NOTES: CHAPTER 3
1Jane's Weapon Systems: 1985-1986 (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, Ltd., 1986), pp. 9-10. See also: Cochran, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, pp. 209-211.
2Jonathan Dean, "The INF Treaty Negotiations," SIPRI Yearbook 1988, pp. 375-394. See also: Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," Survival (May/June: 1983), Vol. XXV, No. 3; Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe 1969-87 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (New York: Random House, 1989); Strobe Talbot, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York: Vintage Books, 1985); U.S. Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), pp., 250-251.
3Ibid. See also: Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985).
4 Jane's Weapons Systems: 1985-1986, p. 44.
5Haslam, Politics of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 104-105.
6Jane's Weapons Systems: 1985-1986, pp. 42-43.
7 INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding and MOU Update.
8 Talbot, Deadly Gambits, pp. 56-91. See also: Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," Survival; Dean, "Negotiations," Yearbook, pp. 375-394.
9 Haslam, Politics of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 101-105. See also: Dean, "Negotiations," Yearbook, pp. 375-394.
10 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 366-399. See also: Haslam, Politics of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 147-174.
11Strobe Talbot, "The Road to Zero," Time, December 14, 1987, pp. 18-30. See also: Nitze, Hiroshima, pp. 421-462.
12ACA, "Germany, US Remove Last Obstacles to INF Agreement," Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.), September 1987, pp. 30-31. See also: Talbot, "Road to Zero," Time, pp. 18-30.
13 For additional information, see: Barry M. Blechman and Michael Krepon, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, in the Significant Issues Series (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), Vol. 8, No. 1; Barry M. Blechman, ed., "Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach," International Security Yearbook (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
14Barry M. Blechman, "A Minimal Reduction of a Major Risk," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago: The Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, April 1988), pp. 44-46.
15U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers," Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 336-344.
16President Ronald Reagan, as quoted in "Remarks by the President at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Signing Ceremony," Press Release (Washington, D.C.: Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 15, 1987).
17 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Risk Reduction Centers," Disarmament Agreements.
18Stephen I. Griffiths, "The Implementation of the INF Treaty," in SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmaments (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 443-458. See also: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Brothers in Arms Control Off to a 'Smooth' Start," Washington Post, September 15, 1988, p. 16; U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: "Nuclear Risk Reduction Center," September 1988; Interview with Colonel Harold Kowalski (USAF), US NRRC Staff Director, November 30, 1990.
19INF Treaty, Article XIII, Paragraph 2.
20Reports of Technical Consultations. See also: Washington Times, March 15, 1988, p. 5; Washington Post, May 13, 1988, p. Al; Schultz, Testimony, pp. 6-9; Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today (Washington, D.C.), July/August 1988, pp. 22-23.
22 U.S. State Department, Fact Sheet: "Risk Reduction." See also: Smith, "Brothers" V. Gan, "US Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Described," Pravda, September 15, 1988, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union (Washington,--hereafter, FBIS-SOV) (September 20, 1988), p. 6.
23"Risk Reduction Center Interviewed," Krasnaya Zvezda, August 2, 1989, trans. in FBIS-SOV, August 9, 1989, p.4. The Soviet NRRC had no role in escorting U.S. inspectors at Votkinsk. That responsibility fell to the Ministry of Defense Industry.
24U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Document 100-11, pp. 24-25. See also: Richard A. Scribner, Theodore J. Ralston, and William D. Mertz, The Verification Challenge: Problems and Promise of Strategic Nuclear Arms Control Verification (Boston: Birkhauser, 1985), pp. 47-66; Kosta Tsipis, David W. Hafemeister, and Penny Janeway, eds., Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Made It Possible (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986).
25INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding. See also: U.S. Senate, Treaty Document 100-11.
26INF Treaty, Article VIII, Paragraph 8.
27Ibid., Article XII.
28Ibid., Article XIII.
29Ibid. See also: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Special Verification Session Ends," Press Release, July 15, 1988.
30 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission, December 20, 1988.
31Memorandum of Agreement on the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty, December 21, 1989.
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