APPENDIX (cont.)
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
WASHINGTON, DC,
July 24, 1991
Hon. JOSEPH BIDEN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: I am Jonathan Dean, now Arms Control Adviser of the Union of Concerned Scientists. From 1949 to 1984, 1 was a Foreign Service Officer of the Department of State working mainly on East-West political-military and arms control issues. In the mid-1950s, as a junior officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, I helped establish the new Federal German armed forces. In the early 1970s, 1 was deputy U.S. negotiator for the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin which, after years of military confrontation, at last obtained from the Soviet Union contractual guarantees of unhindered access to Berlin.
For 9 years, from 1972 to 1981, 1 was associated with the NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations on Mutual and Balance Force Reductions in Vienna, First as Chairman of the interdepartmental working group on MBFR, then as head of the U.S. delegation to the preparatory talks, as Deputy U.S. Representative to the negotiations once started and (1978-81) as U.S. Representative. The MBFR talks covered nearly all the issues raised in CFE. They also covered nuclear weapons, but their area of application did not include Soviet territory.
After my assignment with the MBFR talks, I worked for 2 years as Resident Associate for European security issues with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and have continued to follow closely European security in my work as Arms Control Adviser for the Union of Concerned Scientists. My book Watershed In Europe, Lexington Books 1987, covers the period of the MBPR talks and my book Meeting Gorbachev's Challenge, St. Martins Press, 1989, covers the negotiations for the CFE Treaty.
I enclose a short critique of the CFE Treaty which I hope can be included in the record of the ratification hearings.
Sincerely yours,
JONATHAN DEAN.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CFE TREATY
The CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe has many real benefits.
The first of them is the low limits the Treaty imposes on the major conventional armaments of the Soviet Union deployed west of the Urals. These limits, properly verified, mean that short warning attack is nearly excluded. If the Soviet government takes a common sense approach, it will disband many of the Soviet ground force units which held the armaments reduced by the CFE Treaty. If so, that will add further to warning time even for preparations for mobilized attack. Thus, the CFE Treaty is essential insurance against a negative reversion of Soviet policy, something we do not anticipate now, but which cannot be ruled out for all time.
The CFE Treaty is also an indispensable condition for future democratic development in the Soviet Union. Without the objective, verifiable assurance the Treaty provides against worries over attack from the West, deep-rooted Soviet paranoia could in future years bring recurrent pressures for authoritarian rule and military build-up. Without the reassurance the Treaty gives Western Europe, the European countries would not be prepared to give the Soviet Union the long-term support it needs to develop democratic structures. The Treaty also provides a contractual basis for security of the Eastern Europe states in the form of the prohibition in Article 4 against stationing foreign forces on the territory of signatory states without their agreement, and this in a Treaty to which the United States and all members of the NATO alliance are parties. Given these points and the limitation of German arms and also manpower in the Treaty, CFE is in many ways a combined peace treaty for World War 11 and also for the Cold War.
At the same time, the Treaty has several shortcomings or imperfections. The sum total of these shortcomings is not enough to outweigh the solid value of the Treaty, which is an excellent negotiating job and fully deserves ratification. Moreover, most of the shortcomings are reparable, and there will be opportunity to take action on them in ongoing negotiations. This could happen in the CFE 1A talks now in progress, in further negotiations which are likely after the next Follow-On session of the CSCE, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, scheduled for March 1992, or through agreement in the Joint Consultative Group established by the CFE Treaty. This body may propose amendments to the Treaty, as may any party to the Treaty. The Joint Consultation Group in effect keeps the negotiating team going indefinitely.
On the other hand, if they are left untouched, these shortcomings could provide openings for a changed Soviet government to increase its military power significantly without violating the CFE Treaty.
First, a brief list of the shortcomings:
The most negative issue in connection with the CFE Treaty is the removal from the Treaty's area of application of at least 57,000 pieces of Soviet Treaty-Limited Equipment-over 16,000 tanks, nearly 16,000 armored combat vehicles, and 25,000 artillery pieces.
Second, the absence of limits in the Treaty on active duty ground and air force personnel, and the absence of Treaty limits on force structure, that is, on the number of units and formations, especially ground force divisions and air force combat wings. These gaps have become even more important in connection with the movement of equipment East of the Urals.
Third, as regards the solution found for Treaty-Limited Equipment held by naval infantry and coastal defense units subordinated to the Soviet Navy, it was known from the outset that the equipment held by the Soviet Naval Infantry would raise problems. It is unfortunate that Article III of the Treaty was not formulated from the beginning in the more comprehensive way which was agreed for the supplementary understanding with the Soviet Union on this topic.
The fourth area of shortcomings include: (1) high remaining levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment-under the CFE Treaty, NATO is in practice reducing little more than equipment previously held by East German forces; (2) the absence of reductions in force projection equipment, and (3) inadequate checks on production of Treaty Limited Equipment in the CFE area of application.
Connected with the last point is inadequate effort to establish data exchange and reporting requirements for the two-thirds of the Soviet Union outside the area or application, even at the cost of similar reporting requirements on U.S. forces on U.S. territory. An Open Skies Agreement will be useful here, but data exchange is essential.
A fifth area of shortcoming in the CFE Treaty is the absence of restrictions on reserve activities, mobilization, and force generation.
Taken together, these shortcomings mean incomplete achievement of the Treaty objective of eliminating the capability for initiating large-scale offensive action.
Finally, although Treaty verification appears adequate, more use could have been made in the Treaty of observers at major air bases, major storage sites, exit-entry points to the area of application, or as roving patrols. One logical measure on this last topic would be to establish a multilateral air safety center for Central Europe under the CSCE which could give the smaller NATO states, the neutrals, the Eastern European states, and the Soviet Union reassurance about the military air activities of all parties.
I would like to comment further on a few of these items:
It is disquieting that the Soviet Union has removed from the CFE area of application and stored east of the Ural Mountains more Treaty-Limited Equipment than the Soviet Union is permitted under the CFE Treaty, instead of destroying this equipment, the main disposition for reduced equipment which is foreseen under the Treaty. The NATO countries should have foreseen this problem in a negotiation whose area covered only part of Soviet territory, where the Soviets would be asked to reduce large superiorities, and where NATO had correctly decided that destruction was the most effective means of reduction. As soon as agreement was reached in the spring of 1989 specifying the types of equipment to be reduced, participants in the CFE negotiations should have been asked to agree not to remove this equipment from the area, or to do so only within narrow specified limits.
Taken together with the absence of contractual limits on active duty manpower and on the number of units and formations, these equipment withdrawals create the potential for rapid force expansion in the event of a change in the Soviet government in Soviet policy. No one expects this today, but the potential is there. It is essential that this equipment be kept under careful observation by NATO countries and that the Soviet Union be called on regularly to account for its status.
It is true that a form of manpower limit is being discussed in CFE 1A, the continuing talks in Vienna, but the declaratory form NATO foresees for this restriction will probably push manpower levels upward rather than down. No active negotiation to reduce manpower levels is expected, and the result will not be a contractual limitation. However, all NATO forces based in Germany will be cut 50 percent over the next 5 years. Why aren't we trying to get Soviet cuts in return?
As regards limits on structure, because NATO officials in 1989 at the outset of CFE expected a continuation of head-to-head NATO-Pact confrontation and wished to retain their own flexibility for structure changes, and because there were wide variations in the size of NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions, no effort was made in CFE to negotiate restrictions on structure. However, units of similar size, like brigades or regiments, could have been identified on both sides. In fact, they were identified for other negotiation purposes like verification.
Up to now, the Soviet Union has disbanded only six divisions of those being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. These are the divisions withdrawn under Gorbachev's program of unilateral reductions announced in December 1988. The Soviet Union still has about 100 divisions in the Western U.S.S.R. Although economic considerations could lead us to expect that many of these units will be disbanded, there is no Treaty requirement to do so. Many could be kept on as active duty or reserve units, or new units could be established at a later date at the desire of Soviet authorities, without treaty limitation. Using active duty manpower which will be available under a generous declaratory ceiling, these units could train in the area of application and provide the basis for rapid expansion of forces using the equipment now stored beyond the Urals.
In an expansion situation, Soviet authorities could even equip such units with Treaty Limited arms produced in the CFE area of application and stored at production plants. There are still 12 active Soviet plants in the area, including two large tank factories. There is no limitation in the CFE Treaty on production or stockpiling of Treaty-Limited Armaments as long as they are not sent to Field units-only a loose requirement for an annual report on production. There should be a tighter check on the amount and disposition of this production and we should also have more information about Soviet forces and arms production beyond the Urals.
The reason we have neither is because the United States did not wish to subject itself to reporting requirements on its own production in the United States. For their part, the NATO states, especially France and Britain, were unwilling to agree to greater specificity on their arms production in the CFE area unless the United States was willing to accept similar reporting requirements. The minimum need here is for a bilateral United States-Soviet agreement on exchange of information covering all their territory or exchange of information on production and transfers in the context of current discussions in Paris on arms transfers.
As regards other shortcomings, the levels of arms in Europe will remain high after CFE is implemented-for NATO, four times and for the Soviets three times what the Wehrmacht had at the outset of World War II-far more than is good for stability in Europe, given that NATO and probably the Soviet Union will adopt a strategy of maximum mobility and rapid reaction. Further negotiated reductions are needed.
In this connection, CFE contains no provision reducing force projection equipment-that is, equipment and units for transporting munitions, vehicle fuel, tanks, and also mobile anti-aircraft, field hospitals and prefabricated bridging. Equipment of this kind is necessary for force projection and moving forward into hostile territory on the attack. There are substitutes for this equipment in more static defenses designed to maintain territorial integrity rather than to aim for decisive victory over the opponent on his own territory). It is true that some of this equipment can be rounded up from the civilian sector, but without units trained in using it to support combat units, there would be considerable loss in effectiveness.
The CFE Treaty also contains no restrictions on force generation. There are no restrictions on the number of reserve units, on the level of active duty manpower they may have, on the size or nature or reserve training exercises, or on separation of reserve units from their equipment-other than CSCE confidence-building measures calling for advance notification-which in any event do not cover alert exercises.
There is opportunity to deal with most of these shortcomings in continuing negotiations. It is true that following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, it will be difficult to assemble a negotiation group or to devise a reduction formula for future negotiation. These problems will be solved, however, if there is a sufficient desire to negotiate further. However, at present, the NATO countries do not appear to be approaching this possibility with much anticipation or resolution. They appear to believe that the Soviet Union is suffering from negotiation fatigue and that they themselves are better off without further negotiated cuts. This may be an incorrect assessment of Soviet attitudes. If a Nine plus One Treaty between Moscow and the Soviet Republics goes into effect and revenue-sharing is implemented, there are very likely to be pressures for further drastic cuts in Soviet military budgets and forces. These cuts will be far easier to achieve if they can take place on a negotiated basis. But the NATO countries won't be able to gauge this possibility if they don't make a real try at further negotiation on cutting back armed forces in Europe.
Whether they do make a real try will depend in good part on whether American and European publics and their legislative representatives show real interest in continuing serious negotiation on force reduction in Europe.
NEW YORK, NY,
July 31, 1991.
Senator JOSEPH BIDEN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: I understand you would welcome any comments relevant to the ratification of the CFE Treaty.
I strongly urge your committee to recommend that the Treaty be ratified promptly.
Having spent most of 5 years as head of the U.S. delegation to the MBFR negotiations (1973-78), I have followed the current negotiations closely. In my opinion, the CFE Treaty will be very much in the interest of the United States, of NATO as a whole and of Europe as a whole. It will set the framework for a post-Cold War European security order.
I have read the testimony of Secretaries Baker and Cheney and of Generals Powell and Galvin. I am in full agreement with the reasons they have clearly articulated in support of the Treaty.
I would like o take this opportunity, however, to comment briefly on the follow-on negotiations called CFE 1A.
Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty mandates follow-on negotiations on measures to further strengthen security in Europe, including limits on personnel strength. It is also expected that CFE 1A will add aerial inspection measures to the treaty. These would complement the comprehensive on-site ground inspection already provided for. This would add significantly to the effectiveness of verification.
The CFE Treaty imposes no manpower limits. Prior to last fall, limits on United States and Soviet ground and air force manpower stationed outside their borders in Europe would have been included.
However, when the Treaty on the Final German Settlement and the bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and Hungary and Czechoslovakia made clear that the Soviet Union would withdraw all its troops from Eastern Europe, the proposed manpower limits on United States and Soviet stationed forces were overtaken by events and were dropped. The matter of manpower limits was deferred to CFE 1A.
To date, the only limits on the military manpower of any of the 21 participants in the CFE 1A negotiations is the commitment by Germany made in the German Settlement Agreement. That commitment requires Germany to reduce the personnel strength of its armed forces to 370,000, an approximately 20 percent reduction from the strength of the forces of the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. Active duty ground and air force manpower will be limited at 345,000.
When Germany signed the CFE Treaty, it made clear its assumption that the other participants would accept limits on their personnel strength. This is the "Gentlemen's Agreement" referred to by Secretary Cheney that the other participants would come to some personnel strength agreement in CFE-1A "that would parallel the commitment Germany has already made".
NATO countries with troops in the Central Region alone already plan, and in several cases have announced, substantial manpower cuts over the next 3-4 years. In addition to the German commitment, these include the 50 percent cut in U.S. troops to a level of approximately 150,000 in Europe, the 20 percent reduction by the U.K. in its armed forces and reductions by France, Belgium and Holland. The British Defense Minister has estimated that these reductions will total about 20 percent of NATO troops in the Central Region.
The final size of the reductions of each of the Allies is still apparently not clear. General Powell, in his testimony, stated that each nation is making its own judgment.
I have not seen any published report of the size of expected Soviet manpower reductions. General Krivosheyev, Chief of the Main Directorate of the Armed Forces General Staff, announced, in April, that their worldwide manpower program called for 3,760,000, reflecting completion of the 500,000 unilateral reduction promised by Gorbachev. Only 240,000 of this reduction was to be taken in the Atlantic-to-Urals area. He also reported that there was a 360,000 shortfall presumably because of their known difficulties with conscription.
The Soviet Union has agreed in CFE 1 to a 68 percent reduction in the treaty-limited equipment which it had before the negotiations began. This huge armament reduction indicates a probable Soviet interest in reducing manpower in the ATTU area by substantially more than the announced 240,000. Moreover, the current Soviet severe economic decline and the pressure from the republics to reduce the size of the military, supported by their increasing influence on the allocation of revenues, should add significantly to the existing budgetary pressure for lower man-power levels.
At present NATO countries are seeking in CFE 1A what are described as politically binding statements of intention not to increase some declared level of active duty ground and air force manpower. The weakness of this declaration method is that there will be too much temptation to build in extra room-at-the-top to take care of future contingencies.
The main problem is that the NATO countries will not be using their own intention to cut military manpower and the probability of Soviet cuts to achieve negotiated reductions in Soviet military manpower along with enduring limits which would insure against adverse trends in future Soviet policy.
As an alternative to unilateral declarations, the CFE 1A talks and the planned NATO reductions present an opportunity for the United States and the other non-Soviet participants to press the Soviet Union on a negotiated basis to agree to lower troop levels of a contractual nature which would begin to reflect the new post-Cold War European relationships. In the early CFE negotiations, the Soviet Union proposed manpower limits for the ATTU area as a whole and for each of the four sub-regions for which there are ceilings on armaments. Particularly in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. is now seeking investments and economic aid from the C-7, participants should make maximum use of CFE 1A to seek manpower reductions.
In the past, the United States has been cautious about seeking legally binding limits on Soviet manpower within the Soviet borders. It has feared that such limits would not be effectively verifiable whereas reciprocal limits on Western manpower would be effective due to the openness of Western society. The fact that Germany, the major contributor of forces in the critical Central Region, has already accepted manpower limits now makes this concern less relevant.
Moreover, the comprehensive and remarkably intrusive on-site inspection provisions agreed to in both the CFE and START agreements make it likely that it would be possible to negotiate effectively verifiable manpower limits; namely, limits which would permit detection of any potentially militarily significant violation in time for NATO to react and counter that violation. This would support legally binding treaty limits.
If treaty limits are not possible, the United States and the other participants should at least seek to negotiate lower levels of manpower with politically binding limits rather than settling for voluntary unilateral declarations. These limits should be supported by agreed cooperative measures to facilitate monitoring compliance. Unless this is done, we are likely to be faced by the anomaly that CFE limits are not monitored because they are not considered verifiable, whereas the politically binding Confidence and Security Building Measure for exchange of military information agreed in the CSCE November Vienna Document 1990 calls for "evaluation visits" to check the validity of information exchanged. The United States has recently carried out the first of these visits to a Soviet unit in the neighborhood of Kiev.
Accordingly, CFE 1A should at a minimum include cooperative measures covering information exchange on all active duty units showing designation, subordination, peacetime location and peacetime authorized personnel strength, including separately stated data on the peacetime authorized strength for all units which constitute Objects of Verification as defined in the CFE Treaty plus a sizable number of "evaluation visits". Such cooperative measures would increase importantly the transparency and predictability of Soviet military activity.
Sincerely yours,
STANLEY R. RESOR.
THE JOHNS HOPKINS FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE,
THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON. DC,
August 6,1991.
Senator JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR JOE: Having previously reviewed the principal features of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and now examined the statement made by Secretary Baker before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on CFE, I write to endorse the treaty and urge its ratification. Since the principal features of the treaty began to be laid down, there has been considerable change in the political context in Europe. We have seen revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal, completed or planned, of Soviet forces from the territories of the former Pact members. But the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe continues to be a valuable enhancement of U.S. security interests. Indeed, in some ways the alteration in the map of Europe enhances the treaty's value.
The destruction of numbers of Soviet tanks, armored vehicles and artillery and the withdrawal of other Soviet equipment to East of the Urals is substantial and would not have followed automatically from the political changes and withdrawal of units described in the previous paragraph. The considerable degree of verification, including on-site inspection, provided for in the CFE treaty will enhance both our knowledge or compliance with its provisions and reduce the uncertainties about the forces and movements of a potential adversary that could lead to dangerous reactions and counterreactions in time of crisis. Finally, putting these limitations into a treaty increases the inhibitions on the Soviet Union of reversing them in a way that unilateral reductions would not.
The CFE treaty was a long time in coming-counting the earlier MBFR negotiations, it is almost two decades. While we could have hoped for an earlier resolution, the political changes have produced what is probably a considerably more substantial outcome from the negotiations than could have been achieved at any earlier time. I hope that the Senate, after careful examination, will be able to ratify the treaty at an early date.
Sincerely,
HAROLD BROWN,
Chairman.
CLIFFORD & WARNKE,
WASHINGTON, DC,
August 6, 1991.
HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR JOE: It will, I am sure, come as no surprise to you that I enthusiastically support the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. But even those less convinced of the value of negotiated arms reductions should find it almost impossible to object to this treaty. It is unambiguously in the security interests of the United States and its European allies.
Together with the treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces, the CFE Treaty puts an end to any realistic concerns about a third world war originating in Europe. Moreover, it should provide a further basis for major reductions in our military expenditures, freeing up badly needed resources for domestic programs. We should also expect and encourage the Soviet Union to take advantage of the major improvement in East-West relations to reduce its own swollen military budget.
I am happy that this first step toward ratification is in your competent hands.
With best regards.
Very truly yours,
PAUL C. WARNKE.
ROBERT S. McNAMARA,
WASHINGTON, DC,
August 7, 1991.
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: I fully support the CFE Treaty and its approval by the Senate. I would note, however, that I believe that a more fundamental restructuring of our national priorities is in order than the treaty requires.
Sincerely,
Robert S. McNAMARA.
MELVIN R. LAIRD,
WASHINGTON, DC,
August 7, 1991.
Senators JOSEPH R. BIDEN, PAUL S. SARBANES, PAUL SIMON,
HANK BROWN, AND LARRY PRESSLER.
DEAR SENATORS: I am pleased to respond to your request for my views on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Although I am not privileged to all of the information concerning the detailed negotiations of this Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, the original discussions with the Soviet Union started during the time that I was Secretary of Defense. It is my belief that tile Treaty is, on balance, a positive addition to the national security of the United States. Ratification of the Treaty, therefore, serves the United States' interests.
The Treaty, however, should not be looked upon as an end in itself; it should be, rather, looked upon as one step along a continuum of strategy revision, confidence building, and arms control activities. This letter will address (1) the significant steps taken by the CFE Treaty; (2) what the CFE Treaty does not accomplish; and (3) questions raised by the Treaty. Finally, there will be a few summary comments.
SIGNIFICANT STEPS TAKEN BY THE CFE
While the list of Significant Steps is impressive, it is clear, as many people have observed, that there is much the Treaty does not accomplish.
WHAT CFE DOES NOT ACCOMPLISH
Among the important security facets that limit CFE are the following:
These are important security considerations. Each of these considerations fortunately is susceptible to treatment in follow-on negotiations. The exclusion of these points from CFE constitutes a call for future work-not a signal to avoid ratification of work accomplished thus far.
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS STILL OUTSTANDING
In addition to the obvious security facets not addressed by CFE, there are obviously other important questions and issues. An illustrative list of such questions would include:
The list of questions cited above is far from exhaustive. Not only is the list extensive, but the importance of the issues is clearly substantial. As with the litany of CFE "loopholes," however, it is important to maintain a perspective. A pertinent question would be "Given the admitted CFE loopholes and the myriad questions still surrounding the Treaty, is it worthy of ratification?" I believe the answer is yes.
SUMMARY COMMENTS
The Treaty should be ratified in my judgment because, despite admitted limitations, it accomplishes so much. CFE will provide for control of rive important categories of non-nuclear weapons-from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The Treaty provisions require large cuts in Soviet and Eastern European weaponry. Provisions are made for wide-ranging openness and inspection across the continent. Importantly, CFE establishes a platform and perspective for enhanced security cooperation throughout Europe and for follow-on arms, force, and readiness controls. Finally, the CFE Treaty will assist in locking in and institutionalizing a military component or the dramatic political and economic changes of the past 2 years ill Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
With best wishes and kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,
MELVIN R. LAIRD.
THE CARLYLE GROUP
WASHINGTON. DC,
August 8, 1991.
HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have reviewed the CFE Treaty and would like to go on record as supporting it. In fact, I believe it to be a remarkable achievement that significantly advances the policy interests of the United States.
Most certainly, it will contribute to stability in central Europe and to the emergence of free and democratic governments in Eastern Europe.
I strongly urge that your Committee report favorably on the Treaty's ratification.
Sincerely,
FRANK C. CARLUCCI,
Vice Chairman.
MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY,
WASHINGTON, DC,
August 16,1991.
HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is written to express my strong support for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Having had a role in launching the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks back in 1969, I have followed with intense interest the efforts that have gone forward since then to bring about a more stable military balance in Europe at lower cost. The CFE Treaty will, if it enters into force, make an immense contribution to the fulfillment of this aim. Only a short time go such large cuts in the Soviet arsenal of conventional weapons would have seemed impossible to achieve. Now that the end or the Cold War has led to agreement on equal ceilings for both sides, let's hope the way will open for even deeper cuts and greater savings.
Although I would be surprised if you personally need encouragement from me to vote in favor of advice and consent to the CFE Treaty, please let me know if you think I might be helpful in enlisting the support of your colleagues.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON.
THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION,
WASHINGTON, DC
September 21, 1991.
Senator JOSEPH BIDEN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Washington, DC.
DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to write in support of speedy ratification of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Recent events in the Soviet Union underline the importance of bringing this far-reaching pact into force promptly.
As the committee knows, the CFE agreement will realize several longstanding U.S. aims. Once implemented, the treaty will set continent-wide limits on major conventional weapons, from battle tanks to combat aircraft. At present, no internationally binding agreement limits non-nuclear forces based in Europe.
Under CFE, the Soviet Union, which fields the most numerous forces, will be subject to especially deep cuts. It will be required to reduce 10 times more weapons than all sixteen NATO countries combined. (The cuts are detailed in the accompanying charts.) The reductions, which do not include weapons that the Soviet Union withdrew unilaterally before the treaty was signed, amount to a 27 percent cutback. As a result, the Soviet Union's post-CFE arsenal will be as much as two-thirds below the levels it fielded as recently as 1989, before Moscow began making unilateral reductions.
CFE will also have NATO with numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in each of the rive categories of weapons limited by the treaty, adding quantitative advantage to NATO's longstanding qualitative edge. As senior U.S. military officials have pointed out to the committee, these deep cuts, combined with Soviet unilateral withdrawals, will eliminate the always unlikely threat of a surprise attack on Western Europe, no matter what the future holds for a reconstituted Soviet Union.
The CFE treaty will also create a permanent on-site, on-demand verification system which will require virtually daily monitoring at the military bases of 22 countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. This verification system takes on added importance in the current climate of instability and change, as Europe grapples with reemergent tensions suppressed during 40 years or Cold War.
Finally, the new military balance established by the CFE treaty should encourage the United States to reduce its forces in Europe to levels that are consistent with its present defensive needs and its ability to pay for them. Because CFE will require only small reductions for NATO and still fewer by Washington, the treaty's provisions themselves will not automatically save the United States much money. But the radically changed military picture on the continent should prompt the Defense Department to sharply reduce the roughly $150 billion in annual spending that has been justified as needed for the defense of Europe.
Given the benefits of bringing the CFE treaty into force, I believe it would be a mistake to delay ratification due to the constitutional crisis in the U.S.S.R. While it appears likely that the Soviet Union will be able to consolidate democratic institutions while retaining central control over its military and foreign policy, the situation in the Soviet Union will probably remain uncertain for some time. But now, with the Soviet leadership strongly supportive of implementing CFE, ratification by a newly constituted parliament is highly likely. President Gorbachev announced during a recent Moscow press conference with Secretary Baker that the two "agreed that we will move toward the ratification of the CFE treaty." Moreover, during the transitional period to a new constitutional system, the Soviet Union has stated its intention to adhere to its international commitments. The Congress of People's Deputies declared on September 6 that "during the transitional period, all the international accords and obligations under-taken by the U.S.S.R., including those on the issues of reducing and controlling armaments * * * should be strictly observed."
In addition, any future Soviet government would be bound by prior international commitments. Under widely accepted interpretations of international law, countries must adhere to their prior agreements, even after drastic changes in their governments, so that a newly constituted Soviet state, like the post-communist governments of Eastern Europe, would be obligated to abide by accords approved in the past. If the transitional Council of the Republics, which now has ratification powers, were to approve CFE, a future Soviet government would be required to honor that commitment.
It is less certain if splinter states, such as the Baltics, would be bound by the obligations of their predecessor states. In any event, the newly independent status of the Baltic States need not pose special problems for treaty ratification. The Baltics lack any significant independent military capability. In addition, the current preference is not to expand the number of parties to CFE which currently excludes 13 other European states, most of which also have small armies. (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will become part of the follow-up CFE 11 negotiations to begin next March as the newest members of the 38-country Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.)
The future status of the Ukraine could complicate implementation of CFE somewhat, but need not. Although nationalist forces, including the republic's present defense minister, have called for establishing an independent military force, it is too early to assume that a completely sovereign Ukrainian military will emerge. As newly installed Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Vladimir Lobov recently said, it is "absolutely" possible for the republics to be fully sovereign while maintaining a united armed forces responsible to a newly constituted center. Moreover, even if the Ukraine fields an independent militia, it may still allot to the "center" the responsibility for managing international security obligations. If necessary, the future status of the Ukraine can be addressed by amending the CFE treaty after it enters into force.
Developments in the Soviet Union since the CFE treaty was signed only underline the importance of bringing this broadly backed treaty into force promptly. At a time of radical changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the CFE treaty will lock in and deepen the military effect of those changes. While the United States-Soviet relationship continues to improve, it should not be forgotten that in the absence of this agreement there will be no international agreements that constrain non-nuclear arsenals in Europe. By cutting the five types of the most dangerous conventional weapons in Europe, CFE is, as Secretary Baker has said, our best insurance policy "against a return to Cold War dangers and Cold War animosities."
Sincerely,
LEE FEINSTEIN,
Assistant Director for Research.
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