OVERVIEW OF THE TREATY ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
AND ITS ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

The Treaty consists of a Preamble, 23 Treaty articles, and eight protocols with two annexes. The protocols and annexes are an integral part of the Treaty. There are also three legally binding statements and four political statements connected with the CFE Treaty.

For the purpose of determining equipment ceilings and the quota of inspections each state can conduct, the 22 signatories are divided into two groups: the 16 nations of NATO and the 6 nations that were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact.

Since the signatories are associated with groups only for these specific purposes, and obligations taken by them are incumbent upon them as independent states, the rights, privileges or sovereignty of the former members of the Warsaw Pact are in no way abridged by the Treaty.

The Treaty articles define the area of application-the region from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains-and delineate the overall and regional limits to five categories of equipment: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The aggregate numbers of each type of equipment for each group of states are as follows:

• 20,000 battle tanks
• 30,000 armored combat vehicles, of which no more than 18,000 may be armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles
• 20,000 pieces of artillery
• 6,800 combat aircraft
• 2,000 attack helicopters.

Article VI of the Treaty also limits the amount of Treaty limited equipment any one state can hold in the area of application. This "sufficiency" rule curbs the potential of any one state to acquire or possess an overwhelming preponderance of weaponry in those categories most relevant to carrying out a large scale surprise attack. Under the terms of the Treaty, no one country can hold more than about one-third of the total armaments permitted in the area.

The Treaty articles also define the terms used in the Treaty, including detailed technical descriptions of the equipment and sites covered under its provisions; require regional numerical limits on each category of equipment in order to prevent destabilizing force concentrations in any one area; give specific instructions for reducing equipment limited by the Treaty; prescribe ways in which states may dispose of excess equipment in ways other than destruction-for example, by transferring or "cascading" the equipment to another member of the same group; put special limitations on some stored equipment, certain kinds of equipment---such as armored vehicle launched bridges and that held by paramilitary units--and the amount of equipment that can be held in flank areas; give specific requirements for information exchange and verification procedures; recognize the right to use national technical means for verification; create the Joint Consultative Group to consider matters of Treaty implementation or amendment; provide for follow-on negotiations by the same parties; and give requirements for special conferences, for amendment, withdrawal, ratification and entry into force.

Protocols to the CFE Treaty include the following:

• Protocol on existing types, which lists, in an agreed format, all of those types of conventional armaments and equipment that are limited by the Treaty as of the date of signature;
• The Annex to this Protocol sets forth agreed categories of technical data and specifications for photographs to be provided by each State Party for each model and version of existing types of conventional armaments covered by the Treaty.
• Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, which provides for reductions through the reclassification of certain models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft into unarmed trainer aircraft.
• Protocol on Reductions, which sets forth detailed procedures for the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.
• Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization, which provides for reductions through the recategorization of multi-purpose attack helicopters and specifies how a State Party is to categorize combat helicopters.
• Protocol on Notification and the Exchange of Information, which is designed to aid the verification process by obligating signatories to make self-declarations about their own force structure and conventional armaments at a level of disaggregation that can be monitored with relative ease;
• The Annex on the Exchange of Information provides examples and formats to be used by States parties in the exchange of information.
• Protocol on Inspections, which provides rigorous procedures to implement the Treaty's on-site inspection regime.
• Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, which details the composition and working structure of the body created to ensure a predictable and efficient basis for handling the implementation of the Treaty.
• Protocol on Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the CFE Treaty, which confers, upon signature, certain legal rights and obligations upon the States parties.

Three legally-binding statements are associated with the CFE Treaty. One of the legally binding statements is a statement by the U.S.S.R. with respect to a number of legal obligations it has regarding battle ranks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery subordinated t its naval infantry, coastal defense forces, and strategic rocket forces located within the area of application of the Treaty. The second legally binding statement consists of a response by the other 21 signatories that accepts the Soviet legal statement and also obligates them to proceed toward ratification of the Treaty. In a third statement, concluded on October 18, 1991, in Vienna, the 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty made a legally binding agreement whereby equipment of the Soviet Union in Treaty categories located on the territory of the Baltic states will be subject to all Treaty provisions. These legally binding statements constitute separate international agreements that are associated with, but not part of, the Treaty.

The four political documents associated with the treaty consist of a declaration by the States parties with respect to their land-based naval aircraft in Europe, a declaration by the States parties with respect to the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in Europe, a declaration by Germany with respect to the personnel strength of its armed forces, and a statement by the U.S.S.R. regarding a number of actions it will undertake with respect to its conventional armaments and equipment located east of the Ural mountains. As with the legally binding statements, none of the political documents constitutes a part of the Treaty.

A more detailed description of the CFE Treaty's articles, protocols, annexes, and associated documents is found in the article-by-article analysis submitted to the Senate by the President with the CFE Treaty on July 9, 1991.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I would agree with you on that last statement. I think that now is not the time and it would be very, very difficult, with the republics each asserting themselves, to try to go back and redo this treaty in material ways.

I also agree with both of you in your assessment and with Secretary Baker's letter that this treaty is overwhelmingly in our interest. So I want to put my questions in that context. But I think we have to consider timing and we have to consider what we may do if we are confronted with contingencies that now appear more likely than not.

Mr. Secretary, Saturday's front page of the Washington Post featured this headline: "Republics step up attack on central power." The accompanying article noted that, due to budget cuts ordered by Russia at Boris Yeltsin's urging, over 70 Soviet ministries were being shut down and up to 90 percent of the employees of the Foreign Affairs Ministry were likely to be laid off.

The article also quoted testimony to the Senate last week by Under Secretary of State Zoellick in which he said power has shifted almost completely to the republics of the Soviet Union.

In these circumstances, do you believe that the former Soviet Union, or whatever it may have evolved into today, is still a viable treaty partner in CFE?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. We do. But what is important to say immediately is that the development of increasing power on the part of the republics that you are citing, Senator, does not undercut the validity or the viability of the treaty.

Senator WARNER. I missed a few words. It does not mean what?

Ambassador BARTHHOLOMEW. It does not mean--the development that is taking place today, Senator that is picked up in what Senator Nunn, the Chairman, spoke of in terms of the shift of power to the republics--the on-going shift of power to the republics does not, in and of itself, undercut the viability of the treaty.

I would say it reinforces it.

Senator, can I step back and take a crack at this question of the continuing relevance of the treaty in the face of all of the political developments and political transformation underway?

I mean, the question, it seems to me, that we all have to wrestle with--given what we know is going to be a far-reaching political transformation which is underway, and given also what I think we must assume we are going to have to live with for some time-this is not something that is going to be done by the end of the year or by the end of next year, for that matter, in terms of the sorting-out process. It is going on in terms of the future shape of the political structure of the Soviet Union. The question is, are we better off with this treaty or without it?

Now, I would submit to you that we think that the answer to that question is we are overwhelmingly better off in facing that world of political transformation and change with this treaty than without it, and that, as a corollary of that, it follows that we ought to get the structure in place as rapidly as we can, and not wait for this, that, or the other development.

To some extent, the statement that I make when I say that is a reflection of the fact that we do think, the treaty is sufficiently flexible, built in such a way as to be able to accommodate virtually all foreseeable changes that we think are most plausible as the result of a wide-ranging analysis of the kinds of outcomes that we may face.

But what I am saying here is not just a judgment about the flexibility, the adaptability of the treaty. It is also a judgment of how the Changes that are underway will relate to what we were trying to achieve with the treaty. What were we trying to do with this treaty?

We were, very simply, trying to regulate the force situation in the strategic space defined from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals, defined in ways that we thought were advantageous for us, and I might say others as well, in terms of such concepts as limiting the number of forces, making that limitation irreversible by destruction requirements and by provisions that would prevent any country from having more than a certain proportion of the total forces. Note, Senator, that the famous sufficiency, rule, which limits any country, in the area to about one-third of the total forces, does not say the "Soviet Union." It says "no country" -- no country -- be it Russia or whatever. There is no name that is attached.

But a provision like that, a provision such as what we were trying to do with the whole zonal structure, to prevent the concentration of forces--this whole structure, designed to regulate the strategic space from the Atlantic to the Urals, was built in such a way as to be able to accommodate change.

We did not think that we were writing a treaty that was to remain in force only for 10 years. And, while Jim was doing the treaty, we were coping already with the beginnings and the accelerating rate of change. I think for that reason, the treaty accommodated many of the future options.

Interestingly enough, Senator, I would point to the fact that people, the states involved, want this treaty.

I am unable to come here to you today and cite a single negative statement about this treaty by any leader in Europe, in Central or Eastern Europe, or, for that matter, any leader in a position of responsibility in the Soviet Union. I can cite many urgent statements of support under all three headings. You cited one in terms of Russia and the Ukraine from the October 30 date. It is interesting to note, if we want to say who is most interested in this treaty, who has ratified it first: the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Poland, it is done, and we are just awaiting the President's signature which will take place before the end of the year. But that is an administrative matter.

So it is against this background that we are coming up here with a treaty. I agree with what Senator Gore said and was much struck by it. It is a different kind of universe. We are coming up here under extraordinary circumstances with an agreement. And, oddly enough, I think my answer, Senator Gore, to you is to say the extraordinary change that we face is all the more reason to get this structure in place.

I am sorry that I took so much time, Mr. Chairman, but there were very serious and thoughtful remarks, and I wanted to begin with an overview to join in the questions that are involved here.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Warner, my time has expired.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. But, really, Mr. Chairman, would you take a little more time?

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, but I will come back.

Senator WARNER. Okay. Let me pick up on the Chairman's point there.

Now, as I understand it, the Soviet Union is to ratify before the 21^st of this month, is that correct? Was that not anticipated?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. We are hoping that they will have it done by the 19th, which is the anniversary, the 1-year anniversary, after which we would have to renegotiate the provisional applications.

Senator WARNER. From the reports that we receive from the Soviet Union today, the economic situation and other factors have taken priority, as opposed to this treaty. Or is it just going to be handled very swiftly?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Well, I am not aware of the reports that you are talking about. But it is true, Senator, that they have a great deal on their plate.

All I can say is that we have pressed them. When I say "them," I do not mean just Mr. Gorbachev. I mean Ukrainians, I mean Byelorussians, I mean representatives of the republics to ratify as soon as possible.

Senator WARNER. Let me pick up on that because you are fairly strong here. The only problem that I have with this is I think your statement is a little bit of over-sell. And I say that to you as a good friend.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Which statement? The written one?

Senator WARNER. The written one.

Let me point out something here. You said-and I'm not sure whether this is a grammatical issue-you said that you have heard from all of Europe and you included the republics. Now do you have any Written documentation from any one of the republics to the effect that they want this treaty to be put into effect, or is it just speeches?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. I read to you, Senator, a joint press statement of negotiations between government delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This is a statement issued by their Ukrainian and Russian Foreign and Defense Ministers after talks that they had in Kiev on the 30th of October. I quote from the English translation: "Both sides underscored their readiness to observe the conditions of the 1990 Treaty on Elimination and Reduction of Strategic Forces and the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; in particular, the parts related to forces located on their territories. Ukraine and Russia will undertake, jointly with other interested republics, the necessary steps for early entry into force of these documents."

That is a formal public statement by the ministers of those two key republics.

Senator WARNER. Was there any communication directly between a republic and the United States?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, in various forms and conversations, Senator; I mean in terms of the ongoing discussions that we have with them.

Senator WARNER. Let's take a hypothetical. Supposing one or more of the republics decides to become independent and simply would not observe this treaty. Is there a theory that the chain is no stronger than its weakest link and this treaty does not work as a result of one or more republics seceding? Say that particular republic that becomes independent is where a significant amount of the equipment that has to be verified from time to time is located, and you cannot do the intrusive verification that is required by the treaty.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator let me begin by saying that I think it would be good for the committee to recognize that we have already adjusted this treaty for structural change underway even before it was signed, to reflect the reunification of Germany, because there had been 16 on one side and 7 on the other. We had to adjust it for that.

We adjusted it a second time in the October 18 set of legally binding statements, precisely to reflect the fact that the Baltic States, in regaining their independence, did not wish to accede to the treaty. That was done quickly and effectively by 22 nations in Vienna.

I think the two cases are illustrative.

Now, if we are talking about other republics, let me be honest, Senator. It depends. There are some republics whose holdings are so very, very small-1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, that kind of thing ---

Senator WARNER. That is understandable. But suppose it was significant?

Ambassador BAITTHOLOMFW. Well, I will say to you that if the question is the Ukraine, then the answer is that it almost certainly-almost certainly-the accession of the Ukraine and its participation in the treaty would be necessary for the viability of the treaty. But in that regard, assuming, Senator, that it maintains, as there has been talk of, significant forces, then again, Senator, I have to answer very quickly that we see no reason to question whether the Ukraine-whether it becomes independent or not- will accede to the treaty. I cite again the October 30 statement that the leaders of the Ukraine just jointly issued with the Russians.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator, Warner, may I add one point to that?

Senator WARNER. Yes, of course.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. There is a big jump between the Ukraine and Byelorussia on one hand and the other ---

Senator WARNER. You said the Ukraine and what? I could not hear you.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. And Byelorussia, White Russia, the republic just north of the Ukraine. There is a big jump between the amount of equipment that those two republics and the Russian Re public hold on the one hand versus all of the other republics on the other. All of the others are essentially 5 percent or less of the equipment, even within the European portion of the U.S.S.R., and that (holdings in the European portion) is only one-third, approximately, of the Soviet overall equipment.

So each of those other republics, other than the Ukraine and Byelorussia, bold in tanks well under 2 percent of the total tanks in the Soviet Union.

We are essentially talking about Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia being the three republics where there are based the substantial amounts of equipment that one needs to focus on.

Senator WARNER. My last question, Mr. Chairman, is this.

There have been a number of hearings on this treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But my understanding is that all of those hearings occurred before the coup.

Is this the first hearing since the coup that you have had on this treaty?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. I believe it is, Senator.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes, it is.

Senator WARNER. Is there a requirement, then-and I say this not in a critical way-to change some of the testimony that was made prior to the coup for the Senate record to be complete?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. If there is, we will change it, Senator. But nothing comes to my mind at this point. I think the testimony that was given before the coup, in its broad outlines, at least, will remain valid. But this is something that I would need to check.

[The information follows:]

No such changes were deemed necessary.

Senator WARNER. Does your statement today track the statements that were made by the Department of State officials before the coup?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. It does, indeed, Senator.

Senator WARNER. And the same measure of enthusiasm and so forth?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Well, I cannot speak for the enthusiasm, but I am enthusiastic about this treaty. Yes, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Ah, but you are an enthusiastic person. I remember, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, having lunch with him one day in Beirut, when mortar shells were coming in and the table was rocking. It did not phase him a bit. He just kept right on eating.

You had a distinguished career in that chapter, as you had elsewhere, Mr. Ambassador Bartholomew.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would defer to the subcommittee chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, but please go ahead.

Senator GORE. All right. First of all, let me say that I have listened very carefully to what both of you have said today. I want to congratulate both of you on the work that you have done.

Of course, I have worked especially closely with Jim Woolsey over the years, and I want to congratulate you, Jim.

I have an open mind as one member of this committee on what you are asking us to do. I expressed my concerns at the outset. But I thought both of you made very strong, well reasoned statements, and I think we ought to actively consider doing what you have asked.

But, you know, if the Senate grants what you ask, immediate ratification of this treaty as is, the Senate and the country would be agreeing to some very great uncertainties which are not at all guaranteed a solution.

And yet, our alternatives are not very good, either.

One alternative would be to ratify the treaty with amendments or conditions. You have addressed that in your responses. But I have also looked at some possible conditions by generic type. One would be to say that the treaty does not take effect without signification by the independent republics and others, and that its overall totals and verification rights apply to the whole of the former Soviet Union, regardless of the emergence of new states or a successor government to the present interim government of the former Soviet Union.

Another type of condition would be to say that the treaty is terminated if any republic denies its applicability or interferes with its operation.

Now, a disadvantage with either of those types of conditions would be, among other things, that it could encourage the republics to use this issue for leverage in the intramural rivalries inside the former Soviet Union, and this could actually have a perverse effect on the goals that we are trying to achieve.

I think I understand that. At the same time, logic would lead one to demand in this legal instrument some means of insuring its verification by the legitimate governmental authorities governing the territory on which the agreement is supposed to take hold.

Now a third option, in addition to one of these kinds of amendments or simply ratifying it immediately, as you have asked, would be to delay our action here to see what happens in the Ukraine. The Chairman earlier talked about the tremendous uncertainty there.

But, as I understand your interpretation of the treaty provisions, and it says so on its face, if it is not ratified by November 19, then certain provisional agreements will have to be renegotiated. Although you also note, as I understand your responses, that that process is already tentatively underway.

Now, just choosing at first blush between these three options, it seems to me that if the damage incurred by looking again at these provisional arrangements is not too great, the best course for the country might well be to let this settle long enough to at least see what happens in the Ukraine, where the largest adjustments to the overall Soviet totals could potentially take place, depending on what happens, and then anticipate the revisiting of these provisional arrangements.

I know that you would prefer, obviously, the immediate ratification. But you have also to recognize the position it puts us in in serving as representatives of the American people, looking at the risks our country faces. If some completely different governmental authority is going to be in charge of the area that this treaty covers, maybe we need to know a little bit more about who that government is before we ratify.

Do you wish to comment?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Senator, let me begin by saying that I, for one, can certainly understand, even appreciate, some skepticism here, some jumpiness about blank checks, "pigs in the poke," where are we going, this sort of thing. Please understand that we do not regard that as odd or unwarranted. These are extraordinary circumstances.

But on the other hand, what we would ask you is to say it is not a we/they situation. We share. They share. We are in this together.

As a matter of fact, I might say that the State Department, at least, along with most elements of the government, are not known for being wild gamblers where this kind of business is concerned.

The judgment that we have reached is that delay in the first instance, if I just take that concept, is not necessary to protect our interests and could be damaging.

I think we need to think very, very hard about how we will be read east of the Oder-and I use that to say both in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Soviet Union and any constituent element of it-if we Americans appear to be temporizing and uncertain about the future of this treaty.

I think it is extraordinarily important at this time that we say this treaty represents a stable security structure for Europe. It was negotiated in good faith by 22 nations. Everybody who counts has declared that they are ready to go with it. We have the Ukrainians now on the record, et cetera. The order of business today is to get on with it, to get it into place.

This is the powerful message that we think ought to be coming out of the United States at this point.

If we begin to get into delay, if we begin to ask specific questions about this, that, and the other thing, then we come back, I'm afraid, to the point that Jim Woolsey was making, and that is the need to lock this thing into place at an absolute cusp of history.

I was one of the ones who went through the MBFR wars that Senator Warner was talking about. Those who went through those wars know how unique this opportunity was. And, by the way, I have to take my hat off, along with you, to Jim Woolsey in terms of profiting from that moment and taking advantage of that moment. But it is not repeatable.

What we are putting into place is a security structure. We will lose it, I think, or we risk it, if we delay.

Now, nonetheless, I can say to you that we thought about it. Okay, we go ahead and we ratify it quickly. What can happen that could damage us or our interests? I suppose there might be scenarios. But, as near as we can see, the prospects of negative development are not the high prospects. The lead prospects are that in one way or the other we are going to get the constituent elements that count, starting with the Ukraine, starting with Byelorussia, to accede to the treaty, whatever the inter-republic structure that works; and that we do not need to have anything written because the treaty structure will permit us to adapt to that.

Suppose the Ukraine, running counter to everything they are saying publicly, et cetera, suppose somehow or other the Ukraine were to say no, we have changed our mind, we won't accede to the treaty. Well, I'm telling you here on this record that we think it is almost certainly necessary for the viability of the treaty that a Ukraine with significant forces come in. But there is nothing that leads us to believe at this time that this is a likely event, certainly nothing that would lead us to believe that it is worth sending a signal of hesitation at a time when we should be locking in something that not only we want-and I want to underscore this and I will end on this note, Senator Gore-not only something we want, we, the United States, but something that Czechs and Slovaks want, something that Hungarians, that Bulgarians want, something that I would submit to you many of the constituent elements of the Soviet Union want. This is because of the rules against concentration of force, because of rules that limit the amount of equipment that any one state, be it Russia, be it whoever, can have. So, that is why we-sharing some of the same questions that you do--come to the very firm conviction that the Nation's interest lies in Letting the treaty into place quickly.

Senator GORE. My time has long since expired.

Mr. Chairman, I don't know if Ambassador Woolsey had a response or not.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. If it would be all right, Mr. Chairman, I could say one added word. I think Under Secretary Bartholomew gave a fine answer on the delay issue.

On the first two points you raised, such as the possibility of a condition of some sort that the treaty would not take effect unless it applied to the whole of the U.S.S.R. west of the Urals, or that it would be terminated if any republic or seceding republic, let's say, or independent republic denied that the treaty would be in effect throughout the area, it seems to me that it really is important in these circumstances, with the turbulence of Nagorno Karabakh, and Moldova and so forth, to focus on those portions of the Union that, if they become independent and, as Under Secretary Bartholomew said, against our expectations decline to enter the treaty structure, what parts of the Union rise to that standard of creating potentially substantial difficulty in the overall balance of forces in Europe?

I would submit that, apart from Russia itself, it really is Ukraine and Byelorussia. We have quite reasonably acceded to the three Baltic States' wish for the time being not to join the treaty regime. They have other things to do. They may reconsider at some future point. They may well be looking to their northern neighbors, Sweden and Finland, who are not in the treaty regime. The treaty functions reasonably well without Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland-all countries that hold some reasonable degree of military forces.

The treaty can function without some of these smaller republics if that should take place. Although I would think it would be the position of the U.S. Government and perhaps of most of the other governments involved to strongly encourage any part of the former Soviet Union that declared independence----

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. That is our position.

Ambassador WOOLSEY [continuing]. To join the treaty regime. That is certainly what we would prefer.

But from the point of view of the Senate and the executive branch together, focusing on what we ought to do together to bring the weight of public attention and debate to the minds of those who would be making decisions that would be extremely important to the overall balance in that part of the world, it does seem to me that Byelorussia and the Ukraine are in a very different category from the others.

Senator GORE. Thank you both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Gore. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Bartholomew, this month is the first anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty. How many of the 22 signatories have ratified the treaty?

Assuming the Senate ratifies the treaty this year, when would you expect the treaty to enter into force?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, three countries have ratified-Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republic, and Hungary. Poland has completed the process. It is awaiting the President's signature. We have a number of countries on the NATO side that are near ratification--Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands. All that is required there is signature.

I would expect that, with a push for ratification coming from the United States now, by year's end we ought to be able to have this treaty in place. This would be my expectation, my target, our target, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Woolsey, I understand that some Soviet military leaders had voiced strong objections to the CFE Treaty. In fact, former Defense Minister Yazov is quoted as saying the treaty will never be ratified.

Has this opposition altered in any way since the August coup?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think it has substantially, Senator Thurmond.

Defense Minister Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev, at different times, were Under Secretary Bartholomew's and my counterparts across the table at various negotiations in Moscow over the course of the last year. They were, I think, not favorably disposed fundamentally toward the treaty, although, reluctantly, they came around by June and, in effect, abandoned their effort to exclude substantial amounts of Soviet equipment under this hokey rationale that they had dreamed up whereby they could put tanks in the navy and say they did not count.

It was a very difficult set of negotiations involving very serious levels of the U.S. Government at times, and it was a close thing.

The fact that both of them are no longer in the Ministry of Defense following the failed coup has got to be counted as a definite plus from the point of view of the likelihood of the Soviet Union's not only ratifying but also observing the treaty.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Bartholomew, after the November 19, 1990 treaty signing, there was a great deal of press on the accuracy of the Soviet Union's declared equipment holdings. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) there is still a difference of 2,000 to 3,000 weapons between Soviet data and Western estimates of Soviet holdings.

What is the administration's position on. these differences and what is it doing to resolve these differences?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, I think, as the Chairman said at the outset, the Select Committee on Intelligence is going to be holding hearings on that. I understood the Chairman to say that this committee would be doing this jointly with them.

I would suggest that the question be reserved and dealt with in that context.

Perhaps Ambassador Woolsey would like to say something. But it is something that I think would be best addressed there.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I can say something brief on it, Senator Thurmond, and then the details I think should be in closed session because a full understanding of this issue frankly involves understanding in some detail what U.S. national technical means of verification have discovered and how that might be at odds in some cases with Soviet data. This committee gets into those issues all the time. But it really should be done in closed session.

Let me just say generally, however, that the Soviets have stated that they moved some 57,000 pieces of equipment east of the Urals and destroyed some 10,900 pieces of equipment prior to the treaty taking effect.

We have been able to corroborate a share of this destruction in the zone, the 10,900 pieces of equipment, and a very substantial share of the withdrawals. There is still a question about-I would say in the very low number of thousands-as to whether some equipment was in fact actually removed to east of the Urals before November 19 or whether it was only planned to be removed and perhaps was under way. It is that dispute and that issue about which I would refer you to the closed session.

With respect to equipment left in the zone, there are several hundred pieces of ground equipment and several hundred aircraft, most of them older pieces of equipment, which the Soviets have indicated had been destroyed prior to November 19, but our own indications are that not all of them were destroyed prior to November 19. About that equipment, there is no dispute that there is something in the zone still. The question is, has it been destroyed or was it destroyed by the 19th or not.

Those are essentially the two pieces of the puzzle that it is going to be necessary for this committee to get into in some detail in the classified session if you are so inclined.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

I want to get back to the question of what happens if the Ukraine, for instance, does not agree to the treaty after it becomes fully independent.

First of all, is it clear that, if it does become independent, would it take an affirmative act on Ukraine's part to not be bound?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Our understanding and our view is that action by the Supreme Soviet to ratify this agreement will be binding on the Soviet union and all its constituent elements. So it would take an affirmative action on their part to withdraw from the treaty, which would be a violation.

Senator LEVIN. Under international law, once the Supreme Soviet or the ratifying body in the Union ratifies this treaty, assuming that takes place before full independence, on that assumption---

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. That's correct.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Then it would not only require that they withdraw from the Union, but that they affirmatively withdraw from the treaty in order for them not to be bound by that treaty? Is that correct?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. When is it that you have the Ukraine withdrawing from the Union?

Senator LEVIN. After the ratification.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Well after the ratification, then I think in international law, they continue to be bound by the agreement.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying that if the treaty is ratified on November 19, or by November 19---

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. By the Soviet Union.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. By the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine withdraws next January fully and completely from the Union, that they are still bound by the treaty and cannot withdraw from the treaty?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator Levin, there are two broad theories of international law on this question.

First of all, let me make sure that I have the hypothetical clear. The Supreme Soviet ratifies. Then Ukraine declares independence. The question is at that point, is the Ukraine in the treaty or out of the treaty?

The answer is there are two theories of international law on this point.

The first is embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has even signed, much less ratified, that convention. Under that convention, however, which embodies one view of this issue, when there is a secession from a state that is a party to the treaty-and I am going to ask my counsel here to correct me if I am wrong on any of this-when there is a secession from a state that is a party to a treaty, the obligations of all portions of that former state continue unless that state was a colonial empire, in which case it is only the central power that retains the rights and duties.

One can get into a great tangle here. Is the Soviet Union a colonial empire? Some would say in part, some would say in whole. It is an ambiguity. Again, that is a view which is expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and was not acceded to either by the United States or the Soviet Union.

A separate view is embodied in the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. That view is that the successor state is essentially the large and dominant state, and the successor state automatically assumes the rights and duties of the treaty. If a smaller state splits off, that smaller state does not have such rights and duties.

As a practical matter here, regardless of this historical conflict in international law, if the Ukraine declares independence from the Union following ratification of the treaty by the Soviet Union, I think it will be clear to all concerned that, in order to make the situation clear, we need to get an affirmative decision from the Ukraine to accede to the treaty.

This is too complicated a treaty to make the assumption that something is going to happen. I think everyone involved in Europe, in the United States, in Canada, all parties to the treaty would press the Ukraine to accede in some fashion. That is probably what would happen, in spite of the fact that you can find an international theory that would say they were bound automatically.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. But, Senator, it needs to be stressed again that we have now, on October 30---

Senator LEVIN. I heard that. It still leaves open the question.

I am a little bit surprised to hear what you said, that we, in the absence of an affirmative act on the part of the Ukraine, would take the view or might take the view that they are not bound by a treaty that the Union of which they were a member signed? Is that the position?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. No.

Senator, our position is if the Ukraine has not declared its independence before the ratification of this treaty by the Supreme Soviet, then all parts of the Supreme Soviet, whether they become independent or not, are bound by the treaty. That is my understanding.

Senator LEVIN. And can they become unbound by an affirmative act is the next question?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes, certainly they can become unbound by an affirmative act.

Senator LEVIN. Your first answer is in the absence of an affirmative act they are bound. That seems to me to be the only position that we can take as a country, not just. toward this particular situation but toward any situation. I don't think we want seceding states to have to affirmatively say they are bound by treaties of unions to which they had belonged. Otherwise, the Ukraine would have to support every single treaty affirmatively that the Soviet Union ever entered into. I don't think we can take that position. But that is just question one, that unless they act, they are affirmatively bound.

The second question is can they unbind themselves by an affirmative action. What is the position of this administration on that question? Can they?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Certainly if you assume that they are bound after they secede as a result of the prior ratification, then certainly they can withdraw from the treaty. They can do so under Article 19 of the treaty.

Senator LEVIN. But only in that fashion?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. If you assume that they are bound, they can withdraw.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. It needs to be said, Senator, that there is a political and a technical dimension to this that I would bring forward.

One, we are having a bit of difficulty with this because we are assuming that, from everything we have seen, where the Ukraine is going. The technical thing is the Ukraine would have to take certain steps in order to be part of the treaty structure. For example, it would be required to reach some understanding in the Group of Six as to what share it was going to have of the Group of Six equipment entitlements. There would be a number of steps, positive steps, that it would have to take in that regard.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Woolsey, Article 5, paragraph (b) of the treaty allows a state party to deploy treaty limited equipment on a temporary-basis on the flanks. In the article-by-article analysis of the CFE Treat, it states that, and I quote: "It should be noted that Article 5 does not specify a time limit for such temporary deployments."

Can you tell us why there is no definition for "temporary deployments?" What baseline should the United States or the other members of the Group of Sixteen use to determine whether another state party has exceeded the temporary basis rule on Article 5?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator, first of all, one thing to note about the history of this Article 5 provision-it is sometimes colloquially called the "Norwegian Flow provision" because it was an idea that came from the Norwegian delegation-is that the numbers that are involved are quite small. Any one country, for example, could only temporarily augment its forces by 153 tanks. This is not tiny, but it is relatively small in terms of the overall numbers of pieces of equipment in Europe or even those based on the flanks.

It was introduced into the treaty as a way of permitting a temporary reinforcement of a flank country by someone, some country, such as the United States, in a crisis or a tense situation in which it felt that it needed to have its forces augmented. The reason that it was done was that, up until relatively late in the negotiations, there was no cap on the equipment in the flanks. The equipment allocations that were not used in the central part of Europe or in the rear could be used in the flanks. So the flanks of Europe would, in a sense, be the residual area and could have had very, very large levels of reinforcement.

What this did was cut back on that in two substantial ways-one was to make the reinforcement relatively small, and the other was to add the notion which you alluded to, that the redeployment or the reinforcement could only be on a temporary basis.

I think the only thing one has to go on by way of pouring some content into that word temporary" would be the negotiating history. I would think that most of the people who participated in the negotiations would say that we are talking about something measured in weeks and months, but not years. But, beyond that, I think one has to understand that in a 111-page treaty of this sort which covers this number of issues, there is, on some questions such as this one that involve compromises, going to be some level of ambiguity, and there is a bit of ambiguity with respect to what "temporary" means in those circumstances.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Woolsey, in the Preamble to the CFE Treaty, it states that, and I quote: "Recalling that they signed or acceded to the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 and the Treaty of Washington of 1949, or the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955, and that they had the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance," does this preclude, for example, a member of the Group of Six from entering into a security alliance structure with the Group of Sixteen in the future? Or does it preclude a former republic of the former Soviet Union from joining the Group of Sixteen alliance system? Ambassador WOOLSEY. No, Senator Thurmond. It precludes neither.

It is not at all necessary for a country to be part of an alliance or even to avoid changing alliances in order for it to continue to participate in the treaty in the way that it has.

This was a major aspect of the transition that we engineered from these bloc-to-bloc obligations to the national limitations set forth in Article 7. Essentially, what that article does is make it clear that, once a country has its allocation of equipment-as the countries of the East do now, for example, under the Treaty of Budapest of early November of last year-that allocation is theirs. No other member of their alliance may take it away from them, even if they do not use it.

The only thing in the treaty that I would note here is, if a state wished not only to join a different alliance or form an alliance or join an alliance that it was not a member of before, but if it also wanted to change the group of states to which it belonged under the treaty, which would require some reallocation of equipment, then any country may call an extraordinary conference under the treaty.

That is the only right that anyone has that is even associated with this business of alliances or groups of states. Generally speaking, we made all of the changes I think that would be necessary to make it possible for a country to participate---or not participate---in whatever alliance it would want to, even though under the treaty it was originally, as the negotiation started, in one alliance or the other.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, if you could respond with short answers on this round, just think of it as the "lightening round," if you would. I want to cover a lot of ground quickly here.

First of all, in connection with your assertion that it is important for us to act before November 19 in order to avoid the renegotiation of these provisional terms because, if all the parties do not do it, then it has to be renegotiated, isn't it a fact that the French National Assembly has served notice it does not intend to take this matter up until after November 19, and that, as a result, these provisional arrangements will likely have to be renegotiated whether we ratify it or not?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. That's true, Senator.

Senator GORE. All right. Let me move on, then.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. And the pressure for early ratification is not in terms of the problem of provisional arrangements. It's much larger.

Senator GORE. It's that we might rattle the other parties if we don't move expeditiously.

Okay, I want to clarify that because in your responses here, you gave the other justification. I want to clarify that for the record.

Now, in connection with the legal argument that the Ukraine will be bound whether it declares independence December 1 or not-and you can respond to this for the record-it is my understanding that the Ukraine is presently not sitting in the Supreme Soviet. If the Supreme Soviet ratifies this agreement with the Ukraine not sitting as a member of the Supreme Soviet, is it still bound under your legal theory?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes. Our understanding under our legal theory is it is still bound.

May I take this opportunity on the question which Senator Levin raised, of what happens after that, to say that I would like to submit a more considered answer for the record.

Senator GORE. Surely.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. It appears that my answer did not capture all of the nuances and the fine points of the two legal schools that are involved here, Senator, and I don't want to mislead you.

[The information follows:]

Senator GORE. I think that all of us should look at your expanded responses for the record with more than the usual care because you ought to be accorded the right to really do, this thoroughly for the record. These are extraordinary circumstances, and it is not a question of you walking in here and us quizzing you about something that you have to know off the top of your head. We have never faced a situation quite like this on either side of the table here, and we want you to have the time to think about it thoroughly.

But, just as we want to afford you that time to think about getting your answers straight, we are asking you to consider whether or not the Senate ought to have time to get the answers that we need in order to act responsibly in behalf of the American people.

Now, Ukrainian President Kravchek was quoted in the September 30 Washington Post as saying, after his meeting with President Bush, "Deep in his heart the President is ready to think of the Ukraine as an independent state. He is waiting f6r the referendum. He told me that."

Now if that is the case, will the United States recognize the Ukraine after December 1, or will we simultaneously refuse to recognize them and demand continued compliance with the treaty ratified by the Supreme Soviet with the Ukraine not. sitting as a member? And if we don't know the answer to that question, should we nevertheless, rush to ratify this treaty in ignorance of the answer, prior to November 19, notwithstanding the fact that the French are not going to do it anyway?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, first of all I won't accept a newspaper report that what the Ukrainian President said about the President of the United States' policy is a definitive statement about the President of the United States' policy on this question. I think you will understand that.

On the other question, it is a larger question which I cannot prejudice here with an answer. I do not believe, though, that the answer to that question prejudices the case that we are making here for early and prompt ratification of the treaty.

Senator GORE. All right. Now here is the real question that is worrying me more than the others that I have asked.

Our exchanges today have focused quite often on the issue of whether or not the Ukraine would be bound by the treaty after independence, and the thrust of all your responses is that yes, under this theory or that theory, one way or another, it will be bound.

It seems to me that there is a subsidiary question that is even more important. If the Ukraine claims rights under this treaty, then all of the other limits have to be adjusted downward to reflect the Ukrainian claim.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No.

Senator GORE. Is that wrong?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. That's wrong, Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. The ceilings afforded the Russian Republic as part of the unified government succeeding the U.S.S.R., would they not be affected by a claim on the part of the Ukraine?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Those ceilings are not in the treaty, Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Yes, but they are indirectly in the treaty, aren't they, because of the ceilings applied to the Central Government?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. There's a big difference. Let me explain.

Senator GORE. All right.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. What is in the treaty is, for example, a limit of 20,000 tanks in the East, 16,500 tanks in active units in the East, regional limits and a sufficiency rule. As between, for example, Bulgaria and Romania, there is nothing in the treaty that states or limits directly how many tanks Bulgaria is going to have, how many Romania is going to have. It was necessary, and along with the other four states of the East, they did get together and divide up their allocation of equipment so that they would not exceed any of the treaty ceilings.

The same would be true of the Ukraine following this, let's call it a "hypothetical," but, nonetheless, perhaps it will occur, declaration of Ukrainian independence. If we make the assumption that the Ukraine, after the treaty is ratified by the Union, that the Ukraine declares independence and then chooses to accede to the. treaty, yes, it will be necessary for the Ukraine to get together with the surviving parts of the Union and to divide up allocations of tanks, artillery, et cetera. But that is done outside the treaty, just as the Treaty of Budapest among the six countries of the East was negotiated outside the treaty, and just as NATO has divided up its equipment outside the treaty.

The point is there are not any treaty ceilings that need to be changed if the Ukraine has to divide up equipment with Russia or with the surviving part of the Union. That is why the treaty is flexible enough to deal with the circumstances that might ensue.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. May I just make this one follow-up comment. I will not be able to stay for the third round.

I understand and appreciate the way you phrased your response, Ambassador Woolsey. But the fact is that, one way or another, the adjustment has to be made, and the adjustment process within the Soviet Union is one thing. The adjustment process between an independent Ukraine and an independent Russian republic is something altogether different.

It is easy enough to assume that the Ukraine and the Russian republic will somehow work this out. And maybe under these extraordinary circumstances that is the correct assumption for us to make. But, in doing so, we are running the risk that it has to be done or else we are put at a severe disadvantage under the treaty.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. But, Senator Gore, what disadvantage?

Senator GORE. Well, if they do not work it out, then the ceilings that apply in aggregate are not complied with. If the rest of the Soviet Union plans according to the limits that it has now, the Ukraine pulls out and independently claims 400,000 of this or that, then we rely on the good faith of the rest of the former Soviet Union to adjust downward what it was otherwise planning to do.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, I said earlier that in our view it would be almost certainly necessary for the viability of the treaty for the Ukraine to participate in the treaty because of its significant amount of forces. We are acknowledging that critical point.

The point is we do not prejudice our options, we do not put ourselves at any disadvantage in facing that which is not the most likely outcome by moving now. That is, I think, a very important point.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator Gore, let me add this. There are all sorts of incentives for the Ukraine to make an agreement with the surviving Union just as there were for the five East European countries to agree with the Soviet Union in November of last year in Budapest. It is only if there is a functioning treaty that the Ukraine will be able to limit the equipment in the surviving Union and in Russia. It is only with a CFE Treaty, I would imagine most of the countries of Europe are going to say, that the Ukraine would be permitted in a happy and early spirit to join the family of nations in Europe. If the Ukraine made its debut by destroying the CFE Treaty, it would seem not to be looking toward a show that got raves.

Senator GORE. All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I still have an open mind and I appreciate the extra time. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Gore.

I believe, Senator Levin, that you have not yet had your second round.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What percentage of the treaty limited equipment is in the Ukraine, just roughly? Just take tanks.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Roughly, for tanks, of the Soviets or of--did you ask of the Soviet total or of the total of tile Group of Six?

Senator LEVIN. The total of the Group of Six, of the 20,000 tanks?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Jim, you'd better do the math. Here are the numbers.

Senator LEVIN. How many tanks. I'll give you the percentage; you give me the tanks.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Roughly 6,500 tanks.

Senator LEVIN. So it's about a third.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. We calculate it as a share of the Soviet equipment west of the Urals, which is 39 percent. But we had not calculated it as a share of the 20,000 in the East or the 40,000 in Europe as a whole.

Senator LEVIN. Would you supply that for the record?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes, we will.

[The information follows:]

Senator LEVIN. Anyway, a significant proportion of the treaty limited equipment is in the Ukraine now.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Of the Soviet Union's treaty limited equipment, yes.

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Now, could Moscow decide, if they wanted to, to remove all treaty limited equipment from the Ukraine, or is the requirement for geographical dispersion such that they could not do that consistent with the counting rules?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. No, they could.

Senator LEVIN. They could?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. But in so doing, they would have to continue to observe the zonal limits and what that might mean.

Senator LEVIN. But could they observe the zonal limits and still remove all of the equipment from the Ukraine?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. They could always pull it back. It is a logistical and cost matter. It would be expensive for them. But you can always, under the treaty, pull your equipment back. So they could pull everything in the Ukraine back to the Moscow and the Volga-Ural military districts, if they wanted to.

Senator LEVIN. All right.

Do we have any preference from our security perspective as to where that equipment should be located--still west of the Urals?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Well, we have reached an agreement that says where we are, that defines what we think is a stable situation in terms of force deployments.

Senator LEVIN. But within that agreement.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. And it shifts it. It is obvious that the principle that we followed-and it is not a surprising one-was as far away from the potential line of contact as possible.

Senator LEVIN. So do we have a preference, then, as to in the area that the 20,000 tanks are allowed, for instance, as to where in that area they will be?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Our preference is expressed by the zonal limits of the treaty, as it exists.

Senator LEVIN. And within those possibilities, we have no preference?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. That is a question you might ask the defense representatives, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. All right.

Is it clear that if the Ukraine, for instance, withdraws from the Soviet Union, is totally independent, and affirmatively disassociates itself from the treaty that we would then have the right, in turn, to withdraw from the treaty? Is there any doubt about that?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No, there is no doubt, Senator Levin. You can withdraw under Article 19 for reasons stated there and overwhelming reasons related to national security. Certainly a country the size of the Ukraine, if it had substantial military forces, would I think, also be regarded as a fundamental change of circumstances under the treaty, the old doctrine of "rebus sic stantibus."

Senator LEVIN. So, when the Secretary said we could ratify promptly and still have all of our options open, that is one of the options that we would have if, in fact, the Ukraine decided both to become totally independent and not to be bound by the treaty?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Absolutely right.

Senator LEVIN. That would be fully open to us?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. So we would be no worse off then than we would be by not ratifying the treaty?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Now, there are two things which strike me here about the options that face us. We can wait and see what happens. That is one option. Or we can ratify. There is a third option which is a variety of the wait and see option, although I am not sure.

But at least we have two options. One is to wait and see what happens with the events in the Soviet Union, as to what happens with these republics. Are they going to become independent or not? Is the Ukraine going to be a country or not, and so forth.

It seems to me there are two disadvantages to that that are compelling. One is the leverage that it gives to the republics over each other or that it might give to the republics over each other. That, in turn, might contribute to chaos and instability in the Soviet Union.

The second is the signal which would be sent by nonratification. It would, in and of itself, be destabilizing and contribute to the very chaos which we are trying, I hope, to avoid.

Now, those seem to me to be factors which we have to weigh in these circumstances, and they strike me as being very potent factors, since all of our options are open after ratification if any party withdraws, including any subsequent party, such as the Ukraine, if she becomes independent and does withdraw. If all of those options are open after ratification, it seems to me that the advantages of ratification become weighty, indeed.

I gather I have a few more moments here, so what I would like to press you on is the question of chaos and disintegration. One of the things that strikes me is that we are facing a very brief opportunity in all likelihood. The odds are that democracy is not going to succeed in the Soviet Union and that we are going to have chaos and disintegration and God knows what as a result will follow.

Can you comment on whether or not---be a little more specific--- the failure to ratify this treaty will contribute to such destabilization. You said so, but be more specific and tell UB why such instability would not be in our security interest.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. I would put it positively, Senator. I think we would miss a real bet in terms of contributing to a frame-work that could help stabilize the situation.

There are all kinds of stresses. I know that we felt them particularly when I went to Moscow recently, following up on the President's nuclear initiatives. We are doing business in a different way. The situation is evolving. I have to say that, even in the span of 5 or 6 weeks, you have a different sense and a different feel for attitudes and outlooks where all of this is concerned.

I do think it is a unique opportunity. We have a chance to get them and everybody else in that strategic area to agree on force limits, how much equipment people are going to have, where it is going to be, to agree to accept inspection, to agree to exchange information. Everything is front-loaded to go in that direction. The incentives are all there for them.

They want, most of them, as near as we can see, particularly the key republics--Byelorussia and the Ukraine-want Western acceptance. This is part of joining the Western process, becoming part of Europe.

At the same time, with the stresses and strains that are underway, we just feel that to wait, you risk this becoming caught up in the politics of working out one dimension or another of the relationship there, and this is very, very dangerous. So I think that what we would be doing is a negative thing in the sense of missing an opportunity to take a step that is among the few steps we can take from the outside to give some sort of form and structure to help stabilize that situation, and in our own interest, I might say.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator Levin, I might add that Under Secretary Bartholomew has shown that he is a diplomat by profession. I am a practicing lawyer by profession who has just temporarily detoured into the diplomatic trade.

Let me be very blunt. We have seen in Yugoslavia what ethnic and nationalistic rivalries can produce. I would not think that the United States would want to be involved through delay on this treaty, in even having a small hand in helping turn the former Soviet Union into a Yugoslavia.

Now that would not be the only thing that would help cause it. But our not showing leadership on this treaty could be one contributing factor in chaos and civil war in the Soviet Union, and I would very much hate to see that happen. I think prompt ratification is one thing that tilts against that. It will not necessarily prevent it. But it can help in the ways that Secretary Bartholomew said.

I think the image of Yugoslavia ought to be in everyone's mind in thinking about what the consequences might be for that part of the world of not having a prompt ratification of CFE.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Bartholomew, Ambassador Woolsey has stated that there are two schools of thought with respect to whether the Ukraine would be legally bound by the treaty. Which is the official position of the U.S. Government, upon which the Senate should base its advice and consent for his treaty?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator as I said earlier, following up on my answer to Senator Levin, I would like to give you and the Senator an answer for the record on that, if I may.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you. You may answer for the record.

[The information follows:]

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Bartholomew and Ambassador Woolsey, either one of you, how is Article 5 of the treaty affected if the Ukraine gained its independence and - maintained its own army? Specifically, how would the limitations on the flanks, for example, the deployment of forces in the Odessa military district, be affected by such a situation?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. If the Ukraine becomes wholly independent of the Union, Senator Thurmond and joins the treaty, then it would have all of the Carpathian and Kiev military districts and the bulk of the Odessa military district, excluding really only Moldova, within its territory.

As a first and initial matter, we, I think, and all the other participants would simply expect the Ukraine to observe the limitations on deployments that are included in Article 5 and in the rest of the tr6aty within those military district boundaries. The Ukraine would thus be like the Union or Russia itself, and would have several military districts within its territory.

As time went on, you might find that a Ukraine that was a full and participating member of the treaty would suggest that some of the numerical limitations, as between its various military districts, were ones that it would like to propose changes in. It could make such proposals. The other countries could consider those changes and they could go through a normal amendment process.

But, as a first matter, we would expect that the Ukraine, as an independent country, would observe the limitations that exist now in Article 5.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Woolsey, the former Warsaw Pact Group of Six countries entered into a formal treaty or agreement to allocate among themselves a total TLE allocation under CFE. What mechanism was used by the NATO countries to allocate TLE among the 16 countries? In the article-by-article analysis of Article 7, it states, and I quote: "Assuming that the Group of Sixteen has fully apportioned its allotment of 20,000 battle tanks, Germany could only increase its maximum levels (by 500) by obtaining agreement from one or more states parties within the Group of Sixteen to decrease their maximum levels for battle tanks by an aggregate number of 500."

For purposes of clarification, does this mean that any country unilaterally could allow Germany, to use this example, to transfer a portion of its allotment for tanks? Or would agreement of all 16 countries in the group be required for such a reallocation?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator Thurmond, the mechanism within NATO has been an organization called the High Level Task Force Reinforced, which has meant that there has been substantial participation from the Ministries of Defense in Europe and the Defense Department in the United States.

They have worked on a so-called Straw Man Proposal that has been revised a number of times, as provided by General Galvin and his staff. There has been, as a result of that work over a number of months, a plan agreed upon by all of NATO for not only the initial allocation of maximum levels for holdings, but also the cascading, that is, the deployment of equipment from principally the United States and Germany, relatively modern equipment, to recipient states within NATO. Those are principally Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.

As those several thousand pieces of equipment are moved, the end result will be that older pieces of equipment in the recipient countries are destroyed, and the only slightly, let's say the "middle aged" equipment, such as M-6OA3 tanks and the like that is being given to those countries, will not have to be destroyed by the United States and Germany, but, rather, will be able to be used by the recipient countries.

Now, once that is all in place, and we hope that that will be the case within 16 months, assuming that the cascading occurs---and legislation, by the way, approving that is pending before the House and the Senate---then, when the treaty is in force and effect, let's say several years out in the future, it would only be necessary--- provided no treaty limits, including zonal limits and active limits are exceeded---it would only be necessary for two affected countries to agree between the two of them to a change.

Let's say that Germany decides that it wants 100 fewer tanks and the Netherlands decides that it wants 100 more. Under the treaty, two participating countries that are part of the same zone, the 4.4 zone, can change those allocations themselves. But NATO has done the CFE allocation as part of normal defense planning. So I would imagine that all countries would be consulted. But as a treaty matter, once this is all set up, only the two affected countries would have to agree to make the change.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman I am going to have to leave. There may be a few additional questions that I may want to put into the record.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Thurmond.

Let me pose a few questions to both of you, I guess starting with the Secretary,

In response to an advance question from the committee, Secretary of State Baker stated: "It is the view of the administration that, in order to safeguard the integrity of the treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for Ukraine and Byelorussia, if they were not bound as part of the U.S.S.R. or any successor state, and retained significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories, to accede to the CFE Treaty."

I recognize there are many indications emanating from the Ukraine, including the October 30 communique between the Ukraine and Russia which, Mr. Secretary, you referred to earlier here, indicating that the Ukraine. intends to observe the CFE Treaty. But what would the administration do if the Ukraine became a fully independent and sovereign state with a very large standing army that was not under Central Soviet control, and then they chose not to join the CFE? What would be the options, at least, that the administration would have?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Well, I think the first thing I have to say is you are in the question addressing the case that is in the response that was furnished to you. It says that that kind of situation would almost certainly call into question the viability of the treaty and that would open up a whole range of options, including the question of bringing pressure to bear on the Ukraine to come back into line with the treaty including, ultimately, not just on our part but on the part of other participants, raising the question of the continuation of the treaty.

But all of our options would be open at that time. I. might say, Senator, that for having ratified the treaty beforehand, we would have given nothing away.

Chairman NUNN. Would the administration object to a condition put on by the Senate that would be binding on the President but which would not require the action or the consent of the other CFE parties specifying at least the minimum steps that should be taken in response to that kind of development?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, I think that the administration's position is that we think that the treaty offers sufficient flexibility to adapt; that all of our options are maintained, so that there is no need for such a condition; and that, in fact, such a condition could not help in the cause of holding others to this agreement and getting this agreement put through quickly.

Chairman NUNN. Even if it were framed in a way that the other parties would not have any kind of----

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. No, I understand that and I appreciate the effort that you are making, Senator. But, again, let me take a phrase that was used by Senator Gore.

These are extraordinary circumstances and we want to offer as few chances for second guessing, to the other 21 participants or maybe more participants, as possible. It makes us even more conservative on this question than we normally are as an administration, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Ambassador, after CFE was signed last November, the submission of the treaty to the Senate was held up for about 8 months due to the unacceptable Soviet effort to reinterpret the provisions of the accord relating to naval, infantry, and certain other forces. You have already alluded to that, correct?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. [Nods affirmatively.]

Chairman NUNN. That dispute was resolved by a separate international agreement in the form of a statement by the Soviet Union on June 14, 1991, a statement by the United States on the same date responding to the Soviet statement, and statements identical in content made by the 20 other states parties to CFE. Is that correct?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. That is correct, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. I assume that we would not be here today considering this treaty if that step had not been taken. Is that correct?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think that is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. According to the President's July 9, 1991 letter of transmittal, the June 14 agreement on naval, infantry, and other post-signature issues, while legally binding, is "associated with but not part of the treaty." Is that correct?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Does the June 14 agreement have the same legal weight and effect under international law as the treaty itself?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. That is my understanding. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Why is that? Is there a particular provision of international law that could be cited, or would you put something in the record in that respect?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. It is, in effect, an Executive Agreement that has been submitted to the Senate, along with the treaty, but is equally binding in international law, is my understanding, as the treaty itself.

Chairman NUNN. During the Senate ratification proceedings on the INF Treaty in 1988, time resolution of ratification was amended to include a condition stating that the Senate's advice and consent to that treaty was subject to the condition that the INF side agreements on the definition of the term "weapon delivery vehicle" and certain verification matters were of the same force and effect as the provisions of the treaty.

Secretary Bartholomew, would the administration object to a similar condition dealing with a naval-infantry side agreement being attached to the resolution of ratification on CFE?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator, I think our view is that this is, again, adequately covered by the fact that we have submitted it as an Executive Agreement. We are treating the October 18 agreement where the Baltics are concerned in much the same way, as something that will go up together with the treaty but not be one of the documents for formal ratification.

Given what we thin is adequate treatment of it, combined with the desire to avoid raising any questions or offering any openings, even though I understand the terms which you are talking about, I think that would lead us to believe that we would prefer to stand with the, treaty as written.

Chairman NUNN. On October 18, 1991, the states parties to the CFE concluded a legally-binding side agreement dealing with the accountability and inspectability of Soviet forces in the independent Baltic nations. Is that correct?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Does that agreement have the same force and effect as provisions of the treaty?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Would you furnish also for the record the legal backing for that?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes.

[The information follows:]

• Both agreements are separate, legally-binding international obligations of the 22 States Parties which are associated with, but not part of the treaty.
• Neither agreement, taken alone, requires ratification as it does not limit U.S. Armed Forces or armaments, only Soviet armaments.
  --- However, as documents relevant to the treaty, and in accordance with past practice, they have been transmitted for the information of the Senate.

Chairman NUNN. Would the administration object to a Senate condition that would make that understanding explicit, Mr. Secretary?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Could we repeat my previous answer for the record, Senator?

Chairman NUNN. You're taking the Fifth again, then? [Laughter.]

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Well, no, Senator. I understand the concern that you are expressing and also appreciate the spirit that you are talking about where these conditions are concerned. It is just that we think we have covered ourselves quite adequately where the seriousness of these agreements are concerned. Second, we are concerned about the risks not here but elsewhere.

Chairman NUNN. What would you advise? Would it be the same advice with regard to a Senate condition requiring the Baltic authorities to formally agree to allow such inspections?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. On formally requiring them to permit such inspections, Mr. Chairman, there have been some, I think, very skillfully handled discussions with the Baltic States, skillfully handled by my successor, Ambassador Hansen, the current CFE negotiator. I believe that the situation that has resulted from those discussions is one in which the Baltic States, although they at the present writing are not inclined to become formal members of the treaty, are quite inclined to invite the other states in to inspect the Union forces that are left in the Baltic States for a period of time during withdrawal.

I think that the diplomacy in this situation is somewhat delicate. We want to be careful, for example, that in conducting such inspections or being invited to conduct such inspections, we do not end up applying each and every item of the treaty because some of them that would relate to. cost, for example, and so forth, might not be acceptable to the Baltic States.

Frankly, I think that the best way to handle this is probably to keep it outside the framework of the treaty, to stay with the legally binding agreement among the 22 countries about the equipment counting, and to leave it up to the diplomatic discussions to help produce political invitations from the Baltic States for us and the other states to inspect Union forces in the Baltics to an adequate degree.

I think that will probably ultimately be the solution that would be preferred by the Baltic States as well.

Chairman NUNN. When we were working out the naval-infantry dispute, could you tell us why we did not insist on a Soviet statement confirming that the Soviet interpretation of the relevant articles of the treaty was the same as the 21 other states parties, rather than having a separate agreement which established obligations outside the treaty?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. We would have been quite pleased to have had that. That would have meant a total Soviet general staff capitulation in theory as well as in practice.

As it was, we were willing to have them agree to count all of their naval infantry and coastal defense equipment toward all of the treaty's ceilings and to agree that they had a legally binding obligation to do so.

It was only on that basis that we were able to get the solution in June of this year. Had we foreseen the August coup and the failure of it I suppose we might have said that in the aftermath of that, the Soviets, with a somewhat different Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, might have agreed in theory as well as in practice to go along with the position of all other 21 countries.

However, even under what we did obtain in June, it is quite clear that, if the Soviet Union has one tank more than they are supposed to have under the treaty, whether that is in storage, in an active unit, in the wrong military zone, in overall limits or whatever, that will be-according to 22 countries, including the Soviet Union-a violation of an international, legally binding agreement; and according to 21 countries, it will also be a violation of the treaty itself.

We felt that winning this issue on all the substantive points after working on it for 7 months was a reasonably good achievement, and we were willing, at the beginning of June, to settle for that.

Chairman NUNN. We have to do that frequently in conference with the House. [Laughter.]

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know that you are going to submit for the record the answer to the question about whether or not the Ukraine, for instance, would be bound to this treaty if subsequent to its ratification by the Supreme Soviet it became fully independent. That is fine. I am a little troubled, though and I want to alert you to this, by the State Department's answer to questions on this point to the Foreign Relations Committee, so that you can be alerted to what my concern is in preparing that answer.

For instance, on page 14 of the answers, it says: "The administration does not believe it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the CFE Treaty. In the case of the Ukraine, it is the administration's position that it almost certainly would be necessary for a fully independent Ukraine with significant amounts of equipment in treaty categories to become a treaty participant."

I think there is at least a 50/50 chance that the State Department is going to argue that it already is bound by the treaty and that it would have to act to no longer be bound by the treaty, rather than it-would have to act to become a treaty participant.

The ramifications of this are significant, by the way. As to whether it takes an affirmative act to be bound or whether it takes an affirmative act to be unbound is a very significant distinction and for all kinds of reasons.

I was a little surprised by that answer. I'd say the same thing for page 13. There is a number of places where it was stated that way.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Senator Levin, as I said to you earlier, I think it is my answer to your question that leads you to think that there is a 50/50 chance of the State Department coming out with the view that you just said.

I think that from what I am hearing about some of the nuances here, it may be less than 50 percent that we will come out there.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying that you think it is likely that the State Department position is going to be that it would take an affirmative act on the part of the Ukraine to be bound by this treaty if it became fully independent after ratification by the Supreme Soviet? Is that what you are saying?

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. I think our position is partially based on a need to make sure that there is an avoidance of any ambiguity whatsoever, and that supports the case for a positive act of affirmation.

Senator, I think we need to give this to you in a more considered form than I can here, and I would appreciate the opportunity to do so for the record.

Senator LEVIN. Yes, okay.

[The information follows:]

Senator LEVIN. I just would alert you, when you make those answers, to take a look at the answers that have already been submitted because I do think that there is a problem in the way that has been characterized.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Your question is not the phrase almost certainly." Your question is the "becomes."

Senator LEVIN. Oh, yes.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator Levin, may I just add one point to this.

Unlike the situation with INF, START, and SALT, this multilateral treaty-and there are at least 20 other views that are going to be important here-I think that the likelihood is very strong that wherever countries might come down, whether on the Restatement side or the Vienna Convention side, which I described---a lot of countries are going to want the Ukraine or any republic that secedes from the Union to take some positive action. But I also think we have a very good chance of obtaining that positive action.

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is true. But once you say that it might be necessary, then, if you don't get it, you are giving certain leverage to a whole bunch of republics and creating certain implications in terms of relationships there as to whether or not they are bound by treaties of the Soviet Union when they were part of the Soviet Union at the time the treaties were ratified.

I have no problem with the "almost certainly" part if the answer were it would almost certainly be necessary for us to be satisfied that the Ukraine is bound to the treaty.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. However that is.

Senator LEVIN. However you reach that conclusion.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. You can take that as the answer now, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Well, that's fine. But it leaves open the question.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. But certainly, what we are trying to say there, Senator, is--and if I could put into brackets the exact legal question, which I will come back to--what we are saying is one way or the other; however, it almost certainly would be necessary for the viability of the treaty for the Ukraine, if it had significant forces, to be part of that treaty."

Senator LEVIN. For us to conclude that it is part of the treaty one way or another.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. I think that is the correct way to answer the question, rather than "to become bound."

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, to get caught up in the legal thing there.

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

In any event, I just want to alert you to those answers which have been given already on the record.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. I appreciate that, and we will correct how we answer that question, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. The only other request that I have is this, and it is for the record.

Actually, I have two questions. One is that Ambassador Woolsey, you stated your opinion that it may be very difficult to repeat another CFE-type treaty in Europe. Are you suggesting, then, that there is very little likelihood of success of the CFE-1A or the Follow-on Negotiations? Was that your intent?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think CFE-1A will concentrate heavily on manpower limitations. We all certainly hope they will be successful by next spring.

Manpower limitations inherently have more problems of verification than limitations on hardware. But it will be a valuable adjunct to have personnel limitations and we hope that is successful.

Following that, the now 38 countries of the CSCE will decide on the follow-on scope of their efforts. I would simply say that whatever may be achieved this year or thereafter by way of stabilizing measures, and some of those are extremely useful, my own personal prediction would be that further hardware reductions of the sort that CFE was able to achieve are not going to be extraordinarily likely in the near term. They may occur. Various countries may propose them.

But the main point I was trying to make in my statement was that, if we scrap this framework, coming up with a new framework that everyone can agree to, starting over and renegotiating some of these very difficult verification provisions, numerical limitations and the like would, I think, really not be possible in the foreseeable future. If we scrap this by delay and other countries take the lead and say well, the United States is not interested in moving forward on this, so let's not do it, then I think starting over and coming up with another CFE Treaty would be virtually impossible any time in the foreseeable future.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I do have a couple of requests for the record. They are kind of technical, having to do with manpower levels, equipment levels, budget levels of both NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. I would appreciate it if those could be promptly answered.

You are, seeking prompt action on the part of the Senate, so we really have to put some pressure on you, I am afraid, for prompt answers.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. We will approach them in that spirit, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Mr. Woolsey, I assume by that last answer that you are indicating to us that you are not going to volunteer to renegotiate this. Is that correct?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Senator Nunn, I am happily ensconced now in the private practice of law. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN. Well, you have done a good job. Both of you have, and we appreciate it.

You have given good testimony today.

Echoing Senator Levin, I would say that if we could get the answers to the questions for the record-and we will screen them and try to eliminate duplication---we would like to get them this week. We are going to try to make our recommendations to the Foreign Relations Committee early next week, or certainly by the end of next week. So I would say if you could, get them to us as soon as possible.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. We will, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you both.

Ambassador BARTHOLOMEW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Senator NUNN. The Article-by-Article analysis accompanying the treaty contains the following sentence: "However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union, in contrast to the other 21 signatories to the treaty, does not subscribe to the analysis of the scope of Article 112 counting rule described above."

1. Recognizing that the United States and other States Parties elected to deal with this problem through the mechanism of a side agreement that establishes obligations outside the framework of the treaty, it is nonetheless highly unusual to submit a treaty for advice and consent by the Senate with an open acknowledgement that the parties are in disagreement over a fundamental point of treaty interpretation. Is there any precedent for this situation in recent U.S. treaty history?
2. Are there any other provisions of the CFE Treaty in regard to which the United States and the Soviet Union subscribe to different interpretations?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. It must be emphasized that, while the Soviet Union may still as a matter of principle dispute the original scope of the counting rule in Article III of the treaty, the legally-binding agreement of June 14, 1991 among the 22 signatories resolved the dispute on a practical and legal basis by assuring that the Soviet Union accepted the obligation to count its naval infantry and coastal defense equipment under the treaty's limitations. Furthermore, the June 14 agreement also established that, unless otherwise specified in the agreement, the treaty or its associated documents, all TLE of types limited by the treaty, located in the area of application, regardless of subordination, would count against the treaty's limits. This latter point effectively closes off possible future counting rule controversies. As a result, any question about the Soviet Union's previous interpretation of Article 212 is moot, and any controversy concerning the Soviet Union's interpretation has been extinguished.

• At present, we do not believe there are any other provisions of the CFE Treaty which the United States and the Soviet Union interpret differently. Generally, interpretation disputes arise only after a treaty has been ratified, enters into force and is implemented.

Senator NUNN. In response to a February 5, 1991 letter signed by the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in which the Senators urged the administration not to submit the CFE Treaty to the Senate until the naval infantry dispute and certain other post-signing anomalies were resolved, Secretary Baker Stated that the Soviet interpretation of the application of the treaty to naval infantry units "flatly contradicts the language of the treaty and has no basis in the negotiating record." Secretary Baker's March 7 letter also stated: "This is an issue of principle, a clear-cut case of the Soviet Union failing to fulfill a treaty obligation. We have repeatedly made clear to Soviet officials, at very high levels, that they should abandon this wholly unsupportable position."

1. Do you believe the administration's decision last spring to resolve this dispute by establishing separate obligations concerning these forces outside the framework of the treaty while allowing the Soviets to cling to their own interpretation of Article III as applied within the treaty compromised the principle articulated by Secretary Baker?
2. Since the Soviet military officials who were insisting on the naval infantry exemption have now been discredited for their role in or support for the failed August coup, is there any prospect that the June 14, 1991 side agreement could now be replaced with a simple but clear Soviet statement accepting the same interpretation of the scope of the Article III counting rule as is shared by the other 21 signatories?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW.

1. The resolution or the Article III counting rule dispute by no means of the June 14, 1991, legally binding agreement in no way compromised the principle articulated by Secretary Baker. The June 14 agreement achieved all of the principal objectives of the United States with respect to the counting rule dispute: (a) it did not compromise any of the treaty; (b) it ensured that the Soviet Union accepted the obligation to count its TLE in naval infantry and coastal defense units against all of the numerical limitations set forth in the treaty; and (c) it was acceptable to the other 20 signatories of the treaty.
2. At present, the administration has no plans to pursue another agreement with the Soviet Union-and the other 20 signatories---to improve and supersede the June 14 agreement. It would re-open a subject that has been effectively resolved on terms very favorable to the United States and the Group of 16. The June 14 agreement not only assured that Soviet obligations with regard to its existing coastal defense and naval infantry equipment would be met, but also establishing that in the future, unless otherwise specified in the agreement, the treaty or its associated documents, all TLE of types limited by the treaty, located in the area of application, regardless of subordination, would count against the treaty, a limits. This effectively closed off possible future counting rule controversies. As a result, any question about the Soviet Union's previous interpretation of Article III is moot. A move to reopen the June 14 agreement might also prompt the Soviets to adversely re-evaluate its terms and also could complicate ratification proceedings in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

Senator NUNN. In July, media reports indicated that the Soviet Union was insisting in the CFE the CFE follow-on negotiations on manpower limits (the so-called "CFE-1A" talks) that troops attached to their naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces be excluded from any ceilings that may be agreed.

1. Is this still the Soviet position in CFP-1A?
2. What is the United States' opinion on this issue?
3. Has the United States' willingness to resolve the CFE naval infantry dispute outside the framework of the treaty prejudiced our ability to insist in CFE-1A and other possible follow-on negotiations that all Soviet conventional armaments, equipment and manpower in treaty-limited categories, based on land within the CFE area shall count against the ceilings "irrespective of assignment"?
4. What are the prospects for success in CFE-1A?
5. What will follow CFE-1A?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The United States and our NATO allies continue to work toward our goal of completing a CFE-1A, agreement by March 1992. Although it is hard to predict the impact of future political developments in the U.S.S.R. on the pace of the CFE-1A negotiations, Soviet Negotiators in Vienna continue to affirm their government's commitment to reaching agreement on manpower limitations, on schedule. Following the early data exchange that was the centerpiece of the last round, negotiators are preparing in this round (which opened November 4) to begin drafting elements of the text of an agreement. It should be noted that the Soviet delegation has called for commencement of the drafting process as a useful way to moving the talks forward.

Among the central differences between NATO and the Soviets in CFE-1A has been the question of which categories of manpower should be subject to limits, and the related issue of what the information exchange should encompass. NATO has firmly maintained that all conventional military forces based on land must be subject to limitations, while the Soviets have pressed for a more restrictive definition that would exclude from limits, inter alia, manpower in naval infantry and coastal defense forces. It appears that NATO's insistence on comprehensive equipment limits in the CFE context, which led to the June 14 legally binding side agreements has if anything made our commitment to applying limits to all forces based on land in CFE-1A more credible. The Soviet delegation in Vienna has recently given indications that they consider the issue negotiable, and it continues to be a focus of discussion.

We expect that following the Helsinki Review Conference of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe we will join our allies and all 38 members of the CSCE in a new set of security negotiations designed to encompass within a flexible structure a range of dialogue, confidence building and arms control elements.

Senator NUNN. Have the United States and the Soviet Union agreed upon the inspection procedures that will be followed for Soviet destruction to equipment stored east of the Urals that has been identified by the Soviets as offsetting compensation for the equipment in naval infantry divisions in the CFE zone that the Soviet Union will be permitted to retain pursuant to the June 14, 1991 side agreement? If so, when do you expect this agreement to be reached?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. [Deleted.]

STATUS OF SIDE AGREEMENT ON LAND-BASED NAVAL AIRCRAFT (LBNA)

Senator NUNN. The President's letter of Transmittal for the CFE Treaty describes the November 19, 1990 "Declaration of the States Parties on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe With Respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft" as constituting a "political commitment" "associated with, but not part of, the treaty."

1. Does the LBNA declaration have the same legal force and effect as the treaty?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The LBNA Declaration does not have the same legal force and effect as the treaty. As noted in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the LBNA Declaration, the Preamble to the Declaration is associated with, but not part of, the treaty. The Preamble also makes clear that the commitments in the Declaration are "political." As such, they---unlike the obligations in the treaty---are not legally binding.

Senator NUNN. Would the administration regard the implications of any Soviet violation of this declaration for the integrity of the CFE regime as being as serious as any Soviet violation of any provision of the treaty itself?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The seriousness with which the administration would view a violation of the political commitment limiting holdings of land-based naval aircraft by the Soviet Union would depend on the precise circumstances pertaining at the time-in particular, on the military significance of the violation in question.

• While the LBNA and other political commitments associated with the treaty are not legally-binding, there would obviously be important political costs to any country that overtly abandoned or acted inconsistently with a treaty-assimilated political commitment.
• As a practical matter, moreover, the United States would have a variety of means to respond to a violation of the LBNA political commitment---both within and outside the context of the treaty. It would have the right, e.g., to raise such a violation in the Joint Consultative Group, as an issue "relating to the treaty."

Senator NUNN. Would the administration object to a Senate condition to this effect?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The administration does not believe that it is necessary for the Senate to attach conditions to the treaty.

• In particular, a condition that would legally bind the United States to regard a violation of a political statement as having the same import as would a violation of the treaty, in effect, for the United States, change that political commitment to a legally-binding one. Other signatories (and in the case of the LBNA political statement, every signatory, not just the Soviet Union, agreed to limit their holdings of land-based naval aircraft) might quite rightly object that the United States was attempting to alter the nature of the agreement reached.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Bartholomew, assuming the United States retains a credible reinforcement/reconstitution capability for Western Europe---that is, one that can be accomplished given months of warning-would you say at CFE makes a difference in terms of allowing the United States to draw down its peacetime deployment levels in Western Europe?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The United States has approximately 290,000 military personnel stationed in Europe. A ratified and implemented CFE Treaty will reduce European forces to a level that precludes initiating and sustaining a large-scale offensive. If any signatory of the treaty planned to launch a major offensive against any neighbor, they would have to openly violate the treaty. We believe any cheating on this scale would be detected well before it reached the level of trained and equipped units required for successful military adventurism.

With this confidence in detecting large scale violations, the CFE Treaty will allow the United States to withdraw some of our forward deployed Europe" forces. As the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR testified before the SFRC, these withdrawals should not go below a personnel level of 150,000. This would be a reduction of almost 50 percent from current levels.

Senator NUNN. Do you agree with General Galvin that 160,000 U.S. troops in Western Europe is a "floor"-or do you agree with the sense of Congress as expressed in the Conference Report we concluded Friday that we should plan on reducing U.S. forces t a level below approximately 100,000 by 1995.

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The immediate purpose of our forces in Europe is to maintain stability and signal our commitment to collective security through NATO. U.S. stationed forces in Europe should be capable of actions at the operational level. This requires an army corps, the appropriate associated air support and naval forces. We should give strong consideration to the advice of our senior military leaders. I, therefore, agree with General Galvin's assessment.

Senator NUNN. Ambassador Woolsey, under CFE the 16 nations in NATO can maintain over 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs), 20,000 artillery pieces, 2,000 combat aircraft, and 6,800 combat helicopters. According to one analysis I've seen, to reach these ceilings, NATO need only reduce its current arsenals by a total of only 51 weapons, since current NATO holdings are below the CFE ceilings in every categlory but tanks. In the case of aircraft, NATO can actually increase its current holdings by 20-30 percent. Do those figures sound about right to you?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No, the figures do not correspond to data NATO is using in its harmonization of treaty limited equipment (TLE) allocations. The following is correct data as of treaty signature (19 November 1990) and updated as of 19 February 1991:

                                (NATO)			    NATO
			       allowed		          reductions

   Tanks ......... .............20.000                      5,523
   ACVs ........................30,000                      1,578
   Artillery....................20,000                      2,668
   Attack Helicopter.............2,000                        114
   Combat Aircraft...............6,800                        118

   Total reductions  ......................................16,001

Senator NUNN. How many weapons must the Soviet Union destroy or convert to get under the CFE ceilings--I've heard that is on the order of 20,000?

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Based on Soviet data provided as of treaty signature (revised in February 1991) the Soviet Union incurred an obligation to reduce (mainly through destruction):

                7,575 Tanks
                9,890 Armored Combat Vehicles
                  763 Pieces of Artillery
                1,461 Combat Aircraft
                    0 Helicopters

• On June 14, 1991, as part of the resolution of the dispute over application of the treaty's counting rules (Art. 111). the Soviets made a legally-binding commitment to reduce their holdings in the area of application by an- additional 933 tanks, 1,725 ACVs and 1,080 artillery pieces.
• Half of the tanks (467) would be destroyed or converted within the ATTU; the rest (466) would be withdrawn to beyond the Urals and an equivalent amount destroyed or converted there.
• Half of the artillery (540) would be destroyed in the zone; the other half would be moved outside of the zone and an equivalent number destroyed there.
• Of the ACVs, 753 armored personnel carriers of the MT-LB type would be specially modified into APC "look-alikes" (a treaty-sanctioned reduction method); half of the rest (486) would be destroyed or converted within the zone; and the remainder (486) would be withdrawn beyond the Urals and an equivalent number destroyed or converted there.
• The purpose of the above reductions is to bring the Soviets into compliance with CFE ceilings established for the ATTU zone. They total 21,966 pieces of equipment.

Senator NUNN. How many weapons that the Soviet Union moved east of the Urals prior to signing the CFE Treaty have the Soviets promised to destroy or convert,---- I've heard that is on the order of 16,000?

Ambassador WOOTLEY. In addition to the reductions they will undertake pursuant to the treaty and the June 14 legally-binding agreement which settled the dispute over the counting rules, the Soviets further pledged on June 14 to destroy by 1995 6,000 tanks, 1,600 ACVs and 7,000 artillery pieces already located beyond the Urals. The Soviets have not promised that all of this equipment will be equipment actually moved east of the Urals prior to treaty signing; they have assured us that it will be modern equipment of types limited by the treaty.

• Taking into account both the reductions they will undertake pursuant to the treaty and the June 14 legally-binding agreement, and those they will undertake pursuant to the June 14 political commitment on equipment beyond the Urals, the Soviets have undertaken to reduce 37,927 pieces of equipment, as follows:

Tanks:                      7,575 +   933 + 6,000 - 14,508
ACVS:                       9,890 + 1,725 + 1,500 - 13,115
Artillery:                    763 + 1,080 + 7,000 -  8,843
Aircraft:                                            1,461
Helicopters:                                             0
                                                    37,927

Senator NUNN. Would you say, then, that in terms of weapons reductions the CFE Treaty is a very good deal for the West?

Ambassador WOOLSY. In my view, the weapons reductions under the CFE Treaty are a very good deal for the West, given the far greater amounts of equipment which the Soviet Union must reduce compared to the amounts the United States and its allies must reduce, and particularly given the fact that the treaty permits us to transfer the most modern equipment to allies and destroy only the least desirable equipment. Legislation to permit implementation of this "cascading" plan, of course, is still pending. Reduction under the treaty will, comparatively, still be a good deal for us and for our allies, but less of one, if we are unable to carry out those transfers.

Senator NUNN. With the weapons that the Soviet Union is permitted to retain under CFE in the CFE zone, and taking into account the weapons permitted NATO and Eastern European nations, how likely is it that a future Soviet regime might be tempted to launch an invasion of Western Europe?

Ambassador WOOLSY. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. The CFE Treaty does not affect manpower levels, although they were discussed during the negotiations and several nations made proposals or declarations of intent with respect to reduced manpower levels. Furthermore, significant manpower changes have begun or have taken place since the signing of the treaty, including the withdrawal of Soviet forces from all former Warsaw Pact nations and declarations of withdrawals or troop reductions by numerous CFE signatory states. Does the administration agree that negotiated or agreed reductions in manpower levels could help enhance U.S. security in Europe and for the participating states?

Would it not be in the U.S. and NATO interest to see Soviet manpower levels as low as possible? If so, how low would the United States want to see those manpower levels?

In each case such reductions are sought or achieved, should NATO, including the United States, consider making corresponding reductions in manpower? If so, what is the lowest level of reductions that could be envisioned? If not, please explain why not.

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The administration is committed to reaching an agreement in the CFE-1A negotiation to establish limits on the military manpower of all 22 participants. We believe that such an agreement will enhance the security of all parties to the agreement and of Europe as a whole.

In approaching the CFE-1A negotiation, NATO has sought to ensure that any agreement is comprehensive; that is, that all conventional military manpower based on land is limited. Neither we nor our allies have attempted to define a priori numerical "requirements" for the aggregate manpower of other participants. However, NATO has agreed to press for manpower limits generally consistent with the reduced equipment levels each nation has accepted under the CFE Treaty. In the case of NATO nations, it is agreed that manpower levels should be consistent with alliance defense commitments.

Senator LEVlN. I understand that the follow-on negotiations (the CFE-1A talks) are currently proceeding and that there was a commitment to include manpower levels in there negotiations. What is the status of manpower levels in these negotiations? Are the sides pursuing reductions below the existing levels or the levels announced by various states to date?

Given that Soviet forces are being withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, could the nations of NATO not make corresponding reductions in manpower levels? Is this one of the options being pursued at the CFE-1A negotiations? If not, please explain why not.

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The United States and our NATO allies continue to work toward our goal of completing a CFE-1A agreement by March 1992. Following the early data exchange that was the centerpiece of the last round, negotiators are preparing in this round (which opened November 4) to begin drafting elements of the text of a manpower agreement.

Among the central differences between NATO and the Soviets on CFE-1A has been the question of which categories of manpower should be subject to limits, and the relay issue of what the information exchange should encompass. NATO has firmly maintained that all conventional military forces based on land must be subject to limitations, while the Soviets have Pressed for a more restrictive definition that would exclude from limits, inter alia, manpower in naval infantry and coastal defense forces. The Soviet delegation in Vienna has recently given indications that they consider this issue negotiable and it continues to be a main focus of discussion.

To date, exchanges in Vienna have focused on establishing the framework of an agreement---categories to be limited and counting rules-and not on numerical levels. However, NATO has agreed to press for manpower limits generally consistent with the reduced equipment levels each nation has accepted under the CFE Treaty. NATO allies have also agreed that their national manpower levels should be consistent with alliance defense commitments.

Senator LEVIN. Please provide for the record a list of manpower withdrawals and reductions that have been announced or implemented by CFE signatories since January 1989, including withdrawals from Germany and the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations.

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. When Soviet troops complete their departure from Germany, it is possible that the German government will want to pursue the question of a phased U.S. withdrawal from Germany. Is the U.S. administration currently planning for that possibility? If not, why not?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. Military forces of the United States are based in Europe at the request of the host nation. The German government has continually expressed its interest in hosting U.S. forces for the foreseeable future. The United States is not anning a drawdown of forces in Europe below the projected base force of 150,000.

Senator LEVIN. As we plan to implement the CFE Treaty and perhaps pursue further cuts through negotiators or unilateral moves on both sides, to what extent is the administration considering NATO member countries current defense plans and planned military budgets?

Have those member countries all provided such information to the U.S. recently for U.S. consideration and Planning?

Does the administration believe other NATO member countries' defense plans are still relevant given the immense changes that have taken place in Europe recently, including the failed Soviet coup and the imminent change in NATO strategy?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. With NATO just starting to formalize sweeping conceptual changes in its strategy, force and command structures, answers to these questions will not be available for several months. The new NATO Strategic Concept was just announced at the NATO Summit in Rome on November 7. We expect that the accompanying new military strategy, force and command structure will be approved at the December 12 Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Ministerial.

Formal NATO Force Plans for:1992-1996 are still in the midst of the review and approval process. The NATO Fall planning Cycle is currently under way and will conclude December 12, when the DPC accepts the Defense Review Committee's (DRC's) General Report on Force Planning for the years 1992-1996. The General Report, once approved, constitutes the NATO Five Year Defense Plan. It contains the force contributions NATO member countries are actually committing to in 1992 and planning to contribute over the following 4 years the U.S. is involved in reviewing each ally's defense plans, through its participation in the-DRC and DPC planning process.

The GAO has recently been tasked to conduct a study on NATO members' defense plans, force structures, and budgets, and the future of NATO (GAO Code 467372). Because this study if; being conducted in the midst of the Fall Planning Cycle it can be used to evaluate both the planning process and subsequently (during December and January), the NATO 1992-1996 Five Year Defense Plan. The Departments of State, Defense, and the CIA are supporting the GAO effort. The evaluation team has completed most of its work in Washington and plans to travel to Europe this month to interview U.S. defense and Embassy personnel as well as NATO alliance government officials. The GAO plans to release its findings in late February or early March.

Senator LEVIN. Please provide for the record the following information:

1. the level of forces (equipment and manpower) prior to the signing of the CFE Treaty for each of the 23 negotiating states;
2. the level of forces declared by the States Parties to tile CFE Treaty at the time of signature;
3. the announced and implemented unilateral cuts in equipment and manpower by any of the CFE signatories, including the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Secretary BAHTHOLOMEW. (a) and (b) see tables 1 and 2. The remaining answer is [deleted].

Senator LEVIN. What is the current mission Of U.S. military forces in Europe and how has the mission changed since 1989? Given the lack of military threat from the former U.S.S.R. or its erstwhile allies, what role is envisioned for U.S. forces in Europe in the foreseeable future? Is there a military threat in Europe for which they must remain forward deployed?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The strategic mission of U.S. forces in Europe remains unchanged from 1989: to protect our vital interests against any threat in or near Europe and to manifest our commitment to collective security. While coordinated military aggression by the U.S.S.R. is a remote possibility, new threats to our vital interests could emerge as a consequence of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and other regional turmoil in Europe and its periphery.

When asked about the scope and speed of U.S. force reductions in Europe in light of the rapidly changing international security environment, General Calvin is fond of asking whether the requestor would like the next century to be more like the first or second half of the current one. Of course, the first half of the century, without a peacetime U.S. military presence in Europe, witnessed the world's two most devastating wars, while the second half has been relatively peaceful. Our forward, alliance-based strategy of deterrence in Europe has fostered the conditions for democracy, free market economies and the internal decay of communism --- all important interests of the United States. So long as our interests in Europe are vital, we must continue to secure them with forward deployed forces.

NATO continues to be the beat option for the United States to accomplish its national security objectives in Europe, Collective security with reliable partners is the surest way to maintain peace. The alliance has developed well-functioning military and political structures as it has weathered numerous crises over its 42 year history.

A key manifestation of the U.S. commitment to European peace and security is credible forward-based forces, backed up by CONUS-based reinforcements and the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. The rapidly changing security environment makes us less reliant on large-sized and forward-based forces, while placing greater importance on CONUS-based reinforcements and reconstitution. Realignment by withdrawing over half of our forces to the 150,000 base force, reflects this strategic evolution. Although we are capitalizing on this opportunity to economize, forward deployed forces remain essential. They are not only a tangible sign of our commitment to NATO, but contribute to our influence in the NATO command structure and planning process. To achieve the U.S. strategic objective of deterrence through NATO, these forces must remain militarily credible and politically supportable. Simply put, to be credible a force must be able to right on it own for sustained periods.

Senator LEVIN. How does the emerging NATO strategy incorporate the CFE force reductions and other changes in Europe in its planning? Does it envision a European peacekeeping role in Europe or beyond?

What specific role would there be for the proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Force? Would the now Rapid Reaction Force have a role in such conflicts as the one in Yugoslavia? Would it be considered as a force to intervene in conflicts or disputes that might arise between former Soviet Republics or between other East European nations? What specific force structure is envisioned and how would each NATO nation contribute to it?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. At the London NATO Summit in July 1989, the alliance took account of the dramatic changes in European security, reaching out to our former adversaries in the Warsaw Pact and outlining a work program for transforming the alliance. The NATO strategy, approved at the Rome Summit on November 7, 1991, is the alliance response to a changing Europe. The new NATO strategic concept, adopted at Rome, and the military strategy that it will inform, envision the development of a smaller, more flexible force posture that the allies can now assume In light of CFE limits, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and other political developments. It envisions an increasingly cooperative relationship with the East, and actively promotes that through expansion of liaison activities to include meetings of East European and NATO Foreign Ministers at a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council, as well as routine involvement in other NATO activities, particularly those that will help them develop a civil society and facilitate the transformation of Eastern economies away from defense production. The alliance no longer views the former Warsaw Pact states as a major threat. Instead, it focuses on instability and emergent security problems which may arise from serious economic, social and political differences, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. Because these are threats to alliance values and interests, NATO missions will increasingly focus on crisis management. This strategy is predicated on the withdrawal of all Soviet forces to their home territories, as well as ratification by all signatories and entry into force of the CFE Treaty.

Senator LEVIN. Does it envision a European peacekeeping role in Europe or beyond?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The alliance strategy envisions a peacekeeping role to the extent that such a role means deterring an attack on the territory of any NATO member and enhancing stability through extended deterrence. The alliance strategy does not specifically envision the deployment of NATO troops outside the NATO area-for example, in Yugoslavia-to police conflict. Of course, some forces now committed to NATO could be withdrawn and deployed to crises outside the NATO area, as some U.S. and U.K. forces were to Southwest Asia.

Senator LEVIN. What specific role would there be for the proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Force?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The mission of the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is to demonstrate alliance solidarity in times of crisis, as with the deployment of the ACE Mobile Force (Air) to Turkey during the Gulf war. The ARRC, along with other reaction forces will deter attack-on NATO members, and be prepared to defend the NATO area if necessary.

Senator LEVIN. Would the new Rapid Reaction Force have a role in such conflicts as the one in Yugoslavia?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. There is no role envisioned for the ARRC in Yugoslavia.

Senator LEVIN. Would it be considered as a force to intervene in conflicts or disputes between former Soviet republics of between other East European nations?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. No, it is not envisioned that the ARRC will be used for this type of mission.

Senator LEVIN. What specific force structure is envisioned and how would each NATO nation contribute to it?

Secretary BARTHOWMEW. Planning for NATO reaction forces is in its early stages. All NATO nations participating in the integrated military command will contribute forces and assets to all categories of forces. NATO is studying the possible force structures to match them with the component force mission. The report which outlines proposed future force structures, will be presented for modification or approval to Defense Ministers at the December Defense Planning Committee meeting.

Senator LEVIN. In March of 1992 the CFE process is to be expanded to include all CSCE nations. Is this plan still on track? Will such an expansion of the CFE force reduction process offer further possibilities for force reductions throughout Europe?

If so, how does the United States plan to take advantage of such opportunities? Will we press for additional reductions in equipment and manpower, greater exchange of information, and conversion of military industry?

If not, what goals and objectives are foreseen for the conference?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. The Paris Charter of November 1990 looked forward to a more structured cooperation on security matters, and its signatories committed themselves to new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building which would will open to all CSCE participating states.

• The negotiations are scheduled to begin after the 3-month Helsinki CSCE Follow-up meeting, which will open in March 1992.
• Consultations within NATO and among the now 38 CSCE members are underway concerning the exact shape and content of these negotiations. Specific proposals on reductions, exchange of information or conversion of military industry are still under discussion.
• NATO's broad goal, as expressed at the November 6-8 Rome Summit, is to shape a new cooperative order, in which no country needs to harbor fears about its security. NATO objectives are to:
• strengthen security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;
• conduct an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and foster a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defense policies;
• promote effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.

Senator LEVIN. What is the status of the "Open Skies" negotiations? If they are successful how could or will they fit into the overall verification and observation scheme of an improved security regime in Europe?

Could Open Skies overflights be used to verify reductions in manpower levels? If so, is the United States pursuing this option in its planning and negotiations?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW.[Deleted]

Senator LEVIN. Who will pay for verification and implementation of the CFE Treaty? Is it possible that NATO infrastructure funding could be used for such purposes? Is there any consideration of or agreement on this issue?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. In addition to the ongoing expenses of operating the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), there are three areas in which we foreseer important cost-sharing arrangements for CFE implementation. Two of these relate to the funding of on-site inspections conducted under the CFE verification regime.

1. To exact distribution of costs for conducting and hosting on-site inspections is still under discussion in the JCG. As a general point, the United States has maintained that the inspected state party should bear most of the costs for hosting inspections. There are, however, particular problems still to be resolved in this area, mainly because of the large number of inspections which the Soviets will be required to host. This results both from the many Soviet TLE reduction activities and from their large number of objects of verification (OOVs)-regimental-sized units which are the "unit of account" for calculating the number of inspections a nation is required to receive pursuant to CFE. A different but related problem has resulted in serious German concerns about inspection costs, a consequence of the large number of inspections Germany will host because of non-German forces stationed on its territory.
2. In the context of reaching agreement on arrangements for establishment of multinational NATO teams to conduct inspections of treaty-mandated equipment reductions, allies are also developing an approach to appropriate cost--sharing for the establishment, training, and transport of multinational teams.
3. NATO has agreed on arrangements for sharing the costs of "cascading" modern equipment among allies, to ensure that the Allies' CFE reduction obligations are met through the reduction of older, less modern equipment still in the inventories of some allies, which will then be replaced with more capable equipment. To pay the costs of this process, which is allowed under the treaty, NATO has agreed to reprogram 25 million international accounting units from previously approved infrastructure projects (equivalent to approximately 100 million USD). The U.S. share of this total is 27 percent. This common fund will pay the costs of joint international inspections of equipment to be transferred; repairs of equipment up to a minimum standard; the transport of the equipment from its current site to the recipient's location; and a portion of the cost of reducing TLE to meet NATO nations reduction liabilities.

Under current planning, the full U.S. CFE reduction liability will be met through the cascading of U.S. equipment to other allies; thus, the United States will incur no independent costs for CFE-mandated reduction of equipment. At this stage, all alliance arrangements have been completed for the cascading process to begin, and action is awaiting passage of enabling legislation in the United States.

The scale of distribution for the expenses of operating the JCG is listed in the JCG Protocol. This could be revised in the future, e.g., if there were new treaty participants.

Senator LEVIN. Please list the current plans for 1992-1996 for all NATO member countries for the following: overall defense expenditure; NATO-related or attributable defense expenditure; Contributions to NATO infrastructure funding, manpower, equipment and materiel.

On what force structure and threat assumptions are these plans based?

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. Concrete answers to these important issues are several months away. This question is posited just as NATO is starting to formalize sweeping conceptual changes in its strategy, force and command structures and before going through the real-world machinations their implementation might cause. It also comes in the midst of NATO's annual force planning cycle.

The new NATO Strategic Concept was Just announced at the NATO Summit in Rome on November 7. We expect that the accompanying new military strategy, force and command structure will be approved at the December 12 Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Ministerial.

Formal NATO Force Plans for 1992-1996 are still in the midst of the review and approval process. The NATO Fall Planning Cycle is currently under way and will conclude December 12, when the DPC accepts the Defense Review Committee's (DRC's) General Report on Force Planning for the years 1992-1996. The General Report, once approved, constitutes the NATO Five Year Defense Plan. It contains the force contributions NATO member countries are actually committing to in 1992 and planning to contribute over the following 4 years. The United States is involved in reviewing each ally's defense plans, through its participation in the DRC and DPC planning process.

The GAO has recently been tasked to conduct a study on NATO members' defense plans, force structures, and budgets, and the future of NATO (GAO Code 467372). Because this study is being conducted in the midst of the Fall Planning Cycle it can be used to evaluate both the planning process and subsequently (during-December and January), the NATO 1992-1996 Five Year Defense Plan. The Departments of State, Defense, and the CIA are supporting the GAO effort. The evaluation team has completed most of its work in Washington and plans to travel to Europe this month to interview U.S. defense and Embassy personnel as well as NATO alliance government officials. The GAO plans to release its findings in late February or early March.

Senator LEVIN. Please list the changes since January 1989, actual and planned, for each of the NATO member nations and France in the following categories: force structure, major equipment levels, manpower levels, defense expenditure levels, foreign deployments in Europe (personnel and bases).

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. Please list the changes since January 1989, actual and planned, for the Soviet Union in the following categories: force structure, major equipment levels, manpower levels, and defense expenditure levels.

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW.

Senator LEVIN. Please explain the planned financial contributions of the CFE signatories for the cost of implementation of the CFE Treaty, in terms of percentages or currencies.

Secretary BARTHOLOMEW. Most costs for implementing the CFE Treaty will be national ones, and each participant's contribution will depend on such variables as the amount and types of equipment it must reduce. The treaty does provide for multinational monitoring and verification efforts, and NATO plans to establish alliance teams to conduct inspections of equipment reductions. Appropriate cost-sharing arrangements for the establishment, training, and transport of those teams are being developed. It is unknown to what extent members of the Group of Six might make similar arrangements among themselves.

The exact distribution of cost for conducting and hosting on-site inspections is still under discussion in the CFE Joint Consultative Group. As a general point, the United States has maintained that the inspected state part should bear most of the costs for hosting inspections. There are, however, particular problems still to be resolved in this area, mainly because of the large number of inspections which the Soviets will be required to host. This results both from the many Soviet TLE reduction activities and from their large number of objects of verification (OOVs)-regimental-sized units which are the "unit of account for calculating the number of inspections a nation is required to receive pursuant to CFE. A different but related problem has resulted in serious German concerns about inspection costs, a consequence of the large number of inspections Germany will host because of non-German forces stationed on its territory.

NATO has also agreed on arrangements for sharing the costs of "cascading" modern equipment among allies, to ensure that the Allies' CFE reduction obligations are met through the reduction of older, less modern equipment still in the inventories of some allies, which will then be replaced with more capable equipment. To pay the cost of this process, which is allowed under the treaty, NATO has agreed to reprogram 25 million international accounting units from previously approved infrastructure projects (equivalent to approximately 100 million USD). The U.S. share of this total is-27 percent. This common fund will pay the costs of joint international inspections of equipment to be transferred; repairs of equipment up to a minimum standard; the transport of the equipment from its current site to the recipient's location; and a portion of the cost of reducing TLE to meet NATO nations' reduction liabilities.

Under current planning, the full U.S. CFE reduction liability will be met through the cascading of U.S. equipment to other allies; thus, the United States will incur no independent costs for CFE-mandated reduction of equipment. At this stage, all alliance arrangements have been completed for the cascading process to begin, and action is awaiting passage of enabling legislation in the United States.

In addition, there will continue to be costs incurred in operating the Joint Consultative Group. The scale of distribution of those costs is contained in the treaty's JCG Protocol. That scale could be revised in the future, e.g., if there were new treaty participants.

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