APPENDIX (cont.)

Question. President Gorbachev will meet with the Group of 7 in London later this week. An announcement is expected on the START Treaty to reduce long-range nuclear weapons by President Bush and President Gorbachev.

Do you have any reason to believe that President Gorbachev will not be able to implement the START Treaty? Is there an agreement within the Soviet military hierarchy on this treaty?

Answer. President Gorbachev has indicated his support for the START Treaty on a number of occasions, most recently at the Moscow Summit. He is aware that the Soviet Union incurs obligations under the treaty and that failure to carry them out would adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations. He has not expressed uncertainty about the Soviet Union's ability to fulfill these obligations.

Although representatives of the Soviet military were closely involved in negotiating the START Treaty, the military hierarchy's view of the treaty is not known, although some members of the Soviet military have made statements in support of the treaty. However, President Gorbachev's signing the treaty and the Supreme Soviet's ratifying it-assuming that occurs-would indicate that the Soviet government accepts START obligations.

Question. Last week in Paris, the United States met with the leaders of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Italy to discuss ways to reduce the threat of the development of nuclear technology in the Middle East. Among one of the proposals was the institution of a Middle East registry, in which all of these nations would register all their nuclear sales to the region.

What were the conclusions of this meeting? Where any concrete plans agreed to, including the idea of a registry?

What would your role [as Defense Secretary, Joint Chief of Staff] in the implementation of such a registry?

Answer. Representatives of the United States, the People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met in Paris on July 8-9, 1991, to review issues relating to conventional arms transfers find to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There was no specific discussion "on ways to reduce the threat of the development of nuclear technology."

However, the representatives strongly supported the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East and agreed that one of the critical steps toward achieving that goal would be adoption by the regional states of a comprehensive program of arms control for the region, including:

• a freeze and ultimate elimination of ground to ground missiles in the region;
• a ban on the production and importation of weapons-usable nuclear material-and on the acquisition of the means to produce such material;
• submission of all nuclear facilities in the region to IAEA safeguards;
• agreement by all states in the region to undertake to become parties to the CW Convention as soon as it is concluded in 1992.

Moreover, the representatives agreed to support continued work in the U.N. on an arms transfers register to be established under the aegis of the U.N. Secretary General, as a step toward increased transparency in arms transfers and military matters in general.

The representatives also agreed to draw up guidelines for conventional arms transfer to the region. A group of experts from the participant states will meet in September 1991 to develop modalities of consultations and of information exchanges concerning arms transfers to the Middle East. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will be represented at the London meeting and will assist in the development of appropriate guidelines for an effective notification regime on arms transfers.

EXPORT OF EQUIPMENT

Question. The CFE Treaty prohibits the transfer of excess tanks, fighter aircraft, and other advanced military equipment to third party countries if such transfers are not announced by December 1991, is that correct?

Answer. No. The CFE Treaty does not prohibit the export of TLE to countries that are not State Parties to the treaty. Export or re-export of TLE must be consistent with the exporting or re-exporting State Party's normal practice. However, such export is not a means by which a State Party can achieve its treaty mandated numerical limitations. A State Party's reduction liability can be achieved, that is, a State Party can reduce its holdings to its numerical limitations only as provided for in the treaty. Transfer of "excess" TLE to a State Party that is not a signatory to the treaty is not one of the methods permitted by the treaty. The treaty does permit a State Party to decrease its reduction liability by transferring some of its TLE to another State Party within its group of States Parties so long as the receiving State Party notifies either a corresponding increase in its holdings not exceeding its maximum levels for holdings or a corresponding increase in its reduction liability. That treaty provision is the basis for the NATO Transfer of Equipment Plan.

Question. The administration announced an arms sale to Saudi Arabia on July 11, 1991. Could you clarify exactly what is included in this arms sale, including the dollar amount of the sale?

Do you expect any new U.S. arms packages for Saudi Arabia in the near future?

The export of any weapons to the volatile Middle East is a danger to the peace process. Has the United 8tates taken any moves to halt the proliferation of conventional arms in the region, either by ourselves or by our allies?

Answer. Two proposed sales to Saudi Arabia were notified to Congress on July 10 and announced publicly on July 11: (1) High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) with ancillary equipment and support, valued at $123 million; and (2) contractor services including maintenance, training, and staff support, valued at $350 million, for the E-3A AWACS and KE-3A tankers previously purchased by Saudia Arabia from the U.S. Government.

The administration notified Congress on July 24 of the proposed sale of various air-launched munitions, primarily intended to replenish inventories expended during DESERT STORM, valued at $365 million. No other sales notifications are imminent.

The administration does not agree that all arms sales in the Middle East are a danger to the peace process. Whether a particular sale endangers the peace process depends on the military policy and posture of the purchaser and the sale's effect on the balance of military power in the region. The administration supports providing defense equipment as will as training and other services to help our friends and allies in the region meet their legitimate defense needs. At the same time we are working with our allies as well as the other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to reduce the flow of destabilizing weapons to the region. The representatives of the five permanent Security Council members issued a communiqué in Paris on July 9, confirming that they would not transfer conventional weapons in circumstances which undermine stability. The communiqué also states that the Five would work to establish an arms transfer register to be maintained under the aegis of the U.N. Secretary General and expressed support for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East.

Question. I am concerned that in our negotiations to reduce the number of conventional forces, we have neglected consulting states that are affected directly by the CFE Treaty. These states are Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, classed as part of the Baltic Military District for the purposes of this Treaty.

Do you agree that the inclusion of the Baltic Military District as territories of the Soviet Union does not alter the policy of the U.S. Government in refusing to recognize Soviet sovereignty over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia?

Answer. Inclusion of the Baltic military district within the area of application of the Treaty ensures that the Treaty's limits apply comprehensively to all Soviet forces within the area. This does not represent any change in the long-standing U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

Question. Do you agree that the ultimate decision regarding the stationing of military personnel and equipment of the Soviet Union in the Baltic States should be resolved in bilateral negotiations between the governments of the Soviet Union and the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia?

Answer. We continue to make clear our belief that all outstanding issues between the Soviet and Baltic Governments, including security matters, should be settled through a process of peaceful dialogue that addresses the clearly expressed aspirations of the Baltic peoples.

Question. Do you feel that the United States should inform the Baltic governments of future inspections of treaty limited equipment pursuant to Article XIV and the protocol on inspection occurring on their territory?

Answer. The Inspection Protocol requires that the inspecting State Party inform the State Party on whose territory the equipment is stationed and, if different, the State Party whose equipment is being inspected of its intention to carry out an inspection. The United States plans to adhere to all requirements of the Protocol.

There are no provisions for State Parties to inform States that are not a party to the Treaty. The Baltic state, are not treaty signatories.

Question. Have you received assurances from the Soviet Union that none of the military equipment or personnel covered under this treaty will be used against the democratic Baltic governments?

Answer. The purpose of the CFE Treaty was to reduce holdings of conventional armaments in Europe to lower equal levels and thus to decrease chances of East-West confrontation.

The 22-nation CFE Treaty has no provisions specifically designed to limit the Soviet Government's use of equipment against dissidents or breakaway republics. This was not its purpose.

There are other channels and means, bilateral and multilateral, to encourage and pressure the Soviets with respect to the Baltics. We believe that all outstanding issues between the Soviet and Baltic Governments, including security matters, should be settled through a process or peaceful dialogue that addresses the clearly expressed aspiration of the Baltic peoples.

In fact, however, Treaty provisions which apply to Soviet conventional forces will affect as well their use of equipment for internal security purposes. Without the Treaty, there are no such constraints.

Question. I understand that this treaty covers areas West of the Urals Mountains. Do you anticipate Soviet troop and/or equipment movements in Moldavia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia as a result of this Treaty?

Answer. It is clear that this is a time of change in the Soviet Union, and the Soviets have stated that they are reorganizing their armed forces. The CFE treaty is one of the factors affecting the military reorganization, but it is difficult to pinpoint which changes are linked to the Treaty, other than those clearly necessary to meet Treaty limitations on amounts and locations of equipment.

CFE 1A

Question. Under CFE 1A, the United States will negotiate a reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. I have long stated that the Europeans should take more responsibility in bearing the burden of protecting Europe. I am particularly concerned with the effect of CFE 1A on Turkey, since it borders on that part of the Soviet Union that is West of the Urals.

Have the Soviets given up anything in that area? What will be the effect of these negotiations on NATO troops in Turkey?

Would it make sense to have American forces in Turkey replaced by Turkish forces?

Are Turkish forces in Cyprus considered NATO forces?

Answer. The CFE 1A negotiation has just begun, so manpower limits have yet to be determined. As such, it is too early to determine what the effects on troop levels in Turkey and the Soviet Union will be.

The United States and Turkey have a longstanding bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, and U.S. troops in Turkey are essential to carry out aspects of this agreement.

Turkish forces in Cyprus are not considered NATO forces,

Question. Article 18 of the Treaty states very explicitly that there should be continued "negotiations on conventional armed forces with the * * * goal of building on this treaty." Given that the Europe of today is very different from the Europe that began negotiating CFE reductions, what future arms reductions will we see beyond CFE and will there be any changes in the framework for negotiating these reductions? When can we expect to see CFE 1A?

Answer. As specified in Article XVIII of the Treaty, the 22 participants-working under the same mandate as for CFE I-have undertaken in CFE 1A to negotiate measures to limit personnel strength in Europe, as well as to develop an aerial inspection regime. In addition, NATO is considering whether to propose additional Stabilizing measures. Now that the Article III dispute has been resolved, work at CFE 1A has begun in earnest; working methods have been agreed and several proposals have been tabled.

There have been no proposals made in CFE 1A for further equipment reductions, nor has any participant expressed interest in such reductions.

While there is no requirement to complete the negotiation by the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference, this objective was endorsed by all participants. The resulting time pressure may keep the CFE 1A agenda limited.

The 35 CSCE states, including the United States, have agreed to begin new security talks involving all CSCE participants following the Helsinki conference. Work is now underway in NATO to develop an approach to these talks, but as yet no conclusions have been reached.

SOVIET ARMS SALES TO SYRIA

Question. There are reports that the Soviets are planning to sell the Syrians $2 billion worth of tanks, fighters, and other weapons systems. This report follows the announced sale of Czechoslovakian tanks to the Syrians. This massive arms transfer, to be underwritten by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, includes some of the same types of systems that are covered by the CFE Treaty, including T-72 tanks, MIG-29 fighters, and SU-27 aircraft.

Do we know if any of the arms that may be sold to the Syrians are covered by the CFE Treaty? (That is, does this equipment originate from within the ATTU region.)

Has the U.S. Government been officially notified about this proposed sale and have we made formal objections, expressing concerns about the detrimental effect this sale will have on the balance of power in the region?

Answer (unclassified). TLE that has been designated as awaiting export, and therefore temporarily in the zone of application, is exempted from Treaty ceilings provided that such exports are consistent with normal past practices and meet other technical criteria. Such exempted equipment must be received by contracting parties by the deadline for reductions (40 months after entry into force). Equipment which fails to meet these criteria should be included in overall holdings and used as a basis for calculating reduction liabilities.

Several NATO an East European states, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, have designated TLE as awaiting export. However data submitted by the U.S.S.R. earlier this year does not indicate any TLE as awaiting export. It therefore does not appear that Soviet equipment exports constitute a CFE Treaty issue.

[The administration notes that both the classified and unclassified portions of these answers must be read to gain a complete understanding of the issues. The complete answers can be found in committee files.]

Question. For more than half a century, the United States has refused to recognize Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Nevertheless, the CFE Treaty, signed by the United States, permits the Soviet Union to station a certain amount of military equipment in the Baltic military district-which includes the three Baltic republics. I am concerned that there may be a conflict between not recognizing Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States and signing a treaty which permits the U.S.S.R. to station forces there. Please reconcile the nonrecognition doctrine with the Treaty.

Answer. The CFE Treaty does not "permit" the U.S.S.R. to station forces in the Baltic States; the forces have been there for many years. Inclusion of the Baltic military district within the area of application of the Treaty ensures that the Treaty's limits apply comprehensively to all Soviet forces within the area; if Soviet forces in the Baltic military district were excluded from Treaty coverage, the Soviets would have an incentive to maximize their forces located there.

This does not represent any change in the long-standing U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

The purpose of the CFE Treaty was to reduce holdings of conventional armaments in Europe to lower equal levels and thus to decrease chances of East-West confrontation. For the West, the single most important goal was to reduce and limit the military preponderance of the Soviet Union so that it could not dominate Europe by force or threat of force.

The Treaty has no provisions specifically designed to limit the Soviet Government's use of equipment against the citizens of the Baltics or elsewhere. This was not its purpose. There are other channels and means, bilateral and multilateral, to encourage and pressure the Soviets with respect to the Baltics.

In fact, however, Treaty provisions which apply to Soviet conventional forces will affect as well their use of equipment for internal security purposes. (Without the Treaty, there are no such constraints.)

• The most destabilizing categories of equipment-tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, specialized attack helicopters-fall under CFE numerical limits even if held by internal security forces. Armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV) in excess of 1,000 also count.
• All equipment in Treaty-limited categories held by internal security organizations must be notified as part of the regular information exchange; reassignments of certain categories of equipment from the armed forces to other organizations (like internal security) must also be notified when they occur.

Question. While the United States has signed a Treaty which permits the Soviet Union to station military equipment in the Baltic republics, is it the policy of tile United States that the ultimate decision regarding the stationing of Soviet armed forces in the Baltic republics should be resolved through bilateral negotiations between the government of the Soviet Union and the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia?

Answer. We continue to mike clear our belief that all outstanding issues between the Soviet and Baltic Governments should be settled through a process of peaceful dialogue that addresses the clearly expressed aspirations of the Baltic peoples.

Question. The Preamble of the CFE Treaty recalls the obligations of parties to the Treaty to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations in general. Would the United States consider Soviet use of treaty-limited equipment stationed in the Baltic military district against the people of the Baltic republics, similar to the events of January of this year, to be against the spirit and goals of the Treaty?

Answer. The purpose of the CFE Treaty was to reduce holdings of conventional armaments in Europe to lower equal levels and thus to decrease chances of East-West confrontation.

For the West, the single most important goal was to reduce and limit the military preponderance of the Soviet Union so that it could not dominate Europe by force or threat of force.

The 22-nation CFE Treaty has no provisions specifically designed to limit the Soviet Government's use of equipment against dissidents or breakaway republics. This was not its purpose.

There are other channels and means, bilateral and multilateral, to encourage and pressure the Soviets with respect to the Baltics. We believe that all outstanding issues between the Soviet and Baltic Governments, including security matters, should be settled through a process of peaceful dialogue that addresses the clearly expressed aspirations of the Baltic peoples.

In fact, however, Treaty provisions which apply to Soviet conventional forces will affect as well their use of equipment for internal security purposes. Without the Treaty, there are no such constraints.

Question. Inspections are provided for by the CFE Treaty in Article XIV and the Protocol on Inspections. Under these and other applicable provisions, may the United States inform the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia of the pendency of inspections within the territory of their respective republics?

And, if so, will the United States inform the Baltic governments of pending inspections within those republics?

Answer. The Inspection Protocol requires that the inspecting State Party inform the State Party on whose territory the equipment is stationed and, if different, the State Party whose equipment is being inspected of its intention to carry out an inspection. The United States plans to adhere to all requirements of the Protocol.

There are no provisions for State Parties to inform States that are not a party to the Treaty. Governments of the Baltic States are not treaty signatories.

Question. Does the CFE Treaty provide for representatives of the governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to be present at inspections pursuant to Article XIV, the Protocol on Inspections, and other applicable sections?

If not, will the United States encourage the Soviet Union to accept representatives of the Baltic Republics at inspections within their territory?

And, if not, will the United States negotiate with the Soviet Union and other parties to the Treaty to permit representatives of the governments of the Baltic republics to be present at inspections within their territory?

Answer. The Inspection Protocol specifics that the inspection teams should be composed of members of the inspecting State Party or other States Parties.

There are no provisions for representatives of non-States Parties to participate in inspections. The governments of the Baltic States are not CFE signatories.

We would not permit the Soviets a droit de regard over the composition of our escort teams and do not expect to exercise control over their decisions in this regard.

Question. Does the Treaty permit its parties to share information collected through Treaty established procedures and mechanisms with non-party states?

If so, will the United States share information on the deployment of Soviet military forces based in the Baltic states with the respective Baltic governments?

If the United States does not plan to share such information, will the Baltic governments otherwise have access to information on Treaty-limited equipment within their territory?

Answer. Article XVI of the Treaty states that information obtained "through exchanges of information among States Parties or as a result of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely for the purposes of this Treaty."

We hope and expect the Soviet Union would share such information with the Baltic States as part of a peaceful, wide-ranging discussion on all issues, including security matters.

Question. Mr. Secretary, precisely what did Russian President Boris Yeltsin say to you about the Soviet falsehoods, deception, data falsification, and cover-ups in arms control negotiations when he met with you recently, especially regarding CFE and START?

Answer. RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin mentioned in his conversations with Secretary Cheney the issue of the accuracy of Soviet arms control data. While not specifying the context, he indicated that in the past there had been disinformation about the quantities of Soviet arms. He also indicated that he would stand for more open and honest discussions on this matter.

Question. Did the Defense Department question Yeltsin on these statements to try to elicit specifics?

Answer. Mr. Yeltsin touched on the issue of the accuracy of Soviet arms control data as described in the response in the above question.

THE VIEW FROM NATO

Question. With the formal demise of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991, NATO is currently changing much of its former strategies: Does the CFE Treaty fulfill its mandate? Please explain.

Will NATO approximately downsize from about 1.5 million active troops to .75 million?

Describe the specifics of NATO's shift from a "forward defense strategy" to the more mobile "Rapid Reaction Corps?" Will the U.S. place more of its TLE in POMCUS storage?

Does the U.S. plan to deploy in Europe a new short-range attack missile, the SRAM-T? How many SRAM-Ts does the U.S. plan to deploy? Will Germany support the deployment on its soil of aircraft carrying the SRAM-T? If the SRAM-T is not deployed in Europe, then where will it be deployed?

Answer. Yes. The treaty clearly meets its mandated goals of "a stable secure balance of forces at lower levels," the "elimination of disparities threatening this stability and security," and the "elimination of the capability for surprise attacks and large-scale offensive action." First, the treaty contributes to security by reducing and limiting those armaments necessary to conduct offensive military operations and hold territory: tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Many thousands will be destroyed, most by the Soviets. Second, the ceilings on armaments set geographical sublimate to prevent unstable force concentrations. Combined with the limits on the holdings of any one country, these provisions will drastically reduce the forward-based Soviet force preponderance that characterized Europe during the cold war. Finally, the information exchanges and intrusive inspection provisions make a surprise attack extremely unlikely and promote more productive relations across the board.

The treaty achieves its goals and, in concert with political change underway in Europe provides a firm legal and political foundation that locks in place the positive changes that have occurred thus far. It also helps impede any return to of the confrontational patterns of the cold war.

It is unclear what this question means by "active troops." However, the latest SHAPE data available from nations' DPQ responses on manpower (as opposed to squadron, divisions, etc.) indicates that by 1995 the total NATO active duty (professional plus conscript) force in the ATTU will be around 2.3 million. This is down from a 1990 total of about 2.9 million and represents approximately a 20 percent reduction.

The forward defense strategy represents a response to a fixed threat in the NATO Central Region. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the CFE Treaty, and the Soviet force withdrawal from Europe, the forward defense strategy became an inappropriate response. The development of a new strategy to meet a wider range of threats over a larger area (i.e. the NATO flanks) was necessary. This new strategy began to refocus on contingency operations and crisis response throughout the NATO region. The emergence of multinational formations, such as the Rapid Reaction Force and multinational corps, supports the emerging NATO military strategy. These formations provide NATO with a rapid response capability. The effectiveness of coalition warfare in the gulf crisis proved the political advantage of such formations. Additionally, all member nations are now reducing their respective defense budgets due to the changed security environment and increased internal political pressure. The change to a smaller, more mobile force allows these nations to meet domestic concerns while retaining NATO as a viable organization.

There is currently no intention to place additional TLE in POMCUS.

NATO's leaders have endorsed the continuing need for effective and up to date nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and have supported U.S. efforts to develop TASM (U.S. version: SRAM-T). However, all agree that it is premature to discuss deployment of any system that will not be available until the late 1990's.

It would be unreasonable for the U.S. to expect allied governments to commit to deployment of SRAM-T a full 7 to 8 years in advance of fielding the system. The new NATO strategy now under development continues to stress the need for sharing responsibilities and nuclear roles and that a nuclear deterrent must continue to be based in Europe.

THE FORMER WARSAW PACT NATIONS

Question. With tile formal demise of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991, these nations are looking for new security relationships to guarantee their borders. Which of these nations have asked to join NATO? What was NATO's response? Is there a half-way house in NATO, short of full membership, which could satisfy their Security concerns?

What additional provisions in CFE-1A, or in the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) document, would help their security concerns? Are we working actively to put these provisions in place?

Will these nations have a difficult time paying for the destruction of the TLE under the CFE provisions? Aren't there cheaper ways of destroying tanks that those considered in the CFE Treaty?

Answer. Since the July 1990 London Summit, NATO has developed a new, cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe's new democracies. This new relationship is a key part of NATO'S dramatic transformation in response to the Warsaw Pact's demise and other changes sweeping Europe.

The new relationship does not currently include NATO membership. None of the East European governments has applied for membership, and all recognize that they cannot become members in the foreseeable future. At the same time, they stress that NATO is an integral part of European security and support its continued centrality in European political and security architecture. During their recent visits to NATO, for instance, Czechoslovak President Havel and Polish President Walesa made this point, and other East European leaders have also done so on numerous occasions. The Soviets as well have indicated that they accept NATO's continued existence despite tile demise of the Warsaw Pact.

The heart of the new relationship involves NATO's diplomatic liaison program. This involves a regular dialog between NATO officials and those of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many Soviet and East European officials have visited NATO, and diplomats from those countries, assigned to Brussels and accredited to NATO, meet regularly with Alliance officials on a range of issues. Soviet and East European experts also participate in various NATO programs, including on science and the environment. At the June 1991 NAC ministerial in Copenhagen, the Allies agreed to expand the diplomatic liaison program and set out a series of initiatives to do so.

This new relationship with NATO, combined with expanded ties bilaterally and in other multilateral forums will help ensure security and stability in Eastern Europe. At the Copenhagen ministerial, tile Alliance made clear their "direct and material concern" for the region's security, stability and democratic development.

There are a number of East European proposals in CFE A for the CFE-1A and CSBM negotiations which should enhance their own security. To date, these proposals are generally consistent with those of the West. My understanding is these proposals are being actively worked in Vienna.

All nations will rind that treaty compliance will cost money and will not yield a sudden monetary bonus. No doubt the East will also rind destruction expensive. However, their costs will be mitigated by the fact that the treaty gives a destruction period of 40 months plus after the last country's ratification. Few countries in the East will be forced into an exceptionally rapid destruction regime with attendant escalated costs.

In answer to the second half of the question, the Treaty requires that the TLE be render "militarily ineffective." This may or may not be expensive. The British have recently demonstrated an implosion technique that does the job on a tank for about a $100 dollars. Whether the technique would be equally effective on Soviet equipment and meet the requirements of the reduction protocol needs to be determined. Moreover, indirect costs such as environmental considerations could move costs in different directions.

While it may be that Eastern negotiators in Vienna are concerned with TLE destruction costs, it has not yet appeared as a significant item on the agenda during military-to-military contacts with officials from those countries.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND TIMELY WARNING

Question. Of course, the CFE Treaty will not count few numbers of tanks with great accuracy. In order to determine the effectiveness of verification, it is necessary to determine what is a "military significant violation." flow many divisions, with how much treaty limited equipment (TLE) would constitute a militarily significant violation? What is the spread of opinion of our NATO allies on the definition of a militarily significant violation?

How would you quantitatively define "timely warning," the amount of time that you would reel was necessary to respond to a large force from beyond the Urals? Will our verification regime from the CFE treaty and from national technical means give you this timely warning?

In retrospect, was the INF Treaty a good treaty for Europe and NATO?

Answer. Any reintroduction of TLE into the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) zone which exceeds specified limits of TLE would constitute a politically significant treaty violation. A militarily significant violation would likely involve a large transfer of equipment into the ATTU that skews the balance of forces in favor of the Soviets. [Deleted.]

If equipment from beyond the Urals were to be included in initial Soviet operations, a timely deployment decision several months prior to potential hostilities would be needed for the U.S. and NATO to respond with an adequate defensive force. This warning would likely need to establish potential Soviet intent for hostile action.

In 1987, we believed the INF Treaty was a worthy achievement because it eliminated an entire class of nuclear missiles-those with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers. Of the 2,692 missiles identified for elimination, the Soviets preponderant share was 1,846 missiles, including 654 triple-warhead SS-20s. The Soviet systems could hold all of Europe at risk to virtual no-warning, nuclear attack. European security was enhanced by the elimination of these systems, and our "flexible-response" strategy remained in place with theater nuclear deterrence based upon short-range missile/artillery systems and aircraft delivery.

Given the recent changes in Europe and the impending CFE Treaty implementation, the INF Treaty looks even better in hindsight. The decreased conventional threat and elevated nuclear threshold in Europe validate the destruction of the INF-class of missiles as a well-founded decision. Equally important, the INF Treaty negotiations and resulting intrusive verification regime paved the way and set the standard for the START and CFE treaties. The INF Treaty stands today as an early success in arms control negotiations that helped foster the increased stability and security now evolving in Europe.

SCENARIOS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CFE

Question. One could hypothesize several ways for violations of the CFE. What are some of the ways the Soviets could violate the CFE Treaty?

If the Soviets were to circumvent the treaty, what is the most likely way they would do this? Would we have ample warning?

What are the less likely ways to circumvent the treaty, and why are they less important?

Answer. The Soviets could violate the CFE Treaty by attempting to hold additional TLE in the ATTU or by reintroduction of TLE previously moved east of the ATTU. I believe it is unlikely, however, that militarily significant numbers of equipment could be effectively concealed or moved back into the ATTU without being detected. The Soviets could also attempt to circumvent the treaty by sheltering additional TLE from treaty limits by including it in a nonaccountable equipment category. These options are also unlikely as counting rules and resubordination issues have clearly been defined and resolved.

The most likely way to circumvent the treaty without legally violating it (at least until adoption) would be to maintain very large forces or TLE beyond the Urals for reintroduction when needed. We would expect to detect such a buildup well before it could be moved back into the zone in an integrated, operationally ready force at militarily significant levels.

Although unlikely, the Soviets could attempt to shelter additional TLE from treaty limits by including it in an equipment category which is exempt from such ceilings, such as armored personnel carrier "look-alikes." These attempts to shelter additional TLE are assessed as less likely as the definitions and counting rules for TLE are clearly defined in the treaty text. The effective application of the counting rules-that equipment counts regardless of organization or subordination was reconfirmed in the Soviet's June 14 legally binding statement.

SOVIET TLE TO THE EAST OF THE URALS

Question. The Soviets moved a considerable amount of TLE to the east of the Urals before November 19, 1990. What fraction of the TLE that is cast of the Urals is in open storage? What is your estimate for the lifetime of such equipment, stored in the open?

How long would it take the Soviets to gather the 57,000 tanks, artillery, and armored carrier vehicles, that they have declared exists to the east of the Urals, into active units, repair it, move it to Berlin, and have it ready to fight?

Do you think that the possibility or a Soviet clandestine build-up to the cast or the Urals is very likely? What would be their motives for such a decision?

Answer. [Deleted.] Furthermore, the Soviets have provided NATO written assurance that this equipment would not be used to create a strategic reserve. [Deleted.]

Mobilization of units east of the Urals could occur in reaction to a perceived threat to the homeland.

NATO VERIFICATION PLANS

Question. NATO will decide several aspects of the verification and implementation process for the NATO group of States Parties: How will NATO decide the functions of the on-site inspections allotted to each NATO member? What fraction of the CFE OSIs will the U.S. be in charge?

Does a reduction in the number of Soviet OSIs, by grouping larger amounts of TLE into smaller amounts of Objects of Verification (OOV) make a difference for verification?

How will NATO manage its data from the OSIs and communication between the members? How large an office will be necessary to coordinate these materials?

Answer. The Protocol on Inspection to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe states that it is the sole responsibility of each group of States Parties to determine the allocation of inspections for each State Party within its group of States Parties. Through the Alliance consultative process, member states have agreed to develop procedures to ensure that all of the active quotas of the Alliance are used to best effect. For the baseline validation period, the U.S. will have about 20 percent of the on-site inspection quotas available to NATO.

Since the declared site inspection quota is based on a percentage of OOVs, and the challenge inspection quota is based on a percentage of the declared site quota, fewer OOVs translates into fewer inspections. Also, for each challenge inspection, one quota is subtracted from the total remaining declared site quota. Thus, with fewer overall inspections, challenge inspections will have to be carefully selected. If as a result of reductions, the number of declared sites also decreases, this may narrow the scope of Soviet military infrastructure subject to inspection without right of refusal. Even so, the percentage of TLE holding units/facilities that are inspectable remains the same whether the amount of OOVs is large or small.

On the other hand, an advantage of fewer OOVs is that the size of the area within some sites subject to inspection may increase. This larger area could encompass more units and make more equipment vulnerable to inspection while using a single quota.

I believe the U.S. and NATO will possess sufficient opportunities for on site inspection. On a year-by-year basis this affords a solid verification regime that will expose anything of military significance. While the treaty process will not be able to detect every piece of TLE located where it should not be, I am confident we will be able to determine to our satisfaction whether or not there is general compliance with treaty requirements.

Each State Party to the treaty has agreed to exchange data on conventional armed forces. with all other States Parties as specified by the CFE Treaty. Data management of the input from NATO capitals and other States Parties is embedded in the Verification Support Staff (VSS) at NATO Headquarters. A computerized data base will be maintained and updated. Communication will be as specified in Article XVII of the treaty. For verification support the Alliance members have clearly stated that the funding for the alliance and the level of manning should be held to a minimum.

SECTION 1-CFE TREATY ISSUES

On January 10, 1989, the 23 CFE nations agreed to the following mandate: "the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large scale offensive action."

Question 1A. How well does the CFE Treaty fulfill the objective to eliminate "the capability for launching surprise attack?" What types of specific military equipment and tactics are being controlled to reduce the threat of a surprise attack?

Answer. Given the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing removal of Soviet troops and equipment from Eastern Europe, a Soviet surprise attack on NATO's "Central Region" would have to start at least 400 miles away from NATO territory and proceed across unsupportive (and very likely hostile) East European states. Even absent arms control, these facts reduce substantially the Soviets' ability to conduct such an attack. By the mid-1990's, with the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, this threat of large scale attack with little warning against Central Europe will disappear. A surprise attack involving missiles and air forces in Europe remains a possibility, but the likelihood of such attacks, in the absence of ground campaign to exploit the advantage gained by surprise, is very remote.

The Treaty improves on this situation by limiting each alliance's holdings within the Five limited categories of conventional armaments necessary to conduct offensive military operations and hold captured territory: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. It also limits the amount of equipment within each category that any one country can hold. This "sufficiency" limit (Article VI) currently affects only the Soviets, and the combination of limits will drastically reduce the great Soviet force preponderance west of the Urals that characterized Europe throughout the Cold War. Finally, the transparency created by the combination of information exchange and inspection provisions will greatly reduce the potential that one state could prepare and launch a no-warning or short-warning attack.

The combination of Warsaw Pact disintegration and CFE Treaty constraints means that for the Soviets to conduct an attack on NATO they would be required to engage in lengthy and visible preparations, which would give those states an opportunity to prepare for the defense.

Question 1B. How well does the CFE Treaty fulfill the longer term objective to eliminate the capability "for initiating large-scale offensive actions?" What specific limitations on military equipment, structure, deployment, doctrine and training would limit the capability to carry out large-scale offensive actions? How and when will future CFE IA and CFE II negotiations strive to complete the additional steps needed to fulfill the mandate of CFE?

Answer. The limits and restrictions on Soviet forces in the Treaty will ensure that any subsequent Soviet build-up is lengthy, visible and economically disruptive. Moreover, any Soviet attack on NATO's "Central Region" would still involve moving forces through potentially hostile East European states. As long as NATO maintains significant capable forces, the Soviets would see little prospect of conducting a successful large-scale offensive in the absence of East European support and using only Soviet forces in the ATTU.

Of course the Soviets have moved large-quantities of equipment that would have been limited by CFE out of the ATTU prior to signature. If the Soviets were to maintain a skeletonized force structure in the ATTU in peacetime, they could theoretically surge the withdrawn equipment back Into the ATTU in an effort to regenerate pre-CFE force levels. Even so, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, interns instability in the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe would present the Soviets with far more daunting obstacles to large-scale operations against NATO than they would have faced before 1989. In these circumstances, such aggression by the Soviets is extremely unlikely.

The Treaty provides for explicit notifications of equipment holdings by location and unit, and an intrusive verification regime. This will make Soviet force deployments even more transparent. Violations of the Treaty in preparation for large-scale offensive action would be detected at an early point, allowing NATO to respond with timely defensive actions capable of offsetting Soviet plans.

The immediate follow-on negotiations, known as CFE 1A, will focus on manpower limits, an aerial inspection regime, and possibly additional stabilizing measures to increase further the transparency of each country's forces. While an eventual CFE II negotiation can be expected to seek to further strengthen stability and security in Europe, the basic CFE mandate will essentially be fulfilled with the successful implementation of CFE 1, with its codification of a balance of forces at lower levels.

Question 2A. [Classified.]

Answer. See table below.

Answer. See table below.

Question 2C. Show the effects of CFE reductions on force structure, according to best estimates. List the number and type of ground divisions and air force wings in the ATTU region for each of the 23 nations (including the FRG and GDR together and separately) in the format of Question 2A. Define the size of the divisions and wings. Will whole divisions be removed, or will the forces be thinned out? Estimate how many divisions or wings will be permanently disbanded and how many will remain intact but outside the ATTU region?

Answer. See table below.

The CFE Treaty, by design, leaves the decision of "thinning out" versus removing units to individual countries. The United States will most likely disband units although some may be thinned out. Plans are still in the development stage and are being reviewed in light of budgetary constraints and post-Operation Desert Storm requirements. Other countries have not yet announced their plans. NATO states will not be required to take significant force structure reductions as a result of CFE ceilings.

Data on other countries reflect U.S. IC estimates for January 1989, and national declarations under the CFE Treaty effective as of November 1990. It should be borne in mind that unit structure varies by country, so that the force structures reflected here are not necessarily comparable.

Once again, it is not possible at this time to provide good projections of forces for the post-CFE timeframe.

Question 2D. List the number of divisions and wings of aircraft outside of the ATTU region for those CFE nations which have substantial territory outside of the ATTU region giving the percent change as in the format of 2B. Separate the units on national territory from those held outside national territory and the ATTU region.

Answer. See table below.

Regarding the U.S. data in Table 2(4), the notations are identical to those in Table 2(3), with the exception that U.S. forces are further disaggregated into active and reserve components.

Question 2B. [Classified.]

Answer. See table below.

Question 3C. What is the cost of destroying 20,000 tanks, according to the Soviets and the United States? How long would it take the Soviets to destroy 20,000 tanks under these conditions?

Answer. Based on their most recent data, the Soviets would only need to reduce 7,575 tanks under CFE. (As part of the resolution of the counting rules dispute, they have now committed themselves to reduce 467 additional tanks within the zone, and another 466 outside the zone. The former would be reduced in accordance with CFE Procedures.) We do not have Soviet cost estimates for tank destruction, nor do we know which of the CFE procedures the Soviets will use to carry out destruction. Among the cheapest Treaty-sanctioned methods would be explosive demolition or smashing-for which the cost would be inconsequential except for the cost of labor. Explosive demolition could cost about $100 plus about 2 man-hours per tank. U.S. estimates for destroying M-47 tanks by cutting range up to $5,000, which may be offset by the sale of the scrap metal. The Soviet Union will have lower costs for labor and materials. Moreover, they will not have to comply with stringent environmental standards-as will participants in Western Europe.

Question 3D. What measures will the U.S.S.R. use to make the TLE east of tile Urals accountable? Would U.S. national technical means be able to determine large-scale movements of Soviet TLE from the east of the Urals to the west of the Urals? Will the Soviets notify the United States and the other CFE Treaty partners of these kinds of movements of TLE should they occur? Are there cooperative measures to assist the United States to detect such hypothetical movements? Is there a joint process with the Soviets to strengthen these safeguards against the possible use or this TLE to the west of the Urals?

Answer. The CFE Treaty does not require the Soviets to account for equipment held east or the Urals. However, they have provided aggregate data on the equipment they removed from the CFE zone. We believe our national technical means would have a high probability of detecting large-scale movements of this equipment back into the Treaty zone. The CFE Treaty contains no cooperative measures to enhance monitoring of equipment movements into the zone. It does require annual notifications of equipment introduced into service in the zone during the previous year, total equipment entering the zone, and permanent changes in force structure and changes in holdings, and on-site inspection of equipment holdings in the Treaty zone.

On June 14, 1991, the Soviets gave other Treaty signatories in the CFE Joint Consultative Group a number of formal assurances with regard to the equipment they had moved beyond the Urals. They confirmed earlier reports of how much equipment had been put into storage and how much had been dispatched to units. They also pledged, i.e., to inform other signatories, on a one-time-only basis, of the locations of equipment withdrawn from the zone and placed in storage and the amounts of equipment at each location. They stated as well that a certain amount of equipment in treaty-limited categories located beyond the Urals would be destroyed or converted in such a way as to provide "visible evidence" that it was no longer usable for military purposes. They promised to provide advance notification of such destruction or conversion, with locations and amounts.

A single-country maximum of TLE is set by the "sufficiency rule." The CFE Treaty has set this at about 67 percent of the allotments for either NATO or WTO. As an example, this means that the Soviets cannot have more than about 66.5 percent of the 20,000 tanks allotted to the WTO, or 13,300 tanks. (Or 33.5 percent of the 40,000 CFE tank total. The U.S. allocation is about 10 percent of the CFE total.)

Question 5A. The Soviets have seen their military situation shift from numerical superiority in 1988 to a situation of numerical inferiority in 1993 under the CFET. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a unified, communistic force, the sufficiency rule tends to put the Soviets at a numerical disadvantage because the NATO forces will add up to a full 100 percent, plus perhaps some of the forces from the Warsaw Pact nations, whereas the Soviets will have only 70 percent in the ATTU region. Did these factors encourage a change in the sufficiency Parameter from 60 percent to about 67 percent? What are the values of the sufficiency factors for the Soviets for all 5 TLE categories? What can offset, to some extent, these numerical disadvantages to the Soviets?

Answer. From the beginning, the Soviets argued for sufficiency levels as high as 40 percent of the ATTU-wide ceilings (80 percent of Eastern ceilings), and during the latter stages of the negotiation increasingly sought to justify such a level on the basis of Warsaw Pact disintegration. The West adamantly refused levels this high, proposing instead 30 percent, but finally agreed to Eastern European compromise proposals for levels of "approximately one-third" of total ATTU holdings. The agreed sufficiency levels apply different percentages in each category, but yield an overall sufficiency percentage or 34.0 percent.

In two cases, however, the Soviets agreed within their group of Parties on slightly lower actual residual holdings. Thus, they have agreed to retain no more than 13,150 tanks and 13,175 pieces of artillery. (In the remaining three categories, their agreed maximum levels of holdings are identical to the sufficiency level.)

While the demise of the Pact as a unified force under Soviet control means that, within the ATTU, the NATO nations collectively will have a numerical advantage over the Soviet Union, the latter will continue to be by far the single largest military power under the CFE Treaty. Within the ATTU, the Soviets probably will retain approximately one-third of the total permitted equipment, with additional forces-unlimited by the treaty-outside the AFTU. While the withdrawal of their forces from Eastern Europe will deprive the Soviets of their forward presence, they will continue to enjoy the advantages of continuous, internal supply, communication and transportation lines and the edge this gives them in terms of mobilization and reinforcement vis-a-vis NATO nations.

Question 5B. Will it be possible to gain acceptance of the sufficiency rule in the CFE-1A and CFF-II negotiations?

Answer. NATO has tabled its manpower proposal. This proposal will probably include political commitments from each of the 22 participating nations concerning their manpower levels in Europe. One of the elements under consideration is a sufficiency level for manpower. The agenda for future security negotiations ("CFE 11") involving all 34 CSCE participants (after the Spring 1992 Helsinki CSCE summit) is undetermined.

Question 12A. Describe the criteria for storage of TLE equipment. How will the numbers of TLE in storage be verified?

Answer. A designated permanent storage site (DPSS) is a facility with a clearly defined boundary and a continuous perimeter fence providing limited access for TLE. A DPSS may not house active units, firing ranges or training areas, and must contain facilities only for storing and maintaining TLE. Only personnel assigned to the storage and maintenance of TLE may be accommodated within a DPSS. TLE stored in facilities that do not meet these criteria will be counted as being in active units.

Within the overall ceilings on battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery, the CFE Treaty establishes sub-ceilings on equipment in active units. For instance, each group of States Parties is limited to 20,000 battle tanks, of which no more than 16,500 may be in active units. Any tanks held in DPSS shall be counted as tanks not in active units, and there is no Explicitly defined cap on TLE held in DPSS. There are similar limits on ACVs and artillery.

Because DPSS are objects of verification, and thus declared sites, they will be subject to on-site inspection without right of refusal. Further, the locations and holdings of DPSS must be disclosed as part of the information exchange, and any withdrawal or TLE from these sites must be notified at least 42 days in advance, with an exception for a limited number of TLE withdrawn for routine maintenance, repair or modification.

Question 12B. Describe the criteria for storage in the flank region. Are the Soviets constrained in additional ways in this region?

Answer. In general, DPSS storage is not permitted in the flank region. If TLE is stored there, it will count against the active unit ceilings. As a limited exception, the Soviet Union is permitted to store in DPSS 400 battle tanks and 500 artillery pieces in the Odessa Military District, and 600 battle tanks, 800 armored combat vehicles and 400 artillery pieces in DPSS in the southern part of the Leningrad Military District. Of the 800 stored ACVs in the Leningrad Military District, no more than 300 may be a combination of armored infantry righting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles. The physical criteria, verification and information exchange provisions as described in Question 12A apply to Soviet DPSS on the flank.

Additional constraints on the Soviets in the flank area were agreed primarily in response to the concerns of Norway and Turkey, and as such are discussed in question 11B, above.

Question 13. Were there any ambiguities during the translation of the CFET into the various official language texts of the CFET?

Answer. The CFET was negotiated in English, then translated by "language groups" made up of the relevant national delegations into the other five official CFE languages: German, French, Italian, Spanish and Russian. The Office of Language Services, U.S. Department of State, detailed four language officers to the U.S. Delegation to certify the translations. In working through the different language texts to assure that the English draft had been rendered into the other languages as accurately as possible, these officers identified a number of problems, including instances where the translated text was ambiguous. The biggest problem was posed by the hundreds of technical terms-names and descriptions of weapon systems, methods of destruction, and the like-for which accurate translations had to be found. U.S. language officers took each of these problem areas up with those who had done the translations. In all cases, acceptable solutions were eventually found, and all rive of the translations were certified as being authentic translations from the English.

SECTION II -- CFE MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

Question 1D. What are the limitations for challenge inspections? What facilities will not be open to these inspections?

Answer. The main limitation on challenge inspections is that the inspected state has the right to refuse a request for inspection. Upon designation of the location of the specified area by an inspecting state, the inspected state has up to 2 hours to grant or deny the inspection. If denied, the inspected State must provide reasonable assurances that the specified area does not contain TLE.

If a challenge inspection is granted, the only restrictions on access to facilities within the designated specified area are the same as on facilities within a declared site. Entrance can be denied to buildings or structures that do not have entrances larger than 2 meters in width, items can be shrouded, and sensitive points can be declared by-the inspected party. Further, a specified area cannot be larger than 65 sq. km, and cannot have any two points within it further apart than 16 km. A declared site, certification site, or a reduction site cannot be inspected within a specified area during a challenge inspection without expending another inspection quota.

Each state with territory within the ATTU has a passive quota of challenge inspections equal to a percentage of the total number of inspections-both of its own OOVs and stationed OOVs it hosts-which it is obliged to receive on its territory during a given inspection period. During the baseline validation and residual level validation periods and the reduction years this number is 15 percent; during each year of the residual phase the number is 23 percent. An accepted challenge inspection is charged against both the challenge quota and the declared site passive quota of the host state; a denied challenge inspection is not charged against any quota. States without territory within the ATTU have no passive quota nor right of refusal for challenge inspections. However, in the event that inspectors request access during a challenge inspection to a structure or premises used by a stationing party, the stationing party, exercising the rights of the inspected party, can declare sensitive points, shroud items and deny access to structures with entrances narrower than two meters.

Question 2A. The CSCE summit created a Center for Conflict Prevention (CPC) to house the data and verification center related to the CSBM regime. Will the CPC stay in Vienna? Will the CPC also handle the CFE7 verification data?

Answer. The CPC is an institution created by and under the supervision of the 34 nations of the CSCE. It will initially be located in Vienna; its venue may be reviewed at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992. The CPC will not handle CFE data and notifications. While a common communications system will be used for both CSBMs and for CFE Treaty requirements and the CPC will contain a terminal, this system will be operated by the Netherlands and the hub will be located at The Hague. CFE-related communications will be received only by CFE signatories.

Question 2B. Some view the CFET verification process as an important building block in the construction of a more cooperative European security system to replace the largely antagonistic East-West system that has prevailed for the past four decades. Is this view correct?

Answer. The CFE Treaty itself is an important building block for a stable security system in Europe. The CFE Treaty will establish an overall continental balance at lower levels. In this context, and in conjunction with U.S. NTM, the on-site verification provisions of the Treaty will provide a reasonable assurance that the provisions of the Treaty are being complied with by all parties involved. The CFE verification regime will also greatly increase military transparency-deterring cheating and promoting confidence-paving the way toward the development of a more cooperative security relationship among the states of Europe.

Question 2D. How will the CSBM regime enhance the verifiability of the CFM?

Answer. Any information gleaned from CSBM-related activities will naturally be cross-checked for its application to the CFE Treaty; however, the CFE verification regime is not dependent on CSBMs for its functioning. In this sense, the CSBMs general promotion of transparency and openness in military affairs could be of some additional value in some specific instances.

Question 3A. During the INF ratification hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ambassador Paul Nitze defined a standard for verification by stating: "What do we mean by effective verification? We mean that we want to be sure that, if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation." Is this definition of "effective" verification acceptable for the CFE Treaty?

Answer. Ambassador Nitze's statement highlights our requirement to have the ability to detect militarily significant violations. However, other considerations also bear on the question of "effective verification," and violations do not necessarily have to be militarily significant to be a matter of concern. Their political significance, e.g., would also be taken into account.

To achieve military success the Soviet Union would have to generate the combat capability both to conduct and sustain offensive operations to the depth of the European theater. Generating this capability would require very significant increases in forces (and hence numbers of TLE) above CFE residual limits. Smaller forces than these could achieve more limited objectives. However, the Soviets would incur great risk in engaging in any limited attack without mobilizing and amassing forces necessary for theater success.

CFE places limits-not bans-on military equipment levels, and conventional force structures are not static. Therefore, the presence of more tanks at an inspection site than were declared does not necessarily mean there has been a Treaty violation. The discrepancy may just reflect routine maintenance, training activity or minor alteration in unit structure. No combination of NTM, inspections and information provisions can guarantee timely detection or all politically significant violations.

In this context, what we have to consider is the ability to detect violations, or patterns of violations, even if they are not necessarily militarily significant. We have to consider the ability to detect indications or a violation before it becomes militarily significant in order to have time to respond. A regime affording such capabilities will also have the effect of deterring cheating by raising the costs of avoiding detection to the would-be violator.

Finally, the effectiveness of a verification regime also is related to the degree that it supports compliance decision-making by providing convincing, less ambiguous, evidence of possible violations. In determining the verifiability of the arms control measures, we consider, among other things, the following criteria:

Question 3B. Will the combination of (1) data exchanges, (2) on-site inspections, (3) national technical means of verification (NTM), and (4) cooperative measures be sufficient to effectively verify that the Parties are in compliance with the terms of the CFE Treaty? If the air overflight inspections are approved in CFE l(A), will they further enhance the verifiability of the CFE Treaty?

Answer. The objectives of the CFE Treaty are to achieve a stable conventional balance at lower levels and eliminate the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. In these terms, on the basis of data exchanges, on-site inspections and NTM (CFE includes no cooperative measures), the CFE Treaty is effectively verifiable. Given the complexity and scope of tactical forces and the associated monitoring tasks (accounting for thousands of pieces of mobile equipment) our monitoring uncertainties will be great. In particular, smaller violations could be difficult to detect.

The addition of a well-crafted aerial inspection regime could enhance CFE Treaty verification. The degree of enhancement would depend on the type of permissible sensors, the number of flights and the parameters of flight plans, all of which have not been settled.

Question 3F. Will new TLE be tagged when it replaces older TLE?

Answer. No.

Question 6A. How many employees does OSIA have? How many more will be needed to complement the CFE Treaty? List the actual and expected manpower and budgetary levels for OSIA for FY 89-93.

Answer. See table below.

OSIA is currently authorized 219 employees, and has used over 500 augmentees in inspection and escort activities. Initial estimates are for an increase of about 160 employees for CFE implementation specifically, with an overall increase of 700 employees to implement all planned treaties.

Question 6B. How will OSIA inspection responsibilities be coordinated with other nations in Europe?

Answer. In terms of training, OSIA will contribute substantially to the NATO inspector school by teaching inspection and escort procedures. OSIA also presented instruction during the Danish inspection training in Copenhagen, and will conduct mock inspections with a number of Allies to facilitate inspection training.

Inspections will be coordinated within NATO in the Verification Coordinating Committee to deconflict both quotas and targets. Bilateral executive agreements on support and implementation of inspections with countries where U.S. forces are stationed are under negotiation.

Question 6C. Will U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe play a substantial role in the inspections?

Answer. U.S. military personnel will be assigned to OSIA's European Division in Frankfurt, Germany, to perform inspections. Additional European-based personnel from installations subject to inspection will supplement OSIA escort teams during actual conduct of an inspection of a U.S. facility by another nation.

Question 6D. The OSIA is part of the Department of Defense, but it takes its directions from the interagency process under the National Security Council. Which agencies are part of the interagency process? In case of conflicts of opinion, should the OSIA follow the instructions of the Department of Defense or of the NSC interagency group?

Answer. The NSC-chaired interagency process is made up of representatives from the State Department, ACDA, OSD, JCS, the Intelligence Community and DOE. OSIA participates in this group as a technical adviser. Conflicts of opinion are resolved through the interagency process; OSIA follows directions given by this body through the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Question 6E. The OSIA is not a policy-making agency in the arms control process, but it can give advice on the viability and practicability of various on-site inspection methods. Should the OSIA be consulted on issues related to on-site inspections under arms control treaties before the decisions are finalized?

Answer. OSIA has been and continues to be consulted on issues relating to on-site inspections under arms control treaties before decisions have been finalized. Given OSIA's experience in operational matters pertaining to on-site inspections from almost 3 years of implementing the INF treaty, its advice has proven to be of practical utility,

Question 7A. Describe the internal process by which the U.S. Government will determine whether the terms of the CFE Treaty have been complied with. Which Federal agencies will participate and which agency or agencies will be in charge of the process?

Answer. The Executive Branch has an interagency mechanism for handling arms control compliance and implementation. This mechanism will operate for CFE as it does for other arms control treaties. Compliance issues come under the auspices of the Policy Coordinating Committee (FCC) on Arms Control, chaired by the NSC. Under this body is the NSC-chaired PCC Sub-Committee on Verification and Compliance, and then the ACDA-chaired Verification and Compliance Working Group at the working level. State, ACDA, JCS, OSD, the Intelligence Community and DOE are represented in all of these groups.

Question 7B. How will this process fit into the legal requirements laid down by Section 1002 of Public Law 99-145 and Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and any other relevant laws?

Answer. It has not been determined how CFE Treaty compliance questions will be reported. U.S. Government Findings on Soviet compliance with the CFE Treaty could be reported in the President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance mandated by Section 1002 of Public Law 99-145, while U.S. Government findings on any other CFE participant would be reported pursuant to Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Alternatively, all CFE Treaty compliance issues could be treated in the Section 52 report.

Question 7C. Will the same standard for compliance be applied to the acts of other nations as is applied to the acts of the United States? Will the same process for compliance decision-making be used for consideration of U.S. compliance as is used for other nation compliance? If two different formats are used for compliance decisions, how can it be assured that the same standard is used for both processes? Is there a right of review by one compliance process over the other compliance process?

Answer. The United States will hold its Treaty partners to the same high standards of compliance and implementation to which the United States adheres. The President stated in the March 1990 Report on "Adherence To and Compliance With Agreements," prepared under Section 62 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, "In previous reports to the Congress, I have made clear that the United States expects scrupulous compliance from its arms control treaty partners. For its part, the United States continues to take seriously its commitments to arms control agreements and sets rigid standards and procedures for assuring that it meets these obligations."

To ensure that U.S. plans and programs are in compliance with arms control agreements, they are subjected to internal DoD review, separate evaluations by ACDA, and Congressional oversight. These review processes are further detailed in the report cited above. With regard to the different formats and processes, substantive questions of U.S. compliance are reviewed by the interagency in the process of compiling the Section 52 Report. Thus, the same agencies review compliance for both the United States and other countries.

Question 9. The CFE Treaty uses the combination of declared data and on-site inspections to determine compliance with the CFE Treaty. In order to give the Congress some physical feel for the process, please give a couple of numerical examples on this process. Random sampling methods, using a binomial distribution, are useful in framing such a discussion, however they have limitations because there are scenarios where they would not apply. Nevertheless, consider the case of 20,000 tanks, divided into 500 regiments containing 40 tanks each. Assume that one wishes to determine the number of tanks to within 25 percent (+5,000). How many inspections would be necessary to determine the number of tanks to within 25 percent with a degree of confidence or 75 percent, 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent? Assume that one can count the number of tanks in a regiment to within 5 percent. If this example is not realistic, please develop a better example.

Answer. As the question suggests, random sampling techniques of statistical analysis are of extremely limited utility when applied to a problem of this kind. Many of the assumptions underlying this query are of questionable validity.

["The Administration notes that both the classified and unclassified portions of these answers must be read to gain a complete understanding of the issues."]

Second, random sampling normally assumes homogeneous targets; inspections will be of highly heterogeneous targets, including regiments, repair facilities, storage depots, POMCUS-like equipment bases and even undeclared sites.

[Deleted as stated above.]

Bearing in mind these limitations, we offer a model that focuses not on determining the overall size of a tank force, but on detecting the presence of anomalies--depending on how widespread such anomalies are in a population. This example discusses how many objects of verification (OOVS) must be inspected in order to provide varying degrees of certainty of detecting an anomalous OOV. The total number or OOVs held at risk will be far greater than the number that are actually inspected. While this example still assumes random sampling, it is a better approximation of the role of OSIs in monitoring CFE.

Detecting Cheating. CFE monitoring will not be able to detect clear "violations" at the level of a single OSI. Unlike INF, no specific type of equipment is prohibited, the presence of which would constitute a violation. Nor could inspection alone determine that overall limits are or are not being adhered to. The face that, at any given time, pieces of equipment could be, for instance, absent for repairs or training or present visiting from another OOV means that the number of pieces of TLE may not always correspond to the declared number for a given OOV.

[Deleted as stated above.]

Number of Inspections Required. In the statistical example outlined below, the number of required inspections depends on the degree of confidence required and the proportion of 0OVs that are assumed to be anomalies. For example, if 20 percent of OOVs containing ground TLE are assumed to be anomalies (in this example 140 out of the assumed 700 OOVs), 14 inspections would be necessary guarantee with 95 percent confidence that at least one anomaly would be detected. Only seven inspections would be required to guarantee with 75 percent confidence that at least one anomaly would be detected.

A higher level of "cheating" would be correspondingly easier to detect. If 50 percent (350 out of 700) 0OVs were anomalous, only rive inspections would be required to guarantee with 95 percent confidence that one anomalous OOV would be detected. None of this, of course, addresses the subject of challenge inspections at specified areas.

Assumptions. Again, it is assumed that inspections are made at random-that is, any OOV is just as likely to be inspected as any other and that all 0OVs are equally likely to be anomalous. If the United States could identify some 00ve as more likely to be anomalous than others, we could concentrate inspections on those OOVs and thus reduce the number of inspections required to obtain each level of confidence in successful detection. On the other hand, were the Soviets able to influence our choice of OOVs so that we were less likely to pick anomalous OOVs, more inspections would be required to obtain each level of confidence. Finally, it is assumed that anomalies would be unambiguously detected if inspected.

While required to make the statistical model work, none of the assumptions employed here is likely to be valid in reality. Further, the ability to detect one anomaly does not reflect the size of the anomaly nor the extent to which a state is in compliance with its overall limits under the Treaty.

SECTION III -- NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE (INF AND SNF)

Question 1B. How many on-site inspections have taken place in monitoring the destruction of the INF missiles? How many annual OSIs will take place after the destruction of the missiles? How many full-time personnel were needed to monitor the destruction of the INF missiles? How many will be needed after the destruction is completed?

Answer. See table below.

From June 1, 1991, to May 31, 1996, each Party is entitled to 15 short notice inspections per year. From June 1, 1996, to May 31, 2001, each party is entitled to 10 short-notice inspections per year.

OSIA required 4-5 employees per team for each elimination inspection, although other agencies provided other members for inspection teams. The Treaty allows for up to 20 inspectors per elimination inspection.

Question 1C. What were the INF costs for:

The following response does not include all service-related costs. FY 88 and 89 OSIA's costs were $63.3 million, which included operational and start-up costs. The Agency's database is not programmed to separate these costs. The largest costs were for conducting baseline inspections at 133 Bites ($8 million) and setting up continuous monitoring inspection operations in both the Soviet Union ($14.9 million) and the United States ($6.4 million).

The average annual OSIA cost of implementing the INF Treaty inspection regime after the missiles are destroyed is estimated at $28 million. The only costs saved will be for travel and transportation. All overhead and operating costs remain and provide an infrastructure for future treaties. Costs for operation of continuous monitoring inspection sites will increase primarily because of contractor salaries and administrative inflation.

An average U.S. INF OSI within Germany costs OSIA from $2,500 to $3,000 per inspection. An OST outside Germany costs OSIA an average of $4,000 to $6,000. The typical cost to OSTA for one short notice or closeout inspection in the Soviet Union is roughly $60,000. Escort costs to OSIA (airlift, housing, meals) for similar Soviet inspections within the U.S. range from $30,000 to $50,000 depending on the type slid length of the inspection.

The Air Force Electronic Systems Division spent approximately $15.4 million in procurement and military construction funds for the Cargoscan initial costs. Estimated annual cost of operating Cargoscan as part of the U.S. continuous monitoring inspection at Votkinsk is $1.1 million.

OSIA's initial cost for setting up the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk was $14.9 million and for the site at Magna was $6.4 million. Annual operating costs for the inspection sites at Votkinsk and Magna are estimated at $8.9 million and $3.5 million, respectively. These Figures include driver and escorts at Magna and rotation, airlift and ho6sing for Votkinsk.

Question 1D. Were there any significant problems in implementing the INF Treaty? Describe how these problems were resolved. How would you categorize the Soviet and American attitudes and behavior during the INF process? What fraction of the OSIs have experienced major problems? What are the lessons of the INF Treaty that can be applied to the CFE Treaty? Answer. Implementation or the INF Treaty has, for the most part, been both a smooth and business-like process. However, problems have occasionally arisen. Those that are related to Soviet noncompliance are addressed in the annual President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, and have been raised with the U.S.S.R. through diplomatic channels and in the Special Verification Commission (SVC). Other implementation issues that have arisen between the Parties have also been dealt with through diplomatic channels and the SVC.

It is difficult to compare the INF and CFE Treaties for several reasons: (1) CFE is a multilateral agreement, while INF is bilateral; (2) CFE is concerned with a wide range of conventional weapons which are larger in number and often smaller in size, while INF dealt only with missile a stems; and (3) all of the systems covered by INF were to be eliminated, while CFE is a scaled reduction of equipment and subsequent monitoring of residual levels. Notwithstanding these differences, the INF experience has provided valuable experience in planning and training for the actual conduct of inspections.

SECTION IV -- ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CFE

Question 1. The Congressional Budget Office Report, U.S. Costs of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Control Treaties (September 1990), concludes (Table 4 on page 11) that CFE Treaty verification will cost the United States:

Please comment on these CBO cost projections, and their assumptions to determine these costs. Please state the cost Projections of the Executive Branch in a disaggregated fashion, listing the number and cost of OSIs for each functional purpose, the cost of destruction, and so forth. List the anticipated total cost for CFE monitoring by all 22 nations. Also include Soviet and American estimates for destruction of their tanks.

Answer. OSIA had budgeted $20.6 million in FY92 and $15.9 million in FY93 to cover the costs of conducting CFE inspections. These estimates were based on the assumption that CFE would enter into force in July 1991. Based on this assumption, OSIA identified an unfunded requirement of $11.6 million for inspection costs in FY91. This unfunded requirement was to be met through a reprogramming action, but in light of the possibility that the Treaty will not enter into force at the time assumed this reprogramming action has been deferred.

The OSIA estimates were based on the following assumptions about inspections:

Additional details on OSIA can be provided as necessary; it is important to keep in mind, however, that these estimates are based on assumptions that were established in September 1990.

Working from the same assumptions used by OSIA, the Army has budgeted $18 million in FY92 and $22.6 million in FY93 for CFE inspection and TLE elimination costs. The Air Force has budgeted $3.6 million in FY92 and $3.7 million in FY93. The Army and Air Force also identified unfunded requirements for FY91 of $17.2 million and $3.6 million respectively. As with OSIA, these funding requirements will be met through reprogramming action at the appropriate time.

Beyond the statements provided above, we do not feel it would be appropriate to comment on the CBO study. In addition, the CBO study addresses costs for aerial inspections; since the provisions for aerial inspections have not been finalized we cannot comment on this component of the CBO projection.

We cannot estimate the cost of destroying Soviet tanks because we do not know what methods the Soviets will use to destroy them, nor what costs would be associated with each method. Section 1, question iC addresses cost for destruction of TLE.

Question 2A. The Congressional Budget Office Report, Budgetary and Military Consequences of the CFE Treaty (March 1991), concludes that the total annual savings of the CPE Treaty could range from $6-14 billion, depending on how the United States modifies its forces under the Treaty. Please comment on the CBO projections for costing savings under the CFE Treaty, and their assumptions for these calculations. Please state the cost projections of the Executive Branch in a disaggregated fashion under the assumption of 40,000 and 80,000 troop reductions.

Answer. Based on DoD calculations, the CBO cost savings estimates for 80,000 troop strength reduction ($6 billion, $5 billion for operating and support) appears reasonable. DoD estimates annual recurring savings in operating and support costs for a reduction of this magnitude in Europe to be $3.8 billion in 1992 dollars of budget authority. Closure of facilities in Europe would reduce annual recurring operating and support costs by another $1 billion.

It should be noted that the FY 1992/1993 President's budget reflects the withdrawal of 100,078 military end strength from NATO Europe in FY 1991-1993 (from 287,527 in FY 1990 to 187,449 military end strength in FY 1993). Savings for these force structure changes are reflected in the budget, including the savings that would result from the closure of facilities no longer re red in Europe.

Question 3A. What percent of U.S. costs in 1989 have the European nations paid to the United States for the purpose of basing U.S. troops in Europe? What percent of U.S. costs have Japan and Korea paid in 1989? What is the prospect for the Europeans paying part of the share for U.S. forces in Europe?

Answer. In general, European support for basing U.S. troops comes in the form of reducing the cost burden to the United States, rather than in the form of financial contributions to reimburse us for money spent. For instance, we pay no rent on most of the land and buildings our forces use in Germany, and we have Host Nation Support Agreements with many NATO countries, under which some of expenses for reinforcement exercises are defrayed. In addition, NATO has established common infrastructure and other funding to pay for building operational facilities; the United States both contributes to and receives from these funds. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the Europeans maintain substantial military establishments of their own in support of Alliance security.

By contrast With the European model, the Japanese do directly reimburse the United States for about 40 percent of the expenses associated with basing forces in Japan. The Koreans also recently adopted this practice, and in addition to rent-free real estate we expect their financial contribution to total about 6 percent of our expenses in 1991. We do not foresee the Europeans adopting this Japanese/Korean model of direct reimbursement.

Question 3B. What will be the approximate financial impact to the European economy from the withdrawal of 80,000 and 205,000 U.S. troops?

Answer. It is difficult to estimate the precise impact withdrawals might have on the European economy. U.S. forces in Germany, f6r example, inject approximately $8 billion into the economy annually, and the U.S. presence in Germany generates 66,000 jobs. Obviously, in less populated areas where a U.S. base is the center of the economy, the impact would be greater than for bases located in more diversified areas if troops are withdrawn.

SECTION V -- OTHER NEGOTIATIONS RELEVANT TO CFE

Question 1B. Could an Open Skies regime be used to monitor the CFE Treaty as well as the Open Skies regime? Can Open Skies also be used for other arms control provisions? Answer. The Open Skies treaty will not be a verification agreement per se, but it could provide a useful supplement to other monitoring and verification means, particularly for participants with capabilities less advanced than our own. In addition, Open Skies could contribute to monitoring the disposition of Soviet equipment that was withdrawn east of the Urals prior to signature of the CFE Treaty.

The November 1990 CSCE meeting in Paris expanded upon the 1986 Stockholm CSBM Document which established notification and inspection rights between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and which limited military activities.

Question 2A. How many inspections have been carried out under the 1986 Stockholm Document? In what way will the 1990 Paris CSBM document broaden and expand on the 1986 Stockholm Document? How will these accords lessen the possibility of war in Europe?

Answer. A total of 45 inspections have been carried out under the 1986 Stockholm Document.

The November 1990 Vienna Document incorporates and supersedes the 1986 Stockholm Document. The following new CSBMs and improvements to the Stockholm Document were agreed to as a result of negotiations in Vienna between March 1989 and November 1990:

1. Annual Information Exchange Including:


• Land forces and air forces
• Plans for major weapons and equipment deployment
• Military budgets and expenditures.
2. Risk Reduction


• Mechanism for consultation and cooperation on unusual military activities- to include meetings of the Center for Prevention of Conflict if responses to inquiries are unsatisfactory
• Cooperation on hazardous incidents of a military nature.
3. Contacts


• Visits to air bases once every 5 years to observe routine operations
• Encourage an increase in military contacts and exchanges between senior military and defense officials, military commanders, military schools, and academics engaged in defense studies.
4. Improvements on Stockholm
• Improved safety considerations for military inspectors by, i.e., adequately informing troops in the inspected area of the presence of inspectors
• Improved inspectors' ability to record their observations by permitting use of video recording equipment and night vision devices.
5. A regime of evaluation visits to check data on forces and equipment provided under the military information exchange.
6. Creation of a CSBM/CFE communications system to permit rapid exchange of messages related to agreed measures.
7. Annual implementation assessment meetings to discuss issues related to CSBM implementation.

CSBMs will contribute to stability and the maintenance of peace through enhanced communications and transparency regarding military forces, weapons systems and exercises, risk reduction mechanisms in place for consultations and cooperation in the areas of unusual military activities and hazardous incidents, and through compliance and verification utilizing inspections and evaluations among participating states.

Question 2B. What is different about the mandate and constituency or the CSBM accords as compared to the CFE Treaty? What is the legal status of the Helsinki, Stockholm and CSBM Documents?

Answer. The United States, Canada, and the European nations (all but Albania) are currently participating in the CSBM negotiations. The mandate for these talks was agreed at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting (1980-83), with the goal of building on the confidence building measures adopted as part of the Helsinki Final Act (1975). These first measures, according to the final Act, were designed to reduce the "dangers of armed conflict and or misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension * * *." At Madrid, it was agreed to hold a special meeting whose aim would be to "undertake in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

Subsequently, at Madrid, the area of application of CSBMs was agreed as "the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea areas and air space"-but measures would be applicable to participants' military activities in adjoining sea areas and air space only when these activities affected security in Europe and constituted a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe. The Madrid mandate extended CSBM coverage to the entire European part of the Soviet Union (i.e., to the Ural Mountains); the Helsinki Final Act measures were applicable in Soviet territory only to a depth of 250 kilometers from its frontier facing or shared with any other European State.

The mandate which governs the CFE negotiations was negotiated among the then- 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and completed in Vienna in January 1989. CFE covers only the land territory of the 22 signatories, from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains (part of Turkey is excluded). Its objectives were to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces and to eliminate the capability to launch a surprise attack and to initiate large-scale offensive action. While a variety of methods have been employed to achieve this objective-including "stabilizing measures," the core elements of the CFE I agreement are equipment ceilings, consequent reductions, information exchanges, and on-site inspection rights.

CSBM accords (such as the Vienna Document) are politically binding agreements. The CFE treaty is a legally binding international agreement.

THE VIEW FROM NATO

Question. With the formal demise of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991, NATO is currently changing much of its former strategies: Does the CFE Treaty fulfill its mandate? Please explain.

Will NATO approximately downsize from about 1.5 million active troops to 0.75 million?

Describe the specifics of NATO's shift from a "forward defense strategy" to the more mobile "Rapid Reaction Corps?" Will the United States place more of its TLE in POMCUS storage?

Does the United States plan to deploy in Europe a new short-range attack missile, the SRAM-T? How many SRAM-Ts does the United States plan to deploy? Will Germany support the deployment on its soil of aircraft carrying the SRAM-T? If the SRAM-T is not deployed in Europe, then where will it be deployed?

Answer. Yes. The treaty clearly meets its mandated goals of "a stable, secure balance of forces at lower levels," the "elimination of disparities threatening this stability and security," and the "elimination of the capability for surprise attacks and large-scale offensive action." First, the treaty contributes to security by reducing and limiting those armaments necessary to conduct offensive military operations and hold territory: tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Many thousands will be destroyed, most by the Soviets. Second, the ceilings on armaments set geographical sublimits to prevent unstable force concentrations. Combined with the limits on the holdings of any one country, these provisions will drastically reduce the forward-based Soviet force preponderance that characterized Europe during the Cold War. Finally, the information exchanges and intrusive inspection provisions make a surprise attack extremely unlikely and promote more productive relations across the board.

The treaty achieves its goals and, in concert with political change underway in Europe, provides a firm legal and political foundation that locks in place the positive changes that have occurred thus far. It also helps impede any return to the confrontational patterns of the Cold War.

It is unclear what this question means by "active troops." However, the latest SHAPE data available from nations' DPQ responses on manpower (as opposed to squadron, divisions, etc.) indicates that by 1995 the total NATO active duty (professional plus conscript) force in the ATTU will be around 2.3 million. This is down from a 1990 total of about 2.9 million and represents approximately a 20 percent reduction.

The forward defense strategy represents a response to a fixed threat in the NATO Central Region. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the CFE Treaty, and the Soviet force withdrawal from Europe, the forward defense strategy became an inappropriate response. The development of a new strategy to meet a wider range of threats over a larger area (i.e. the NATO flanks) was necessary. This new strategy began to refocus on contingency operations and crisis response throughout the NATO region. The emergence of multinational formations, such as the Rapid Reaction Force and multinational corps, supports the emerging NATO military strategy. These formations provide NATO with a rapid response capability. The effectiveness of coalition warfare in the Gulf Crisis proved tie political advantage of such formations. Additionally, all member nations are now reducing their respective defense budgets due to the changed security environment and increased internal political pressure. The change to a smaller, more mobile force allows these nations to meet domestic concerns while retaining NATO as a viable organization.

There is currently no intention to place additional TLE in POMCUS.

NATO's leaders have endorsed the continuing need for effective and up-to-date nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and have supported U.S. efforts to develop TASM (U.S. version: SRAM-T). However, all agree that it is premature to discuss deployment of any system that will not be available until the late 90's.

It would be unreasonable for the United States to expect allied governments to commit to deployment of SRAM-T a full 7-8 years in advance of fielding the system. The new NATO strategy now under development continues to stress the need for sharing responsibilities and nuclear roles and that a nuclear deterrent must continue to be based in Europe.

THE FORMER WARSAW PACT NATIONS

Question. With the formal demise of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991, these nations are looking for new security relationships to guarantee their borders. Which of these nations have asked to join NATO? What was NATO's response? Is there a half-way house in NATO, short of full membership, which could satisfy their security concerns?

What additional provisions in CFE-1A, or in the Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) document, would help their security concerns? Are we working actively to put these provisions in place?

Will these nations have a difficult time paying for the destruction of the TLE under the CFE provisions? Aren't there cheaper ways of destroying tanks than those considered in the CFE Treaty?

Answer. Since the July 1990 London Summit, NATO has developed a new, cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe's new democracies. This new relationship is a key part of NATO'S dramatic transformation in response to the Warsaw Pact's demise and other changes sweeping Europe.

The new relationship does not currently include NATO membership. None of the East European governments has applied for membership and all recognize that they cannot become members in the foreseeable future. At the same time, they stress that NATO is an integral part of European security and support its continued centrality in European political and security architecture. During their recent visits to NATO, for instance, Czechoslovak President Havel and Polish President Walesa made this point, and other East European leaders have also done so on numerous occasions. The Soviets as well have indicated that they accept NATO's continued existence despite the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

The heart of the new relationship involves NATO's diplomatic liaison program. This involves a regular dialogue between NATO officials and those of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many Soviet and East European officials have visited NATO, and diplomats from those countries, assigned to Brussels and accredited to NATO, meet regularly with Alliance officials on a range of issues. Soviet and East European experts also participate in various NATO programs, including on science and the environment. At the June 1991 NAC ministerial in Copenhagen, the Allies agreed to expand the diplomatic liaison program and set out a series of initiatives to do so.

This new relationship with NATO, combined with expanded ties bilaterally and in other multilateral forums will help ensure security and stability in Eastern Europe. At the Copenhagen ministerial, the Alliance made clear their "direct and material concern" for the region's security, stability and democratic development.

There are a number of East European proposals in CFE A for the CFE 1A and CSBM negotiations which should enhance their own security. To date, these proposal are generally consistent with those of the West. My understanding is these proposals are being actively worked in Vienna.

All nations will find that Treaty compliance will cost money and will not yield a sudden monetary bonus. No doubt the East will also find destruction expensive. However, their costs will be mitigated by the fact that the Treaty gives a destruction period of 40 months plus after the last country's ratification. Few countries in the East will be forced into an exceptionally rapid destruction regime with attendant escalated costs.

In answer to the second half of the question, the Treaty requires that the TLE be rendered "militarily ineffective." This may or may not be expensive. The British have recently demonstrated an implosion technique that does the job on a tank for about $100. Whether the technique would be equally effective on Soviet equipment and meet the requirements of the reduction protocol needs to be determined. Moreover, indirect costs such as environmental considerations could move costs in different directions.

While it may be that Eastern negotiators in Vienna are concerned with TLE destruction costs, it has not yet appeared as a significant item on the agenda during military-to-military contacts with officials from those countries.

SCENARIOS FOR VIOLATION OF THE CFE

Question. One could hypothesize several ways for violations of the CFE. What are some of the ways the Soviets could violate the CFE Treaty?

If the Soviets were to circumvent the treaty, what is the most likely way they would do this? Would we have ample warning?

What are the less likely ways to circumvent the treaty, and why are they less important?

Answer. The Soviets could violate the CFE Treaty by attempting to hold additional TLE in the ATTU or by reintroduction of TLE previously moved east of the ATTU. I believe it is unlikely, however, that militarily significant numbers of equipment could be effectively concealed or moved back into the ATTU without being detected. The Soviets could also attempt to circumvent the treaty by sheltering additional TLE from treaty limits by including it in a non-accountable equipment category. These options are also unlikely as counting rules and resubordination issues have clearly been defined and resolved.

The most likely way to circumvent the treaty without legally violating it (at least until adoption) would be to maintain very large forces or TLE beyond the Urals for reintroduction when needed. We would expect to detect such a buildup well before it could be moved back into the zone in an integrated, operationally ready force at militarily significant levels.

Although unlikely, the Soviets could attempt to shelter additional TLE from treaty limits by including it in an equipment category which is exempt from such ceilings, such as armored personnel carrier "look-alikes". These attempts to shelter additional TLE are assessed as less likely as the definitions and counting rules for TLE are clearly defined in the Treaty text. The effective application of the counting rules-that equipment counts regardless of organization or subordination was reconfirmed in the Soviet's June 14 legally binding statement.

NATO VERIFICATION PLANS

Question. NATO will decide several aspects of the verification and implementation process for the NATO group of States Parties: How will NATO decide the functions of the on-site inspections allotted to each NATO member? What fraction of the CFE OSIs will the United States be in charge?

Does a reduction in the number of Soviet OSIS, by grouping larger amounts of TLE into smaller amounts of Objects of Verification (OOV) make a difference for verification?

How will NATO manage its data from the OSIs and communication between the members? How large an office will be necessary to coordinate these materials?

Answer. The Protocol on Inspection to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe states that it is the sole responsibility of each group of States Parties to determine the allocation of inspections for each State Party within its group of States Parties. Through the Alliance consultative process, member states have agreed to develop procedures to ensure that all of the active quotas of the Alliance are used to best effect. For the baseline validation period, the United States will have about 20 percent of the on-site inspection quotas available to NATO.

Since the declared site inspection quota is based on a percentage of OOVs, and the challenge inspection quota is based on a percentage of the declared site quota, fewer OOVs translates into fewer inspections. Also, for each challenge inspection, one quota is subtracted from the total remaining declared site quota. Thus, with fewer overall inspections, challenge inspections will have to be carefully selected. If as a result of reductions, the number of declared sites also decreases, this may narrow the scope of Soviet military infrastructure subject to inspection without right of refusal. Even so, the percentage of TLE holding units/facilities that are inspectable remains the same whether the amount of OOVs is large or small.

On the other hand, an advantage of fewer OOVs is that the size of the area within some sites subject to inspection may increase. This larger area could encompass more units and make more equipment vulnerable to inspection while using a single quota.

I believe the United States and NATO will possess sufficient opportunities for on site inspection. On a year-by-year basis this affords a solid verification regime that will expose anything of military significance. While the treaty process will not be able to detect every piece of TLE located where it should not be, I am confident we will be able to determine to our satisfaction whether or not there is general compliance with treaty requirements.

Each State Party to the Treaty has agreed to exchange data on conventional armed forces with all other States Parties as specified by the CFE Treaty. Data management of the input from NATO capitals and other States Parties is embedded in the Verification Support Staff (VSS) at NATO Headquarters. A computerized database will be maintained and updated. Communication will be as specified in Article XVII of the treaty. For verification support the Alliance members have clearly stated that the funding for the alliance and the level of manning should be held to a minimum.

U.S. SENATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
October 9, 1991.

Hon. JAMES A. BAKER III,
Secretary of State, Washington, DC

DEAR MR. SECRERARY: Prior to the revolutionary changes in the former Soviet Union this August, the Foreign Relations Committee had intended to move forward with its consideration of the CFE Treaty sometime in October.

As my letter to you of September 6 indicated, many questions of implementation have arisen. I understand that you are scheduled to testify before the committee sometime after the Columbus Day recess. At that time, I would hope you could provide me with responses to the attached questions on CFE Treaty implementation.

Based on those responses, it would be my intention to chair one final hearing with Under Secretary Bartholomew and other administration witnesses to go over several issues in depth.

Although I still believe that implementation of the CFE Treaty can serve American and European security interests, the August revolution has raised serious questions that must be answered satisfactorily before the committee and the full Senate can move forward to provide its advice and consent to ratification.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs.

SOVIET RATIFICATION

1. At the current time, what entity will act to ratify the CFE Treaty on behalf of the former Soviet Union and when do you expect that action to occur?

2. Assuming the Council of Republics acts to ratify the CFE Treaty, will that action place a binding obligation under international law for all members of the Council to guarantee compliance with the CFE Treaty?

3. Should the, United States insist that central authorities announce a plan, agreed to by all the republics, for achieving compliance with the CFE Treaty and establishing accountability for potential noncompliance?

4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of delaying U.S. ratification until central authorities in the former Soviet Union announce an acceptable plan agreed to by all the republics for compliance with the CFE Treaty and accountability for noncompliance?

ZONES OF APPLICATION

5. Please explain what effect a decision by the a former Soviet Union to establish military districts that correspond directly to each Republic would have on the zones of application envisaged by the CFE Treaty? Would the Treaty zones need to be renegotiated?

BALTIC STATES

6. Have the Baltic States indicated to the United States or other CFE state parties whether or not they wish to become a party to the CFE Treaty?

7. If the Baltic States wish to become parties to the CFE Treaty, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made to incorporate the Baltic States into the treaty regime, including new agreements with the former Soviet Union and other state parties.

8. If the Baltic States wish to become parties to the CFE Treaty, what form would new agreements take? Would those agreements be amendments subject to Senate consent? Would any changes be needed that would be subject to Senate consent?

9. If the Baltic States choose to remain outside the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made, in what form those changes would be made, and whether such changes would be subject to Senate consent?

GEORGIA, AZERBEIJAN, ARMENIA, AND MOLDAVIA

10. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Moldavia become independent states and wish to join the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sub-limits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations? Would such changes be subject to Senate consent?

11. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Moldavia become independent states and choose not to join the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be make in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations?

12. If these republics stay in a new Union but choose to defy that new Union by taking actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty, who will the United States and other CFE Treaty parties hold accountable for possible noncompliance?

13. Does implementation of the CFE Treaty provide incentives for any of these four republics to stay in the Union or to become independent? Would adherence to the CFE Treaty by any of these republics prejudice their ability to become independent in the future?

RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELORUSSIA

14. If Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia become independent states and wish to join the CFE Treaty, please detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations? Would such changes be subject to Senate consent?

15. If Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia become independent states and choose not to join the CFE Treaty regime, would the administration still seek to maintain the CFE Treaty or would the administration propose to withdraw from the Treaty?

16. If these four republics stay in a new Union but choose to defy that new Union by taking actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty, who will the United States and other CFE Treaty parties hold accountable for possible noncompliance?

17. Does implementation of the CFE Treaty provide incentives for any of these four republics to stay in the Union or to become independent? For example, could treaty compliance become prejudicial to republic claims of sovereignty?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
October 12, 1991.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your recent letters and for your continued support for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. I fully agree with you that the CFE Treaty serves the security interests of the United States and of all of Europe. These benefits can best be ensured by prompt advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty.

My recent trip to Moscow has convinced me that all those engaged in transforming what was formerly the Soviet Union are committed to proceeding with ratification and carrying out Soviet Obligations under the CFE Treaty. In particular, they are focusing on central control of the military in a manner that should facilitate the implementation of the CFE Treaty. In addition, the Treaty is unusually well structured to accommodate the historic events that have taken place. Because it was negotiated in a time of unprecedented political transformation, it contains the mechanisms needed to ensure its continued relevance in a changing Europe-without in any way mitigating its rigorous destruction and verification requirements.

Indeed, it is a measure of the value of the CFE Treaty that it remains more crucial than ever during this pivotal time. As nations re-emerge, or are metamorphosed, a predictable pattern of security arrangements will unquestionably be a stabilizing factor. The Treaty's maximum force levels and the assurances provided by inspections and exchanges of information should contribute not only to future planning, but to allaying fears of arms buildups or an imbalance of power. Moreover, its emphasis on consultation and cooperation, through the continuation of negotiations and creation of bodies such as the Joint Consultative Group, fosters the interaction that will be needed as we all help to shape a new Europe.

It is likely to be quite some time before we know the ultimate configuration and nature of the entity or entities that will succeed the Soviet Union, but we have carefully analyzed a range of possible outcomes. Many of them would require no changes to the Treaty regime at all; others would require only minimal changes. We are convinced that the Treaty can safely be ratified m written and any required changes dealt with after entry into force.

Three nations, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, have already ratified the CFE Treaty. All our NATO Allies have also expressed their commitment to moving quickly toward ratification and full implementation. Even in this time of confusion and competing priorities, Soviet leaders have taken care to express their continued support for the obligations undertaken in the CFE Treaty. The United States should be in the forefront of this movement to reaffirm the importance of lower levels of armaments and a reliable European security structure, and to express support for CFE as the beat vehicle for ensuring this outcome.

It is our strong conviction that the valuable contribution the CFE Treaty makes to the security of the United States and its allies can be sustained. We are fully confident that the advice and consent of the Senate to the CFE Treaty continues to be in the national security interest of the United States.

However, we take a serious risk if we do not move quickly. The Treaty's many advantages cannot be realized until it is ratified and implemented. The temptation for signatories to tinker with it may also increase as time goes on-and some important provisions that are favorable to the United States and our Allies could be lost. In addition, if momentum slows now, the leaders who have heretofore expressed their determination to abide by the Treaty may become preoccupied with other concerns or lose power to those who have opposed its measures. We need to act decisively in the Treaty's favor if we are to lock in its benefits.

As you know, I have departed for the Middle East for the eighth and most intense round of discussions in an effort to move toward a comprehensive peace settlement. I have asked Reginald Bartholomew to go up and discuss with the Senate our views on how to proceed, and explain why we consider it important to do so. I will be happy to come up to the Hill to discuss this subject when I can on my return. You will also be receiving in the near future responses to the questions you included with your October 9 letter.

Again, I want to express my appreciation for your support of this important agreement. I look forward to working with you to ensure CFE's ratification as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

JAMES A. BAKER, III.

SOVIET RATIFICATION

Question. At the current time, what entity will act to ratify the CFE Treaty on behalf of the former Soviet Union and when do you expect that action to be taken?

Answer. The new Supreme Soviet is empowered to ratify the CFE Treaty. It is expected to consider the Treaty shortly after reconvening on October 21, placing it at or close to the top of their agenda. We understand there is strong support for the Treaty, and for rapid ratification, both among officials of the central government and the republics.

Question. Assuming the Council of Republics (new Supreme Soviet) acts to ratify the CFE Treaty, will that action place a binding obligation under international law on all members of the Council to guarantee compliance with the CFE Treaty?

Answer. Ratification b6nthe new Union will place a binding obligation under international law on the Union to comply with the CFE Treaty. It will be up to central Union authorities to see that Treaty obligations are fulfilled-throughout the territory which comprises the Union.

Question. Should the United States insist that central authorities announce a plan, agreed to by all the republics, for achieving compliance with the CFE Treaty and establishing accountability for potential non-compliance?

Answer. We will hold the central government accountable for fulfilling all Treaty obligations. It will be up to central government authorities to work out arrangements with republics which are part of the new union or confederation to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of delaying U.S. ratification until central authorities in the former Soviet Union announce an acceptable plan agreed to by all the republics for compliance with the CFE Treaty and accountability for non-compliance?

Answer. There are no advantages to holding up U.S. ratification, since such a Union-Republic plan might indicate good intentions, but would do nothing else for other Treaty signatories in terms of ensuring compliance with Soviet Treaty obligations. The central government, as Treaty signatory, will be held accountable for fulfilling Treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics; it cannot transfer that accountability to constituent republics. Only the successor state or states to the former U.S.S.R. and those republics which might choose to opt out of this new union and accede to the Treaty as sovereign states can be held separately accountable for obligations under the Treaty.

Delaying U.S. ratification carries with it significant disadvantages. It is important to ratify as soon as possible. The Treaty's reductions, limits, information exchanges and on-site inspections will impose minimal constraints on us, but major ones on Soviet successor who will continue to hold the largest military forces in Europe. Above all, it will provide a reliable, stable structure for security relations. Such a structure is needed especially during unsettled times and to serve as a basis for further cooperative developments in the Security sphere. The United States and its allies can only gain from CFE and its many advantages will not be realized until the Treaty enters into force and is being implemented.

The Treaty is an intricate web of hard-fought compromises among 22 states; despite the fact that the political and military circumstances of many of those signatories changed during the negotiation and have continued to change, we are convinced it continues to be viable, and, indeed, is more valuable now than ever.

The longer entry into force is delayed, however, the greater will be the temptation for one or another signatory to revisit some of those compromises or to pursue other changes. As a result, the whole Treaty might be unraveled.

ZONES OF APPLICATION

Question. Please explain what effect a decision by the former Soviet Union to establish military districts that correspond directly to each Republic would have on the zones of application envisaged by the CFE Treaty? Would the Treaty zones need to be renegotiated?

Answer. The new Union might decide to redraw the boundaries of its military districts to correspond to the boundaries of each Republic, but that would have no effect on the Treaty sublimits or other Treaty obligations. The military district boundaries for purposes of the Treaty were set as of Treaty signature. At that time, the U.S.S.R. submitted to the Treaty depositary a map of its military districts. The purpose of this submission was to assure that Treaty obligations could not be unilaterally altered by district redrawing.

While the Treaty could be amended to redraw those boundaries, in our view this is not necessary, and could provoke a complete renegotiation of sublimits. Even if more sovereign states were to emerge from the former U.S.S.R. and were to accede to the Treaty, they can be accommodated under the existing zonal scheme. The zonal sublimits established by the Treaty effect a redistribution of equipment throughout the area of application so as to prevent unstable force concentrations- particularly on the flanks and in central Europe. That principle is still valid.

The military districts of the Soviet Union-as defined pieces of territory-were used along with independent countries as elements in the zonal scheme. Even if those pieces of territory are no longer part of the Union, they can continue to be elements in the zonal sublimit system. That applies as well if a new state includes more than one military district and has territory in more than one subzone.

The territory of the Baltic states, which are non-Treaty signatories, is no longer part of the area of application. The Baltic Military District, however, also includes a small portion of the Russian republic, and this portion would remain part of the Treaty zonal scheme. By agreeing that Soviet equipment stationed on Baltic territory will be subject to the Treaty, the Soviet Union is also undertaking to count this equipment against the sublimits established for the zone which includes the Baltic MD (4.3). (It is possible, however, that all such equipment will have been withdrawn by the end or the reduction period, when ceilings come into force.)

Question. Have the Baltic States indicated to the United States or other CFE states parties whether or not they wish to become a party to the CFE Treaty?

Answer. Baltic officials told a visiting U.S. delegation recently that they were not now inclined to seek accession to the Treaty but indicated at the same time that they had not yet fully considered this issue.

Question. If the Baltic States wish to become parties to the CFE Treaty, what form would new agreements take? Would those agreements be amendments subject to Senate consent? Would any changes be needed that would be subject to Senate consent?

If the Baltic States wish to become parties to the CFE Treaty, what form would new agreements take? Would any changes be needed that would be subject to Senate consent?

Answer. The accession of the Baltic States to the Treaty would require relatively few changes to the Treaty text, and those changes would be minor in nature. The changes that would be required are as follows:

Preamble: The names of the Baltic States would be added to para. 1; "and having conducted this negotiation" would be replaced with "which was conducted" in para. 2. (Presumably the name of the U.S.S.R. would also be changed here, and in the other places in the Treaty text where the names of participants appear.)

Art. II: Add names of Baltic states to Eastern Group of States Parties with language adapted to take account of their not being signatories to the Warsaw Treaty.

Art IV: Add names of Baltic States.

Protocol on Existing Types: Equipment lists for Group of Six would have to be updated if the new states held any type of armament subject to the Treaty which is not now on the list. This is unlikely.

JCG Protocol: The new states would have to be added to the scale of distribution of expenses.

Such changes could be handled in the Joint Consultative Group as improvements relating only "to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature" (Article XVI, para. 5, of the Treaty). Since the changes above are straightforward and minor in scope, the Administration does not believe that they would constitute amendments to the Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Similarly, Senate advice and consent is not required when new states accede to other multilateral treaties, e.g., the Nonproliferation Treaty. However, any final judgment could not be made until the exact amendments were known.

Other steps required by Baltic accession (in accordance with existing Treaty provisions):

Each new State Party would have to provide notification of its maximum levels of holdings to other signatories, pursuant to Article VII. Unless the new states decide to hold no TLE, such new notifications would require decreases in previously notified maximum levels of one or more of the group of six-presumably those of the Soviet Union. All such changes, provision for which is made in the Treaty, would have to be notified to other signatories.

New states would have to provide data as required by the Information Exchange Protocol, and to make various other notifications, such as those as required by Art. VIII, the Protocol on Reclassification of Aircraft, the Reduction Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol (notification of active quotas, lists of inspectors and transport crew members, languages to be used by inspection teams, and standing diplomatic clearance numbers).

Question. If the Baltic States choose to remain outside the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made, in what form those changes would be made, and whether such changes would be subject to Senate consent?

Answer. A decision by Baltic States to remain outside the Treaty regime would require no changes to the Treaty text. That part of the Baltic military district that still exists contains only a small portion of Russia. This portion, however, contains considerable TLE.

Although it requires no changes to the Treaty text-as long as Union equipment remains on Baltic territory and the Baltics do not accede to the Treaty regime-it will be necessary to ensure that this equipment is subject to the Treaty. The legally binding agreement which was agreed in Vienna on October 18, 1991, makes it clear that Soviet equipment in Treaty categories stationed on Baltic territory is subject to all provisions of the Treaty, its associated documents and the June 14 Soviet commitments which resolved the counting rules dispute. This will ensure that Soviet equipment located on Baltic territory will count against the aggregate ceilings and subceilings established pursuant to the Treaty for the Group of Six and be subject to the sufficiency rule. It will also provide assurance that notified maximum levels for holdings (Art. VII of the Treaty, which reflects intra-Group allocations) are respected.

The United States is also in the process of addressing CFE with officials of the Baltic States, with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment on their territory. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections of any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the Treaty enters into force.

GEORGIA, AZERBEIJAN, ARMENIA, AND MOLDAVIA

Question. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Moldavia become independent states and wish to join the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations? Would such changes be subject to Senate consent?

Answer. Any State wishing to accede to the Treaty would be expected to accept all limits and other obligations as written. Any of these republics which join as an independent state would be expected to join the existing group of six (this would also be the case for the Baltic States), which is the group to which the U.S.S.R. belongs. Presumably one or more of the new signatories would want to hold equipment in categories subject to the Treaty. This would require a reallocation of the group of six entitlements-a procedure which is already provided for in the Treaty. Presumably their portion would come out of the existing entitlement of the Soviet Union. The new states and the state or states for which allocations had changed would then so notify the other signatories.

The new states would also be required to provide a data set on their existing equipment holdings in Treaty categories. This would establish one of the bases for calculating their eventual reduction obligations-if any. They would also be required to make a number of other notifications, e.g., those required by the Protocol on Reclassification of Aircraft, the Reduction Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol (notification of active quotas, lists of inspectors and transport crew members, languages to be used by inspection teams, and standing diplomatic clearance numbers).

The accession of new states to the Treaty would require relatively few changes to the Treaty text, and those changes would be minor in nature. The changes that would be required are as follows:

Preamble: The names of the new states would be added to para. 1; "and having conducted this negotiation" would be replaced with "which was conducted" in para. 2. (Presumably the name of the U.S.S.R. would also be changed here, and in the other places in the Treaty text where the names of participants appear.)

Art. II: Add names of the new states to Eastern Group of States Parties with language adapted to take account of their not being signatories to the Warsaw Treaty.

Art IV: Add names of new states.

Protocol on Existing Types: Equipment lists for Group of Six would have to be updated if the new states held any type of armament subject to the Treaty which is not now on the list. This is unlikely.

JCG Protocol: The new states would have to be added to the scale of distribution or expenses.

Such changes could be handled in the Joint Consultative Group as improvements relating only "to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature (Article XVI, para. 6, of the Treaty). Since the changes above are straightforward and minor in scope, the Administration does not believe that they would constitute amendments to the Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Similarly, Senate advice and consent is not required when new states accede to other multilateral treaties, e.g., the Nonproliferation Treaty. However, any Final judgment could not be made until the exact amendments were known.

Question. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Moldavia become independent states and choose not to join the CFE Treaty regime, please describe in detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations.

Answer. The Administration would prefer to see all newly emergent states on the European territory of the U.S.S.R. included in the CFE Treaty regime. However, if small republics such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldavia decide to opt out of a new union, there would be no reason to insist on their accession to the Treaty regime unless they hold such substantial amounts of TLE that other signatories would be uneasy.

We would need to ensure, however, that all equipment in categories subject to the Treaty and under the control of the new Union remains subject to Treaty provisions and associated agreements-whether located on the territories of its member republics or on the territories of newly independent states which choose not to join the union. A legally binding statement covering Soviet equipment in the Baltic States was agreed to in Vienna among the 22 signatories on October 18, 1991. A Similar commitment could be secured with regard to other newly emergent states where the Union will station forces.

The United States is also in the process of addressing CFE with officials of the Baltic States, with whom arrangements would have to be made to permit inspection of Soviet equipment on their territory. Preliminary discussions between Baltic leaders and U.S. representatives indicated a willingness to allow inspections or any Soviet TLE remaining on their territory after the Treaty entered into force. Similar arrangements could be made with other small republics which opt out of the union and choose not to accede to the Treaty-but on whose territory union forces are stationed.

Question. If these four republics stay in a new Union but choose to defy that new Union by taking actions inconsistent with the CFE Treaty, who will the United States and other CFE Treaty parties hold accountable for possible non-compliance?

Answer. We would hold the new Union government responsible for fulfilling Treaty obligations throughout the territory of its constituent republics. As they would not be Treaty signatories, there would be no legal basis for holding individual republics accountable in cases of non-compliance. Of course that would not prevent the United States-under certain circumstances-from pressing representatives of recalcitrant republics, as well as union officials, to take steps to ensure that compliance problems are resolved.

Question. Does implementation of the CFE Treaty provide incentives for any of these four republics to stay in the Union or to become independent? Would adherence to the CFE Treaty by any of these republics prejudice their ability to become independent in the future?

Answer. In our view, while we believe there are incentives for republics which have decided to leave the union to accede to the Treaty (such as participation in the European security system the Treaty will establish), we believe that a republic will base its decision whether or not to stay in the union on other factors, since participation in the Treaty regime is possible either as a constituent republic or as an independent state. We do not believe that constituent republics which support continued Treaty adherence by the Union would be prejudicing their ability to become independent in the future, since the Treaty regime would not be endangered by a further shrinking of the union-unless a republic holding Significant amounts of equipment, such as Ukraine, were to withdraw and refuse to accede to the Treaty as an independent.

RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELORUSSIA

Question. If Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia become independent states and wish to join the CFE Treaty, please detail all changes that would have to be made in order to ensure compliance with CFE numerical limits and sublimits, reduction obligations, transparency obligations, and inspection rights and obligations? Would such changes be subject to Senate consent?

Answer. For the Russian republic to "become an independent state," i.e., to withdraw from the union, would mean the disintegration of the union as we know it. We do not expect this to happen. However, if the union did completely disintegrate, the Russian republic presumably would assume the international obligations of the former U.S.S.R. The following responses, therefore, deal with Ukraine and Belorussia only.

Any state wishing to accede to the Treaty would be expected to accept all limits and other obligations as written. Any of these republics joining as an independent state, would be expected to join the existing group of six, which is the group to which the U.S.S.R. belongs. A reallocation of group of six entitlement-a procedure which is already provided for in the Treaty-would have to be made. Presumably their portion would come out of the existing entitlement of the Soviet Union. The new states and the state or states whose allocations had changed would then so notify the other signatories. The new states would also be required to provide a data set on their existing equipment holdings in Treaty categories. This would establish one of the bases for calculating their eventual reduction obligations. They would also be required to make a number of other notifications, e.g., those required by the Protocol on Reclassification of Aircraft, the Reduction Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol (notification of active quotas, lists of inspectors and transport crew members, languages to be used by inspection teams, and standing diplomatic clearance numbers).

The accession of new states to the Treaty would require relatively few changes to the Treaty text, and those changes would be minor in nature. The changes that would be required are as follows:

Preamble: The names of the new states would be added to para. 1; "and having conducted this negotiation" would be replaced with "which was conducted" in para. 2. (Presumably the name of the U.S.S.R. would also be changed here, and in the other places in the Treaty text where the names of participants appear.)

Art. II: Add the names of the new states to the Eastern Group of States Parties with language adapted to take account of their not being signatories to the Warsaw Treaty.

Art IV: Add names of new States.

Protocol on Existing Types: Equipment lists for Group of Six would have to be updated if the new states held any type of armament subject to the Treaty which is not now on the list. This is unlikely.

JCG Protocol: The new states would have to be added to the scale of distribution of expenses.

Since the changes to the Treaty text noted above are straightforward and minor in scope, the Administration does not believe that they would constitute amendments to the Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Rather, such changes could be handled in the Joint Consultative Group as improvements relating only "to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature" (Article XVI, para. 5, of the Treaty). Provisions already exist in the treaty to permit the other steps which would have to be taken in the wake of accession to the Treaty by new states (reallocation of equipment, e.g.).

Question. If Russia, Ukraine, or Belorussia become independent states and choose not to join the CFE Treaty regime, would the administration still seek to maintain the CFE Treaty or would the Administration propose to withdraw from the Treaty?

Answer. In order to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty regime, it almost certainly would be necessary for all three of these republics, as they are likely to retain significant amounts of equipment in Treaty categories, to participate in CFE. Given the fact that the CFE Treaty is seen by European states as the cornerstone of a new European security system, we believe that there would also be powerful political, military and economic incentives for all three republics to participate in CFE.

If these republics should become independent states and choose not to participate in the Treaty, the United States and its allies would consider an appropriate response. The Treaty contains mechanisms for withdrawal should this be necessary.