terms and all degrees of force,
including "noncombat operations." Meanwhile, army, navy, and air force combat
units are also likely to break the traditional service arm operating limits, and
perform the combat operations of other service arms. For instance, land units
will fight naval and air battles, with naval and air force units fighting land
battles. Therefore, some Western military experts predict that as units
diversify, unit establishment categories will decrease.
Ever since the 1970s, when new high technology began to be rapidly developed
and widely applied in the military field, the international strategic situation
has undergone a series of great changes. Regional wars, especially those under
high-tech conditions, have resulted in the profound reform of concepts, modes,
and tactics in modern operational doctrine. The traditional doctrine of
operations since the World War II has been seriously challenged. Some of it
gradually has lost significance. Therefore, new relevant doctrine must be
explored and developed for future warfare.
The Limitation of War Scale Major General Wu Guoqing is the Director, Department of Operations and
Tactics, Academy of Military Science, Beijing. His paper was originally
published in China Military Science ( Summer 1994).
Limiting war scope and controlling its effects are possible with new
technology and are actually required by the international environment and modern
warfare. Operational purposes can be better realized with precision conventional
weapons. On the other hand, the high consumption rates of high-tech regional
wars require their scope to be limited and that combat remain within the limits
a country's economy is able to endure.
New Implications of Joint Warfare The integration of military actions, politics and diplomacy will increase.
Military actions will be subordinate to politics and diplomacy. In turn,
political and diplomatic struggles will make full use of military success to
achieve victory in regional war. All this is subject to the strategic conceptual
enrichment of military operations in regional wars. With the deepening and
perfection of joint operations doctrine, from now on, is most likely to develop
into essentially operational theory early in the next century. By then, though,
the doctrine will be further enriched with newer meaning.
The Concept of Quality First With the rapid spurt of science and technology and its extensive applications
in military fields, military equipment has become the key to operational
competence for modern forces. An army's fighting competence will largely be
affected by its combat equipment. Among the many factors affecting the decisive
victory in wars is the increasingly important role of the technology of military
equipment. Troops using weapons no longer depend principally on their bodily
strength as a standard, but on skillfully mastering and applying equipment, and
adapting themselves to high-tech warfare. Quality first and technology first
will become more fully embodied in the operational doctrines and practices of
the armies in the world.
High-Speed and Flexible Reactions Principle of Quick Decision Hitting Vital Parts of the Enemy Battlefield Dominance Will Change Meaning
The Importance of Mobile Warfare With the development and extensive application of military high technology,
the side possessing superiority in high-tech weapons may adopt mobile war
tactics, such as launching surprise attacks, laying siege and outflanking over
long distances, "frog leaps" by air, and penetration in depth and width. New
tactics such as mobile warfare over air and land and over-the-horizon and
amphibious mobile warfare can be used one by one. Owing to the greater
variations of future battlefields and front lines, uncertain fighting areas,
irregular and frequently changing battlegrounds, any operation must act
according to the changing situation. Meanwhile, with the substantial advancement
of the devastating effectiveness of precision-guided, long- distance weapons, it
will become even more difficult to use fixed battlegrounds and fixed positions
for covert actions and to protect personnel. The traditional linear positional
operation will hardly meet the demands of future military actions. It can be
estimated that new mobile warfare, nonlinear operations, unbalanced
dispositions, and mobile actions will be adopted by more and more armies of the
world.
Special Warfare From now on, every country may strengthen the study of special warfare by
determining war purposes by special warfare; coordinating special warfare with
mobile and position warfare; and enlarging the content of special warfare.
Traditionally, special warfare is an irregular operation. It may in the future
include the content that originally belonged to regular warfare, involving
political and diplomatic struggles and aerial combat. Currently, studies on
special warfare are in their development phase, and their contents will
inevitably be enriched and enlarged through practice and theoretical research.
New Operational Methods Opposing sides may not necessarily face each other in battles. Instead, they
will launch attacks hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away by fully
employing air assaults and missile weapons. Even if a campaign starts within a
battleground, attacks are as likely to be launched from outside of the enemy's
defense area and actions will occur with opposite sides "never meeting each
other."
On the other hand, traditional methods will be reinvigorated and adapted to
new operational conditions. With technical development of precision all-weather
targeting, stealth weapons, precision guidance, and night fighting, traditional
warfare can also be enhanced. Further, night fighting will no longer be confined
by the range or parts of a battlefield. Large-scale night fighting in depth and
width with combined arms coordination may be extensively adopted in high-tech
operations in the future.
Modes and Patterns of Operations Will Be Synthesized Operations of Joint Services Will Increase Technology and Art in Operational Methods
Highly Synthesized Command Organizations Intelligently Automated Command In the Gulf War, the multinational forces had their means of command
intelligently automated to some extent. The appearance of intelligently
automated command will bring about changes in the command doctrines of the armed
forces. With the use of intelligently automated command in operations,
scientifically determined operational doctrine will be gradually perfected.
Command Concepts Will Synthesize Doctrine
Studies on Stereoscopic Defense Theory Will Deepen A Mobile Defense Doctrine Will Emerge A New Structure for the Defense System Under today's comparatively peaceful environment, the armed forces of many
countries are now paying attention to the shift from the traditional formula of
"technology pushing" tactics to that of "doctrine pushing," which means that the
progress of military technology and development of weapons will be guided by
thinking about future operations. The interactive function of "technology
pushing" and "doctrine leading," will bring forth scientific ideas and
theoretical principles compatible with our era.
Cao Benyi The powerful capabilities and special characteristics of stealth weaponry
enable evasion of detection by sensing equipment on the ground, breaking through
a great variety of the enemy's defensive systems, and penetrating deeply into
enemy territory to attack all strategic objectives. As a consequence of the very
rapid development of stealth technology, the survival potential and the rate at
which stealth weapons will successfully break through enemy defenses in modern
warfare have been remarkably enhanced. This has attracted worldwide attention.
This article elaborates on four aspects of the functions and future trends of
stealth weaponry.
Cao Benyi contributed this article to the Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry, Modern Weaponry, no. 11 (8 Nov 1992).
F-117A stealth fighters, developed by the United States, were used in the
armed invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989, when they successfully evaded the
radar network of the Panamanian defensive forces and unloaded two almost
laser-guided bombs on the Rio Hato airfield, 90 km southwest of Panama City.
This made it very easy for the U.S. paratroopers to accomplish the great
military achievement of occupying the Rio Hato airfield. When the Gulf war
erupted on January 17, 1991, F-117A stealth fighters were the main formation in
the attacking air force, and they dropped the first bombs on Baghdad. These
laser-guided bombs of the "Bao-shi-lu" III type, weighing one ton each, were
dropped with unerring precision on the large communications building that housed
the information services of the Iraqi armed forces, scoring a remarkable hit.
One F-117A stealth fighter dropped two 2-ton laser-guided bombs right into the
entrance to the Iraqi Scud Missile storage hangar. Another F-117A stealth
fighter dropped one bomb into the air shaft of the Baghdad air defense
headquarters, and yet another made a very destructive attack against the Baghdad
air force headquarters, bringing this huge building down in a big cloud of fire
and smoke. In all these air attacks the F-117A fighters maintained a record of
zero losses.
Used as a strategic and tactical attack weapon, a stealth-guided missile
makes it impossible for the target to defend itself. During the Falkland War of
1982, the Argentines used the French-made Exocet guided missile to sink the
British destroyer Sheffield. In the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy used 100 highly
effective Tomahawk cruise missiles with stealth characteristics to attack Iraqi
strategic targets in the early morning of January 17, 1991.
The great importance of stealth weaponry in modern warfare has gradually been
realized by China's scientific and military experts. China has vast territories,
vast territorial skies and waters, and long shorelines. To protect its
territorial rights over its land, air, and sea against any future aggression, it
is necessary for China to make every effort to develop stealth technology, to
develop stealth weaponry, and to do what is necessary to enable China's stealth
technology to catch up with the world's most advanced level of such technology
in a short time.
During the last few years, some units have started research on stealth
materials. For example, the research institute of the Beijing Iron and Steel
Complex has developed a coating material of superfine metallic particles with
radar wave absorption properties. Other relevant units have developed other
coating and structural materials.
Because China was late in starting research on stealth weaponry, it has
technically not yet nearly reached the level of such countries as the United
States and the former Soviet Union. To offset its underdevelopment, to narrow
the disparity with the rest of the world, and to be in control of the initiative
in any future war, it is certainly necessary from now on to intensify research
in stealth weaponry. The following are some of the critical technical problems
that will have to be resolved in China's research on stealth weaponry:
Radar-indiscernible material is one of the key items in stealth weapons;
application of indiscernible material and the outer stealth structural contours
are of equal importance. Research abroad has already produced various kinds of
highly effective radar-indiscernible coatings and structural materials. At
present, as far as materials technology is concerned, mixed materials for
increased wave absorption have very good prospects. The appearance of such new
technologies as sandwich-intertwined wave-absorbing materials and
self-programming materials have opened new roads for the development and
manufacture of radar-indiscernible materials. Superfine metal particles also
have great potential as a radar-indiscernible coating material. It is necessary
for China to develop through various technological methods a series of
structural and coating materials with radar-indiscernible properties.
General Mi Zhenyu
Structure of a Competition Lower levels of conventional power competition could also be divided into
land, sea and air services competitions. In a word, the competition aspects of
national defense development strategy objectives requires that one enter into it
with an analysis of the specifics of the competition and use the overall
competition objective to determine each of the subsystem's competition missions,
using the competition functions of each subsystem to assure the competition
results of the whole. The basic tactics that competition objectives force us to
adopt are to attack the weakness of the enemy and avoid his strength, and to
develop our strength and avoid our own shortcomings. If we cannot attain these
then we ought to raise competition to a new sphere where the enemy and we are on
the same plane, and where we strive to gain the initiative and have the ability
to change before the enemy.
Predicting Competitions Elasticity of Competition We must build and complete effective feedback loops, change static
projections into dynamic projections, continuously make use of feedback
information, promptly come out with new assessments and selections, and make
timely and necessary adjustments, refinements, and amendments to predefined
objectives to ensure a subjectively and objectively unified state. We must also
focus on the relationship between the positive flexibility and negative
flexibility of the objectives. In terms of its totality, strategy objectives
must be sought with keen determination, with an eye towards ensuring positive
flexibility and not "holding back a trick or two" but "giving the extra effort"
when something comes up. With scientifically based predictions, we must prepare
beforehand various plans for selection and be prepared for the enemy changing
and our own changes, as well as our changing before the enemy can change. From
the partial perspective, even though we may strive to of our own accord to
influence change, there are times when we will definitely be forced into a
position of reacting to change, hence, we must concentrate on maintaining enough
latitude to deal with especially serious key elements so as to ensure the
stability of the overall predefined objective. There are times when we must use
some negative flexibility to ensure that a positive system can quickly move
toward the general development of a predefined objective.
The Development of Modern Weaponry and National Defense Science and
Technology One is electronics. With the development of microelectronics, computers,
satellite communications, lasers, and other technologies and greater
improvements seen in communications, navigation, radar, telemetering, remote
control, remote sensing, and modern electronic command, control, and
communications systems because of electronics and the radio, various kinds of
weapons systems are extensively using electronic equipment and technology. From
the perspective of the cost accounting of weapons systems, the percentage of the
costs of the electronic equipment within each of these weapons systems is
relatively sizable. In aircraft, it is 33 percent; in missiles, 45 percent; in
space vehicles, 66 percent; in military vessels, 22 percent; and in combat
vehicles, 24 percent. Electronic equipment has already become an indispensable
component of modern weapons systems. It has also become the nerve center of
modern weapons systems. With the development of the fifth generation of
computers, artificial intelligence, and robotic technology, it is possible that
troops could be equipped with simple artificial intelligence weapons systems in
the future.
Second is the change in guidance systems. Since the 1950s, along with the
development and discovery of new technologies like wireless, television,
infrared, laser, microwave, inertia guidance, photoelectricity,
acousto-electronics, sensors, and precision measuring and automation,
precision-guided weapons systems (cruise missile, surface-to-air missile,
air-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles,
ship-borne missiles and antitank missiles) have appeared along with terminal
precision-guided weapons warheads for guided artillery shells, guided bombs, and
guided torpedoes. The guidance system changes in these weapon systems have
greatly increased their capabilities for automatic searches and identification
and attack, and have increased tenfold the precision of these weapons systems,
to the point of near perfect accuracy.
Third is covertness. Weapons are tools for the destruction of the enemy but
at the same time, they are also the major target of offensives by the enemy. The
new technological revolution has searched for and provided advanced equipment,
ways, and methods for the modern battlefield, and together with troops, weapons
have now become a serious threat. In the history of combat, to increase
battlefield survivability of weapons, man has thought of many kinds of decoys
and camouflage. With the development of invisible light technology (like
infrared, ultraviolet, laser, microwave, and others), surveillance technology
and various anticamouflage technology, original camouflage mechanisms have lost
a great deal of their effectiveness. To increase their battlefield
survivability, weapons systems have begun moving toward the direction of
concealment. "Concealment" is the use of various types of scientific technology
to decrease detection by radar, infrared, photoelectricity, and weapons sighting
systems. It is the adoption of a specialized technology through systems research
and design. Major "concealment" methods include:
War and the need for the development of weapons power are the motivations for
weapons development. As long as war, an abnormal development of mankind,
persists, the military will strive to find more sophisticated weaponry and
suggest the need for development of weapons. With this "demand as an incentive,"
opposing sides, all wanting victory, will initiate national defense construction
"monitors" for "military expenditures" for large investments in national defense
science and technology and support for research work in the leading edge of
technology and advanced weapons systems. The greatest "investment returns" in
weapons development for national security and arms superiority would be a
pioneering spirit in new ideas, exploitation, and creation of new technologies.
In other words, national defense science and technology could apply all kinds of
new technologies to both the research of weapons and their production, thus
acting as "technology boosters." In this way, the research disciplines within
national defense science and technology could become the "breeding grounds" for
high technology development; furthermore, the new achievements of science and
technology would most appropriately find their first applications within the
military.
Weapons Development and the National Defense Economy
In 1945, the atomic bomb appeared. The research of computers for weapons
use came in 1946. In 1952, the first transistorized computer was developed. In
1953, the world's first hydrogen bomb was exploded. In 1955, the first
nuclear-powered submarine was launched. In August 1957, the first
intercontinental ballistic missile was fired, and in October of that same
year, the first manmade satellite was orbited. In 1960, mankind recovered its
first satellite. In 1961, the world's first manned satellite did an orbit
around the earth and returned to the surface. In 1967, the first integrated
circuit was successfully developed. In 1969, man had his first landing on the
moon. In 1977, the neutron bomb was researched and developed. In April 1981,
the world's first spacecraft flew. The research and production of all these
new weapons and equipment and a large portion of the new technology that
entered into the sphere of the national defense economy not only greatly
changed the production and industrial structure of the national defense
economy, it also added a series of new production and industrial sectors.
These changes helped to restructure the traditional national defense
industries, moving them in the direction of technological improvement, and
development of a technological reserve. The diffusion of a large quantity of
high technology made it possible to turn a consuming national defense economy
into a propagating field of national defense economy. Weapons and Equipment Development and Military Scientific
Theory
During the Falklands War, England's SHEFFIELD class missile destroyer did
not even have the opportunity to react before it was hit by Argentina's EXOCET
missile. With this short span of time, it is very difficult to react. This has
made even greater demands on command and control. The largeness of the
battlefield and the number of troops involved have given rise to immense
increases in technical weaponry and specialized technology and have caused
even greater problems in the coordination of operations and commands.
According to reports, there were only 20 different military specialties during
Word War I. It grew to 160 during World War II, and at present, the number of
military technologies and specializations exceed 2,000. During combat, the
army, navy, air force, and the other different service branches are all
involved at the same time. The types of weapons used are never less than a
dozen and usually are in the hundreds. This alone would demand that the
commander prepare detailed plans and coordinate his commands well. There must
be no mistakes in differentiating missions, allotting time, and coordinating
activities. Any small error could lead to major mistakes and even greater
disasters.
Weapons and Equipment Development Strategy Research China is a socialist country and a part of the Third World. This is the
political basis from which China formulates its national defense development
strategy. China espouses a foreign policy of independence and
self-determination. It is against all expansionism and aggression. It supports
all struggles and movements for justice. China, together with the rest of the
Third World, is a major force for the preservation of world peace. This demands
that China have the necessary military strength and an appropriate weapons
development program to defend itself against outside aggression. It also demands
that it have the ability to completely protect its territory and rights, to
protect its country's unity, legitimate rights, interests and self-respect, to
prevent the breakout of world wars and to protect world peace. China is a
country that is still economically, scientifically, and technologically
undeveloped. This in itself imposes a limit on the amount of money it can
possibly commit to weapons development and makes it even more impossible for it
to be involved in an arms race. Thus, the development of China's weaponry must
be based on the needs of national defense and military construction and economic
strength, the level of potential in construction and its economic strength, the
level of potential in the development of its science and technology, and the
independent, self-determining and self-reliant road it takes toward developing
weaponry. In the near future, our actions must be firmly directed toward
transforming our present weaponry, so that our military weapons will be improved
by the end of the century and they will have the ability to meet the demands of
a localized conflict. We must also face the future by developing weapons systems
for our country, striving to reach world advanced standards in weapons in the
next century and carrying out the modernization of our weapons. In order to
realize the objectives of the above-mentioned weapons development strategy, our
military must develop suitable strategic nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear
weapons, strengthen its research for precision-guided weapons and electronic and
technological equipment, and work even more toward modifying various
conventional weapons.
Strategic nuclear weapons are not only a combat tool of immense destructive
power; they also serve as powerful deterrents and an anti-deterrent force. After
our country had successfully exploded its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964,
it went on to successfully explode its first hydrogen bomb in June 1967. With
every step China takes in the development of its strategic nuclear weapons, the
strength of world peace is also increased by those steps. China's development of
its limited nuclear capability is completely for the purpose of defense, for
breaking up the nuclear monopoly and nuclear threats of the United States and
the Soviet Union, and for preserving long-lasting world peace. To win time for
the world to stabilize within this nightmarish nuclear situation and to provide
our socialist modernization greater security in the international environment,
to completely destroy the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to
strive for the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, to proceed toward
preventing a world from exploding into war, and to increase the strength for
world peace over war so that China and Third World countries can play a greater
role in international affairs, China must continue to develop proper strategic
weapons and move toward upgrading their precision, lessening their weight, and
increasing their mobile combat capability.
Field tactical nuclear weapons are an effective antipersonnel weapon. The
extent of their destructive area is above 300 km. This weapon not only has the
superior tactical technical capabilities of long range, fast firing rate, high
accuracy, and great destructive power, but it could also be used as a surprise
weapon in major field operations to strive for and grasp the field initiative.
In its tactical use, in an offensive situation it could directly break up the
effective fire power of the enemy and destroy the defense points of the enemy
from a distance, or it could attack the depth defenses of the enemy and cut off
the enemy's retreat. In a defensive situation it could attack the enemy rear
echelon troops, stop the continuous assault of the enemy, and defend against the
enemy making a direct deep push. Coordinated and complementary field tactical
nuclear missiles used with various other conventional weapons systems could give
the military greater military benefits and battlefield power. In a situation
where, temporarily, no global wars are being fought, localized wars will be the
major forms of combat for a period of time. In localized wars, the possible use
of field tactical nuclear weapons by the enemy cannot be dismissed. Thus, China
appropriately and within reason must develop field tactical nuclear weapons in
order to further break down the various kind of nuclear threats of the
hegemonists and restrain the use of field tactical nuclear weapons by the enemy.
After the implementation of the strategical changes in the guiding ideologies
of military construction, the serious research of various weapons systems for
localized wars will become the major tasks of our country's weapons system
development for a period of time. The effective use in recent years of
conventional precision-guided weapons in several localized combat theaters of
operations has been followed with general interest by various countries around
the world. Our national socialist characteristics have also determined that the
major combat form of our military will hereafter still be that of defending our
national territory. In a defensive war, the major missions assumed by our
military will be defending against the enemy's surprise air attacks and stopping
a mass invasion by the enemy's tanks. In our military's conventional arms
buildup, the development of different precision-guided weapons for anti-air and
antitank defense will be of special importance.
The level of modernization of our weapons directly corresponds to how
sophisticated our electronic technology is and this will have a direct impact on
victory or defeat in modern warfare. After our forces are equipped with a large
quantity of electronic equipment and computers, not only will the electronic
command, control, communications and information systems (C3I) within our combat
and control become highly automated, and simple platforms and partial electronic
equipments of warfare like reconnaissance and antireconnaissance, jamming and
antijamming, destructive and antidestruction devices be completely transformed
for "electronic wars;" they will also allow electronic technology to spread and
permeate into all of the other weapons systems until it becomes the mainstay of
our modern weaponry. The energetic development of our country's military use of
electronic technology is of utmost importance to upgrading the modernization
level of our military weapons and closing the weapons gap with advanced
countries.
For a long time, our military had summarized a complete set of combat methods
and experience on how to gain victory with inferior equipment over a superiorly
equipped enemy. Facing a strong opponent, our military would be inferior in
terms of weapons. Our country's economic strength is still very weak, our
science and technology is still not very developed and compared to a strong
enemy, the gap in our weapons will be difficult to overcome immediately. After
our country implemented the strategic change of "transferring the work emphasis
towards economic construction," there has been little possibility that military
expenditures will be increased greatly and also little possibility that more
money will be forthcoming for the research of sophisticated weapons. Thus, we
must begin exploring new ways to develop weapons that possesses Chinese
characteristics.
On the one hand, we can track the development of global high technology,
build a good technological reservoir, and actively research new weapons systems
in order to lay a foundation to close the gap with the advanced standards in
foreign countries. On the other hand, we can use what we currently have and what
high-technology results we have already achieved to change the low-tech
conventional weapons system in our military, and upgrade the tactical
technological capability of our present weapons so that with these slightly
improved low-tech weapons systems we can still win a victory over our enemy's
hi-tech weapons.
A weapons development strategy is an important component of our national
defense development strategy. In the historical situation where our guiding
ideology for military buildup is undergoing grave strategic changes, the somber
formulation of a military weapons development strategy, the development of
military weapons in a planned, focused, and measured way, and the acceleration
of the pace of development of our military weapons will all have practical and
long term impacts on encouraging our military's modernization and
standardization.
Yang Wei Military Forum recently called a "Pen Meeting on Tactical Studies" at the
Shaanxi Military Command. Guided by Mao Zedong's military thinking and Deng
Xiaoping's thinking on Army-building during the new historical stage,
participants at the meeting aired their views, which have provided us with much
food for thought, on battlefield environment and basic tactics of modern warfare
under future hi-tech conditions, renewing military concepts, and strengthening
the study of tactical changes from a technological angle.
Today, some people believe that the economic arena has been most affected by
the technological revolution and has seen the greatest changes. This is true.
However, as long as we study closely the Yang Wei serves at the Shaanxi Military
Command. This essay originally appeared in the Liberation Army Daily, 28 May
1993, 3.
several limited wars that have taken place in the postwar world, it will not
be difficult to see that the technological revolution has had similarly powerful
effects on the military arena. Military technology has undergone changes with
each passing day. However, the basic law that the military absorbs and utilizes
scientific and technological results the fastest and the most has not changed a
bit.
The PLA enjoys a good reputation in the world after overcoming very strong
enemies on several occasions. For the PLA, refraining from remaining satisfied
with past glory and being brave enough to stand at the new starting point are
key to overcoming one's self. To show indifference and apathy toward changes in
weaponry, while being intoxicated with the glorious history of the past, is an
great ideological roadblock. Since the 1980s, the powerful message relayed by
hi-tech weaponry has resulted in drastic changes in operational methods. We must
shift our point of interest and stimulus to high technology. Should we stick to
the traditional train of thought, or study medium- or low-tech operations when
we are aware of hi-tech weapons, we would be making an error. Under such
circumstances, we would become our own enemy and would have defeated ourselves
before any action had taken place.
To overcome the enemy in ourselves, we must seek out our own weaknesses.
Compared with the armed forces of industrially developed countries, the PLA is
used to studying tactics from the strategic rather than the technological angle.
This is chiefly because PLA weapons and equipment have lagged behind those of
the enemy for a long time, and there was no other choice; on the other hand, it
is undeniable that it was quite beyond PLA ability to study tactics from a
technological angle because of knowledge limitations. Obviously, such conditions
must be changed today.
We should never evade our shortcomings; the result of evasion can only be a
widening of the gap. It is imperative for us to pursue our glorious tradition of
overcoming an enemy with superior weaponry and equipment with our inferior ones
and to seek ways of dealing with hi-tech warfare through high-tech study. Meager
hi-tech knowledge or even ignorance would be like trying to catch a sparrow when
blindfolded, and new tactics would become outmoded even before they were
applied. Only by renovating our knowledge and absorbing the results of
technology studies done by foreign armed forces will it be possible for us to go
deep into modern hi-tech warfare to seek out the laws governing things at a
deeper level, while refraining from letting our studies stay at some superficial
level characterized by "being extensive in scope for a short period with a quick
tempo."
The PLA has implemented a great change in its strategic guiding ideas since
1985, which was a first step made in transcending the self. However, we cannot
expect transcending the self to be completed by a single change. We said long
ago that we should not study "minor warfare" with the concept of "a major war";
however, as soon as a study begins in depth, the "major war" train of thought
would dominate academic study. From another angle, this shows that the degree of
difficulty in overcoming the self can be very great and that there is still a
long way to go.
The impetus for overcoming the self originates from sober judgment and
scientific analysis. For example, in hi-tech warfare, tactical effectiveness no
longer depends on the size of forces or the extent of firepower and motorized
forces, but more on control systems over the war theater and efficiency in
utilizing information from the theater. "Superiority in numbers and strength" no
longer plays a decisive role. The amount of time modern hi-tech warfare can be
sustained is already leaning toward "a quick decision," some even call it
"second-count warfare," and great changes have taken place in the relationship
between a traditional "quick decision" and protraction.
The goal of war has changed from attacking cities and strategic locations
regardless of the cost, as in the past, to obtaining maximum result with minimum
cost, thus paying greater attention to seeking a favorable strategic state. War
is now becoming "clean," a demand that hi-tech means are capable of meeting.
That "war begins only after a declaration has been made" is now a historical
concept, and the traditional "three steps" has been replaced by a new "three
steps," namely, "low-altitude, night action, and electronic warfare," and so
forth. We should resolutely do away with our outdated "Panorama" of war, broaden
our vision, and find a new path for overcoming the self.
Second, tactical studies should guide reform in military training. Presently,
explorations and discussions of the Gulf war are being approached at a deeper
level to seek "new" characteristics and revelations. The tremendous energy
released by hi-tech operational forces on the battlefield originates from the
long-term accumulation of an army's peacetime building; such quantitative
accumulation is precisely the result of strict training aside from breakthroughs
in tactical studies and the impetus of technological development. The
requirements of hi-tech warfare on our army's training are that training should
be implemented according to a program, but it should not go round and round at a
low level characterized by achieving "certain scores in shooting, certain times
in obstacle clearance operations, certain distances in grenade throwing, and
certain skills on the horizontal bar." Military training should not be limited
to the traditional repetition and extension of the experiences of officers and
men from one generation to the next. High technology should be regarded as the
extension of the arm and the expansion of the brain to war as well as the main
content of training. An army with low-level intelligence training will be
eliminated in war. This has been proven time and again in recent limited wars.
If we believe that the ways and principles of traditional military training
remain useful, they should not stay in the simple form of whether or not the
army's forces are concentrated and whether or not coordinating actions are
implemented. Military principles and predetermined operational plans could
possibly be "included" in computer software for future operations through the
"starter" of military training in peacetime operational studies, joint
exercises, the finalization of weapon designs, army formations, seeking optimum
tactics, and building automated systems. Such military training is "war
behavior" in a higher sense and has unfolded "war" in a comprehensive way in
peacetime, where war is but a final solution through one or several contentions.
Tactical studies may provide new trains of thought or goals for army
building; however, how we should combine "tactics" with "the way of building"
eventually depends on man's dynamic role. The limited wars of the 1980s and
1990s provide us with a clear picture: the two major factors of arms and man are
merging with each other, and man's decisive role is not only embodied in the
employment of weaponry, but runs through the weapons systems. In the Gulf War,
the multinational air force controlled some 30 airfields, 122 in-flight
refueling lines, 660 no-fly zones, and 220 air corridors, involving scores of
computers working around the clock. Because computers simulate man's thinking,
the extent of its dependence on man is far greater than other technological
equipment. What differs from the past is that intelligent weapons systems
possess certain thinking "functions," whereas man's intelligence and wisdom is
realized through making weapons intelligent. Passing judgment while relying
solely on the direct perception of the commander is a long way from complying
with modern warfare.
Modern trained soldiers are the leaders and organizers of a new hi-tech
revolution. Many strategists with vision have stated that the next century will
be a time for the combination of soldiers and high technology, and soldiers
should be the ones who blaze new trails at the forefront of science and
technology. Military technology is entering the forefront of military
development with a faster development rate, higher practical value, and still
greater military and economic results. Should we hesitate to take into
consideration the issue of training qualified people until we come across a new
technology on the battlefield, we will undoubtedly be doomed to defeat.
It is not too difficult to play a musical instrument; however, he who plays a
musical instrument is not necessarily a musician. An outstanding musician must
have a perfect command of musical theory, while having a good knowledge of every
single piece of the musical instrument under his baton. Likewise, on a hi-tech
battlefield, an accomplished commander should have a perfect command of basic
tactics, while being familiar with the use of various technological means in
conducting war. Only then will it be possible for him to perform one scene after
the other full of the power and grandeur of the arena of war. It is precisely in
this way that hi-tech warfare has set such a severe historical requirement.
Up to the present, there have been three military revolutions:
This article is from Contemporary Military Affairs, March 11, 1996.
Concentration of military force is an operational principle universally
followed by strategists in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad; it is
mainly achieved by increasing the density of unit-space military force.
Following the rapid development of technology and its increasingly widespread
application in military affairs, the ancient military principle of concentration
of military force must be reconsidered and viewed from a new angle:
The method of the past in which a decisive battle with the enemy's main force
was sought makes it difficult to grasp the opportunity for battle and also makes
it difficult to achieve ideal results. However, provided the enemy's information
system and his command and decisionmaking system are destroyed, countered, or
interfered with, thereby destroying his capability to obtain, process, transmit,
control, and use information, we can paralyze the enemy's entire operational
system and thus he will lose his operational capability. This has more results
in actual combat than continually killing or wounding many troops, and
continually destroying many ordinary weapons. That is to say, the meaning in the
traditional sense of "destroy the enemy and preserve oneself" should be extended
to "strike the enemy's information system and ensure our side's capability for
information warfare."
In a certain sense, for armed forces in the information era the test of
strength is between intelligence capabilities, and the core of the third
military revolution is the development and use of information capability.
Therefore, some people say: If we say that in the two previous military
revolutions, because of the use of chemical, thermal, and nuclear energy, man's
physical capability was extended and man's four limbs were liberated, then the
third military revolution, which develops and uses information capability, will
extend man's intelligence capability and liberate man's cerebrum. The armed
forces of the future will be "high-tech forces" with photoelectric specialists,
information specialists, aviation specialists, and other outstanding specialized
talents as its core.
Long-Range Combat Outer Space Combat
Paralysis Combat
Formation of the mutually connected system allows a front-line commander to
directly obtain intelligence from general headquarters or space information
centers, and the middle-level commander loses the reason for his existence. This
will make the command system of future armed forces, because of the reduction in
the number of levels, a thin and flat structure that is wide horizontally and
short vertically. Therefore, this kind of command system is called a "thin and
flat" command system. Its main characteristics are: all the network's nodal
points are connected vertically and horizontally, thereby both maintaining the
strong point of the past vertical connection between the upper- and lower- level
units, which is convenient for centralized command, and have the capability to
make direct connections between parallel units, which is convenient for
dispersed command. The "thin and flat" command system will lead to a change in
the form of command, which will shift from the former centralized command to
dispersed command, and, under a unified plan, the lower-level commanders will
have a primary role in decisionmaking. This thin and flat command system will be
able to reduce the amount of information flow, shorten the line of information
flow, ensure that the lower-level commanders obtain real-time battlefield
intelligence, improve the capability for decisionmaking response, and fully
display subjective capability.
Operational simulation this "laboratory" for war no matter whether in the
domains of military science, armed forces system and establishment, weapon
development, and military training, or in the aspects of selection of long-range
delivery of military force and firepower, force composition, plan formulation,
logistics and technical support, and tactical application, is playing an
increasingly important role. For example, in unit training, by providing an
operational simulation system that is sufficiently scientific and rational for
tanks, armored vehicles, portable weapons, aircraft, helicopters, ground combat
units, and other systems, training costs can be reduced, thereby greatly
improving the beneficial results of training and increasing its safety. As of
now, the U.S. Armed Forces have set up six laboratories for simulation
techniques and methods. These six laboratories, by putting all arms and branches
of the service on line with computers, can combine in one form the units,
weapons and equipment with simulation equipment, and if necessary can conduct
large-scale combined arms exercises. Britain, Russia, Japan, France, Sweden, and
Israel are vigorously exploring the use of laboratories similar to those
mentioned above.
Major General Zheng Qinsheng The end of the Cold War has added many uncertain factors to the international
situation. In our efforts to make a greater contribution to the development of
our country and nation during this major historical transition period, we should
first gain a clear idea of the following two issues concerning military
struggle: One is the need to carefully analyze changes in the international
strategic setup in our age and be clear about the tasks of military struggle,
with a view to keeping to the correct orientation of the struggle; the other is
the need to profoundly grasp the law of military struggle in the new period and
provide correct strategic guidance, with a view to gaining a sound grasp of work
methods.
This article is from Liberation Army Daily, July 16, 1996, 6.
Ever since the time when countries first appeared, war has always been a
major way to seek national rights and interests. The evolution of human history,
as well as the rise and decline of countries, are mostly a historical record of
war. That is why historians have noted: "War is the normal behavior of mankind."
However, during the past 50 years, in the wake of World War II, considerable
changes have taken place in the forms of war, unprecedented, savage
intercontinental wars have occurred, and the past nearly half a century has
witnessed a sustained period of relative stability. During this period, "cold
war" has to a great extent, taken the place of the "hot war" of violent
confrontation. Instead of causing worldwide turbulence, the over 200 local wars
and armed conflicts that have taken place during this period have been
effectively limited to a certain scope and intensity.
Deterrence has become a prominent component of modern national strategy, yet
it is not a strategy for staging wars but for avoiding wars. It can be said that
every formulator of war strategies will have the same thought: On the one hand,
he should try his very best to prevent his country from being drawn into a
modern war; and on the other hand, he will also try his utmost to enable his
country to win an advantageous strategic position and to realize the ideal of
"winning a war without actually going into it." As a result, plans to win wars
have been turned into efforts to contain war. Such changes, which have been
brought about by the special features of military struggle, are not only a
reflection of objective material conditions, but a selection of subjective will
and behavior as well. The former is based on the fact that the military
revolution facilitated by scientific and technological advances has provided the
objective material means for deterrence; while the latter gives expression to a
distillation in the understanding of wars shared by strategists.
With the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region and the future arrival of
the Pacific age in the 21st century, hegemonists have stepped up their economic,
scientific and technological, cultural, and military infiltration into the
Asian-Pacific region, thus giving prominence to a number of hidden
contradictions. In our efforts to attain the strategic targets of economic
take-off and national rejuvenation, we hope to have a peaceful international
environment in order and a stable neighboring environment; to explore and make
use of more resources for the purpose of promoting the economic, scientific, and
technological development of the country; to gain greater shares in
international markets and successfully practice an export-oriented economic
strategy; to arouse the self-confidence and enterprising spirit of our
nationals; and to safeguard the integrity of our country and nation. External
challenges are unavoidable, and what counts is how we are going to meet the
challenges and take countermeasures.
To fulfill the tasks of military struggle in the new period, the most
important issues are those of military strength and strategic guidance. In
ancient times, military strategy was called the "principles of commanding
generals." In modern times, military strategy was summed up as the "art of wars
and battles," a belief shared among Napoleon, Clausewitz, von Moltke, and
Schlieffen. Contemporary strategists believe, however, that traditional military
strategies dealt only with what an army must do during wartime and failed to
make clear what they should do during peacetime. We must be aware that with the
rapid development of science and technology in the world today, the issue of the
peacetime building and the development of military strength is becoming the
focus of attention among military strategists. Defense experts in western
countries have stressed that today's military strategy is no longer the "science
of military victories." This means that under a longstanding peaceful
environment, the emphasis of military strategies has been shifted from wartime
to peacetime; and peacetime strategies will not be limited to the planning and
guidance of wars, but will also cope with the issue of how to build up and
develop military strength during peacetime.
The Americans have claimed that victory in the Gulf War was the outcome of 20
years of hard effort. In a sense, the "20 years of hard effort" refers to the
whole process of rebuilding their military strength. In the wake of the Vietnam
War, the U.S. Armed Forces suffered from low morale and army building remained
in the doldrums. To put an end to such a situation, they carried out a series of
reforms in such fields as military theory, military technology, military
training, cultivation of military officers, and operational formations. The 20
years of of hard effort have brought new life to the armed forces. This is a
typical example of "winning a war before actually going into it."
In a local high-tech war, the first battle is the decisive battle, which will
decide the outcome of the entire war. Generally speaking, there will no longer
be any chance for wearing down the enemy's effective strength. In view of this,
experts have pointed out that most victories on future battlefields will not be
"decided by the war itself" but "decided by pre-war building." Therefore, to
fulfill the tasks of military struggle in the new period, we must plant our feet
on the reform and the quality building of our army. To reinforce the quality
building of our army, we must persistently carry out theory-trailed policies. A
global review tells us that in the past, the blueprints for army building were
mostly drawn up on the basis of experience gained in previous wars. Today, they
are designed in accordance with the demands of future wars.
What are the demands of future wars? We can only gain a clear idea through
theoretical thinking, and can only complete such a design through the
theoretical study of science. With the emergence of the technology of "virtual
reality," the military theories guiding future wars will be produced in combat
laboratories, and the inspection of the "product" quality of the army will also
be conducted in combat laboratories. This tremendous change has provided new
ideas for military development.
A military revolution is now in the ascendant in today's world. Thoughts on
reinforcing the quality building of our army should be conducted against this
general background. "After going through the stages of bare-handed battles, cold
steel weapons, hot steel weapons, and mechanization, military operations are now
entering the information age. These five major military revolutions corresponded
with five industrial revolutions."
What we need to do now is to study the information war under nuclear
deterrence; the well-known scientist Qian Xuesen laid bare the essence of the
military revolution with one remark. "The world has entered a period of new
military revolution, which is a reflection of social, economic, and scientific
and technological changes in the military field. Information technology is the
nucleus and foundation of this military revolution."
Information and knowledge have changed the past practice by which military
capacities were simply measured by numbers of armored divisions, wings of the
air force, and aircraft carrier combat groups. Today, we also need to count
invisible strengths, including:
In recent years, our troops have attained considerable results in
implementing the military strategic principle of the new period, learning
high-tech technologies and knowledge, and in studying wars under high-tech
conditions. However, where shall we place the nucleus of high-tech development?
Where shall we put the main emphasis of local high-tech wars?
A consensus on these issues has yet to be reached throughout the army. People
still tend to place greater emphasis on hardware instead of software, and on the
present instead of the future. Such a transitional "optical parallax" is
hindering us from gaining a correct grasp of major contradictions.
In our consideration of the quality development of our military in the
context of a world military revolution, we need to appropriately handle
relations between universality and individuality and between generality and
particularity. Armies have always had a role in the international arena.
Therefore, the modernization building of our army will naturally follow the
common law guiding the world's army modernization, yet it also needs to maintain
its "Chinese characteristics" at the same time. It should not copy
indiscriminately the patterns of Western developed countries, yet cannot cut
itself off from the general trend of the military revolution. From the strategic
change in its guiding ideology to the formulation of a military strategic
principle for the new period, our army can be said to have completed the change
in its strategic guidance only, and needs to make further efforts to facilitate
a change in its overall building.
In view of this, we have called for the efforts of all officers and men of
our army to conduct a conscientious study of
A future war, which may be triggered by a disruption to the network of the
financial sector, may be combat between digitized units or a two-man show, with
the spaceman (or robot) on the stage and the think tank behind the scenes. It
may also be an interaction in the military, political, and economic domains,
making it hard to define as a trial of military strength, a political argument,
or an economic dispute. All this has something to do with the leap forward of
modern technology and the rise of the revolution in the military domain.
The technological revolution provides only a stage for confrontations. Only
when this revolution is married with military operations can it take on the
characteristics of confrontation. Some believe that the information
superhighway, the Internet, computers, and multimedia are synonymous with
commerce, profit, and communications. In fact, this is far from true.
Thanks to modern technology, revolutionary changes in the information domain,
such as the development of information carriers and the Internet, are enabling
many to take part in fighting without even having to step out of the door. The
rapid development of networks has turned each automated system into a potential
target of invasion. The fact that information technology is increasingly
relevant to people's lives determines that those who take part in information
war are not all soldiers and that anybody who understands computers may become a
"fighter" on the network. Think tanks composed of nongovernmental experts may
take part in decisionmaking; rapid mobilization will not just be directed to
young people; information-related industries and domains will be the first to be
mobilized and enter the war; traditional modes of operations will undergo major
changes; operational plans designed for information warfare will be given
priority in formulation and adoption; and so on and so forth. Because other
technologies are understood by people only after they are married with
information technology and because information technology is becoming
increasingly socialized, information warfare is not the business of armed forces
alone. Conditions exist that effectively facilitate the participation of the
public in information warfare.
This article was excerpted from the Military Forum column, Liberation Army
Daily, June 25, 1996.
Information is intercommunicative and therefore must not be categorized by
sector or industry. It is very wrong to think that information in only the
military field is worth keeping secret and that information for civil purposes
does not belong to the category of secrecy. In fact, if no security measures are
taken to protect computers and networks, information may be lost. Similarly, if
we think it is the business of intelligence and security departments to obtain
the enemy's information and that it has nothing to do with anyone else, we would
miss a good opportunity to win an information war.
In March 1995, Beijing's Jingshan School installed a campus network with 400
PCs, an "intelligent building" design, and multimedia technology. The school
runs 10 percent of its courses through computers; students borrow books from the
library through a computerized retrieval system; and experiments are conducted
with demonstrations based on multimedia simulation systems. This illustrates in
microcosm the many information networks that our country has built with its own
resources. More than one million PCs were sold in China in 1995, and the figure
is expected to reach 2.7 million in 1996. Faced with the tendencies of a
networking age, if we looked upon these changes merely from a civil perspective
and made no military preparations, we would undoubtedly find ourselves biased
and shortsighted.
An information war is inexpensive, as the enemy country can receive a
paralyzing blow through the Internet, and the party on the receiving end will
not be able to tell whether it is a child's prank or an attack from its enemy.
This characteristic of information warfare determines that each participant in
the war has a higher sense of independence and greater initiative. However, if
organization is inadequate, they may each fight their own battles and cannot
form joint forces. Additionally, the Internet may generate a large amount of
useless information that takes up limited channels and space and blocks the
action of one's own side. Therefore, only by bringing relevant systems into play
and combining human intelligence with artificial intelligence under effective
organization and coordination can we drown our enemies in the ocean of an
information offensive.
A people's war in the context of information warfare is carried out by
hundreds of millions of people using open-type modern information systems.
Because the traditional mode of industrial production has changed from
centralization to dispersion and commercial activities have expanded from urban
areas to rural areas, the working method and mode of interaction in the original
sense are increasingly information-based. Political mobilization for war must
rely on information technology to become effective, for example by generating
and distributing political mobilization software via the Internet, sending
patriotic e-mail messages, and setting up databases for traditional education.
This way, modern technical media can be fully utilized and the openness and
diffusion effect of the Internet can be expanded, to help political mobilization
exert its subtle influence.
In short, the meaning and implications of a people's war have profoundly
changed in the information age, and the chance of people taking the initiative
and randomly participating in the war has increased. The ethnic signature and
geographic mark on an information war are more pronounced and the application of
strategies is more secretive and unpredictable.
Information-based confrontations will aim at reaching tangible peace through
intangible war, maintaining the peace of hardware through software
confrontations, and deterring and blackmailing the enemy with dominance in the
possession of information. The bloody type of war will increasingly be replaced
by contention for, and confrontations of, information.
The concept of people's war of the old days is bound to continue to be
enriched, improved, and updated in the information age to take on a new form. We
believe any wise military expert would come to the same conclusion.
Major General Sun Bailin History shows that today's scientific dreams can readily become tomorrow's
scientific realities and today's scientific explorations can become sources of
development for tomorrow's socially productive forces and military combat power.
Therefore, people who are concerned about future social development trends
inevitably are also concerned with current scientific exploration. While
advancing toward a macro world, people are also engaging in unremitting
exploration of the micro world. Having undergone the "catalysis" of modern
science and technology, certain notions that used to be viewed as wild tales are
now approaching mankind "as if coming to "life." Some of man's fancies are to
manufacture extremely small-scale electrical machinery that can only be seen
under a microscope, an "intelligence chip" that could be transplanted into the
brain of an insect, a "remote controlled submarine" that could freely navigate
the human circulatory system, small-scale spacecraft and satellites the size of
a thimble, an actuator that could respond to a single atom, and so forth. These
are microscale electromechanical system technologies that have been discussed
with increasing frequency during the 1990s.
This article by Major General Sun Bailin of the Academy of Military
Science is excerpted from National Defense, June 15, 1996.
The term "microscale electromechanical system" principally refers to
controllable and movable microscale electromechanical apparatuses that have
exterior dimensions of less than a millimeter and the components of which have
dimensions that are in the micron to nanometer range. They are the inevitable
result of man's pursuit of the miniaturization of high-technology apparatuses
since the advent of microelectronic technology. As early as the beginning of the
1970s, exploratory research into microscale electromechanical systems had
already begun, but this field saw substantial development only by the end of the
mid-1980s. At that time, it was realized that by using advanced manufacturing
technology for large-scale integrated circuits, one could develop microscale
prototypes of large-scale mechanized systems. Hence, a "technological
revolution" was initiated advancing toward microscale electromechanical systems.
The essence of this "technological revolution" was that in the course of
transforming man's relationship with nature, we have progressed from the
material millimeter-micron stage to the molecular-atomic nanometer stage. It
could possibly bring about a leap forward in unit material storage and
information processing capabilities. Its basic characteristic is, through
precise, perfect control and accurate, subtle discrete forms, to configure
molecular or atomic structures rapidly and, according to a person's intent, to
control atoms and molecules or atomic and molecular clusters to manufacture
microscale devices with a specific function, thereby raising materials
processing technology to an unprecedented level.
Because this revolution's latent prospects for application and its extremely
rapid development, and also because of its having opened up several new high
technologies of great significance to the national economy and defense,
including nano-electronics, the study of nanomaterials, nanomechanics,
nanobiology, nanomanufacturing, nanosurveying, nanocontrol, and nanomicrology,
it is ushering in the "nano-era" of the 21st century. Experts commonly believe
that technology on the micron-nanometer scale is military-civilian dual-use
technology that contains extremely great promise. At present, its application in
military affairs consists primarily of two aspects: microscale electromechanical
systems and their micro-electric connected specialized integrated microscale
apparatuses.
Microscale Robot Electrical Incapacitation Systems When the target goes into operation, the systems sense the target's location
and move in its direction until they permeate the target's interior, thus
causing the enemy's electrical systems to malfunction. When releasing microscale
electromechanical systems, one should be as close to the target as possible. In
this way both time and equipment can be saved. After release, the systems can
automatically seek the target and permeate its interior, thus causing it to
wholly or partially lose its ability to operate. Microscale robot electrical
incapacitation systems have an additional potential use, which is an economic
blockade or embargo of the enemy. For example, by slipping into "information
superhighway" apparatuses and preventing unimpeded flow along the "information
superhighway," these systems could severely harm a modern, information-intensive
economy. In addition, strategic targets that are vulnerable to attack by
microscale robot electrical incapacitation systems include electrical power
systems, civilian aviation systems, transportation networks, seaports and
shipping, highways, television broadcast stations, telecommunications systems,
computer centers, factories and enterprises, and so forth. Of course, there are
those who worry that, were this kind of apparatus ever to used by an
international terrorist organization, it could very possibly become a
"double-edged sword" that threatens social stability.
Ant Robots Blood Vessel Submarines Distributed Battlefield Microscale Sensor Networks One possible case would be to use unmanned aircraft or other methods to
distribute a large number of low-cost, use-on-demand microscale sensor systems
over a combat zone. High-altitude unmanned aircraft would employ an onboard
coded laser of a modulated double-angle reflection communications system to
record the position of every microscale sensor. Then, the sensor systems begin
to collect, process, and store information, until another unmanned aircraft uses
an identical coded laser to send out an inquiry. Each sensor again employs
modulated double-angle reflectors to transmit its data back to the unmanned
aircraft. This type of microscale electromechanical system has clear advantages
in terms of deployment, endurance, and vulnerability. Compared to existing
theater long-range monitoring systems, microscale sensor systems are more
rapidly and conveniently deployed, and they are more complete. Existing sensor
equipment, when in the open, can be seen with the naked eye within a range of
200 meters. However, microscale electromechanical systems, which are measured in
millimeters, cannot be distinguished with the naked eye when dispersed in the
air and are also difficult to identify with instruments. Certain materials
reveal that microscale electromechanical systems are not confined to use in the
military arena. They also provide impetus for man's efforts to understand and
alter his environment in the fields of information technology, the study of
materials, environmental science, biology, and medical science.
In the application of specialized integrated microscale apparatuses, such
apparatuses currently being developed can acquire environmental information on
the local area or in remote areas and, through the specialized integrated
microscale apparatuses' gene-fragment communications system, transmit the
information to nearby microscale apparatuses. They can also transmit to a
central processor. The uses of specialized integrated microscale apparatuses
with the most vitality are the infield of space navigation. They will be able to
gradually replace all sorts of subsystems on current spacecraft and carrier
rockets, and then develop further into independent space systems, thus leading
to the advent of microscale satellites and "nanosatellites."
Nanosatellites
Of course, whether one discusses microscale electromechanical systems or
specialized integrated microscale apparatuses, their research and development
are not easy to accomplish. For microscale electromechanical system technology
and specialized integrated microscale apparatus technology to move from the
laboratory into engineering practice, and finally into application, there are
still quite a few difficulties that must be overcome. However, a variety of
indications show that "nanotechnological weapons" could well bring about
fundamental changes in many aspects of future military affairs. "Nanotechnology"
will certainly become a crucial military technology in the 21st century!
PART FOUR:
WEAPONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY
This article looks at how weapons and
military units will be information intensified, focusing mostly on the years
2010-2020. Information-intensified weapons include precision-guided weapons,
(guided bombs, artillery shells, and cluster bombs, cruise missiles,
target-guided missiles, and anti-radiation missiles). These are weapons that can
acquire and use information provided by the targets themselves to correct
trajectory. These smart weapons will be able to be launched from outside the
enemy firepower network and identify and attack targets. Their circular probable
error of target accuracy will be close to nil. The Gulf War has already
demonstrated that accurate guided weapons are the basic firepower of
high-technology warfare.
In the 21st century soldiers will carry
conventional rifles and hand grenades, and also use small, light-weight,
multimedia electronic information equipment. This equipment will have a personal
radio communications function, a global positioning system (GPS) direction-
finding function, a personal computer and network function, a night- vision
function, an identification (friend or foe) function, a warning function, and a
launch command function for some information-intensified weapons. The soldiers
will wear clothing with adjustable temperature and color; in some circumstances
personal flight platforms will be used.
The battle platforms of the 21st
century, including airplanes, vessels, and armored personnel carries, will all
be equipped with large amounts of electronic information equipment. They will
have various kinds of telecommunications equipment for use in exchanging combat
information with higher levels and neighboring units. They will have various
kinds of equipment to detect enemy targets, in order to provide information for
accurate firepower attacks against enemy targets. They will have ample computer
and computer-network capabilities that will be able to provide timely and
effective supplementary information for combat actions.
The C I system is the nerve center for
all information-intensified weapons and military units. When summarizing the
lessons of experience of the Gulf War, every country concluded that the C3I
system will have a tremendous role in future warfare. They emphasize that a
dispersed C3I system that resists destruction is the orientation for
development.
The weapons systems
of the 21st century will be "information-intensified weapons systems" made up of
information-intensified combat platforms and weapons and corresponding C3I
systems. Various kinds of information-intensified combat platforms in which
information-intensified weapons form the basic firepower and carry out different
missions will be logically arrayed to form "information-intensified combat
groups." The overall combat effectiveness of these combat groups will show a
qualitative leap, and they will be the main form of 21st-century combat systems.
In combat, if just one side has information-intensified units under control of
trained personnel, an "information-intensified battlefield" exists.
Information warfare uses firepower
and command to obtain and to deny information, to suppress and countersuppress,
and to deceive and counterdeceive, as well as to destroy and counter the
destruction of sources of information. It is also warfare to win people's minds
and boost morale by employing television, radio broadcasting, and leaflets
focused on the use and prevention of use of information.
Nuclear weapons appeared an the
end of World War II. They were followed by the appearance of the nuclear
deterrence concept in military theory. Owing to the appearance of large numbers
of high technology conventional weapons during the late 1970s, the concept of
conventional deterrence reappeared. Nuclear and conventional deterrence are not
just theoretical issues, but real forces that have a powerful and effect on a
potential adversary.
U.S. National Defense Science and
Technology Strategy, published in 1992, called for the development of seven
military technology capabilities, one of which was "synthetic environment." A
synthetic environment consists of a number of simulated systems that are
connected to form a network. The environment being completely visual, operators
can immerse themselves completely in the simulated environment. Any national
defense system that has computer programs, such as various combat platforms, C3I
systems, and models, can ultimately be incorporated into this environment for
various kinds of network combat simulation. One can create an electronic
battlefield by using this synthetic environment, which has a mixture of real and
simulated targets from factories to the battlefield and can be used in widely
separated locations, thereby enabling subscribers, research and development
personnel, and testing personnel to communicate effectively. This environment
enables both leaders and combat units to prepare for war and accompanies them to
the real battlefield.
Measures of
effectiveness for 20th-century military forces have often been portrayed as
static, but they will not suffice for military forces during the 21st century.
Once an information-intensified
military unit discovers the enemy disposition, it can make a judgment within a
very short time and decide what to do. It can concentrate powerful
precision-guided firepower to attack the enemy, its firepower figured in terms
of unit of time and unit of space, i.e., its firepower intensity is
unprecedentedly great. The strike accuracy of precision guided weapons is very
high, far higher than the firepower intensity that non-information-intensified
weapons can attain. Furthermore, although the total consumption of ammunition is
very great for non-information-intensified forms of combat such as blind firing,
enemy firepower suppression, and carpet bombing, when looked at in terms of the
targets of attack, the intensity of this firepower is really very low.
Mobility intensity as applied to combat troops
and combat platforms means the distance in space possible to move per unit of
time (day, hour, minute, or second). Applied to military units, it means the
quantity of combat troops that can move at the same time. The continued
development of power technology enables continued increases in the dynamic
properties of combat platforms. The continued development of electronics
technology makes possible accurate coordination of movement on a large scale. By
2010, global mobile warfare by joint forces (a combination of army, navy, and
air forces) may be possible. A single highly mobile army battalion may be able
to defeat two or more mobile army battalions.
The special feature of
information-intensified military units is full use of information. Information
intensity is the amount of information that an organizational unit can use, or
prevent the use of, within a unit of time or space. Information intensity is an
important indicator of accurate strike, coordinated warfare, command and
control, and electronic warfare capacities. A military unit whose information
intensity is very low cannot fight a high-technology war. A difference in
information intensity between two military forces is bound to translate into a
gap in combat capabilities.
Supply intensity means the amount of supplies of
various kinds that an organizational unit can provide per unit of time to a
prescribed area. The total amount of logistical supply for
information-intensified warfare during the 21st century will likely be less than
for today, but the intensity of supply will increase to meet the requirements of
highly destructive and highly mobile warfare.
The
human factor will be more prominent in high-technology warfare. Making the most
of the combat effectiveness of high-technology weapons and application of
correct strategy and tactics will depend on the caliber of military personnel.
Nevertheless, "fighting fiercely" requires an increase in weapon
payloads, and "fighting remotely and rapidly" requires an increase in combat
platform payloads.
21ST-CENTURY NAVAL WARFARE
Naval Lieutenant Commander Zhang
Haiyin
Naval Lieutenant Zhou Xinsheng
More triphibious and
multidimensional operations are going to develop in a battle space that
integrates land-sea, land-air, surface-subsurface, sea-space, and the full
electromagnetic spectrum. By now, warfare has been through the stages of cold
arms, hot arms, thermonuclear arms, and high-tech arms. As we have seen
scientific and technological advances steadily expand the scope of deployment of
combat forces, with armed attack and destructive might growing steadily,
battlefields are developing from single to multidimensional, little to greater
depth, small to large triphibious operations, and relatively fixed to uncertain
battle lines. The battlefield scope in the next century is also going to expand
sharply, with the major fields of expansion being outer space, undersea and
electromagnetic space. The use of high-tech arms will make direct attacks on
naval battlefields possible from outer space, remote altitudes, and remote land
bases, while improvement in long-range mobile combat capacity at sea will expand
the control and striking range of naval warfare. Naval battle space is going to
expand unprecedentedly.
For
thousands of years, the theory of "mastery of the seas" has always been praised
as the infallible law of decisive naval engagement. As aircraft carriers and
carrier-based aircraft have appeared, however, the theory, "Without mastery of
the air, there is no mastery of the seas," has found favor throughout the world.
Since the 1970s, "electromagnetic dominance" has also been held to be crucial to
naval victory. By the next century, as high-tech space technology develops, the
deployment of space-based weapons systems will be bound to make "mastery of
space" and "mastery of outer space" prerequisites for naval victory, with outer
space becoming the new commanding elevation for naval combat. All spacecraft,
including military satellites, space shuttles, and permanent space-based
platforms, will observe and control maritime operations from high altitudes,
with space-based weapons systems probably directly attacking and intercepting
warships and their cruise missiles. But ships at sea will take stronger
antireconnaissance steps, probably constituting along with seabed-based weapons
platforms for direct strikes against space satellites and other space systems.
The electromagnetic battle will densely cover all naval battle space,
penetrating all combat operations. The side with electromagnetic combat
superiority will make full use of that invisible "killer mace" to win naval
victory.
In the 21st century, the
development of a host of new science and technology fields and new sciences will
certainly speed up the development of naval weaponry:
In addition, marine environment technology will also be
employed by the navy. In short, the new naval-warfare weaponry will have six
features:
So it could be said that smarter, more electronic, and more lethal
systems will be the basic development trends of the coming naval-warfare arms.
Naval warfare
has developed and changed enormously in this century, and its development and
changes in the next century are going to be amazing. Naval warfare in the 21st
century is bound to bring about an historic change in its traditional appearance
to confront the people of the next century. Today, while our forecast of the
major issues of 21st century naval warfare is subject to time limitations and is
not immune to mistakes, we can still forecast future naval warfare in order to
proceed actively with our future naval preparations.
THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN NAVAL WARFARE
Naval Lieutenant Commander Zhang
Haiyin
Naval Lieutenant Zhou Xinsheng
At present, technology groups, such as technologies of
nuclear, space, shipbuilding, microelectronics, satellite, air cushion, surface
effect, new materials and marine technology, are becoming the materials bases
for the new military revolution to influence naval combat theory and to change
concepts. Among the new technologies, electronic and information technologies
are of the most profound significance in terms of improving the capacity for
obtaining, processing and transmitting information of the battlefield,
increasing the transparency of the war, improving the precision and reliability
of firepower, and quickening the process of sea warfare. There is no doubt that
during the revolution, combat theory and concepts will be largely modified.
Like nuclear deterrence,
information deterrence is a new concept of victory without war and can even
prevent escalation of sea warfare. Electronic information is needed to
facilitate both naval and land operations and the command and control of vessels
and aircraft. The new military revolution will accelerate the digitization of
the naval battlefield, increase modes of communication, strengthen the capacity
for information processing and improve the efficiency of command and control.
High-speed platforms and long-range precision missiles will, to a great extent,
rely on effective combat information systems in order to achieve combat
efficiency. In addition, such systems will significantly improve the power of
platforms and weapons, resulting in a sharp increase in the role of information,
control of which then becomes a new and important deterrent. The side
controlling information will be able to manipulate the beginning, middle, and
end of the war, attack the enemy with advanced information weapons to paralyze
enemy aircraft, vessels and various command systems, and destroy important
targets with precise firepower. It will be difficult for the other side to
initiate sea war against an opponent who controls information, and once a war
starts, it will not be able to win. Hence, future naval warfare needs a strategy
not only in the air and sea but also in information control.
In naval combat, vessels are usually organized in task
forces or battle groups to fulfill tasks. Concentration is conveniently used for
organizing effective command, using massive firepower, and forming the most
favorable defense system in order to reduce enemy threats. However, in the
informationized battlefield, vessels can have direct communication with the
command post. Vessels can have access to each other's location and situation and
have information about enemy vessels and aircraft. In addition, the capacity for
long-range precision attack is also improved. Information enables dispersal of
platforms. Under such circumstances, the firepower needed to attack targets can
be allocated through precise information transfer and long-range attack instead
of concentration of platforms. Concentrations of battle groups in future warfare
will probably be replaced by small formations and single vessels. Vessels will
be dispersed "evenly" at sea.
With high
technology, future sea warfare will adopt the remote attack as the major combat
concept. Satellites and other information platforms will provide large-scale
monitoring, warning, and target information processing and transmission
services. This will supply future vessels and aircraft with targeting
information for launching long-range, precision-guided platforms. On the other
hand, missiles and other weapons will be produced that have long-range capacity,
intelligence, and precision accuracy, all of which provide remote attack. Hence,
remote attack will be widely employed on future battlefields and even become the
major mechanism for combat platforms to destroy the opponent's strategic
targets. Such mechanisms will survive better and extend the range and number of
targets that can be attacked by using stealth and sudden strikes. In November
1993, U.S. troops attacking Iraqi "restricted airspace" launched 45 cruise
missiles from ships a thousand miles from the targets. In the future, when
combat information is transmitted instantly during battle, it will be more
common to attack targets with remote firepower from various places
The
extensive application of information technology improves the transparency of the
sea battlefield and increases the deterrence of vessels and aircraft. Such
deterrence is multidirectional but much less serious to submarines, because
submarines are more difficult to track. Submarines can fulfill combat tasks and
attack land targets according to information obtained from the command post
while keeping their movement concealed, and they can move under water for a long
time without being discovered. The prospect for using submarines is good,
because of their covertness and power. Even without attacking targets,
submarines are menaces existing anywhere at any time. Therefore, the role of
submarines in future information warfare will be very important.
Digitization is the
connection of various combat platforms, units, and even arms of the services in
naval combat through digital communication systems and information systems,
including computer information processing systems and terminals, and
establishment of a digital command and control chain to inform the units
involved precisely and rapidly. In the digitized naval battlefield, information
is somewhat transparent. Information about the facilities, military bases,
communication networks, and command and economic centers of both sides are kept
on a combat data base. Naval weapons will be long range, feature high precision,
and have more power. In the future naval battlefield, a single tactical action
can probably achieve the goal of the entire campaign or even the strategy. U.S.
vessels are equipped with the capacity to launch both strategic and campaign
attacks; such capacity will make the boundaries among strategy, campaign, and
tactics ambiguous and sometimes concepts integrate to change naval combat. Such
change is reflected in three aspects fulfilling strategic missions with
nuclear-powered attack submarines; long-range attack from sea to land; and joint
actions of cruise missiles and aircraft carriers. With the growing changes in
naval tactics, tactical concepts will be expanded tremendously. The employment
of tactics will be more flexible and tactical doctrine will be enriched.
During the Gulf War, the Iraqi troops were not overly
different from the multinational troops in terms of equipment and logistics.
However, the situation always favored the multinational troops. As Alvin Toffler
commented, the Gulf War was a trial of strength between two military systems.
After most radar and monitoring equipment of the Iraqi army was disabled, the
army became a conventional military machine, which was at the Second Wave level.
It was still strong, but slow. Western countries have become more restless about
the shortcomings in developing information war systems. The U.S. military has
examined information combat and believes that computer systems and communication
networks could be easily destroyed by an enemy. The increase of information
systems probably could provide an enemy with targets for attack, thus the U.S.
Defense Department has invested $1 billion in establishing a network to
safeguard its information system. Some military colleges have added training on
computer information security. A new service arm, computer security, is under
consideration. In future naval war, destroying the opponent's information
network will have important significance in controlling information and taking
the initiative in the war. There are many ways to destroy information systems
attacking radar and radio stations with smart weapons, jamming an enemy's
communication facilities with electronic warfare and attacking communication
centers, facilities, and naval command ships; destroying an enemy's electronic
system with electromagnetic pulse weapons; and even destroying computer software
with a computer virus.
To adapt
to future war, the structure of the army, navy, and air force will become
similar. Command communication among the armed forces will be more integrated.
Weapons will be more interchangeable among the services, and rear services will
work for various services. In addition, land, sea, air and electromagnetic space
will be linked together by an information combat system, which will provide
timely and precise technical support to the army. Difficulties and barriers of
joint combat will be smoothed. The navy will emphasize joint combat with other
armed forces because it can improve the attacks on land targets a development
trend of future naval combat actions. In addition, the navy will depend more and
more on army and air forces in sea and offshore combat. The U.S. Army believes
that joint combat is the key to winning. Any single arm of the service cannot
implement a campaign-level operation. Each service on the battlefield should
cooperate and give full play to the advantages of air, land, naval and space
forces. Today, the U.S. Army has established a doctrine center for naval, army,
and air forces to formulate technical and tactical command and control programs.
First, technical groups headed by information technology
will accelerate the improvement of the navy's combat ability. The offensive and
defensive capability of single vessels and aircraft, coordination ability of
single force action, and joint combat will all be enhanced. For single navy
combat platforms, quick reaction and precise delivery of firepower will be
improved because of timely and accurate information. Because of the connection
between the of communication systems of submarines, aircraft, and ships, the
various combat platforms will be effectively combined into an integral part to
attack the enemy. The communication and navigation capacity of the vessels will
be strengthened to expand the scope of combat for various platforms. Combat
tasks will be emphasized more on the ocean and the defense focus will shift from
land to sea. Firepower will play a superb role with the assistance of
information technology. Combat capabilities of informationized platforms cannot
be estimated by the firepower of weapons, but by the formula "firepower +
information force." It is estimated that digitized troops will possess three
times the combat effectiveness of conventional troops.
Motivated by the new technological
revolution, each country will no doubt reduce force sizes and improve quality.
According to the principle of "being rational and sufficient," countries are
downsizing and making transcentury military plans. A prominent character of
force restructuring is the expansion of the navy and air force. Navy
restructuring is regarded as key to military organization. Most countries are
reducing the number of military personnel and stressing navy restructuring to
bring about a fundamental change in the military structure.
During the Cold Weaponry
era, the major mode of operations for the navy were ships that rammed each
other. In the Hot Weaponry era, the mode was artillery action within vision
distance. Firepower and mobility are the most basic and decisive technical
elements in such actions. Early this century, ship speed was limited, so
technology focused on increasing firepower. Technical competition was focused on
increasing firepower. The development of nuclear technology also brought forth a
"zenith" of fire power. Currently, the military revolution is infiltrating into
every aspect of naval equipment buildup. The pounding of the revolution on war
format, mode, and methods of operations will eventually bring about further
change in weapons. Such change is not interested in acquiring new ships and
aircraft with faster speeds and higher destructive power but tries to focus on
winning information combat.
Future navies will
consist of scientists, engineers, and technicians. Equipped with information
technology, the navy needs a large group of specialists in computer, information
engineering, and satellite technology.
21ST-CENTURY AIR WARFARE
Colonel Ming Zengfu
In the course of its development, air
force munitions went through three stages unable-to-control after launching,
able-to-control after launching, and, finally, unnecessary-to-control after
launching. The first state of air force munitions was in the decades after
aircraft came into being until World War II, when all airborne weapons were
aimed by sight, which has a low-kill probability. Along with the rapid
development of information technology and control technology after WWII,
airborne sight weapons developed into guided target-seeking weapons, and the
development of air munitions progressed to the second stage and then to the
third. Before early air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiles, and
precision-guided bombs were launched, information about targets was transmitted
to their control section by pilots. In order to control the missiles, pilots
continually transmitted information about targets to the control section after
launching the missiles or bombs, in order to insure that they flew precisely
toward targets. As information technology further develops and is applied to air
munitions, active and passive information devices can automatically acquire
information about targets after air munitions have left their platforms. Thus
the munition is able to change its own flight and destroy targets precisely.
"Unnecessary to control after launching" has therefore been largely achieved.
According to calculations, if the kill probability remains unchanged, while
precision increases by 1, 2, or 3 times, the efficiency equals, respectively,
that of 4, 9, or 16 times that of warheads, or that of 8, 27, or 63 times that
of ammunition equivalent. Increased ammunition performance enables air warfare
to develop toward "one warhead, one target." According to relevant data, to
destroy a strong underground fortification in World War II, 9,000 bombs were
needed; in the Vietnam War, 600 bombs; in the Gulf War, only 1 or 2 bombs. Thus,
"unnecessary to control after launching" air munitions for the 21st century are
already under research, and the amount of this kind of munition is increasing
rapidly. It is predicted that, with its high precision, this kind of ammunition
will play a dominant role in the air battlefield of the 21st century.
An early aircraft was only a machine able
to fly in the sky. Only after it was used in war did it become an operational
platform. Aircraft have undergone a development course from a mechanical
platform to an informationized operational platform and finally to an
intellectualized operation platform. The first generation aircraft were
jet-propelled and pursued supersonic speed; the second generation could reach
bi-sonic speed and a height of over 20,000 meters. On this basis, information
equipment on board second generation aircraft began to hold an important
position. Fire-control radars were generally used in second generation aircraft.
Information equipment in third-generation aircraft holds a more important
position. What are generally used on board include pulse Doppler radar,
forward-looking infrared devices, night vision devices, low-light TV,
navigational and digital headsup displays, etc.
Radar is an
information-collecting device which was designed to adapt to aerial warfare
weapon's characteristics. Its emergence made it possible to control air warfare
and brought to an end the epoch when air warfare equaled blind men touching an
elephant. However, in the long period ever since, because of low-level of
information technology, the command system was restricted to the realm of manual
operation, thus the operation or capability of air power was heavily limited.
Since the 1950s, when collecting, transmitting, processing and using information
were fused, the command system of air warfare has witnessed such a rapid
development process "manual operation command became semi-automatic command,
which became automated command," resulting in the eventual appearance of
integrated and automated C3I systems.
In the multipolar
international framework of the 21st century, a focus of national attention will
be on how to cope with local wars and regional crises. In multilevel military
operations, in peacetime or in times of neither-war-nor-peace, air power will
play a more important role. The employment concepts of air power will become
more diversified.
Compared with actual combat, deterrence has some
limitations. However, because its functions are broad, one may both launch an
attack and make peace, achieving goals without sacrifice. So deterrence can be
used separately or as the precursor of actual combat. In the 21st century, air
deterrence will become the first-choice mode of employing air power.
Therefore, air
deterrence will become the basic employment mode of future deterrence.
A "no fly" zone is a forbidden airspace set up in a
conflicted area, using air power as its main force. In the no-fly zone, none of
the opponent's air actions is permitted, nor can any opponent install
ground-to-air weapons that may threaten one's own air actions. No-fly zones are
a new application mode of air power in the last decade of the 20th century. For
example, the United States, Britain and France set up a no-fly zone in Iraq to
protect the Kurds, and the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution to set up a
no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
According
to relevant resolutions of international organizations and at the request of
peacekeeping forces, limited air strikes may be carried out by authorized
countries or a group of countries against military targets that violate relevant
rules; these are called limited aim air strikes. For example, in November 1994,
in accordance with U.N. resolution 958, NATO's air forces bombed Udbey airport
in Bosnia-Herzegovinia, which was controlled by Serbs. Soon after, Serbian
military targets, such as ground-to-air missile positions and groups of tanks,
were attacked by air.
Air Blockades at Sea
The sea-air blockade is one
of the basic application modes of air power. It is a military action blockading
a certain section of the sea, a certain coastal area, or a certain country by
way of aerial mining in order to blockade seaports and sea lanes as well as
attack targets trying to break the blockade. Naval blockades against Japan in
World War II and against important ports of northern Vietnam in the Vietnam War
were enforced mainly by aerial mining. In air battles of the 21st century, air
blockades will still be important.
Strategic Air Lift
Strategic airlift is a
large-scale operation to transport troops to warring regions by air. With the
improvement of air transport, strategic airlift has demonstrated some
incomparable advantages which other transport modes do not possess:
Precision/ Surgical Operation Air Strikes
Surgical
air strikes are a growing aspect of air power employment in high-tech local
wars. Its strategic objective is obtained by precisely attacking the enemy's
sensitive strategic targets. Typical examples include the Israeli air force
bombing both the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and the PLO headquarters in
Tunisia in 1985, and the United States striking Libya in 1986. In this kind of
operation, air power is the main strength, and sudden attack is the main
operational principle.
Large-Scale Air Offensives
By
studying the regional wars after World War II, especially recent regional wars,
we can conclude that air offensives begin with massive air strikes in rather
long and relatively separate phases.
Joint Operation
of Various Services
Joint operation of various services means air power
joins in an equal partnership with the army and navy. This symbolizes a
qualitative change from previous history. In the past, the air force assisted
the army or the navy to carry out missions. In past large-scale wars, the air
force's operational role was subordinate to that of the army and navy and could
only share the victory of the army and navy. When air operations became
decisive, a great breakthrough was made in applying air power.
Before the Vietnam War, when
air strikes were carried out by the same type of aircraft, visual coordination
was the main type of strike. Air operation methods qualitatively changed during
the Vietnam War, when several joint operational methods with various types of
aircrafts taking part came into use. In order to cope with the integrated
air-defense systems comprising fighters, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft
guns and air-defense C3I systems, an operation took shape to include formations
such as airborne early warning and command formations, escort and protective
formations, strike formations, air defense suppression formations,
reconnaissance formations, electronic warfare formations, air refueling
formations, air-rescue formations, etc. Among these the strike formations are
the main force, with the rest supporting, protecting and assisting.
When the operational mode of global
strike and global reach is applied, the battle space is enlarged, and
traditional theories and ideas about the battlefield are broken. Any target in
any part of the world is within striking range of air power. After the Gulf War,
the main military powers in the world decided to enhance their air power's
ability to carry out global strike and all-depth operations. In May 1993, the
Russian Air Force organized a large-scale intercontinental maneuver operational
exercise from its European region to the Far East. According to the military
strategy of "forward presence plus troop transport," the U.S. Air Force
established an operational doctrine of "global reach and global operations."
Air combat is the main means of air
power used to annihilate the enemy air force. According to distance, it is
divided into visual air combat and beyond-the-horizon air combat. The main
concept of air combat has been to attack from behind at a distance of hundreds
to thousands of meters. The precondition of attacking is the occupation the
advantageous position at the rear of the opponent, called short-range air
combat.
Ever since air weapons came
into being, the way to attack ground targets was to bomb right over the targets
after penetrating the ground-to-air defense. In the past 10 years, this method
has been used less frequently. Instead, a method that has been used more and
more often is to stand off and launch munitions from a long range. This tendency
is bringing great changes to air-to-ground operations. Primarily because of
stand-off air-to-ground missiles, air power is capable of launching attacks from
a long distance, out of range of the defense.
In the first air raid in the Gulf War, 30 U.S.
Air Force F-117A stealth fighters directly attacked Baghdad after flying beyond
Iraqi air-defense troops, instead of attacking air-defense radars and
neutralizing airports and air-defense ground positions to open a penetrating
corridor for followup units. This new operational method is characteristic of
nonlinear operations. It stops the enemy from organizing effective defenses by
harassing the enemy's air-defense rhythm. Relying on stealth fighters' being
difficult to be detect, stealth penetration neutralizes the enemy's old formula
of air-defense operations, which can be described thusly: find incoming targets;
judge the nature of the targets and degree of threat; assign targets; order air
defense troops to annihilate the targets. With stealth, the enemy is attacked
before they detect the incoming targets. Because it is the crucial positions of
the enemy's air-defense system that are first attacked by stealth planes, the
enemy's air-defense troops have been paralyzed before they are put into action,
so it is impossible for them to arrange organized resistance against the air
-raid. Therefore, the air raid attacks predetermined targets without facing
resistance. Using this method in the Gulf War, the U.S. Army reduced the ratio
of assault troops to service troops to 1:1, and kept the loss rate at 0.03
percent. More and more stealth planes will be rushing into the air battlefields
of the 21st century, and stealth penetration bombing will be more commonly
applied.
The performance of
airborne fire-control-radar is being improved, and night-vision devices such as
infrared and low-light devices and space-based precision guidance systems are
being added. Many midrange air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiles,
infrared-guided bombs and laser-guided bombs are being used. Air power has
greatly enhanced its ability to attack air and ground targets at night and in
any meteorological conditions. Meanwhile, air power can perform all-weather and
round-the-clock attacks. This was the case in the Gulf War. Throughout the Gulf
War, all-weather and round-the-clock continuous operations were carried out by
the multinational forces, in which sorties dispatched at night equaled 70
percent of the total. Characteristics. Because all-weather and round-the-clock
operations are widely used, the better equipped side benefits from the night and
bad weather, which previously favored the less well equipped side. Because of
high-technology, night battlefields become transparent. Bad weather is no longer
an obstacle to the better equipped side. Meanwhile, the poorly equipped side can
no longer utilize the night and bad weather to change its unfavorable situation.
This operational mode greatly intensifies operations and speeds up the rhythm of
war. Attacking Joints and Ripping Fabric The third generation of
precision-guided bombs has an accuracy of less than 1 meter. Modern air strikes
tend to be "one bomb, one target." Air power's ability in precision strike is
increasing and the mode of long-range precision strike is used. It is possible
through joint strikes to achieve fabric ripping.
THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN AIR POWER
Major General Zheng
Shenxia
Senior Colonel Zhang Changzhi
The fundamental cause of the current military
revolution is the extensive application of modern technologies, within which
information technology is the core. A modern air force is equipped by
information technology, whose use in modern local war reveals the great changes
in air power and its bright future. The development of air power is the most
direct catalyst of such a revolution.
The above
changes illustrate that space-weapon development is in a transitional period of
integrating information technology with weapon production. Space weapon systems
have possessed some quasi-human functions (such as observation, memory, analysis
and synthesis). Missiles have become "shells with eyes." Future air force C I
systems and various weapons will be controlled by intelligence machines, and
will have dialogue with human beings through connection with information
processing and displaying working stations. The systems will not only change the
air combat information process and transmission modes but also integrate humans,
combat theory, and computers into a whole. Through the systems, human
intelligence can be immediately released in the form of energy to obtain
unprecedented combat effectiveness. Since World War II, the conventional
destructive capacity of aircraft has increased by 70 percent. Specifically,
modern air weapons have developed in seven aspects:
The development and application of air
information weapon systems immediately resulted in revolutionary changes in the
war field. A lot of concepts only imagined or developed a few years ago became
reality in Operation Desert Storm. To a great extent, information combat has
been enlightened by the Gulf War, in which multinational troops captured all the
high-frequency and ultrahigh frequency radio signals of the Iraqi army and
stored the numerous amounts of information gathered by the 34 reconnaissance
satellites, 260 electronic reconnaissance planes, and 40 prewarning aircraft.
Then, the multinational troops used various information systems and high-tech
weapons to destroy the Iraqi communication system and take control of the war.
The Iraqi command system, radar, and command systems of missiles, aircraft, and
artillery were at a standstill. This demonstrates that information is the key to
victory. The side that controls information can give full play to the materials
and energy possessed, and thereby increase combat power.
The Gulf War displayed not
only the embryonic form of information combat but also the advantages of air
power and revealed the importance of air power in bringing about satisfactory
operational effectiveness in information combat. Therefore, each nation has
prioritized the development of air strength under the principle of upgrading the
entire defense system and developing all forces:
The
reasons why each nation lays stress on the buildup of the air force are:
In battlefield command,
gaining the upper hand in information confrontation can help commanders make
decisions and work out strategies. Hence, information superiority is becoming a
tremendous combat strength. The C I system is important to winning information
superiority in battle and to improve the flexibility of the army and navy. Under
the influence of modern high technology, the ability to obtain battlefield
information from air and space has witnessed fundamental changes. Outer space
itself becomes a battlefield of monitoring to provide reliable information with
the assistance of reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and orientation
systems and early-warning systems. Information gathered can be used for
strategic command, for campaign and combat command and even by single vessels,
vehicles, and soldiers.
On the other hand, military combat strength in
the information era is relatively reduced. Coping with local war and controlling
crises becomes the strategic concern. Local war, which restricts operational
goals, time, and space, puts forward new requirements for air combat ability. To
achieve the strategic goal, ground operational measures are greatly restrained
and air operations enhanced. Air operations often become the major or even the
only force to be used. On the other hand, the air force, which can avoid direct
contact with the opponent and quickly deliver strategic proposal, can start and
stop operations easily so they will not result in territorial disputes and a
cease-fire agreement. This is definitely what military decisionmakers want to
apply in today's conflicts, in which no one wants to escalate the conflicts but
everyone is eager to restrain the other. The standard of winning and losing is
changed to a great extent. The ultimate goal of the parties involved is not to
occupy the other's territory but to check the enemy country and take initiative
at the negotiation table. Because an air force can achieve such a goal without
escalating the conflict, it has more opportunities to be employed. In addition,
the attacking side places more importance on reducing human casualties by
increasing material loss. As a former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff said before
the Gulf War, the only way to avoid excessive bloodshed by the army was to use
the air force.
Because of the strict restriction on use of nuclear weapons and the
air force's replacement of nuclear force, nuclear-possessing countries have
started to shift their attention from preparing for nuclear war to conventional
war. The production of nuclear weapons is slowed down. The principle of using
nuclear weapons has been changed from "using in the first place" to "using at
the last stage." Strategic rockets are in a declining position and the air force
enjoys a rising importance. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union
have re-emphasized the role of air force to make up the gap in fire structure
caused by restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons.
In the
meantime, these countries have strengthened the establishment of key troops. The
U.S. Air Force has sped up the establishment of a mobile speed reaction force,
which includes two components the global force, with 20 operational units and
bombers, and the air transport troops, which can reach every corner of the
world.
The model of the
fourth generation fighter of the U.S. Air Force, the F-22, has been chosen and
is undergoing flight trials. It is planned to be manufactured in the mid-1990s.
The EFA, which was jointly developed by Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain, the
JAS-39 of Sweden, and the followup of the M-29 of Russia are all under
development. Some Asia and Pacific nations have also joined the trend. Japan has
sped up development of its FSX attackers to replace the current F-1 attackers.
21ST-CENTURY LAND OPERATIONS
Colonel Xiao Jingmin
Major
Bao Bin
The operational
activities of the army have always been restricted by time and other conditions,
seeking the unity of the battle objective and efficiency. In the industrial era,
the fighting capability of the army was manifested mainly in huge armed forces
and mechanized weapons, and the objective of the battle was to destroy enemy
forces and weaponry in large numbers. The destruction of the enemy
transportation system and supply line was to create better conditions for the
destruction of the enemy forces. It was through continuous and intense fighting
and large consumption of materials that increased our own strength and decreased
the enemy's, and finally led to the defeat of the enemy. During the process of
operational activities, the objectives of the battle moved with the battle. The
latter part of the industrial era found changes in this strategy. With the
development of electronics technology, armed forces can interfere with an
enemy's command system through electromagnetic jamming and can destroy the
coordination among enemy forces, creating even better conditions for their
destruction. In future 21st century land warfare, the primary objective of the
battle will mainly be the destruction of enemy command, control, and weapons
systems through the combination of counterinformation and fire power attack, and
not the destruction of the enemy forces. Increased firepower range and accuracy
make the choosing of battle objectives more flexible and more threatening. This
kind of fight will be low in consumption of supplies but highly efficient. The
destruction of enemy command and control systems means the disintegration of the
enemy fighting forces. Though smart weapons carry a small strike load, they are
highly accurate and destructive, which makes small-scale operational activities
highly efficient. The concept of achieving high efficiency at a relatively low
cost has become the basic goal of modern warfare and will be even more so in
21st-century land operations.
The wide application of electronic information
technology in the military sphere will integrate information with firepower,
resulting in a new type of warfare. The competition for information in future
21st-century land operations will be based on computer technology. With digital
communication as the means, the information network collects and processes the
data on the battlefield and utilizes these data in the weapon system to ensure
efficient attacks against enemy forces, realizing automated, informationized,
and intelligence capabilities to the greatest degree at every stage of
operations. Under the conditions of information warfare, armed forces will use
satellites, high-altitude aircraft, helicopters and unmanned flying equipment,
and sensors to collect and process information; use digital communication
techniques to transmit computer data within the information network; and use
digital modulators and demodulators to retrieve various information and command
or control information, which it will display on the information complex with
many forms like graphics, data, sound and images, so that the various command
organs and units of the armed forces will have relevant intelligence regarding
the fighting task. In future land operations, the main activities will be the
collection and processing, transfer and utilization, and competition for and
countering of battle information. This will be the case during the whole process
of the battle. The supremacy of information will replace the supremacy of forces
and weapons and will be the key in winning the upper hand in the land operations
and the guarantee for defeating the enemy. The side with information supremacy
will from the collection of information to command decisions, from detection and
positioning to guided strike proceed with automation and at high speed,
achieving quasi real-time or even real-time battle results and, discovering the
enemy first, will strike first. The traditional concept of "hard kill" and the
negligence of "soft kill" apparently will not be suited to the future new
situation on the battle fields.
The integration of fighting forces in the 21st century will not
be a simple adjustment in the structure of the army and the multigroupings of
the fighting forces. Instead, it will require a new combination of land fighting
forces as a result of the development of army weapons and changes in the methods
of warfare. The combination of land fighting forces with the air and sea forces
will become an integrated fighting force connected by a battle information
network and formed by special units of the various army corps. Land fighting
forces will be part of integrated forces in battle. Under the circumstances, the
role of the army land fighting force will obviously change and become part of
the network formed by the land, sea, air and space forces. It will be possible
to destroy important military and economic facilities of the enemy without
contact with the enemy at the front, and make the enemy lose its ability to
resist. At the same time, the land fighting force will continuously receive
all-round, all-depth, and all-time support from air and space fighting equipment
as well as from fighting forces on the sea. The integrated operations by various
army corps will be able to comprehensively use different fighting methods and
striking means, thus avoiding the shortcomings of fighting by a single force
coordination.
On the
digital battle field, the units of the armed forces, through a digital
information network, will receive orders and decisional information from the
commanding organization, feed back the situation on the battle field, exchange
information with other units, and carry out a close cooperation. The various
units of the armed forces will not only be able to use their own weapons systems
but also will be able to use different support weapons systems flexibly and in a
timely fashion within the network. They will be able to carry out long-range and
accurate attacks, and every unit or even every single soldier will have the
information and fire power support of the whole digital information network. In
past warfare, attention was focused on the same battle area, and close
coordination of fighting activities in different time frameworks. On the digital
battle field, more attention will be focused on the close coordination of
different fighting areas in the common time framework. Different fighting units
will, according to the unified time and objective, strike different battle
targets, and achieve coordination of the whole campaign or battle with active
fighting activities of their own. For the digital fighting force, every unit
will be in contact with the enemy force on the battle field, and there will be
no frontline.
Looking at the current situation, it can be seen that
the authorized strength and equipment, strategy, tactics, and military theory of
China's military are still basically the products of the industrial era and are
far from satisfying the demands of information warfare. We have much work to do
to shrink this gap, and our first task is to clarify our war preparation
concepts. We have already made it clear that the basis of war preparation is to
achieve victory in modern warfare, especially high-tech warfare, and this is
quite correct. High-tech warfare, however, has already developed from an
emphasis on guided missiles to an emphasis on information. Firepower superiority
depends on information superiority. This has been a phased transition. In
keeping with the demands of information warfare, we must base our war
preparations on achieving victory in this area and use it to plan China's
military and national defense modernization. When we engage in war with strong
enemies in the future, we will face comprehensive and powerful information
suppression.
We must put effort into information technology,
information weapons systems, and information networking. These are the important
aspects of hardware construction for the military when adapting to information
warfare. Information is a material good, and information sources, information
channels, and information storage are all material goods. The gathering,
transmission, processing, and use of information and the development of
information into combat power all depend on certain material goods, energy, and
technology carriers. Information technology itself is a pinnacle of high
technology. The key technologies are remote-sensing technology, communications
technology, and computer technology. Key information weapons include
precision-guided weapons systems and electronic warfare weapons systems as well
as C4I systems (communications, guidance, control, computers, and intelligence)
which form the central nervous system. These hardware items are necessary and
essential to adapt to and achieve victory in information warfare, and we must
make efforts here. Developing this hardware, however, is not easy. It will be
restricted by the level of our information technology base and funds. Hence,
comprehensive consideration must be given to the direction, goals, and emphases
of this development. The overarching demand, for long-term planning as well as
short-term arrangements, is to consider fully the threat faced by China, the
possible warfare tasks of the near future, the battle regions and battlefield
conditions, the state of China's defense technology development, as well as the
possible support for military funding. Thus, it appears that we should emphasize
in our development the following aspects of information technology.
The goal is to
obtain timely information, to understand the enemy and ourselves, and to achieve
clarity about our situation with great determination. It is especially necessary
to establish a strategic reconnaissance warning and air defense system to
achieve a capacity for early detection of enemy movements, in order to be
forewarned and ready.
The most important of these are air
defense weapons systems, offensive tactical guided missile attack systems,
landing and touchdown operations equipment systems, electronic warfare equipment
systems, and underwater minelaying systems. These will give China
over-the-horizon, high-precision, concealed, sudden defensive attack capability
and a stronger survival capacity and make the enemy terrified and worried,
providing an effective threat.
First, we
should establish battlefield information networks and battlefield databases for
the battlefields in priority strategic directions. By bringing all branches of
the military into an information network, information may be shared on the
network. Near-real-time communication can be gained in all directions and a
better solution can be achieved for the problem of vertical and horizontal
coordination in warfare.
To achieve
victory in information warfare, the central issue is control of information.
In comparison
with the strength of potential enemies, the information technology and
information weapons of China's military may all be inferior for quite some time.
When China's enemies mainly use their air forces and navies to conduct strategic
information warfare, China will be in the strategic position of engaging in
defensive warfare along interior lines. The progress and outcome of the war will
be determined by the state of China's advance preparations and defensive
situation during the war. In defensive warfare, China should still thoroughly
implement an active defensive strategy. In addition to hiding and concealing
forces, in combat, especially during key phases in key areas, we must engage
even more actively in air defense warfare and intercept and attack enemy weapons
as they arrive in surprise attack. When conditions permit, we should also engage
in counterattacks against the enemy and interfere with or misguide their guided
weapons, thus damaging or destroying their equipment. Strategically, we should
use preparation and defense, and in combat we should use attacking and fighting
to achieve victory.
Information
warfare includes engaging in an active offense of information suppression and
attack, as well as in the reactive defense of information
counter-reconnaissance, resistance to interference, and defense against
destruction. The issue of an information offensive can only be discussed if one
has superior technology for information suppression. In a strategic defense
situation, sometimes information offensives can be undertaken during warfare
actions in limited areas. In that case, information technology suppression
superiority must first be achieved in warfare actions in that limited area.
Under the conditions of modern high technology, an information offensive is
often a prelude to a strategic offensive. Take, for example, the surprise attack
on Libya by the United States. Before the attack, 18 electronic-warfare aircraft
were sent to Libya to engage in powerful interference.
The information offenses and defenses outlined
above, in addition to using information technology extensively, also use
information weapons extensively. Thus, during the process of a war, these do not
exist alone but accompany strategic offenses and defenses and are consistent
with the overall situation of strategic offenses and defenses. Before and after
war, information hassling never stops for a moment but usually does not involve
the use of information weapons.
This is the basic warfare style which Mao Zedong
taught us, and it is an excellent tradition of China's military. Strengths and
weaknesses are in comparison with those of the enemy. What then will China's
strengths be in future wars? What will be China's weaknesses? Politically
speaking, China's military has the advantage of justness, which is conducive to
gaining international sympathy and support, and it has the support of the people
domestically. In terms of warfare space, when China's military engages in war on
China's soil, it will have the advantages of topography and position. In air,
sea, space, and electronic warfare, however, the enemy will have the advantage.
In terms of the choice of timing for warfare, because the enemy will have more
advanced night-vision instruments, the advantage will not be China's, especially
in air and sea warfare at night. The enemy will have advantages in
instrumentation. China will have advantages in familiarity with the topography.
Each will have half the advantages. In terms of warfare techniques, China's
military has a tradition of flexible fighting methods and is more adapted to
nonlinear warfare, but lacks practical battle experience in information warfare
with high technology. In terms of weapons and equipment, generally speaking the
enemy will have the advantage, but in some areas, such as guided missiles and
submarines, China can still shock the enemy to a certain degree. China is strong
in close warfare; the enemy is strong in distant warfare.
In summary, our warfare methods must adapt to the needs of
information warfare. We must use all types, forms, and methods of force, and
especially make more use of nonlinear warfare and many types of information
warfare methods which combine native and Western elements to use our strengths
in order to attack the enemy's weaknesses, avoid being reactive, and strive for
being active. In this way, it will be entirely possible for China to achieve
comprehensive victory over the enemy even under the conditions of inferiority in
information technology.
In the final analysis, information
warfare is conducted by people. The basic great plan is to cultivate talented
people suited to information warfare. One aspect is to cultivate talent in
information science and technology. The development and resolution of
information warfare can be predicted to a great degree in the laboratory.
Information science and technology talent is the forerunners of science and
technology talent is the forerunner of science and technology research. The
achievements and practical use of their research will play a key role in the
development and advancement of society and military construction and warfare.
The second aspect is talented people in command and control. They especially
need to have the ability to conduct comprehensive analysis and
policy-information processing, to understand themselves and the enemy, as well
as the battlefield, and also to have a capacity for scientific strategic
thinking and a comprehensive point of view. Senior command personnel especially
need to have information knowledge and the ability to control information
warfare and must be adept at using information technology to organize and
command warfare. They must be very knowledgeable, brave, and talented people.
INFORMATION WARFARE
Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li
Fei
This paper was excerpted from articles in
Liberation Army Daily, June 13 and June 20, 1995. The authors work at the
Academy of Military Science, Beijing.
Information warfare is combat operations
in a high-tech battlefield environment in which both sides use
information-technology means, equipment, or systems in a rivalry over the power
to obtain, control, and use information. Information warfare is a combat aimed
at seizing the battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential
combat force; the seizure, control, and use of information as its main
substance; and all sorts of information weaponry [smart weapons] and systems as
its major means. Information warfare is combat in the area of fire assault and
operational command for information acquisition and anti-acquisition; for
suppression [neutralization] and antineutralization; for deception and
antideception; and for the destruction and antidestruction of information and
information sources.
The two general areas are information
protection (defense) and information attack (offense). Information defense means
preventing the destruction of one's own information systems, ensuring that these
systems can perform their normal functions. In future wars, key information and
information systems will become "combat priorities," the key targets of enemy
attack.
While information
warfare in the true sense has not yet arrived in the battlefield arena, the
repeated live-troop maneuvers and simulated drills of the armies of Western
nations such as the United States, as well as the Gulf War, have enabled us to
determine certain innate features of information warfare:
A digitized battlefield is a
composite network system covering the whole operational space. It is made up of
a communications system, a command and control system, an intelligence
transmission system, a computerized battlefield database, and user terminals,
all of which can provide users with large amounts of operation-related
information in real time or nearly real time. This network system's function is
to use information technology to acquire, exchange, and use digitized
information in real time, promptly meeting the information demand of commanders,
combat personnel, and combat support personnel, so that they can clearly and
accurately grasp all battlefield conditions needed to draw up and apply
operational plans. This system can transmit information such as voice, graphics,
text, and data, and can also provide users with a battlefield image portrayed by
a common database and the supreme battlefield command knowledge-base (including
substance such as one's own posture, the enemy's posture, combat readiness,
logistics conditions, and operating environment).
The second major support for
information warfare [IW] is an informationized military. While many developed
Western nations are now considering the establishment of technology-intensive
informationized armies, the United States is the only one that has drawn up and
started to implement plans for an informationized military establishment.
While IW has not yet occurred or at most
has only started to show up, as it is an exceptional and new form of warfare
with milestone significance, it will have an enormous impact on all aspects of
the military arena.
The IW proposition will
have an impact on many aspects of combat concepts:
Wars
during the industrial age have had military structures determined by the
"firepower casualty system" base, but wars in the information age will require
an "information-based" troop organization. With a changed base, the military
system establishment will also be bound to change significantly.
Because of the
"effects" of IW and military spending shortages, developed nations are adopting
an equipment establishment policy of "more research and new technology, and less
production and arms purchases." To implement this policy, they are taking three
steps:
To be able to fight IW in the next
century, developed nations such as the United States will place priority on the
development of equipment such as the C4I system (command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence system), personal digitized
equipment, and stealth weapons.
FUTURE TRENDS OF MODERN OPERATIONS
Major General Wu
Guoqing
One significant feature of regional war
is its limited scale. Conventional weapons will be applied to achieve
operational purposes at low cost in military actions by limiting the war's
scope. The new edition of Operational Outlines by the U.S. Army puts forward
operational concepts of the early 21st century. It emphasizes limiting future
war and requires controlled actions. The concept of limiting the scope of war
has now been accepted by a number of Western powers and many underdeveloped
countries.
Operations with several services,
where the air force and the navy will play even more important roles, will
change past patterns where the army played the main role with other services
only assisting it. Operational range will increase because joint air force/army
actions will gradually be replaced by jointness of the army, the air force, the
navy, and the missile force. Battlefields will increasingly depend on outer
space. Encouraged by the strategic concept that "whoever controls outer space
dominates the world," great powers regard the opening of outer space
battlefields as the essential component of military strategies. Development of
space weapons will be a critical means to seize hegemony in outer space. An
important military part of being a superpower will be military space systems
with high performance and multiple purposes. Future wars must be joint with
different combat arms throughout the entire battlefield including air, land,
sea, and space forces.
Putting quality first means that the
qualitative advantage of an army will be crucial in operations, and particularly
superiority in any equipment that helps to achieve victory.
Operational principles are
developing in three ways. The first is just adding the new to the old. For
example, the operational principles in the new edition of U.S. Army Field Manual
100-5, Operations, add "multipurpose" forces to the original "initiative, agile,
profound, and coordinated." Further, "operations other than war or non-wartime
actions" now have a set of formal theoretical principles. The Russian army has
also augmented its operational principles for suddenness and independent
operation in defense. Second, principles that have lost significance have been
abandoned. For example, there used to be 13 phases of campaign principles in the
former Soviet army, but now they have been recomposed into only eight. Those
dropped mainly concerned operations under nuclear conditions. Third, new
subjects have been added to former operational principles. For example,
Operations has added "non-wartime actions" to the operational principles of
"initiative, agile, profound, and coordinated." The Russian army's principle of
"achieving sudden action" now emphasizes military planning and counter
reconnaissance.
After the Cold War, many
countries are now confronted with realistic problems such as uncertain
operational regions and unpredictable targets. Additionally, the emergent
regional actions have become the main task for armies in future fighting. Such
actions that frequently result from sudden incidents are characteristic of
suddenness. With the high-tech scouting and monitoring system widely applied, it
is more difficult to achieve suddenness of actions. However, the sudden actions
in operation are much more favored by the improvement of the assault, mobile
capabilities, and the technology of camouflage in high-tech weapon systems along
with the successful. Therefore, only when an army possesses the strong
capability of high-speed and flexible reactions, able to arrive at whatever
areas in whichever circumstances to fulfill any task, can it meet the demands of
future high-tech operations in a regional war.
In order to reach the operational
purpose, a war of quick decisions endeavors to shorten the duration and to end a
campaign early with increased fighting force. This is chiefly decided by the
limitations of high-tech regional war and other factors such as high input, high
consumption and high efficiency. The high-tech regional war, whether large or
small in scope, is closely related to policies of politics, economy and
diplomacy, and to the fundamental interests of a country. Either side of the
war, therefore, will inevitably send a high-tech weapon system and picked troops
into the decisive campaign and do their utmost to win. The fundamental feature
accounts for the limitation of the operational purpose, duration, and range.
High-tech weapons are very destructive and can cause great loss; they are also
quite expensive to produce, even for large and stronger countries, which may
find it difficult to fight a prolonged war of this kind. Ever since the Gulf
War, the U.S. Air Force has forwarded the new concept of the so-called
"oversleeping war," which would attempt to end a regional war within the
shortest period of time through repeated attacks of high intensity. With the
development of military technology and combat doctrine, such operational
doctrines as "twinkling war," and "brief assault" are likely to be put forward
or enhanced.
The systems engineering and the
experiences of the modern war prove that in the systems of military forces and
weapon equipment, there are vital parts or crucial links that can affect the
whole situation, e.g., the C3I system that links the operational forces, the
supply system that helps maintain strong operational forces, and the operational
platform on which high-tech weapon equipment depends. Once these targets are
damaged, the fighting capabilities as a whole will certainly be affected, and
the functions of the weapons system will be in disorder. Hitting the vital parts
of the enemy is quite effective in an operation and is favorable to winning
greater victory with little costs. The high-tech systems of scouting and
surveillance, the accurate guidance weapons, and the equipment for electronic
war all provide advanced measures for hitting the vital parts of the enemy
effectively.
Battlefield dominance,
the prerequisite in gaining the operational initiative, has long been regarded
as a very important operational principle by many armies of the world. To
control future battlefields does not mean only control over land, air and sea,
but also over electromagnetism, information, and even outer space. The control
of the latter three is vital to the former. In a sense, only after dominance
over electromagnetism, information, and outer space is achieved can control over
land, air, and sea be effectively obtained. This is interrelated and
interactive, forming the new meaning of dominance over battlefields. Therefore,
only in these ways can dominance and initiative in high-tech local war be really
possessed.
Operational modes are the
manifestation of operational concepts. Operational modes in the past, offensive
or defensive, were usually mobile warfare, positional warfare, and guerilla
warfare. Many factors are reshaping operational concepts, so the traditional
three modes are being gradually replaced by high-tech mobile, positional and
special warfare.
As an operational concept, mobile
warfare has a long history. It is, however, only after the 1970s that it began
to be recognized as an independent operational mode and was adopted by more and
more armies. The application of high technology improved mobile and
reconnaissance capabilities, which laid the foundation for mobile warfare. With
the end of the Cold War, the probability of high-intensity warfare decreased,
and nations focused on how to deal with regional conflicts and wars. Since local
war is characterized by multiple threats, uncertain battlefields, suddenness and
quickness, the side good at mobile warfare is more likely to be successful.
Those who stick to traditional methods and fight along fixed fronts are bound to
lose opportunities, be passive, and be defeated. U.S. and Russian armed forces,
accordingly, particularly emphasize research on mobile warfare. They even view
it as the best mode of operation for the beginning of the next century.
Special warfare is an irregular operational action
in which special troops adopt special tactics. In its 40 years, special warfare
has developed from the original so-called "counterinsurgency" into the actions
of special reconnaissance, sabotage and attacks in the enemy's rear area, search
and rescue, and psychological war. In the Gulf War, the multinational forces
headed by the United States were organized in special units and thousands of
servicemen were sent into the rear area of the Iraqi troops to perform special
warfare such as reconnaissance, jamming, sabotage, deception, and feint
movements, supporting the main attack and assaulting units from the sky.
Large quantities of high-tech weapons on
battlefields pose serious challenges to traditional methods of operation and
also accelerate a series of revolutionary changes in concepts. On the one hand,
new methods adapting high-tech tactics will be created one after another, e.g.,
advances in highly precise and long distance powerful signs may make it possible
for remote fire to become important. With this method, operational forces can,
instead of entering the battlefields at the front, directly start their actions
from bases far from battle.
Battle space
has drastically increased with the rapid advancement of military technology.
Interdependence of operations will strengthen day by day. Any military actions
under future high-tech conditions, large or small in range, will be
characterized by comprehensive antagonism between the two sides in various
battlefields with multiple forces and forms. All military means in the conflict
will tend to be synthesized, emphasizing the superiority of some modes and
patterns in order to seek maximum system effectiveness. This means that
operations will most likely become "combination boxing," the combination of
various operational modes and patterns.
Operations will well
exceed the range of a single service or battle ground in high-tech conditions.
The operations of various services will be further merged, and a basic feature
of future operations will be joint operations with integrated services. For
example, air strikes are no longer only attacks by the air force. Naval and army
air forces can also play very important roles. Missile attacks can be either
from aircraft, cruise missiles, or land; information war, electronic wars and
psychological war are usually combined actions of all services together. Because
of this, operational method must tear itself away from the reach of a single
service. The substance of developing operational methods is the pattern of joint
trans-service action.
Operational methods have
never been just the passive adoption of new technology, but are created by new
operational art. Applying new technology in the operational field means that
instead of rejecting or degrading the role of operational art, conditions are
created for combining military technology and operational art. For example, the
advancement of simulation will even more forcefully stimulate the merging of
deceiving technology and art in operations, thus having better effect in
deception warfare. Future methods of operation will be the product of closer
combinations of military technology and operational art. More emphasis will be
laid on the methods of "attaining high quality with low cost." That is to say
more efficient results will be achieved with fewer personnel wounded or killed
and minimum loss of high-tech weapons in the shortest time.
The phenomenon of war will
fundamentally change with the development of modern science and technology and
its extensive application in the military field. This profound change will also
occur to the basic elements of operational command with respect to
organizations, skills, and patterns.
Future fighting formations
will integrate the army, the navy, and the air force, resulting in more and more
operations of combined services. Not only will campaigns require multi services
and weapon systems, but all combat units will need to be cooperative. The
complexity of operational forces determines that the command structure must meet
the requirement of integrating the operations of many services. Synthesized
command organization with various combat arms, shared information, and
compatible communication will certainly emerge, along with development of
command theory involving integrated operations.
In past decades, operational
command efficiency has been greatly improved since the highly automated
operational command system was integrated with command, control, communication,
and information by computers. This has enabled commanders and staff officers to
get rid of much of their complicated manual work and helped to break through the
human limits of physical and mental abilities. On the basis of automated
information collection and processing, and operational calculation, further
improvement of command decisionmaking will enable the artificial intelligence
simulation systems to mimic commanding officers' mental activities and be
extensively used in command activities in the near future.
Future high-tech regional
wars will provide the platforms for numerous command forms including command and
autonomy, centralized and decentralized, hierarchical and overstepping, stable
and movable, those on land, in the air and at sea, and even those involving
outer space facilities to play their parts based on the situation of the
battlefield. These command forms will be flexibly used and make up for each
other's deficiencies to raise command efficiency and keep command constant, so
that continuous command can be achieved in any circumstances. This is the trend
of command doctrine in study and practice.
Nowadays, the armed forces of the
world are confronted with the contradiction between the increasing dependence of
operational activities on defense and the increasing difficulty of defense. A
common topic is how to develop defense theory for high-tech regional wars in the
future.
In future wars,
defensive technology will become more and more advanced and defensive patterns
be continuously increased, particularly with outstanding stereoscopic defense
protection. As range has been enlarged, range of protection will also increase.
The range of operation will quickly expand into the air and outer space along
with the stretch towards the two sides and depth of the battlefields. In
operational protection, forces will more extensively use various platforms in
the air, including reconnaissance and surveillance systems and communication
systems based on those in outer space to perform reconnaissance over the enemy.
Command centers in the air and outer space will be developed so that mobility,
high speed and secure communications will be improved. Logistical protection
will be increased, and troops will depend more on airplanes, even space carriers
for the protection of materials, technology, and medical service. In future
battlefields, combat to safeguard ourselves and destroy the enemy's defenses
will take place in the air and outer space, on the ground, on the surface of and
under the water, and even under the ground. Winning or losing combat in larger
stereoscopic range will decide the success of the defensive forces.
Future high-tech regional
wars characterized by suddenness, uncertainty of the operational areas, and the
rapid shift between attacks and defense, will be more mobile than ever. Unitary
fixed defense can hardly meet the requirements of highly mobile future
battlefields. At present, therefore, the main military powers have laid great
emphasis on the study of mobile defense doctrines. For example, in dealing with
the new situation under amphibious mobile operations, the U.S. Marine Corps has
proposed that most fixed or semifixed defensive facilities be at sea for mobile
protection. Under the condition of remarkably improved operation mobility, the
traditional connection of fixed defenses will probably be replaced by a
combination of mobile with fixed defenses, taking mobile defense as the dominant
factor.
Future defenses will vary
with the changing of requirements and the increase of means. The structure of
traditional defensive systems will be destroyed. The main features of the new
structure will include:
Integrated Protection and Operations
In future warfare, the
gap between the front line and the rear area will be greatly reduced. Modern
protective facilities and their functions, most of which have the double
function of protection and combat operations, will become more advanced so that
a closer connection between defensive protection and combat operations will
gradually fill the gap. This tendency may bring about the following results: on
defense, the original function of mere protection will change into both
protection and combat operations; in combat operations, the idea that protective
troops are just for protection and operational troops are just for combat
operations will be replaced by the concepts that operational troops will take
responsibility for self-protection while performing their main task of fighting,
and that protective troops should share the task of some operations.
This article sets forth the important function
of stealth weaponry in modern warfare, as well as domestic and foreign research
and development in this field. It also points out the crucial technological
problems that have to be overcome in research on stealth weaponry in view of
Chinese conditions, and offers some recommendations. The purpose is to draw the
attention of relevant Chinese specialists to the problems connected with stealth
weaponry research.
It is
characteristic of modern warfare that it stakes everything on technology.
Following the rapid development of radar, infrared, laser, and millimeter wave
detector and guidance technologies, every kind of weaponry is almost immediately
monitored by concentrated radar and photoelectric detectors. It is for this
reason that every country is now expending great energy on stealth weaponry
research to enhance the operational effectiveness and survival potential of
weaponry in modern warfare. Stealth technology is part of high technology;
stealth weaponry is extremely important in modern warfare. Several countries
have by now developed various kinds of highly efficient stealth weaponry, such
as stealth planes, stealth missiles, stealth naval vessels, stealth tanks, etc.
Some have indeed already been transferred for use by the armed forces and
successfully tried out in actual combat.
In China, research on stealth weaponry was started in
the 1980s, and great progress has been achieved, particularly in aspects of
theoretical research on active and exterior stealth applications for entire
aircraft and for components. Microwave tests, in dark rooms and in the open,
have by now been completed in the case of a number of entire aircraft and a
large number of components.
Expand the stealth waveband. Stealth technology is an important component
of electronic warfare, and development of stealth technology must be conducted
with full consideration for the peculiarities of modern warfare. The main
emphasis on research of stealth weaponry in the various countries is currently
placed on centrimetric wave, submillimeter wave, infrared, laser, and metric
waveband expansion. The stealth waveband will therefore have to be expanded.
The
radar-indiscernible structure of the stealth weaponry is an important research
topic. It comprises primarily research on the external structural contours and
structural research on power units, power unit installations, exhaust and air
intake, directional guidance installations, installation platform for the
armament system, and the antenna system. The rational structural composition of
stealth weapons is extremely important for a reduction of its radar-reflecting
surface area and for enhanced radar-indiscernibility.
CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS
In today's era, filled with various
contradictions and complicated interweaving of interests, development of
anything is necessarily competitive. The differences in the development of
objectives between national defense and politics, economics, science and
technology is that the form that the development of national defense objectives
must take to be competitive is external competition. This is especially true of
our country with our kind of socialistic characteristics where our national
defense development is not production methods to meet our own needs but to
counterbalance threats from the outside. So, the selection of our national
defense development objective must include the following aspects of competition.
There is structure to competition. From
the point of power, there is total national defense power competition and
military power competition, there is actual power competition and potential
power competition, there is actual combat power competition and deterrent
General Mi Zhenyu is a former Vice President of the Academy of Military Science,
Beijing. These excerpts are from China's National Defense Development Concepts
(Beijing: PLA Press, 1988), 50-53 and chapter 9. power competition. From the
perspective of form, there is the competition of superior over inferior, of the
inferior over the superior, and also the competition of sitting as equals at the
same table. From the perspective of attributes, there is the competition of
material strength and the competition of spiritual strength, obstinate
competition and flexible competition; there is the competition that draws one
into a war and the competition to accept actively a challenge. There are
multilevels in each competition. For example, the competition at a lower
structural level of military power could be divided into competition with
nuclear power and conventional power; at a level below the nuclear level could
be competition of strategic nuclear power, battlefield nuclear power and
tactical nuclear power.
National defense development strategy is a
mentality that we hope to achieve in the future. Thus, its competition
possibilities do not deal only with what is before our eyes. We must direct our
attention globally, direct our attention toward modernization and find ways to
deal with the sciences of the future. It is even more urgent to get a foothold
on the capabilities to deal with future threats and planning for the future,
especially under the historical conditions where there are no possibilities of a
world war being fought. However, to predict the future does not mean to ignore
the practical. It means to keep an eye on its development and, based on the
revelations of the laws of development of objective reality, scientifically take
control of the trends of the future. Think about the potential development in
terms of competition in the year 2000, predict the possible ways that the
national defense strength can be used, analyze its strong and weak points and,
on this foundation, determine the challenges and opportunities that would be
faced. We must focus the selection of our strategy objective with the aim of
attaining the competition results set by that objective and not just the general
efficiency of that objective. For example, the discrepancy in standards between
the weapons and equipment we now possess compared to those of advanced countries
is 20 to 25 years. If our objective for the year 2000 is merely to shrink this
discrepancy to 10 to 15 years, then from the point of view of effectiveness, it
would seem to be high, but from the point of view of competitive effectiveness,
it would only be an impractical increase in quality, perhaps even a decrease.
Indeed, when we compare the discrepancy of one or a half generation of weapons
in the year 2000 with the two- to three-generation discrepancy today, the
difference in competitive effectiveness could prove even greater. Thus, although
it is necessary to close the gap, focusing only on setting objectives to close
this discrepancy gap and not set a competition objective could turn out to be
useless even if the objectives are reached. This should be of extreme concern to
us. Today is the starting point of our future and only when we come up with a
competition objective to project the future will it be possible for us to be
less sidetracked and gain time. If we do not start today to plan to be better,
to be ahead of everyone, how can we possibly make use of the opportunities and
become latecomers that surpass the old timers?!
Because the development of objective
reality undergoes myriad changes in the twinkling of an eye, especially for
competition predictions, and when potential actions and intentions of the enemy
are constantly changing, it is not possible for us to entirely understand all
his actions and intentions. This, inevitably, brings with it some level of
unpredictability and danger when we base our national defense development
objective on these projections. Therefore, when we select our development
objective, we should do so with a certain amount of flexibility to guarantee
that in situations of complex changes, the adaptability and efficaciousness of
competition objectives are preserved. This would require that when we formulate
our objectives, we must first of all focus on the compatibility of the very best
and most satisfactory objectives, most satisfactory and feasible objectives, and
the most feasible and possible objectives. Even though there will be changes in
this kind of situation and although it may be impossible for us to completely
realize our predetermined competition objectives, we will still be able to
achieve some benefits from this competition.
Weapons
are tools used to carry out armed conflicts. It is an important component of the
military's combat power. It is the major element that determines the success and
failure of a war. The development of modern weaponry, contained and controlled
by national defense science and technology and national defense economic
realities, have affected a succession of military scientific theories.
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force sent out 14 aircraft
and bombed a nuclear reactor 20 km southeast of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.
"The bombs landed precisely on the main building where the nuclear reactor was
located." On May 2, 1982, during the Falklands War between England and
Argentina, England's SSN Conqueror fired two wire-guided TIGERFISH torpedoes and
sank the only 13,000-ton large cruiser, General Belgrano, in the Argentina Navy.
Two days later, the Argentina air force flying the French manufactured SUPER
ETENDARD fighters needed only one EXOCET AM39 air-to-ship missile to sink the
large, superbly equipped and costly ($200 million) SHEPHERD class destroyer from
a distance more than 45 km away. On May 25, Argentina sank the British Navy's
18,000-ton troop transport, an ATLANTIC SEA TRANSPORT [Daxiyang Yunsongze] class
ship. In June 1982, in the air battle above Syria's Bekka Valley, the Israeli
Air Force won an important battle by using all types of jamming methods and
precision-guided weapons like air-to-surface missiles and television and in 2
days completely destroyed all the surface-to-air missile sites in the Bekka
Valley. In the surprise attack on Grenada on October 25, 1983, the United States
used many surveillance methods and sent out an E-2C high-altitude, early-warning
aircraft with antijamming capability, and hi-tech F-15s and F-16s, which had
been remodeled and equipped with infrared sighting equipment, laser-guided
bombs, and radar-guided self-seeking air-to-surface missiles, to achieve its
predetermined military objectives with very little cost. During the military
conflict over the Gulf of Sidra between the United States and Libya between
March 24-25 , 1986, and in the air attack on Libya by the United States on April
15, the United States used hi-tech weapons such as laser-guided bombs, "Rockeye"
cluster bombs, TRIDENT radar-guided, self-seeking air-to-surface missiles and
for the first time, used its high speed antiradiation missile "HARM" as well as
other hi-tech equipment such as new infrared sighting equipment. The United
States lost only one F-111 fighter-bomber and in turn sank and seriously damaged
two Libyan cruisers, destroyed one missile launching site, destroyed about 5 to
12 Soviet made MIG-23s and 3 to 5 IL-76 transports, and achieved combat
successes on 5 predetermined targets. Since the 1980s, several local area
conflicts have vividly shown, and people have clearly understood even before the
smoke cleared, that modern weapons have assumed some new characteristics under
the impetus given them by the advances made in national defense science and
technology.
Fourth,
focused energy, is different from radiation mass destruction weapons like
chemical, atomic, and nuclear weapons. A focused- energy weapon directs energy
into beam power that kills the enemy or destroys a target directly. (It is also
called a directed energy or directed beam energy weapon.) The rapid rise of
laser technology, particle beam technology, microwave technology, and plasma
technology has provided the foundation for the creation of focused-energy
technology. In recent years, there has been rapid development in focused-energy
weapons, and at present, the phase of theoretical experimentation has largely
been completed and has entered the prototype stage of research. According to
reports, the Soviet Union is in the process of researching three kinds of high
energy laser weapons for its anti-air defense. It could complete the research
work for a practical model against a star wars weapon in the 1990s and deploy a
small quantity of them. There is intense research going on for various kinds of
tactical laser artillery and guns and the coming of directed- energy weapons in
theaters of war are not far away. The combined use of these and conventional
weapons systems will result in greater casualties and destruction.
It is common
knowledge that modern warfare is not only the competition of weapons on the
battlefield but is also, at the same time, an all-out competition of the total
strength of the opposing side's politics, economics, military, and science and
technology. During the development of weaponry, the four aspects of politics,
economics, military and science and technology are completely brought into play.
In today's climate of rapid development of national defense science and
technology and the daily emergence of new weapons, the material base of the
actual national defense economy should be not only strong but also exceptional.
In addition to the above, research and production of
weapons, ammunition, technical facilities and engineering equipment all consume
large amounts of metal and various kinds of nonferrous metals. They also need
the support of the chemical industry and energy resources, as well as military
industrial products. According to the statistics from affiliated departments at
the United Nations, 15 to 16 percent of the world's copper output and 10 percent
of it tin, nickel, lead, and zinc outputs are used for weapons production and
toward the building of other national defense installations. The consumption of
energy resources is even greater. During WWI, the consumption of fuel by each
soldier for each day averaged about 6 kg. During WWII, it was increased to 20 kg
for each person each day. In the several local area wars fought in recent years,
the fuel consumption of each man each day increased to 90 kg. The consumption
level is shocking! This not only raises problems for logistics support, it also
increases the economic and energy resources burden.
Weapons
development is reliant on the development of the national economy. It also
encourages the growth of national defense science and technology. Military
high-technology also gave impetus to the development of the economy. Looking at
this from two-dimensional space, this big "O" cycle could possibly expand
further. Analyzing it from a three-dimensional space, this kind of spiraling
trend is perfectly suited to the objective laws of material development.
"Technology determines the tactics." The appearance of large
quantities of technical equipment inevitably brings about great transformations
in military theory and tactics; this in turn leads to great changes in strategic
thinking, patterns of combat, combat style, and military structures:
In addition to nuclear weapons, the
emergence of strategic weapons has definitely caused reforms within the
military, changing past combat theories that we must go through war and
campaigns to achieve strategic objectives to the possibility that strategic
weapons could directly attack the opponent's strategic targets and achieve the
strategic objectives. The development of various space weapons has not only
intensified military struggles in space, it has also increased ways in which
strategic objectives could be directly achieved.
First strike has always been the combat phase that
militarists attach greatest importance to. The success or failure of the first
strike impacts the whole battle. In modern combat, because of the short time
needed for combat, the phases of combat are no longer clearly delineated. The
long range surprise attack or the counterattack during the preliminary period of
the combat has become the main combat model for first strike. Thus, every nation
has given special attention to studying the first strike phase of a war. The
United States emphasizes that "every preparation must be made to win with the
first strike." The Soviet Union also believes that "surprise attacks are the
most effective combat opening moves to implement in future wars. . . . Victory
can basically be determined in the first phase of a war." This will demand that
commanders make complete preparations for first strikes. Intelligence,
reconnaissance, personal observations with automatic and rapid analysis,
processing and judgment, decisionmaking, formulating careful plans, and even
reactions must be quick and accurate because only then could the "first strike
win" objective be achieved.
The impact of modern weapons on military theory has been
profound and extensive. The various sophisticated tools, means and methods of
modern policy decision studies, projection studies, and futures studies have
scientifically given impetus to and provided directions for military theories
and strategic growth. It has allowed the military to grow scientifically so that
it can completely anticipate conflicts and play a better leadership role.
The weapons
development strategy is dictated by the realpolitik of politics, economics,
national defense and science and technology. These situations suggest
comprehensive ideas for the development of weapons. Weapons development hinges
between the needs of combat and military construction, and what is possible
economically and in science and technology. At the same time it is also
determined by a country's political system, its national defense strategic
policies, and its fundamental appraisal of the international condition. Thus,
different countries have different weapons development strategies.
TACTICAL STUDIES
We believe that the two
industrial revolutions took place in the 1760s and the 1870s which brought about
qualitative changes in military weaponry and equipment, thus changing the basic
form of military confrontation. The current of the new technological revolution
that began in the 1970s has led to a sudden change in the arena of military
technology. The effects of these changes on the modes of war will be even more
profound and far reaching.
The Army should be built today according to how future
hi-tech warfare will be fought. First, tactical studies can lead directly to the
development of weaponry and equipment. Successful 20th-century examples are
noteworthy. In 1929, when the German military did not have any tanks, a young
officer, Heinz Guderian, broke through the bondage of traditional thinking and
initiated the theory of lightning tank warfare based on the historical
experience of the British use of tanks during World War I. His theory lead to
the production, organization, and founding of operational corps with tanks as
the main body, which then swept across Europe 10 years later. President
Roosevelt accepted Einstein's theory to develop the atomic bomb, and turned a
new leaf in the history of war and mankind. Stalin consulted the great and
talented aircraft designers Ilyushin and Yakovlev and discussed various issues
related to improving aircraft technology; consequently, the air force of the
former USSR enjoyed a great global reputation. Mao Zedong, the soldier who
introduced the proletarian military theories of people's war and guerrilla
warfare to the world of military thinking, saw the far-reaching historical
significance of developing the "atomic and nuclear bombs and satellites." The
fulfillment of this goal has greatly elevated China's position in the world and
has made historic contributions to peace for scores of years. Today, high
technology is an important support for a country's military strength and war
potential. It is a sign of comprehensive national strength, as well as the
material basis for creating new tactics. There is no time to lose in developing
hi-tech weaponry and equipment to comply with the needs of our specific tactics.
We must seize the opportunity and link it to China's national conditions.
THE THIRD MILITARY REVOLUTION
Ch'en Huan
Without the slightest doubt, like all previous military revolutions,
the third will have far-reaching effects on military practice and theory.
From a look at the
object of concentration, we see that striking the other side's effective force
is no longer the main starting point, and the focus is now on interfering with
and destroying the other side's information and cognitive systems. By striking
at one point one can achieve the operational objective of paralyzing the entire
body. "Destroy the enemy and preserve oneself" is another operational maxim that
all armed forces, in ancient and modern times, in China and abroad, have always
followed. However, in warfare in the information era the tendency is for
military forces to be deployed in a dispersed manner, the demarcation line
between the front and the rear to disappear, and weapon systems to reach over
the horizon and cross national boundaries.
In the "cold
weapons" era, armed forces mainly depended on the physical ability to use
weapons when waging war, and their overall combat effectiveness was only the
multiplication of the individual combat effectiveness of their soldiers. Even in
the "hot weapons" and "hot-nuclear weapons" eras, armed forces were skilled
armed forces; among operational units there existed a relationship of a clear
division of work and coordination; the overall combat effectiveness was the
square of the sum of the collective combat effectiveness. In armed forces with
information weapons, rank-and-file soldiers, who originally depended on their
physical skill in using mechanized weapons and equipment, will be replaced by
specialized software that mainly depends on intelligence in using weapons and
equipment that has been transformed by information. This "multiplier" effect of
intelligence and information almost leads to a limitless expansion of the combat
effectiveness of conventional weapons and equipment.
In a future war
there will be nonlinear attacks on enemy objectives. The concepts in the "hot
weapon" era of a battle front and an operational depth will lose meaning. The
main reasons for this are:
The vigorous
development of information-transformed weapons will make fundamental changes in
the traditional operational concepts, thereby causing many new operational forms
to appear in future wars.
Previously, because the performance of weapons
and equipment was limited, quite a few strategists were fond of the tactic of
"close combat." Now, there has been a great increase in the types of long-range
antipersonnel methods. Among them, the air arm, the over-the-horizon precision
strike force, and the large amount of equipment of electromagnetic units will
replace the face-to-face ground attack units of the past and become the main
strike forces in future operations. The further development of long-range strike
weapons will make long-range combat an operational form in future wars. There
will be three main forms of long- range strikes in the future: the first form is
the one in which the air arm independently carries out long-range strikes; the
second form is one in which the long-range strike combines with the long-range
rapid movement of troops transported by land and sea with the vertical airdrops
of airborne forces; and the third form is five-dimensional air, land, sea,
space, and electromagnetic long-range combat.
Under the impetus of information technology and
other high and new technologies, satellites, space shuttles, manned spaceships,
and space stations have appeared in succession. The following new-concept
weapons will come forth in a continuous stream all these weapons will make outer
space the fifth dimension operational space following land, sea, air, and
electromagnetism:
Because the efficacy of these new-concept weapons
depends on the hard-shell support of a space platform, once the space platform
is lost their efficacy will be weakened and they will even become powerless. In
this way the two sides in a war will focus on offensive and defensive operations
conducted from space platforms in outer space, and these operations will
certainly become a new form in future wars. In the U.S. Armed Forces a new
service the Space Force is being discussed, showing that the idea of outer space
combat is close to moving from theory to actual combat.
This tactic does not make the elimination of the
enemy's effective forces its objective, but rather takes as its starting point
the destruction of the enemy's overall structure for combined arms operations
and the weakening of the enemy's overall efficacy in combined arms operations.
Under high-tech conditions, all subsystems of combined arms operations are
mutually replenishing and inseparable operational groups. If there is no unified
command and control monitoring and early warning by the information- transformed
C3I system, then it is difficult to obtain timely, reliable intelligence.
Additionally, when there is an assault it is also impossible for the subsystems
to coordinate without electromagnetic superiority, assaulting units become
"blind persons," and even if they have more troops and weapons than the enemy
they are nothing but a pile of trash. Therefore, by striking at the "vital
point" of the enemy's information and support systems one can at one blow
paralyze the enemy and collapse his morale.
The armed forces
command system in the "hot weapons" and "hot-nuclear weapons" era was a
horizontally unconnected "tree-shaped" structure, which from top to bottom was
in line with the units in the military arm and branch establishments. This
structure was convenient for centralized command, but it had a fatal weak point
its survivability was poor. If a branch of a tree-shaped structure is cut, that
branch is affected, but if its trunk is cut, the entire structure is paralyzed.
When the information-weapon era arrived, because of the large amount of use of
the computer and the great improvement in its capability for searching,
processing, transmitting, and displaying information, the various command and
control systems could form an integral, mutually connected network connecting in
one body the state's command authorities to the individual soldier, all of them
sharing information.
Modern
operational simulation uses an especially large amount of computer operational
simulation, applying it to simulate tanks, battle vehicles, artillery, surface
ships, submarines, and many other weapons. It will also apply to different
levels of strategy, campaigns, and tactics, thereby providing a scientific basis
for decisionmaking.
Following the
development of information technology, any armed force will certainly tend to
become smaller. At present the group army- and division-level scale structure
widely used by the armed forces of various countries could become obsolete and
be replaced by crack, intelligence-type small units that possess the capability
for a high degree of mobility. In future operations, the attacking and defending
sides will put more emphasis on being economical in the use of their operational
strength, only throwing into the operations the essential units. A prominent
characteristic of this kind of establishment is that it possesses
"divisibility," i.e., based on the nature and need of an operational mission,
units can at will be "divided" and combined.
MILITARY CONFLICTS IN THE NEW ERA
In our study of military
struggle in the new period, we should first take a look at "major events
throughout the world" and gain a clear idea of the features of our age. Marxists
believe that an historical era serves to be the foundation of our decisions.
Lenin stressed repeatedly that "only when we make a correct assessment of the
international environment, or the basic features of our times, can we correctly
formulate our own strategies." In an effort to base the situation analysis on
the features of our age, we should pay attention not only to the local situation
of our neighboring areas, but also to the strategic setup of the whole world,
and not only to changes that have taken place during a recent period, but also
to the historical vicissitudes over a considerably long period of time. During
the mid-1980s, basing on his correct assessment of the situation then, Comrade
Deng Xiaoping vividly summarized the highly complicated international situation
into a four-word idea of "East, West, South, and North," with "East and West"
referring to the issue of seeking peace, while "South and North" refers to the
issue of seeking development. Meanwhile, he also expounded the dialectical
relationship between peace and development. This summarization not only
identified the major contradictions of today's world, but also analyzed the two
sides of these contradictions, thus putting forward the idea of seeking peace
and development. Centered around the two major themes of peace and development,
in recent years, the central authorities have readjusted the country's
diplomatic strategy and foreign relations, and have attained major victories in
our diplomatic struggles. When trying to gain a correct understanding of peace
and development as the features of our age, we need to grasp the following
several basic points:
In short, seeking peace and development is
a great banner for mankind in our age. We need to regard it as the basic ground
for our observation of the world trend, and also for our resolution of major
problems during the future historical period. In today's world, the main forms
of military struggle share the following two distinguishing features: One is the
shift from violent confrontation to deterrence based on actual strength; the
other is the exercise of effective control over war behavior.
Demands for survival and
development constitute the eternal interests of a sovereign country. Today, the
space and resources needed for survival and development remain the focus of
contention between all countries, and military struggle is a major expression of
such contention. The turn of century witnessed extremely acute competitions for
survival and development among different countries in the world. Amidst the
rapids of such international competitions, we will inevitably encounter severe
challenges in our effort to realize the strategic target of "unifying the
motherland, promoting the economy, and safeguarding peace." At present, major
countries in the world are vying with each other to readjust their own
strategies. Under the new strategies, they will:
As Chairman Jiang Zemin pointed out in "China's Declaration of the
21st Century," China should first turn itself into a powerful country if it
intends to make a greater contribution to both the progress of mankind and world
peace. This is the strategic thought of our leaders as well as the voice of all
our nationals and comes from the bottom of their hearts. The present relatively
stable period of peace is still fraught with many destabilizing factors. The
challenges result from competition in comprehensive national strength, which is
a pressure in reality, while struggles centering on national reunification,
territorial disputes, and arguments over maritime rights and interests may lead
to local wars and sudden changes. What merits our special attention is that with
the increase in the world's population and the ongoing trend of tighter supplies
of natural resources and a relatively smaller space for subsistence, the tasks
of military struggle currently facing us have not yet been totally separated
from the nature of taking cities and seizing territory.
The Central Military Commission
has put forward a military strategic principle for the new period, which calls
for efforts to base military struggle on winning local wars, which employ modern
technologies, especially wars under high-tech conditions. Meanwhile, stress has
been placed on the need to accelerate the modernization building of our Army,
contain and win wars, and fulfill the army's major missions in the military
struggle of the new period. This new strategic principle embraces both the
realistic employment and the long-term building of military strength. Today, the
employment of military strength by major countries generally shares the
following features:
We should maintain the modernization and alertness of our military
forces at a high level so that we can make rapid responses to contingencies and
gain the strategic initiative in any place at any time. To win local wars under
high-tech conditions, we need all the more to adhere to the Confucian ideology
of "winning victory in a war before actually going into it." If we say that the
idea of "winning a war before actually going into it" adhered to by militarists
in the past was concerned only with the stage of pre-war preparations, then the
idea of "winning a war before actually going into it" held by today's
militarists means, more importantly, the design and building of military
strength during peacetime.
The well-known scientist Zhu
Guangya profoundly pointed out these criteria for judging the quality of today's
army.
A philosopher
once said: "At the back of the tremendous tension of traditions is an inert
force of history." During this important cross-century period, we should conform
to the trend of our times, renew our military concepts, and accelerate the
quality building of our army amid reform, with a view to adapting ourselves to
the needs of the military struggle during the new period.
INFORMATION WAR: A NEW FORM OF PEOPLE'S WAR
Wei
Jincheng
In the information age, an all-new
concept of operations should be established. Information is a "double-edged
sword." In the information age, information is not only a weapon of combat but
also the object sought after by the warring parties. The quantity, quality, and
speed of transmission of information resources are key elements in information
supremacy. That is why information is not just a piece of news and information
weapons do not refer only to such information-based weapons as precision-guided
weapons and electronic warfare weapons. The most effective weapon is information
itself. Information can be used to attack the enemy's recognition system and
information system either proactively or reactively, can remain effective either
within a short time or over an extended period, and can be used to attack the
enemy right away or after a period of incubation. Therefore, good information
protection and launching a counterattack with information weapons when attacked
will become the main subjects of preparation against war during the information
age.
Information warfare is entirely different from the
conventional concept of aiming at a target and annihilating it with bullets, or
of commanders relying on images and pictures obtained by visual detection and
with remote-sensing equipment to conduct operations from a map or sand table.
The multidimensional, interconnected networks on the ground, in the air (or
outer space), and under water, as well as terminals, modems, and software, are
not only instruments, but also weapons. A people's war under such conditions
would be complicated, broad-spectrum, and changeable, with higher degrees of
uncertainty and probability, which requires full preparation and circumspect
organization.
NANOTECHNOLOGY WEAPONS ON FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS
In 1993, the U.S. Rand Corporation
submitted to the U.S. military a research report, "Military Applications of
Microscale Electromechanical Systems," which portrayed the latent military
applications of microscale electromechanical systems, attracting attention from
relevant quarters. The possible military applications of the microscale
electromechanical systems conceived of in this report include the following:
The microscale
electromechanical systems typically conceived for development usually include
six sub-systems: sensor systems, information-processing and auto-navigation
systems, maneuvering systems, communications systems, destruction systems, and
drive generators. These microscale electromechanical systems have a certain
automatic capability and mobility. When there is a need to attack enemy
electrical systems, one can utilize unmanned aircraft to disperse these
microscale electromechanical systems in the vicinity of a target.
These microscale electromechanical systems can be
controlled with sound. The drive-energy source of ant robots is a microscale
microphone that can transform sound into energy. They can be used to creep into
the enemy's vital equipment and lurk there for as long as several decades. In
peacetime, they do not cause any problems, but in the event of war, remote
control equipment can be used to activate the hidden ant robots, so that they
can destroy or "devour" the enemy's equipment. In addition, there are at least
25 specialists who have done many years of research on nanotechnology and
microscale electromechanical systems. Speaking from the latter stages of a great
deal of scientific investigation, within the next 10 to 25 years, manufacture of
these microscale electromechanical apparatuses of molecular dimensions will be
possible and may actually sport "changeable hair," like that of Sun Wukong.
These ant robots would "self-replicate" and have ultrasensitive reconnaissance
apparatuses and remote-control mines for a combat platform. Were the need to
arise, ant robots could be released against an enemy and used to search out
sensitive military areas that must be controlled. By means of a control program,
microscale reconnaissance apparatuses and microscale mines could
"self-replicate" to the required density, thereby creating a "strategic
threat"or decisive blow against the enemy. It can be conceived that, once ant
robots that can "self-replicate" appear on the future battlefield, a "sudden
paralysis" of the enemy's macroscopic combat system will occcur by means of the
tremendous combat force emitted by microscopic apparatuses, to the extent that
the enemy must submit to the combat pressure created by microscopic
electromechanical systems.
Microscale electromechanical systems can
be made yet smaller, being manufactured into "blood vessel submarines." Such
devices can undertake patrol missions within the complex human circulatory
system, and upon discovering a "focus of infection" or an "abnormality"
somewhere within the body, they can both send a warning signal and also
undertake activities under the direction of a doctor or engage in mortal combat
with bacteria and viruses within the body. If this concept is realized, doctors
will be able to call upon microscale electromechanical systems to perform
"molecular or atomic surgery."
In modern
warfare, in order to accurately reconnoiter enemy combat deployments and troop
movements in a timely fashion, opposing sides have invested financial, material,
and personnel strength to research, produce, deploy, and employ reconnaissance
systems and apparatuses throughout the world. However, the solemn facts of the
Gulf War tell us that, when hunting the highly mobile and wideranging "scud"
missiles, the area covered by existing reconnaissance systems is limited.
However, microscale electromechanical systems could solve the problem of crucial
areas that must be kept under continuous surveillance.
"Nanosatellites" represent a revolutionary
breakthrough in future satellite development. They are a type of distributed
satellite structural system. Such distributed systems, in contrast to integrated
systems, are able to avoid the damage that follows the malfunction of an
individual satellite, and thus will increase the survivability and flexibility
of future space systems. The best application of nanosatellites is their
deployment in local satellite groups or in distributed constellations. For
example, if we launch nanosatellites in solar stationary orbits, with 36
nanosatellites placed evenly into each of 18 equally spaced orbits, then there
would be a total of 648 nanosatellites in orbit. Thus, we could ensure that at
any given time, there would be continuous coverage and surveillance of any spot
on the Earth. Currently, there are already a few western countries that are
researching "microscale" satellites.
Since the beginning
of the 1990s, the topic of microscale electromechanical systems has been raised
many times in scientific publications, and this field's specialized
deliberations have attracted attention. A few experts in Japan, Western Europe,
and the United States believe that with the rapid development of science and
technology, microscale electromechanical systems will be a research topic of the
utmost importance over the next 10 years. According to the Rand Corporation
report, Japan is the nation making the greatest investment into research and
development of microscale electromechanical systems at present. Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry has formulated a 10-year plan for developing
microscale electromechanical systems; furthermore, it has already built a
"molecular assembler." At the end of 1993, the Hitachi Corporation announced
that it had, under room temperature conditions, built a working single-electron
memory chip. Just like current chips, this type of chip can store one bit of
information, but the newer memory devices only require 1/1,000,000 of the power
consumption of older memory devices, and they require only 1/10,000 of the
surface area.
According to the Rand
Corporation, the investment of the United States in research into microscale
electromechanical systems is probably an order of magnitude lower than that of
countries such as Japan or the Netherlands. In order to turn around this lag in
the area of microscale electromechanical systems, the United States has already
included such systems in its "U.S. National Critical Technologies" plan, and the
U.S. military has especially drafted a 3-year plan for developing and applying
microscale electromechanical systems.