STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR R. JAMES WOOLSEY, CHIEF OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE CFE TREATY CALLED "SOME REASONABLE AND DECENT FENCES"

I was reading last night a new collection of essays by a very wise European, Sir

Isaiah Berlin. Its title, "The Crooked Timber of Humanity," is derived from a quota-

tion from Kant: "From the crooked timber of humanity, nothing entirely straight

was ever made." All his life, Sir Isaiah has been an enemy of excess-the excess

that has stemmed from two intellectual traditions, both that of the Enlightenment

(e.g., from Rousseau and his intellectual progeny) and from what Sir Isaiah calls the

"Counter-Enlightenment (18th and 19th Century romanticism, especially in Germa-

ny). Both traditions, in Sir Isaiah's; view, have produced the intellectual underpin-

nings, on occasion, for zeal, excess, and-in the extreme-tyranny.

Sir Isaiah has, on the other hand, been a gentle advocate of the views of those

from both of these traditions (e.g., Montesquieu and Hume from the first, Herder

and Vico from the second) who have understood that one must not push intellectual

theories too far. These writers have recognized, from different perspectivei;, that we

are all made of "crooked timber" and that we need to be watched, need to be

checked, need to be fenced. A distinguished American judge, Learned Hand, once

described well this spirit that has drawn Sir Isaiah's approval in remarks he made

to a new group of Americans, immigrants from this continent to the United States

during the middle of World War II. He called it the "spirit of liberty," and summed

it up as being "that spirit that is not too sure that it is right." Generally, we Ameri-

cans are members, along with our other fellow North Americans, of one part of the

European intellectual tradition. We are a mixed lot, but overall might think of

us as somewhat idiosyncratic children of Montesquieu, who inhabit an outlying

region of Europe and who, incidentally, have given to the world Disneyland and

MacDonald's. (The virtues of the latter were reportedly recognized yesterday by no

less a figure than the chief of the Soviet staff, General Moiseyev, himself.)

In my view, this CFE treaty is itself a product of a fine part of the European in-

tellectual tradition-Sir Isaiah's part. What we have done in this treaty is, essen-

tially, to build Bome fences around ourselves-so that if any of us, in future years,

should got caught up in zeal, in excess, or even in tyrann , we won't stray as quick-

ly or as far as we otherwise might. The essence of this treaty is thus at odds with

the passionate pursuit of utopias, of whatever stripe, that has produced much of Eu-

rope's agony in this century-including both World War II and the Cold War. This

treaty builds fence: of verification, of destruction and withdrawal of equipment of

international guarantees-not perfect fences, but useful ones. (Since we build the

fences, they are, inevitably, also hewn from crooked timber.) We may nevertheless

all hope that the lines of these new fences mark the end of the most recent war, the

Cold War and the beginning of something better for Europe and the world.

I am glad that we Americans, as Europeans of an idiosyncratic sort, have been

able to help in the process of producing this treaty. (And I appreciate the kind

words by the chairman about my own role. As is customary on these occasions,

kindness leads to vast exaggeration, but the kindness is much appreciated.)

I should add that I leave these negotiations and this position with a sense of hope

about the utility of these fences that we have built together. This hope is partially

based on pride in the care with which we have done our work. It is partially based

on the new spirit in Europe-a spirit whose transatlantic essence was most clearly

demonstrated to me in December- 1989, 1 month after I came to these negotiations,

when I stood on the Charles Bridge in Prague with my family and sang With Czech-

oslovak students some of the same civil rights songs that I had sung as a student

demonstrator in Washington over a quarter of a century ago. This hope is also, in

part, based on the sense of comradeship and common purpose that we have devel-

oped around this table-and the notion that this common purpose might even

become a metaphor for our countries' dealings with one another in the future.

But hopes can be dashed. Fences can break down. And so hopes and notions must

always be heavily seasoned with uncertainty-with the realization that we are, and

work with, only crooked timber. As one of Ambassador de Brichambaut's predeces-

sors, who walked these same halls during an earlier negotiation in Vienna, once

said: "Above all, no zeal." Talleyrand was right, of course. Zeal and hope are far

from being guarantees of success in international affairs. The only real guarantee in

this case is a solid appreciation that we must all work continually to keep these,

somewhat crooked, fences mended.

I would close by suggesting that one of the First American diplomats-and prob-

ably the most successful ever-Benjamin Franklin, once made a similar point very

effectively. Toward the end of his long life, he was walking out of the final session

345

of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on a very hot summer day liver

200 years ago, when a bystander shouted to him, "What sort of government is it to

be, Mr. Franklin?" He replied, "A republic, air-if you can keep it."

We have built some reasonable and decent fences here together. They will, fellow

Europeans, continue for some time to help restrain our foolishnesses and excesses-

if we can keep them. If we can keep them.

BUDGETARY AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE CFE TREATY: AN UPDATE

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

On Novmber 19, 1990, the 16 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

tion (NATO) and six members of the Warsaw Pact signed a treaty limiting conven-

tional armed forces in Europe (CFE). This historic document, referred to as the CFE

treaty, will require significant reductions in the number of conventional weapons

located on European soil between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains in

the central part of the Soviet Union. Weapons held by either alliance in this region

in excess of those permitted by the treaty will have to be destroyed. The Warsaw

Pact, which currently controls far more weapons than does NATO, will have to de-

stroy many more weapons and reduce its inventories by a much larger proportion.

Specifically, the Warsaw Pact will have to destroy over 34,600 weapons, including

tanks, armored combat vehicles, pieces of artillery, and combat aircraft representing

more than 30 percent of its current arsenal. After excluding weapons once can--

trolled by East Germany, NATO will be required to destroy about 3,700 weapons, or

only 6 percent of its total arsenal. The treaty also rermits each side to conduct ex-

tensive inspections of the other side's military facilities to ensure compliance with

its provisions.

Me treaty has not yet been submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification because

of controversy over an interpretation by the Soviet Union that certain of its weap-

ons are not constrained by the treaty. No other parties to the treaty support the

Soviet interpretation. The numbers used in this analysis are based on declarations

made by the parties to the treaty at the time of its signing. Depending on the out-

come of the controversy, some of the numbers could change but not enough to

change the estimated savings or basic conclusions presented in this memorandum.

Last ear, the Congressiohal Budget Office (CBO) completed three analyses deal-

ing with the budgetary and military consequences of the propow CFE treaty and

with the costs of verifying and complying with the treaty. This Staff Memorandum

revises the analyses in those studies to reflect the provisions included in the signed

version of the treaty. Detailed descriptions of the methods used in the analysis sum-

marized here are contained in the earlier studies.

CBO's analysis finds that the balance of military forces in Europe is shifting

sharply in NATO's favor, both because of recent political changes and because of

the potential benefits of the CFE treaty. For example, measures bf military capabil-

ity that reflect both the quantity and quality of ground-based military equipment

show that in 1988, the countries that made up the Warsaw Pact had an advantage

over NATO by a factor of about 1.5 to 1. Taking into account the dissolution of tfie

Warsaw Pact as a military entity and the CFE treaty, the ratio of NATO forces to

those of the Soviet Union alone shifts to 1.7 to I in NATO's favor. The ratio of air

forces also shifts in NATO's favor, though by a smaller amount.

Although carrying out the provisions of the CFE treaty would enhance the bal-

ance of military forces, it would not guarantee any significant U.S. budgetary sav-

ings. The United States could comply with the treaty without eliminating any of its

military units from Europe. Instead, the United States could reduce the amount of

its equipment that is now stored in Europe as reserves for replacement of wartime

losses. Eliminating reserve equipment would not significantly cut costs. Indeed, the

CFE treaty could result in modest added costs for verification and compliance. One-

time costs for verification and compliance might amount to between $130 million

and $385 million, with ongoing annual costs amounting to between $25 million and

$75 million.

'This memorandum was prepared by the Congressional Budget Ofrice (CBO) in response to a

request by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. It revises and updates

Rrevious CBO analyses of the treaty limiting conventional arms in Europe to reflect tht provi-

sions included in the signed version of the treaty.

'Congressional Budget Office, Btidgetary ana Military Fffects of a Treaty Limiting Conven-

tional Forces in Europe (January 1990, updated as a CBO Paper, September 1990); and US. Costs

of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms treaties (September 1990).

346

Because of improvements in the bnlance of military forces, and the reduced

chance of a major war in Europe, the United States might elect to reduce its forces

in Europe more than would be required by the treaty. A reduction in U.S. troops to

a level of 225,000 (as President Bush recommended in January 1990) miglit eventu-

ally reduce the annual U.S. defense budget by about $6 billion compared with its

1991 level. Reducing U.S. troops to a level of 100,000 could lower the annual budget

relative to the 1991 level by about $14 billion. The balance of military forces associ-

ated with these larger reductions would be less favorable than what would result

from only those reductions needed to comply with the CFE treaty. Even with a re-

duction to 100,000 U.S. troops, however, the balance of forces would still favor

NATO over the Soviet Union by a ratio of 1.3 to I for both ground and air forces

DESCRIPTION OF THE TREATY

The CFE treaty would limit alliance weapons holdings in five broad categories.

tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, helicopters, and aircraft (see

Table 1). During final negotiations, limits on U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe,

which had been discussed earlier in the negotiations, were dropped from consider-

ation. Thus, the treaty would not restrict the number of NATO or Pact troops in

Europe.

Based on the weapons ceilings in the treaty and on current holdings of weapons,

NATO, after excluding recently acquired East German weapons, would have to

reduce its inventories in only two weapons categories-tanks and artillery.2 Even in

these areas, NATO's reductions would be relatively small-3,615 tanks and 118

pieces of artillery-representing reductions of 16 percent and I percent, respective-

FYI. In contrast, based on declarations submitted the day-before the treaty was

signed, tile Warsaw Pact would be required to destroy 13,191 tanks, 12,949 ACVS,

and 6,953 pieces of artillery, representing reductions of 40 percent, 30 percent, and

26 percent in its holdings. Based on data submitted before the treaty was signed,

neither alliance would need to reduce its helicopter fleet in order to comply with

the treaty. (See Table A-1 in the appendix for more details.)

Effects of the CFE treaty on aircraft will be even more favorable for NATO than

those on ground-based weapons. Under the provisions of the treaty, NATO will actu-

ally be allowed to increase the number of aircraft in its air forces, should it choose

to do so. The Warsaw Pact, however, would have to destroy 1,572 aircraft, which

represents about 19 percent of its fleet.

line United States expressed doubts concerning tile accuracy of tile numbers coti-

tailied in the Soviet Union's declaration of its assets at the time t)ie treaty was

signed. Some NATO officials felt that the Soviet Union had understated its holdings

by up to 40,000 weapons. The dispute seems to have arisen because the U.S. intelli-

gence community was unable to keep track of the large numbers of Soviet weapons

moved cast of the Urals before the treaty was signed. Three months later, revised

U.S. intelligence estimates differed from Soviet declarations by less than 2,000 to

3,000 weapons.

A more serious controversy surrounds the Soviet Union's declaration that three of

its divisions are part of its naval forces and outside the jurisdiction of the treaty.

This dispute would apply to about 3,500 tanks, ACVS, and pieces of artillery, and

would establish a precedent for exempting land-based naval units from the provi-

sions of the treaty, an interpretation that none of the 22 parties to the treaty,

except the Soviet Union, supports. U.S. Administration officials have stated that

they will not submit the treaty for ratification with these disputes pending. By the

time the Senate takes up the matter of the CFE treaty, therefore, these issues pre-

sumably will have been resolved.

The provisions of the treaty are to be fully in place 40 months and 10 days after

the treaty is ratified by all 22 parties. To ensure compliances the treaty permits

each alliance to conduct specified inspections of the other's military facilities. For

example, each alliance can inspect the other's facilities to verify that no weapons

are being stored there in violation of the treaty. In addition, each alliance has the

right to observe and confirm that the other side is destroying its excess weapons in

compliance with the treaty.

2 While the treaty was being negotiated and weapons ceilings set, East Germ,,n@,,wa,, an

active member of the Warsaw Pact. Just before the treaty was signed, however, the rman

united and all East German weapons came under NATO control. With this shift, about 2,3@0'

tanks, 6,500 ACVS, over 2,200 pieces of artillerwy@ and more than 400 combat aircraft became part

of NATO rather than Pact inventories. All weapons formerly belonging to East German are

assumed to be destroyed as part of the unification and CFE Even after this shilt, re-

ductions required of the Pact by the treaty are much la 'ger t=lrequired of NATO.

347

MILITARY AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THE TREATY

The treaty would significantly alter the balance of NATO and Pact military

forces-or Soviet forces alone after the Pact is dissolved-in Europe. It would have

only modest efrects on the U.S. defense budget, however, yielding no direct savings

an requiring, on average, annual expenditures of less than $200 million, or less

than 0.1 percent of the Defense Department's total budget.

Military Effects of the Treaty

Once the treaty has been carried out, NATO and the Warsaw Pact will have an

equal number or weapons deployed in Europe between the Atlantic Ocean and the

Ural Mountains (the ATTU region). NATO's historical edge in the quality of its

weapons, however, should provide it with an advantage over Pact forces. This ad-

vantage would be enhanced by U.S. reinforcements from the continental United

States that are not limited by the treaty, and by the fact that the Pact will cease to

exist as a military alliance on April 1, 1991.

To quantify the effects of the treaty on the military balance in Europe, CBO used

analytic methods that take into account both the quantity and quality of each side's

weapons. The capabilities of the ground and air forces of Pact and NATO countries

were quantified based on the Army's weapons effectiveness indices/weighted unit

value (WEI/WUV) and TASCFORM methodologies, respectively. Both methods rank

and score individual models of weapons-foe exam le, an MI tank or an F-15 right-

er aircraft-based on their capability relative to other weapons or the same type.

The scores of all the weapons held by each alliance are then weighted appropriately

and added up for the entire combined ground or air forces.3

These methods produce scores for the ground and air forces fielded by the mem-

bers of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Brividing the total score for Pact or Soviet

forces by NATO's total score yields a ratio that is one measure of relative military

capability. These ratios do not take into account losses resulting from combat;

rather, they estimate the capability of forces that would be availa le to each side

after mobilization and the ar-rival or all out-of-theater reinforcements, but before an

attack begins. Moreover, there are important assumptions and limitations inherent

in the methods that produce the ratios; these limitations suggest that the ratios

should be used only as a rough guide to relative military capability.

Ground Forces. rrhese analytic methods document the decline in military advan-

tage of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces. Analysis of ground forces typical-

ly focuses on the key central region of Europe, where most of the Fighting in any

European war would take place.4 In 1988, before any of the military changes amoct-

ated with the end of the cold war had occurred, the ground forces of the Warsaw

Pact had a significant advantages ratio of roughly 1.5 to I-over NAro ground

forces in the centraltryion (see rable 2).

In 1989, the Soviet Union and some of its Eastern European allies began unilater-

al reductions in their military forces, which reduced the Pact advantage over NATO

ground forces to a ratio of about 1.2 to 1. At about the same time, the Warsaw Pact

ceased to be a viable military alliance because of the movement toward democracy

by many of its Eastern European members. Also, the unification of Germany, and

the decision of the unified Germany to remain part of NATO, eliminated East

German military forces from those available to the Warsaw Pact. There shifts are

best captured by considering the ratio of Soviet to NATO forces.' By that measure,

there is a rough parity of ground forces in the central region of Europe.

The rough parity in capability between the ground forces available to the Soviet

Union and NATO in central Europe may actually overstate the Soviet Union's abili-

ty to wage war against NATO. The Eastern European nations that have left the

Soviet orrit have requested that all Soviet forces eventually leave their soil. Thus,

by 1994, there should be no Soviet forces stationed in Europe outside the Soviet

Union. In order to attack NATO, Soviet ground forces would have to traverse

Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, where they might be opposed by indigenous

forces. The need to fight their way through Eastern Europe, or merely to leave

troops behind to guard their supply lines, would reduce Soviet forces available to

oppose NATO.

I For details of these two methods,-see Congressional Budget Office, "Budgetnry and Military

Effects of a Treaty Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe" (CBO Paper, September 19.)O).

1 The central region includes Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and

Czechoslovakia.

I CBO did not assume thnt military forces of the rormer country or East Germany become

part or NATO forces. Instead, in order to provide.a conservative analysis or NATO's advantage,

CBO assumed that East German military forces are disbanded.

348

The CFE treaty will continue the shift in military advantage away from the Pact

and its sole remaining military member, the Soviet Union, and toward NATO. After

the treaty is fully in place, the ratio of Soviet to NATO ground forces will be about

0.6 to I (see Table 2). Stated another way, NATO ground forces will have an advan-

tage of about 1.7 to I over those of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the treaty will

not permit the Soviet Union to recapture any of its former advantage by increasing

its weapons levels up to the level allowed for the entire Warsaw Pact: the treaty

limits holdings of ground weapons by individual countries.within each alliance to

about two-thirds of the alliance's total ground weapons.

Although the Soviet Union could build up its forces east of the Ural mountains

where the treaty does not apply, it would take time and effort to bring these weap-

ons to bear on NATO. First, the forces would have to move more than 1,500 miles to

NATO's eastern border. Second, the weapons would need to be maintained in an

area where today there is not a large concentration of Soviet military units. Thus,

although positioning forces for use against NATO in Soviet Asia is possible under

the treaty, it may not be practical.

Air Forces. The effect of the treaty and political events on NATO's relative capa-

bility in the air will be less dramatic than for ground forces, but still will be sub-

stantial. In 1988, NATO air forces enjoyed relative parit with the Pact air forces;

the ratio of capability stood at about 1.1 to I in favor of the Warsaw Pact (see Table

2). Unilateral cuts bi the Soviet Union combined with the dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact resulted in a ratio of 0.9 to I that favors NATO over Soviet forces. After imple-

mentation of the treaty's provisions, the ratio will move to about 0.8 to 1 in favor of

NATO. Thus, after the treaty is fully in place, NATO's air forces could enjoy an

advantage of 1.3 to I over those of the Soviet Union.

Savings Associated With the Treaty

In contrast to the large military benefit that would accrue to NATO and the

United States as a result of the treaty, there is no guarantee of significant budget-

ciry savings. Because the treaty does not limit troops stationed in Europe, the

United States is not required to withdraw or disband any of its units based in

Europe in order to comply with the treaty. As a result of the agreement within

NATO on how to distribute reductions in weapons imposed by the treaty, the

United States will be required to destroy or transfer to a NATO ally 1,898 tanks,

375 armored combat vehicles, and 109 pieces of artillery from its holdings in Europe

(see Table 3). The United States could choose to remove these items from the large

stocks of equipment it currently stores in Europe. These stocks are not in military

units but rather are kept as reserves to replace weapons damaged in war. If U.S.

stocks are reduced to comply with the treaty, the only savings associated with the

treaty will be reductions in storage costs, which would not be significant.

The United States could, of course, comply with the treaty by removing military

units from Europe, destroying their equipment or transferring it to a NATO ally,

and eliminating them from the U.S. force structure. Indeed, some units have been

withdrawn from Europe and sent to the Persian Gulf in connection with Operation

Desert Storm. If these units are eventually eliminated from the force structure,

there would be substantial budgetary savings. But those savings are not guaranteed

by the CFE treaty.

Cost of Verifying and Complying With the Treaty

The CFE treaty includes detailed provisions delineating how countries should

comply with the treaty, and how they can monitor each other's activities to be confi-

dent that all parties are in compliance with the treaty. These verification and com-

pliance provisions include important rules for exchanging data on military, equip-

ment-their numbers and locations, in particular-and for on-site inspections of

military inventories covered by the data bases. They also stipulate how excess equip-

ment should be destroyed or converted to civilian use.6

This analysis reaches no conclusions about the level of confidence that activities

allowed by the treaty would provide regarding compliance with its provisions.

Rather, it provides estimates only of the budgetary costs to the United States associ-

ated with verifying and compl ing with the treaty, which could be between $25 mil-

lion and $75 million a year. In addition, there would be a one-time investment of

between $130 million ar@d $385 million.

4Parties to the treaty technically would not conduct verification, since that term implies cer-

tainty and also presupposes compliance. More accurately, countries would accumulate informa-

tion from a variety of sources in order to reach "comoiance BBBmments" of other countries'

activities.

349

One-nme Costs. The initial, one-time investment would be required to fund sever-

al types of operations that would take place during the first 44 months after the

treaty takes effect. NATO representatives would conduct baseline inspections of

Pact military facilities to verify the number of weapons the Pact declared it had at

the time the treaty was signed. In addition, the Uniied States would have to pay the

costs for personnel accompanying Pact inspections of U.S. fncilities in Europe for

the same type of baseline verification. The United States would probably conduct

about 50 to 75 inspections at Pact bases during the baseline validation period and a

comparable number during the residual-level validation period. The United States

will be subject to soniewhnt fewer inspections at its European bases during each

phase (for more details, see Table 4).

Also contributing to the initial costs is the need to provide observers to watch the

destruction of weapons by the Warsaw Pact and to destroy perhaps as many as

1,000 U.S. weapons.7 There would also be "challenge" inspections of sites not de-

clared by one alliance as containing treaty-limited items, but suspected by the other

alliance of doing so. Finally, an initial investment would be needed to pay for the

establishment of aerial reconnaissance to supplement on-site inspections, once

follow-on negotiations determine what type of equipment will be allowable for this

purpose, and for research and development of technical enhancements of current

methods for treaty verification and weapons destruction.

Annual Costs. The ongoing costs of between $25 million and $75 million a year

associated with treaty verification and compliance would result from the need to

provide hosts for about 30 on-site inspections-at U.S. bases in Europe and to conduct

about 65 inspections at Pact bases. These inspections would be used to confirm that

weapons systems at declared sites do not exceed the numbers assigned to them at

those sites, and that no limited weapons exist at undeclared sites. Some of these in-

spections would be routine, and some might result from suspicions aroused by other

means of observation such as aircraft or satellites. Additional costs could be in-

curred to support aerial reconnaissance flights to monitor compliance with the

treaty (see Table 4).

Not all of these costs for verification and compliance would increase the U.S. de-

fense budget. Some or all of the added costs co-uld be offset by decreases in other

portions of the defense budget, and some would be associated with shifting person-

nel from other duties rather than adding personnel. Indeed, because the provisions

of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 limit U.S. defense spending through fiscal

year 1993, any verification costs that add to the U.S. defense budget would arguably

Kave to be offset by cuts in other types of defense spending.

The range of cost estimates for verification and compliance reflects uncertainty,

principally about the cost of each inspection. The treaty generally specifies a maxi-

mum number of inspections, but fewer inspections may be carried out. Also, the cost

of each inspection depends on how many inspections can be made during a single

trip, how many personnel are involved, and how long each one takes. There is also

uncertainty about how many of the inspections would be carried out by the United

States and how many by other NATO allies. CBO developed the range of estimates

in this memorandum based both on discussions with executive branch personnel

about the possible range of costs and on experience with verification of the lnterme-

diate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty.

OPTIONS FOR FURTliER U.S. FORCE REDUCRIONS

The United States could decide that the reduction in Soviet military capability

that would result from the CFE treaty, coupled with the dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact, would permit this country to reduce the number of forces it commits to

NATO. Although this approach would forgo some of the reduction in military risk

afforded by the-treaty, ii would result in budgetary savings. This analysis illustrates

possible savings based on two assumptions about how many U.S. forces are with-

drawn from Europe and eliminated from the active military.

Option I: Reduce US. Forces in Europe to 225,000

In his January 1990 State of the Union address, President Bush proposed a limit

on the number of U.S. and Soviet troops that could be based in Europe but outside

their home territory. Under this proposal, U.S. and Soviet troops in central Europe

would have been limited to 196,000 on each side, with an additional 30,000 U.S.

troops allowed outside Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. All

7 CBO assumed that the United States, through a process called "cascading," would transr(@.r

some of its excess weapons to its NATO allies, who would, in turn, destroy their older weapons.

350

parties had tentatively agreed to this provision in early 1990, but it was dropped

from the final version of the treaty.

This option would withdraw approximately 80,000 U.S. troops from Europe, reduc-

ing U.S. forces in Europe to the level proposed by President Bush in January 1990.

Such a withdrawal could be accomplished in many ways. In order to estimate sav-

ings associated with a smaller U.S. presence in Europe, CBO constructed an illustra-

tive withdrawal that would include two of the 5% Army. divisions and two of the

eight Air Force tactical wings that were in Europe before the transfers connected

with Operation Desert Storm." (An Army division of the type now in Europe con-

sists of-about 16,000 personnel and a substantial number of tanks and other equip-

ment. A tactical fighter wing typically consists of about 72 aircraft.) As a conse-

quence.of these reductions, about 73,300 Army and 6,200 Air Force troops would be

removed from Europe and from active service. About 3,300 additional support troops

based in the UnitedStates would also be eliminated.

Savings. The savings under this option would eventually reduce the annual de-

fense budget below the 1991 level by about $6 billion in 1991 dollars of budget au-

thority (see Table 5). Most of the savings, about $5 billion, would result from reduc-

tions in operating and support costs (assuming that all costs associate directly'or

indirectly-with the eliminated units are avoided). The remaining $1 billion in sav-

ings would be realized in procurement funding because of the reduced need for

weapons to equip a smaller Army and Air Force. These budgetary reductions would

be made only after implementation of the treaty is well under way; thus, the full

savings might not be realized for several years. Nevertheless, these savings would

more than offset the small annual cost associated with verifying and complying

with the treaty.

The savings associated with this option result from adoption of a military force

structure that is smaller than today's and are, therefore, relative to the 1991 level

of defense spending. The actions assumed under this option, however, might not rep-

resent savings from the levels proposed by the Administration in the defense budget

plan for 1992 through 1997 that was submitted to the Congress in February 1991.

This budget plan includes the elimination of military units, some of which may be

the same units that would be eliminated under this option. Since the Administra-

tion's plan does not specify which units it would eliminate, it is impossible to say

how much of the $6 billion in savings associated with this option is already included

in the Administration's plan.

Military Consequences. This option would negate some of the beneficial shifts in

the balance of military forces afforded by the CFE treaty, but most would be re-

tained. The option assumes that the United States reduces its forces in Europe by

80,000 troops but that reinforcing units based in the continental United States dedi-

cated to NATO's defense would remain unchanged. The United States' NATO allies

are assumed to make reductions in their forces proportional to the overall cut in the

U.S. forces for NATO, and the Soviet Union is assumed to make no cuts beyond

those required by the CFE treaty. Under these assumptions, the balance of ground

forces would shift modestly away from NATO, but the-resulting level would still be

favorable to the NATO alliance. The Soviet ground forces woufd be at leas of a dis-

advantage-0.7 to I after NATO's additional force cuts, compared with 0.6 to I

based solely on reductions required by the treaty (see Table -2). The ratio of air

forces would be virtually unchanged.

Option II. Reduce U.S. Forces in Europe So That 100,000 Troops Remain

In view of the large reductions in Pact and Soviet forces required by the CFE

treaty, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the likely withdrawal of all Soviet

troops from non-Soviet territory, the United States could -make much larger cuts in

its European forces than those proposed by President Bush in January 1990. For

example; the United States might reduce Its European troops to a level of about

100,000-roughly one-third the number of troops this country maintained during the

height of the Cold War. The United States' NATO allies probably would also reduce

the size of their active forces. This option assumes, therefore, that U.S. allies reduce

their forces proportionally, and that the Soviet Union makes no reductions beyond

those required by the CFP, treaty.

As with Option 1, CBO constructed tin illustrative withdrawal and deactivation of

units from Europe designed to achieve the desired level of 100,000 U.S. troops. In

this illustration, one Army corps including the equivalent of 21/3 Army divisions

(that is, two divisions and one armored cavalry regiment) would be withdrawn from

Included in the 52/3 divisions are four full divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, and

three separate brigades. Three brigades or regiments are considered equivalent to one division.

351

Europe and disbanded along with five Air Force tactical fighter wings. In addition,

two individual Army brigades now stationed in Europe but Monging to divisions

based in the continental United States and the brigade stationed in Berlin would be

deactivated. After these reductions, the United States would have the equivalent of

2V3 Army divisions and three Air Force tactical righter wingi3 in Europe rather than

the 52/3 equivalent divisions-including separate regiments and brigades-and eight

wings that were in Europe before the movement of troops in connection with Oper-

ation Desert Storm.

Savings. Once fully implemented, which could be several years from now, this

option could reduce annual U.S. defense Upending by as much as $14 billion (see

Table 5). Most of the savings-almost two-thirds-would represent reduced funding

for the Army. Considering the Army and the Air Force together, $11 billion of the

total savings would be realized in operating and support costs, the remaining $3 bil-

lion tn procurement costs. As with Option 1, the actions taken under this option

would represent reductions relative to the 1991 level of defense spending, but might

not represent reductions relative to the reduced levels of defense spending proposed

by the Administration in February 1991.

Military Consequences. The effects of this.option on the military balance would

not be significantly different from those of the previous option. The ground force

ratios would remain about the same, with NATO enjoying an advantage over Soviet

ground forces in central Europe. NATO would also retain its edge in the capability

of its air forces over those of the Soviet Union throughout the European theater.

Table I.-Reductions Required by the Treaty Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe

wxs Warsaw Pact NATO- Ratio

Number Percent Number Percent PXVNATO

Main battle tanks ......................................................... 20,000 13.191 40 3,615 16 4

Armored combat vehicles ............................................. 30.000 12.949 30 (1) (1) N.A.

Artillery ........................................................................ 20,000 6,953 26 118 1 59

Helicopters ................................................................... 2,000 (1) (1) (1) (1) N.A.

Aircraft ......................................................................... 6,800 1,5 7 2 19 (1) (1) N.A.

Sources: Congressional Budget office based on United Stites information Afency, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Paris:

November 19, 1990); British American Security Information Council, BASCI Reports from Vienna (Washington, DC: December 17, 1990); am

Arms Control Association. Arms Control Today (January/February 1991). P. 29.

Note. N.A. =not applicable

- Excludes weapons formerly belonging to list Germany and included in German and NAIO arsenals a the lin* the treaty was Signed. These

included 2,334 links. 6,469 armored combat vehicles. 2,216 pieces of artillery. 51 helicopters, and 408 aircraft.

Alliance holdings in these categories are below the ceilings.

Table 2.-Ratios of Military Forces in Europe After Full Mobilization

Ground

forces Muded in iilim I forces 'in the Ak F"

It. ATTU

,mntril

Belate the CFE Treaty:

1988 forces ................ .............................................................................. Pact/NATO I....................... 15 1.1

After unilateral pact cuts are unification of Germany ............................... Pact/NATO ........................... 1.2 1.0

After unilateral pact cuts and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact a ............. Sovk[/NATO ........................ 1.0 0.9

After the CFE Treaty:

Treaty reductions only ............................................................................... SovW/NATO ........................ 0.6 0.8

Option 1: Reduce U.S. forces in Europe so that 225,000 remain' ............ Soviet/PATO ........................ 0.7 0.8

Option 11: Reduce U.S. forces in Europe so that 100,000 refrain' ........... Soviet/NATO ........................ 0.8 0.8

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: ATTU = Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

Except where rated, East German forces are assumed to km k" &sbanded and are not counted as Dart of tithe Pact at NATO forces.

Based on ratios after 90 days of mobilization.

Based on ratios of aircraft available throughout Europe reinforcements.

East German forces are included in Pact totals.

The Pact will cease to exist as a military alliance on Apfl 1, 1991.

Assumes reductions in allied NATO forces proportional to those made in U.S. forces for NATO.

352

Table 3.-Provisions of the CFE Treaty and Their Impact on U.S. Weapons Holdings in Europe

Current t@Wings ma.imum R@uired

u S. k%lti

-NATO - U'S. ("ion

Category ng S

Tanks ........................................................................................................... 20,000 22,757 5,904 4.006 1,898

Armored combat vehicles ............................................................................. 30.000 28.197 5,747 5,37 2 375

Artillery ........................................................................................................ 20,000 18,404 2.601 2,492 109

Attack helicopters ........................................................................................ 2,000 1,685 279 518 (1)

Aircraft ......................................................................................................... 6,800 5.531 704 784 (1)

sources: Congressional Budget Olfee based an United Stairs information Agffq. Treaty on Conventional Armed fucts In Europe (Patis:

November 19, 1990): British-Mwicu Security iniamation Cound, BASIC Atport, lrom Vknns (WasNntlon. DC: Deceffiv 17. 1990); and

Arms Control Today (January/febtuary 1991). p. 29

Exdudes weapons acquired from East Germany.

None.

Table 4.-U.S. Procedures and Costs for Compliance and Monitoring

(In millions of 1991 dollars)

Number of visits cost

One-Time procedures and costs

Observations of Warsaw Pact eliminations/conversions .................................................................... 50-200 10-50

Elimination on of excess U.S. equipment ................................................................................................ 10-50 5-30

Baseline validation and residual-level validation inspections: I

At U.S. bases 3 ............................................................................................................................ 65 25-50

At Warsaw Pact bases .................................................................................................................. 100-150 3-15

Challenge inspections during baseline validation and residual-k-M validation:

At U.S. bases ............................................................................................................... .. ........... 10 1-10

At Warsaw Pact bases .................................................................................................................. 1 5- 25 1-5

Establishment of aerial reconnaissance 4 .......................................................................................... N.A. 40-100

Monitoring through national technical means: 6

Satellite reconnaissance ................................................................................................................ N.A. 0

Other ............................................................................................................................................. N.A. 0

Initial planning and management ....................................................................................................... N.A 10-25

Research and development .............................................................................. ... . ........................ N.A. 25-100

Total ................................................................................................................................ N.A. 130-385

Annual recurring procedures and costs

Short-notice inspections:

At U.S. bases ................................................................................................................................ 25 1-5

At Warsaw Pact bases .................................................................................................................. 50 1-5

Challenge inspections:

At U.S. bases ............................................................................................................. ..................5 1-5

At Warsaw Pact bases .................................................................................................................. 10-15 1-5

Air reconnaissance: 4

........... 10-50 5-15

Over U.S. bases .................................................................................................................

Over Warsaw Pact territory .......................................................................................................... 10-50 5-15

Management and analysis................................................................................................................. N.k 10-25

Additional monitoring through national technical means: I

Satellite reconnaissance ................................................................................................................ N.k 0

Other ............................................................................................................................................. N.A. 0

Total ................................................................................................................................ N.A. 25-75

Total costs over different time port*&

First 44 months:

Total .............................................................................................................................................. N.A. 205-610

Annual average ............................................................................................................................. N.A. 55-165

First 5 years:

Total .............................................................................................................................................. N-k 240-710

Annual average ............................................................................................................................. N.A. 50-140

354

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991)-Continued

Counity Nw, ma. Under Reduc. Ifinslet Receive

1990 I"els max lions

Total .......................................................................... 2,307 2,031 81 363 0 0

Canada:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 77 77 ......................................................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 27 7 277 ......................... . ...........................................

Arty ........................................................................ ................ 38 38 ......................................................................

A/C ........... ............................................................................ 45 90 45 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 12 13 1....................................................

total .......................................................................... 4 4 9 495 46 0 0 0

Denmark:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 419 353 .................. 66 .................. 110

ACVs ........................................................................................ 316 316 ......................................................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 553 553 ...................................................... 36

A/C ......................................................................................... 106 106 ......................................................................

Helos ......... .............................................................................3 12 9....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 1,391 1.340 9 66 0 146

France:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,343 1,306 .................. 3 7..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 4,1 7 73,820 .................. 357 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,360 1.292 .................. 68 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 699 800 101 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 4 IS 352 .................. 66 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 7,991 7,570 101 528 0 0

Greece:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1.879 1,735 .................. 14 4.................. 804

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,64 12,534 893 .................................... 150

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,908 1,878 .................. 30 .................. 7 2

A/C ......................................................................................... 469 650 181 ....................................................

Helos .......................................................................................0 1 8 18 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 5,897 6,815 1.092 1 74 0 1,026

Italy:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,246 1,348 102 .................................... 22

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,958 3,339 .................. 619 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,1 4 41.955 .................. 189 .................. 20

A/C ........................;................................................................. 517 650 73 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 168 1 4 2.................. 26 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 8.093 7,434 1 75 834 0 4 2

Netherlands;

Tanks ....................................................................................... 913 743 .................. 170 1 70 ................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,467 1,080 .................. 38 7 128 ................

Arty ......................................................................................... 837 607 .................. 230 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 196 230 34 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 9 1 69 .................. 22 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 3.504 2,729 34 809 298 0

Norway:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 205 170 .................. 35 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 146 225 79 ................................ 66

Arty ......................................................................................... 531 527 .................. 4 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 90 100 10 ....................................................

'.355

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991)-Continued

Counlry Nov MA. Urde, RMK. l,ansfe, Rece,,e

1990 levtls I*ns

Helos .......................................................................................0 0......................................................................

Total .......................................................................... 9 7 2 1.022 89 39 0 66

Portugal:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1 4 6 300 1 54 .................................... 80

ACVs ........................................................................................ 24 4 430 186 .................................... 128

Arty = .................................................................................. 343 450 107 ....................................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 96 160 64 ....................................................

Helos .......................................................................................0 26 26 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 829 1,366 537 0 0 208

Spain:

Tanks ........................... ........................................................... 854 794 .................. 60 .................. 532

ACVS ........................................................................................ 1,256 1.588 332 ............................... too

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,313 1,310 ............... .. 63 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 242 310 68 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 28 7 1 4 3............;.......................................

Total .......................................................................... 3.753 4,073 4 4 3 123 0 632

Turkey:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2.823 2.795 ..................' 28 .................. 1.052

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,502 3.120 1.618 .................................... 600

Arty ......................-............................................................ 3,442 3,523 81 .................................... 72

A/C ......................................................................................... 449 750 301 ....................................................

Helos .......................................................................................0 43 43 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 8,216 10,231 2,043 28 0 1,124

United Kingdom:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,198 1,015 .................. 183 ...........................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,193 3.1 76 .................. 17 ..................................

Arty ................................................................................... 636 636 ......................................................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 842 900 58 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 368 384 16 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6,237 6,111 74 200 0 0

United States:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 5,904 4,006 .................. 1,898 1.993 ................

ACVs ......................................................................................... 5,741 5,372 .................. 375 536 ................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,601 2.492 .................. 109 180 ................

A/C ......................................................................................... 704 784 80 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 279 518 239 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 15.235 13,112 319 2,382 2.709 0

West Germany:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 4,126 4.166 .................. 560 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,103 3,446 343 ....................................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,462 2.705 243 ....................................................

A/C ....................................................... ................................. 626 900 274 ................................ ...................

Helos ....................................................................................... 206 306 100 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 11,123 11,523 960 560 0 0

NATO without GDR lotals:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 22,092 19,142 .................. 2.950 2.163 2,600

ACVs ........................................................................................ 28.408 29,822 1.4 14 .................. 664 1,044

Arty ................................................................................... 18,604 18.286 .................. 318 180 200

356

Table A-l.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991) --- Continued

Country Nov. Max Under Reduc. liansief Receive

1990 lmis max lions

A/C ......................................................................................... 5,332 6,662 1,330 .................. 0 0

Helos ....................................................................................... 1,573 2,000 427 .................. 0 0

Total .......................................................................... 76,009 75,912 3.1 71 3,268 3,007 3,844

NATO with GDR

Belgium:

Tanks ........... . .......I................................................................. 359 334 .................. 25 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,381 1,099 .................. 2 82 ..................................

Arty........................................................................................ 376 320 .................. 56 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 191 232 41 ....................................................

Helos .......................................................................................0 46 46 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 2,307 2,031 87 363 0 0

Canada:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 77 77 ......................................................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2 7 7 27 7.......... ...........................................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 38 38 ......................................................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 45 90 45 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 12 13 1....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 449 495 46 0 0 0

Denmark:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 419 353 .................. 66 .................. 110

ACVs ........................................................................................ 316 316 ......................................................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 553 553 ...................................................... 36

A/C ......................................................................................... 106 106 ......................................................................

Helos .......................................................................................3 12 9....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 1,397 1,340 9 66 0 146

France:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1.343 1.306 .................. 37 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 4.177 3.820 .................. 357 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,360 1,292 .................. 68 ..................................

A/C ........................................................................................ 699 800 101 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 418 352 .................. 66 ..................................

total .......................................................................... 7,997 7,570 101 528 0 0

Greece:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,879 1.735 .................. 14 4.................. 804

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,641 2,534 893 .................................... 150

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,908 1,878 .................. 30 .................. 72

A/C ......................................................................................... 469 650 181 ....................................................

Helos .......................................................................................0 18 la ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 5,897 6,815 1,092 1 74 0 1,026

Italy:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,246 1.348 102 .................................... 22

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,958 3,339 .................. 619 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,144 1,955 .................. 189 .................. 2 0

A/C ......................................................................................... 577 650 7 3....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 168 142 .................. 26 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 8,093 7,434 175 834 0 4 2

357

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991)-Continued

Countly Nov. Max U(O" RedtK- lianstef Receiye

1990 kwis max tions

Netherlands:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 913 743 .................. 170 170 ................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1.461 1,080 .................. 387 128 ................

Arty ......................................................................................... 831 607 .................. 230 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 196 230 34 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 9 169 .................. 22 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 3,504 2,729 34 809 298 0

Norway:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 205 170 .................. 35 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 146 225 79 .................................... 66

Arty....................................................................................... 531 527 ..................4..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 90 100 10 ..............................................

Helos .......................................................................................00......................................................................

Total .......................................................................... 972 1,022 89 39 0 66

Portugal:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 146 300 154 .................................... 80

ACVS ........................................................................................ 244 430 186 .................................... 128

Arty.....-................................................................................. 343 450 107 ....................................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 96 160 64 ....................................................

Helos .......................................................................................026 26 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 829 1.366 531 0 0 208

Spain:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 854 794 .................. 60 .................. 532

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,256 1,588 332 .................................... 100

Arty.........................................................................I............ 1,373 1,310 .................. 63 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 242 310 68 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 28 7 1 43 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 3.153 4.073 443 123 0 632

Turkey:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2.823 2,7 9 5.................. 28 .................. 1,052

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,502 3,120 1,618 .................................... 600

Arty .................................................................... .................... 3,442 3.523 81 .................................... 12

A/C ......................................................................................... 449 750 301 ....................................................

Helos ........................... @.: .........................................................043 43 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 8.216 10,231 2,043 28 0 1,724

United Kingdorn:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,198 1,015 .................. 183 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,193 3,1 76 .................. 17 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 636 636 ......................................................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 842 900 58 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 368 384 16 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6,237 6,111 74 2DO 0 0

United States:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 5,904 4,006 .................. 1.898 1.993 ................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 5,747 5,372 .................. 375 536 ................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,601 2,492 .................. 109 180 ................

A/C ......................................................................................... 704 784 so ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 279 518 239 ....................................................

358

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991)-Continued

Counlry Nov. Max Ur&, Reduc- T,anslef Receive

1990 )rms max lions

Total .......................................................................... 15.235 13,172 319 2,382 2,709 0

West Germany.

Tanks ....................................................................................... 4.726 4.166 .................. 560 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,103 3.446 343 ....................................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,462 2,705 24 3....................................................

A/C ..... . .................................................................................. 626 900 2 74 ................ ...................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 206 306 100 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 11,123 11,523 960 560 0 0

East Germany GDR:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,27 40.................. 2,274 ..................................

ACVS ...................................:.................................................... 5.8170.................. 5,817 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2.1400.................. 2,140 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 3920.................. 39 2..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 520.................. 52 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 10,67500 10.675 0 0

NATO with GDR totals:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 24,366 19.142 .................. 5,224 2.163 2,600

ACYs ........................................................................................ 34,225 29,822 .................. 4,403 664 1,044

Arty ......................................................................................... 20,744 18,286 .................. 2,458 180 200

A/C ......................................................................................... 5.7 24 6,662 938 ................ .00

Helos ....................................................................................... 1.625 2,000 375 ..................00

Total .......................................................................... 86,684 75.912 1.313 12,085 3,007 3.84 4

WP (group of 5)

Bulgaria:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2.14 51,475 .................. 670 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2,204 2,000 .................. 204 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,116 1,750 .................. 366 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 243 235 ..................8..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 44 67 23 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6,752 5.527 23 1,248 0 0

Czechoslovakia:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1.797 1,4 7 5................. 322 ..................................

ACVs ............... ......................................................................... 2,538 2,050 .................. 488 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,566 1,150 .................. 416 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 348 345 ..................3..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 56 75 19 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6,305 5,095 19 1,229 0 0

Hungary:

Tanks ..................................................................................... .1,345 835 .................. sio ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 1,720 1.700 .................. 20 .......... ......................

Arty ................................................................. ....................... 1,047 840 .................. 207 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 110 ISO 70 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 39 108 69 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 4,261 3,663 139 737 0 0

Poland:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,850 1,730 .................. 1,120 .................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2,377 2,150 .................. 227 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,300 1.610 .................. 690 ..................................

359

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Now. 6, 1991)-Continued

Country NOV. Max Un* ReU. Tiansfel Rem"

1990 k-Ms ffqx lions

A/C ......................................................................................... 551 460 .................. 91 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 29 130 101 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 8.107 6.080 101 2.128 0 0

Romania:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2.851 1.375 .................. 1,416 ..................................

ACVs .............................................................................. 3,102 2,100 .................. 1,002 ..................................

Arty ........ . .................................... ........................................ 3,789 1,4 7 5.................. 2,314 ..................................

A/C ............................................................... . ....................... 505 430 .................. 75 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 13 120 107 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 10,260 5.500 107 4,867 0 0

WP (group of 5) totals:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 10.988 6,890 .................. 4,0980 0

ACVs ........................................................................................ 11,941 10,000 .................. 1,9410 0

Arty....................................................................................... 10.818 6,825 .................. 3.9930 0

A/C ......................................................................................... 1,757 1,650 .................. 1070 0

Helos ....................................................................................... 181 Soo 319 .................. 0 0

Total ................................................... ...................... 35,685 25.865 319 10,139 0 0

WP (group of 6)

Bulgaria:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,145 1,4 7 5.................. 670 .................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2.204 2,000 .................. 204 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,116 1.750 .................. 366 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 243 235 ..................8..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 44 67 23 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6.752 5,527 23 1,248 (I 0

Czechoslovakia:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1.797 1,4 7 5.................. 322 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2,538 2,050 .................. 488 ...................................

Arty....................................................................................... 1,566 1.150 .................. 416 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 348 345 ..................3..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 56 75 19 ....................................................

Total ........................................................... .............. 6,305 5,095 19 1,229 0 0

Hungary:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,345 835 .................. 510 .................................

ACVs ......................... . ............................................................. 1,720 1,700 .................. 20 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,047 840 .................. 207 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... tio 180 70 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 39 108 69 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 4.261 3.663 139 737 0 0

Poland:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,850 1,730 .................. 1,120 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2,377 2,150 .................. 227 ..................................

Arty....................................................................................... 2,300 1,610 .................. 690 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 551 460 .................. 91 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 29 130 101 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 8.107 6,080 101 2,128 0 0

360

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991)-Continued

Country NW, Max under Reduc. lianstef Receive

1990 levels mix lions

Romania:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,851 1,375 .................. 1.4 76 ..................................

ACVs........................................................................................ 3,102 2,100 ..................1,002

Arty ......................................................................................... 3,789 1.4 7 5.................. 2,314 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 505 430 .................. 75 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 13 120 107 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 10,260 5,500 107 4,867 0 0

U.S.S.R. (June 14th):

Tanks ....................................................................................... 21,658 13,150 .................. 8,508 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 31.615 20.000 .................. 1 1.615 ..................................

Arty......................................................................................... 15,018 13,175 .................. 1,843 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 6,611 5,1 SO .................. 1,461 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 1,481 1.500 1 9....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 76,383 52,975 1 923.427 0 0

WP (group of 6) total$:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 32,646 20,040 .................. 12,6060 0

ACVS ........................................................................................ 43,556 30.000 .................. 13,5560 0

Arty....................................................................................... 25,836 20,000 .................. 5,836 0 0

A/C ......................................................................................... 8,369 6,800 .................. 1,568 0 0

Helos ....................................................................................... 1,662 2,000 338 ..................0 0

Total .......................................................................... 112,068 78,840 338 33,566 0 0

WP (group of 7)

Bulgaria:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2.145 1,475 .................. 670 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2.204 2.000 .................. 204 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,116 1,750 .................. 366 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 243 235 ..................8..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 44 67 23 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6,7 52 5,527 23 1,24 8 0 0

Czechoslovakia:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,797 1,475 .................. 322 ..................................

ACVS ........................................................................................ 2,538 2,050 .................. 488 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 1,566 1,150 .................. 416 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 348 345 ..................3..................................

Helos...................................................................................... 56 75 19 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 6,305 5.095 19 1,229 0 0

Hungary:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 1,345 835 .................. 510 ..................................

ACVs .......................................................................... .. .......... 1,720 1,700 .................. 20 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 1.047 840 .................. 207 ..................................

A/C......................................................................................... 110 180 70 ....................................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 39 108 69 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 4,261 3,663 139 737 0 0

Poland:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,850 1,730 .................. 1,120 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 2.377 2.150 .................. 227 ..................................

Arty ......................................................................................... 2,300 1,610 .................. 690 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 551 460 .................. 91 ..................................

361

Table A-I.-Executive Branch CFE Analysis (Nov. 6, 1991)-Continued

Country Nov, Max Undm RedtK. Tianslet Reetk

1990 L-M s max this

Helos ....................................................................................... 29 130 101 ............................ .......................

Total .......................................................................... 8,101 6,080 101 2,1280 0

Romania:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,851 1,375 .................. 1,476 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 3,102 2,100 .................. 1.002 ..................................

Arty....................................................................................... 3.789 1,475 .................. 2,314 ..................................

A/C .................. . .................................................................... 505 430 .................. 75 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 13 120 107 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 10,260 5,500 107 4.8610 0

U.S.S.R. (une 141h):

Tanks ....................................................................................... 21,658 13.150 .................. 8,508 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 31,615 20.000 .................. 11,615 ..................................

Arty....................................................................................... 15.019 13,175 .................. 1,843 ..................................

A/C ......................................................................................... 6,611 5.150 .................. 1,461 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 1.481 1.500 19 ....................................................

Total .......................................................................... 76,383 52,975 19 23.4270 0

last Germany GDR:

Tanks ....................................................................................... 2,2 740.................. 2,2 74 ..................................

ACVs ........................................................................................ 5,8170.................. 5,817 ..................................

Arty....................................................................................... 2,1400.................. 2,140 .............................:

A/C ......................................................................................... 3920.................. 392 ..................................

Helos ....................................................................................... 520.................. 52 ..................................

Total .......................................................................... 10,6750010,675 0 0

WP (group of 7) totals;

Tanks ....................................................................................... 34,920 20,040 .................. 14,88000

ACVs ........................................................................................ 49,373 30.000 .................. 19,37300

Arty....................................................................................... 27.976 20,000 .................. 7.97600

A/C ......................................................................................... 8,760 6.800 .................. 1,96000

Helos ....................................................................................... 1,714 2.000 286 ..................00-

Total .......................................................................... 1 22,7 43 78.840 286 4 4,1 890 0

DISPUTE OVER TREATY COUNTING RULES (ARTICLE III) AND RESOLUTION

The dispute arose shortly after signature of the Treaty on November 19, 1990. In

the information exchanged among-the 22 signatories upon signature, the Soviet

Union failed to count against the Treaty's numerical limits tafiks, artillery pieces

and armored combat vehicles held within the area of application by its Naval Infan-

try units, three new Coastal Defense divisions, Strateiic Rocket Forces, Civil De-

fense and DOSAAF organizations, and internal security organizations.

In its corrected data (provided on February 14, 1991), the Soviets accepted that

items held by DOSAAF, ind battle tanks and artillery held by internal security or-

ganizations counted against Treaty ceilings, but continued to assert that equipment

held in Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense, Strategic Rocket Forces and the C I De-

fense Organization-a total of almost 6,500 items-was not subject to the numerical

limits of the Treaty. The main argument they used was that the mandate for the

CFE Negotiation stated that naval forces woula not be addressed.

Led by the United States, the Soviet position was firmly rejected by the other 21

signatories as being without foundation-in either the Treaty text or t e negotiating

record of the Treaty.

362

The "mandate defense" was specious on two grounds:

First and foremost, it is the Treaty which governs, and the counting rules in

Article III are unambiguous: all equipment located in the area of application, if

it falls in the trenty-limited categories, must count, unless specifically exempt-

ed. There is no exemption for "naval" equipment, nor did the Soviets ever seek

one during the negotiation.

Second, the mandate was never intended to exempt equipment from consider-

ation just because of its organization subordination. The mandate makes clear

that conventional armaments and equipment permanently based on land are

the subject of the negotiation. In stating that "naval forces" will not be ad-

dressed, the intention was to preclude naval forces as such from being a subject

of the negotiation. And the term "naval" is a generic one; naval forces are those

forces which operate primarily at sea.

It is important to remember that the stated objectives of the CFE negotiation-i.e.,

to eliminate capabilities for launching su rprise attack and for initiating large-scale

offensive action-only made sense if one considered all equipment relevant to those

activities. Just because a state assigned a tank based in the area of application to

the navy did not make it less threatening from the standpoint of use in a land con-

flict in Europe.

In bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union over a period of several months, the

United States sought to achieve a resolution of the Article III dispute that would: (a)

not compromise the substantive provisions or objectives of the Treaty; (b) be accepta-

ble to the other 20 signatories.

It became clear that these objectives could only be satisfied if there were a practi-

cal solution that did not require either the Soviet Union, or the United States and

the other signatories to abandon their position with respect to the coverage of Arti-

cle III.

Breakthroughs toward such a solution were achieved on the basis of high-level

communications, including between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, and meetings,

including between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in

March 1990 in Moscow and a visit to Washington by Chief of the General Staff Moi-

seyev in late May 1990. Agreement in principle on a solution was struck between

Baker and Bessmertnykh in Lisbon on Yurnecl. United States and Soviet teams sub-

sequently got together in Moscow to work out the details.

On June 14, 1991, at an extraordinary conference of the 22 CFE signatories in

Vienna, the Soviet Union made legally-binding commitments which:

-obligate it to cap its holdings of Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense, and Strategic

Rocket Forces at their levels as of November 19, 1990, and not to equip its SRF

with equipment in Treaty-limited categories other than armored personnel car-

riers;

-obligate it to reduce a number of conventional armaments and equipment limit-

ed by the Treaty within the area of application equal to its holdings in Naval

Infantry and Coastal Defense, so that at holdings within the area of application

are in conformity with all numerical limits act forth in the Treaty and pursuant

to the Treaty (such as its maximum levels worked out in consultation with

other former members of the Warsaw Pact);

-make clear that Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense units shall be subject to

challenge inspections only, but during these, effective verification will be en-

sured; and

-make clear that, unless otherwise specified in the Statement, the Treaty or its

associated documents, all conventional armaments and equipment of a type lim-

ited by the Treaty, regardless of subordination, will count against the Treaty's

ceilings.

It was agreed that APCs in the Strategic Rocket Forces, limited to existing levels

(1701) would not count against Treaty ceilings, but rather could be exempted under

Article III's paragraph (P), which applies to certain equipment held by internal se-

curity organizations. This exemption was considered appropriate in light of the fact

that these APCs are used exclusively for maintaining security at Soviet missile in-

stallations.

In order to meet the additional reduction obligations included in the Soviet state-

ment, the Soviets agreed to destroy or convert 1,493 pieces of equipment in the zone,

in accordance with all Treaty procedures. Another 1,492 pieces could be withdrawn

from the zone, but an equal amount would be destroyed East of the Urals, with ad-

vance notification and proof that military utility had been destroyed. Another 753

APCA, all of th type "MT-LB" would be modified into armored personnel carrier

look-alikes in acecorlance with existing Treaty provisions.

363

The Soviet statement is not a part of the Treaty, but is associated with it. It is

also a separate international agreement equally as legally-binding as the Treaty

itself is.

It remains the position of the other signatories that the Treaty itself, as well as

the Soviet statement of June 14, cover the disputed equipment; the Soviets, no

doubt, would argue that only the statement does. This is a point on which we agreed

to disagree, in order to resolve the issue and move toward ratification and imple-

mentacton. The result should be the same: Soviet compliance with all Treaty ceil-

ings and other key Treuty provisions. Moreover, given the fact that-as stated in its

preamble-the objective of the statement is to promote the implementation of the

Treaty, the Joint Consultative Group is clearly empowered to consider compliance

issues relating to it.

Text of Soviet Statement, and U.S. Statement in Response (statements of other 20

signatories were identical in content to U.S. text) Attached.

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Government of the United States of America hereby agrees that the State-

ment of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of today's date

provides a satisfactory basis for proceeding toward ratification and implementation

of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the

Treaty).

The aforementioned Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and this Statement of the Government of the United States of America

shall be equally legally binding; they shall enter into force simultaneously with the

Treaty, and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

June 14, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe of November l9, 1990 (the Treaty), the Government of the Union

of Soviet Sociafist Republics states that it assumes the following obligations outside

the framework of the Treaty.

I

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hold within the area of application

of the Treaty conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited catego-

ries not to exceed: in Coastal Defence forces-813 battle tanks, 972 armored combat

vehicles and 846 pieces of artillery; in Naval Infantry-120 battle tanks, 753 ar-

mored combat vehicles and 234 pieces of artillery; in the Strategic Rocket Forces-

1,701 armored combat vehicles, each being an armored personnel carrier as that

term is defined in the Treaty.

II

Forty months after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, within the levels

and sublevels that ensue from the obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

Eublics under the Treaty, the holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of

battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery shall be less than its

maximum levels for holdings, as notified in accordance with Article VII of the

Treaty, by the number it will have in Coastal Defence forces and Naval Infantry

within the area of application of the Treaty. For example, with regard to battle

tanks, unless the maximum levels for holdinis for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-

publics are revised in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, the numbers for

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the area of application of the Treaty,

including battle tanks in Coastal Defence forces and Naval Infantry, will not exceed:

13,150 overall; 10,500 in active units overall; 7,150 in active units within the region

described in Article IV 'paragraph 3 of the Treaty; and 1,850 in active units within

the area described in Ariicle V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) of the Treaty.

III

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall reduce, in addition to the reduc-

tion liability established for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the

Treaty on the basis of information it supplied its holdings of conventional armn-

ment,s and equipment in the Treaty-liniited categories withkn the area of application

or the Treaty by the number which it had as of the date of signature of the Treaty

in Coastal Defence forces and Naval Infantry, that is,by 933 battle tanks, 1,725 ar

mored combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery.

2. Such additional reduction shall be carried out by means of destruction or con-

version into civilian equipment of 933 battle tanks and destruction of 1,080 pieces of

artillery. Of the 1,725 armored combat vehicles to be additionally reduced,- 972 ar-

mored combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted Into civilian equipment and

753 armored combat vehicles or the MT-LB type, included in the armored combat

vehicle category and belonging to the number declared as of the date of signature of

the Treaty, shall be modified, in accordance with the Protocol on Existing Types,

into armored personnel carrier look-alikes of the MT-LB-AT type, which are not lim-

iteg by the Treaty.

3. Fifty percent of 933 battle tanks and 972 armored combat vehicles shall be de-

stroyed or converted within the area of application of the Treaty and 50 percent of

1.080 pieces of artillery shall be destroyed within the area of application of the

treaty, within the time limits and in accordance with the procedures established by

the reaty. The remainder of these conventional armaments and equipment shall be

withdrawn from the area of applicntion of the Treaty; an equivalent number of con-

ventional armaments and equipment shall be destroyed or converted outside of the

area of application of the Treaty within the time limits established by the Treaty

and in accordance with procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that the

conventional armaments and equipment have been destroyed or rendered militarily

unuspble. The States Parties to the Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the

location, number and types of conventional armaments and equipment to be de-

stroyed or converted.

IV

The holdings of armored combat vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not be subject to the numerical limitations

of the Treaty, in accordance with Article Ill,tgaragraph 1, subparagraph (F) of the

Treaty. These forces shall not be equipped with conventional armaments and equip-

ment in the Treaty-limited categories, other than armored personnel carriers.

v

The conventional armaments and equipment of Coastal Defence forces and Naval

Infantry in the categories subject to the Treaty within the area of application of the

Treaty shall be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with the provisions of

the Protocol on Insrction. Effective verification of such armaments and equipment

shall be ensured. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide separate in-

formation to all States Parties on such armaments and equipment of the same scope

and with the same degree of detail as provided for in Section III, paragraph 2 of the

Protocol on Information Exchange, and under the same timetable for the provision

of information as provided for in Section VII of that Protocol.

VI

Unless otherwise specified (a) in this Statement, (b) in the Treaty, or (c) in the

Declaration on Land-Based Naval Aircraft, all conventional armaments and equip-

ment in the Treaty-limited categories, based on land within the area of application

of the Treaty, irrespective of assignment, shall be subject to all numerical limita-

tions of the Treaty.

VII

This Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics re-

garding the aforementioned obligations assumed outside the framework of the

Treaty shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, shall be legally bind-

ing and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP-OCT. 18, 1991

1. I hereby record that:

(a) The States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of

November 19, 1990. hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, acknowledge that in view

365

of the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the area of application defined

in Article 11 of the Treaty does not include the territories of Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania.

(b) I have today received a statement from the Representative of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics as follows:

In order to fulfill the legally-binding obligations of the Treaty on Convention-

al Armed Forces in Europe and of the agreements entered into by the States

Parties on June 14, 1991, the Union of Sc@viet Socialist Republics shall treat all

its conventional armaments and equipment in the categories defined in Article

11 of the Treaty present, on or after November 19, 1990, on the territories of

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as subject to all provisions of the Treaty and as-

sociated documents. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in

the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as art of Soviet holdings

arrd shall count toward the Soviet reduction liability. This statement shall be

legally binding and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

(c) I have also received statements from the representatives of the Kingdom of

Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,

the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,

the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian

Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the

Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the

Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland and the United States of America that, in accordance with

the legally-binding statement made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, all

Soviet conventional armaments and quipment in the categories defined in Article

II of the Treaty resent, on or after November 19, 1990, on the territories of Esto-

nia Latvia, and Eithuania shall be treated as subject to all provisions of the Treaty,

its associated documents and the legally-binding commitment entered into by the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on June 14, 1991. In particular, conventional ar-

maments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as

part of Soviet holdings and shall count toward the Soviet reduction liability.

(d) The States Parties acknowledge that arrangements for inspection of the above-

mentioned conventional armaments and equipment on the territories of Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania will require the consent and cooperation of those States.

2. This Chairman's statement, recording the above legally binding agreement

among the States Parties, which will not be considered a precedent, will be recorded

in the Journal, transmitted to the Depositary and deposited together with the in-

struments or rfitification.

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS OF

UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION-OCT. 30, 1991

On October 30 in Kiev, Government delegations from Ukraine and Russia had a

thorough exchange of views in connection with the development of Ukrainian-Rus-

sian relations in the context of implementing the Treaty between the Ukrainian

SSR and the RSFSR of November 19, 1990, and the communique of August 29, 1991.

Taking part in the negotiations were: for the Ukrainian side-Minister of Foreign

Affairs A.M. Zienko, Minister of Defense K.P. Morozov, First Deputy Minister of Pi-

nance V.P. Tentyuk, Deputy Minister of the Economy Yu. A. Dvoynykh and other

officials; for the Russian side-Minister of Foreign Affairs A.V. Kozyrev, State

Councillor for Defense Issues K.I. Kobets, Deputy Minister of Finance C.A. Korolev

and other officials.

The intention was expressed to follow a strategic course to strengthen the tradi-

tional neighborly relations between Ukraine and Russia in all areas, on the basis of

complete equality, recognition and respect for the sovereignty and choice of their

people.

Thoroughly discussed were questions of mutual implementation of responsibilities

in the area of human rights in accordance with international standards, politico-

military questions and paths to a complete reformation of the external political

structure of the former Union. The sides agreed on the necessity of mutual action,

together with other republics, on conducting a regulated reduction of the previous

union structure in accordance with the new demands and a necessary accounting of

the interests of each republic.

Both sides agreed to establish a working group with the goal of developing and

strengthening the politico-legal basis of their relations, and working out correspond-

ing agreements. They discussed means of mutually agreeable activity in this area.

366

The Russian delegation welcomed the resolution of the Ukrainian Supreme Council

of October 24 on the "nuclear-free status of Ukraine." Both sides underscored their

readiness to observe the conditions of the 1991 Treaty on Elimination and Reduction

of Strategic Offensive Forces and the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe,

in particular, the parts related to forces located on their territories. Ukraine and

Russia will undertake, jointly with other interested republics, the necessary steps

for early entry into force of these documents.

Both sides welcomed measures to withdraw and destroy tactical nuclear weapons.

Ukrainian and Russian delegations underscored that questions of preparation and

implementation on their territories of agreements in the area of arms reduction will

be decided with their immediate participation and in consideration of their inter-

ests.

Both sides will provide for mutual exchange of information and will assist one an

other in the realization of the interests of Ukraine and Russia in direct participa

tion in the European community process and European structures.

Both sides declared a common approach to participation in international economic

and monetary-financial institutions. Ukraine and Russia intend to broaden their co-

operation with the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Recon-

struction and Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-

ment and in other organizations, with the intention of joining them.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Russia signed a protocol on coop-

cration and coordination of activity between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Ukraine nnd the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

SOVIET PRE-TREATY WITHDRAWALS BEYOND THE URALS

Between approximately January 1989 and the signature of the Treaty on Novem-

ber 19, 1990, the Soviet Union moved thousands of armaments in Treaty-limited cat-

egories out of the area of application to beyond the Urals-according to their own

later accounting, some 57,000 tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery pieces.

lind they been left in the zone, the Soviets would have had to destroy most of the

withdrawn equipment.

The holdings and consequent reduction obligations reported by the Soviets at

Treaty signature were as follows:

Declared Maximum levd Reduction

Tanks ......................................................................................................................... 20,725 13,150 7,57 5.

ACVs .......................................................................................................................... 29,890 20,000 9,890

Artillery..................................................................................................................... 13,938 13,175 7 63

Aircraft ....................................................................................................................... 6,611 5,150 1.461

Helicopters ................................................................................................................. 1,481 1,5000

Note: As pat of the resolution ol the Article III (Nspute, the Soviets agreed to reduce another 3,738 pieces of equipment-467, tanks and 486

ACVs by destruction or conversion and 540 artillery pieces by destruction within the zone, following Treaty procedures; another 466 tnks, 86 ACVs

and 540 artillery outside the zone; and 753 ACVs by a special modification procedure spelled out in the Treaty.

Withdrawals prior to Treaty signature were not illegal, but many CFE partici-

pants, including the United States, found such a large withdrawal and build-up of

armaments and equiipment just outside the area or application to be inconsistent

with the goals of the Treaty and potentially destabilizing.

The reasons the Soviets have given for the TLE transfers are:

(1) unilateral withdrawals (as announced by Gorbachev, as well as those re-

quired under bilateral agreements with Eastern European States) and residual

force restructuring;

(2) inadequate storage west of the Urals to accommodate units forced to leave

eastern Europe much sooner than expected;

(3) insufficient new industrial production to support equipment upgrades in

units east of the Urals and an unwillingness to destroy still-viable equipment-

particularly under tightening economic conditions; and

(4) too few destruction facilities in the Treaty zone to destroy excess equip-

ment within CFE-stipulated timelines.

The United States led diplomatic efforts to prevail upon th Soviet Union to pro-

vide assurances with regard to the use and ultimate disposition of the withdrawn

equipment. These efforts were pursued over the course of approximately a year,

from the summer of 1990 to June of 1991. During this period, the Soviets provided

367

United States and other Western representatives with a gradually more-detailed ac-

counting of their pre-Treaty transfers:

Into storage To units Total

Tanks .......................................... ....................... ....... 8,400 8,000 16,400

4,700 1 1.200 1 5,900

ACVs ..........................................................................................................................

Artillery...................................................................................................................... 23,400 1,600 25,000

Includes both those stored for eventual placement with units as well for spare parts.

Finally, on June 14, 1991, in a statement to the CFE Joint Consultative Group

which incorporated the above accounting, the Soviets provided formal assurances

that:

-A certain number of armaments located beyond the Urals would be destroyed

or converted between 1991-1995 (at least 6,000 tanks, 1,500 ACVS. 7,000 pieces

of artillery); advance notification and "visible evidence" (i.e., visible to NTM) of

such destruction/conversion would be provided.

-Additional equipment in Treaty categories would be destroyed/converted after

1995;

-Withdrawn equipment would not be used to create a strategic reserve or oper-

ational groupings-i.e., units of division size or larger;

-Information would be provided on equipment withdrawn from the zone and

placed in storage; and

-These stores would gradually be depleted.

(Text of Soviet Beyond the Urals Statement Attached.)

STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN

THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty), I have been instructed by the

Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to state the following. i

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, during 1991-1995, destroy or con-

vert into civilian equipment no less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armored combat

vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the conventional armaments and

equipment in the Treaty-limited categories beyond the Urals, in addition to the

numbers of armaments subject to destruction and conversion specified in the State-

ment of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 14, 1.991,

concerning obligations outside the framework of the Treaty.

These armaments will be destroyed or converted under procedures that will pro-

vide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms that they have been destroyed or

rendered militarily unusable. Advance notification and' information will be provid-

ed to the States Parties to the Treaty regarding the locations and numbers of battle

tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery undergoing destruction or

conversion.

Elimination of armaments in the Treaty-limited categories will also be carried out

subsequently as their operational and service life is expended.

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the period between January 1989

and signature of the Treaty on November 19, 1990, in connection with activities re-

lated to unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces, the withdrawal of Soviet

troops from countries of Eastern Europe and adaption of the armed forces to the

new defensive doctrine, withdrew beyond the Urals the following numbers of con-

ventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories: 16,400 battle

tanks, 15,900 armored combat vehicles and 25,000 pieces of artillery.

Of these numbers of armaments and equipment, 8,000 battle-tanks, 11,200 ar-

mored combat vehicles and 1,600 pieces of artillery have been turned over to rnili-

tary units and subunits in the eastern Soviet Union for the purpose of re-equipping

them and supplementing their armaments.

Another part of the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited

categories, which have been transferred beyond the Urals (8,400 battle tanks, 4,700

armored combat vehicles and 16,400 pieces of artillery), has been placed in storage.

In addition, 7,000 pieces of artillery are being used for replacement and repair.

368

These stored conventional armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the

Urals will be used up in the process of replacing obsolete armaments and equipment

that have expended their established operational and service life and, in the eastern

Soviet Union, also in supplementing units.

With respect to the armaments and equipment transferred beyond the Urals

before signature of the Treaty that have been placed in storage or are used for re-

placement and repair beyond the Urals, upon entry into force of the Treaty, infor-

mation will be provided to all States Parties about the locations and numbers of

battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery at such locations as of

July 1, 1991. Armaments in each of these categories (battle tanks, armored combat

vehicles and pieces of artillery) will be stored separately.

3. The conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories

withdrawn beyond the Urals prior to signature of the Treaty will not be used to

create a strategic reserve or operational groupings, and will not be stored in a way

permitting their rapid return to the area of application of the Treaty, that is, such

armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will not be stored in sets

for military formations.

Military formations and units deployed within the area of application of the

Treaty will be organized in line with the Soviet defensive doctrine and taking into

account the sufficiency levels of armaments established by the Treaty for a single

state.

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