Chapter 1 - A New Treaty, A New Mission

		INF Treaty Mission
Pershing II missile.		Known officially as the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles," the 17-article INF Treaty was supplemented by two protocols and a memorandum of understanding. The "Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty" defined the elimination procedures in detail. The "Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty" spelled out the purpose, rules, and procedures for conducting on-site inspections. The accompanying "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty" provided a detailed accounting by each party of the number and location of all missiles, launchers, associated equipment, and facilities covered in the treaty. The treaty's first article defined the essence of the United States' and the USSR's obligations: "...each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty." All ground-based intermediate-range missiles (1,000-5,500 kilometer range), all shorter-range missiles (500-1,000 kilometer range), and their associated launchers, equipment, support facilities, and operating bases worldwide were to be eliminated or closed out from any further INF missile system activity. Defining the INF missile systems by range rather than type of armaments (such as nuclear or conventional) was important. Because the INF Treaty prohibited the parties from producing or flight-testing any INF-designated missiles, and the treaty was for an unlimited duration, no ground-based missiles in these ranges could be produced, possessed, or tested by either nation in the future.¹⁵

Eight different types of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems would be eliminated. For the United States, these missiles were the Pershing II, the BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile, and the Pershing lA missile. For the Soviet Union, the INF missile systems slated for destruction were SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23. Two missiles that had been tested but not deployed were incorporated into the treaty because of their ranges. These were the U.S. Pershing lB missile and the Soviet SSC-X-4 cruise missile. As of June 1, 1988, none of the Pershing lBs existed and only 80 SSC-X-4s had been produced for testing.¹⁶

All of these INF missiles would be eliminated under one of the most comprehensive verification regimes ever established to monitor compliance with a U.S.-Soviet arms control treaty. The monitoring provisions combined traditional satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means with totally new procedures for on-site inspections of missile production plants, operating bases, support facilities, and elimination sites.

Five Types of On-Site Inspections

Under the INF Treaty inspection teams performed different functions. They carried out these functions through five types of inspections: baseline, elimination, portal monitoring, closeout, and short-notice.¹⁷

The first type of inspection established a baseline inventory. Thirty days after the formal exchange of the instruments of ratification, each nation had the right, over the next 60 days, to send 10-person on-site inspection teams to all missile operating bases, support facilities, and elimination sites specified in the official INF Treaty Memorandum of Understanding. Once on site, the teams had 24 hours to confirm the number of all treaty items present. The results of this inspection were recorded in treaty-mandated inspection reports. These reports, when combined with the official data and photographs in the Memorandum of Understanding, constituted the baseline data for the duration of the treaty.

A second function of the inspection teams was to monitor the elimination of all 2,692 INF missiles, and their launchers and support equipment at designated elimination sites. The Soviet Union designated eight elimination sites; the United States established four sites. All INF missile system eliminations and elimination inspections were to be completed within three years.

FIVE TYPES OF INSPECTIONS:

BASELINE

ELIMINATION

CLOSEOUT

SHORT NOTICE

PORTAL PERIMETER

A third use of on-site inspection teams was for closeout inspections. These inspections confirmed, within 60 days of notification by the inspected party, that all INF-specified equipment, support structures, and treaty-related activity had ceased at the missile operating base or support facility. In the Memorandum of Understanding, the Soviet Union declared 130 INF sites; the United States, 31. INF activities at all of these sites were to cease within three years of the treaty's entry into force.

The fourth function of inspection teams was to conduct annually, on short notice, a limited number of inspections of active missile operating bases or previously active (closed-out) missile sites, support facilities, or launcher production facilities. The purpose of these short-notice inspections was to determine if any INF missiles, support equipment, or declared items were present. During the first three years of the treaty, each party had the right to conduct up to 20 short-notice on-site inspections annually. During the next five years, each side would be allowed 15 inspections annually; during the final five years, 10 per year.

A fifth function of the on-site inspectors was initially to monitor the portals of a single, designated missile production or final assembly facility in each nation. During final treaty negotiations, the Soviet delegate declared that its nation intended to continue the final assembly of a ground launched ballistic missile that was "outwardly similar" to a stage of an INF Treaty missile. For this reason, the United States was given the right to have on-site inspectors monitor--24 hours a day, 365 days a year--the portal and perimeter of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in the Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, USSR. This inspection right was to be in effect for at least 3 years and up to a maximum of 13 years. A maximum of 30 on-site inspectors could be used for this inspection. At Votkinsk, Soviet SS-20, SS-23 and SS-12 missiles had been assembled at the plant; currently, Soviet SS-25 missiles--similar but with a greater range--were being assembled there. These SS-25 missiles were not banned by the INF Treaty. The purpose of U.S. portal monitoring inspections at Votkinsk was to ensure that the USSR did not assemble the banned SS-20 missile under the guise of an SS-25 missile. U.S. on-site inspectors would not enter the plant; instead, they would continuously monitor the portal and patrol the perimeter. The INF Treaty granted the Soviet Union the right to place a team of up to 30 resident on-site inspectors at the portals of Hercules Plant No. 1 in Magna, Utah, where Pershing II rocket motors had been produced. The Soviet inspectors would monitor the plant's portals and perimeter. As at Votkinsk, the INF inspectors could not enter the plant.

In less than five months from its establishment, the new On-Site Inspection Agency had to recruit, train, prepare, and equip the U.S. on-site inspection and escort teams to carry out the initial inspections.