Senate Debate on the Resolution of Ratification
to the CFE Treaty
November 25, 1991
The Congressional Record
Pages S18018-Sl8038




The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will go into executive session to consider the resolution of ratification on the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The clerk will report the resolution.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Treaty Document No. 102-8, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe [CFE].

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

Pending: Smith-Wallop executive amendment No. 1433, to establish U.S. obligation to the terms of the treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is the amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. SMITH, to the resolution. The time between now and 2 p.m. is equally divided and controlled in the usual form.

Who yields time?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WELLSTONE). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair wishes to notify the Senator from New

Hampshire and other Senators that the time between now and 2 p.m. is divided and controlled in the usual form.

Mr. SMITH. How much time is remaining, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has approximately 25 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I yield such time as I may consume for myself

Mr. President, during debate on the CFE Treaty this past Saturday, Senator WALLOP and I offered what I believe is a very important amendment. For those of my colleagues who may have not had the opportunity to review that amendment, let me say that is it very simple and straightforward.

It says that the United States shall not be bound by the terms of this treaty, unless and until the President submits to Congress his annual report on Soviet noncompliance, and certifies in the report that the Soviet Union is not in violation or probable violation of the CFE Treaty.

That is the amendment, Mr. President. It is neither lengthy nor is it complicated, but it cuts directly to a core issue in our consideration of this treaty: Whether the Soviets are violating the accord before it even enters into force. That is the question.

As my colleagues know, I have some very strong concerns over the manner in which the Senate is executing its advice and consent role on CFE. They involve issues of national security, constitutional prerogative, and precedent.

While the Foreign Relations Committee, I believe, has made a good-faith effort to address some critical issues, the committee-reported resolution of ratification simply falls short, in my view. Mr. President, the Smith-Wallop amendment focuses the Senate's attention on both substance and precedent. The amendment would condition Senate advice and consent to ratification on Soviet compliance with the treaty,

Frankly, I cannot imagine how anybody could oppose this amendment. Without compliance, a treaty is worth no more than the paper it is written on. If the Senate is expected to ratify an arms accord, the very least we should demand is that it is complied with. What is happening in the Senate, Mr. President, is that we are saying that regardless of whether the Soviets adhere to the conditions of the treaty, we are still going to rubber-stamp that agreement; this Senate is going to ratify the CFE Treaty, whether the Soviets comply or not.

I would say at this point, Mr. President, that the historical record is replete with Soviet treaty violations. I am not going to go into them all. But we certainly know that the ABM Treaty, SALT 1, SALT II, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Helsinki Final Action, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF] have all been violated by the Soviets.

So this is nothing new. Each year the President is required to submit to Congress a formal report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. The report assesses Soviet treaty obligations and provides a valuable perspective on the efficacy of verification regimes. The report is due on December 1 -Mr. President. That is not very far away.

I understand that if we recess for the year and come back after the holidays, several weeks time will have passed. But surely the Senate, in advising and consenting to this treaty, ought to be interested in reviewing that report prior to ratification.

That is the point of my amendment.

Should we ratify a treaty before we find out if the Soviets are already cheating, and what those violations are? And make no mistake, they are violating it. And, yet, we are saying: Let us ratify it anyway; do not worry. Well, that is a dangerous precedent. It is a dangerous precedent for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ratification process and all future treaties, as well.

The Smith-Wallop amendment states that the United States will not be bound by the CFE Treaty unless the President submits the Soviet noncompliance report, and in it certifies that the Soviets are not in violation of the accord. I believe that action by the Senate in this regard would be very important, because it would send a message to the Soviets that we will not accept violations. Abide by the treaty, or the United States will not be bound by it. That is the issue.

Undoubtedly, some of my colleagues will probably say that this is an amendment designed to kill the treaty. That is just not the case. I am not opposed to the CFE Treaty. What I do oppose is hastily rushing consideration purely for appearances' sake. This treaty, Mr. President, off and on, has taken some 15 years to put together. Events have taken place in the last 2 years that none of us could ever have dreamed would happen-positive events. Perhaps those events moved faster than the treaty. I think it is pretty obvious they did.

I do not think that the proposed treaty is responsible for the positive developments such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact dissolution, and now the breakup of the Soviet Union. We know it is not.

Nonetheless, if the Senate's will is to ratify the accord prior to Thanksgiving, which it is apparently, we owe it to national security and our constituents to hedge U.S. obligations under the accord to a certification that the Soviet Union is honoring their commitments. That is all I am asking.

Mr. President, the intent of this amendment could not be clearer. If it is adopted, I hope the administration would not exploit some legal loophole to circumvent what is obviously intended through the certification. The process by which the Senate has considered the CFE Treaty is wrong. The constitutional advise-and-consent process has been severely undermined here by both hasty and superficial consideration of the accord.

To speak out against hasty approval is not to speak out against the treaty. It is not to speak out against those have worked for years to formulate this accord. It is not to speak out against the administration. It is not to speak out against those in this Senate who strongly support the treaty.

It is simply saying let us find out what the violations are, and demand that the Soviets clear up those violations before we consent to ratification. What is wrong with that?

A report is due on December 1, days away. If we wait, true, we cannot ratify this treaty until January, perhaps February. But what will we have lost? A couple more months, after 15 years?

The Senator from Delaware said last Saturday-or hinted-that the intent of the sponsors of the amendment was to kill the treaty. Again, this is not true. The intent is to make the treaty worth something; to give it legitimacy and meaning.

This amendment does nothing to delay or prevent ratification. It merely sends the message that the United States will not be bound by the accord until the President certifies that the Soviets are not already cheating. In my view, this is the minimum which the Senate should insist upon in providing its advice and consent to the treaty and exercising its constitutional prerogatives.

To do otherwise is simply irresponsible and, I believe, damaging to our institution and damaging to the concept and precedent that it would set for advice and consent.

Mr. President, at this time, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.


Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, when we were last here a half-hour ago, the Senator from Virginia had preferred a potential compromise. Is there any word from the sponsors on their inclinations, if not the final disposition?

Mr. SMITH. May I ask the Senator from Delaware, has he approved that and will he accept it?

Mr. BIDEN. I have not seen the language.

Mr. SMITH. Let me see if I can find it. Does the Senator have a copy of it?

Mr. BIDEN. I now have a copy.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor.

Mr. WALLOP. Just an observation: I think that Senator WARNER from Virginia is on his way over to discuss that with both the Senator, as the distinguished manager of this bill, and with the Senator from New Hampshire, who had only just seen it.

Mr. BIDEN. Maybe I should withhold any further discussion of that potential compromise, until it is appropriate to speak more generally to the amendment as it now is proposed by the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, what is the time situation? May I inquire of the Chair?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 15 minutes and 51 seconds.

Mr. WALLOP. Will the Senator yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Wyoming?

Mr. SMITH. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, once again I return to the floor to suggest that this is more in the nature of a political document than a document that has any military significance. It will be touted and embraced by the administration and those who espouse it as having military significance, but, if it did, the amendment that has been offered by the Senator from New Hampshire and myself would have been adopted. If it made a military difference to the United States, it would surely make a military difference to the United States to know whether or not the party with whom we are entering into this agreement would be in compliance. It cannot be argued, Mr. President, that this treaty has consequence to the American people in terms of our military safety or our allies' and at the same time be argued that it is of no consequence whether the other side is in compliance.

Now, there is disagreement in the intelligence community on the issue, but everyone agrees that the treaty limited equipment that was in the zone at the time of signature of the treaty. And the estimates range from several thousand to some 18,000 pieces.

The Senator from Delaware stated that the lower range was some 800 pieces of treaty-limited equipment. That is simply not true. That is not the lower range. And were we to have a classified session, other Senators could assure themselves of that.

The problem, Mr. President, is that this treaty is probably, because of the passage of time, already irrelevant. It is certainly relevant to ask the question whether the principal entity with whom we enter this treaty exists any longer, namely, the Soviet Union. But if the argument is made that they do exist, then somebody has to make an argument, Mr. President, that the purpose of these treaties is to comply the terms with them. Neither party can trust the other party's will unless both parties are willing to do that.

Now, the treaty that is going to be relevant is arriving in the Senate probably next year early, namely, the START Treaty. And if the precedent set here today is that it does not make any difference how lawful the behavior of either party is to the treaty, then, Mr. President, the Senate is abdicating its rightful role in the process. And that is what I think is the worry that the Senator from New Hampshire and I have.

Again, I say, it cannot be argued that there is military significance to this treaty and at the same time argue that it makes no difference whether or not they are in compliance. I wish that my friend from Delaware and I could debate this issue in front of the full Senate in classified session because the figures are significant, I will say to the Senate. They are not militarily insignificant unless the whole thing is militarily insignificant.

One begins to have the idea when one sees that the amendment we will be voting on later also requires that the people of the United States pay to dismantle the weapons that were constructed to destroy them. We will be asking, now, the taxpayers of the United States to pay for the dismantlement of those, at the same time that a modernization program is going on.

Mr. President, until the Senator from Virginia arrives with his suggestion, I yield the floor and hope that the manager might use some time on their side so that we might be able to discuss that proposal when he arrives.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, while both the Senator from New Hampshire and the Senator from Delaware have different perspectives in deciding whether or not the proposal that is being suggested by our friend from Virginia here is acceptable, I would like to speak to a few points that have been made thus far.

In the resolution of ratification that is at the desk now, condition 2 relates to data and the data discrepancy. It says:

Whereas data supplied by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to Article XIII and the Protocol on Information Exchange, regarding its equipment holdings in the Atlantic to the Urals area as of November 19, 1990, differed from United States estimates of such equipment, the United States shall-

(A) continue to seek clarification of those holdings of Treaty-limited equipment as of November 19, 1990; and

(B) seek to obtain additional reductions of equipment in Treaty-limited categories in the event the President determines that actual holdings of Treaty-limited equipment by any state party exceeded its declaration concerning its holdings of such equipment as of November 19, 1990.

The purpose of that is to accomplish the end being sought by the Senator from New Hampshire. But let me read from a letter that I received just this morning from the President of the United States. It is dated November 25, 1991.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased that the Senate will vote on the CFE Treaty today and appreciate what you and your colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee have done to bring the Treaty to this point. After months of work by the Foreign Relations, Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, the CFE Treaty is on the verge of being approved by the Senate.

Unfortunately, the positive results of years of work could be lost if the Senate approves an added condition such as that to be voted upon today that ties U.S. compliance with the Treaty to the Soviet data problem. Such a condition could not be implemented and would cause this complex, multilateral-and extremely advantageous-Treaty regime to collapse.

A key element of the dispute over Soviet underreporting was their failure to count ground-based equipment assigned to the Navy. In resolving this issue, we also dealt with Soviet withdrawals of equipment beyond the Urals. Ultimately, after seven months of negotiation, in which President Gorbachev and I were directly involved, all 22 Treaty participants reached a legally-binding agreement that the Soviets would reduce some 3,700 more pieces of equipment now in the CFE zone, and a political commitment that they would reduce 14,500 additional pieces beyond the Urals.

These June agreements did not, of course, resolve all outstanding data questions. But it was the view of all CFE Treaty signatories that there was sufficient progress to make it possible to proceed toward ratification and implementation. Indeed, your Committee, in its analysis of the data issue, saw in the 14,500 reduction an effort by the Soviets to "make amends."

I take the issue of Soviet underreporting- very seriously, and work on these issues continues in Vienna. Our dialogue with the Soviets, especially since the August coup, has been encouraging. But we would destroy all these efforts, and indeed the Treaty as a whole, if the Senate imposed a unilateral U.S. solution to this complex issue. The condition already recommended by your Committee gives me a way to continue work on remaining data questions within the 22-nation framework.

I sincerely hope that the Senate will consent today to this vital Treaty based on the Resolution of Ratification as it now stands.



I did say to my colleague from New Hampshire in the discussion we had last week that we could not afford to wait. And my good friend from New Hampshire a moment ago stated that we waited this long, what difference would 2 months make which is the amount of time the Senate would be out of session, before we are able to reconsider this resolution of ratification?

I suggest that, in light of what has happened in the last 2 months, Lord only knows what is going to happen in the next 2 months. We have a circumstance now where all of the 22 nations have agreed to the details of the resolution that is before the Senate. Not the conditions, but the details that they were required to sign onto.

And further, we have a clear understanding on the part of the Republics which may become independent nations, that it is their intention to be bound by the conditions of this treaty. And we put in a condition dealing with the prospect for a republic becoming an independent nation.

My concern is, if we let this languish for 2 months, we in fact do not have any idea what the lay of the land will be, come February; come mid-February, or March, or whenever we would get back to this treaty if we were to delay. The end result of this is, as we are dealing with an attendant piece of legislation, the so-called cascading legislation, would require the Soviet military to destroy thousands and thousands of pieces of equipment of dire consequence to us, when in fact we will not have to destroy any at all.

To wait for that bargain to be remade, for it to be altered so that the conditions of the Senator from New Hampshire would be met, would put us in such a position, that we would be operating at our own risk because of the rapidity with which the Soviet Union is disintegrating and with which the rest of Eastern Europe is emerging.

I see my friend from Virginia is on the floor, the architect of this potential compromise. In order to accommodate his schedule and all of ours, I will yield the floor at this moment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Virginia?


Mr. WARNER. Parliamentary inquiry, the time allotted to each side remaining is what?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 11 minutes and 23 seconds, and the Senator from Delaware has 14 minutes and 57 seconds.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I make a proposal that such time as I may take, 3 or 4 minutes, be allocated equally between the two sides?

Mr. BIDEN. That is fine. Up to 4 minutes. Equally divided.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank all Senators present here, particularly the sponsors of this amendment and the distinguished Senator from Delaware. I do suggest a proposal. It is one that has basically been structured with the consultations of the Senator from New Hampshire and the Senator from Wyoming. I shall read it. But before doing so I would like to give some background.

As I examined this amendment and the work by the Senators from Wyoming and New Hampshire, their work is consistent with what this body has repeatedly done time and time again in the area of compliance with the treaties with the Soviet Union. It is not really breaking any new ground, except that we have done it first in bills which eventually became statutory law. Now it is a question of treaty.

So I think there is a certain consistency that can be achieved. I suggest the following language might well be that vehicle to achieve consistency between the actions taken by this body in recommending to the President for his signature, which became law, certain statutes and now the treaty. I will read it.

The amendment would read:

Add after Condition (a)(5)(C), the following condition:

(6) Presidential Certification on Soviet Compliance. Within 30 days of the Senate's approval of the resolution of ratification, the President shall certify in the President's Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements Report, required pursuant to Public Law 99-145, whether or not the Soviet Union is in violation or probable violation of the terms of the CFE Treaty and protocols thereto.

I believe this modification would allow the Senate to register its very deep concern about the possibility of Soviet violation of this CFE Treaty at the time of signature relating to the date, while at the same time recognizing changes that have occurred since that time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to expand my remarks, and I yield the floor.

Mr. WALLOP. Could I direct a question to the Senator from Virginia?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. SMITH. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, this contains additional language over that which was discussed prior to lunch. I might inquire of the Senator, what was it the law citation requires?

Mr. WARNER. Public Law 99-145.

Mr. WALLOP. It requires?

Mr. WARNER. It is the annual report.

Mr. WALLOP. It is the same annual report that is due on December 1?

Mr. WARNER. That is correct.

Mr. WALLOP. And which never arrives until sometime in June?

Mr. WARNER. It is correct it is due December 1.

Mr. WALLOP. That is the report, the only report the Senate would receive with regard to Soviet compliance or noncompliance with this amendment?

Mr. WARNER. Under the proposal of the Senator from Virginia, Mr. President, that would be the only report.

Mr. WALLOP. I ask the Senator if he thought that the administration and others might suggest that that report-time is of the essence with regards to that report. Whereas the other ones might be less so. That is one of the reasons why the Senator's first suggestion to us was acceptable. But if we have to wait for all other chemical and toxic weapons, it really sort of takes away the basis.

Mr. WARNER. The Senator makes an observation. He is correct, in my personal judgment. The amendment that the Senator is recommending to be two sponsors is-the Senator from Virginia's amendment-it does not imply this meets all of the judgments that are present in the administration at this time. I have spoken to several of the principles and I believe there is a consensus that this would be helpful. But I am not representing that this is an administration amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes of the Senator from Wyoming have expired.


Mr. WALLOP. Could I have 1 additional minute?

Mr. SMITH. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming, 2 additional minutes.

Mr. WALLOP. What I would like to try to achieve is you get this report separated out from the report on arms control compliance, so that at least it was a report to the Senate. Keep in mind this does not require any responsive behavior on the part of the administration. Even if they say they are in compliance with no part of it we will still have authorized the ratification and I assume they will have already ratified that as a treaty. So keep in mind it does not ask us to back out of the treaty or take any other action other than to report to the Senate the status of compliance with regard to this treaty and its protocol.

Could we try to find a way? Does the Senator think we could separate that piece out?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am open to suggestion. I suggest the two principal sponsors see if they can reconcile their views on that point. I am merely trying to resolve this in such a manner that the amendment would garner greater support in the Senate.

I think with some modification in that vein, the amendment would.

Mr. WALLOP. Still on the time yielded to me, I inquire of the Senator from Delaware if he has any information to work toward a resolution that would be satisfactory to that side?

Mr. BIDEN. I apologize for not being able to answer immediately. That is what we are trying to do right now.

But I am disinclined at the moment to accept the compromise. I know you are not offering it, but it you could give me at least another moment, that is what I am considering right now. I am trying to make sure I understand everything.

Mr. WALLOP. Could I suggest the absence of a quorum with the time to be charged to both sides?

Mr. BIDEN. I object to that, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. BIDEN. I object only for the following reason, I say to my friend. We have only 12 minutes left. The Senator from Tennessee has a good 40 minutes of questions for me. We are going to try to get it in 7 minutes. I do not know how that is possible if we let the quorum call run.

Mr. SMITH. May I suggest the Senator from Delaware take a little time with his side and discuss it.

Mr. WARNER. Will the Senators forebear and give me 30 seconds?

As I examine this, I believe the recommendation-and it is a recommendation. I am, under parliamentary procedure, not able to send an amendment to the desk, so it is up to the two sponsors. But I believe the language that is now being discussed with the Senator from Virginia would go directly to that concern expressed, in the letter from the White House, by the President which "ties U.S. compliance with the treaty to the Soviet data problem." That is the purpose of the language of the Senator from Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 7 minutes to my distinguished friend from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, there are a lot of legitimate questions about what we are doing. Before I put some of them I would like to compliment the distinguished manager of this matter for his patience and diligence and understanding of these questions. Most of the debate and discussion relating to the Senate's action with respect to the CFE have centered about essentially constitutional questions. I would like to make sure we understand what we might be getting into in the extremely likely event that the Ukraine does, in fact, declare itself to be independent.

I tried to reduce my uncertainties to questions and they are sincerely meant. I have come to the floor in search of knowledge on these points. In light of the short amount of time that we have, I would like to have an elaborated answer for each of these questions for the record. I would like to just put them aside and explain my understanding of them and why I think the Senate should proceed to ratify this treaty in spite of the tremendous uncertainty that surrounds it.

I do think that the Senate's amendment makes it possible to ratify the treaty, uncertainties notwithstanding. But based on what I take to be a great deal of ambiguity about the situations we may find ourselves in after the Ukraine announces its independence, I hope that we all realize that there is a difference between ratifying a treaty and being able to sustain a treaty.

It may very well be, in fact I think it is in the best interest of the United States of America to ratify this treaty, for the Senate to do so. But whether or not it can be sustained will depend upon how we react to the events we are going to see unfold after the Ukraine's announcement of independence.

We have to be absolutely clear that there are limits to how far we can tolerate being yanked around as a result of protracted maneuvering and disagreement between the Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet Union. They have to realize that the stakes are very high, and interfering with this treaty's operation will carry with it the risk of severely damaging all other forms of U.S. cooperation. Frankly, I would feel better if that point were made pretty forcefully by the President.

One set of questions involves the United States view of the obligations held by the Ukraine at the moment it declares its independence. Will it be bound even though it is not a party to the treaty? And if that is our assertion, how solidly based is that in international law? If it is based on the Vienna Convention, does the fact that the United States has not ratified that convention complicate our reliance upon it?

I will invite the distinguished floor manager to respond for the RECORD. But let me state that it is my understanding, having searched for the answers to these questions, that there is no clear and definitive answer available, and we are asked to vote on this even though there is uncertainty about such important points as these.

I do believe, let me repeat that it is nevertheless in our interest and in the country's interest to ratify this treaty. But, again, the way the Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet Union interprets these questions and the way we interpret these questions and answer them will determine whether or not this treaty is sustainable,

The next set of questions are as follows: Is the Senate's amendment saying any future state formed in the region covered by the treaty is expected to accept the obligations of the treaty? And if that is the case, then when is the Ukraine considered to be a state? When it declares itself to be one? When the United States officially recognizes it? When all of the CFR signatories recognize it?

Again, these questions, important as they seem to be, have not yet been answered and remain shrouded in uncertainty.

Is it irresponsible for the Senate to go forward and ratify this while these questions remain unanswered?

Under normal circumstances, I would say, yes, that is irresponsible. But the world is changing so rapidly, perhaps as rapidly in the former Soviet Union as in any other part of the globe, that a choice to withhold ratification would be a worse option. And so again we come to this distinction between the extent to which a treaty is ratifiable and the extent to which it is sustainable after ratification.

I would simply say, as one Senator, I would like to serve notice that I believe it is in the best interest of the United States not just to ratify it but to review its sustainability afterwards in light of the way we, the Ukraine, and the rest of the former Soviet Union respond to these expected developments.

Finally, suppose the Ukraine states that it is ready to accept the obligations of the treaty but continues to assert its intention to form a 400,000-man army and suggests that the Soviets or the Russian Republic absorb that by reducing their forces accordingly. At what point do we consider the treaty to be actually breached? Do we wait until the actual number of troops by our count exceed overall totals? Is it correct that under the treaty there could be a period of as long as 30 months before a material breach could be declared?

To that latter question, it is my understanding that the answer is yes, there could be a period of as much as 30 months before a material breach could be declared. The answers to the other questions in this set of questions will be up to the Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet Union.

But, Mr. President, it is of no small consequence when a new nation the size of France with an army that might be larger than that of Germany's is suddenly an independent nation. These questions remain; they represent significant uncertainties. In my view again, to close, we should ratify this treaty in spite of them and then constantly monitor it to see that it is sustainable afterwards.

I hope the floor manager will respond to these questions in more detail for the RECORD.

I yield back my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

The Senator from Delaware.


Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator from Delaware have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes 19 seconds remaining.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me say to my friend from New Hampshire and my friend from Wyoming with regard to the potential compromise offered by the Senator from Virginia, both my staff and I have been in contact with the White House. The only condition upon which they would be willing to accept the proposal being put forward by the Senator from Virginia is as I believe the Senator from Wyoming was informed. If the language was changed to report to the Senate whether or not the Soviet Union is in violation, as opposed to the language that was proposed which includes that report in the President's Soviet noncompliance, et cetera. I just ask whether or not the proponents of the amendment would be willing to accept that. If not, I think we should just vote on the amendment.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Wyoming. How much time do I have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. WALLOP. Just 1 minute will suffice.

I would say that the reason for the language is twofold: One is that there is no reason for an entirely new reporting mechanism. The Congress lays enough bureaucracy on the administration and the Government, and second, a mere report can be a letter from the President saying, "I think they are probably in compliance."

That is not what is sought here. We are seeking a specific report. I am speaking for myself The Senator from New Hampshire is the offeror of the amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. I ask my friend from New Hampshire what his disposition is. Again, I am not trying to encourage him to accept this. I just wish to know what it is.

Mr. SMITH. I have consulted with Senator WALLOP and with Senator WARNER and am prepared to accept the language that Senator WARNER suggested which includes certification. My preference would be, if that is not acceptable to the Senator, to go ahead, I would want the certification language as suggested by the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on my time, I am not merely speaking for myself. It is unusual for me to be speaking on behalf of the administration. But in this case I am speaking in support of the administration. They feel very strongly that such language would be very damaging. They would not accept the language. So when our time is expired, I would suggest we vote the Senator's amendment.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senator has the right to object to a unanimous consent to modify the amendment. If I were to offer to modify the amendment as suggested by Senator WARNER.

Mr. BIDEN. I would object.

Mr. SMITH. Would the Senator object?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes; I would object to that modification on behalf of the administration.

Mr. SMITH. Under those circumstances, I have no choice but to remain with my original amendment. I sincerely regret that the Senator from Delaware would object to that. I think at this point, Mr. President, just to get it on the record, I am going to offer the modification in an effort of good faith, and if the Senator chooses to object, he has that right.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may now modify my amendment with the modification which is at the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on my own behalf but also on behalf of the administration, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. SMITH. How much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 3 minutes and 48 seconds remaining.

Mr. SMITH. I yield another minute to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I regret that. Let me just say categorically that the amendment was not a departure from tradition. The report that is required under it is a certification. The administration is indulging in absolute pettifoggery by thinking that they have some kind of constitutional loss here if they have to certify that the people they are asking the Senate to enter into an agreement and a treaty with are in compliance with the terms of that treaty.

Mr. President, it is absolutely untrue to say that this is a killer amendment, and it is especially untrue to say that a report such as suggested in the unanimous consent of the Senator from New Hampshire merely requiring the administration to certify the status between the two parties, requiring no response or reaction to them, they could have said they are in violation. We certify they are in violation of everything and done nothing about it, is a killer amendment. It requires no Soviet behavior. It requires no behavior on the part of the administration with regards to the treaty, only the report to be certified as to the status.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's additional minute has expired.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Delaware have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 3 minutes and 28 seconds remaining.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know if is not really the time he needs, but I yield 30 seconds to my friend from Oklahoma, who has much more to say about this and other matters, but I need to reserve 3 minutes.

Mr. BOREN. I thank my colleague from Delaware.

Mr. President, we will soon be voting on the sequence of votes on the Nunn-Lugar amendment. I strongly support that amendment. What we have learned from intelligence sources and from briefings of all of those with strong expertise in the Soviet Union is that there is a genuine threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; those weapons falling into the wrong hands if we do not begin to work together cooperatively right now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 30 seconds have expired.

Mr. BOREN. Therefore, I hope my colleagues will join me in voting for that amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, after further consultation with the administration, I would ask whether my friends could live with the following language, and that is that "the President shall certify in a report to" so it would contain the word "certify" and it would be a report.

Mr. SMITH. Will the Senator please repeat that?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes. I will read the whole thing:

Within 30 days of the Senate's approval of the resolution of ratification, the President shall certify in a report to the Senate whether or not the Soviet Union is in violation or probable violation of the terms of the CFE Treaty and protocols thereto.

Mr. SMITH. The Senator said "report." Would he accept "Presidential Report on Soviet Noncompliance"?


Mr. BIDEN. I say, Mr. President, no. The administration would not accept that language. We will say "certify in a report" but not specify which report. The administration will certify through a report transmitted to the Senate containing only this information.

Mr. WALLOP. Could the Senator say what the information is?

Mr. BIDEN. I do not know what the information is.

Mr. WALLOP. Not what it will be but what information is required in the report?

Mr. WALLOP. Whether or not the Soviets are in violation or probable violation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, since this is a highly unusual circumstance, I ask unanimous consent that we have an additional 5 minutes, pushing the entire vote process back 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMENICI. I ask the Senator whether I could have I minute of the remaining time.

Mr. BIDEN. I will be delighted to yield 1 minute of time.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, on Tuesday or Wednesday of last week, when Senator NUNN came to the floor to discuss the very issue that is in the Nunn-Lugar amendment, I came to the floor and indicated then that I supported that approach, and today I want to repeat that. For those who think this is a foreign aid issue, I submit it is a domestic issue of the highest magnitude and I say if you do not do something like that, just wait and see; when those weapons become dangerous because they are in the hands of the wrong people or are even on the market somewhere, or their managers are on the market somewhere to produce more proliferation, wait and see if it is not right in the front rooms of every home in America where they begin to ask, "What is this all about?"

I think that makes it a very serious domestic issue, and I compliment those who started that issue. I was an original cosponsor. I am pleased to be and I hope it passes overwhelmingly today.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, how much leader time do I have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes of leader time has been reserved.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield for a quick inquiry?

Mr. MITCHELL. Certainly.

Mr. WALLOP. We would like, we think, to be able to modify this amendment with the agreement from the Senator from Delaware. Could we be assured enough time to see if that would be the case?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time does the senior Senator from Delaware have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes and 36 seconds remaining.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, might I suggest that I will make my statement and Senators can continue their discussions and perhaps we will be in position to do that upon completion of that time.

Mr. President, in light of developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, some have argued that the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe has become an anachronism.

In some respects it has been overtaken by the startling pace of political change, but it remains an important benchmark and building block for ensuring the future security of the European continent.

I commend President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, and former CFE negotiators James Woolsey and Stephen Ledogar for achieving this significant treaty.

Signed last November by the members of NATO and the now-defunct Warsaw Pact, the treaty was submitted to the Senate by the administration this July. It has been the subject of hearings and debate in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Intelligence and Armed Services Committees also conducted hearings and submitted their views to the Foreign Relations Committee. There has been a thorough review of the many aspects of the treaty's provisions and their ramifications.

The CFE Treaty was designed to reduce the conventional armies of the opposing forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It aimed to reduce the likelihood of a conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe and to lessen the threat of war on the Continent.

Yet, as we all know, the Warsaw Pact has dissolved itself.

Most of the Communist nations against whom the West armed are now on their way to becoming democracies.

Soviet troops have left or have begun leaving East European territory.

Some East European countries would like to joint the European Community and even NATO.

The Soviet Union itself remains a Union more in name than in fact. Many of the republics have begun assuming independence. The Baltic States are free.

The Soviet Government is preoccupied with winning a war against economic decline, not a war against the Western powers it now seeks to emulate.

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is an historic document that exemplifies the enormity of these changes.

The very signing of a treaty involving 22 nations, tens of thousands of arms, and 2-1/2- million square miles is in and of itself an accomplishment. The treaty's massive cuts in weapons both spurred and reflect the positive transformation of Eastern Europe.

Moreover, the agreement's verification and transparency measures are themselves valuable and set an important precedent for further arms control measures.

The CFE Treaty will require the destruction of thousands of weapons in order for both sides to reach equal levels of weaponry. Although it obviously forces the far greater burden of destruction on the countries of the East, its limits on conventional arms may now seem too high given the pressures for disarmament in those formerly Communist countries.

But the ratification of the CFE Treaty by all parties will provide additional assurance of adequate warning of any arms buildup and an effective block against any country's ability to launch a large-scale attack.

The treaty was signed a year ago. Continuing political turbulence among the nations of Eastern Europe has since raised possible complications for the treaty as drafted.

I am pleased that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has added to the resolution of ratification conditions that anticipate some of these eventualities.

Specifically, I commend the committee and the senior Senator from Maine, my colleague Senator COHEN, for anticipating the possibility that an emergent state might decline to accept the obligations of the treaty.

It is important to recognize that a newly independent state could ignore responsibility for upholding the CFE Treaty's provisions, thereby upsetting the stability and transparency of arms that the treaty is designed to ensure.

It is also critical that the Senate be involved in the decision whether or not to stay in the treaty or to renegotiate its provisions under such circumstances.

I am satisfied that the resolution of ratification adequately protects both the security interests of the United States and the Senate's role in the event that a potentially militarily significant state might choose to abrogate the treaty.

I also support the resolution of ratification's conditions that several treaty-related assurances, known as side agreements, be considered to have the same legal force as the treaty itself.

It is important for preserving both the constitutional powers of the Senate and the integrity of the treaty process to insist on this point.

The executive branch cannot make freestanding agreements to resolve problems inherent in the treaty and then expect Congress to ignore the relevance and legal standing of these agreements. To have any relevance, side agreements must have the same weight and binding quality as the provisions of the treaty itself.

It is therefore important that the resolution of ratification clarifies this point regarding both the Soviet statement of June 14, 1991, and that of October 18, 1991.

I believe that the most important aspect of CFE is the baseline it establishes for additional arms control and confidence-building measures. CFE is a building block for future steps toward a stable and peaceful security regime for Europe.

The CFE Treaty represents both the end of an era and the beginning of a new phase in arms control and security regimes.

It was a result of the cold war and a divided continent.

It will be implemented in the context of a new Europe in which integration and mutual advantage-rather than suspicion and conflict-can be the guiding principles.

The new era offers great possibilities for Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States to move toward a more far-reaching and permanent concept of arms control.

President Bush's unilateral arms reductions, and the subsequent unilateral initiative by Soviet President Gorbachev, demonstrate that the new climate of cooperation can yield great dividends in moving toward reduced arms.

Now is the time to press forward and realize the full potential of this new period in bilateral relations.

The administration has said it will shortly send the already signed START agreement regarding strategic arms to the Senate for consideration.

But the administration has been silent on what it once termed START II, a follow-on agreement to make even deeper cuts in the bulk of the two nations' nuclear arsenals.

Equally disappointing has been President Bush's silence in the face of new Soviet offers to negotiate more comprehensive arms control agreements.

President Gorbachev has called for negotiations to halt the production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials.

The great environmental hazard of nuclear production facilities, the excess plutonium, and highly enriched uranium available from retired warheads, and the lack of a need for even more nuclear warheads, all make this a compelling goal.

I hope President Bush will agree to at least explore this offer from President Gorbachev.

President Gorbachev has renewed his offer to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet Union has now instituted a unilateral 1-year testing moratorium.

It has been longstanding U.S. policy to pursue a halt to nuclear testing. Now is the time to renew this commitment. I plan to join in introducing legislation to require a 1-year mutual testing moratorium as a step toward this goal.

Finally, President Gorbachev has pledged to unilaterally reduce Soviet strategic forces to 5,000 warheads. This is 1,000 fewer than the agreed upon 6,000 START-accountable limit. Gorbachev also proposed to begin negotiations on further reductions to approximately half of the 6,000 accountable warhead START limit. This is an offer that also deserves immediate attention.

It is unfortunate that President Bush has yet to respond to any of the Soviet President's new arms control initiatives.

The possibility to achieve such far-reaching agreements may not always exist.

I believe it is in our interest to explore them now.

I am pleased that the Senate today will fulfill its constitutional responsibility by providing its advice and consent to ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

I hope that the treaty will not just be a benchmark of the progress that has been made in enhancing European security.

I hope the CFE Treaty will serve as a catalyst, spurring the administration to work vigorously to realize the enormous opportunities before us today.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.


Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BRYAN). The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a section of the committee report dealing with data discrepancy be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:


The administration told the committee in July that some of the equipment the Soviets claimed had been withdrawn from the ATTU by November 19, 1990, had, in fact, not been removed by that data. Evidence of destruction in the ATTU and information available on holdings now located east of the Urals indicates that nearly all the TLE in question is now no longer present in the ATTU, but the baseline OSIs could, of course, prove otherwise.

In July, Senator Biden asked Ambassador Ronald Lehman, Director of ACDA, about the amount of TLE withdrawn from the ATTU after November 19, and about the general conditions of the Soviet departure from the ATTU. Ambassador Lehman testified that "it would appear that what the Soviets have given us is their projection of what they expected to have in the zone at the time *** we are continuing to pursue this issue in the JCG." A week earlier, Richard Kerr, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, stated: "At this time, our best judgement is that the Soviet 19 November figures reflected what they intended to have in the zone when the Treaty entered into force-if not before."

Senator Biden then followed up with further questions on the actual amount of unreported TLE that was still in the ATTU on November 19, and "about the efficiency and the capability of the Soviets to either, (A) move; (B) know whether it was moved; and (C) know where it was in transit."

Ambassador Woolsey responded as follows:

"* * * we believed based on information that has been provided to us by the intelligence community that there were problems, * * * concrete data problems with a somewhat smaller level of equipment *** there were approximately 1,000 aircraft, much of it in storage at air fields, looking to us as if it were older aircraft, that the Soviets did not try to hide, but did not declare. And we raised this issue in the Joint Consultative Group and after discussions there, they increased their notified holdings by between 100 and 200 aircraft. There were still 800 or so aircraft that they did not notify. Now some of that aircraft appeared to have been in the process of being destroyed at the beginning of the period (and) * * * much of it has been destroyed since. * * * There were also * * * on the order of 800 pieces-of ground-based equipment, which we have * * * [with] reasonably good confidence [determined] were not declared properly and we continue to raise that issue in the Joint Consultative Group ***."

Ambassador Woolsey also mentioned possible further undeclared ground equipment "in the very low thousands." This "several thousand" TLE did not actually arrive at destinations east of the Urals until after November 19, 1990, but it cannot be proven to have been in the ATTU on that date.

By observing the date of arrival, one can estimate how many of these late-arriving TLE may have still been in the ATTU on November 19, 1990, and that number is about 3,000.

Also, some destruction of older tanks and aircraft in the ATTU appears to have been underway on November 19, but not completed until after that date. The Soviets have agreed that about 800 to 1,000 aircraft were in the ATTU on November 19, but they assert that these aircraft were older and did not meet the definition of "aircraft" in the Treaty. It now appears that some 1,500 additional older tanks and aircraft have been or are being destroyed.

As part of their June 14, 1990, unilateral political commitment, the Soviets declared that they would destroy "an additional 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories beyond the Urals." Thus, the Soviets will have, at least, agreed to make amends. The unilateral destruction of 14,500 TLE, plus the reduction of 3,738 TLE pursuant to the Article III dispute (in addition to the reduction obligations under the Treaty already accepted by the Soviets), is clearly welcome.

Other observers have suggested that there may have been as many as 18,000 more pieces of equipment in the zone on November 1990 than the Soviets declared. Based on open and closed testimony by the intelligence agencies, it seems fair to conclude that we will never be able to confirm whether 18,000 extra TLE were in the ATTU on November 19, 1990.

In light of the importance of this issue to committee members, a summary of available classified information will be available to all Senators in S407 during the consideration of the Treaty by the full Senate. Thereafter, the summary will be retained in the committee's files.



Senators Biden and Helms both expressed concern over the data discrepancy issue. In response to questions from Senator Biden, representatives from the intelligence community confirmed that "we have found some undeclared equipment in the zone." Intelligence community representatives confirmed that this number is about 800. Furthermore, the intelligence community stated that it "cannot negate the possibility" that additional equipment was moved out of the zone after the date of treaty signature.

The committee condition makes clear that a discrepancy does exist between U.S. estimates and Soviet declarations. The condition goes on to require that the United States "shall continue to seek clarification of those holdings of Treaty-limited equipment as of November 19, 1990."

Perhaps most important, the committee condition states that the United States "shall seek to obtain additional reductions of equipment in Treaty-limited categories in the event the President determines that actual holdings of Treaty-limited equipment by any state party exceeded its declaration concerning its holdings of such equipment as of November 19, 1990."

In other words, the committee strongly believes that if the Soviet Union did fail to declare equipment, such equipment should be treated as if it were covered by the agreement. Although most administration officials believe that the treaty calls for calculating destruction requirements on the basis of each state's declaration, the committee believes that if Soviet declarations are lower than actual holdings, the United States should seek to obtain additional reductions. The Soviet Union should not be permitted to benefit from incorrect data declarations.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today, the Senate takes up the CFE Treaty. This treaty has been a long time in the making. Indeed, this historic treaty was signed in Paris by 22 nations I year ago this week. If the Senate acts in the coming days, the United States will help lead the West and the East in shaping a new Europe.

In my view, ratification of the CFE Treaty will mark a watershed in American and European history. It will eliminate a fundamental cause of tension in Europe since the end of World War II: The huge numerical advantage of Soviet conventional forces.

Ending this superiority will serve to eliminate a threat to the security and prosperity of Western Europe and Eastern Europe, and it will eliminate a fundamental cause of the nuclear arms race.

In short, this treaty's ratification will set the first foundation stone for a new and more secure Europe.

As far as numbers are concerned, this treaty overwhelmingly serves American security interests. That fact was emphasized over and over again in our hearings. Secretary of Defense Cheney made this point. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, said it. Each of the Chiefs of the four services said it. And General Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said it.

These distinguished officers explained that this treaty will required the former Soviet Union to destroy 23,000 tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and other equipment. Meanwhile, if we proceed with planned transfers of equipment to our NATO allies, the United States would not be require to destroy any equipment as a result of the treaty.

Such a ratio of Soviet to United States reductions-23,000 to 0-has never before been accomplished in arms control and probably never will be again.

This fact bears repeating: The former Soviet Union must destroy 23,000 pieces of conventional equipment and the United States none. The committee report details at great length the military advantages of this treaty. But I think this ratio-23,000 to 0-speaks for itself.

Let me say to my colleagues that this fact cannot be overemphasized. Because it is this fact that convinced me to recommend Senate consent to the treaty despite the uncertain political situation in the former Soviet Union.

While President Mikhail Gorbachev retains some power as head of the new Union Government in Moscow, clearly the fate of the treaty now lies in the hands of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

I am optimistic that leaders of the three most important republics-Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia-will choose to accept the obligations of the treaty. Indeed, I would note that the new Director of Central Intelligence has advised the committee that he believes these republics will join the treaty.

The classified rationale for this judgment is available to all Senators in S407.

But it is possible that new states will be formed in the former Soviet Union, and that those new states will not join the treaty regime.

Because the treaty imposes no real constraints on the United States, I would argue that the downside risk of new states refusing to join the treaty regime is virtually nil.

The question of whether large republics-like Ukraine-join the treaty is an important one. Therefore, the committee developed, in close consultation with the administration, a condition that sets up a flexible procedure for such a circumstance.

What the condition does is this. If a large republic with a substantial army becomes independent and chooses not to join the treaty, three things happen:

First, the administration will consult with the Senate as to the how the United States should proceed;

Second, if the President chooses not to withdraw from the Treaty, he will call for an extraordinary conference to discuss the effect on the treaty of this new circumstance;

And third, if any changes are made to accommodate the new circumstance, the President will forward those changes to the Senate for its advice and consent.

In my view, this condition resolves the problem of Senate consent to a treaty when the other main party-the former Soviet Union-may soon disappear. I hope my colleagues will agree.

The resolution of ratification also protects the prerogatives of the Senate by making clear that several side agreements will be deemed as equivalent to the treaty in their legal significance.

Finally, let me say a word about verification. I asked all the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether the Soviet Union had any incentive to cheat on this agreement. Their answer was no. We heard testimony from all the Joint Chiefs on this issue, from all the intelligence agencies, and from the Secretary of Defense. Each assured the committee that this treaty is effectively verifiable.

The reasons why we can effectively verify this treaty are laid out in extensive detail in section 5 of the committee report and I will not repeat them here.

I urge all my colleagues to examine the report. If they do, they will see that militarily significant violations cannot occur without our intelligence community knowing about them well before they become dangerous. In short, this threshold verification test has been met.

Mr. President, let me point out to my colleagues that before the committee markup I received a letter from an unprecedented array of former Cabinet and top officials: Three former Secretaries of State, six Secretaries of Defense, three Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three Directors of Central Intelligence, two National Security Advisers, and five Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Their letter urges us in the strongest possible terms to act favorably on this treaty.

In other words, if we vote yes for this treaty, we will be in pretty solid company. I ask unanimous consent that this unprecedented letter of support be printed in the RECORD at the close of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1).

Mr. BIDEN. In closing, let me say that by acting now we will be helping to create a new, more stable European security order, where Soviet Republics can become independent and still use this treaty to join the European security regime which the other Nations of Europe have already joined.

I hope and expect my colleagues to agree.




Washington, DC, November 18, 1991.


Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: In response to your request on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am transmitting a statement endorsing the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty and urging the Senate to act promptly in providing its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty. The statement has been agreed to by 33 former senior U.S. government officials and military officers who have had special knowledge and responsibility relating to the subject matter of the treaty.

I hope you will find this statement useful in the committee and Senate action on this very important treaty.

Sincerely yours,


President & Executive Director.



We, the undersigned, believe that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty, concluded last year between the 22 nations of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, will make a substantial contribution to the continuing security interests of the United States and its Western allies and should be ratified as soon as possible,

Recent events in the Soviet Union, including and subsequent to the failed hardliner coup, have not only underscored the dangers of delay in implementing the CFE Treaty but have demonstrated the importance of having in place a structured set of obligations on the successor state or states of the Soviet Union. The CFE Treaty will require the successor state(s) to make deep, asymmetrical cuts in European-based conventional weapons to levels that will essentially eliminate the threat of a conventional attack on Europe. The existence of a formal Treaty with extensive on-site verification provisions will also provide an unprecedented degree of access to, and information about, military activities on the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals.

In the face of an uncertain political future, the security interests of the United States will be much better served under the Treaty than without it. Nothing will be gained by delaying the ratification process. Moreover, if ratification is delayed, the rapidly evolving political situation might require the Treaty's renegotiation which would be far more difficult than adapting, an existing Treaty to subsequent political changes.

For these reasons, we urge the United States Senate to act expeditiously to provide its advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty.

Hon. Harold Brown, Hon. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Hon. McGeorge Bundy, Gen.

William F. Bums, Hon. Frank C. Carlucci, Hon. William E. Colby, Adm. William

J. Crowe, Hon. Lloyd N. Cutler.

Amb. Jonathan Dean, Amb. Ralph Earle 11, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Gen.

David C. Jones, Hon. Max M. Kampelman, Hon. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Hon.

Melvin R. Laird, Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Edward C. Meyer.

Gen. Robert E. Pursley, Amb. Stanley R. Resor, Hon. John B. Rhinelander,

Hon. Elliot L. Richardson, Amb. Rozanne L. Ridgway, Hon. Eugene V. Rostow,

Hon. Dean Rusk, Hon. James Schlesinger.

Hon. George P. Shultz, Amb. Gerard C. Smith, Gen. W.Y. Smith, Adm.

Stansfield Turner, Hon. Cyrus R. Vance, Gen. John W. Vessey, Amb. Paul C.

Wamke, Gen. John Wickham.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a collection of reports prepared by the British-American Security Council on European Arms Control, chronicling crucial developments in the CFE negotiations, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Basic Reports on European Arms Control, Nov. 4, 1991, No. 18]


The broad outlines for arms control negotiations among the 38 CSCE member states are beginning to emerge after a series of consultations within NATO.

NATO leaders are expected to make a general statement of support for post-CFE talks at their summit in Rome this week, but diplomats are pointing toward the CSCE Helsinki review conference in March 1992, where a more concrete set of goals will be adopted. Preliminary discussions have focused on the establishment of a set of permanent "security forums," in which various subjects can be addressed. The future negotiations are usually referred to as "post-Helsinki arms control" or "Security Forum 38."

In an interview, a Pentagon official described a four-forum format being discussed within the administration:

An arms control forum to follow through on the agenda of the CFE IA and CSBM talks;

An "information dialogue" forum would cover new possible transparency measures to open up budget and force planning data to international scrutiny;

A forum on non-proliferation would harmonize national regulations on export control;

And a forum on regional arms control would sponsor talks among sets of neighbors.

The Pentagon official stressed that each of the forums was designed with "separate terms of reference." Under this conception, the arms control forum would develop limits and measures (with attendant verification inspections) that would apply to the Atlantic-to-Urals region of Europe whereas the information dialogue would extend to U.S. based Forces. Eager for inspections of Soviet territory East of the Urals, France and the U.K. would like the option of inspections of U.S. territory held open.

The Charter of Paris signed by CSCE heads of state a year ago called for "new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building open to all participating states." The CFE agreement only covers the 22 members of the NATO and the erstwhile Warsaw Pact. One of the first tasks of SF-38 is expected to be the extension of certain CFE and CFE IA provisions to the neutral and non-aligned states.

The CFE IA negotiations currently underway in Vienna will set national ceilings on the troop levels. While little progress has been made in these talks so far (see below), negotiators feet the CFE IA structure could be a good model for further limits on equipment levels. Rather than compelling countries with small forces to cut, the Pentagon officials pointed out, such discussions could focus on the major military powers. While the limits themselves would be national, the talks could have the aim, he suggested, of reducing the overall number of certain armaments (tanks, artillery) to a lower level.

The German foreign ministry is developing proposals on a broad range of arms control ideas. A German diplomat, in an interview, urged "cooperative measures" such as more regular liaison between military officers and "operational" arms control regimes that would govern the readiness level of forces.


Moves toward sovereignty by the Ukraine have raised questions about the impact on arms control of the changes in the Soviet Union. As the USSR's second most populous republic, the Ukraine is home to roughly 1.5 million troops and 6,000 tanks. The government of the Republic has promised to abide by the provisions of the CFE Treaty; it has also called for the formation of a 450,000 troop Ukrainian army.

Government leaders in the newly and would-be sovereign republics are inexperienced in such technical foreign policy issues as arms control. As the Pentagon official put it, "when new leaders in the Ukraine talk about honoring obligations, they don't know what that means." The official is in Kiev with a U.S. delegation this week to discuss these issues.

The Ukraine's plans to form such a large army may prompt concerns among its neighbors; the Republic shares borders with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the Soviet Republic of Moldavia, and the Russian Federation. Under a provision of CFE negotiated at the eleventh hour, Poland, the CSFR, Hungary, and Romania will be able to conduct on-site inspections of units in the Ukraine.

The Pentagon official pointed out that a security forum for regional arms control could also help address such concerns. "You need structures to allow the Eastern countries to start arguing with each other," he said.


The CFE IA talks have made little progress toward an agreement limiting personnel levels of the 22 CFE signatories. Negotiators are still working on establishing the scope and definitions for the talks. Positions vary widely over what kinds of forces should be counted under an agreement. The Soviet delegation has insisted on a narrow definition covering only troops in units with CFE-limited equipment. According to its chief negotiator in Vienna, Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, Hungary is calling for the inclusion of "anything that has a conventional war-fighting capability," including border guards and other internal security forces exempted from CFE. Dr. Gyarmati, characterized the current discussions as "a talk shop, not a negotiation." But he was nonetheless confident that an agreement would be reached in time for the Helsinki summit.


[BASIC Reports on European Arms Control, Sept. 23, 1991,

No. 17]


The Bush administration is urging the speedy ratification of the CFR Treaty without modifications. Content to accept the guarantee of the Soviet central authority. Administration officials want to put the Treaty into force before individual republics take a more independent line. "If we don't ratify, and [instead] wait to see what the final political structure of this part of the world is, we will doom the Treaty," said a Pentagon official in an interview.

Soviet republics have so far offered strong support for CFE. The 10 republics that are forming a confederation have authorized the center to coordinate arms control and other aspects of foreign policy. The Pentagon official is eager to pocket these commitments; he expressed a desire to "get everybody who's anybody to say they love the Treaty."

Administration officials are willing to wait until after treaty ratification for details of how the Treaty's numerical limitations would be apportioned among the republics. Referring to the equipment allotments agreed among the former members of the Warsaw Pact, a State Department official said, "you might need an intra-republic understanding the way you had a group of six understanding."



According to this source, State Department lawyers who looked in to the implications for the Treaty of the changes in the Soviet Union concluded that the central authority for the confederation could be considered a "successor state." The official said, "If the confederation of sovereign states subscribes to the Treaty obligations of the USSR, you can go ahead and assume the limits apply."

The Bush administration is wrestling with the issue of whether the newly independent Baltic states should be encouraged to sign the CFE Treaty. Some in the government feel such a move would necessarily prolong links between the Baltics and the USSR. But others are concerned that if the Baltics are left out of the Treaty regime, it would set a bad precedent for republics with larger forces on their territory.


[Basic Reports on European Arms Control, Aug. 20, 199 1, No.



Between July 11 and July 25, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings on the ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Much of the discussion focused on the accuracy of the data presented by the Soviet Union in mid-November when the CFE Treaty was signed. There is still substantial confusion over how much equipment the USSR moved out of the Treaty zone by November 18 and how much was left within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) area. The Soviet military is suspected of understating the size of their holdings in the ATTU at that time.


Estimates of the discrepancy provided during the hearings ranged from 1,680 to 18,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment. A State Department official explained that the various estimates rested on different levels of evidence: "There are the smoking guns, the warm barrels, and what we would come up with if we had to do a bottom line best estimate."

Chief U.S. negotiator Ambassador James Woolsey discussed the figures for which there is the strongest evidence. He said there were roughly 880 aircraft, much of it apparently awaiting destruction, "that the Soviets did not try to hide, but did not declare." Woolsey said another 800 pieces of ground equipment were in the ATTU but not disclosed in the data exchange. Testifying separately, CIA officials explained that they observed 800-1,000 pieces of equipment arriving at storage depots behind the Urals in mid-December. From this they inferred that it has been moved after the data was presented. In addition to these weapons, Ambassador Woolsey also spoke of equipment-numbering in the "low thousands"-that "we have some evidence to suggest were not destroyed in time and/or alternatively did not get out in time."

In his testimony General John Galvin, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, explained that the 18,000 figure represents the unaccounted-for portion of the equipment the USSR claims to have withdrawn (57,000), destroyed (10,000), or converted (7,000). "We, with our ability to overfly the Soviet Union with satellites and to do other things with our intelligence systems, have not been able to account for every single one of these pieces of equipment. There are about 18,000 pieces of equipment that we have not been able to specifically note," Galvin said. A Pentagon official pointed out, in an interview, that his figure also matches the discrepancy between the Soviet data and Western calculations of Soviet strength in 1988.

General Galvin, however, explained that the actual figure may be significantly lower. He said much of the transferred equipment is kept in covered storage-where it cannot be readily observed-and that it is distributed widely within the Soviet Union. The NATO commander also argued that the confusion over Soviet data is "a very strong argument for the treaty, itself, and for the verification regime that will work with the treaty."

The Pentagon official portrayed the Administration's decision to proceed in spite of the data questions as a judgement call: "The cheating is real and it is troubling. We figured if we could get the limits in place and cover everything by working out the Article III problem, that would put them in a tremendous force structure bind and would be worth it." He said the real test would be future compliance with the agreement. "We'll have to watch them every day to see how they're living up to the Treaty limits and the political declarations. If this [the discrepancy] is one blip, and they live up to those obligations, then we made a good bet," he said. He also pointed out that the decision was based in part on the high regard for Gorbachev.

The performance of the intelligence community in this area has come under scrutiny since early leaks last winter put the data discrepancy as high as 40,000. Senator Helms charged that senior administration officials applied pressure for the estimates to be revised: "I am told the word went out to the U.S. intelligence analysts that this gap was just a little bit embarrassing and that the intelligence people ought to get rid of this gap by what they call 'creative re-analysis."' Testifying on behalf of the intelligence community, Deputy CIA Director Richard Kerr offered a candid assessment of its efforts: "We essentially lost our place as they [the USSR] began to move and draw forces out and were unable to keep that database up to date."


A number of senators pressed the issue of how CFE treats the Baltic republics. Under the Treaty, forces in the Baltics are counted under the Soviet Union's allotted equipment entitlements, prompting concern that this amounts to tacit acknowledgment that the republics lie within the Soviet Union. Secretary of State James A. Baker III took issue with this interpretation: "This treaty does in no way alter or reduce our position that we do not recognize the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union."

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell explained how the Treaty handles this issue-and how any secession would affect CFE: "The holdings [in the Baltics] are owned by the Soviet Union. They own the entitlement, and whether the individual seceding republics would ask that the Soviets move the equipment that's in that particular republic to somewhere else within the Soviet Union [is] a matter between the republic government and the government of the Soviet Union."

Even before the current coup-which is apparently aimed at quashing the aspirations of breakaway republics-senators were concerned that the Treaty permits a buildup in the Baltics. Senator Helms raised the question of whether armored combat vehicles (ACVS) belonging to the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces that have been exempted could be used to crack down. Administration witnesses reassured the committee that very few such ACVs were in the Baltics. Steven Lilly-Weber of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge said that according to their calculations, the regional limits in the CFE Treaty would prevent rather than permit a buildup in the Baltics.


General Galvin assessed the military threat from the forces moved East of the Urals. He said only one-third (or roughly 20,000) of the withdrawn equipment is being kept in a usable condition. The rest, Galvin said, "was parked... [in] the closest place that could be found to park it. It was not put there because somebody was going to exercise it, preserve it, take care of it, worry about it."

Galvin pointed out that even the 20,000 systems that are being maintained are not organized into military units and are not associated with any troops.

According to the General, reintegrating this equipment into a capable force would be a large task. "What you would have to do is you would have to organize the people and train the people... We would not be talking about weeks; we would be talking about months."

The NATO commander also gave details of the Alliance's "cascading" program, through which excess U.S. and other weapons are transferred to Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey so that they can upgrade their forces. Galvin said 2,000 tanks (mostly M-60s), 600 ACVs (M-113 s), and 180 8-inch artillery pieces would be shifted.


According to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer interviewed after the hearings, Committee members plan to express their views on the Treaty by attaching a number of conditions to the Senate's resolution of consent to ratification. He said there would probably be conditions on the Baltics, Article III, and equipment East of the Urals.

Secretary Baker, predictably, denied the need for any conditions. But he left the door open, saying, "talk to the experts ... and if you still have a problem, we're prepared to sit down and try and work through it with you."



[The following is a politically binding declaration covering equipment East of the Urals. It was presented alongside the USSR's legally binding statement on issues raised under Article III (see issue # 15 of BASIC Reports). The numbers given here replace figures presented in a table in the last issue. -Editor]

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, (the Treaty) I have been instructed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to state the following.


1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, during 1991-1995, destroy or convert into civilian equipment no less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories beyond the Urals, in addition to the numbers of armaments subject to destruction and conversion specified in the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of (date of Statement) concerning obligations outside the framework of the Treaty.

These armaments will be destroyed or converted under procedures that will provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. Advance notification and information will be provided to the States Parties to the Treaty regarding the locations and numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery undergoing destruction or conversion.

Elimination of armaments in the Treaty-limited categories will also be carried out subsequently as their operational and service life is expended.

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the period between January 1989 and signature of the Treaty on November 19, 1990, in connection with activities related to unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries of Eastern Europe and adaptation of the armed forces to the new defensive doctrine, withdrew beyond the Urals the following numbers of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories: 16,400 battle tanks, 15,900 armored combat vehicles and 25,000 pieces of artillery.

Of these numbers of armaments and equipment, 8,000 battle tanks, 11,200 armored combat vehicles and 1,600 pieces of artillery have been turned over to military units and subunits in the eastern Soviet Union for the purpose of re-equipping them and supplementing their armaments.

Another part of the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories, which have been transferred beyond the Urals (8,400 battle tanks, 4,700 armored combat vehicles and 16,400 pieces or artillery), has been placed in storage. In addition, 7,000 pieces of artillery are being used for replacement and repair.

These stored conventional armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will be used up in the process of replacing obsolete armaments and equipment that have expended their established operational and service life and, in the eastern Soviet Union, also in supplementing units.

With respect to the armaments and equipment transferred beyond the Urals before signature of the Treaty that have been placed in storage or are used for replacement and repair beyond the Urals, upon entry into force of the Treaty information will be provided to all States Parties about the locations and numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery at such locations as of July 1, 1991. Armaments in each of these categories (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery) will be stored separately.

3. The conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories withdrawn beyond the Urals prior to signature of the Treaty will not be used to create a strategic reserve or operational groupings, and will not be stored in a way permitting their rapid return to the area of application of the Treaty, that is, such armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will not be stored in sets for military formations.

Military formations and units deployed within the area of application of the Treaty will be organized in line with the Soviet defensive doctrine and taking into account the sufficiency levels of armaments established by the Treaty for a single State.

Note.-News of the hard-line coup in Moscow broke as BASIC Reports was going to press. The State Emergency Committee claiming power promised to honor all international accords and treaties, and President Bush said the ratification of CFE should go forward. All interviews quoted in this issue were conducted before the coup.

[BASIC Reports on European Arms Control, June 17, 1991, No.



Final resolution of lingering CFE controversies was achieved Friday when Soviet representatives in Vienna presented a set of binding promises on forces which have been at the center of a seven-month dispute with the other Treaty signatories. The 22 signatory nations will now go ahead with ratification proceedings, which were held up by the disagreement.

The Soviet declarations were worked out during several rounds of high-level U.S.-Soviet consultations since the Treaty was signed in November. The compromise was concluded at a June I meeting in Lisbon between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, but major progress was achieved during an earlier visit to Washington by Chief of the General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev.

The negotiators skirted a laborious legal debate over whether the language of the Treaty covers ground forces under naval command. Instead they focused on practical measures to protect the integrity of the Treaty's limits. A State Department source explained in an interview that the declaration "brings the Soviet Union into practical conformity with all the ceilings and subceilings."

The Soviet Union's legally binding statement (reprinted on pp. 3-4) specifies how it will comply with these ceilings and prevent any similar controversies over interpretation. To compensate for equipment in its coastal defense and naval infantry units, the USSR will cut tanks by 933, armored combat vehicles (ACVS) by 1,725 and its artillery by 1,080.


A compromise agreed by the U.S. allows the Soviet Union-contrary to the provisions of the CFE Treaty-to carry out half of these reductions (or 1,500) outside the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTLJ) geographic area covered by the treaty. This provision will enable the Soviet military to preserve some of its most modem armaments, rather than destroy it. The USSR is expected to move newer pieces of equipment to units East of the Ural Mountains and destroy or convert an equivalent number of obsolete pieces. NATO has a similar program (referred to as "the cascade") under which it has shifted arms from modem armies such as the U.S. to less well-equipped forces like Turkey. Commenting on the concession made by the U.S., a Pentagon source said, "their [the Soviet military's] whole world fell in, and these are minor adjustments in comparison."

Destruction and conversion carried out East of the Urals will not be subject to the same on-site inspection rights provided in the treaty, but will be observable by U.S. spy satellites. In its declaration, the USSR said it would destroy such equipment, "in accordance with procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that [it has] been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. The States Parties to the Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the location, number and types of conventional armaments and equipment to be destroyed or converted."

The statement's language on coastal defense and naval infantry equipment was couched in a way that allows the Soviet military to save face on the treaty interpretation dispute. It pledges that the level of Soviet equipment in regular army units will be lower than the Treaty ceilings-with the difference equaling the holdings of the naval infantry and coastal defense units. Those units will, according to the Soviet declaration, not grow beyond their current level. Under this formula, all the equipment is effectively counted, but the Soviet Union is able to keep at least a separate rhetorical accounting of the forces it claimed wasn't covered by the Treaty.

The third controversial category, strategic rocket forces, was also capped at the current level (1,701 ACVS) and was excluded from Treaty limits under an exemption in the agreement for internal security forces. Ethnic tensions within the Soviet Union have prompted concerns over the security of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal.

In order to prevent any similar controversies, the USSR stated that aside from the agreed exceptions, all other forces "irrespective of assignment" would be counted. This language was crafted to insure that new types of military commands were not created to shield forces from treaty limits. As a U.S. official put it, "the Boy Scouts won't get tanks."

Any inspections of the naval infantry or coastal defense units would fall under the "challenge inspection" provisions of the treaty, rather than the somewhat stricter rules for "declared sites." The naval infantry units had already been considered undeclared sites in the Treaty, and the coastal defense divisions were given this status under the new compromise.


The Soviet declaration resolving the interpretation dispute was presented at a special meeting called by France, which used a Treaty clause providing for "extraordinary conferences." At a special session of the Joint Consultative Group on the same day, the USSR tabled a separate set of promises covering equipment that had been moved East of the Urals before the Treaty was signed. Because these armaments are not covered by treaty limits, the second declaration is considered politically (rather than legally) binding.

Between 1988 and November 1990, the Soviet Union shifted slightly less than 60,000 tanks, ACVs and artillery guns behind the Urals. Roughly 11,000 of these weapons have since been destroyed or converted. On Friday the USSR promised to destroy or convert an additional 14,500 armaments: 6,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery, and 1,500 ACVS.

According to the Defense Department source, the Soviet military has already placed 29,100 pieces of equipment in storage-much of it in the open, where it can be seen. [The USSR has provided detailed data on the disposition of equipment East of the Urals. The Soviet statement presented in Vienna Friday promises that none of the equipment moved East will be stored in unit sets or used to create new large formations. Another U.S. official explained, "they won't store it in ways where guys can jump in it and drive off." This pledge conforms with a longstanding Soviet policy that forces from Europe will not be used for a military build up in the Asian portion of the country.



On May 19-21, General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet General Staff, visited Washington for a round of meetings with senior Bush administration officials. The visit was taken as sign of how stubborn the Soviet military had been on the CFE disputes. The Foreign Ministry usually handles such negotiations, but the Kremlin decided to have the General Staff deal directly with the U.S. administration.

Early in the discussions with an American delegation headed by Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, however, the Soviet General showed new flexibility. Reflecting on the meetings, the Pentagon official said, "the Moiseyev visit was more productive than I ever expected. ... He came and right in the beginning made a concession on the principle [of counting the naval infantry equipment]." In March the Soviet Union agreed to count coastal defense equipment but held out on naval infantry.

The General's visit did not, however, resolve the dispute. While in Washington, Moiseyev complained that if he was going to make additional reductions, it would be difficult to comply with Treaty ceilings for active unit equipment in the ATTU and in the Flanks region. He requested that new, higher limits be set (with increases of 100-200 tanks and artillery and 750 ACVS). The U.S., unwilling to renegotiate provisions of the Treaty, rejected this proposal. At the Lisbon ministerial, the position was withdrawn, and the USSR said it would cut the 750 ACVs by using a procedure in the Treaty for conversion to look-alikes.

Resolution of the CFE disputes will clear the way for progress on the CFE IA follow-on talks. At their Copenhagen meeting on June 7, NATO foreign ministers promised to table a new proposal on personnel limits by the end of the current round in Vienna.


[BASIC Reports on European Arms Control, April 8, 1991, No.



The Bush administration is preparing a response to Soviet proposals on controversies that have blocked ratification of the CFE Treaty, according to U.S. officials. At the center of the dispute are Soviet ground forces, under naval command, that the USSR argues fall outside the treaty's limits.

The U.S. government is clearing the way for a compromise by shifting its focus from the legal to the numerical dimensions of the dispute. Earlier statements by officials have insisted that the Soviet Union abandon its legal interpretation of the treaty. But senior policy makers are now developing compromise measures that would bring the controversial forces into line with the numerical limits in the treaty. One U.S. official described the administration's approach in an interview, saying "there are issues of principle involved ... [but] there may be practical solutions around that might have the same effect."

There are three main types of forces at issue-coastal defense, naval infantry, and strategic rocket guards. (A small number of arms in civil defense units are also in discussion.) The USSR has insisted that none of the equipment associated with such units is covered by the Treaty. Moscow bases its case for the exemption of naval units on the CFE negotiations mandate, which excludes naval forces from the talks. The Treaty does, however, cover all ground equipment deployed within the Atlantic to the Urals, and there is no treaty language distinguishing ground equipment in naval units from those assigned to the army. Article III of the Treaty does list seven clearly defined exceptions for other categories.

In a political agreement outside the treaty text, the parties set separate ceilings for land-based naval aircraft and land-based naval helicopters. The Soviet Union had originally insisted on keeping these systems unconstrained, but a compromise was negotiated by the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers themselves. The USSR was thus allowed special treatment for its aircraft, and the U.S. insured that these systems were capped. A Pentagon source drew a parallel between these provisions and the proposals being developed which he said would "take everything that's under dispute and work it in a way analogous to land-based naval aircraft."

The Soviet position on these issues is a refinement of a proposal first presented by Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh during a January Washington ministerial. Bessmertnykh promised that the equipment in these categories would not be increased. In mid-March, the Kremlin offered to withdraw forces equaling the holdings of the coastal defense units from the ATTU. A March 25 letter from President Gorbachev promised that the withdrawals would be taken from the same regions where the controversial units are, which would bring the levels into compliance with both the overall and geographic subregion ceilings. The prospect of a buildup in the northern and southern flanks of the USSR was a strong concern of Norway and Turkey during the talks. Testifying at a Senate hearing, Ronald Lehman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, highlighted this point: "the issue of the flanks was very vigorously negotiated."

According to the administration officials, the U.S. will press for similar assurances on the other disputed categories. A Pentagon official said "we need coastal defense and naval infantry [marines] treated the same." There is speculation that strategic rocket forces will be frozen but not compensated by withdrawals. These forces have aroused less concern because they are widely scattered and do not possess the most capable equipment.


Commenting on the naval ground forces issue in an interview, a Soviet diplomat said, "I wonder why these questions weren't discussed in the negotiations." The diplomat claimed that the Soviet military began restructuring its coastal defense units in 1989. This claim raises questions about whether the Soviet military, as has been charged, suddenly begun the restructuring to create an issue that could scuttle the Treaty. The diplomat also told of military plans to make the controversial units, which had been switched from an army command, more clearly oriented to shore defense. The divisions are located near major naval bases at Kalingrad, Murmansk, and Sevastapol. The diplomat said that like units in Soviet Asia, the divisions would have fewer tanks, and their artillery would be stationary.

The Soviet proposals to withdraw equipment do not include an offer to destroy the systems as would be required under the Treaty. The difficulty of meeting the three-year destruction timeline is often cited as a reason for the massive movement of weapons East of the Urals. The 5,457 pieces of equipment being debated comprise roughly 6% of Soviet forces West of the Urals.


Two other issues that had been cited by the Bush administration as stumbling blocks are no longer seen as obstacles. A dispute over the accuracy of Soviet data was downgraded in February when it was revealed that U.S. intelligence estimates had overstated the size of Soviet forces. Secretary Baker acknowledged the mistake in a letter on CFE to Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE): "It now appears that the magnitude of these discrepancies may be less than we had originally believed." The administration is also taking a more relaxed attitude toward the question of what will happen to Soviet equipment moved out of ATTU before the treaty took effect. While this withdrawal was perfectly legal, some in the U.S. government had wanted solid assurances that the arms would not be used to build up elsewhere. A U.S. government source said, "We have gotten lots of information, and it seems to add up now. And we have assurances about what they're going to do. They're not building up in Asia or creating new units. We've gotten about as much as we can."

If President Bush sends President Gorbachev a counterproposal, as he is expected to do, it will be the first major U.S. move toward compromise since these issues first arose in November. A Pentagon official expressed some frustration at having to negotiate new provisions after the treaty has been signed. But the source was also glad the treaty will not be sacrificed over these issues: "In the end I'd rather have the agreement."


[BASIC Reports on European Arms Control. Feb. 19. 1991. No.



Disputes between the Soviet Union and the other CFE signatories have indefinitely delayed ratification of the treaty. Meanwhile the schedule of the forum where these issues are being discussed has also been left open-ended in the hope that the differences can still be resolved. Last Sunday (February 17) marked the end of a 90-day period during which countries were supposed to submit revisions in their data for the size of their forces, but the Joint Consultative Group, which was set up to review compliance and interpretation questions, will remain in session.

There are three main areas of controversy. The one that has aroused the most concern involves a Soviet claim that three of its motorized rifle divisions near the Baltic and Black Seas have been reassigned to Naval command and are thereby exempt from treaty limits. The Soviet position is widely seen as a move to dramatize the lack of constraints on naval forces, which the Soviet military has pressed for and the United States has opposed.

While the CFE Treaty does not cover naval forces, it does limit all ground equipment deployed within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU). Article III of the Treaty lists six exceptions for equipment not deployed with military units and one covering paramilitary forces. The Treaty sets separate ceilings for land-based naval aircraft and helicopters; there is no treaty language specially treating naval units with ground equipment. Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh proposed negotiating ceilings on such units during his late January meetings in Washington. There is concern that allowing the exemption of the three "shore defense divisions" would set a precedent for further "resubordination" of ground units.

According to a Western European negotiator, Chief Soviet CFE Representative Oleg Grinevsky acknowledges ongoing debate in Moscow and, "hints that there are problems of interpretation within the Soviet government." The rigid Soviet positions are widely seen as reflecting military discomfort with CFE, but the Western diplomat said other Soviet officials are "not unsympathetic to the interpretation of the other countries. "

Giving his own assessment of the issue, the diplomat said that "from a clearly legalistic standpoint, you can not say that it is a clear breach of contract. It is a debatable thing." While the diplomat was careful not to paint the Soviet Union into a comer, he affirmed the case against the resubordination loophole, pointing out that the negotiating record is clear on the point.

The second issue concerns the fate of Soviet arms moved east of the Urals and therefore out of the area covered by the Treaty. These forces are not legally covered by the agreement, but the U.S. and its allies are asking the Soviet Union to provide a detailed plan for what will be done with the systems. In October, then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze gave rough figures for tanks that had already been destroyed, or were slated to be converted or exchanged for Far Eastern forces that would in turn be destroyed.

The one dispute on which the sides have narrowed their differences is the accuracy of Soviet data for its forces in the ATTU.



On February 2 The Manchester Guardian reported that the U.S. had reduced its estimate of the size of the Soviet force. In December the Bush administration accused the USSR of understating its holdings by 40,000, but in late January the figure was lowered to under 10,000. The Guardian reported that the earlier charge was based on information collected in early October rather than after the November 19th date on which the Treaty took effect.

A former U.S. official who dealt with these issues acknowledged the difficulty in an interview with BASIC Reports. Referring to the massive withdrawals of Soviet forces, this source said, "we simply did not have the capability to track the changes as they were happening."

Since raw intelligence typically takes a few weeks to analyze, there is some question over why the U.S. was so quick to base its accusation on the higher figure. Wishing to keep these issues from becoming too politically charged, the administration has sought to downplay the disputes. Officials refrain, for instance, from portraying the controversies as violations.

A State Department source explained, "we want to give them room to pull back and admit they were wrong and do it with some dignity." This attitude underlies the patient approach to the data revision deadline: "there's nothing really magical about the 17th," said the official.


Ambassador Grinevsky presented limited revisions to the Soviet data on February 14. The USSR raised the figures for their equipment holdings by a total of 700-including 160 combat aircraft, 150 attack helicopters, 30 tanks, 250 armored combat vehicles, and I 10 artillery. The revisions leave a large gap between Soviet and U.S. reckonings.

According to a Pentagon source, the forces added to the data fall into a different category than those comprising the bulk the data discrepancy. This official says the U.S. has identified Soviet army units with more treaty-limited equipment (TLE) than they are listed in the data as having. The 700 TLE in the new data, however, are in paramilitary units the USSR now recognizes come under the treaty.

Officials are reluctant to specify the size of the alleged discrepancy, (which they place between 3 -1 0,000) in part out of a desire not to reveal the intelligence methods on which the charges are based. The data controversies center on the amount of equipment that was in the ATTU on November 19 when the Treaty was signed. There is also concern that withdrawal of equipment since November may circumvent the Treaty. But a Western diplomat said it is hard to resolve data disputes without the Treaty's verification provisions, which only take effect after ratification: "once [the USSR] has removed the evidence by removing the equipment from the ATTU, there is not much that can be done."


Meanwhile, the first plenary meeting of the CFE IA follow-on talks was held on February 14. The substantive agenda of CFE IA is held up by the disputes with the USSR, but it was seen as symbolically important to begin them formally. A State Department official explained in an interview the desire to "make it clear that we're not walking away from the process and want to go forward."

Most analysts predict that it will take an intervention by President Gorbachev to shift the Soviet positions on the disputed issues. In early February President Bush sent a letter on these issues to the Soviet leader.


The German delegation also presented new figures in Vienna. The original German data counted forces not covered by the treaty; most of the new numbers are, therefore, lower. Another reason for the revisions is that the November figures for East German forces were estimates. The total reduction was 922 TLE.

Roughly 130 pieces of equipment in research and development at military test sites were removed; the Treaty only covers forces deployed with military units. 42 artillery pieces fall into this category. Of 130 tanks removed from the accounting, 61 were test models, and the rest were miscounted GDR equipment. The aircraft count was reduced by 46 (30 in R&D, 14 due to error, and 2 destroyed in accidents since November).

Germany took 600 Soviet-made BTR-40 from the GDR off the list, claiming they are look-alikes. 99 BO-105 helicopters were also removed because that variety is not considered an attack helicopter. Germany added 20 objects of verification.


[BASIC reports from Vienna-A regular update on the CFE and CSBM negotiations from the British American Security Information Council, Dec. 17, 1990, No. 12]


With the CFR Treaty negotiated and signed, officials have now focused on differences over the data exchanged in Vienna on November 18th, the day before the agreement was signed in Paris. The U.S. and its NATO allies have raised questions about the accuracy of Soviet data. If the differences are not resolved in the coming weeks, Senate consideration of the Treaty for ratification could be delayed. (Data for all countries is given on pp. 2-4.)

The low Soviet figures presented in Vienna are only partially explained by the massive withdrawal of forces to the Eastern USSR; territory beyond the Ural Mountains is not covered by the Treaty. Pentagon sources told BASIC Reports that the USSR has more forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) area than it acknowledges in the data.

U.S. and Soviet officials have met to discuss this issue twice since the Paris summit. Chief U.S. CFR negotiator James Woolsey led an American delegation to Moscow December 6-7, and Woolsey talked about the matter with Soviet officials at the December 10-12 ministerial in Houston. The problem was also taken up at in the Joint Consultative Group, a body established by the Treaty to discuss compliance issues, which ended 3 weeks of meetings on December 13.

None of these meeting yielded significant progress. Pentagon officials point to the stubbornness of the Soviet military; one said, "there was no interest on the part of the General Staff to move at all." Expressing his hope that the question would be settled soon, another Pentagon official said, "it isn't a good idea to make this a big political issue." The Treaty itself provides for the revision of data within 90 days (or before February 18), but officials point to the next Joint Consultative Group meeting, which opens January 19, or the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet ministerial within the next month.

In contrast to the apparent hard-line of the Soviet military, representatives of the foreign ministry have acknowledged inaccuracies in the data (attributing them to error) and promised to correct them. The Soviet defense and foreign ministries had difficulty coordinating their positions in the closing months of the CFR talks, and there is speculation that Gorbachev is building closer political ties to the military. In response to the suggestion that the Soviet military may be trying to undermine the Treaty, a Soviet diplomat said "it's just the difficulty of handling the restructuring of forces." The diplomat provided a figure for Soviet artillery holdings that was slightly higher (by 168) than the official data exchange. (The reason for the difference was unclear.)

Another explanation offered by a Defense Department official is that the Soviet military is trying to claim credit in advance for withdrawals from Eastern Europe not yet carried out. Referring to the low tank figure in the data, the official said the Soviet army "had every intention of taking out 20,000 tanks [from the ATTU] by the time treaty was signed, but they didn't make the deadline. They gave us data that reflects a projection rather than actual holding." According to this source, the discrepancy in each category is in the thousands and in some cases is over 10,000. The only category in which the Soviet data is described as accurate is attack helicopters. The American charges are based on the surveillance of Soviet forces by U.S. intelligence agencies carried out in late November.


The data dispute is focused in part on three Soviet divisions that the USSR calls "shore defense divisions." Since the CFR Treaty does not limit naval forces, the Soviet Union argues that these divisions are not covered by treaty limits. A Pentagon official claims, however, that the units are motorized rifle divisions within the normal structure of Soviet land forces. The official says, "they are located where they have always been."

The issue of limits on naval force has been highly charged; naval arms control has been resisted by the U.S. military while it is known to be a priority of the Soviet military. The two sides resolved a dispute over limiting land-based aircraft in the Soviet Navy by setting a politically binding ceiling outside the formal treaty.

Another data issue centers on the MT-LB armored personnel carrier. The Treaty contains a paragraph describing how this vehicle can be transformed into a non-combat look-alike, which would not be counted under treaty ceilings. The two sides differ over how many MT-LBs currently in the Soviet arsenal be counted as look-alikes and how many are still combat-capable. The Soviet diplomat said 12,800 are look-alikes used for towing artillery and as ambulances.



The CFE Treaty requires the Soviet Union to destroy any equipment being removed from the ATTU to reach the treaty ceilings. That equipment would have to be destroyed within three years of the Treaty's entry into force. Neither of these requirements applies to equipment that was already beyond the Urals when the Treaty was signed. The USSR acknowledges having accelerated its withdrawal of equipment behind the Urals in the final months before Treaty signature. But Soviet officials resist the charge that they are trying to avoid destroying their arms, claiming instead that they would have had difficulty carrying out all of their destruction on the Treaty's 3-year timeline.

Even though equipment that had already been moved to the Eastern USSR by November 18 is not legally covered by the CFE Treaty, the United States is seeking assurances that these forces will present no threat. In an October 13 letter, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze detailed Soviet intentions for the 20,000 tanks it had planned to withdraw. 4,000 had already been converted, destroyed, or exported. Another 8,000 tanks are slated for future destruction or conversion-mostly to fire-fighting equipment. The other 8,000 were being moved to the Far Eastern part of the USSR to replace aging weapons that will in turn be destroyed. A Soviet diplomatic source said that 500 artillery pieces from Europe have also been destroyed and that 6,400 artillery pieces have been moved to the Asian Soviet Union, along with 4,700 armored combat vehicles.


One of the elements of the Soviet data that most surprised Western officials was the short list of objects of verification provided. In early October, Soviet officials told U.S. counterparts that the USSR had 1,560 such sites, but the data lists only 895. The issue is important because the number of on-site inspections a country is required to host is based on the number of objects.

A Soviet diplomat explained why the figure is so low. According to this source, Eastern and Western negotiators agreed in the final weeks of the talks that 120 Soviet regiments and battalions in Eastern Europe would not be counted as objects because all of their treaty-limited equipment (TLE) had already been removed. The USSR also claims that an additional 80 sites were removed from the list due to withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe.

The diplomat also said that 100 training centers were discounted; these sites are said to have less than 30 total TLE or less than 12 items of any one category. In restructuring of its forces, the USSR claims to have removed all TLE from its chemical and communications and control units, thereby eliminating 360 objects of verification.

Acknowledging that many of these changes had indeed been made, a Pentagon official commented that "we'll probably have to live with the object of verification numbers." The issue is understood to be of greater concern to some of the United States' NATO allies.




[Basic Reports From Vienna, a Regular Update on the CFE and CSBM Negotiations From the British American Security Information Council, Nov. 8, 1990, No. II]


The area of the CFE Treaty requiring the largest amount of last-minute negotiation, according to officials involved in the talks, is the Treaty's verification regime. During meetings in Washington to prepare for the early-October New York ministerial, U.S. and Soviet officials resolved differences over the conceptual framework for verification.

The two sides had been using different methods to calculate the number of on-site inspections that a country would be required to host (its so-called passive quota). They disagreed over what unit of measurement would be used to determine the quota. The West had resisted the Soviet concept of "objects of verification", feeling the USSR was trying to protect its bases from full inspection by dividing them into "objects."

But at the Washington meetings, Soviet negotiators provided clarification and reassurance. According to a Soviet diplomat who took part, "anything contiguous to an object can be inspected, except for another object [which would count as a separate inspection under the quota]." The Soviet official elaborates that "you can look at the whole site (or division) within which a regiment lies, but you have to use another inspection to look at another regiment." The diplomat recounted that negotiators needed to use donuts in their meetings to demonstrate these concepts.

Having agreed on the conceptual framework, the sides still need to set quotas. The inspections will be divided chronologically into four periods: baseline, implementation, closeout, and duration. Baseline inspections will verify the starting point levels from which a country will be reducing and will last 120 days. The next phase will observe the reductions taking place over 3 years to determine whether they are on schedule. Closeout inspections, also lasting 120 days, are meant to ensure that countries have reached the ceilings mandated by the treaty. Inspections for the duration of the treaty will monitor compliance until the accord is no longer in effect.

Countries will be required to host inspections of a certain percentage of its objects during each of these periods. According to an American military official, the U.S. is proposing 20 percent of objects be inspected during the baseline period; 10 percent annually during implementation; 15 percent during closeout; and 15 percent annually for the duration. The official said there are 1,930 Soviet objects. According to an Eastern diplomat the only figure with which the USSR differs is the baseline quota for which they suggest 15 percent. The difficulty will now come in convincing the NATO allies to accept these quotas; the major West European allies have resisted intrusive verification since early in the negotiations.

A variety of other technical issues still need to be worked out. Many of these stem from the adoption of Soviet concepts. A U.S. official who is enthusiastic about the shift to the Soviet approach commented that "we still got what we want, but it's in rubles instead of dollars. All of the other concepts-like team days-need to be converted from the one currency to the other." "Team days" refers to the amount of time inspectors will have to conduct each inspection.


Mr. President, before we vote on this treaty, I want to pay tribute to those members of the administration who made the treaty possible. These are the public servants we never hear about. These are the people who worked day and night for the last several years negotiating with the Soviet Union, with our NATO allies,, and with the East European nations, to write the language of this treaty. Sometimes these men and women also had to fight against the recalcitrant bureaucracy in Washington.

These men and women deserve our praise, our respect, and our thanks. At the risk of omitting some, I would like to at least name a few: Ms. Janet Andres, a fine and highly professional Foreign Service Officer; Bill Parsons, a capable and determined lawyer in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and three other highly competent administration officials: Craig Chellis from the National Security Council, Doug Maceachin from the Central Intelligence Agency, and Tom Graham from the General Counsel at ACDA.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to acknowledge the critical role of Ambassador Jim Woolsey, who is known to many of us for his consummate skills, knowledge, and capability.

Without his skill in working with the committee, and without his understanding of the constitutional role of the Senate, Speedy action on this treaty would not have been possible.

It was Ambassador Woolsey who was able to overcome the almost impassable channels of communication which the administration has set up between the Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department.

Let me not put too fine a point on it, Mr. President. If we had relied solely on those channels, we would still be waist deep and sinking in the quicksand of controversy. There were key issues to resolve-issues involving considerable complexity-and only by setting up direct channels of communication were we able to resolve these issues in a timely manner.

I commend Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft for designating Ambassador Woolsey to speak for the administration on this matter. If they had not, I do not believe the committee would have voted unanimously for the treaty, and I do not think the full Senate's deliberations would have gone as smoothly as they have.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes, 3 seconds.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Vicki Stack, a health fellow on the staff of Senator DOLE, be granted the privileges of the floor during the consideration and votes concerning HR3595, the Medicaid rules bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may now modify my amendment with a modification which I believe is at the desk and has been agreed to between the Senator from Delaware and myself.

Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, will the Senator ask for a rollcall vote on this amendment?

Mr. SMITH. It is not my intention.

Mr. BIDEN. On the condition that there will be no rollcall vote, I will not object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so modified.

The amendment (No. 1433), as modified, is as follows:

Add after Condition (a)(5)(C), the following condition:

"(6) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE. -Within 30 days of the Senate's approval of the resolution of ratification, the President shall certify in a classified and unclassified report to the Senate whether or not the Soviet Union is in violation or probable violation of the terms of the CFE Treaty and protocols thereto."

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I would like to have the modification read into the Record, as there has been considerable debate over the specific language. I want to make certain that everybody understands what the amendment is.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the modification.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


Add after Condition (a)(5)(C), the following condition:

"(6) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE. -Within 30 days of the Senate's approval of the resolution of ratification, the President shall certify in a classified and unclassified report to the Senate whether or not the Soviet Union is in violation or probable violation of the terms of the CFE Treaty and protocols thereto."

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I think we have concluded the debate from our side. The purpose of my amendment was to advise my colleagues in the Senate, before they offer their advise and consent, that the Soviets have been in violation and likely remain in violation of the treaty at precisely the same time that we are approving ratification. I find this situation extremely disturbing, and our failure to adequately address this matter reflects poorly on the integrity of this institution. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from Delaware have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-eight seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to make it clear that the administration has agreed to this compromise. They think that it makes sense as it has been compromised. I also thank Senator PELL, the chairman of the full committee, for his leadership on this entire CFE Treaty debate. I, again, compliment Ambassador Woolsey for an incredibly fine job in the interest of the United States. I also want to thank Jamie Rubin and John Ritch of my staff for their efforts, and Dave Sullivan of Senator HELMS' staff for his fine efforts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has either expired or been yielded back.

Under the previous order, the question is on agreeing to the Smith-Wallop amendment, as modified.

The amendment (No. 1433), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I rise today to support ratification of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty. This landmark agreement took almost 20 years to negotiate. It marks a great step forward in arms control agreement and verification. The treaty will greatly improve international security.

We are in the midst of an extremely fluid situation. The Soviet Union continues to struggle with its identity. The Republics continue to weigh their need for sovereignty against their need for independence. Such volatility makes verifiable arms control measures imperative.

The CFE Treaty is not perfect. We are all aware of Soviet attempts to move equipment beyond the Urals. Outside the geographic area governed by the treaty. We know that there have been discrepancies regarding the actual count of Soviet equipment to be destroyed or converted.

No one can say with certainty how emerging states in the U.S.S.R. might fit into the arms control agreement we are considering today.

These are legitimate areas of concern. The resolution before us addresses each of these concerns.

The conventional force gap in Europe has been eliminated. Furthermore, both the United States and the Soviet Union have drastically cut their nuclear arsenals, including tactical weapons in the European theater. United States troops are no longer needed as a nuclear tripwire intended to discourage a nuclear attack on Western Europe.

The resolution of ratification was approved unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations last week. It includes a list of Soviet actions that the Senate would consider to contravene the treaty. These conditions are based on specific Soviet statements made after the treaty was negotiated. The administration must adhere to these conditions in implementing the agreement.

The resolution also includes language addressing the possibility of new states arising on Soviet territory.

Ratification of the CFR will make a significant contribution to international security as well as to the strengthening of multilateral regimes. The concrete benefits strongly outweigh the risks of potential cheating and the emergence of new states that may or may not choose to adhere to the treaty. The language of the treaty, combined with the Senate conditions, enable us to deal with those contingencies should they arise.

Mr. President, there is a domestic component of this treaty beyond the international security implications. I have expressed my deep concern about the amount of money this Nation continues to spend on outdated and unnecessary weapons systems. I do not make these remarks lightly. I am as committed as any Member of this body to a strong and effective national defense.

But once again, I must ask my colleagues: Has nothing changed over the course of the last year? Whether it is exotic weapons systems that are over budget and do not work, or $65 billion to keep U.S. troops in Europe, we are wasting vital resources.

We have a national debt of $3.7 trillion. The deficit this year will be nearly $279 billion. We have been in a recession for 2 years. More than 8 million Americans are out of work, out of savings, and out of patience. We cannot afford to continue to prepare for world conflicts which are simply not possible.

I support and will vote to ratify the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. This treaty is a positive step-in my opinion only a first step-in changing our defense posture to reflect the present state of the world.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, we are considering an historic treaty today. For over 20 years the United States has pursued efforts to reduce military tensions in Europe. This included efforts to significantly reduce armaments deployed by the Warsaw Pact countries and members of the NATO alliance. The CFE Treaty accomplishes this goal.

The treaty will not only help to reduce the likelihood of war between the East and West, it will also put a halt to the conventional arms race between the superpowers. The treaty also has significant implications for the Soviet Union because it will indicate to Soviet leaders that the United States is very serious about ending the arms race and that it poses no threat to the Soviet Republics.

By ratifying the treaty we are also sending a signal to Eastern Europe and the rest of the world that political and ideological differences can be resolved peacefully without resort to armed conflict. Another benefit that will result from the treaty will be that the European community may now assume a greater responsibility for the defense of Europe. This factor should reduce the amount of money we spend on European defense affairs.

The CFE Treaty is also very complementary to our efforts of reducing strategic arms as well. The President has undertaken a broad range of arms control initiatives and this is one of the most important treaties that we will ratify in this decade.

In the past, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries had a very significant advantage with regard to conventional force strength. The Soviets had more tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and troops in the region. It has cost the United States and our European allies billions of dollars to be prepared to defend against this threat. With the ratification of the CFE Treaty, this major imbalance will no longer exist, and cost savings will realistically be achieved.

The treaty will provide for limits on force levels in each country and will limit both sides to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored personnel carriers, 20,000 pieces of artillery, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. These levels should provide both sides with a feeling of security but will give neither side an advantage against the other.

Most importantly, the treaty would prevent any single country from having more than one-third of the total forces on each side and it contains vital verification provisions. It will cause the dramatic action of requiring the Warsaw Pact countries to destroy or remove 54,000 units of military equipment while the allies will only be required to do this with 16,000 pieces of equipment. These cuts are a result of the political changes in the Soviet Union and the new political situation in Eastern Europe. From a military point of view, this treaty is unprecedented. We all know full well the historic instability that has plagued European relations. This treaty will help to ensure that stability will be the new world order and not instability. This will then be the rule as we enter the next century.

While there are many positive aspects about the treaty, there are also some potential pitfalls ahead. We do not know exactly what will happen in the Soviet Union with regard to the Soviet Republics. It is possible that certain non-Russian Republics may not agree to the terms of the treaty. However, if this does occur, it does not mean that the NATO countries will be threatened. More than assuredly it would cause some discomfort within the Soviet Union. However, I firmly believe that the administration and the Senate have the latitude to deal with this type of circumstance as it arises in the future.

The major benefits of the treaty more than outweigh any possible negatives. The implications for world security and peace are tremendous and ratification by the Senate will send a very powerful message to the world that peace and security in Europe are no longer just goals-but are truly the new realities.


Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on November 19, 1990, when the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was signed, it was an historic event. The treaty marked, in the words of Secretary of State Baker, "a fundamental shift away from the cold war to a Europe whole and free. Not only is it an essential foundation for the new Europe, but it will be a bulwark against a return to cold war dangers and animosity."

Now almost a year later, the events in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and in this country have diminished the euphoria that accompanied the signing of the treaty. There is a question about the relevance of the treaty now that the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated and the Soviet Union is fracturing as a nation. In addition, our own budgetary problems are forcing us to make decisions that may have a significant impact on both the equipment and manpower forward deployed in Europe.

Although I support the ratification of the treaty, there are two issues which have the potential of significantly impacting on future arms agreements and the success of this treaty. The first, and in my judgment, the most important issue is that of the inaccuracy in the data provided by the Soviet Union on the treaty limited equipment in area of application at the time the treaty was signed in 1990. The administration has attempted to resolve the differences with the Soviet Union, however, substantial differences still exist between what the Soviets say and what our intelligence agencies estimate. I am advised that the range in these estimates is in the thousands of pieces of treaty limited equipment above the amount included in the Soviet declaration.

Prior Soviet violations of agreements, such as the INF Treaty and the ABM Treaty radar violation, which were acknowledged by the past two administrations, should raise grave concerns in regard to this treaty. It is unfortunate that this treaty, for which everyone has such great expectations, will go into effect with doubts on the validity of the base data. I expect that the provisions in the resolution of ratification will force the administration to resolve this data difference before the Nation assumes its obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

Mr. President, my second concern is the applicability of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty to follow on states. This concern is heightened by the current situation in the Soviet Union. The central government is at the verge of collapse and the Republics are declaring their independence on a daily basis. Republics, such as the Ukraine, have military forces that are greater than those of Germany. Yet there is a question on whether these new states, such as the Ukraine, Belorussia, or Russia, will be bound by the treaty. Although I understand that these Republics have indicated that they would comply with the treaty, I believe it is important that there be a strong statement requiring the President to review the treaty in case they do not comply. Senator COHEN's amendment to the resolution of ratification, which I supported, provides sufficient assurances to resolve this concern.

Mr. President, in his testimony on the CFE Treaty, Admiral Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Armed Services Committee:

**** that no responsible military officer can see any advantage in delaying. To the contrary, delaying U.S. ratification only delays the advantages that will be gained when the treaty comes into force. If we fail to promptly ratify we will fail to set the leadership example needed to encourage potential successor states to the Soviet Union to enter the new European security and stability order.

Mr. President, I support ratification of this treaty and urge my colleagues to join me in giving it their support.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this treaty is overwhelmingly in the United States' security interest.

Mr. President, the CFE Treaty is a historic accomplishment that would have been absolutely unimaginable just a few years ago. The American people should be proud of our Nation's role in this achievement and of the results: A stunning reduction in military forces that could threaten our national interests in Europe and the establishment of a political process that renders such military forces entirely unnecessary.

Mr. President, it is true that the treaty has, in some senses, been overtaken by political events in Europe during the last 18 months. It was conceived and negotiated when there was still a Soviet Union and a Warsaw Pact, and before the process of democratization took root in Eastern Europe.

It is not, however, irrelevant. Indeed, it is exactly what is needed at this moment to guarantee that the positive events in Europe are not reversed by a return of armaments that are unwanted, unneeded, and destabilizing. The CFE Treaty represents a long-awaited farewell to some arms at least.

But given the extraordinary changes and developments in Europe over the last 2 years, we must go beyond the CFE Treaty. We must not, Mr. President, let the CFE Treaty be the end of military reductions or security improvements in Europe or elsewhere. If we are to harvest the rewards of increased security and democratization we must do more.

NATO has just unveiled a new strategic concept that changes dramatically the focus of this military alliance to the political and economic sphere. The new concept declares that the Soviet military threat has disappeared and that the greatest risks now come,

* * * from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. President, this political transformation of NATO is both appropriate and necessary. NATO recognizes the need of having regular, direct high-level dialog and interaction between itself and the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was recently established for exactly that purpose. The security of NATO, and of U.S. interests in Europe, are now inextricably linked with the security of all nations in Europe. The situation requires an unprecedented level of cooperation.

But it also requires that the United States not retain the vestiges or burdens of the cold war. That would be politically unwise and economically unaffordable. We should seek to reduce our military manpower in Europe to the low level consistent with the new political and military situation there.

Mr. President, if there is no military threat to NATO there is also no need to keep a huge fighting force stationed in Europe. We should remove those U.S. forces from Europe that are not considered essential and let the European nations provide for a greater share of their own defense responsibilities. This will permit a considerable reduction in the costs of keeping hundreds of thousands of personnel in Europe while maintaining security at an appropriate level.

The current U.S. plan is to reduce our military forces in Europe to a level of 150,000 by the year 1995. Next year alone we will bring back over 55,000 of our troops. Mr. President, I believe we should continue that pace of withdrawals for several years and continue to reduce to a level well below 100,000. At that level we should be able to keep the vanguard of a fighting force in place with the ability to reinforce it as necessary.

Mr. President, lest anyone be concerned that such a withdrawal would be precipitous, let me reassure my colleagues that our allies in Europe are also planning to make significant reductions in their military forces and defense spending. This is mandated by the new situation in Europe. We can be sure that the result will be much lower levels of forces than at present, thanks in part to the CFE Treaty and to the follow-on CFE 1A negotiations that aim to produce an agreement on manpower limitations by March of next year.

So, Mr. President, as we ratify the CFE Treaty, let us also look forward to the new security possibilities in Europe and make appropriate changes to our force structure and defense budget. That is the way to assure a healthy U.S. economy which is the bedrock of our security.


Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, a vote consenting to ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe may be the easiest vote I am called upon to cast this year.

The proposed treaty meets nearly every test a nation could reasonably ask an arms control agreement to meet. It reduces the risk of war; it lowers the level of armaments; it requires far greater sacrifices on the part of other treaty signatories than it does of the United States; it is verifiable; and it sets a valuable precedent for future negotiations.

The central provisions of the treaty are well known. It applies to the 16 members of NATO and the 6 members of the former Warsaw Pact. Geographically, it will limit armaments from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. It applies to five major categories of conventional weapons, including battle tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The treaty limits the number of weapons any country subject to the treaty may have in any one category, a limitation that requires substantial reductions only from the Soviet Union. Those weapons that remain must be distributed in a manner that will make offensive military actions more difficult. No nation is permitted to station forces on the territory of another nation without the permission of the host government. Finally, both sides are required to place roughly 20 percent of their ground weapons in designated permanent storage sites, thereby reducing further the capability for surprise attack.

The treaty includes the most far-reaching verification and inspection provisions in the history of arms control. On-site inspections, exchanges of information, and notification requirements are all included.

Europe, under CFE, will bear little resemblance to the Europe even of 4 or 5 years ago. Instead of a NATO force vastly outnumbered by massive, heavily equipped, and threateningly deployed forces from a united Warsaw Pact, we will see a total Soviet withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe; we will see an aggregate reduction in non-NATO forces in Europe of more than 50 percent; we will see large quantities of armaments destroyed, others put in storage, and still others deployed in less threatening ways. We will see, in short, an end to the threat of a major surprise attack in Europe by any side, not simply for a short period of time, but for as long as the provisions of the treaty are observed.

It has become a cliche to suggest that the CFE has already been overtaken by events. Certainly, the major aspirations of the Western signators of the treaty were realized with the overthrow of Communist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet decision to begin unilateral withdrawals of equipment and troops. Certainly, the stark cold war division between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations that lies at the center of CFE is now obsolete. Certainly, the liberation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was not anticipated when CFE negotiations began. Certainly, the erosion of Federal control throughout the Soviet Union has accelerated dramatically over the past 3 months. Certainly, the Europe of the 1990's will differ enormously from the Europe of the cold war whether CFE is ratified or not. But none of these facts leads us to the conclusion that CFE is unneeded or unwise or irrelevant to our security or to our goal of building a more peaceful and stable world.

If the events of the past several years prove anything, it is that the world can change dramatically, unpredictably, and with astonishing speed. Just as the Europe of today differs markedly from the Europe of yesterday, so may it differ from the Europe of tomorrow. We can hope-even believe-that the road ahead for Europe will be largely peaceful, but we cannot assume it and we cannot take it for granted.

Implementation of the CFE will establish legal rules governing the size and deployment of armed forces that are designed specifically to minimize the likelihood of war. Any future government anywhere in Europe that disregards these rules will be quickly identified and subjected to the kind of scrutiny and pressures that potentially aggressive behavior demands. The governments of newly independent states-in Belorussia or Ukraine, for example-will understand that accession to CFE will help them to achieve full acceptance within the family of nations. Remaining hardline elements within the Soviet military will understand that their capacity to intimidate others through the use and threatened use of force is dwindling rapidly and will soon fade away. And the United States will have the assurances we need to reduce the deployment of our own forces in Europe, thereby saving taxpayers an estimated $10 to $15 billion a year.

Ratification of this treaty was delayed by disagreements between our Government and the Soviet Government over weapons-counting, the number of weapons to be destroyed, and the categorization of three Soviet infantry divisions. In each instance, the United States position was correct and, in each case, the Soviets either accepted the United States position or offered a compromise that was acceptable to the administration. These issues were settled through a side agreement on June 14 of this year and are incorporated in the resolution of ratification as if they were part of the treaty itself. In other words, Soviet failure to live up to the terms of the side agreement will be interpreted by the United States as failure to live up to the CFE Treaty, and will prompt the same United States response.

The independence of the Baltic States raised another important question that has since been resolved. Because substantial amounts of Soviet military equipment remain on Baltic soil, it was necessary to clarify that this equipment would be included in the Soviet totals under CFE. This clarification was included in a statement by the CFE joint consultative group on October 18, 1991. Again, the resolution of ratification makes it clear that this agreement will be considered as if it were part of the treaty itself.

Ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty will help ensure that the post-cold war world is, in fact, more stable and secure than the balance of terror it has replaced. The treaty constitutes, however, only one step along that road. We must work to persuade newly independent Republics, especially Ukraine, to accede to the treaty. We must go forward with efforts to limit nuclear arms, through formal treaty and voluntary action. We must maintain sensible limits on the deployment of antiballistic missile systems. We should negotiate a verifiable agreement further limiting or banning nuclear tests. And we should continue working with the international community to control nuclear proliferation, to ban chemical and biological weapons, and to regulate trade in advanced conventional arms. In all of these areas, the principles of reduced armaments, verification, and consultation that are at the heart of the CFE agreement will stand us in good stead.

Mr. President, this treaty is a good treaty. The resolution to provide our advice and consent was carefully worked out by the Committee on Foreign Relations, in consultation with the administration and with other appropriate committees of the Senate. The rapidly changing times have perhaps reduced the urgency of our need for this treaty, but they have not altered its capacity in the long term to serve our Nation, and our world, exceedingly well.


Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the ratification of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty may appear to some to be a pointless undertaking. After all, the press of events has already led many CFE signatories to reduce their conventional forces below levels laid down in the treaty.

Moreover, since the treaty was signed by its various parties, several new European nations have come into being. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all may choose to establish armed forces of their own. Meanwhile, some of the former Soviet Republics are moving toward full sovereignty and Ukraine, in particular, is discussing the possibility of its own armed forces.

Clearly, any treaty which presumes to stabilize levels of conventional forces in Europe will have to take these new nations into account.

However, none of these factors, in my opinion, fundamentally undercuts the rationale for ratifying the CFE Treaty. That treaty may not constitute the final step toward military stability, but it certainly does constitute a very useful first step. Let us not forget that this is first-the very first-time that we have managed to negotiate any type of agreement limiting the size of conventional forces in Europe. Certainly, more needs to be done, but that should not lead us to overlook the value of this primary treaty.

In addition, Mr. President, I should remind my colleagues that, while most of Europe is now at peace, that region has twice been the cockpit of war in this century. The breakup of the Soviet Empire, while it is broadly welcomed, could easily facilitate the reemergence of the ethnic conflicts which, in the past, have fueled the build up of large military forces and, ultimately, broad military conflicts. Anyone who believes that a repetition of these sorry events is impossible would do well to consider the current situation in Yugoslavia. That type of situation could spread. In short, Mr. President, this CFE Treaty might, in the present context, appear to allow for an unnecessarily high level of forces, in coming years it could act as a vital brake on nations with aggressive attentions on their national agenda.

In closing, Mr. President, I believe that we should all congratulate the men and women who have spent so many hours, so many late nights, negotiating this treaty. So often, when we consider these treaties, we credit the Ambassadors with the honors of success. This is perfectly correct, but the Ambassador is only the head of a team, a team which, in this case was drawn from the ranks of the Armed Forces, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and our various intelligence agencies. All of these men and women deserve our heartiest congratulations for their successful negotiations of this treaty. The Senate's ratification of this CFE Treaty will constitute an appropriate recognition of their work.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, while the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement is an important treaty that will be augmented by a fairly comprehensive onsite verification regime, it should be noted that this accord is far from perfect. I have two specific problems with the current accord.

First, the Soviet Union has traditionally violated arms control agreements, both in spirit, and in fact, and the Senate should not have any illusions about the Soviet penchant for cheating on this occasion. With respect to the CFE agreement, the accuracy of Soviet data declarations of TLE in the area of application on November 19, 1990, is still a serious issue, and raises questions about the ability of the Soviets to negotiate in good faith. This data CFE discrepancy problem was and remains a serious concern of mine, and a number of my colleagues. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee inserted a provision in the Senate resolution of ratification, which goes a long way in addressing this important problem. However, I also support the Wallop-Smith provision that requires tougher provisions on data discrepancy. While the administration has crafted an extensive onsite verification regime, in conjunction with our NATO allies, we should resolve the numerical differences in data submitted by the Soviets as soon as possible. I further believe that the Bush administration should pursue this data discrepancy problem vigorously in future negotiations with Soviet leaders, because it is a subject that should not be overlooked permanently by the administration for reasons of political expediency.

A second concern of mine is that this agreement does not pay enough attention to the current deployment of Soviet troops in the Baltics, which is in the range of 135,000 troops. While the Soviets have started to remove and disengage some units from East Europe, the Soviet Military Establishment seems a bit too well entrenched in the Baltics. In my opinion, Soviet forces in the region constitute a clear violation of Baltic sovereignty. This prompted me to introduce Senate Resolution 196, expressing the sense of the Senate that the Soviet Union should immediately begin a prompt withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces and undertake discussions with the Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia appropriate to facilitate that withdrawal. This bipartisan resolution passed on November 23, 1991, and illustrates the concern in the Senate over Soviet troops in the Baltic States.

Mr. President, these are important reservations and criticisms of the CFE agreement. However, after a great deal of deliberation, I have decided to support the overall ratification of the CFE Treaty. While I believe that the Wallop-Smith amendment would send a strong signal to the Soviets, I would contend that the conditions and various declarations attached in the resolution of ratification are sufficient to justify support for this treaty. I also believe that the CFE Treaty is still a useful accord, and that the agreement should be ratified for two reasons.

First, the CFE agreement is politically significant because it codifies, in treaty form, the removal of Soviet offensive forces from East Europe. The geographic proximity and preponderance of Soviet forces on the European continent during the last four decades represented the most fundamental challenge to the security of the United States and to our NATO-European allies. It also provided the Soviet Union with the ability to impose authoritarian control over East European States. CFE Treaty implementation could therefore help promote political stability on the European continent through explicit declarations and numerical limits on Soviet force deployments in the region.

Second, the CFE agreement is militarily important because it will require substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet military forces and improve the transparency of Soviet military operations from the Atlantic to the Urals [ATTU]. NATO defense planners sought to eliminate the disparities that existed between the West and the Soviet Military Establishment and the CFE agreement focuses on the disposition of military equipment in five separate categories: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and helicopters. These five categories were not chosen at random. NATO officials targeted a specific weapons systems, in which the Soviets had maintained a distinct numerical advantage, and that could be utilized in future Soviet offensive operations. The CFE agreement will help to reduce highly destabilizing military asymmetries in these categories. Soviet treaty limited equipment [TLE] in the ATTU region will decline from a figure of about 152,000 in 1988 to 53,000 under CFE. The Soviets will be forced to scrap 20,000 tanks and artillery pieces alone, whereas NATO reductions would be minimal.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I reiterate my support for CFE ratification due to its political and military importance, but fervently hope that the specific problems dealing with data discrepancy, and Soviet forces stationed in the Baltics, are resolved by all parties in the near future.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. While the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union have diminished the significance of this historic agreement, it is still a formidable achievement in arms control, virtually eliminating the threat of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union against our allies in Western Europe.

As a member of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee which have held hearings on this treaty, I have concluded that our national interest would be served by ratifying CFE. In particular, I concur with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's conclusion that U.S. intelligence should be able to detect any militarily significant violation of this treaty.

Mr. President, I believe that this treaty must be examined in the context of the unique international environment in which it is being ratified. The last several years have seen an extraordinary transformation in United States-Soviet relations. We have witnessed the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty, START, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the democratization of the Soviet Union, and indeed, the end of the cold war. However, with these positive developments have come problems as well.

There is no question that the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact raise unique issues for the CFE Treaty. For example, treaty implementation will be impacted by such uncertainties as who will ultimately exercise command and control authority over Soviet forces and how treaty obligations will be shared within the new union as well as with the former republics that are gaining their independence.

Some may argue that it would be prudent to delay implementation of the CFE Treaty until we have a better idea of what national entities and alliances replace the Soviet Union. I believe, however, that on balance, it is best to act expeditiously to ratify this agreement. As turmoil rises in what remains of the Soviet Union, implementation of the CFE agreement will provide us with a useful, legally binding framework to closely monitor changes in the Soviet military that are certain to accompany the political changes taking place.

In short, I believe that enactment of the CFE Treaty will provide a useful measure of predictability and stability to an inherently unpredictable and unstable situation-the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. As Secretary of State Baker has recently state: "***[w]e need the CFE regime in place as a framework for security decisions during this time of dramatic political Transformation."

Mr. President, I support the CFE Treaty and urge my Senate colleagues to do the same.


Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the result of lengthy negotiations, represents a successful entry of arms control into conventional armaments.

Until Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia gained their independence, I was seriously concerned that the inclusion of the Soviet Baltic Military District, which included the three Baltic Republics, in the area of application of the treaty, could encroach upon the long-standing United States policy of nonrecognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States. Which the failed coup in the Soviet Union, however, the fate of the Baltic States took a wonderful turn as they regained their lost independence.

As sovereign nations which had not ratified the CFE Treaty, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania no longer were parties to the treaty and their territories were no longer considered part of the area of application (art. 11, sec. B). Thus, there was a serious question as to whether the Soviet Union would reduce its forces in the territory of the newly sovereign Baltic Republics. On October 18, 1991, this issue was laid to rest.

In a legally binding agreement, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the other parties to the CFE Treaty agreed that while Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were not parties to the treaty, the Soviets would follow the reduction targets in the treaty as if Baltic territory was part of the area of application.

I ask unanimous consent that the statement of the chairman of the Joint Consultative Group of October 18, 199 1, be placed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:


1. I hereby record that:

(a) The States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, acknowledge that in view of the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the area of application defined in Article II of the Treaty does not include the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

(b) I have today received a statement from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as follows:

"In order to fulfill the legally-binding obligations of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe and of the agreements entered into by the States Parties on 14 June 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall treat all its conventional armaments and equipment in the categories defined in Article 11 of the Treaty present, on or after 19 November, 1990, on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as subject to all provisions of the Treaty and associated documents. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as part of Soviet holdings and shall count towards the Soviet reduction liability. This statement shall be legally binding and shall have the same duration as the Treaty."

(c) I have also received statements from the representatives of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America that, in accordance with the legally-binding statement made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all Soviet conventional armaments and equipment in the categories defined in article II of the Treaty present, on or after 19 November 1990, on the Territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shall be treated as subject to all provisions of the Treaty, its associated documents and the legally-binding commitment entered into by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 14 June 1991. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as part of Soviet holdings and shall count towards the Soviet reduction liability.

(d) The States Parties acknowledge that arrangements for inspection of the above-mentioned conventional armaments and equipment on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will require the consent and cooperation of those States.

2. This Chairman's statement, recording the above legally binding agreement among the States Parties, which will not be considered a precedent, will be recorded in the Journal, transmitted to the Depositary and deposited together with the instruments of ratification.

Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, testifying on November 4, 1991, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the agreement:

The parties to the Treaty agreed to a legally binding statement establishing that Soviet equipment in the Baltics is subject to all provisions of the Treaty, that it will be notified as part of Soviet holdings and will count toward the Soviet reduction liability. It also established that the Baltic states were fully sovereign and the inspections on their territories could only take place by their consent.

While much was solved by this legally binding agreement, I was also concerned that the limits on Soviet force levels in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania would be seen by a future Soviet Government not as restrictions, but as ceilings up to which it was permitted to keep its forces. This is not the case. On November 20, 1 asked the State Department whether the CFE Treaty or the October 18, 1991 agreement give the Soviet Union permission to keep treaty limited equipment [TLE] in the independent Baltic Nations. Assistant Secretary of State of Legislative Affairs Janet Mullins explicitly answered no.

Moreover, Assistant Secretary Mullins confirmed that the Soviet Union may only keep TLE or other military equipment in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania if those countries explicitly consent. She stated:


As sovereign states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have the right under international law to request and have removed any and all Soviet forces stationed on their territory without their explicit permission.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Secretary Mullins' cover letter, the questions I posed for the record on November 20, 1991, and the answers of Assistant Secretary Mullins be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:


Washington, DC, November 22, 1991,

DEAR SENATOR RIEGLE: Enclosed please find responses to the questions you addressed to the Administration concerning the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Baltic States.

We of course stand ready to respond to any further queries you may have.




Legislative Affairs.



Question. Does the CFE Treaty or the legally binding agreement of October 18 relating to the Baltic States extend or imply permission for the Soviet Union to keep TLE or other military forces in Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia?

Answer. Neither the CFE Treaty nor the legally binding agreement of October 18, 1991, relating to the Baltic States extend or imply permission for the Soviet Union to station Treaty-limited armaments and equipment or other military forces in Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia.

Subparagraph 1 (a) of the October 18 agreement makes clear that the Baltic States are sovereign states and that they are located outside of the Treaty's area of application. Furthermore, subparagraph 1 (d) of the agreement provides that any inspections of Soviet forces on Baltic territories must have the content and cooperation of the Baltic States. These legally binding provisions serve to highlight that the CFE Treaty Signatories, including the Soviet Union, recognize the Baltic countries as independent, sovereign states. As sovereign states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have the right under international law to request and have removed any and all Soviet forces stationed on their territory without their explicit permission.

Question. In response to a question by Senators Nunn and Warner, Undersecretary Reginald Bartholomew stated: "Conversations with Baltic officials to date have indicated that the continued presence on their [Baltic] territory of Soviet forces remains one of the greatest concerns. They are seeking complete withdrawal as soon as possible.... Any actions taken in conjunction with ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty should ensure the sovereignty of these nations."

Is it the policy of the United States that the Soviet Union may keep TLE or other military forces in the sovereign nations of Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia only if Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia consents to the presence of TLE or other Soviet military forces on its territory?

Answer. Yes. It is a principle of customary international law that, with certain exceptions (e.g., as part of a United Nations Security Council enforcement action carried out in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter), no nation may station forces on another nation's territory without the permission of that nation. The United States supports this principle.

Finally, according to Assistant Secretary Mullins, the CFE Treaty and the October 18 agreement "serve to highlight that the CFE Treaty signatories, including the Soviet Union, recognize the Baltic countries as independent, sovereign states."

Mr. President, the CFE Treaty is an important step forward in the history of arms control and the security of Europe. It goes a long way toward cementing the momentous changes the world has witnessed in Europe by reducing armaments to their lowest levels in nearly half a century. With the assurance that neither the CFE Treaty nor the legally binding agreement of October 18, 1991, permit the Soviets to keep military forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, I wholeheartedly support the CFE Treaty and will vote to ratify it on the Senate floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question now occurs on the adoption of the resolution of ratification with declarations and conditions of the Executive Calendar No. 16, Treaty Document 102-8. The Chair informs the Senators that the yeas and nays have not been ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIXON], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. KERREY], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. PRYOR] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA], and the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIXON] would each vote aye.

Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HELMS] is necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HELMS] would vote yea.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The yeas and nays resulted-yeas 90, nays 4, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 273 Leg.]





Adarns Baucus Bentsen

Biden Bingaman Bond

Boren Bradley Breaux

Brown Bryan Bumpers

Burdick Bums Byrd

Chafee Coats Cochran

Cohen Conrad Cranston

D'Amato Danforth Daschle

DeConcini Dodd Dole

Domenici Durenberger Exon

Ford Fowler Gam

Glenn Gore Gorton

Graham Gramm Grassley

Hatch Hatfield Heflin

Hollings Inouye Jeffords

Johnston Kassebaum Kasten

Kennedy Kerry Kohl

Lautenberg Leahy Levin

Lieberman Lott Lugar

Mack McCain McConnell

Metzenbaum Mikulski Mitchell

Moynihan Murkowski Nickles

Nunn Packwood Pell

Pressler Reid Riegle

Robb Rockefeller Roth

Rudman Sanford Sarbanes

Sasser Seymour Shelby

Simon Simpson Specter

Stevens Thurmond Warner

Wellstone Wirth Wofford








The PRESIDING OFFICER. On the resolution of ratification, the yeas are 90, the nays are 4. Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

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