CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

HEARINGS BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 4, 13, 1991

NOVEMBER 4, 1991

NOVEMBER 13, 1991

U.S. SENATE:,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m., in SR-212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Gore, Warner, and Thurmond.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; and Lucia M. Chavez, research assistant.

Professional staff members present: Robert G. Bell, Richard E. Combs, Jr., T. Kirk McConnell, and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: Patrick A. Tucker, minority staff director and counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Judith A. Ansley, Brian D. Dailey, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., and Ann Elise Sauer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Mary J. Kampo and Debra A. Rice.

Committee members' assistants present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leon S. Fuerth, assistant to Senator Gore; Terence M. Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Eric H. Thoemmes, assistant to Senator Coats; Ross Lindholm, assistant to Senator Mack; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith.

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee meets this afternoon to begin its hearings on the national security implications of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, known as CFE. I expect that the committee will receive testimony on CFE from the Defense Department and from the Joint Chief witnesses next week. We may schedule a closed intelligence briefing on Soviet conventional forces next week as well.

I will also mention that the Intelligence Committee is planning two hearings on CFE verification next week, and I understand from Chairman Boren that our members will be invited to sit in. So we may be able to combine the closed hearing we need with that hearing. We will have to wait to see if we can so combine them.

The CFE Treaty was submitted to the Senate on July 9. Since then, the committee has been almost totally occupied with the Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization bill.

On Friday, we completed our conference on that bill, and we look forward to taking the conference report up in the Senate some time in the next few days, at least in the next week or two.

In some respects, we are fortunate that we have not been in a position to turn to the treaty before now. Over the past 3 months, we have witnessed an extraordinary series of events in the Soviet Union including the failed coup in August, a fundamental change in its governmental structure in September, and a far-reaching devolution of power and sovereignty to its constituent republics that has yet to run its full course.

Senator Warner and I noted in our letter to Secretary Baker on October 8, quoting from that letter, "These developments have raised a number of questions in our minds concerning the continued viability of the treaty."

In that letter, Senator Warner and I ask a number of questions concerning these issues. I would ask unanimous consent that the letter, our questions, and the Secretary's responses be included in the record of this hearing.

Is there objection?

Senator WARNER. No objection.

Chairman NUNN. It will be so included.

[The information follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, October 8, 1991.

Hon. JAMES A. BAKER, 111,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECIINARY: As you know, the Armed Services Committee is currently engaged in a challenging conference with the House of Representatives on the FY 112 defense authorization bill. We hope to conclude the conference as soon as possible, following the Senate's October receB8 week, at which time we hope we can turn our attention to other pending matters, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

Although CFE was signed eleven months ago, it was not submitted to the Senate until July 9. Since then, the former Soviet Union has undergone a fundamental change in its governmental structure and a far-reaching devolution of power and sovereignty to its constituent republics. These developments have raised a number of questions in our minds concerning the continued viability of the Treaty.

On September 26, our staffs met with Ambassador Woolsey and officials from ACDA, State, and Defense to discuss these issues. During the meeting, Ambassador Woolsey outlined several principles which he believes the Executive Branch and the Senate could agree upon as a basis for dealing with the procedural complications resulting from the dissolution of the former USSR. We believe codifying these principles in the form of conditions or reservations to the CFE Treaty would go a long war toward meeting our concerns. To assist us in preparing to take up this Treaty, and to help us make decisions on the timing of our hearings, we would appreciate your cooperation in responding to the attached questions at an early date.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN, Chairman,
JOHN W. WARNER, Ranking Minority
      Member.

QUESTIONS ON CFE

      Question 1. If the Ukraine or Byelorussia become separate, sovereign states, what impact will that have on:

1. The application of the Treaty to the new government in that state?
2. The obligations of the remainder of the former Soviet Union?

      Question 2. Under what circumstances would the creation of new states within the territory of the former Soviet Union permit the United States (should it so choose) to invoke the doctrine of "changed circumstances" and withdraw from the treaty under customary international law?

In the event that the three Baltic States do not choose to accede to the CFE Treaty, Ambassador Woolsey said that he believed some legally binding side agreement between the United States, the former Soviet Union, and the other 21 States Parties to CFE would be required to address issues raised by the reestablishment of full, legal independence by those nations. One option for the Senate would be to wait until this side agreement is negotiated. This is the approach the Senate took when the CFE naval infantry controversy arose, and it is also the course the Senate followed during INF ratification when unresolved issues were uncovered. Rather than wait until such a side agreement is negotiated, another option would be for the Senate to attach a condition to the treaty anticipating this agreement.

      Question 1. Does the administration intend to negotiate a CFE side agreement dealing with issues raised by Baltic independence?

      Question 2. If so, does the administration believe that it would be appropriate for the Senate to withhold giving its advice and consent to the treaty until the side agreement is negotiated, or does it believe the Senate could adopt a condition anticipating this agreement? Why?

      Question 3. If the latter, does the administration agree that this condition should specify that as long as Soviet forces remain stationed on Baltic soil, the treaty-limited equipment (TLE) of these Soviet forces must count against the aggregate ceilings and subceilings for the Group of Six, as well as the former Soviet Union's TLE allotments under the "sufficiency rule"?

      Question 4. Does the administration believe that this condition should specify that: (1) this TLE must remain subject to inspection by other States Parties to the treaty under the Protocol on Inspection; and (2) that Objects of Verification (OOVs) and Declared Sites in the Baltics would be maintained for purposes of treaty verification?

      Question 5. If so, which government would function as the "host" or "inspected" party-that of the former Soviet Union or that of the specific Baltic state on whose soil the TLE, OOV or Declared Site was located?

      Question 6. Would all 22 States Parties to the CFE Treaty have to sign this agreement for it to be legally effective? If so, what venue would be employed to negotiate it? If not, what effect on forces, equipment, and inspection rights would occur with respect to nonsignatories?

      Question 7. Would the Baltic nations have to sign this agreement?

      Question 8. Does the administration believe that this condition should be a "Category 111" condition (that is, one that would require the explicit agreement of tile other States Parties)? If not, why not?

Ambassador Woolsey also said that it appeared to be the case that if the Ukraine or Byelorussia were to become wholly independent of the former Soviet Union, including for purposes of the CFE Treaty, it would be necessary in his view to ensure that the Ukraine became party to the treaty as a separate, sovereign state. One way to deal with this contingency from the point of view of the Senate would be for the Senate to insist that, should the Ukraine achieve full, legal independence subsequent to the entering into force of the CFE Treaty, the treaty would become null and void unless (1) the Ukraine acceded to the accord as a separate and sovereign State Party, and (2) the Ukraine agreed that its "TLE" would count against the former Soviet Union's allotments.

      Question 1. Does the administration believe that the CFE Treaty would not remain viable if the Ukraine achieved full, legal independence, including autonomous control over its own armed forces, and elected to remain outside the treaty regime?

      Question 2. Does the administration believe that a Senate condition to the CFE Treaty should specify that the treaty would be declared null and void should the Ukraine secede from the former Soviet Union and not accede as a separate, sovereign State Party to the treaty?

      Question 3. If so, does the administration believe this should be a Category III condition? If not, why not?

      Question 1. Does the administration consider November 19, 1991 as a deadline for entering the CFE Treaty into force? If so, why?

      Question 2. Paragraph 3 of the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe states that the protocol shall terminate 12 months after November 19, 1990, but it also provides: "The period of application of this protocol may be extended if all the States Parties so decide."

1. Has the administration sought such an extension or initiated discussions on the possibility of such an extension? If not, why not?
2. Does the administration have reason to believe that any of the 22 States Parties to the CFE Treaty would object to an extension of the 12-month duration for this Protocol should the ratification process in all 22 States Parties' governments not be complete by November 19? If so, why?
3. Does the administration have reason to believe that any of the 22 States Parties to the CFE Treaty are having second thoughts as to whether it or they want to remain a party to the treaty?
4. Does the administration have a schedule for the remaining 20 countries to ratify the CFE Treaty? If so, please provide us with this schedule.

      Question 1. When does the administration expect the former Soviet Union to ratify the CFE Treaty?

      Question 2. What organ of the new "Union of Sovereign States" has this authority?

      Question 3. Will the central union government ask the republics that lie within the CFE zone to approve the treaty?

      Question 4. If the former Soviet Union has not ratified the CFE Treaty by November 19, would the administration propose an extension of the Protocol on Provisional Application?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, October 18, 1991.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SAM: Thank you for your letter of October 8. I was most pleased to hear that you hope the Armed Services Committee can soon turn its attention to the CFE Treaty. The Administration remains firmly committed to its ratification and implementation as soon as possible.

We are, of course, aware of Senate concerns about the continued viability of the Treaty in light of the momentous changes in the Soviet Union. It is our strong view that the Treaty not only continues to be viable but that bringing it into force is more crucial now than ever before. We are also convinced that it can safely be ratified as written and any required changes--which would be minor--dealt with after entry into force. We are ready to work with the Senate to allay any concerns.

Time is critical, however. We need the CFE regime in place as a framework for security decisions during this time of dramatic political transformation. The Treaty, moreover, is a complex agreement of 22 countries; the longer it remains unratified, the greater becomes the temptation for one or another signatory to tinker with it. Prompt U.S. ratification could be a critical factor in keeping it on track; a Senate decision to delay until next year, however, could signal its demise.

I hope we can count on your support to secure advice and consent to this key agreement before the Senate adjourns next month. As you noted, Jim Woolsey and others have been in contact with your staff. You should also have already received our responses to the questions on the Treaty which you included with your October 8 letter; we stand ready to respond promptly to any further queries. I am currently involved in intense Middle Eastern consultations, but have asked Reginald Bartholomew to discuss with the Senate our views on how to proceed and to explain why we consider it important to do so.

Sincerely,

JAMES A. BAKER, III.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, October 22, 1991.

Hon. SAM NUNN,
Committee on Armed Services,
US. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHARIMAN: Enclosed please find responses to the questions you sent to Secretary Baker on October 8 concerning the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The Secretary very much wanted for me to get these responses to you quickly so that consideration of the Treaty by the Committee on Armed Services can proceed.

We of course stand ready to respond to any further queries you may have.

Sincerely,

JANE, R. G. MULLINS,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure: as stated.

      Question 1. If the Ukraine or Byelorussia become separate, sovereign states, what impact will that have on:

1. The application of the Treaty to the new government in that state?
2. The obligations of the remainder of the former Soviet Union?

      Answer. It is the view of the administration that in order to safeguard the integrity of the treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for Ukraine and Byelorussia, if they were not bound as part of the U.S.S.R. or any successor state, and retained significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories, to accede to CFE. Both of these republics have already indicated that they are interested in participating in the treaty.

The actions of Ukraine or Byelorussia will not have any direct legal effect on the relationship of the other former Soviet republics to the treaty.

      Question 2. Under what circumstances would the creation of new states within the territory of the former Soviet Union permit the United States (should it so choose) to invoke the doctrine of "changed circumstances" and withdraw from the treaty under customary international law?

      Answer. A party to a treaty may invoke the doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances as grounds for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty if the change of circumstances was not foreseen at the time of conclusion of the treaty, provided that: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. The only application of the doctrine In U.S. practice was the decision of President Roosevelt to suspend operation of the Load Lines Convention during World War II.

If a new state were to be created as a result of its secession from the Soviet Union, that fact alone would not give rise to application of the doctrine.

If a separating state should continue to be bound by the obligations formerly applicable to its territory, there would be no case for invoking the doctrine. The possibility would arise, however, if a militarily-significant new State were not prepared to accept the CFE regime. One would then have to decide whether, in the new circumstances, elements essential to the continuation of the agreement were no longer resent and that the new circumstances radically-transformed the extent of the obligations to be performed.

In summary, while available, we would envisage invoking such a doctrine to withdraw from the treaty only in the case of a truly fundamental change in circumstance, and if the U.S. determined that continuing to adhere to the treaty would be contrary to U.S. interests. Indeed, given that the treaty itself contains mechanisms for consultation, amendment or, in extreme cases, withdrawal under altered circumstances, it is unlikely that any other principle would have to be invoked.

In the event that the three Baltic States do not choose to accede to the CFE Treaty, Ambassador Woolsey said that he believed some legally binding side agreement between the United States, the former Soviet Union, and the other 21 States Parties the CFE would be required to address issues raised by the reestablishment of full, legal independence by those nations. One option for the Senate would be to wait until this side agreement is negotiated. This is the approach the Senate took when the CFE naval infantry controversy arose, and it is also the course the Senate followed during INF ratification when unresolved issues were uncovered. Rather than wait until such a side agreement is negotiated, another option would be for the Senate to attach a condition to the treaty anticipating this agreement.

      Question 1. Does the administration intend to negotiate a CFE side agreement dealing with issues raised by Baltic independence?

      Answer. On October 18, 1991, in Vienna, the 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty agreed to a legally-binding statement whereby equipment of the Soviet Union in treaty categories located on the territory of the Baltic States will be subject to all treaty provisions. Soviet representatives cooperated fully in this endeavor. The United States and other CFE signatories are also in the process of addressing this issue with officials of the Baltic States, with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment on their territory. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the treaty entered into force.

It is not clear how long Soviet equipment might be located on Baltic territory. All three Baltic governments are seeking total withdrawal of Soviet forces as soon as possible.

Should one or more of the Baltic States eventually become a treaty participant, of course, all equipment in treaty categories on their territory-both their own and stationed by any other treaty participant-would automatically be subject to the treaty.

The administration's decision to settle the dispute with the Soviets over applicability of the treaty's counting rules to naval infantry and other equipment before submitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent should not be seen as a precedent. The Soviets' position was a clear violation of the counting rules which undermined the basic integrity of the treaty. That is not the case with the current situation, in which all the Treaty's central provisions remain viable. It is the administration's strong view that and adjustments to the treaty or to its implementation modalities which eventually prove necessary can be dealt with on a case by case basis after entry into force.

      Question 2. If so (i.e., if there is to be such a side agreement), does the administration believe that it would be appropriate for the Senate to withhold giving its advice and consent to the treaty until the side agreement is negotiated, or does it believe the Senate could adopt a condition anticipating this agreement? Why?

      Answer. On October 18, 1991, the 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty agreed to a legally-binding statement whereby equipment of the Soviet Union in treaty categories located on the territory of the Baltic States will be subject to all treaty provisions.

The United States and other CFE signatories are also in the process of addressing this issue with officials of the Baltic States, with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment on their territory. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the treaty entered into force. There is thus no reason to delay U.S. ratification of the treaty. There is, on the other hand, every reason for moving ahead expeditiously. The United States and its allies can only gain from CFE implementation. The treaty's reductions, limits, information exchanges and on-site inspections will impose minimal constraints on us, but major ones on Soviet successors who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe.

The treaty is an intricate web of hard-fought compromises among 22 states; despite the fact that the political and military circumstances of many of those signatories changed during the negotiation and have continued to change, we are convinced the treaty is more valuable now than ever. Above all, it will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. Such a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a basis for further cooperative developments in the security sphere.

The longer entry into force is delayed, however, the greater will be the temptation for one or another signatory to revisit some of those compromises or to pursue other changes. This could risk unraveling the whole treaty.

It should be noted that conditions attached to the treaty could significantly delay and even preclude entry into force of the treaty, especially if a condition required formal notification of or action by other signatories. Three have already ratified the treaty and others are well advanced in the process; a U.S. attempt to impose conditions which go beyond what is already agreed will, at the least, complicate matters considerably.

      Question 3. Does the administration agree that such a condition should specify that as long as Soviet forces remain stationed on Baltic soil, the treaty-limited equipment (TLE) of these Soviet forces must count against the aggregate ceilings and subceilings for the Group of Six, as well as the former Soviet Union's TLE allotments under the "sufficiency rule"?

      Answer. The administration does not believe that it is necessary for the Senate to attach a condition to the treaty. The side agreement which was concluded in Vienna on October 18, 1991 makes it clear that Soviet equipment in treaty categories stationed on Baltic territory is subject to all provisions of the treaty, its associated documents and the June 14 Soviet commitments which resolved the counting rules dispute. This will ensure that Soviet equipment located on Baltic territory will count against the aggregate ceilings and subceilings established pursuant to the treaty for the Group of Six and be subject to the sufficiency rule. It also provides assurance that notified maximum levels for holdings (Article VII of the treaty, which reflects intra-group allocations) are respected.

      Question 4. Does the administration believe that this condition should specify that: (1) this TLE must remain subject to inspection by other States Parties to the treaty under the Protocol on Inspection; and (2) that Objects of Verification (OOVS) and Declared Sites in the Baltics would be maintained for purposes of treaty verification?

      Answer. The administration does not believe that it is necessary for the Senate to adopt such a condition. The legally-binding agreement that the signatories finalized in Vienna on October 18 specifies that Union equipment located on Baltic territory is subject to all provisions of the treaty and associated documents. The Protocol on Inspection is part of the treaty. It provides for inspection rights by other States Parties and details obligations with regard to declared sites and OOVs. Additional inspection provisions are included in the June 14 statement by the Soviet Union on the basis of which the Article III dispute was resolved. The October 18 agreement of the signatories provides assurance that Soviet equipment in the Baltics is subject to all these provisions.

      Naturally, arrangements will have to be made with the governments of the Baltic States to permit treaty signatories access to Soviet equipment stationed on their territory. Representatives for a number of the signatories, including the United States, have been in contact with Baltic officials on this matter. Since the Baltic States are not signatories to the treaty, they are not bound by its provisions. Prior to conclusion of such arrangements, it cannot be definitely predicted whether or not those states will take obligations identical to those contained in the treaty for host state parties--i.e.; a state receiving on its territory within the area of application conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of another state party stationed by that state party. The objective will be to provide for adequate monitoring of Soviet equipment subject to the treaty located there. Conversations with Baltic officials to date have indicated that the continued presence on their territory of Soviet forces remains one of their greatest concerns. They are seeking complete withdrawal as soon as possible. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the treaty enters into force.

      It should also be noted that achievement of full sovereignty by the Baltic republics fulfills a long-standing U.S. policy objective. Any actions taken in conjunction with ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty should ensure the sovereignty of these nations.

      Question 5. If so, which government would function as the "host" or "inspected" party-that of the former Soviet Union or that of the specific Baltic state on whose soil the TLE, OOV or Declared Site was located?

      Answer. As noted, unless and until the Baltic States become participants in the treaty, they are not bound by the specific provisions covering obligations of host states and inspected parties. However, in working out arrangements with the Baltic States to permit access to Soviet forces for inspection purposes, it will be necessary to ensure that all functions essential to adequate monitoring of Soviet equipment from a treaty compliance standpoint are carried out. The Soviet Union will be bound to fulfill all obligations specified as if it were a stationing state party, including those incurred when the stationing state assumes the obligations of the inspected state party. The Union will also be bound by all other relevant inspection provisions of the treaty and associated documents, to the extent that fulfilling those obligations is not inconsistent with the arrangements concluded with the Baltic States.

      Question 6. Would all 22 States Parties Co the CFE Treaty have to sign this agreement for it to be legally effective? If so, what venue would be employed to negotiate it? If not, what effect on forces, equipment, and inspection rights would occur with respect to non-signatories?

      Answer. On October 18, 1991, in Vienna, all 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty agreed to a legally-binding statement whereby equipment of the Soviet Union in treat categories located on the territory of the Baltic States will be subject to all treaty provisions. Soviet representatives cooperated fully in this endeavor. It was negotiating the context of the Joint Consultative Group, the 22-nation body of treaty signatories, which meets in Vienna.

      This agreement will have to be supplemented by arrangements with the Baltic non-signatories in order to provide for access to Soviet forces for purposes of inspection. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the treaty entered into force.

      Question 7. Would the Baltic nations have to sign this agreement?

      Answer. The agreement concluded on October 18, 1991, which extends the provisions of the treaty and associated documents to Soviet equipment stationed on Baltic territory, involves only the 22 treaty participants. It will have to be supplemented by arrangements with the Baltic States to permit access to Soviet forces on their territory for purposes of inspection.

      Question 8. Does the administration believe that this condition should be a "Category III" condition (that is, one that would require the explicit agreement of the other States Parties)? If not, why not?

      Answer. The administration does not believe it is necessary for the Senate to attach any conditions to the CFE Treaty. On October 18, the 22 CFE signatories concluded a legally-binding agreement in Vienna which specifies that Soviet equipment stationed on Baltic territory is subject to all provisions of the treaty.

      It should be noted that a Category III condition would jeopardize the ratification process. It would require explicit agreement of the other States Parties, and three signatories have already ratified the treaty; others are well along in their ratification process. Requiring the agreement of the other 21 to a U.S. condition would require reopening the treaty negotiation and would likely antagonize other participants. It would likely result, at the least, in a lengthy delay in implementation and could well mean the unraveling of the entire treaty.

Ambassador Woolsey also said that it appeared to be the case that if the Ukraine or Byelorussia were 6 become wholly independent of the former Soviet Union, including for purposes of the CFE Treaty, it would be necessary in his view. to ensure that the Ukraine became party to the treaty as a separate, sovereign state. One way to deal with this contingency from the point of view of the Senate would be for the Senate to insist that, should the Ukraine achieve full, legal independence subsequent to the entering into force of the CFE Treaty, the treaty would become null and void unless (1) the Ukraine acceded to the accord as a separate and sovereign State Party, and (2) the Ukraine agreed that its "TLE" would count against the former Soviet Union's allotments.

      Question 1. Does the administration believe that the CFE Treaty would not remain viable if the Ukraine achieved full, legal independence, including autonomous control over its own armed forces, and elected to remain outside the treaty regime?

      Answer. It is the view of the administration that in order to safeguard the integrity of the treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for Ukraine, if it were not bound as part of the U.S.S.R. or any successor state, and retained significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories, to participate in CFE. Statements to date made by Ukranian officials indicate that they intend to adhere to the terms of the CFE Treaty.

      Question 2. Does the administration believe that a Senate condition to the CFE Treaty should specify that the treaty would be declared null and void should the Ukraine secede from the former Soviet Union and not accede as a separate, sovereign State Party to the treaty?

      Answer. The administration does not believe it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the CFE Treaty. In the case of Ukraine, it is the administration's position that it almost certainly would be necessary for a fully independent Ukraine with significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories to become a treaty participant.

      Question 3. If so, does the administration believe this should be a Category III condition? If not. why not?

      Answer. The administration does not believe it is necessary for the Senate to attach any conditions to the CFE Treaty; the administration sees that it almost certainly would be necessary for a fully independent Ukraine with significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories to become a treaty participant. A Category III condition would jeopardize the ratification process. It would require explicit agreement of the other States Parties and three signatories have already ratified the treaty; other are well along in their ratification process. Requiring the agreement of the other 21 to a U.S. condition would require reopening the treaty negotiation and would likely antagonize other participants.

      These questions underscore the undesirability of attaching Category III conditions. There are a wide variety of circumstances which could prevail in the context of a fully independent Ukraine and it is quite conceivable that an absolute requirement to declare the treaty null and void regardless of the situation would he a completely inappropriate response under unforeseen circumstances.

      Question 1. Does the administration consider November 19, 1991 as a deadline for entering the CFE Treaty into force? If so, why?

      Answer. On November 19, 1991, the first anniversary of treaty signature, provisional application of a whole range of treaty measures, including requirements for information exchange and meetings of the Joint Consultative Group, will lapse. Extension is possible if all signatories concur, and discussions are underway in Vienna to effect a temporary extension, should this prove necessary. However, all signatories seem to be in agreement that this is not the optimum solution. A number of nations hope to ratify the treaty before the provisional application lapses, both in order to underscore the treaty's significance and to main in the momentum needed to ensure that the treaty enters into force as own as possible.

      Question 2. Paragraph 3 of the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe states that the Protocol shall terminate 12 months after November 19, 1990, but is also provides: "The period of application of this Protocol may be extended if all the States Parties so decided."

1. Has the administration sought such an extension or initiated discussions on the possibility of such an extension? If not, why not?
2. Does the administration have reason to believe that any of the 22 States Parties to the CFE Treaty would object to an extension of the 12-month duration for this Protocol should the ratification process in all 22 States Parties' governments not be complete by November 19? If so, why?
3. Does the administration have reason to believe that any or the 22 States Parties to the CFE Treaty are having second thoughts as to whether it or they want to remain a party to the treaty?
4. Does the administration have a schedule for the remaining 20 countries to ratify the CFE Treaty? If go, please provide us with this schedule. Answer. In Vienna, the United States, along with the other 21 treaty signatories, is currently discussing an extension of provisional application, should this prove necessary. Although no opposition to such an extension is envisioned, and notions from the treaty are expected, all signatories are in agreement that it would be preferable to ratify the treaty before an extension of provisional application is needed. A number of states parties are Pushing to ratify the treaty before November 19. The administration believes that prompt ratification by the United States would encourage all treaty signatories to move quickly to lock in the benefits that treaty Implementation will bring.

The U.S. continues to press other signatories to ratify the treaty as soon as possible-and vice versa. In our view, this is very much a dynamic process, and the more countries ratify, the more pressure will be exerted on those who have not yet acted---since one country can hold up implementation for all. Prompt ratification by the United States should have a particularly positive impact; by the same token, a U.S. delay could undermine the considerable support the treaty now has. A recent poll in capitals produced the following status report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials:

Former Warsaw Pact

      Question 1. When does the administration expect the former Soviet Union to ratify the CFE Treaty?

      Answer. Soviet officials have recently reconfirmed to us that President Gorbachev and other leading figures in the Soviet Government see ratification of the CFE Treaty as a top political priority. The new U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet is expected to consider it for ratification shortly after it reconvenes on October 21, placing it at or close to the top of their agenda. Foreign Minister Pankin is expected to convoke a meeting of the new Council of Republican Foreign Ministers before the Supreme Soviet meets; this Council is expected to recommend ratification of the treaty without delay.

      Officials of both the center and republics have repeatedly stated their intention that all international accords and obligations undertaken by the U.S.S.R., including those in the area of arms control, should be strictly observed. Certainly the wish of both a new Soviet Union, and of any former republics which opt for complete independence, for acceptance into and assistance from their neighbors and the world community are powerful incentives for supporting the implementation of the CFE agreement, which is seen by most Europeans as the corner. stone of a new security order.

      Question 2. What organ of the new "Union of Sovereign States" has this authority?

      Answer. The Soviet of the Republics, which is the upper chamber of the new U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, has the authority to ratify international agreements.

      Question 3. Will the central union government ask the republics that lie within the CFE zone to approve the treaty?

      Answer. We do not know the extent or exact nature of deliberations between the center and the republics on various issues. As noted, it is expected that the new Council of republican Foreign Ministers will meet prior to the reconvening of the Supreme Soviet and will recommend rapid ratification. We expect that such recommendation, as well as ratification by the Supreme Soviet, will reflect the approval of the treaty by each of the republics participating in those bodies. We also understand that union authorities will a discussing implementation of CFE with the independent Baltic States. The central government, of course could not speak for totally independent republics.

      Question 4. If the former Soviet Union has not ratified the CFE Treaty by November 19, would the administration propose an extension of the Protocol on Provisional Application?

      Answer. The administration hopes all signatories will complete their ratification processes by November 19 or shortly thereafter and believes that this is possible. The question of an extension of provisional application of the treaty it; being discussed in Vienna.

      Chairman NUNN. Since we wrote our letter, there have been two particularly encouraging developments that should help maintain the integrity of the CFE regime. First, on October 18, the 22 nations that are parties to the treaty concluded an agreement affirming that Soviet forces in the independent Baltic nations will count against the Soviet CFE quotas and will remain inspectable pursuant to treaty provisions until they are withdrawn.

[Copy of Statement of the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group dated October 18, 1991 follows:]

18 OCTOBER 1991.

STATEMENT OF THE CTIAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP

1. I hereby record that:
1. The States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, acknowledge that in view of the sovereignty of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania, the area of application defined in Article 11 of the Treaty does not include the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
2. I have today received a statement from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as follows. "In order to fulfill the legally-binding obligations of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and of the agreements entered into by the States Parties on 14 June 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall treat all its conventional armaments and equipment in the categories defined in Article II or the Treaty present, on or after 19 November, 1990, on the territories or Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as subject to all provisions of the Treaty and associated documents. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as part of Soviet holdings and shall count towards the Soviet reduction liability. This statement shall be legally binding and shall have the same duration as the Treaty."
3. I have also received statements from the representatives of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain h Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America that, in accordance with the legally-binding statement made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all Soviet conventional armaments and equipment in the categories defined in Article 11 of the Treaty present on or after 19 November 1990, on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Shall be treated as subject to all provisions or the Treaty, its associated documents and the legally-binding commitment entered into by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 14 June 1991. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as part of Soviet holdings and shall count towards the Soviet reduction liability.
4. The States Parties acknowledge that arrangements for inspection of the above-mentioned conventional armaments and equipment on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will require the consent and cooperation of those States.
2. This Chairman's statement, recording the above legally binding agreement among the States Parties, which will not be considered a precedent, will be recorded in the Journal, transmitted to the Depositary and deposited together with the instruments of ratification.

Senator NUNN. Second, on October 30, the Ukraine and Russia signed a communique in Kiev in which both republics underscored their readiness to observe the START and CFE Treaties and pledged that they will "undertake jointly with other interested republics the necessary steps for early entry into force of these documents."

[Copy of Joint Press Statement on Negotiations Between Government Delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation dated October 30, 1991 follows:]

OCTOBER 30, 1991.

On October 30 in Kiev, Government delegations from Ukraine and Russia had a thorough exchange of views in connection with the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the context of implementing the Treaty between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR of November 19, 1990, and the communique of August 29, 1991. Taking part in the negotiations were: for the Ukrainian side--Minister of Foreign Affairs A. M. Zienko, Minister of Defense K. P. Morozov, First Deputy Minister of Finance V. P. Tentyuk, Deputy Minister of the Economy Yu. A. Dvnykh and other officials; for the Russian side-Minister of Foreign Affairs A. V. Kozyrev, State Councillor for Defense Issues K.I. Kobets, Deputy Minister of Finance C. A. Korolev and other officials.

The intention was expressed to follow a strategic course to strengthen the traditional neighborly relations between Ukraine and Russia in all areas, on the basis of complete equality, recognition and respect for the sovereignty and choice of their people.

Thoroughly discussed were questions of mutual implementation of responsibilities in the area of human rights in accordance with international standards, politico-military questions and paths to a complete reformation of the external political structure of the former Union. The sides agreed on the necessity of mutual action, together with other republics, on conducting a regulated reduction of the previous union structure in accordance with the new demands and a necessary accounting of the interests of each republic.

Both sides agreed to establish a working group with the goal of developing and strengthening the politico-legal basis of their relations, and working out corresponding agreements. They discussed means of mutually inspectable activity in this area. The Russian delegation welcomed the resolution of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of October 24 on the "nuclear-free status of Ukraine." Both sides underscored their readiness to observe the conditions of the 1991 Treaty on Elimination and Reduction of Strategic offensive Forces and the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, in particular, the parts related to forces located on their territories. Ukraine and Russia will undertake, jointly with other interested republics, the necessary steps for early entry into force of these documents.

Both sides welcomed measures to withdraw and destroy tactical nuclear weapons. Ukrainian and Russian delegations underscored that questions of preparation and implementation on their territories of agreements in the area of arms reduction will be decided with their immediate participation and in consideration of their interests.

Both sides will provide for mutual exchange of information and will assist one another in the realization of the interests of Ukraine and Russia in direct participation in the European community process and European structures.

Both sides declared a common approach to participation in international economic and monetary-financial institutions. Ukraine and Russia intend to broaden their co-operation with the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and in other organizations, with the intention of joining them.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Russia signed a protocol on cooperation and coordination of activity between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

Senator NUNN. These are welcome developments, and I am glad that the Senate is in a position to take them into account prior to giving its advice and consent to the treaty. Nevertheless, a central question still remains, and I expect our witnesses will address this today.

Notwithstanding these expressions of good intent, how confident are we that there will not be adverse developments in the coming weeks or months in the relations between the republics or between various republics and the Union that would undercut the integrity of the CFE Treaty?

For example, what if a fully independent Ukraine insists on its own 450,000 man army? Will it petition to join the CFE regime? If so, can we be sure that the Ukraine and what remains of the former Soviet Union could agree that Ukrainian weapons would count against Soviet allotments under the treaty's sufficiency rule? If the Ukraine has its own large army, will other republics, including Russia, insist on having their own army and reject the idea of a centrally controlled Soviet army?

The procedural issue before the Senate, then, is whether it would be prudent for the United States to continue to observe CFE provisionally while waiting to see what transpires after the Ukrainian independence referendum is voted on on December 1 before we enter it into force formally with ratification, or, on the other hand, to give our advice and consent to the treaty before we adjourn, hopefully around Thanksgiving, and anticipate what may transpire later with conditions to the treaty.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on this critical issue, and perhaps there are other options that they will point out.

I am pleased that Senator Levin will be able to be here later. I know that he is coming in from the airport. He has done a lot of work on these issues as Chairman of our Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense. He has been a real leader in this area. I am sure that he will be coming in, and I am going to ask him to help preside in some of these hearings that we will be having today and in the future.

Our witnesses today are of course well qualified to speak to this subject. They are Hon. Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of Stale for International Security Affairs, and Ambassador R. James Woolsey, Chief Negotiator for the CFE Treaty.

Secretary Bartholomew, we welcome you and appreciate your being here today. With the NATO summit in Rome only a few days away, I know this is a very busy week for you.

Ambassador Woolsey, it is always a pleasure to have your counsel on security matters. I am tempted to ask you what you think of the administration's decision to cancel all mobility options on the Midgetman. But perhaps Senator Gore will ask that later in the day. [Laughter.]

I will not lead off with that question. Neither will I read some of your pithier statements from your pre-CFE days as to what vulnerable ICBM's mean to the defense of our Nation. But Senator Gore may decide to pursue that line with you a little later on.

Senator GORE. Those were Woolsey-Scowcroft articles, as I remember.

Chairman NUNN. That's right, Woolsey-Scowcroft.

Several of the members of this committee are members of the Arms Control Observer Group. From our visits to Vienna during the negotiations, we know first-hand what a superb job you did, Jim, in helping steer this treaty through a very difficult 22 nation negotiation. So we appreciate both of you being here. We appreciate the good work you have done on this treaty, which is unprecedented in terms of its scope and which, for those of us who followed its predecessor negotiations, MBFR, for years and years and years, there would not have been many of us back then that would have predicted this would ever become a reality.

So we are pleased to be here today.

Before turning to you for your testimony, I will see if Senator Warner has any comments.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a few comments.

Ordinarily, I do not take much time. But the importance of this occasion is such that I would like to express my views.

First, I join you in expressing our respect for these two outstanding public servants. I have worked with both of them in various capacities over the years. Jim Woolsey, of course, has a long affiliation with this particular committee.

I was with the Chairman and others when we visited you in Vienna and saw first-hand the work that you were doing, Ambassador Woolsey.

The CFE Treaty represents the culmination of many years of negotiation on reducing conventional forces in Europe. While the CFE process itself was relatively short by almost any standard for arms control treaties, the genesis of the treaty can Se traced back to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, or MBFR, negotiations, which started nearly 20 years ago, in 1973. At this point, I would like to put a footnote of history in the record.

I was in the Pentagon at that time as Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor, was the first negotiator at that time, leaving his post as Secretary of the Army to take on this mission. I hope that you have communicated with him through the years and have sought his advice.

These arduous discussions lasted for over 15 years and ended formally in February 1989, as the CFE negotiations were about to begin. While no treaty resulted from the MBFR negotiations, they served as an important building block for the CFE process, which began in March 1989 and ended with the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris in November 1990, after less than 2 years of intense negotiations in Vienna.

We have to thank you again, Ambassador Woolsey, and your able negotiating talents for this important historic document before us today.

The treaty is the first conventional arms control agreement since World War II. It was intended to significantly eliminate the overwhelming Soviet numerical advantage in conventional armaments that has existed in Europe since World War II. The treaty still holds the promise of doing so.

The problem, however, is the fact that the threat situation in Europe today is quite different than at the time when the CFE mandate was drafted almost 3 years ago. The military alliance structure present in 1989 is no longer in place. Dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 have brought into question the relevance and necessity of a treaty that was structured for another era, namely the bipolar Cold War era.

Indeed, some of the former members of the Warsaw Pact have now indicated the desire to affiliate with NATO.

One of the purposes of these hearings, however, is to better understand the treaty and how it will contribute to maintaining, if not further strengthening, stability during the next few years in light of the historic changes we have seen in the security structure of Europe.

Most importantly, I believe the committee must understand how this treaty will contribute, and not detract from, building a new, stable security structure, one that addresses the growing emergence of ethnic and nationalist tensions in Europe, as opposed to the ideological tensions of the former military bloc alliance of a few years ago, or just two, to be exact.

In this regard, I am concerned about recent suggestions that the treaty is a vital arms control agreement and that the very structure itself is the anvil u n which a new security structure will be forged. This suggestion been made primarily with the recalcitrant republics of the former Soviet Union in mind, republics which have indicated a desire to maintain national armies independent of the Central Government's control.

I do not doubt the merits of this agreement. But I am concerned that those who make it may overstate the ability of the treaty to for a stable security structure.

I share, Mr. Chairman, the very views that you expressed about that.

I will put the balance of my statement in the record to save time.

Than you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Without objection, your entire statement will be a part of the record.

(The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to express my warm welcome to Ambassadors Reginald Bartholomew and Jim Woolsey. Over the years, I have worked closely with these two distinguished public servants, and have high respect for their professional ability. I look forward to hearing their testimony today on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which was signed by 22 nations on November 19, 1990.

Mr. Chairman, the CFE Treaty represents the culmination of many years of negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe. While the CFE process itself was relatively short by almost any standard for arms control treaties, the genesis of the treaty can be traced back to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, or MBFR, negotiations which started nearly 20 years ago in 1973. These arduous discussions lasted for over 16 years and ended formally in February 1989 as the CFE negotiations were about to begin. While no treaty resulted from the MBFR negotiations, they served as an important building block for the CFE process which began in March 1989 and ended with the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris after less than 2 years of intense negotiations in Vienna. We have you to thank, Ambassador Woolsey, and your able negotiating talents for this important and historic document which is before us today.

The CFE Treaty is the first conventional arms control agreement since World War 11. It was intended to significantly eliminate the overwhelming Soviet numerical advantage in conventional armaments that has existed in Europe since World War I II and the treaty still holds the promise of doing so. The problem we face today, however, is the fact that threat situations in Europe bears little resemblance to the Europe which existed when the CFE mandate was drafted over 2 years ago. The military alliance structure which was present in 1989 is no longer in place in Eastern Europe. The dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 have brought into question the relevance and necessity of a treaty that was structured for another era-the Cold War. Indeed, some of the former members of the Warsaw Pact have indicated a desire to affiliate with the NATO alliance.

One of the purposes of these hearings for me, Mr. Chairman, is to better understand how the CFE Treaty will contribute to maintaining, if not further strengthening, stability during the next few years in light of the historic changes we have seen in the security structure of Europe. Most importantly, I believe the committee must understand how this treaty will contribute to and not detract from, building a new stable security structure, one that addresses the growing emergence of ethnic and nationalist tensions in Europe, as opposed to the ideological tensions of the former bloc alliance system.

In this regard, I am concerned about recent suggestions by some that the CFE Treaty is a vital arms control agreement, and that the very treat itself is the anvil upon which a new security structure will be forged. This suggestion has been made primarily with the recalcitrant republics of the former Soviet Union in mind-Republics which have indicated a desire to maintain national armies independent of central government control. I do not doubt the merits of this argument, but I am concerned that those who make it may overstate the ability of the treaty to forge a stable security structure.

Arms control has a very important place in national security planning. But arms control agreements which merely regulate levels of military equipment to not prevent conflicts or wars. We learned very early on during the interwar period that naval arms control agreements, like the 1922 Washington Treaty, the 1930 London Treaty, and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, did nothing to halt the march of war in Europe. In other words, arms control agreements cannot stop a leader whose intention is to use armed force to implement foreign policy objectives. At best, arms control agreements limit or regulate the options of military planners which, in turn, may preclude the use of force as an option. But again, as history has shown, leaders intent on using force to implement foreign policy objectives rind ways to circumvent or ignore arms control treaties when such treaties stand in the way of their objectives.

In short, I will support approval of the CFE Treaty, but I question whether the treaty is as VITAL to European security as some would assert. Much has changed in Europe, and the treaty must be subject to careful review to determine its applicability to new European realities. Our responsibility is to consider how and in what form the treaty may still be relevant and how, from the perspective of U.S. national security interests, its implementation could contribute to the process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the wit nesses.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, before we begin-and we will begin in a moment and will call on you to lead off-let me ask you some straight-forward, procedural questions concerning the Senate's role in treaty making and treaty interpretation.

I trust you will not be surprised by these questions since I have asked them of every executive branch witness who has appeared before this committee to testify on a pending treaty since the INF Treaty, and there is a historical background here about reinterpretation that we do not need to dwell on today.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, I hope you will not be surprised by my answers.

Chairman NUNN. I hope I won't, either.

First, can the Senate regard your testimony as authoritative? That is, are you speaking on behalf of and with the full authority of the administration insofar as your testimony today is directed to the meaning and legal effect of the CFE Treaty?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. Ambassador Woolsey, I will ask you that same question.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Secretary, can you assure us that the executive branch will review the record of the committee's hearings on this treaty before the Senate gives its advice and consent and notify us if any testimony is deemed to be either inaccurate or at variance with the negotiating record?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. Can you assure us that all official submissions for the CFE hearing record by the executive branch can be regarded by the Senate as authoritative?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Chairman NUNN. Can you assure us that the meaning of the treaty, as presented to the Senate by authoritative executive branch witnesses, in testimony, documents, and official submissions for the record, will be deemed by the Executive Branch to constitute a common understanding between the Senate and the executive branch, whether or not that common understanding is explicitly restated by the Senate in its resolution of ratification?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Can you assure us that the President will not depart from the common understanding as to the meaning of the treaty the Senate and the executive branch reach during these proceedings unless he first consults with and obtains the approval of the Senate?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, I think I can say that, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Finally, are you authorized to speak for the Secretary of State with regard to policy issues associated with possible conditions the Senate may choose to attach to the resolution of ratification?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Authorized to?

Chairman NUNN. To speak for the Secretary of State?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. I am indeed, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Okay. Thank you.

Senator Warner, do you have any procedural questions before I turn to our witnesses.

Senator WARNER. No, but I wonder if our colleagues might have a word or two, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. I would be glad to ask.

Senator Gore, do you have any comments?

Senator GORE. I will save most of what I have to say for my turn at questions.

I would just note that I do not view this as an ordinary hearing. No hearing on ratification of an agreement of this sort is ordinary. I do not mean to so imply. But the degree of change which has occurred since the successful negotiation of this agreement and the time in which it is presented to the Senate has been so extraordinary that this is really not an ordinary proceeding.

I personally have serious doubts about the way in which we ought to receive and act upon this agreement. I will have some questions about the viability of amendments.

I raised a number of questions about this agreement in a lengthy speech on the Senate floor on September 12, and I will explore some. of those questions in the further proceeding today.

I will save the rest of my comments for that time.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Gore. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to join you and Senator Warner in welcoming Secretary Bartholomew and Ambassador Woolsey. Both of them played a key role in the negotiations and drafting of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. I appreciate their appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee as we begin the advice and consent process on this important treaty.

In November 1990, when the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was signed, it was an historic event. The treaty marked, in the words of Secretary of State Baker, "A fundamental shift away from the Cold War to a Europe whole and free. Not only is it an essential foundation for the new Europe, but it will be a bulwark against a return to Cold War dangers and animosity."

The events in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and in this country over the past year have diminished the euphoria that accompanied the signing of the treaty. There is a question about the relevance of the treaty now that the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated and the Soviet Union is fracturing as a nation.

In addition, our own budgetary problems are forcing us to make decisions that may bring our forces in Europe to a level below that envisioned by the treaty.

My personal concern is that we do not yet know what the future of the Soviet Union holds. Will this treaty be applicable to the republics that are declaring their independence on almost a daily basis? What will happen to the treaty in the event that Soviet hard liners stage another coup and this time are successful?

These are questions that must be answered before I am satisfied that the Senate should ratify this historic, but in my opinion, dated, treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Mr. Secretary, we appreciate again you being here. We know that an awful lot of the work here has been done by you, and we are grateful for that and for your leadership in so many areas. We are pleased to have your testimony.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Thank you, Senator. Senator, I have a very brief statement that I want to make to the committee because I think that it will be a framework that I hope will be the basis for answering many of the questions that have already been raised.

As Secretary Baker make clear to you in his letter of October 12, the administration remains firmly committed to the early ratification and full implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Both President Bush and President Gorbachev reiterated this during their Madrid meeting last week, when the, need to move ahead quickly on ratification was stressed.

The CFE Treaty is a landmark in the history of security negotiations. By its terms, conventional forces in Europe will be reduced to their lowest levels in nearly half a century. The reductions, it must be said, are overwhelmingly advantageous to the United States and its allies. Moreover, the equipment in those forces will be permanently limited through destruction of excess equipment and strict rules about force concentration and movement. These are extremely important provisions precisely because they provide an internationally sanctioned hedge against mercurial political or military actions.

These provisions are further bolstered by a rigorous verification and inspection regime. An interlocking system of information exchange, on-site inspections, verification of destruction or conversion of equipment, and challenge inspections, all coupled with national intelligence means, gives us high confidence that the CFE Treaty is effectively verifiable.

Through CFE's requirements for data exchange, our access to information about conventional forces in Europe will also be considerably expanded.

As unprecedented events continue to unfold in Europe, we, for our part, far from questioning the value of this treaty, become ever more convinced that it is advantageous and believe that this becomes increasingly apparent. Change and transformation will be the rule for some time to come. Certainly this is the case for the strategic space east of the Oder.

The CFE Treaty will put in place in all of Europe a regime under which a country's actions are accountable under international law. The reassurance provided by lower equipment levels and a predictable, internationally recognized. conventional security structure will go a long way toward fostering stability in Europe.

Our European allies, the signatories from Eastern and Central Europe and the republics emerging in the Soviet Union are keenly aware of these advantages. They have urged us to move swiftly to put the treaty into force so they can plan and act in an atmosphere of decreased tension.

Full implementation of the CFE Treaty will help forestall rivalries or arms build-ups during this period of political transition. The implications of the situation in Yugoslavia have not been lost on anyone and have increased the urgency with which the implementation of CFE is viewed. Our European partners also join us in believing that CFE offers a fine model for responsible and profitable multilateral interaction.

The successful negotiations last fall, last November, among the six former Warsaw Pact members, about their holdings and allotments in equipment was an illustration of how effective the mechanisms in the CFE Treaty for discussion and decision-making can be.

It is also increasingly clear that the CFE Treaty itself is a flexible instrument that can accommodate even the momentous changes in the Soviet Union we have seen recently. The treaty, in fact, was negotiated during a time of uncertainty and crafted to assume, rather than resist, new political developments. Technically, we are, therefore, in an excellent position to move forward with the ratification and implementation of the treaty, as written.

A good example of the adaptability of the CFE Treaty regime is the agreement that you cited, Mr. Chairman, reached a few weeks ago, on October 18, in Vienna, on the status of Soviet forces in the Baltic States. The parties to the treaty agreed to a legally binding statement establishing that Soviet equipment in the Baltics is subject to all provisions of the treaty, that it will be notified as part of Soviet holdings, and will count toward the Soviet equipment reduction liability.

It also established that the Baltic States were fully sovereign and the inspections on their territories could only take place with their consent. The agreement was reached with relative ease through the Joint Consultative Group, a body representing all of the treaty signatories.

Inspection of Soviet forces in the Baltics will be coordinated through separate side agreements with those governments. These side agreements are currently being developed.

The creation of the Joint Consultative Group is itself one of the treaty's many advantages, and it will continue to provide an effective mechanism for dealing with issues and problems that may arise concerning implementation of treaty provisions. In fact, however, after examining a wide variety of possible outcomes, Mr. Chairman, the administration has concluded that very probably only technical fixes --- such as updating names of treaty partners -- would be required as a result of recent developments in the Soviet Union. Implementation requirements, such as reallocation of Soviet equipment entitlements if new states emerge from the territory of the U.S.S.R. and decide to become treaty signatories -- would be covered under existing treaty provisions.

To maintain the integrity of the treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for any republics which retain significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories to participate in CFE. Fortunately, statements by Russian, Ukrainian, Soviet and other officials, including here, Mr. Chairman, the October 30 statement by the Russians and the Ukrainians that you cited, these statements with regard to fulfilling CFE obligations are encouraging. We will continue to work with them to ensure the viability of the treaty.

The provisions of the CFE Treaty itself afford several effective ways of coping with such situations. The Joint Consultative Group, mentioned earlier, is an important one since it offers a mechanism for adapting the treaty without having to undergo a cumbersome amendment process.

The fact that decisions about national allocations are taken outside the structure of the treaty allowing for adjustments necessary because of changes in the political or military situation, and accommodates the expansion or the contraction of the number of parties to the treaty, again without requiring or without resorting to amendments of the treaty.

The provision for calling extraordinary conferences offers yet another way to resolve disputes or fine-tune the treaty without opening it up to renegotiation.

Mr. Chairman, we feel strongly that ratification should proceed with dispatch. This goes to the question that was touched on about now versus the end of the year.

There is no question that the CFE Treaty is greatly to the advantage of the United States and its allies. But its many benefits will not be realized until it is ratified and implemented. We think it behooves us, the United States, to move now to continue our leadership in this process, to lock in CFE's advantages, and to reassert our commitment to a Europe that is truly whole, free, and secure.

Ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty is a key part of insuring several of the most significant foreign policy goals of the United States. We would like to see Europe move toward greater cohesion and stability. We want a predictable pattern of military arrangements so that security affairs can be conducted with confidence, and attention and energy can be focused on the development of democracy and free market systems. And we want to continue to foster exactly the kind of multilateral cooperation and planning so well exemplified by CFE.

This treaty has often been referred to as the cornerstone of a new European security structure, and rightly so. But we must set that cornerstone in place if we are to build on it. We cannot do that until the CFE Treaty is ratified and implemented.

Mr. Chairman, three nations, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, have already ratified the treaty. Several other nations are well along in the process. A number of signatories, including the Soviet Union, have pledged to ratify before November 19, 1991, when provisional application of portions of the treaty would require extension. The will and pace with which the United States moves toward ratification will have a decided effect on the course taken by other capitals. Just as we led throughout the process of negotiation, so do all other participants look to us for direction in ratification and implementation of the treaty.

Hesitation on our part could risk losing CFE's many benefits, just as clear action by the United States will undoubtedly speed ratification efforts elsewhere and hasten the treaty's entry into force.

Mr. Chairman, in concluding, I urge you and your colleagues to move forward with advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty as soon as possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Ambassador Woolsey.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would submit my written statement for the record and simply speak here from a few notes by way of making some summary points.

Chairman NUNN. Will your oral presentation be shorter or longer than your written one?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. It will be shorter, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Okay.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. You know me too well. It will be shorter.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection, your entire statement will be part of the record.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought it might be helpful for the committee members for me to touch on the seven or eight main things that the CFE Treaty does, just to establish a framework for furtfier discussion.

It sets, first and foremost, numerical limits. These were originally derived from East-West numbers. But, as I will mention in a minute, they have produced a very different type of limitation than was originally conceived. These numbers limit tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

In addition to the specific numerical limits which, by the way, were set in almost all cases slightly below NATO's levels and substantially below the levels being held in the East, in addition to those overall numerical limits, there are three principal types of sub-limits on these five types of equipment.

First of all, there is the one-third sufficiency rule, stating that no country may hold more than approximately one-third-and the numbers in the treaty are exact-of the military potential in those equipment categories in Europe.

Second is a series of geographic sub-limits which, as I will mention again in a moment, make adaptation of the treaty to the new circumstances considerably easier than might have been the case if we had put in the treaty itself nation-by-nation limits.

Third is active sub-ceilings, that is, sub-ceilings on equipment that may be held in active units, the balance needing to be held in designated storage facilities, such as our own POMCUS sites in Europe.

Reduction to get down to these levels is to be accomplished principally by destruction. We can certainly talk in the question period--I am sure you will have some--about the movement of Soviet equipment east of the Urals. But there are still substantial amounts of destruction of equipment involved. Some 37,000-plus pieces of Soviet equipment, for example, will be destroyed east and west of the Urals under the treaty and the associated agreements.

There is a very far-reaching information exchange-and many people in the U.S. Government regard this as one of the most useful aspects of the treaty-to provide a data base which is highly disaggregated. And, although there are some errors and problems in it, particularly with the Soviet data, it brings us a long way toward establishing something to start from by way of assessing Soviet forces, something we did not have before.

In the treaty's verification regime, each state has to accept a certain quota of on-site inspections, essentially at its military facilities-army, air force, and storage facilities-plus a certain share of challenge inspections in areas that are not such "declared sites."

This inspection regime, a really rather intrusive and expansive verification regime, is designed to complement national technical means of verification, and certainly not to be self-supporting in and of itself. But as such a complement, we think it has a great deal of utility.

The Joint Consultative Group has been addressed by Ambassador Bartholomew.

The role of alliances in the treaty or "groups of states" is now simply a coordinating one. Coordination does need to be done with respect to establishing national levels of equipment. That has now been done in both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. A certain amount of coordination is required for purposes of carrying out inspections, in terms of allocating quota numbers. But the original concept of this treaty, which was a sort of pure East-West, bloc-to-bloc arrangement, is no more.

We did have substantial post-signature problems. This committee is familiar with those. The Soviet military's gambit to place substantial shares of equipment into its navy and allege that this meant it was not to be counted under the treaty was effectively thwarted by NATO solidarity. We negotiated the details of the resolution of this over months, mainly in Moscow, and finished it up in early June. It is embodied in the legal, binding agreement before you, dated June 14.

The Soviet equipment that was transferred beyond the Urals is partially subjected to some destruction and to some verification steps. Those provisions are set forth in the separate political commitment by the Soviets that we also negotiated in early June and which is a separate agreement, a statement by them, dated June 14.

Baltic independence was, of course, a major event in the history of this treaty's operation following its signing. The signal event here is the October 18 legally binding statement by the 22 countries that the equipment of the Union, the Soviet Union or some other type of union in the future, located in the Baltic States will continue to count for purposes of the treaty. In order to inspect that equipment, we would, all of us, need invitations from the Baltic States. But we do not anticipate that there will be any difficulty in those being provided when the time is appropriate.

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that in November 1989, when the Wall went down-by way of note, this was 3 days after I arrived in Vienna to negotiate this treaty -- and we started seeing the Communist governments fall in the East ----

Senator GORE. You are not citing that as a causal relationship, are you?

Ambassador WOOMEY. I have been asked to serve in Cuba next, Senator Gore. [Laughter.]

No, I am not, of course. This is definitely a post hoc statement.

When these governments started to fall, we began immediately to build features into the treaty to try to adapt it and to reduce its bloc-to-bloc character. Some of these steps were proposed by the East Europeans themselves. I would cite particularly the Hungarian delegation as having been extremely thoughtful and effective in fostering these steps. They include such things as a ban on stationing forces in another country without its consent-a multilateral ban under the treaty; a guarantee to one's entitlement of equipment, even if one does not use that entitlement; and, particularly, the approach toward maximum levels for holdings, which is embodied in Article 7 of the treaty.

The short of that is that the treaty itself does not prescribe country-by-country ceilings. It prescribes ceilings in the way I described it first. But, by having country-by-country ceilings that are binding as a result of negotiation among subsets of countries and notification to the other parties, the treaty itself builds in a substantial type of flexibility, which I think already has permitted, and will permit it in the future, to deal with some of the uncertainty that we see in the East.

Moreover, the treaty does not prohibit moving forces to the rear in the East, or, for that matter, to the rear in the West. In fact, it encourages it. So there is nothing in the treaty to make difficult- indeed, it is encouraged-the Soviet Union's movement of forces back toward the Moscow and the Volga-Ural military districts as its various allies in Eastern Europe split off from it and expel its troops and forces, and even as component portions of the Soviet Union itself may split off.

Finally, let me say that this treaty was negotiated during a very special window of time. Many of the detailed compromises that made it possible were made between early October 1990 and mid-November, some of them in the closing days.

We had to work fast in Vienna and also at some of the ministerials in Moscow and in New York. But there was a positive side to that because, during those few weeks, the Soviet Union was in a situation in which it was still strong enough to negotiate and sign a treaty, but was in a condition that I would say, given the events of the preceding year or so, made it considerably more willing to agree to compromises than might have been the case before that.

Furthermore, so were other countries. In pushing toward the summit of November 19, 1990, all countries were willing to make some compromises in some views which had been strongly held for a long time.

I would say this: given the political conditions in the East and the long-standing ethnic and national rivalries that are now coming to the fore, my personal judgment is that we will not be able to repeat this exercise any time in the foreseeable future. For better or for worse, if the world wants a conventional arms treaty, requiring destruction, numerical limits, inspection, regular consultations among the parties, and that covers, among other places, that part of Europe that is now most threatened by ethnic strife and nationalism, CFE is the only vehicle available and will be the only vehicle available for the foreseeable future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Woolsey follows:]

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