Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to have with us today such a distinguished panel consisting of Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz and Adm. David E. Jeremiah to discuss the proposed Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

I applauded the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. The Communist/Soviet 40-year economic and military program precipitated a political crisis which acted as the catalyst for these historic events. In turn, these developments vindicated our democratic values. I also welcomed the proposed treaty on military force reductions in Conventional Forces in Europe, a treaty which will significantly reduce the United States military presence in Europe.

I am concerned about the threatening instability of the Soviet Union and how this instability might Impact enforcement of the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe. Additionally, I am concerned by ethnic rivalry and hostility in this region and their potential destabilizing effect on international security.

I look forward to exploring these and other issues as we hear testimony from the members of this distinguished panel.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Wolfowitz, Admiral Jeremiah: I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you to this important hearing on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Your views as the representatives of the Department of Defense, are especially critical to the ratification process of this historic but in my opinion outdated treaty.

The coup attempt in August and the assertion of independence by the various republics in the Soviet Union have raised questions in regard to the CFE Treaty. Among them are: Will the treaty be applicable to the republics that are declaring their independence? Does the Soviet Union have the technical and economic ability to destroy the vast quantities of equipment that are identified for destruction under the treaty? Finally, there is the question of the Soviet Union's compliance with the treaty.

Past violations of agreements, such as the INF Treaty, the ABM Treaty radar violation, which were publicly acknowledged by the past two administrations raise grave concerns in regard to this treaty. We have already seen several instances such as the transfer of equipment east of the Urals and the redesignation of units to naval infantry" and "coastal defense," that should heighten our concerns in regard to compliance to the CFE Treaty. My concerns are further heightened by the disintegration of the Central Government in the Soviet Union, which may no longer have the power to enforce the treaty.

I hope this series of hearings will resolve these questions. If they do not, I question the value of this treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RATIFICATION OF TVIE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in July of this year, Secretary Cheney testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of ratification of the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). I have come before this committee to reiterate his support for CFE ratification.

As you are all aware, in the intervening period extraordinary changes have transformed and are continuing to transform what was once the Soviet Union. These changes are of such amaritude that we can state confidently that the alliance's original objective for negotiating CFE-to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large scale offensive action on the part of a united Warsaw Pact led by the U.S.S.R.-has been largely accomplished.

But it would be a great mistake to leap to the conclusion that CFE is no longer relevant or that failure to ratify the treaty would have little consequence. Despite the enormous changes that have taken place-indeed because of them--CFE ratification remains important as a way of helping to address the security consequences of a time of great uncertainty and transition in the eastern half of Europe.

The basic benefits that the treaty provides for the United States and its allies were stated very clearly by Secretary Cheney and General Powell in their July 16 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and were reviewed most recently by Under Secretary of State Bartholomew and Ambassador Woolsey before this committee last week. The treaty's basic limitations create a hedge against the re-militarization of the region to a level that would again threaten NATO. Such remilitarization could not occur without breaking the treaty limits; and such treaty violations would be detected.

NATO's response to the treaty includes the important new program for military modernization through the transfer of treaty limited equipment within the alliance. This program will help NATO maintain peace and security under its new strategic concept, while easing our own CFE implementation requirements. We support it; and we urge Congress to enact legislation enabling it to begin this fall.

But CFE is proving to be an instrument that is useful for more than just its original purpose of reducing the threat of a large scale military offensive against Western Europe. In a time of great change and uncertainty, CFE makes two other important and more immediate contributions to enhancing security and stability for the emerging new democracies of Eastern Europe: (1) the treaty supports efforts of democratic forces in the region to carry out a far-reaching demilitarization of the political and economic life of the lands of the former Soviet Union; and (2) it provides basic limitations, verification and data exchange provisions that will help to make the transition to a new military balance in this region more transparent arid predictable.

This morning I would like to address these two contributions of the treaty in greater detail, as well as the problems these changes in the region raise for ratification and implementation of the treaty.

1. Demilitarization. For the long term peace and stability of Europe as a whole, as well as to relieve the terrible burden on their economies, it is important that the people of the former U.S,S.R, make a radical break with the Soviet past. There must a thorough going demilitarization of political and economic life, including radical reductions of forces and of production of military equipment.

Last week Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood returned from a 10 day trip to Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kiev. Traveling with him was a group of U.S. industrialists. They were seeking ways to transform the heavily militarized, state-owned economy of the former U.S.S.R. to a commercially-oriented, private economy. This group surveyed existing production and design facilities, examined the status of economic reforms and legislation designed to create market incentives, and talked with a wide range of governmental and industrial officials. Our long term aim must be to find ways of helping the people of the former U.S.S.R. who are working with great emergency to try make the decisive break with the Soviet past.

The CFE Treaty can help to support this process. That role is recognized by the states of Eastern and Central Europe themselves. It is not an accident that three of these states-Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria-were the first to ratify the treaty. CFE establishes both overall and regional limitations that require a significant cut in military forces. Such limitations support the efforts of economic reformers to reverse the wasteful and gargantuan Soviet military expenditures that are a major to reverse the wasteful health economies.

If it should come to more radical danger in the region, where large TLE-holding Republics like Russia or Ukraine become independent, the limitations and reductions of CFE would provide a ceiling under which the re-division of forces could take place. The limits that CFE imposes on military competition will assist and strengthen the progress of political and economic reform. This is an additional reason why it is important to keep republics with significant TLE holdings like Ukraine within the CFE framework.

There is every reason to expect the emerging democratic leaders in the former Soviet Union to welcome the limits provided by CFE. Indeed, it will be very much in their interest to reduce their military burdens still further. CFE limits provide for a more than adequate level of conventional military forces to meet the legitimate requirements of self defense. Most recently, for example, Ukrainian leaders told Deputy Secretary Atwood that they would respect CFE levels in the creation of their armed forces and that the eventual outcome could be much less than the publicly proclaimed figure of 460,000 military personnel. We should support and encourage this trend in the republics toward lower military expenditures and force levels by ratifying the CFE Treaty ourselves.

2. Making the transition to a new military balance more predictable and transparent. The CFE Treaty provides a variety of provisions that could make the transition to a new military balance in the region more predictable and transparent.

• The CFE Treaty provides for the exchange of detailed information on command structure, locations and holdings of major units and changes in holdings over time. Information exchange of this type is important in a time of great change precisely for those states in the region without access to the kinds of national intelligence means that the U.S. enjoys. There may come into being new chains of command, redeployments of existing forces or the disbandment of some units and the formation of others. The provisions of CFE help to ensure that these kind of changes take place in a more open environment. Neighboring states will receive detailed information on the forces around them each year. Important changes will be notified specially.
• In response to the great changes that took place in 1989, the CFE Treaty permits states belonging to the same group of parties to carry out on-site inspections of one another's territory, that is, it permits Hungary or Poland to inspect the U.S.S.R. This gives neighboring states the right to examine ongoing developments for themselves through on-site inspections.
• The treaty's joint consultative group is a multilateral forum where states may address serious concerns raised by the actions of other parties with respect to treaty obligations. It provides these states a forum to discuss the information they obtain and to resolve ambiguities against the backdrop of the treaty's explicit limitations and obligations.

Conclusion. Some have asked whether we can be sure that our ratification of the CFE Treaty will lead to CFE's ratification and implementation on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. No one can be sure, although what we know at present gives us pounds for optimism. But clearly it is in the interest of the United States and of Europe and in the interest of reform in the Soviet Union for CFE Treaty limits to be accepted.

I believe CFE ratification by the United States will help to move events in the former U.S.S.R. in a positive direction and provide additional encouragement for those who want to carry out reforms and demilitarize society. It will send a signal that we regard the CFE Treaty limits as an important part of the developing security environment west of the Urals. Our failure of hesitation to ratify would, I believe, send the opposite signal and introduce uncertainty in an area where it is not desirable.

The United States should also follow through beyond ratification to foresee, respond to and shape developments in a way that preserves the security benefits of the Treaty.

• We should also be prepared to help officials in the region understand their obligations under the treaty and to demonstrate how the treaty contributes to a more stable and secure environment in the region and in Europe as a whole.
• We must make it plain to the leaders of the new union, republican officials and, where required. new national authorities that the U.S. regards CFE ratification and implementation as an important step in the integration of these states into the new European security structure.
• We must also be prepared, where necessary, to adapt the treaty to change, whether through the joint consultative group or formal amendment. The treaty contains the necessary mechanisms to adapt and respond to change.

The changes in the former Soviet Union represent a unique opportunity to escape the centuries old pattern of state centralization and militarization. CFE is part of the package of incentives we have to move in this new direction. It provides basic limitations that nonetheless recognize the need for residual forces in the region. It supports efforts underway by reformers in the region to demilitarize the economy and redirect assets to civilian needs. It provides a forum to engage the new governments in the region on the direction of their military policies. For these reasons, as Well as the more direct benefits that the treaty brings to the security of NATO, the Department of Defense continues its strong support of the CFE Treaty and urges the Senate to proceed with ratification.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral.

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to testify in support or prompt ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The military remains firmly committed to the early ratification and implementation of this historic treaty.

This treaty is a major success story for the Atlantic alliance because it achieves all the initial objectives of our negotiations. An implemented CFE Treaty will strengthen stability and security in Europe by reducing armed forces to much lower levels and removing past disparities in military equipment holdings. It will thus eliminate on the continent the capability of the Soviet Union to launch a successful surprise attack and to initiate large-scale offensive operations.

The treaty places limits on battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. These are the primary combat systems used in offensive operations to seize and hold terrain. A total of 54,000 such systems will have to be reduced by the Eastern Group of six. By contrast, NATO's required reductions will be approximately 16,000 pieces of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE), much of which is former East German equipment now owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.

An implemented CFE Treaty not only reduces the offensive combat equipment holdings of the Soviet Union, but also helps codify Europe's incredible political and military changes of the past year. Already, there are no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia or Hungary and all Soviet forces will have completed their withdrawal from Germany and Poland by 1994. The next few years are likely to be turbulent in Central and East Europe and this treaty will provide security and stability to the emerging democracies during a difficult transition period.

When the treaty enters into force, how will we know the force reductions have been made and the TLE destroyed? The combination of information exchange requirements, on-site inspection provisions, and continued monitoring by national technical means give us a high degree of confidence that this treaty is verifiable. While we cannot assure the detection of a treaty violation involving a single tank in excess of treaty limits, we can, with high confidence, detect a militarily significant treaty violation. We consider a violation to be militarily significant when it gives the Soviets an advantage to which NATO would have to respond militarily.

In view of all the changes of the last year and especially the past few months, we find it difficult to identify a cheating scenario that is logical or has any probability of being successful. However, our past studies have suggested that treaty cheating, at a militarily significant level, would have to be of such a magnitude that it would surely be detected in sufficient time for NATO to adequately respond.

I know some of you have questions about the viability of the CFE Treaty given the changes in the Soviet Union since August of this year. These changes have been dramatic and considerable uncertainty remains regarding the eventual configuration of the former Soviet Union. Regardless of the outcome of the crucial debate between Moscow and the republics, CFE ratification remains in the best security interests of the United States. Let me take a few moments to explain this point.

Treaty-mandated equipment reductions, regional limits, information exchanges, and on-site inspections will impose few constraints on NATO while placing major limitations on a Soviet successor who will likely continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe. We would prefer to see the military forces in and newly independent successor or successor states emerging from the former Soviet Union remain accountable under the CFE Treaty. However, from a military perspective, if smaller republics opt out of a new union, it is unlikely that the amounts of TLE which they might hold would be militarily significant. We do need to ensure that all TLE remaining under the control of the central government, but still located on the territories of the newly independent republics, remains subject to treaty provisions and associated agreements.

We already have a precedent for this. Last month the Soviets agreed, in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, that all Soviet (i,e. central government) TLE in the three Baltic States will remain fully accountable under the treaty. NATO inspections of Soviet forces in the Baltics will have to be negotiated with the governments of those three nations. Similar arrangements could be made concerning the TLE belonging to the central government located in any small republics that may opt for total independence from the Union.

The large republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia present a somewhat different problem. Each of these republics has the potential to Field significant military forces and are positioned in more strategic locations. Their locations and potential military size make it almost certainly a necessity that they participate in the CFE Treaty. I believe there are powerful political, military, and economic incentives for these republics to participate in the CFE Treaty.

To sum up, there are no advantages to holding up U.S. ratification of the CFE Treaty until all center-republic relationships within the former U.S.S.R. are clarified. The central government, as treaty signatory, should be held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics and with respect to its forces located elsewhere in the treaty's area of application (ATTU). Those republics which opt out of the union and accede to the treaty can be held separately accountable for obligations under the treaty. Independent republics acquiring indigenous military forces in the region will be encouraged to participate in the treaty regime. The treaty provides the flexibility and mechanisms such as the Joint Consultative Group, to accommodate these changing situations.

In the process of implementing the treaty, we particularly benefit from the continued viability of the NATO alliance. The alliance collectively can hold half the TLE in the ATTU while the sufficiency rule restricts the former Soviet Union-and now its successor-to one-third of the TLE. While we will not permit U.S. security interests in Europe to rely solely on the CFE Treaty, it does allow us to reduce our force levels with far less risk. The combination of our allowed holdings and continued POMCUS stocks gives us the capability to reinforce our forward-deployed forces. As you know, we will reduce U.S. military stationed forces in Europe to 160,000 by fiscal year 1995. The expected enhanced security and stability in Europe along with the continued viability of NATO will allow us to make this major force adjustment.

Last week, NATO's leaders announced the development of a new strategy; this new strategy is directly linked to the new security which the CFE Treaty, when ratified, will provide. While acknowledging the significant changes in Europe the summit statement emphasized the continuing relevance of the CFE Treaty and calls for its prompt ratification.

Any discussion of NATO's implementation plans requires an explanation of how the alliance is harmonizing TLE holdings and planning transfers of TLE to fit a destruction schedule. In 1989 NATO initiated the Harmonization Plan to reach agreement on national allocations of maximum levels for holdings in each category of TLE. SACEUR suggested a concept whereby alliance members with treaty required reductions of modern equipment in the central zone transfer this equipment to other nations with less modern equipment in other zones. The final plan transfers modern tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles, over 4,000 pieces of TLE, from the United States, Germany and the Netherlands to six other NATO allies.

U.S. participation in the Transfer Plan is approximately 2,900 pieces of TLE. Most of this TLE would otherwise have to be destroyed under the CFE Treaty's reduction protocol. The Transfer Plan allows the United States to avoid the high costs of destruction while enhancing NATO's defense capabilities. All the equipment we have offered in the plan will be completely excess to U.S. military requirements by fiscal year 1995.

As you know, we need legislative authority to participate in the transfer plan. German end Dutch equipment is already being shipped to recipients. We would appreciate expeditious consideration of the bill before you, allowing us to proceed with this important program.

Today, I have tried to explain your military's conviction that we have a good treaty before us and a solid process for alliance implementation and monitoring Soviet compliance. However, some suggest we delay U.S. ratification of the treaty to see what develops in the Soviet Union. I repeat that no responsible military officer can see any advantages in delaying. To the contrary, delaying U.S. ratification only delays the advantages that will be gained when the treaty comes into force. If we fail to promptly ratify we will fail to set the leadership example needed to encourage potential successor states to the Soviet Union to enter the new European security and stability order. With a ratified treaty in place, we can better influence developments throughout the region of the former Warsaw Pact.

Five nations--the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Belgium, and Netherlands--have ratified the treaty. Most of the signatories, including the Soviet Union, have pledged to ratify before the end of the year.

Next week, on the 19th of November, will be the first anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty. Positive action here in the U.S. Senate will undoubtedly speed ratification efforts elsewhere and hasten the treaty's entry into force.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly encourage you and your colleagues in the Senate to provide the President your unreserved advice and consent to ratification of this historical treaty. Thank you.

There would be additional costs to the United States if we fail to receive legislative authority to participate in the NAT0 cascading program. The U.S Army in Europe pays over $6 million per year to store and maintain the equipment we plan to transfer. If we do not transfer the equipment we will continue to store it until the treaty enters into force and then be required to start the destruction phase.

Since the United States will use the cascade program to cover all its treaty reduction liabilities, we need to complete all transfers prior to 16 months after treaty entry into force. This is required due to a treaty interpretation which would require us to destroy equipment we would otherwise transfer. If in fact, the sooner we begin the transfers the better it is for the United States, the recipient nations, and treaty implementation.

NATO is ready to initiate the U.S. portion of the cascading project. We expect the U.S. equipment to begin moving within 2 months of enactment of the enabling legislation.

The only legal problem associated with the cascade program is the U.S. requirement to have enabling legislation in order to participate. Without the legislative authority, we legally cannot fulfill our part of the NATO plan.

We believe that there are new no regular army, air force, or naval units under the command of the Ukrainian President or any other Ukrainian authorities, despite the Ukraine's claim to Soviet military forces in the republic. The Ukraine does, however, apparently control a limited number of Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, formerly subordinate to Moscow.

The status of KGB personnel is less clear. It is our understanding that KGB components in the Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, are in the process of being resubordinated under various other organizations. The border guards, for example, have apparently been separated from the KGB and are reportedly under joint republic/center control, with the exact status yet to be worked out. Certain other forces of the former KGB apparently have been transformed to the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

Ensuring the safety, security, and responsible control of Soviet nuclear weapons is a high priority of the administration. Indeed, it was a key objective of the President's September 27 Nuclear Initiative and his proposal to gin discussions on these issues.

Responsible control can best be preserved if the weapons are placed under the collective control of a single authority. Pressing for the consolidation of weapons and their control in one republic-Russia-may not be as prudent, particularly given the positions adopted by other republics such as the Ukraine.

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

November 18, 1991

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
The Honorable Jesse Helms.
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senators, Pell, Helms and Biden:

The Committee on Armed Services has completed its review of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and has concluded that the Treaty promotes the national security interests of the United States, our allies in NATO, and the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. The Committee recommends that the Committee on Foreign Relations report the Treaty favorably to the Senate, subject to certain conditions.

First, the Committee believes that the CFE resolution of ratification should condition the Senate's advice and consent on its understanding that the June 14, 1991 side agreement resolving the naval infantry dispute has the same legal force and effect as the Treaty itself. In a February 5, 1991 letter to Secretary Baker, the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on intelligence urged the Administration not to submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate until the naval infantry dispute and certain other post-signing discrepancies were resolved. In a March 7 reply, Secretary Baker stated that the Soviet interpretation of the application of the Treaty to naval infantry units "flatly contradicts the language of the Treaty and has no basis in the negotiating record." Secretary Baker's letter also stated: "This is an issue of principle, a clear-cut case of the Soviet Union failing to fulfill a Treaty obligation. We have repeatedly made clear to Soviet officials, at very high levels, that they should abandon this wholly unsupportable position."

Notwithstanding its original demand that the Soviet Union recant its unacceptable interpretation of Article III, the Administration elected to deal with this problem through the mechanism of a side agreement that establishes obligations outside the frame work of the Treaty. While that approach will result in Soviet equipment holdings under CFE at the same level as if they had never asserted that naval infantry equipment was exempt, the decision to resolve this dispute through a separate side agreement has the disadvantage of leaving the Soviet Union in disagreement with the 21 other CFE signatories over the interpretation of a key provision in the Treaty. As noted in the State Department's Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty: "... it should be noted that the Soviet Union, in contrast to the other 21 Signatories to the Treaty, does not subscribe to the analysis of the scope of Article III counting rule described above."

It is highly unusual for an administration to submit a treaty for advice and consent by the Senate with an open acknowledgement that the parties are in disagreement over a fundamental point of treaty interpretation. This anomaly is only tolerable to the Senate due to the corrective effect of the June 14, 1991 side agreement; however, this makes it all the more important that the Senate act within the resolution of ratification to ensure that the side agreement is afforded the same legal force and effect as the Treaty. A Condition making this explicit will help guarantee that any Soviet action inconsistent with or in violation of the June 14, 1991 side agreement is treated by the United States with the same gravity as any Soviet action inconsistent with or in violation of the Treaty.

The June 14, 1991 side agreement raises another point of concern to the Committee: the Executive Branch's continuing practice of using legally binding side Agreements and political commitments to establish obligations outside the framework of an arms control treaty. President Bush's July 9 letter of transmittal for the CFE Treaty describes the June 14 side agreement on naval infantry as associated with, but not part of, the Treaty. The practice of relying upon agreements and commitments outside the framework of treaties began with the Soviets' "political commitment" on Backfire bomber issues in SALT II, was repeated in the case of various definitional and verification issues in INF, and has now been repeated with regard to a variety of issues related to CFE and START. The Committee believes that the practice of relegating "too hard to solve" negotiating issues to side agreements, rather than resolving them within the confines of the treaty proper, threatens to detract from the Senate's role under the Constitution as a co-maker of treaties. Absent a change in ad-roach, the Committee believes that it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the resolution of ratification that predicate the Senate's advice and consent to arms control treaties upon the understanding :hat the various side agreements have the same legal force and effect as the treaties.

Second, the Committee recommends that the CFE resolution of ratification also condition the Senate's advice and consent on its understanding that the October 18, 1991 side agreement dealing with the accountability and inspectability of Soviet forces in the independent Baltic nations has the same legal force and effect as the Treaty. The Committee recognizes that this side agreement responds to a development (the Soviet Union's formal recognition of Baltic independence) that arose well after the Treaty was signed. Nonetheless, the Committee would note that the Administration chose to address this development through the mechanism of a side agreement that established obligations outside the framework of the Treaty, rather than as an amendment or protocol to the Treaty that would have required formal approval by the Senate. As with the naval infantry side agreement, failure to affirm the legal force and effect of this side agreement in the resolution of ratification would detract from the Senate's Constitutional role in the treaty-making area.

Third, the Committee recommends that the resolution of ratification include a Condition addressing the possibility that the Ukraine or some other republic of the former Soviet Union with large military forces or a significant military potential might achieve independence and elect not to be bound by or accede to the Treaty or for other reasons remain outside the CFE regime. in response to a question we submitted in advance of our first hearing, Secretary Baker stated:

It is the view of the Administration that in order to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for Ukraine and Byelorussia, if they were not bound as part of the USSR or any successor state, and retained significant amounts of equipment in Treaty categories, to accede to CFE.

During our November 4 hearing, Ambassador Woolsey testified that should such a scenario play out, it would provide grounds for U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty, "Certainly a country the size of the Ukraine, if it had substantial military forces, could, I would think, also be regarded as a fundamental change of circumstances under the Treaty, the old doctrine of 'rebus sic stantibus.'"

The Committee recognizes that-there have been many signals emanating from the Ukraine, including the October 30 Kiev communique between the Ukraine and Russia, indicating that the Ukraine Intends to observe the CFE Treaty. Nonetheless, many issues remain unsettled, including the question of which current CFE state or states in the Group of Six would yield entitlements of Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) to the Ukraine to establish I Ukrainian TLC allotments in the event the Ukraine joins CFE as a sovereign state.

The Committee believes the uncertainties in the current situation are such that the resolution of ratification should include a Condition requiring certain actions in the event former republics become independent and decline to be bound by the CFE Treaty or, assuming that they are not bound under international law In the absence of any action on their part, decline to Ve accede to ihe Treaty. In such a Condition, such developments with respect to the Ukrainian, Belorussian or Russian republics would be recognized as a militarily significant changed circumstance -- a point that was acknowledged in our hearings by numerous Administration witnesses.

In the event of such developments with these three republics, the Condition should require the President to consult immediately with the Senate as to whether the United States should exercise its withdrawal rights under the Treaty. If, after such consultation, the President elects not to exercise withdrawal, the Condition should, at a minimum, require him to request the Treaty Depository to convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties pursuant to Article XXI, with representatives of the new state in question invited, to assess the continued viability of the Treaty and whether amendments are necessary and appropriate to deal with these changed circumstances.

If, following such a conference, the new state in question still refuses to accede to or be bound by the Treaty, the Condition should require the President to immediately transmit to the Senate any amendments agreed to during such conference, or if no such amendments have been agreed to, a recommendation as to whether the United States should continue to be bound by the Treaty or to withdraw from the Treaty and his explanation of his reasons for such recommendation.

Finally, we would note that we have reviewed the draft legislation on CFE "cascading" that has been negotiated between the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Department, and we have no objection thereto assuming it is not amended. We recognize that this CFE implementing legislation, which would amend the Arms Export Control Act to permit certain specified weapons transfers within NATO for the purpose of modernizing our allies equipment, is under the jurisdiction of your committee, but we would-recommend that you act on this matter before the Senate adjourns.

We have consulted with all Members of the Committee on the recommendations outlined above and no objection has been raised. However, certain Members of the Committee have identified in the attached Additional Views other proposed Conditions, including one on the issue of the Soviet declaration of TLE in the area of application on November 19, 1990 -- a declaration that is disputed by U.S. intelligence. While the other Members of the Committee agree that this is an issue of serious concern, they have deferred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in making recommendations to your Committee on an appropriate Condition on this subject.

Sincerely,

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We agree with the Committee's letter report on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and endorse the recommended conditions to any Senate approval of ratification of the CFE Treaty in at least the specific areas addressed in the letter. We believe, however, that further recommendations are necessary to protect the Senate's Constitutional prerogatives in the Treaty-making process and to assure future U.S. national security interests.

Specifically, the inaccuracy of Soviet data declarations of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) in the area of application at the time the CFE Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990 is a serious concern. while the Administration has attempted to resolve this issue, significant differences still exist between the Soviet data declaration and U.S. intelligence estimates of the number of Soviet TLE in the area of application. These differing estimates range in the thousands of pieces of TLE above the amount included in the Soviet declaration.

We believe this discrepancy represents a significant question about Soviet probity and good faith with respect to their obligations under the terms of the CFE Treaty. While the Administration has expressed its intention to continue to work to achieve a resolution of this data dispute, it has not yet been able to do so. The June 14, 1991 resolutions of the Article III dispute and the issue of Soviet equipment transferred to locations east of the Urals do not resolve this issue.

We do not believe this is necessarily an issue over the military significance of the unreported Soviet equipment, and we make no judgment as to the military significance of this equipment or which U.S. intelligence estimate of unreported TLE is most accurate. Instead, we believe there is a very important principle associated with this issue with respect to maintaining the integrity of the arms control process, particularly as it might set a dangerous precedent for START. Consequently, we believe this issue must be resolved before the United States assumes responsibility for its obligations under the terms of the Treaty.

In order to resolve this issue in a manner consistent with U.S. national security interests and what we view as the national interests of other State Parties to the Treaty, we propose the following reservation to the CFE Treaty which should be included in the resolution of ratification. The reservation would read as follows:

"Whereas, data supplied by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to Article XIII and the Protocol on Information Exchange, regarding its equipment holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area as of November 19, 1990, differed from United States estimates of such equipment, the United States shall not be bound by the terms of the Treaty unless and until--

1. the President has certified to the Senate his best estimate of the amounts and types of equipment holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Atlantic to the Urals area of application on November 19, 1990;
2. the President has certified to the Senate that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has agreed that the Soviet equipment holdings described in (A) are the amounts and types of equipment holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area of application on November 19, 1990; and
3. the President has certified to the Senate that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has agreed that it will destroy such amounts and types of equipment as required by the Treaty based on the amounts and types certified pursuant to clause (A) either as required by the Treaty or, if such equipment is no longer in the Atlantic to the Urals area, in accordance with destruction procedures similar to those provided for in the Treaty."

Additionally, while the Committee letter suggests a general condition designed to deal with the possibility of the Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian Republics becoming independent and not agreeing to the Treaty, we believe we should provide our views on a specific reservation designed to deal with this situation.

We believe that the resolution of ratification should provide for very specific procedures to be followed in the event that the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Russian Republics were to become independent and not agree to be bound by the terms of the Treaty. Administration officials consistently testified that, if such a circumstance-should arise, it would amount to a militarily significant changed circumstance and would seriously bring into question the continued validity of the Treaty. While we recognize the possibility exists that other Soviet republics might well become independent in the future and might, for whatever reason, not agree to be bound by the provisions of the CFE Treaty, it is less likely that such situation would amount to militarily significant changed circumstances.

Therefore, we suggest that the Foreign Relations Committee include in the resolution of ratification two conditions dealing with the creation Of new states in the Treaty area of application: one condition applicable with respect to the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and the Russian Republics, and another condition applicable with respect to the creation of new states in any other area. Furthermore, we suggest that the Foreign Relations Committee include a condition relating to creation of new states in the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or the Russian Republic that might go so far as to mandate U.S. withdrawal unless the President resubmits to the Senate for its advice and consent the Treaty or amendments to the Treaty which are designed to deal with the changed circumstances.

Additional Views of Senators Smith, Wallop, and Mack
Concerning the CFE Treaty

We, as members of the Armed Services Committee, have reviewed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and share the view of our colleagues that, with the inclusion in the Resolution of Ratification of certain conditions to the Senate's advice and consent, the Treaty would promote U.S. national security interests. In our opinion, however, further clarification on a variety of issues is needed before the Senate discharges its constitutional prerogatives.

We recognize that the Administration considers prompt ratification of CFE an urgent priority. It is neither our wish nor intent to prevent timely disposition of this matter. However, the Warsaw Pact dissolution and subsequent disunion of the USSR are extraordinary transformations which have injected great uncertainty into the legal, political, and military foundations of the Treaty. We are concerned that precipitant consideration, prior to resolution of technical discrepancies, and ongoing political proceedings among the Group of Six, particularly the former Soviet Union, could severely undermine the Senate's province and contribution to the ratification process.

For instance, with respect to treaty limited equipment (TLE) within the ATTU zone, there exist significant disparities between U.S. intelligence estimates and the Soviet data declaration provided at the time of Treaty execution. Although numerical estimates of unreported TLE differ among elements of the intelligence community, there is consensus that some TLE, and quite possibly a substantial amount, was not reported. Under-reporting of TLE would significantly diminish Soviet reduction obligations under the Treaty, and could prove to be militarily significant. Yet, to our knowledge, this matter remains unresolved. In our ooinion, ratifying CFE prior to resolution of data base discrepancies would imperil Treaty efficacy and set a dangerous precedent for consideration of the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty.

Furthermore, the abortive August 1991 coup has triggered unprecedented political and military discord within the former Soviet Union. Rising nationalism and sovereignty claims among the republics have eroded internal symmetry, and shifted the power balance within the Group of Six. At present, it is unclear how these developments will transform the Soviet political and military framework, and whether the individual republics will, in fact, accede to the Treaty. Both Secretary Baker and Ambassador Woolsey have affirmed that Treaty viability hinges on participation by the republics, particularly Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia.

We share this view, and believe it would be premature for the United States to act on the Treaty prior to the impending referendums on independence in Ukraine and Belorussia.

Moreover, we are concerned that, in the wake of the Warsaw Pact dissolution, the bipolar structure of the Treaty may actually jeopardize the long term security interests of emerging East European democracies, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. It merits note that many East European nations have expressed interest in affiliating with NATO. it is not inconceivable that, in the future, these nations may determine a need to augment their armed forces in response to unforeseen regional security threats. However, within the existing bloc-to-bloc Treaty structure, larger TLE holders, such as the Russian republic or some other former Soviet state system, could exercise a de facto veto over such augmentations by refusing to lower their own equipment allocations. We believe this matter warrants consideration.

The fundamental objective of the Treaty has always been to eliminate the massive disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels, and to reduce the threat of surprise attack or large scale offensive action against western Europe. This imperative has been largely accomplished, irrespective of CFE, through the demise of the Warsaw Pact and disunion of the USSR. Nonetheless, we believe that, with the inclusion of certain conditions, the Treaty would retain a degree of flexibility and efficacy necessary to promote U.S. and NATO security interests.

In our opinion, the national security interests of the United States, and our NATO allies, would be best served by resolving the aforementioned issues Prior to ratification. While we understand the Administration's desire to secure prompt approval of the accord, it should be noted that formal transmittal and subsequent Senate action were unduly delayed because of Soviet Article III violations. Given present uncertainties regarding the legal, political, and military foundations of the Treaty, we recommend the Senate defer action until these questions are resolved. However, should the Senate elect to proceed with ratification at this time, we believe the suggested conditions of the Republican Armed Services Committee members should be wholly incorporated to condition Senate advise and consent.

Malcom Wallop (R-WY) Bob Smith (R-NH)

Connie Mack (R-FL)

IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator LEVIN. Can you describe what the impact would be on our national security and military planning if political transformations in the Soviet Union result in the formalization of multiple nuclear-capable states?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The former Soviet Union is undergoing a dramatic political and military transformation, the outcome of which is uncertain, Clearly, the future disposition and control of nuclear weapons in whatever states succeed the Soviet Union could have significant implications for the security of our country and our allies. To reduce the potential for instability and miscalculation inherent in this situation, leaving the nuclear weapons or the former Soviet Union under the collective control of a single authority is in both our interests and the interests of the Soviet people.

WEAPON CONTROL

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe that there is a window of opportunity right now to get these weapons under such control?

Mr. WOLFOLWITZ. Yes. The President in his September 27 Nuclear Initiative sought to take advantage of what he considered an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Seizing this opportunity, one of the President's objectives was to help the leaders in the Kremlin and the republics get under control their enormous nuclear stockpile, which now seems less an instrument of national security and more of a burden.

CENTRAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator LEVIN. Could you tell us what the Pentagon proposes to do to enhance the possibilities for central control of nuclear weapons? Are the Soviets in need of any technical or logistical assistance in consolidating control over these weapons, for instance in transporting them or constructing storage for them? Have they asked us to provide such help? What has been our response?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The President proposed, and Mr. Gorbachev accepted, joint discussions on nuclear command and control arrangements and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. There is also agreement to explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads. These discussions have begun.

THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Senator LEVIN. Recently before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, whether it was in our national security interest to see that democracy prevails in the Soviet Union. He said yes, and agreed that the causes of civil unrest would have to be addressed in order to make that possible. Do you believe that chaos in the Soviet Republics threatens our long-term national security?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The continuing erosion of Soviet state authority without question presents a new get of potential security challenges to the United States and our allies, including the prospect of militarization of ethnic or political conflict within the Soviet Union. As Secretary Baker said before the CSCE in September, the United States urges support for democracy and the rule of law in the Soviet Union, and we strongly believe that any changes within the Soviet Union should occur only by peaceful means. The United States has urged the Soviet central government and the various republics to seek to resolve their differences though peaceful dialogue.

SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

Senator LEVIN. The conferees on the DOD Authorization bill are trying to include provisions that would give the Pentagon more authority to reduce the Soviet military threat while we have a chance, and to assist in reducing chaos there. Wouldn't you welcome this authority as precisely the kind of program we urgently need to take in our own security interest?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Providing humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union, and assisting the Soviets in trying to demilitarize their economy and convert defense industries, are certainly programs which DOD supports. Our concern regarding the proposed legislation was that important DOD programs might be affected in the effort to fund Soviet-related assistance. Secretary Cheney indicated that DOD would not oppose the authority which the conferees were addressing, provided that such authority was discretionary.

SOVIET UNDER-REPORTING OF TREARY-LIMITED EQUIPMENT (TLE)

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, at the time of a nature of the CFE Treaty in November 1990, the Soviet Union reported significantly less treaty-limited equipment (TLE) within the ATTU zone than had been-estimated by U.S. intelligence agencies. While there remains some disagreement over the exact numbers of TLE omitted from the Soviet data declaration, there is agreement within the intelligence community that at least some TLE as not reported. Some analysts believe that the amount of unreported TLE is significant and that more than half of this equipment remains within the ATTU.

The under-reporting of TLE significantly reduced the Soviet Union's reduction obligations under the treaty. Secretary Baker indicated in his July testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee that this was a serious issue and that discussions with the Soviets were underway to resolve this issue.

Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, to your knowledge, what is the current status of these discussions, and in what forum and with whom are such discussions being conducted? Are either of you or representatives of your offices participating in these discussions?

What do you believe to be the correct amount of under-reported TLE in the ATTU at the time of signature? Of this amount, how much do you believe remains in the zone today? Is this an Intelligence Community estimate, and if go, are there dissenting views within the administration as to the estimated amount of Soviet TLE undeclared at time of signature or remaining in the zone today?

Is it your view that the Soviets should be required to revise upward their previous data declarations in order to accurately reflect their TLE holdings in the ATTU at the time of signature, with a corresponding increase in their reduction obligations?

JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Discussions concerning the accuracy of Soviet data submissions continue to take place in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, as well as bilaterally. The JCG was established under the CFE Treaty as the primary forum to address issues such as this. Representatives from the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff participate in these discussions.

The Intelligence Community has provided the information and estimates regarding the amount of under-reported Soviet TLE, its current status, and other facts and estimates concerning this question. Their information has been provided to the Senate in a classified response to previous questions. Please refer to those responses for the second part of this question.

We will continue to address data questions with Soviet representatives both in the JCG and bilaterally. These discussions have already resulted in two agreements signed on June 14,1991: first, a politically binding statement by the Soviets agreeing to the destruction or conversion of an additional 14,500 pieces of TLE located east of the Urals, and second, the resolution of the Article Ill dispute by a legally binding commitment to include within original treaty ceilings the amounts of TLE in naval infant and coastal defense divisions, thereby further increasing the amount of Soviet TLE to be destroyed or converted.

Admiral JEREMIAH. Discussions concerning the accuracy of Soviet data submissions continue to take place in the Joint Consultative Group in Vienna, as well as bilaterally. The JCG was established under the CFE Treaty " the primary forum to address issues such as this. Representatives from the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff participate in these discussions.

The Intelligence Community has provided the information and estimates regarding the amount of under-reported Soviet TLE, its current status, and other facts and estimates concerning this question. Their information has been provided to the Senate in a classified response to previous questions. Please refer to those responses for the second part of this question.

We will continue to address data questions with Soviet representatives both in the JCG and bilaterally. These discussions have already resulted in two agreements signed on June 14, 1991: first, a politically binding statement by the Soviets agreeing to the destruction or conversion of an additional 14,500 pieces of TLE located east of the Urals, and second, the resolution of the Article III dispute by a legally-binding commitment to include within original treaty ceilings the amounts of TLE in naval infantry and coastal defense divisions, thereby further increasing the amount of Soviet TLE to be destroyed or converted.

TLE IN THE UKRAINE AND OTHER SOVIET REPUBLICS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, a significant amount of Soviet TLE is located in the Ukrainian republic. The Ukraine is generally expected to vote its independence from the Union on December 1, and Ukrainian officials have declared jurisdiction over this Soviet equipment in order to support an independent military organization, perhaps as large as 460,000 troops.

What would be the military significance of the existence of an independent Ukraine in the ATTU zone, which is a party to the CFE Treaty and which possesses significant amounts of former Soviet equipment which was to have been limited under the treaty?

Lesser amounts or Soviet TLE remain in several other republics which are within the ATTU-Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belorussia. If any of these republics were also to become independent and gain control over the Soviet equipment within their borders, what would be the possible military significance if these republics chose not to accede to the CFE Treaty?

In short, what is your overall assessment of the impact on European security if large amounts of TLE formerly controlled by the Soviet Union and limited under the CFE Treaty are suddenly controlled by new nations not party to the treaty? In this type of situation, do you believe the CFE Treaty would continue to serve U.S. national security interests?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ and Admiral JEREMIAH. Obviously, we would prefer to see all newly emergent states on the European territory of the U.S.S.R. remain accountable under the CFE Treaty. However, from a military perspective, if the small republics opt out of a new union, it is unlikely that the amounts of treaty limited equipment which they might hold would be militarily significant. In any event, we would need to ensure that all treaty limited equipment remaining under the control of the central government, but still located on the territories or the newly independent republics, remains subject to treaty provisions and associated agreements.

With regard to the Ukraine and Belorussia, my assessment is that if either or both of these large republics retain significant amounts of equipment in treaty limited categories, their participation in the CFE Treaty almost certainly would be necessary. Because this treaty is seen by European states as the cornerstone of a new European security system, we believe that there would be powerful political, military, and economic incentives for both of these republics to participate in CFE.

ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY OF FORCES IN EUROPE

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, in the Secretary of State's letter to the President recommending that he submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, he stated that the Treaty ". . . will eliminate the enormous conventional forces disparity that has existed between the East and West since World War II." If the West does not exercise its right to maintain forces at the levels allowed for under the treaty, does this statement still hold true? I ask this question because it is becoming apparent that many Western countries, including the United States, may not maintain forces even at the levels agreed to by the Group of 16.

This is the most important part of my questions. Assuming that the future direction of a new Soviet Union will be settled one way for another in the next few years, isn't it important that the Group of 16 maintain forces at a level relatively equal to the treaty allotments?

Admiral JEREMIAH. While it would be preferable for all members of the group of 16 to maintain TLE at their maximum levels for holdings, fiscal realities preclude this optimum situation. However, it should be noted that, under the limits that are set forth in Article TV and Article VI of the treaty, the group of 16 can hold up to one-half of the TLE in the ATTU while the Soviet Union can hold only up to approximately one-third of the total TLE permitted by the treaty. Thus, the group of 16 can achieve parity with the Soviet-Union, in a purely quantitative sense, by maintaining force levels of only two-thirds of what their side is permitted to have.

Additionally, we will continue to train and equip ground, air, and supporting naval forces for rapid deployment back to Europe if needed. We must retain the capability to reconstitute forces. This Base Force concept-forward deployed forces, backed up by a capability to reinforce (which could rapidly plus-up our forces in the ATTU to our treaty limits)-will give us the ability to respond to any adverse trends which might require a military response.

BALTIC COOPERATION FOR INSPECTIONS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, although Soviet authorities have agreed that Soviet military equipment located in the former Baltic republics will be counted against treaty limits, the Baltic states have not yet agreed to inspections of this Soviet equipment, as called for by the treaty.

If we are unable to secure agreement from the Baltic nations for full inspection rights of this equipment, how serious an impact could this loss of inspection rights have on our confidence in the treaty's security regime?

Mr. Wolfowitz and Admiral JEREMIAH. Baltic officials recently told visiting U.S. representatives that they would be prepared to work out such arrangements. While Baltic officials' number one priority is complete Soviet withdrawal in the shortest amount of time, they acknowledged that it is very much in their interest to assure that Soviet forces are subject to treaty monitoring provisions as long as they are stationed on Baltic territory. We thus anticipate no problems in working out such arrangements. Moreover, the amount of Soviet equipment in the Baltics is modest and is unlikely to remain there for an extended period.

DEFINITION OF A "BATTLE TANK"

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, during our hearing on the INF Treaty, this committee identified a problem with the overall definition of the weapons covered by the treaty, specifically with respect to future weapons platforms. I have examined the definitions for the various systems covered by this treaty, and have one question with respect to definition of a tank.

In Article 11, Paragraph (C) it states that: "The term 'battle tank' means a self-propelled armored righting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun, necessary to engage armored and other targets . . ." In the article-by-article analysis for the CFE Treaty, it stated that: "The 'battle tank' definition was drafted in this way in order to provide a procedural mechanism for addressing, in the Joint Consultative Group (in accordance with Article XVI of the treaty) or in conferences (in accordance with Article XXI of the treaty), the deployment of new weapons technologies."

For clarification, how would the parties resolve a new weapons system that meets all the criteria for a "battle tank," but instead of a "high muzzle velocity direct fire gun," it employs a high-power laser or some other non-muzzle weapon system? Is this already covered by the treaty, or would all parties have to agree to include this under the limits set forth for "battle tanks?" If the latter, would this require a consensus of all the parties to the treaty, and if so, could the state party that developed the system veto such an attempt to cover this weapons technology under the terms of the treaty:

I also ask this question because the treaty definition for "combat aircraft" covers weapon systems that use "other weapons destruction technology to cover technologies not known today. Why didn't we use a similar phrase for "battle tanks?"

Were you consulted during the negotiation of this particular provision? What was your position on this issue at the time it was being negotiated? What is your understanding of the meaning of the battle tank definition in the final treaty, as it relates to future weapons systems?

What significance might this apparently lack of clarity have for future U.S. weapons systems?

Mr. Wolfowitz and Admiral JEREMIAH. The equipment definitions are designed to capture within treaty limits any future types of TLE. The signatories agreed that modernization would have to be discussed as it occurred and that the existing treaty definitions provide an adequate vehicle for this purpose. In each definition, the general description takes precedence over specific parameters. Thus, if a country deployed a new laser battle tank, the JCG, which would address this issue, might deem it capable of performing the role foreseen in the tank definition and count It against the treaty's tank ceilings. This approach was fully discussed and coordinated within the U.S. Government and will not have any significance for future U.S. weapons systems.

CFE TREATY

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, as you know, the CFE Treaty was negotiated and structured during a time when the Cold War bloc alliance system existed in Europe. The CFE Treaty was meant to achieve a limit on Soviet and other Warsaw Pact countries. That situation no longer exists-there is no Warsaw Pact. Indeed, many former Warsaw Pact countries have indicated a desire to join NATO.

In retaining the bloc-to-bloc structure of the CFE Treaty, are we not leaving countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia at the hands of Russian or central authority control with respect to determining the defense requirements of former Warsaw Pact countries? In other words, in the event that Poland or Czechoslovakia feel that their defense requirements are lacking against a possible future threat to them by Germany, for example, or Russia, by retaining the bloc-to-bloc structure of the CFE Treaty are we allowing the Russian Republic or some other former Soviet state system the right to prevent increases in treaty limited equipment for the Eastern European democracies by vetoing increases in their allotments under the equipment levels of the treaty. For example, according to the Group of Six allocation table, the U.S.S.R. is allowed to retain 13,150 tanks out of a total of 20,000, while Poland and Czechoslovakia are limited to 1,730 and 1,436, respectively. Germany, on the other hand, is allowed 4,166 under the Group of 16 allocation for NATO. As currently structured under the CFE Treaty, the only way Poland and Czechoslovakia can increase their tank holdings is by asking Russia for a portion of their allotment since it is unlikely that other members of the Group of 6 states would be willing to forego their already meager share of the allocation.

Are we not in many ways codifying some of the worst elements of the former security structure of the Cold War, by limiting the security requirements of these nascent democracies in Eastern Europe to the will of the Russian Republic or some central Soviet authority?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. CFE ceilings are set by Group but there are no group obligations. All treaty responsibilities fall on individual nations, and independent republics which participate in the treaty would be expected to fulfill those responsibilities. Each participant, e.g., has maximum equipment levels and a quota of inspections which can be conducted against it.

Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as the rest of the Group of Six, agreed to certain equipment levels during the negotiation process. These levels are not necessarily permanent, however, and could be reallocated, as long as they did not violate the over-all zonal limits of the treaty.

The treaty is thus not only well suited to a Europe of independent countries, but is the only legally-binding mechanism readily available for regulating security relations in this new, more uncertain environment. The basic structure of the treaty would not be affected by the addition of new states on the Eastern side; the Group of Six would expand and its equipment entitlements would be reallocated.

PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, I would like to ask you about security or peacekeeping assistance to a state party under the treaty in the event such a country requests such assistance. Let's assume, for example, that the Ukraine were to become an internationally recognized independent state and a party to the treaty. Suppose, in 6 or 10 years, that the Ukraine were to become concerned about a civil war in Russia spilling over into the Ukraine, or uneasy about a buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border with extensive logistical support in the rear areas that nevertheless did not breach the Russian allocations or treaty zonal limits. Under these circumstances, could the Ukraine call upon the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to maintain the security of the Ukraine or the region? Specifically, does the treaty preclude the movement of such a peacekeeping force into the treaty's area of application, particularly if the deployment of that peacekeeping force would mean that the Ukraine's equipment holdings would exceed that allowed for under the treaty, the zonal limits, or the overall equipment levels for the former Warsaw Pact countries?

In other words, are there allowances under the treaty for peace-keeping forces outside treaty limits, even though direct threats or aggressive acts have not yet been initiated?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. There are no specific provisions under the treaty to allow for the deployment of peacekeeping forces, but there is nothing in the treaty to restrict such deployments of TLE to the territory of a state party, if it involves equipment of other states parties or of states not party to the treaty including deployments from NATO countries onto the territory of members of the Eastern group, which Ukraine would be), provided that no treaty limits were breached and provided that permission had been given by the state on whose territory such equipment would be located, in this case, Ukraine.

More specifically, however, if the United Nations Security Council had authorized an enforcement action in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, then CFE limits could be exceeded pursuant to Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

ELIMINATING EQUIPMENT

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Soviets must eliminate over 37,000 items of treaty-limited equipment under the provisions of the CFE Treaty and subsequent legal and political commitments. Do you believe the Soviets will be able to meet the schedule for reductions set out in the treaty, in view of both the disastrous economic situation and the continuing political instability in the Soviet Union? What discussions, if any, have you had with the Soviets concerning their reduction obligation under the treaty?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Administration officials have had a number of discussions with Soviet center and republican officials concerning the obligations of the CFE Treaty, including meeting the destruction obligation. They have made several declarations of their intent to implement and abide by the terms of the treaty. We therefore expect them to fulfill their obligations under the treaty.

TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED PEOPLE

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, does the United States have enough language-trained and technically qualified people to carry out the inspection regime of the CFE Treaty, while at the same time continuing inspection activities under the INF and Nuclear Testing Treaties? Will additional assets be required to perform these activities, and what impact will the START Treaty have on our inspection capabilities?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes. Currently, the On-Site Inspection Agency has about 2,500 names in its database of qualified inspectors and escorts for all arms control regimes. Recently, we have augmented our OSIA permanent party inspection and escort teams with specialists from a variety of interagency fields to enhance OSIA's inspection capability and to provide opportunities for U.S. technical experts who have studied CFE Treaty-related TLE. For CFE, OSIA inspection teams consist of a core of six people, including linguists and military members with combat arms or aircrew experience. Core teams are augmented by up to three individuals with Soviet or area CFE, expertise who are assigned to OSIA on a temporary duty basis. The variety of experience on the inspection teams provides the flexibility necessary to conduct inspections of all treaty-limited equipment subject to the CFE Treaty adequately.

By START EIF, OSIA, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence College, will have trained approximately 800 future START inspectors and escorts.

In summary, OSIA has a sufficient number of permanently-assigned inspectors/ escorts, weapons specialists, and linguists to form the OSIA "core teams" in order to execute the INF, START, NIT, CW and CFE missions. Of course, temporary duty augmentation will be required for START, NTT, CW and CFE, as it was for INF.

COST ESTIMATES FOR IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE CFE TREATY

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, would you please provide for the record current cost estimates for implementation of the CFE Treaty, continuing activities under INF and the Nuclear Testing treaties, as well as costs associated with implementation of the START Treaty.

This information should include, for each treaty, all estimated costs to the United States for: destruction or conversion of weapons and equipment; any transportation of weapons or equipment to comply with any treaty, cascading of equipment under CFE, on-site inspections, monitoring and verification activities, activities for which reimbursement is expected from another state, and any other costs associated with implementation of each treaty. Please also provide information as to which agency of the Federal Government is expected to pay these costs. This information may be provided in classified or unclassified form.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The following budget estimates for implementing CFE for USG agencies ire in millions of dollars:

Further information, and information concerning other treaties is not yet available and will be provided.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE CFE TREATY

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, how does the administration view the "Joint Press Statement" of October 30, 1991, between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, which states an intent to take the "necessary steps for early entry into force of these documents?" Is it not simply a statement of intent, or does the administration give it some legal standing?

In the same paragraph, the Ukrainian and Russian delegations went on to underscore "that questions of preparation and implementation on their territories of agreements in the area of arms reduction will be decided with their immediate participation and in consideration of their interests." What do the delegations mean when they say "in consideration of their interests?" Does this mean that they may selectively adhere to the treaty?

Moreover, since Admiral Jeremiah stated in his prepared testimony that the central government is "held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations," have they commented on the joint press statement? Does the current central government acknowledge and agree to the intent of the joint press statement, particularly with respect to the Ukraine?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. This statement is one in a series of assurances given by the central government and Ukrainian officials that they accept the obligations of the CFE Treaty, and will implement its provisions. The October 30 statement is part of a general trend toward full acceptance of CFE by Ukraine, and the acknowledgement of this by Soviet central government. We welcome these developments and continue to expect all parties to accept and implement fully all CFE provisions.

U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, it has been pointed out that intelligence gathering activities unrelated to CFE could be undertaken by Soviet or other inspection teams who are allowed access to sites under U.S. and allied control in Europe. Do we have sufficient counterintelligence capabilities to cope with this possible threat?

Admiral JEREMIAH. The Department of Defense is both concerned about and alert to the potential for intelligence exploitation posed by granting Soviet inspection teams access to U.S. sites in Europe. The Joint Staff has provided policy guidance and the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and the counterintelligence agencies of the military services have developed a plan for protecting sensitive points while still complying with the requirements of the treaty. Counterintelligence-trained personnel will conduct a variety of defensive measures to protect escort and site personnel from any attempts to cultivate or recruit them. Sufficient counterintelligence capabilities exist to cope with this threat.

SOVIET REPUBLICS' RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER CFE

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, it has been suggested that the Soviet republics have not really come to an understanding of their responsibilities under CFE. What about the responsibilities of U.S. forces under the treaty? Have we come to clear definitions with our NATO counterparts?

Mr. Wolfowitz. We have worked out a series of arrangements and agreements within NATO covering the cost sharing of the harmonization program, the rights and obligations of host and stationing states during CFE inspections, coordination of verification activities, and other issues. These arrangements and agreements have resulted in clearly defined responsibilities among NATO nations in meeting the obligations of the CFE Treaty.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Senator WARNER, Admiral Jeremiah, many have stated that due to the vast changes which have occurred among the former Warsaw Pact countries since the signing of the CFE Treaty, the treaty is no longer a viable instrument. With regard to ratification, are there Specific operational problems for the United States or our allies, which ratification of the treaty would create, exacerbate, or eliminate?

If problems are created or exacerbated, are these problems sufficiently significant to over-shadow the benefits derived from the treaty?

Admiral JEREMIAH. There are no specific operational problems for the United States which ratification of the treaty would create, exacerbate, or eliminate. The reporting requirements of the treaty represent new requirements, but ones that present no operational problems.

NATO HARMONIZATION PROGRAM

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, as a matter of policy, given the Defense Department's current force structure adjustments, are there opportunities created by this treaty to make these reductions-more palatable and perhaps more efficient?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes. Perhaps the beat example of such an opportunity is the NATO harmonization program, under which equipment in excess treaty ceilings and force structure requirements will be transferred to NATO allies, who will then destroy older equipment, resulting in an overall increase in alliance military capability.

THE ROLE OF THE CENTER IN THE FORMER USSR

Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, you state in your prepared testimony that "The central government, as treaty signatory, should be held accountable for fulfilling treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics and with respect to its forces located elsewhere in the treaty's area of application." Is the JCS informing the committee that you expect a central government to be retained in the former Soviet Union? Are you assuring the committee that a central government authority as opposed to a Russian authority is certain to be retained over republics opting to maintain some of Union?

Admiral JEREMIAH. The prepared testimony reflects the administration's position that the United States will hold the new union government responsible for fulfilling treat obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics. It will be up to the central government authorities to work out arrangements with republics which are part of the new union or confederation to achieve compliance with the treaty. It will also be the responsibility of the central government to fulfill all treaty obligations concerning any Of its forces which may be located in the ATTU but outside the territory of its constituent republics. This basic approach does not, of course, apply to republics which may become independent of the union.

RATIFICATION OF THE CFE TREATY

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, as you know, the Senate is considering attaching conditions to the resolution of ratification of the CFE Treaty. Some of these conditions may relate to the legal status of the subsequent agreements reached in June relating to Soviet reinterpretation of Article III provisions and the removal of Soviet equipment to areas east of the Urals; another condition may relate to the status of the October 18 JCG statement regarding the Baltics and the October 30 press statement regarding the Ukraine.

Please advise whether any of the countries which have already ratified the treaty have attached any conditions to ratification, in relation to the above mentioned issues or any other matters. Is the administration aware of any conditions which may be attached by any other countries to the treaty regarding the above mentioned issues or any other matters?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We are not aware of any conditions attached to ratification by any country that has ratified the treaty.

U.S. CONCERNS WHICH LED TO THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz, in his Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 11, 1991, Secretary Baker outlined the following as U.S. concerns which led to the CFE negotiations:

• The massive preponderance of Soviet offensive forces capable of attacking Western Europe;
• The danger of short warning blitzkrieg created by military secrecy and closed societies in the East;
• The political weight of Soviet occupation forces in Central and Eastern Europe, burdening the prospects for reform; and,
• The economic costs of defending against the threat.

In my view, all of these concerns have been greatly reduced by what has already happened in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. My question to you concerns whether the United States relies too heavily on arms control agreements to maintain stability. Arms control has a very important place in national security planning, but arms control agreements which merely regulate levels of military equipment do not prevent conflicts or wars. We learned very early on during the inter-war period that naval arms control agreements, such as the 1922 Washington Treaty, the 1910 London Treaty, and the 1915 Anglo-German Naval Agreement did nothing to halt the march of war in Europe. In other words, arms control agreements cannot stop a leader whose intention is to use armed force to implement foreign policy objectives.

Can you cite any example in which an arms control agreement prevented the action of any country with aggressive intentions?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No.

Senator WARNER. Do you believe the CFE Treaty could prevent, for example, aggression by the leadership of the Russian Republic against Czechoslovakia or Poland given the numbers of TLE allowed for the former U.S.S.R.?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No.

Senator WARNER. What about the treaty continues to make its ratification and implementation vital to the best interests of the United States and our allies?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We agree that all the listed concerns have been significantly reduced by recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There is, however, a world of difference between a military threat reduced by circumstance---which is always subject to change and a military balance established by treaty obligations. This is one of the key assurances CFE will provide.

The United States and the West can only gain from CFE---even if uncertainties persist about our Soviet treaty partner. The treaty's reductions, limits, information exchanges and on-site inspections will impose minimal constraints on us, but major ones on Soviet successors who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe.

The CFE Treaty evolved during its negotiation to being far more than a means of establishing an East-West balance of conventional forces at lower levels and of containing the Soviet Union. We believe, in fact, that the treaty is still very advantageous to the United States and to all involved in the more fluid situation existing today.

Above all, CFE will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. Such a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a base for further cooperative developments in the security sphere.

Implementation of the treaty, with ceilings, limits and other provisions intact, will reduce levels of key offensive armaments, limit the amounts of equipment which can be held collectively and individually, vastly increase information about force structure and equipment deployments, permit extensive on-site inspections, and provide a stable foundation for European political and economic developments.

In our view, we would be far better off during these unsettled times if CFE were in force---providing an internationally-recognized framework of constraints on military activities and a forum for addressing questions and disputes.

The Treaty is not only well suited to a Europe of independent countries, but is the only such legally binding mechanism readily available for regulating security relations in this new, more uncertain environment.

FORCE BALANCE

Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, operationally, how would you assess the balance of forces which would remain under the CFE Treaty, given the close proximity of Soviet reinforcement equipment east of the Urals, compared to the somewhat more difficult reinforcement situation for NATO? Moreover, how much POMCUS equipment does the United States plan on maintaining in Europe?

Admiral JEREMIAH. The balance of forces under an implemented CFE Treaty will be distinctly better for the United States and NATO than has been the case without the CFE Treaty. I am confident that the United States and NATO will be able to detect any violations of the treaty and respond as needed, to include reinforcing U.S. forces in the ATTU, before the Soviets could achieve a militarily significant advantage from any illegal reinforcement of their forces from outside of the ATTU. POMCUS requirements currently are being examined to meet the new force requirements in Europe. The treaty limits and the U.S. portion of those limits provide sufficient numbers of TLE for the United States to meet foreseen requirements.

U.S. POSITION IN "OPEN SKIES" NEGOTATIONS

Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah or Secretary Wolfowitz, under a possible Open Skies agreement, I understand that limited access to U.S. airspace would be permitted to any other party to the agreement, and that sensor capabilities on aircraft would be relatively unlimited. Can you comment as to whether my understanding is correct concerning relatively unlimited sensor capabilities? If this is the case, do you have any concerns about our ability to protect sensitive sites and facilities from observation under an Open Skies regime? What is the U.S, position on the current negotiations? Specifically, regarding sensors and access to U.S. territory?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The President's concept for Open Skies, which he articulated in May 1989, is that the participating states would have short notice, unrestricted (except for safety) access to the airspace of each of the other participants with any sensors they wished to carry except signals intelligence collectors. Progress toward that goal was unattainable while the Soviet Union refused unrestricted access to its territory. This month (November 1991) the Soviet negotiators in Vienna publicly announced that access to the entire Soviet airspace would be open to Open Skies participants. The current negotiating round specifically concerns the number and quality of the sensors to be made available to participants. The administration believes that the prohibition on SIGINT collectors and the notice provision sufficiently protects U.S. facilities and programs and enables the President's initiative to be truly open.

Admiral JEREMIAH. Open Skies negotiations involving the NATO Allies and former Warsaw Pact members resumed in Vienna, November 5. Progress in earlier rounds was hampered by Soviet efforts to limit coverage of Soviet territory and to minimize the number of overflights and types of sensors used. The Soviets also insisted on using Soviet aircraft to overfly the Soviet Union. In April of this year, NATO approached the Soviets with a compromise proposal meeting the Soviets' aircraft concerns in exchange for Soviet flexibility on territorial coverage, quotas and sensors.

While the Open Skies Treaty will not be a verification agreement per se, it could provide a useful supplement to other monitoring and verification means, particularly for participants with capabilities less advanced than our own. In addition, Open Skies could contribute to monitoring the disposition of Soviet equipment that was withdrawn east of the Ural prior to signature of the CFE Treaty.

TLE REDUCTIONS

Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah or Secretary Wolfowitz, how much equipment will the NATO countries an a whole be required to reduce under the treaty? What is the understanding concerning the cost of eliminating over-coiling TLE?

I understand that the United States will only be required to destroy some very old equipment-640 M-47 tanks and 5 old howitzers. What is the cost to the United States of destroying this equipment? Why has this equipment been returned to the United States, when, and from whom?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The treaty requires countries to reduce in each category the amounts by which their current holdings exceed their maximum levels of holdings. NATO set maximum levels for NATO-member countries in November, 1990. NATO nations' total reduction liabilities are-tanks, 5,523; ACVS, 7,578; artillery, 2,668; combat helicopters, 125; fixed-wing combat aircraft, 118.

Over half of these reductions represent former East German TLE now under the control of the FRG.

Cost of reduction will be determined and born by individual nations that have reduction obligations. If nations' reduction obligations Increase as a result of NATO's equipment transfer ("cascading") program, NATO will commonly-fund reimbursements for the additional costs. Amounts reimbursed will be the minimums as determined by treaty standards and international competitive bidding.

This equipment was provided long ago to allies un er military assistance program agreements which required that it be offered back to us for disposal once the receiving nations no longer wanted it. Under these kinds of agreements, the following countries have offered---and we have accepted-the following equipment during the 1981-88 period:

We must destroy this equipment under CFE because it is located in the ATTU and we own it.

We will put destruction contracts out for bid. We currently estimate total costs will be about $6.4 million ($10 thousand each for tanks; $5 thousand each for howitzers).

TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENTS TO THE FLANKS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, Article V, paragraph (B) of the treaty allows a State Party to deploy treaty limited equipment on a "temporary basis" in the flanks. In the article-by-article analysis of the CFE Treaty it States that: "It should be noted that Article V does not specify a time limit for such 'temporary' deployments."

Were you consulted during negotiation of this provision? Can you tell us why there is no definition for temporary deployments? What is your understanding of the length of time allowed under a "temporary" deployment? Do the Defense Department and the JCS have a baseline that the United States should use to determine whether another State Party has exceeded the "temporary basis" rule under Article V?

With respect to your answer, Admiral Jeremiah, what would you estimate to be a "temporary", deployment that could potentially have military significance?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Temporary deployments to the flanks are limited in number. For example, a State Party may temporarily deploy no more than 153 tanks, 241 armored combat vehicles, and 140 pieces of artillery to the territory (in the flank zone) of a State Party. The term "temporary" is not defined or explained in the treaty as it relates to the "flank flow rule." However, during the negotiation of this provision, it was made clear that the purpose of the provision was to provide for limited reinforcements in "exceptional circumstances" and for "a limited duration." In view of these qualitative descriptions, the term "temporary" may be construed to indicate a duration of days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years. Due to the limited quantities of TLE allowed to one State Party for temporary deployment, it is difficult to envision such a deployment that would have military significance.

Admiral JEREMIAH. Temporary deployments to the flanks are limited in number. For example, a State Party may temporarily deploy no more than 153 tanks, 241 armored combat vehicles, and 140 pieces of artillery to the territory (in the flank zone) of a State Party. The term 'temporary' is not defined or explained in the treaty as it relates to the "flank flow rule." However, during the negotiation of this provision, it was made clear that the purpose of the provision was to provide for limited reinforcements in "exceptional circumstances" and for "a limited duration." In view of these qualitative descriptions, the term "temporary" may be construed to indicate a duration of days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years. Due to the limited quantities of TLE allowed to one State Party for temporary deployment, it is difficult to envision such a deployment that would have military significance.

MAINTAINING TLE AT MAXIMUM LEVELS

Senator WARNER. Secretary Wolfowitz and Admiral Jeremiah, in the Secretary of State's letter to the President recommending that he submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, he stated that the treaty ". . . will eliminate the enormous conventional forces disparity that has existed between the East and West since World War II." If the West does not exercise its right to maintain forces at the levels allowed for under the treaty, does this statement still hold true? I ask this question because it is becoming apparent that many Western countries, including the United States, may not maintain forces even at the levels agreed to by the Group of 16.

This is the most important part of my question. Assuming that the future-direction of a new Soviet Union will be settled one way or another in the next few years, isn't it important that the Group of 16 maintain forces at a level relatively equal to the treaty allotments?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ and Admiral JEREMIAH. While it would be preferable for all members of the group of 16 to maintain TLE at their maximum levels for holdings, fiscal realities preclude this optimum situation. However, it should be noted that, under the limits that are set forth in Article IV and Article VI of the treaty, the group of 16 can hold up to one-half of the TLE in the ATTU while the Soviet Union can hold less than one-third of the total TLE permitted by the treaty. Thus, the group of 16 can achieve parity with the Soviet Union, in a purely quantitative sense by maintaining force levels of only two-thirds of what their side is permited to have.

Additionally, we will continue to train and equip ground, air, and supporting naval forces for rapid deployment back to Europe if needed. We must retain the capability to reconstitute forces. This Base Force concept-forward deployed forces, backed up by a capability to reinforce (which could rapidly plus-up our forces in the ATTU to our treaty limits)-will give us the ability to respond to any adverse trends which might require a military response.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA DISCREPANCIES

Senator WA?TNER. Admiral Jeremiah, Gen. Colin Powell testified to the Senate Foreign Nations Committee that the return to the ATTU Zone of some 15,000 pieces of TLR-currently located east of the Urals would be "indeed militarily significant." General Powell was not asked for a minimum level of militarily Significant excess TLE in violation of the treaty limits, but he did testify that any single piece of equipment above the ceilings of the treaty should be "a violation of concern."

Do you agree with General Powell's characterization of 15,000 excess TLE returned to the ATTU Zone as militarily significant? Do the JCS believe an amount less than 15,000 excess TLE on the order of perhaps 10,000 items, could be considered militarily significant? In other words, what is the least amount the JCS believe might be militarily significant?

Admiral JEREMIAH. General Powell's judgment is that a militarily significant violation is one that could give the Soviets a discernible advantage to which NATO therefore would have to respond militarily. In making this assessment, we have to look at violations in an operational context and on a case by case basis. We look at operational capabilities and not just numbers of TLE. Equipment does not right wars; fully manned, reasonably trained, and adequately equipped and well led units right wars. Therefore, we need to understand the mobilization process. It is not just a matter of shifting equipment; the Soviets would also have to create and train units, map them up with their equipment, move those units forward into the ATTU an ultimately mass them in a threatening manner.

TLE IN THE ATTU ZONE

Senator WARNER. Admiral Jeremiah, in addition to equipment moved out of the ATTU, the Soviets significantly underreported the amount of TLE in the ATTU Zone at the time of signature. Some believe that a large amount of this TLE remains in the zone today. Since this equipment is already in the zone, what amount of such equipment would you consider militarily significant? Would a militarily significant amount be several thousand? Would it be 10,000? What amount?

Admiral JEREMIAH. The Chairman's rationale described in the question above, concerning what constitutes a militarily significant violation, applies equally to this question.

ESTIMATE OF EQUIPMENT

Senator MCCAIN. Please provide a detailed analysis of the current U.S. estimate of the equipment holdings of each signator to the CFE for each category covered by the treaty. List any discrepancy between the U.S. estimate, the official NATO futures and the estimates provided by the Soviet Union and other former Warsaw Pact countries.

Provide a detailed explanation of each discrepancy involving the Soviet Union, former Soviet republics, and former Warsaw Pact countries.

1. Does the administration believe that any of these discrepancies indicate any intent to provide false or misleading data?
2. Does the administration believe that any of these discrepancies could be used to violate the CFE Treaty?
3. What confidence does the administration have in its ability to monitor and verify the resolution of any such discrepancies if disputes arise between the Soviet republics or if given Soviet republics do not comply with the reporting and verification provisions of the CFE Treaty?

Mr. Wolfowitz. [Deleted.]

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FORCE CUTS

Senator MCCAIN. Please provide a chronological analysis of all Soviet and East European force cuts, withdrawals, and redeployments affecting forces Covered by CFE since 1988. Indicate the size and disposal of the forces involved. In the case of Soviet forces, indicate the Soviet republic where forces or equipment has been moved.

1. What degree of confidence does the administration have in its ability to monitor and verify the relocation of equipment moved to date that is covered under the CFE Treaty to given Soviet republics?
2. What is the statistical level of uncertainty for each type of equipment by republic?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. [Deleted.]

SOVIET EQUIPMENT

Senator MCCAIN. Provide a detailed explanation of each separate case where any Soviet equipment has been transferred to locations, units, or new designations that would remove that equipment from coverage under the CFE Treaty.

1. How has each such transfer been resolved to date?
2. To what extent do such transfers indicate a current or future risk of violation of the CFE Treaty?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. (a) The June 14, 1991 politically binding statement made by the U.S.S.R. obligated them to reduce 14,500 additional pieces of TLE which had been moved out of the CFE Treaty's area of application shortly before its signature. To a considerable degree this statement resolved that transfer concern. The United States and other nations continue to work to resolve other transfer/data questions with the former U.S.S.R. in meetings of the Joint Consultative Group.

(b) [Deleted.]

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF CFE TREATY

Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's view of the Soviet violations of the CFE Treaty affecting the transfer of SS-23 missiles? What is its view of what this indicates regarding potential future violations of the CFE Treaty?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The CFE Treaty places limits on such conventional systems as tanks, ACVS, and combat aircraft. SS-23 missiles are not limited by the CFE Treaty; thus, any possible violation of the INF Treaty regarding SS-23 missiles is not linked to any potential future violation of the CFE Treaty.

MONITORING TLE EQUIPMENT

Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's overall capability to monitor the active and stored holdings of TLE equipment in each Soviet republic?

1. By percentage of uncertainty for each type of equipment for each republic if that republic complies with the verification provisions of the treaty?
2. By percentage of uncertainty for each type of equipment for each republic if that republic does not comply with the verification provisions of the treaty?
3. How would these estimates of uncertainty alter if Soviet equipment production capabilities are taken into account?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. [Deleted.]

DESTROYING SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's estimate of Soviet capability to destroy or dispose of each type of surplus equipment?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. [Deleted.)

TREATY LIMITED EQUIPMENT

Senator MCCAIN. What is the administration's estimate, by individual Soviet re- public, of the worse case result of non-compliance with the reporting provisions of the CFE Treaty? How would this affect individual equipment types?

1. At what level of violation would the administration take action to enforce the terms of the CFE Treaty?
2. What range of actions would the administration take for given levels of violation?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Attached is a breakout of treaty-limited equipment by Soviet Republic (encl. I). These holdings describe for the immediate future the scope of the worst case result of non-compliance. [Deleted.]

Enclosure 1. [Deleted.]

Attached is a breakout of Treaty Limited Equipment by the Soviet Republic (see previous question, encl. 1). These holdings describe for the immediate future the scope of the worst case result of non-compliance.