Question. Have any of the other 20 parties to the CFE Treaty suggested the possibility of Moving forward to ratify the CFE Treaty prior to a Soviet reversal of their position on article III?

What commitments have other nations made with regard to approving the CFE Treaty without reservations or conditions?

Answer. The Parliament of the Czech and Slovak Republic recently approved the CFE Treaty. We understand, however, that President Have] will not sign the instrument of ratification until the problems with article III have been resolved. Otherwise, to our knowledge, none of the other parties has submitted the treaty for parliamentary approval, pending resolution of the article III problems.

No country has indicated thus far that it intends to place reservations or conditions on the treaty-during the ratification process.

Question. Have Soviet negotiators discussed a possible timetable for ratification of CFE in the event the article III dispute is resolved?

What about other parties?

Answer. There have been some mostly informal, discussions with the Soviets and other signatories about CFE ratification procedures, but given the continuing problems over article III. few states have made specific projections about the timetable.


Question. Please describe the U.S. force structure in the ATTU, listing the numbers of Army divisions and Air Force tactical fighter wings disaggregated by type, for the 1988 level of U.S. forces, the level of 225,000 troops that President Bush recommended in January 1990, and a level of half the size of the 1990 recommendation that many experts and members of Congress have suggested?

Answer. As of 1988 the United States had 4 2/3 Army divisions in the ATTU (2 armored, 2 mechanized, and 2 armored cavalry regiments), and 10 tactical Air Force fighter wings. President Bush proposed in his State of the Union address in January 1990 that the U.S. and the Soviet Union limit their stationed ground and air personnel in Eastern and Central Europe to no more than 195,000. The U.S. would have maintained 225,000 ground and air force manpower in all of Europe. This proposal is not included in the CFE Treaty and was never expressed in terms of divisions and wings.

Question. How will the acquisition and deployment of NATO weapons under the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine c modified to take into account the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe?

Answer. SACEUR has assessed the prospective environment and determined that FOFA as a concept is still relevant. He also concluded that we can plan for a much smaller force to cover the same area. Therefore, long-range fire (air and surface launched), wide-area target acquisition and mobility are at a premium. The revisions to FOFA he has defined as Joint Precision Interdiction, and systems such as JSTARS and ATACMS, are essential.

Question. Please describe what U.S. TLE were withdrawn from the CFE zone for use in the gulf war. What will be the final disposition of any withdrawn TLE?

Answer. All types of CFE treaty-limited equipment-main battle tanks, artillery above 100mm, armored combat vehicles, combat helicopters and fixed-wing combat aircraft were deployed to SWA from Europe in connection with Desert. Shield/ Storm. Combat aircraft will return to their original European bases with their units. Much of the Army's treaty-limited equipment will similarly return, although precise numbers, types and destinations are being determined according to Army priorities.

Before CFE signature on November 19, 1991, a total of 836 tanks were withdrawn from U.S. stocks in Europe for Desert Shield/Storm. Of these, we provided 220 M6OA3's to Persian Gulf allies and sent 616 M1A1 tanks for use by U.S, forces. As we have informed the Congress and our allies, these tanks will not return to Europe. The United States has undertaken to treat these tanks as if they were Still in Europe on November 19 for the purposes of establishing NATO's reduction liability under the CFE Treaty.

Question. Please describe the current status of the NATO strategy review regarding the following questions:

  1. To what extent will NATO nuclear weapon requirements be reduced under the new declaratory policy of nuclear weapons as "weapons of last resort?"
  2. Will a new employment policy he established?
  3. Will MC 14/3 be revised as a result of the new "last resort" declaratory policy?
  4. In what way will "forward defense" be changed?
  5. In what way will NATO conventional defenses utilize a multinational unit structure?

Answer. (a): At the London Summit meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in July 1990, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to maintain the lowest, most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the peace. Since 1980, NATO has reduced the size of its nuclear stockpile by over 50 percent, to its lowest level in 30 years. The new security environment will allow NATO to go even further. Future nuclear requirements will decline to reflect NATO's overall reduced reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. The stockpile level will be reduced further as a result of the diminished need for sub-strategic systems of the shortest range. The London Declaration states that once SNF arms control negotiations begin, NATO will be prepared to eliminate its nuclear artillery shells from Europe, in return for Soviet reciprocal action. Additional reductions will likely result as NATO further adapts its nuclear force posture to support the new strategic concept.

Answer. (b): As part of NATO's on-going review of strategy, the Alliance has undertaken to modify the size and adapt the tasks of its nuclear deterrent forces. In considering how to adapt its nuclear policy and force posture, NATO is agreed that nuclear weapons will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted.

Answer. (c): (Deleted.]
Answer. (d): [Deleted.]
Answer. (e): (Deleted.]


Question. Does the administration now consider the Soviet declaration of a lower number of Objects of Verification (OOVS) than we anticipated as an obstacle to submitting the CFE Treaty for Senate consent?

Answer. The Soviet OOV total is lower than we had expected. This is due in large part to equipment withdrawals and unit restructuring accomplished by means consistent with the provisions of the CFE Treaty. While there are fewer Soviet 0OVs, each will likely hold relatively more TLE, thus permitting inspectors to view more TLE during a single inspection than would otherwise be possible. We have raised our specific questions regarding the number and content to their OOVs in the Joint Consultative Group and bilaterally with the U.S.S.R. The ultimate acceptability of the Soviet OOV number must be addrei3sed in the context of all the data issues which are under discussion.

Question. Does the administration now consider the discrepancies between Soviet declarations of TLE and our estimates as an obstacle to submitting the CFE Treaty for Senate consent?

Answer. The data the Soviet Union submitted at treaty signature contained numerous inaccuracies. The U.S.S.R. submitted revised data on February 14 to the Joint Consultative Group (JCG). While the inaccuracies have been partially corrected, we still have questions concerning the Soviet data. Consequently, we are continuing to analyze the revised Soviet data, to refine our own estimates of Soviet TLE in the treaty zone, and to engage in a dialog with the U.S.S.R. seeking a satisfactory resolution of any remaining problems and questions. This is an ongoing process.

Question. Does the administration now consider the Soviet transfer of TLE east of the Urals as an obstacle to submitting the CFE Treaty for Senate consent?

Answer. While massive Soviet equipment withdrawals prior to treaty signature are not a violation of the treaty, they do raise concerns about Soviet intentions and the ultimate disposition of the withdrawn equipment. We are concerned that this equipment could become a strategic reserve force just outside the zone or be used to build up Soviet forces in Asia. We are continuing to press the Soviets on this matter to secure the best possible resolution of it.



Question. On December 6, 1990, Senators Pell and Helms sent a 17-page list of questions on the CFE Treaty. The executive branch responded with a thorough 125- page response in June of 1991. However, most of these responses were classified and unusable to the committee for its public documents on the CFE Treaty, such as the hearing record of the CFE Treaty and the committee report on the CFE Treaty. Now that the CFE Treaty has been forwarded to the Senate, much of the classified response can, in our view, be declassified for the public record. Much of this information is already in the public press, such as the data declarations and data on cascading. Thus, it is very timely to make the administration's responses available to the committee and the full Senate for their public consideration of the ratification or the CFE Treaty.

Answer. We are now in the process of declassifying as much as possible of the material sent to the committee in June. When our review is complete, we will inform the committee which portions can be declassified.


QUESTION. Many have suggested that this treaty has been overtaken by the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany and the Soviet commitment to withdraw all their forces from Eastern European countries.

Could you explain what obligations this treaty will create that will not occur as a result of political developments in Europe?

Answer. The treaty establishes legally-binding obligations, including mechanisms for checking compliance and addressing compliance issues. Unilateral moves to reduce and limit forces can be unilaterally reversed. Bilateral agreements (e.g., on Soviet withdrawal of forces) involve only two nations. In particular, the CFE Treaty:

Establishes overall and subregional ceilings for equipment in each treaty category to hinder force concentration; limits apply within the European portion of the U.S.S.R. as well as in Eastern Europe.

Provides a legally-binding, multilateral framework; this is particularly important in terms of locking in the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, thereby supplementing bilateral agreements.

Explicitly prohibits a state from stationing forces on the territory of another without the consent of the host state.

Requires the destruction or conversion of equipment in the zone in excess of agreed levels-in accordance with procedures which eliminate its military utility.

Significantly increases transparency of military forces and activities. The Soviet Union, e.g., will be subject to some 180 onsite inspections during the 120-day baseline inspection period alone.

Requires the establishment for each state of maximum levels for holdings; the former Warsaw Pact states signed a formal agreement on CFE entitlements, locking in maximum Soviet levels.

Ensures, in addition, through the "sufficiency" rule that the other Eastern states will always have at least about one-third of the overall Eastern allowances to split among themselves-in many cases a higher share of the equipment of this group of states than they had pre-CFE.

A state's entitlement cannot be reduced without its consent, even if its actual holdings decrease.


Question. Some have suggested that this treaty does not take into account the likelihood of further political change in the Soviet Union.

What would be the implications of a breakup of tile Soviet Union that created new countries in the zone covered by the treaty? How would we handle that problem?

Would new countries, like Russia or the Baltic States, have to sign tile treaty?

Would we have all extraordinary conference as envisaged in article XXI of the treaty?

Answer. The question of the possible effect on the CFE Treaty of the creation of new countries-such as if the Baltic States were to regain their independence- raises a number of complex legal issues. As a result, it is premature to make any definitive statements as to how the treaty regime would be affected. An extraordinary conference is certainly a possibility; one can be convened at the request of any signatory who considers that exceptional circumstances relating to the treaty have arisen.


Question. The territory of the Baltic States is covered by the treaty because Soviet conventional forces are deployed there.

To what extent does this treaty imply recognition of Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union?

Answer. Inclusion of the Baltic military district within the area of application of the treaty ensures that the treaty's limits apply comprehensively to all Soviet forces within the area. This does not represent any change in the long-standing U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

Question. Was any compromise made as part of the settlement of the article III dispute that would enable the Soviet Union to use additional equipment to control the Baltic States?

Answer. No. Under the solution worked out, none of the treaty ceilings will be exceeded-including those for armored personnel carriers. In their June 14 statement, the Soviets pledged to reduce another 1,725 armored combat vehicles, bringing them down to the treaty-permitted level.

They will do this by a combination of destruction, conversion for nonmilitary use, and the internal modification of a certain type of armored personnel carrier ("MT- LB") in a manner specified in the treaty to reduce its troop-carrying capability.

We also agreed that the Soviets would not have to count against tile treaty's ceiling the armored personnel carriers in their Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).

These APCS, in the SRF, are used for security at Soviet missile installations -- none of which are located in the Baltic military district. We agreed it was appropriate to apply the counting rules exemption for certain equipment used for internal security purposes (exemption F in article III).

In addition, the Soviets agreed not to increase their holdings of these SRF vehicles (1,701) and not to assign CFE equipment other than APCs to the SRF.


Question. Many have suggested that the Soviet effort to reinterpret article III so as to exclude some 3,600 pieces of equipment assigned to the Soviet naval infantry and coastal defense units was an attempt b the Soviet military to sink the treaty.

How do you account for the Soviet military's attempt to change this treaty in such a fundamental way?

Could you describe the interplay between the Soviet military and the Soviet foreign ministry on the subject of article III?

Answer. There were indications of differences between Soviet military and civilian officials over the article III dispute-but any comment on the background of Soviet internal decisions would be pure speculation.

In any event, the Soviets asserted that the treaty's counting rules did not apply to equipment assigned to their naval infantry, Coastal Defense, Strategic Rocket Forces and Civil Defense organization. if they had been able to get away with this, they could have maintained equipment in excess of treaty ceilings within the zone. Moreover, treaty limits would have been rendered virtually meaningless-easily circumvented by resubordinating equipment to organizations not deemed by a particular state to be part of its "conventional armed forces."

The resolution or the article III dispute preserves the numerical limitations and other key provisions of the treaty and the overall integrity of the treaty. Most importantly, the Soviets reaffirmed the comprehensiveness of the counting rules.

Both military and civilian officials represented the Soviet Union in discussions to resolve the dispute. important progress was made during the visit by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Gen. Moiseyev, to Washington in late May 1991. Shortly thereafter, on June 1 in Lisbon, on the basis of a letter from General Moiseyev to Undersecretary of State Bartholomew, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Begsmertnykh were able to reach agreement in principle on a settlement which was acceptable to all parties to the treaty.


Question. Clearly, the compromise on article III succeeded in creating a Soviet obligation to treat its naval equipment as if it were covered by the treaty. What changes were agreed to by the United States that would involve Soviet obligations under the compromise different than the obligations that are contained in the CFE Treaty?

Doesn't the compromise permit the Soviet Union to move equipment out of the Atlantic to the Urals zone that would otherwise have to be destroyed in the zone?

Did we obtain any new obligations under the article III compromise that would not have been part of the CFE Treaty?

Did we gain any additional rights with the Soviets, beyond those of the CFE Treaty?

Answer. There is only one provision which diverges explicitly from the treaty: the Soviets will be permitted to withdraw 1,492 pieces of equipment rather than destroy or convert them in the zone. They will, however, be required to destroy or convert the same number East of the Urals-providing advance notice and "visible evidence" that military utility has been removed. (The Soviets also added 1,493 pieces of equipment to their existing in-zone destruction/conversion requirements, and 753 armored personnel carriers of the MT-LB type that must be modified in such a manner, under treaty provisions, that they no longer constitute APCS.)

It was also agreed, under the settlement, that the Soviets' current holdings of coastal defense equipment would be subject only to challenge inspections and not to the declared site regime, thus bringing this equipment under the treaty inspection provision designed for naval infantry equipment. This required, however, no departure from the treaty as written.

It was further agreed that it would be appropriate to apply to Soviet SRF armored personnel carriers the existing counting rules exemption for certain equipment used for internal security. Again, this required no departure from existing treaty provisions.

The Soviets also took on new obligations under the settlement, including capping Coastal Defense, Naval infantry and SRF holdings of CFE equipment at current levels and limiting the SRF to armored personnel carriers.

Finally, while the other 21 signatories continue to hold that the Soviets' attempt to exclude naval infantry and coastal defense equipment was contrary to the treaty's counting rules, the Soviets maintain that these forces are limited by the article III legally-binding dispute settlement only. They thus would see their pledge in that settlement statement that the counting rules will be applied comprehensively-irrespective of organizational assignment-as a new obligation.


Question. Clearly, the 75,000 pieces of Soviet equipment moved East of the Urals was an attempt to exempt this equipment from the destruction requirements of the treaty.

Do you believe this effort was in violation of the spirit of the CFE Treaty?

Do you think we could have avoided this circumstance if we had finished the treaty more quickly?

Would the United States consider Soviet actions inconsistent with their political pledge on this equipment to be a matter sufficiently important to warrant possible withdrawal from the treaty?

Answer. The Soviets have told us they moved 57,300 pieces of equipment in treaty categories-not 75,000-beyond the Urals prior to treaty signature; they say another 10,900 was destroyed in the zone and a further 8,900 MT-LB APCs modified so as to turn them into APC "Look-Alikes," which do not count against treaty ceilings. Some of these reductions of holdings in the zone were Part of the unilateral withdrawals announced by Gorbachev at the U.N. in December 1988. The U.S. welcomed this announcement, as a step toward greater security-especially as there was no prospect at the time for an imminent CFE agreement. However, while pretreaty withdrawals were not illegal they diminished markedly the amount of equipment the Soviets would have to reduce under the treaty.

This is a situation we will continue to watch closely, but the political assurances the Soviets provided us on June 14-when seen against the background of the military and political changes which have taken place in Europe and within the Soviet Union-adequately satisfy our major concerns about the disposition and possible future use of equipment withdrawn prior to signature.

The 22-Nation treaty was completed in record time-some 20 months after the negotiation began. Gorbachev announced in December 1988-3 months before the CFE negotiation began-that the Soviets would begin withdrawing forces from Eastern Europe. Withdrawals continued throughout the negotiation. While the Soviets might well not have gotten as much equipment out of the zone prior to signing if the treaty had been signed earlier, pretreaty withdrawals would clearly not have been avoided.


Question. Do you believe that there is any implicit deadline for completing ratification of this treaty? When will the other parties consider the treaty?

Answer. There is no deadline for ratification, but provisional application of certain treaty provisions-including those on information exchange and the Joint Consultative Group-will lapse on the first anniversary of signature (November 19, 1991) unless all participants unanimously agree to extend it. Such a lapse would clearly complicate eventual implementation.

One participant Czechoslovakia-has already ratified the treaty. Most others have begun the ratification process. Other signatories have indicated they expect to complete ratification procedures this fall.


Question The treaty will require Eastern European countries, like Poland and Hungary, to reduce large amounts of equipment.

How supportive of the treaty are these countries? Aren't they worried that the treaty will lock them in to lower levels of forces that could render them subject to Soviet intimidation?

What will happen if one of the Eastern European countries wants to leave the Group of Six and join NATO? How will that change the destruction obligations created by the treaty?

Answer. Eastern European states enthusiastically support the treaty and worked successfully to include provisions of special interest to them. They will benefit in general from the stable security framework, including the vastly increased transparency, established by CFE. In particular, they will benefit from the Soviet reductions and limits that the treaty requires and the legally-binding multilateral framework it provides to lock in Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe.

While Eastern European states must reduce and limit their equipment under the treaty, the Soviets are also limited and will have to take large equipment reductions. The treaty's "sufficiency rule," proposed by NATO to cap Soviet equipment levels, ensures that the other Eastern states will always have at least about one-third of the overall Eastern allowances to split among themselves-a larger proportion, in some categories-than they had prior to CFE.

A number of the treaty's other provisions also support and promote Eastern European independence from the Soviets.

It explicitly prohibits a state from stationing forces on the territory of another without the consent of the hosting state.

The geographic subceilings will limit the amount of equipment the Soviets can deploy on their own territory, on the borders of their former allies.

Treaty rights and obligations fall on individual states-not on alliances.

Equipment ceilings are for groups of States, but group allocations are divided up at the outset, with each state responsible only for its own share. The former Pact states signed a formal agreement on CFE equipment allocations, locking in maximum Soviet levels. Under the CFE Treaty, a state's allocation cannot be reduced without its consent, even if its actual holdings decrease. CFE info exchange and inspections are conducted on a national basis. The treaty also allows the Central and East Europeans to inspect the Soviet Union.

If one of the East European states were to announce its intention to leave its Group of States or to join the other Group (NATO), an extraordinary conference would no doubt be requested. The Soviets, in fact, insisted on language to this effect in article XXI of the treaty. Signatories would have to decide at this conference how to deal with the situation. Reauction obligations fall on individual states; they are not group obligations.


Question It has been reported that Czechoslovakia had been selling large numbers of modern tanks-the T-72-to Syria.

Are such arms sales consistent with the treaty?

Have we challenged the Czechs?

Answer. We and other signatories have expressed concern to Czechoslovakia over the large amounts of equipment in treaty categories it listed for export in its data submissions. (Czechoslovakia has declared slightly over 5,500 items of equipment for export.)

Provided certain criteria are met, equipment awaiting export is exempt from treaty limits.

One of these criteria is that the exports must be consistent with a country's normal practices; we and other signatories question whether the Czechoslovak declarations satisfy this condition.

We have expressed concern as well that some of the equipment is reportedly bound for Syria. (Other than these sales to Syria, the Czechs are not known to have any other firm contracts for the equipment declared for export.)

We have made very clear our objections to any sale of arms to countries which support terrorism.

Bilateral contacts continue between a number of treaty signatories, including the U.S., and the CSFR, in an effort to convince them to revise their data submissions.

This has not yet been raised as a formal compliance concern in the Joint Consultative Group and it is our hope that this will not be necessary.

The Czechoslovaks have cited economic reasons for wanting to sell, rather than destroy, this equipment. We are sympathetic, of course, to efforts to improve their economic situation, but believe that treaty obligations must be met.


Question This treaty creates a requirement to continue negotiations among these same countries, with the aim of reaching agreement on manpower reductions and aerial inspections.

Are you optimistic that such negotiations will bear fruit?

How are those negotiations connected to "Open Skies?"

Answer. The 22 participants-working under the same mandate as for CFE I- have undertaken in CFE-1A to negotiate measures to limit personnel strength in Europe, as well as to develop an aerial inspection regime. in addition, NATO is considering whether to propose additional measures. Now that the article III dispute has been resolved, work at CFE-1A has begun in earnest; working methods have been agreed and several proposals have been tabled. We are optimistic that a CFE-1A agreement will be achieved.

While there is no requirement to complete the negotiation by the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference, all participants agreed that they would "seek to conclude" by then. The resulting time pressure may keep the CFE-1A agenda limited.

The United States views the CFE aerial inspection regime and the Open Skies regime as separate but complementary. CFE aerial inspection would apply only to the ATTU area, whereas Open Skies would also include all Soviet territory East of the Urals and U.S. and Canadian territory. The purpose of the CFE aerial inspections would be to monitor compliance with CFE Treaty obligations. Open Skies has a broader intent emphasizing increased openness and confidence-building concerning the military capabilities of participating parties. While Open Skies will not be a verification regime per se, it could provide a useful Supplement to other monitoring and verification means. Open Skies could also contribute to monitoring the disposition of TLE that the Soviets moved East of the Urals. Open Skies is a separate negotiation, but involves the same 22 nations that signed CFE I and are negotiating CFE-1A.

NATO members have agreed that for the time being, priority should be given to securing an Open Skies agreement.


Question As part of the settlement on German unification, the Soviet Union was told that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces (SNF) in Europe would begin after the CFE Treaty was signed. Why haven't those negotiations started? Answer. Actually, it was at the July 1 990 NATO Summit in London that the U.S. and its Allies agreed that U.S.-Soviet SNF talks could b4n shortly after the conclusion of CFE. This issue was not linked to German unification.

At the London Summit, NATO also agreed that the U.S. and its Allies would hold consultations to develop an Alliance framework for the talks.

Since September 1990, the U.S. and its Allies have been meeting regularly through NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG) to develop such a framework. The SCG is making progress towards this goal.

The problems associated with Soviet fulfillment of CFE obligations delayed the SNF process considerably.

Question Are we prepared to consider large-scale reductions in U.S. nuclear forces in Europe now that this treaty will eliminate the Soviet advantage in conventional arms in the European theater?

Answer. Since the early 1980's, the U.S. has reduced sharply its nuclear deployments in Europe, including all those warheads assimilated with missiles eliminated under the INF Treaty. The President has also terminated the Follow-on to Lance (FOTL) missile program.

At NATO's July 1990 Summit, President Bush and the Allied leaders concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for substrategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. As noted above, the NATO leaders endorsed the idea of U.S.-Soviet SNF talks and agreed that once the talks begin, NATO will propose the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe-in return for reciprocal Soviet action.

The NATO leaders have reaffirmed, however, that "to keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary."

Finally, NATO Heads of State have declared that, "as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will be used except in self-defense and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war."


Question About how much money will the U.S. save annually if it reduces its forces in Europe to about 100,000 and musters out the reduced forces? Answer. Actual reductions attributable to CFE are difficult to estimate at this time. The CFE Treaty helps bring about a greatly reduced threat to Europe and contributes to the decision to reduce defense expenditures. The current budget submission before the Congress represents a 25 percent reduction in defense spending. It must be emphasized that these force structure changes are being effected globally and cannot be simply traced to a specific region. Cognizant of the reduced threat and significant budgetary pressures, the European Base Force Plan, as briefed by General Galvin, calls for approximately 150,000 troops in the European Command by the end of FY 95, (As stated by Secretary Cheney and General Powell, this is the lowest level to which U.S. troop strength can be reduced and still support U.S. security interests in Europe.)


Question In the concluding moments of the negotiation, some of the stability measures were dropped.

What were these stability measures?

Will the U.S. move to the adoption of these measures in the future?

Answer. Two NATO-proposed stabilizing measures-on designated storage and armored-vehicle-launched bridges-are, in fact, in the treaty.

There was considerable work on other measures, including ones on limiting the call-up of reservists and constraining exercises.

Considerable progress was made during the CFE I negotiation on a measure limiting the call-up of reservists. Just defining the term, however-given the great variety of practices of the 22 participants-took a great deal of time and it was not possible to complete the work and still sign the treaty in a timely fashion. Work is continuing on the issue in CFE-1A.

Stabilizing measures, while desirable, were always seen as auxiliary to the treaty's central provisions on ceilings, reductions and verification.

Further confidence and security building measures are also under consideration in the parallel CSBM negotiation, involving all 35 CSCE states.

Moreover, the notification of force movements for exercises and other purposes is already required under the 1990 Vienna Document which emerged from the CSBM negotiation.


Question May we have your assurance that this committee will receive, under all the same strictures regarding the handling of classified information, the same data and reports being supplied to others in the Senate?

I will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the anomaly will be corrected and that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the committee of jurisdiction over these treaties, receives on a regular basis all information relative to these treaties that the executive branch is sharing with any other Senate entities. I understand that Ambassador Lehman has already taken steps to satisfy the committee.



Question There has been considerable discussion in the press that NATO will downsize from about 1.5 million troops to about 0.75 million, with the U.S. dropping from 320,000 troops to 100,000 or 156,000. The new NATO would give up on its "forward defense" strategy, and in place of that, institute a Rapid Reaction Corps and a multinational Main Defense Force of 400,000 to 500,000 troops.

Specifically, how will we change the types of U.S. forces in Europe? How specifically will we change the mix of our equipment in order to fit into the Rapid Reaction Corps? Will we place a greater fraction of U.S. equipment in POMCUS storage?

Would you favor the use of the NATO Rapid Reaction Forces to defend Middle Eastern oil?

Is the U.S. presently modifying its air-based, short-range attack missile, the SRAM, into a new tactical missile, the SRAM-T, to be based in Europe with nuclear weapons? Is this the right time to start deploying new nuclear systems into Europe? About how many are we planning to deploy? Will Germany support the deployment on its soil of aircraft carrying these missiles?

Answer. The latest SHAPE data available from nations' DPQ responses on manpower indicates that by 1995 the total NATO active duty (professional plus conscript) force in the ATTU will be around 2.3 million. This is down from a 1990 total of about 2.9 million and represents approximately a 20 percent reduction. The U.S. is planning on maintaining approximately 150,000 troops, roughly one corps and the supporting equipment that goes with that, in the ATTU. We will also be maintain- in equipment in storage in Europe and support personnel to facilitate possible U.S. reinforcement.

The mix of forces will essentially be one corps of ground forces with air support. As in the past, we will also maintain naval forces and air wings in the European region. No final decision has been made about the extent of ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). However, we expect to contribute some ground combat elements to the ARRC, as well as to the Main Defense Forces.

There is currently no intention to place additional TLE in POMCUS, although the proportion of equipment in Storage in Europe will be higher because of reductions in active units.

-- NATO countries can of course operate individually out-of-area in the Middle East. Such efforts can be coordinated among Alliance members, e.g. as demonstrated by the Persian Gulf War. However, members have traditionally interpreted the NATO Charter as applying only to the North Atlantic area. Therefore, unless all NATO countries agreed to an out-of-area deployment, the AARC could not be used in the Middle East.

-- NATO leaders have endorsed the continuing need to maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and kept up to date as necessary. In this connection, allied leaders have supported U.S. efforts to develop SRAM-T (the U.S. version of TASM.) All agree that it is premature to discuss the deployment of any systems that will not be available until the late 1990s. However, the new NATO strategy continues to stress the need for sharing responsibility and nuclear roles, and for continuing to base a nuclear deterrent in Europe.


Question There are many options for military organizations in Europe: a continuing NATO, the European Community's Western European Union or some future CSCE military institution. The U.S. favors a strong NATO.

What are the ways in which NATO can address some of the concerns of the non-NATO, former Warsaw Treaty nations?

Answer. NATO has made clear its concerns about security and stability in Eastern Europe. At the June 1991 Copenhagen NAC ministerial, the Allies indicated this by stating their "direct and material concern" with "the consolidation and preservation of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation" throughout Europe.

Over the past year, NATO also has developed a new, more cooperative relationship with the new democracies of Eastern Europe, as well as with the Soviet Union. Numerous East European leaders, including Presidents Havel and Walesa and military officials, have visited NATO. The Alliance also has fostered a useful dialogue with East Europeans through its diplomatic liaison program, the East European experts have taken part in selected NATO committee activities, such as programs on science and the environment.

This cooperative relationship will expand. The East Europeans have welcomed it, and have made clear the importance they attach to a strong NATO in ensuring stability in Europe.

In addition, NATO has addressed East European concerns through its role in strengthening CSCE with a role complementing the security NATO provides.

The stable security framework, including the vastly increased transparency, established by CFE and the CSBM's document will greatly benefit the Eastern European states. In particular, they will benefit from the Soviet reductions and limits that the Treaty requires and the legally-binding multilateral framework it provides to lock in Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, as well as from the information exchange and other measures in the Vienna Document 1990.


Question Of course, the CFE Treaty will not count few numbers of tanks with great accuracy. In order to determine the effectiveness of verification, it is necessary to determine what is a "militarily significant violation."

How many divisions, with how much treaty-limited equipment (TLE) would constitute a militarily significant violation?

How does one quantify the number of divisions? Computer models in J-8, with discussions of military tacticians?

Answer. (The answer to this question has not been completed; it will be provided as soon as possible.)


Question One could hypothesize several ways for violations of the CFE Treaty.

What are some of the ways the Soviets could violate the CFE Treaty?

If the Soviets were to circumvent the treaty, what is the most likely way they might do this? Would we have ample warning?

What are the less likely ways to circumvent the treaty, and why are they less important?

Please quantify the approximate detection level of the numbers of TLE in violation of the CFE Treaty that could be detected with low, medium and high confidence.

Answer. (The answer to this question, which will be classified, has not yet been completed; it will be provided as soon as possible.)


Question In order to make sure that U.S. security interests are not harmed, one must consider verifiability of the treaty.

How would you define "effective verification"?

Is the CFE Treaty "effectively verifiable"?

Answer. The standard of "effective verification" that we would apply to the CFE Treaty includes several elements:

First, it includes the ability to detect a militarily significant violation in time to respond effectively and thereby to deny to a would-be violator any benefits from such a violation.

Second, it includes the ability to detect violations or patterns of violations even if they are not necessarily militarily significant, both to provide greater time to respond to such violations and to raise the coats of cheating to the would-be violator.

Third, it includes the ability of the regime to support compliance decision-making by providing convincing, less ambiguous, evidence of possible violations.

In assessing the verifiability of the CFE Treaty, we must therefore, take into account the degree to which we can monitor the agreement, the level of noncompliance which would pose a security threat to Western security, our ability to compensate for such noncompliance or to deny the benefits of noncompliance, the extent to which the agreement itself raises the risks and costs of cheating, others' incentive to violate the agreement and their perception of whether the U.S. and its Allies would act in response, and the political significance of detected violations.

Given the complexity and scope of tactical forces and the associated monitoring tasks (including accounting for thousands of pieces of mobile equipment), our monitoring uncertainties will be great. In particular, smaller violations could be difficult to detect.

The objectives of the CFE Treaty are to achieve a stable conventional balance at lower levels and eliminate the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. In these terms, on the basis of comprehensive data exchanges, onsite inspections, and national technical means (NTM) of verification, the CFE Treaty is effectively verifiable.


Question The CFE Treaty allows the Parties to reduce their TLE by passing on their less sophisticated and older equipment to their allies, who would then reduce their TLE to stay within their CFE limits.

How much TLE does the U.S. plan to cascade? Which equipment to which nations? What is the financial cost of this transfer?

How much U.S. TLE from the ATTU has been exported to nations outside the ATTU? What types of equipment to what nations?

Is the Soviet Union cascading any of its TLE to other nations? Have they cascaded some of their TLE to their forces in the far East? How much TLE has cascaded by these two routes?

How much of the Soviet TLE that is based in the cast of the Urals will be exported to other nations? flow much and to which nations?

Answer. (The answer to this question, portions of which will be classified, has not yet been completed. It will be provided as soon as possible.)


Question How much TLE of each of the five types will actually be destroyed from the following entities; U.S., Soviet Union, and the other 20 CFE nations, NATO (without GDR), NATO (with GDR), WTO (with the Soviet Union), WTO (without the Soviet Union).

Answer. Each State is required to notify its reduction obligation no later than 30 days after entry into force of the treaty. That obligation shall be no less than the difference between its notified maximum levels for holdings and its notified holdings in the zone-either as of signature or entry into force, whichever is higher. While tentative national reduction obligations can now be calculated based on holdings notified as of signature (and these calculations appear in the attached charts), these could change if greater holdings were subsequently notified or if maximum levels were changed. National reduction obligations can also be adjusted through the transfer of equipment among members of the same group ("cascading").

Tentative national reduction obligations -- based on holdings notified as of signature. "Transfer" and "Receive" Figures for NATO states indicate cascading plans. These plans, which hive not yet been final approved by member states (U.S. legislation, for example, is pending before the Congress) have not yet been reflected in the tentative reduction figures. Since the original cascading plan was drawn up, specific figures have changed and more changes are expected. Cascading will to some extent cause the reduction obligations of donor states to decrease and the obligation of recipients to increase (need for increase marked by asterisk).

All figures for Iceland and Luxembourg are 0.

Question What method will the U.S. use to destroy its tanks? How much will it cost to do this for each tank?

Answer. The U.S. will destroy 639 tanks by severing as described in the Reduction Protocol of the CFE Treaty. The preparation for and destruction of each tank in accordance with the Protocol will cost $10,000. A total of $6.8 million has been budgeted to complete the destruction. Question. If the Soviets used our methods to destroy their TLE, about how much money would this cost them? Do the cases of (1) actual numbers of TLE to be destroyed in the ways that they have agreed to for the two sides of the Urals, and (2) the amount of destruction that would have taken place had the Soviets maintained their July 1988 TLE levels within the ATTU and had to destroy it all pursuant to CFE.

Answer. The Reduction Protocol to the CFE Treaty offers a range or conversion as well as destruction modalities. The relative costs associated with treaty-approved modalities vary widely. For example, destruction by severing may be accomplished by several methods ranging from plasma torches (expensive) to explosives (relatively inexpensive). The ruble cost to the Soviet Union for eliminating roughly 36,000 pieces of TLE (total affected by the treaty and subsequent agreements on equipment beyond the Urals) cannot be estimated with any precision. The U.S. is not aware of which modalities the Soviets will choose nor the resources they would employ should they destroy their TLE by our severing methods. Consequently, there is a virtually no basis of comparability for estimating costs. It is clear, however, that Soviet reduction/destruction costs for the agreed level will be significantly less than they would have been had TLE levels of June 1988 been present, as the Soviets would have had to destroy on the order of 100,000 pieces of TLE.


Question In Deputy Director of the CIA Kerr's open statement on July 17, he stated that: "We have confirmed that some of the weapons being moved east of the Urals did not arrive at their destination until a month or so after signature. We also know that a number of items that the Soviets claimed to have eliminated by November were still in the zone."

In response to a question, the CIA indicated that some 800 TLE were observed in this type of situation, plus some additional aircraft that the Soviets believed were not operable.

How much TLE will the Soviets destroy, beyond their commitment to destroy some 20,000 plus 3,500 TLE, pursuant to the treaty?

What was the general quality and age of the Soviet TLE that was removed after November 19?

About how much TLE departed the ATRU after November 19? Consider only the TLE for which there is reasonably solid evidence, known with good confidence. Do not consider the TLE for which there is no, or poor evidence, known with low confidence.

Please compare the number of extra TLE to be destroyed (beyond CFE requirements, as answered above) and the amount of TLE that was late getting out of the ATTU. Numerical answers would be preferable for the public process to be more effective. If you refuse to use numbers for the open record, then you must comment if the extra destruction is significantly larger (3 or more times), much larger (2 or more times), somewhat larger (1.5 times), or a little larger (1.25 times).

Answer. (The answer to this question, which is classified, has not yet been completed; it will be provided as soon as possible.)


Question. May a State Party increase its holdings of treaty-limited armaments and equipment (TLE) within the area of application during the 40-month reduction period?

If so, would such an action constitute circumvention of the treaty's provisions? Answer. The treaty does not specifically require a State Party or a group of States Parties to maintain progressively lower intermediate levels of holdings within the area of application during the 40-month reduction period. Rather, States Parties are required to reduce a certain number of treaty-limited armaments and equipment in order to meet their reduction liability calculated in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8 of article VIII of the treaty. In this respect, then the reduction regime under the treaty is different in concept from the one set forth, for example, in the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) (i.e., the INF Treaty did specifically require progressively lower intermediate levels to be reached between entry into force and the end of its 3-year elimination period).

Thus, under the CFE Treaty, a State Party may, as a general rule, maintain holdings during the reduction period in excess of its maximum levels for holdings notified in accordance with article VII, and even in excess of its holdings notified at the time of signature. Similarly, groups of States Parties may maintain during the reduction period aggregate holdings in excess of the levels specified in articles IV and V of the treaty. However, certain conditions must be met.

First, States Parties must report their holdings in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange. This requirement thus provides for "transparency" during the period in which there are excess holdings within the area of application.

Second, States Parties must carry out reductions during the 40-month period in accordance with the phased reduction schedule specified in paragraph 4 of article VIII in order to meet their reduction liability . Furthermore, in accordance with paragraph 5 of article VIII, all TLE so reduced must have been within the area of application at the date of signature. As n result, even if a State Party does bring more TLE into the area after the treaty enters into force, such TLE may not be used to fulfill its-reduction liability.

Third, at the end of the 40-month reduction period, each State Party must be at or below its notified maximum levels for holdings and the numerical limitations set forth in article VI, and the members of each group of States Parties must have aggregate holdings at or below the numerical limitations set forth in article IV and V. Thus, any TLE brought into the area of application after the treaty enters into force in excess of the treaty's numerical limitations must be removed no later than 40 months after entry into force of the treaty.

As a general rule, increasing TLE holdings during the reduction period would not constitute a circumvention of the treaty's provisions. As noted above, the treaty does not prohibit such an action, provided that the conditions discussed above are met.

However, if a State Party were, during the reduction period, to surge into the area of application TLE in numbers or proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application, such an action might very well constitute circumvention. This is because such an action would undermine the principal goals (i.e., object and purpose) of the CFE Treaty, which are to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and to eliminate, as a matter of high priority, the capability of a State or large-scale offensive action in Europe. In such instances, a State Party would have the right to raise the issue as a compliance question in the Joint Consultative Group in accordance with subparagraph 2(A) of article XVI of the treaty and, if the State Party deemed that the situation warranted, to withdraw from the treaty in accordance with paragraph 2 of article XIX in order to safeguard its supreme national interests.


Question. The Administration has indicated that in its view, the Inspection Protocol does not provide for State Parties to inform States that are not a party of the Treaty of pending inspections. But does the Inspection Protocol contain a specific prohibition against informing non-party States of pending inspections?

If such a prohibition does not exist, would the United States consider informing the Baltic governments of pending inspections within those republics?

Answer. The Inspection Protocol requires that the inspecting State Party inform the State Party on whose territory the equipment is stationed and, if different, the State Party whose equipment is being inspected, of its intention to carry out an inspection. The United States plans to adhere to all requirements of the Protocol.

There are no provisions for State Parties to inform States that are not a party to the Treaty. Governments of the Baltic States are not Treaty signatories. However, clearly inspections may not be carried out on the territory of sovereign states, such as the Baltics, without their consent.

The United States is consulting with other Treaty parties and the Baltics about mechanisms whereby Soviet equipment in the Baltics may be inspected.


Question Will compliance decisions on the CFE Treaty be treated alone, on their own merits, uncoupled to issues on other arms control treaties?

Answer. A variety of factors will undoubtedly be taken into consideration in addressing CFE compliance. Noncompliance on another arms control agreement by any State Party, for example, might heighten interest in that Party's conventional forces. However, decisions on an actual cheating will, of course, be based on the provisions of the Treaty and on the findings of the U.S. Government on the basis of on-site inspections, information exchange, NTM, and other information sources.


Question What will be the Administration's approach to potential Soviet violations or the CFE Treaty, if they were to take place? Please give some examples of violations and U.S. responses.

Answer. The Administration will view very seriously any proven violation of the CFE Treaty. In addition, a suspicion of violation will be thoroughly investigated, through verification and inspection provisions of the Treaty and other NIM. It is difficult to speculate on any U.S. response, since it would depend on the individual situation-for example, the nature of-the violation, the type and firmness of the evidence available, etc. The Treaty, however, provides mechanisms through the Joint Consultative Group to address compliance issues in cooperation with the other signatories. Other channels, e.g., bilateral consultations, exist as well for addressing compliance questions.

The most obvious way of violating the Treaty would be for the Soviets to attempt to hold additional TLE in the ATTU or to reintroduce TLE previously moved east of the ATTU. The Soviets could also attempt to circumvent the Treaty by sheltering additional TLE from Treaty limits by including it in an equipment category that is exempt from ceilings, such as armored personnel carrier "look-alikes." However, it is unlikely that any militarily significant numbers of equipment could be concealed or moved back into the ATTU without being detected. Rigorous counting rules and clearly defined resubordination agreements make detection of excess TLE that might be "hidden" on paper highly probable. Any such detection would be a cause for serious concern and appropriate remedial action by the United States.


Question Will compliance decisions be based only on evidence for which there is a good to high confidence that it is correct?

Answer. All compliance decisions by the U.S. Government are made on the basis of a complete evaluation of all available evidence. The detailed verification provisions of the CFE Treaty, coupled with NTM, will help to ensure that any violations can be verified with confidence. Decisions on any actual cheating will, of course, be based on the provisions of the Treaty and on the findings of the U.S. Government on the basis of on-site inspections, information exchange, NTM, and other information sources.


Question When the Soviets departed the ATTU there was a lack of specific data on most of the uncertain TLE transfers when the Soviets downsized the TLE in their units, and there was a lack of specific data on when the actual numbers of TLE in covered storage were reduced. Will this lack of data on timing of departure from the ATTU be used to prove Soviet noncompliance to the baseline data declarations?

Answer. The United States and other signatories continue to address data questions with Soviet representatives both in the JCG and bilaterally. Within the Administration, all available evidence and its degree of certainty will be considered during the process of reading any non-compliance finding.


Question It has been stated that it takes a higher standard of evidence to remove a suspected violation from a list of violations, than it takes to raise the alarm that it might be a violation in the first place. Is this correct?

Answer. A variety of circumstances, some of them minor, might point to a violation and result in a concerted program of investigation, inspection and monitoring over an extended period of time. To establish definitely that a suspected violation is not occurring, however, would require a high standard of "negative" evidence before all doubts could be erased.


Question Will the response to a violation, if it were to occur, be proportionate to the degree of the violation?

Answer. Serious consideration will be given to the U.S response to any violation of the CFE Treaty. Since the response to a violation would depend on the specific case involved, it is difficult-to speculate on the exact nature of that response. It can be assumed, however, that a more serious violation would precipitate more serious actions on the part of the United States than would a minor infraction.



Question The Treaty obviously leaves it up to each group of parties to determine how many inspections a party may conduct on the territories of other parties. What percentage of NATO's active inspection quotas will the United States receive during the baseline inspection period? What criterion were used to determine this allocation? Will the national proportions remain the same for the other three inspection periods (reduction, validation, and residual)? If not, how will the allocation be determined in the future.

Answer. As notified on March 19, the United States will have up to 69 of the total 380 inspections-that NATO countries notified as their active quota for the baseline validation period-or l8 percent of the total. This proportion reflects an initial allocation of inspections based on the proportion of objects of verification which each NATO member notified at Treaty signature, supplemented by additional considerations including national requests and transfers among member countries. Such proportions will likely remain the same through the reduction and residual level validation periods-with the possibility remarrying for additional transfers. Changes in the overall numbers and proportions of objects of verification may result in recalculation of active inspection all locations for the residual period.

It should be noted that the number of active inspections notified represents the maximum number each individual country can conduct. The number NATO states collectively will actually conduct will be less, since once an inspected state's passive quota is exhausted, no further inspections can be conducted. The members of the Group of Six are expected to be liable to receive approximately 299 inspections during the baseline validation period; NATO states notified active quotas totaling 380. since there is no provision for changing the active quota notification to take into account intra-Group inspections or transfers among members of the same Group, the Group of 16 wanted to ensure that a sufficient number of inspections were notified to accommodate any changes before entry into force. Hence, the actual proportion of inspections conducted during the baseline validation period is not known.


Question The definition of combat aircraft appears to be very comprehensive. On the other hand, it would seem to apply to strategic bombers as much as it applies to tactical combat aircraft. And yet, except for the Backfire bomber, no strategic bombers are listed in the, Protocol on Existing Types. Nor, for that matter, do strategic bombers appear to be excluded from accountability under Article III. What rules will govern the treatment of long-range bombers, including those that may, in the future, be converted to conventional weapon systems (like our B52s)? Where are these rules noted? Are there any aircraft other than strategic bombers in Soviet strategic air forces, and are they counted or not?

Answer. While the definition of the term "combat aircraft" and the counting rules in Article III of the CFE Treaty are broad and comprehensive, negotiators agreed that they would not capture strategic (i.e., long-range or heavy) bombers. This is made clear in the list of existing types of combat aircraft set forth by the Treaty's Protocol on Existing Types. That provision does not list any strategic or heavy bombers. The list of existing types "fleshes out" the combat aircraft definition in Article II by clarifying which particular aircraft within the area of application are captured by that definition and thus are counted under the Treaty.

United States and Soviet long-range or heavy bombers are captured under the START Treaty. This division of coverage was well understood by the CFE negotiators when both the CFE Treaty and START were drafted.

The Backfire bomber (i.e., the TU-22M) is listed as an existing type of combat aircraft under the CFE Treaty, but is not limited by it. Furthermore, neither Article III(10)(d)(ii) nor the MOU of the START Treaty list the Backfire as an existing type of heavy bomber. The Backfire is addressed, however, by a unilateral declaration of the Soviet Union. In this declaration, the Soviets undertake a political commitment not to have more than 300 TU-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval TU-22Ms. In addition, they undertake not to have more than 200 naval TU-22M aircraft. These political binding limits are global in scope.


Question Limits on land-based naval aircraft are provided for in a political commitment undertaken outside the framework of the Treaty. The limits obviously are in addition to those applied by the treaty to other combat aircraft. What is not clear is how or where land-based naval aircraft are excluded from accountability under the Treaty. They don't seem to be mentioned in Article III. Could the failure to mention land-based naval air anywhere in the Treaty undermine the definition of combat aircraft or the purpose of Article III? Why did we not use Article III to exempt LBNA?

Answer. Although land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) are not excluded by means of the definition of combat aircraft in Article II(1)(K) or under the counting rules in Article III, they are limited pursuant to the LBNA Declaration. Since the Declaration is the only document associated with the CFE Treaty package that addresses land-based naval aircraft, the negotiators believed that it alone would be sufficient to express their intention that such aircraft be limited in a separate document, but not be counted under the Treaty itself. After all, it would have been unnecessary and illogical to limit LBNA in a separate political Declaration if they had already been covered by the Treaty.

Article III. was not used to exclude LBNA because, up until the final days of the negotiation, it was drafted in such a way as to include such aircraft. However, when it became clear that the Soviet Union would never agree to a CFE Treaty that included LBNA, it was agreed to constrain such aircraft by means of the LBNA Declaration. Article III was deliberately not changed to reflect the exclusion of LBNA for two reasons. First, as noted above, it was believed that the LBNA Declaration clearly expressed the intent of the negotiators that such aircraft were not to be counted under the Treaty. Second, the negotiators wished to leave the counting rules, as originally and painstakingly negotiated, intact and thus as broad as possible.

The fact that LBNA are not specifically addressed in the Treaty proper in no way undermines the definition of combat aircraft or the counting rules. LBNA are not counted under the Treaty only because of the special exclusion embodied in the Declaration. Without such a special negotiated arrangement, they would have counted.


Question There is an obvious gap between the definition of a battle tank and the definition of an Armored Combat Vehicle. One could, for example, deploy armored vehicles with 74mm guns, but with no troop carrying capacity. They wouldn't be battle tanks, HACVs, or AIFVs. How would such weapons be captured? Moreover, how do we currently differentiate Soviet armored air-defense vehicles (like the 2S6) from HACVs? If the Soviets were to deploy thousands of 2S6s, what legal objections could we raise; on what basis?

Answer. As noted in the Article-by-Article Analysis, subparagraph 1(D) of Article II is structured to make it clear that the general definition of armored combat vehicle (ACV) takes precedence over the specific definitions for the subcategories of armored personnel carrier (APC), armored infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV), and heavy armament combat vehicle (HACV). It is for this reason that those three subcategories are indented and placed under the general definition of armored combat vehicle. As a result, an armored vehicle with a 74 millimeter gun but no troop carrying capacity could-subject to agreements in the Joint Consultative Group-be considered and counted as an ACV under the Treaty even though it did not meet the specific definitions for APC, AIFV or HACV. Such vehicles would thus be subject to all of the sublimits for ACVs set forth in the Treaty (e.g., subparagraph l(B) of Article IV).

The 2S6 is not counted under the Treaty because its primary mission relates to air defense. The Treaty's definitions relating to armored fighting vehicles and artillery are intended to constrain those types of conventional armaments used to conduct large-scale offensive operations. As a result, air defense weapons, with only a secondary offensive or ground attack capability, were excluded from the scope of the Treaty. It is for this reason that, for example, self-propelled 20 millimeter VULCAN air defense weapons systems also are not counted under the Treaty.


Question As we understand it, the first thousand Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVS) assigned to Soviet internal security forces are not accountable under the CFE Treaty limits on AIFVS. What is not clear to us is how AIFVs in excess of that thousand will be identified for the purpose of assessing Soviet compliance with the sub-zonal ceilings described in Articles IV and V. Please explain.

Answer. Paragraph 1 of Article XII makes clear that AIFVs in internal security forces in excess of 1,000 must be counted under the Treaty. Sub-subparagraph (1) of subparagraph (A) of paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange in turn requires that States Parties provide information on the numbers, location, and subordination of "* * * armored infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the Treaty * * *."


Question The wording of Paragraph 6 in Article IV permits the Soviets to have up to the maximum amount of TLE permitted in zone 4.3 (under Paragraph 3 of Article IV) provided that "no (other) state party is thereby prevented from reaching its maximum levels * * *." Could Soviet TLE located in zone 4.3 be increased to levels above the Soviet maximum levels announced for zone 4.3 provided? For example, if the Soviets declared their readiness to remove excess TLE from the Baltics, could they locate more TLE there provided the East Europeans did not exercise their maximum entitlements in the rest of zone 4.3? In this regard, how is paragraph 6, Article IV different from paragraph 6, Article VII, and why the redundancy if in fact they are redundant?

Answer. The Soviet Union may never increase TLE holdings in excess of its notified maximum levels for holdings, even in cases in which the other members of the Group of Six elect not to exercise their maximum entitlements. In this regard, Article VII makes clear that States Parties may never exceed their notified maximum levels for holdings. In particular, paragraph 6 of Article VIl provides that a State Party may not unilaterally increase its maximum levels in order to take advantage of the unused portion of another group member's maximum levels for holdings.

In essence, the rule pertaining to maximum levels for holdings in paragraph 6 of Article IV is not different from the one set forth in paragraph 6 of Article VII. The provision concerning maximum levels was repeated in paragraph 6 of Article IV, at the insistence of the East Europeans, in order to make absolutely clear that the deployment rule set forth in paragraph 6 of Article IV did not take precedence over the rule on maximum levels for holdings set forth in paragraph 6 of Article VII.


Question The article-by-article analysis of the Treaty text, as provided by the Executive Branch, indicates that the Soviets can "decommission" up to 1 percent of their TLE according to a ratio of 200 ground force items (tanks, artillery, ACVs) for every 50 air force items (combat aircraft, attack helos). Where is "decommissioning" defined in the Treaty, and where is this "proportionality" rule identified?

Answer. The term "decommissioning" is not defined in the Treaty. The principal rules relating to decommissioning are set forth in Article III(1((D), Article IX, and Section IV(1)(A)(3) of the Protocol on Notification.

Subparagraph (B) of paragraph I of Article IX sets forth limits on holdings of decommissioned equipment, which were intended to provide protection against circumvention of the Treaty's ceilings through the stockpiling of decommissioned items. The wording is ambiguous as to how the two limits (i.e., the 1 percent rule vs. the flat 250 limit) are to work in conjunction with one another. The decommissioning visions are applied provisionally, and some states have declared decommissioned items. In fact, only in the case of the Soviet Union would 1 percent of total holdings exceed 250 (the Soviet Union has not declared any decommissioned items). Should this issue arise in the future, the JCG would have to address it. One obvious way to interpret the rule is to maintain that if a State Party has more than 250 TLE in decommissioned status (i.e., if 1 percent of its notified holdings exceeds 250), the same proportion of 200 to 50 between battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and pieces of artillery, on the one hand, and between combat aircraft and attack helicopters, on the other hand, should apply.


Question The rules governing equipment located in Designated Permanent Storage Sites (DPSS) are well defined. There do not seem to be any rules governing TLE items located in other (non-DPSS) storage sites. However, they can be stored in unit sets, and these unit sets can be removed at any time. It is not even clear that the temporary removal of stored TLE from a non-DPSS storage site would have to be reported. In that regard, if a regimental set of such TLE were removed from a non-DPSS storage site, when (and under what circumstances) would that regiment first be counted as an "object of verification" in its own right? What would prevent the Soviets from declaring a large military base (one on which several active divisions are maintained at a high state of readiness) a "storage site?"

Answer. The second sentence of paragraph 4 of Article X makes clear that conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (TLE) in storage other than in designated permanent storage Sites (DPSS) are counted as being in active units. Thus, there is no advantage to storing TLE in non-DPSS sites. Such TLE would still count under the active unit sublimits and the sites at which they were stored would count as objects of verification.

It is important to remember that TLE stored in declared non-DPSS storage sites not organic to other formations or units identified as objects of verification (see Section 1 (J)(2) and (1)(M) of the Protocol on Inspection) are also objects of verification. Thus, in the example cited above, the brigade/regimental, etc., formations comprising the "active divisions" would constitute objects of verification in their own right. As a result, the Soviets would be prevented from declaring that the TLE belonging to such divisions is stored at a military storage site. This, in turn further prevents the Soviets from claiming that all of the TLE belonging to those divisions constitutes only one object of verification.

If TLE was removed in a regimental set from a declared non-DPSS storage site and not legitimately included in another object of verification (e.g., placed in DPSS or another existing military storage site), then the regiment or facility which received it would count as an object of verification at the next information exchange in accordance with Section III(1)(A) of the Protocol on Information Exchange and Section I(1)(J) of the Protocol on Inspection.


Question The political commitment b the Soviet Union to limit TLE in land-based naval infantry, coastal defense, and strategic rocket forces was obviously the product of difficult negotiation. We are told that this Soviet commitment will alter the amount of TLE treat the Soviets are required to place in Designated Permanent Storage Sites. Is that information correct?; if so, what is the connection?

Answer. The Soviet Union explicitly agreed to limit its conventional armaments and equipment in Treaty-limited categories held by Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense, and the strategic Rocket Forces within the area of application in a Statement that it presented during an extraordinary conference convened in Vienna on June 14, 1991. Significantly, the Soviet Statement is legally binding, and not merely a political commitment. However, the Statement does not alter the number or conventional armaments that the Soviet Union is required to place in designated permanent storage sites (DPSS).

In a Statement in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on June 14, 1991, the Soviet Union also provided a number of political commitments with respect to the storage of several thousand pieces of conventional armaments and equipment located east of the Urals. Because these commitments relate to armaments and locations outside of the area of application, they do not concern designated permanent storage sites (which by definition are only located inside of the area of application.) Nonetheless, the Soviet JCG Statement mandates the Soviet Union to place in storage (albeit not DPSS) several thousand items over and above what the CFE Treaty, as signed on November 19, 1990, requires. In this sense, the storage requirements placed on the Soviet Union have been altered and increased.


Question The Treaty only recognizes three purposes for permitted on-site inspections (i.e., to monitor compliance with TLE limits, reduction obligations, and recategorization/reclassification). What about inspections simply to verify the accuracy of the data on force structure, on non-TLE items "subjects in the treaty, or on the removal of TLE from storage? In other words, why can't inspections be utilized to monitor compliance with any commitment undertaken as the result of the treaty.

Answer. The first purpose for inspections listed in Article XIV is "to verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, V, and VI." Likewise, Article XIII specifies that the provisions of the Information Exchange Protocol are "for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Treaty." Hence, verifying the accuracy of force structure data, on non-TLE items subject to the Treaty, and on the removal of TLE from storage, is all envisioned as a purpose of inspections pertaining to Article XIV. Information on all these other aspects of a State Party's conventional armed forces is germane to judgments about compliance with the numerical ceilings on certain categories of armaments.


Question The CFE Treaty calls for aerial inspections (AI) to begin upon completion of the 120-day residual level validation period. Such a regime is supposedly under discussion in the CFE In negotiation. However, we are told frequently that progress on Al is unlikely; Open Skies has priority. Is a serious effort going to be made to achieve a separate CFE aerial inspection regime? Or, will the United States abandon Al if an Open Skies agreement is achieved?

Answer. The United States has agreed with its Allies that the Open Skies negotiation currently has priority over negotiating a detailed CFE aerial inspection provision. This does not mean that CFE aerial inspection is not important or is neglected. A serious effort is being made to achieve progress on Open Skies in the near term, which could facilitate, in turn, agreement on CFE aerial inspection. CFE aerial inspection is already an obligation in the CFE Treaty, and it is neither United States nor NATO policy to abandon it.

Also bear in mind, that the CFE aerial inspection regime is not to be employed until 44 months after entry into force, the date of which remains uncertain. Thus, there remains considerable time in which to conclude an agreement on the modalities of aerial inspection.


Question In the START negotiation considerable attention is paid to the question, "when does a missile become a missile?" However, almost nothing is said in the CFE Treaty about "when a tank becomes a tank". Thus, it would appear that the Soviets could keep tank hulls in one place and tank turrets in another, and insist that neither the hulls nor the turrets should count as tanks. Similar forms of circumvention might be attempted in other categories of equipment as well; Article XIX would not seem to apply. Legally speaking, what does preclude the Soviets (or any other party) from stockpiling partially assembled components of TLE?

Answer. Article III of the Treaty provides a lethal roadblock against the stockpiling of partially assembled items of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment (TLE). Subparagraph 1(A) of Article III states that TLE in the process of manufacture, including manufacturing-related testing, are not counted under the Treaty. However, the chapeau to Article III makes it clear that this exemption is permitted only if the numbers of TLE in question are "in a manner consistent with a States Party's normal practices." Also, in order to emphasize the right of other States Parties to question abnormal practices, paragraph 2 of Article III provides that a State Party, if so requested, must explain in the Joint Consultative Group the reason for unusually high numbers of TLE notified as being in the process of manufacture. Thus, if a State Party began to stockpile partially assembled items of TLE in abnormally high numbers, that State Party could be said to be in violation of the Treaty's main counting rule set forth in Article III.


Question Is it true that the movement of units into or out of the ATTU is only reportable annually? Provided that no TLE ceiling is breached, could a U.S. armored division or air wing be moved into Germany without notifying any other arty until the following 15th of December? If the division or wing were withdrawn before the 15th of December, would there be any report required at all? Answer. No formal CFE notification would be required in advance of or in conjunction with movement of such formations into or out of the ATTU. At the same time, assuming that they were assigned to a formation in the zone, such movement's would likely change by 10 percent or more the holdings of TLE in whatever higher formation was notified pursuant to Section III of the Information Exchange Protocol. Hence, pursuant to Section VIII, subparagraph l(B), notification of such changes by 10 percent or more would have to be given within 5 days of the change. Moreover, if such movements involved permanent changes in the organizational structure of that State Party's conventional armed forces in the ATTU, notification would be required 42 days in advance. In any event, Section IX and X would require that these units' equipment be included in the aggregate reporting coincident with the annual information exchange, even if they entered and then left the ATTU during that year. If, however, equipment enters and then exits the area of application within a 7-day period, it is considered to be "in transit" and no such reporting is required.


Question How exactly would the Soviet Union (or any other party) go about inspecting U.S. facilities located in Iceland? As the inspected State, how many declared site inspections is Iceland obliged to accept as the result of the United States presence? Is Iceland also subject to one challenge inspection per year?

Answer. The Soviet Union may inspect U.S. facilities in Iceland by notifying a declared site inspection (assuming that Iceland's passive declared site inspection quota has not already been exhausted). The United States declared one object of verification (OOV) in Iceland, and that OOV is the only one in Iceland. Therefore, when paragraphs 10 and 12 of Section 11 of the Protocol on Inspection are read together, Iceland has a passive declared site inspection quota of one (1) in any particular specified time period. Iceland also is subject to one challenge inspection per year (see the Article-by-Article Analysis of paragraph 12 of Section It of the Protocol on Inspection for more details), but such inspections in Iceland must be conducted within areas other than the site at which the United States declared its OOV.


Question The parts of the Treaty that are concerned with the inspection of battle tank and ACV conversions are difficult to understand. A simple reading of the Treaty suggests that each State Party is only required to accept ten (10) conversion inspections per year, and that the inspecting states do not have to be notified of anything other than the date and time when an inspection team should arrive (if it wishes to conduct an inspection). When are the number and types of inspectable, converted TLE to be identified? How would the inspecting party know whether it was coming to validate the conversion or I tank, or 100?

Answer. When considering the issue of conversion of battle tanks and armored combat vehicles (ACVs), it is important to distinguish between notification and inspection with respect to the reduction process prior to final conversion and notification and inspection with respect to final conversion.

All items, before they may be finally converted, must be reduced in accordance with paragraphs 5 through 10 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction. These provisions require, among other things, that the State Party undertaking the conversion to: (a) notify all other States Parties of the numbers of battle tanks and ACVs it plans to convert (para. 5); (b) notify all other States Parties of its intention to carry out conversion, including the number and types of items to be converted, the starting and completion date of conversion, and the specific non-military purpose of the vehicles to emerge after conversion (para. 5); (c) carry out reduction procedures, which are similar to destruction procedures, prior to final conversion (para. 6); and accept, without the right of refusal or quota, inspection of this reduction process prior to final conversion (para. 7). Thus, the actual reduction process prior to final conversion is subject to the full array of notification and inspection procedures.

On the other hand, Section X of the Protocol on Inspection makes clear that the actual process of final conversion, in which the reduced items are then converted into non-military purpose vehicles, is not subject to inspection. Nonetheless, the State Party undertaking the final conversion is subject to up to 10 inspections per year so that states Parties may validate (i.e., confirm) that the final conversion process did result in vehicles for non-military purposes as initially notified by the converting State Party. In accordance with subparagraph 5(E) of Section X of the Inspection Protocol, a State Party must provide notification of its intention to carry out final conversion. Such notification requires only the date and time at which the inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit to conduct the "validation" inspection. However, as noted above, States Parties prior to the validation inspection already have had ample opportunity to inspect the process by which the converted items were reduced initially.


Question It is clear from the treaty text that inspectors will be permitted to inspect one object of verification (OOV) per accountable declared site inspection. The treaty also spells out what will constitute an OOV for data reporting (and OSI quota determination) purposes. Further, the treaty seems to say that each declare site will be divided into inspection sites (one per OOV) plus common areas. Is the intent here that any installation on which there is one or more OOVs will be completely inspectable (except for sensitive points and structures with small entrance way)? For example, must service support units (e.g., medical, transportation, supply, signal, etc.) be located either within the boundary of an inspectable OOV-site, or in the "common area"? Are such units inspectable even though they do not have any TLE? Are there areas on any garrison that are not part of an OOV-site or a common area? If an internal security (paramilitary) unit were located on a declared site, is it inspectable? Answer. The Inspection Protocol clearly states (Section VI, subpara. 23B), that inspection of an OOV gives the inspector access to the entire declared site except for that area belonging exclusively to another object of verification (for which an additional quota would be necessary). Hence, the "common area"-a phrase that does not appear in the Treaty-includes, by definition, all territory that does not belong exclusively to one object of verification. Thus, service support units and, for that matter, paramilitary units, would be inspectable even if they do not have any TLE, as long as they are within the boundary of the declared site.


Question The Protocol on Information Exchange requires that parties provide information on units below the level of military district (or its equivalent). What kinds of units do each of the states parties have that might be considered "above" that level? How are the TLE items in such units limited? Are non-TLE items of equipment that are "subject to the treaty" (e.g., combat support helicopters) reportable if they are held by units above division level? Are there any internal security units that would be exempt from a TLE reporting requirement due to their level of subordination? Other than converted APCs, are there any TLE items in strategic rocket forces (or strategic air forces) that are in any way exempt from CFE reporting requirements?

Answer. An example of a level of organization above a military district or its equivalent would be the Ministry of Defense or other national-level organization to which military districts belong for administrative purposes. TLE in units below the level of Military District would be reported in aggregate at each level at which they are held. Hence, TLE-as well as equipment subject to the Treaty-held by a military district or equivalent or higher formation are reported for that formation as well as with the appropriate subordinate elements if those subordinate units and formations are notified. In other words, there is no "top" to the level of aggregation. As for internal security units with TLE, all formations down to the level of separately-located or independent battalions are reportable, and there is no "top" to that level of aggregation. The Strategic Rocket Forces hold APC8, but these, given their use for internal security purposes, have been exempted from Treaty ceilings. The number of these APCS, nevertheless, is capped at current levels (1701) and no other equipment in Treaty-limited categories can be assigned to SRF. There is no requirement that SRF APCs be "converted."

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