Following an inspection of SS-23 missiles at Saryozek, USSR, Commander John C. Williams, U.S. Navy,(r) the American team leader, shakes hands with Nikolai Golovatsky, a Soviet observer.
CHAPTER 4
Following an inspection of SS-23 missiles at Saryozek, USSR,
Commander John C. Williams, U.S. Navy,(r) the American team
leader, shakes hands with Nikolai Golovatsky, a Soviet observer.
| President
Reagan stood next to General Secretary Gorbachev in the
Kremlin on June 1, 1988. As the two leaders exchanged the
INF Treaty and the instruments of ratification, President
Reagan made a brief formal statement. Setting the treaty
into the context of recent Soviet-American relations, he
praised the negotiators and concluded, "These are
historic moments. As we exchange these documents, and the
instruments of ratification, this treaty--the terms of
which we formally agreed to last December in
Washington--enters into force."1 On that day, all parts of the INF Treaty entered into force. They included the treaty (preamble and 17 articles), Protocol on Eliminations, Protocol on Inspections, the Special Verification Commission, the requirement to communicate through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, and the requirement to establish a treaty data base using the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).2 This memorandum became immediately the focus of attention. It was the starting point for critical treaty data on the INF missile systems (numbers and types of INF missiles and support equipment at each site, technical specifications, photographs of each type of missile and support equipment, and geographical coordinates for each site) that had to be exchanged before any inspections could be conducted. |
| On June 1,
the United States and the Soviet Union provided a revised
and updated MOU, listing deployed and nondeployed
missiles, launchers, support equipment, and missile
structures.3 It
described the location of these treaty items according to
degrees, minutes, and seconds of longitude and latitude.
It listed the mutually agreed upon technical
characteristics for each missile system, including number
of warheads per missile, length of first and second
stages, diameter by stages, weight by missile stage, and
weight by canister. Other MOU technical data described
missile launchers, launch canisters, support equipment,
and support structures. Finally, the updated MOU contained corrected site diagrams, outlining the perimeter of the areas subject to on-site inspection. In this memorandum the United States certified it had 2,332 treaty-limited items, including 846 missiles and 289 launchers, located at 31 current and former INF missile sites and missile-related facilities. The Soviet Union declared it had 5,439 treaty-limited items, including 1,846 intermediate- and shorter-range INF missiles and 825 launchers, located at 130 INF missile sites. |
||
| INF Baseline Inspections Defined | ||
| The first
INF Treaty on-site inspections, called baseline
inspections, had to be conducted between 30 and 90 days
after the treaty entered into force. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union initiated baseline
inspections on July 1, 1988, and completed them by August
29. Every INF missile site and missile-related facility
authorized by the treaty was inspected. The function of the baseline inspections was "to verify the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and equipment, and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty."4 Physical observation by the on-site inspectors had to confirm or, if necessary, correct the data published in the MOU. According to the treaty's Protocol on Inspections, the inspecting party had the right to "inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI (Technical Data) of the Memorandum of Understanding...." Those dimensions described the length, diameter, and weight of the missiles and stages; as well as those of launchers and support equipment for the INF missile systems. |
| From an
operational viewpoint, this concept of implementing the
treaty with baseline inspections had several
implications. First, it meant that the most intensive
period of on-site inspection operations during the entire
treaty would be during the first 90 days. American
inspection teams had to be ready to go to two or three
sites a week for eight consecutive weeks in order to
inspect all 130 Soviet sites. Soviet teams would have to
inspect all 31 U.S. INF missile sites and facilities
during the same period. Escorting teams had to be
prepared to conduct the inspection teams to each and
every INF site. Transportation, specifically military
airlift, had to be ready for a maximum effort in the
initial 90 treaty days. Communications centers also would
be operating at peak effort. Assimilating information
about the on-site inspections would be particularly
intense. Thus, from both an operational and a logistical
point of view, the baseline inspections were critical. Both the Soviet and American military services had committed considerable time, money, and people to preparing each and every site for a baseline inspection. The Soviets conducted mock inspections to train inspectors and escorts. At many Soviet missile sites, temporary living quarters were rehabilitated in preparation for American inspectors. At six Soviet elimination sites new facilities were constructed for the American inspection teams. At U.S. military bases in Europe and the United States, special sections of temporary housing quarters were set aside for the Soviet inspection teams.5 |
The 130 Soviet INF sites included missile main operating
bases, deployment areas, and launcher production facilities,
missile and launcher storage facilities, repair facilities, test
ranges, training sites, and elimination facilities. U.S. on-site
inspectors went to all of these sites and conducted baseline
inspections in July-August 1988.
Previous Chapter | Table of Contents | Next Section