chapter 7 -- Reduction Years

DECLARED SITE AND CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS CONTINUE

Declared site and challenge inspections continued through the reduction years, although the incidence of those inspections was not as frequent. The treaty obliged nations to receive declared site inspections based on 10 percent of their declared OOVs during each reduction year. By contrast, the baseline period inspection rate had been 20 percent over only 120 days.

OSIA inspectors conducted 16 declared site inspections and two challenge inspections during the first reduction year, November 1992 through November 1993. During that period, team chiefs declared four ambiguities, site access being the common thread in all four. The first ambiguity occurred in Belarus at Marina Gorka, where Team Fiser inspected the 30th Independent Mechanized Brigade. On April 1, 1993, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, received a site diagram excluding areas of the military facility. The Belarus escort team denied the American team access to areas that were within the military facility but not on the site map. Fiser declared an ambiguity and completed his inspection of 240 pieces of TLE and 96 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST).¹²

Former Major, now Lt. Colonel Keith A. Oatman, USA, also declared an ambiguity when he led an inspection team at Baranovichi, Belarus, on November 9, 1993. He received the site diagram for the 28th Weapon Combat Vehicle Storage Base, which excluded areas believed to belong to two colocated missile brigades. The Belarussians had not declared the colocated brigades a sensitive point, nor had they declared them OOVs. Lt. Colonel Oatman requested access to these areas but the Belarus escorts denied the request. As was the case in Marina Gorka, Belarussian officials stated that it was the exclusive right of the inspected state to determine the boundaries of its OOVs and declared sites. Lt. Colonel Oatman disagreed, cited the treaty definition of a declared site, noted the ambiguity, and continued his inspection of 254 pieces of TLE and 57 pieces of other treaty-reportable equipment.¹³

A Belarussian site diagram is displayed during a German-led inspection.

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, declared an ambiguity in Ukraine on May 4, 1993, while inspecting Ukrainian army forces at Khmelnitskiy. Lt. Colonel Gessert announced the 15th Mechanized Brigade as the OOV for inspection. During the inspection, Ukrainian escorts denied Gessert's team access to three of the 15th's four subordinate battalions on the site. Lt. Colonel Gessert declared an ambiguity and completed the inspection.¹⁴

On July 14, 1993, Major Ronald M. Tait, USAF, and his team of CFE inspectors arrived at Praslavice, in the Czech Republic. Before inspecting the 33rd Tank Regiment, he received a site diagram that depicted the OOV as being the entire declared site; it did not include any other area of the military facility. The Czech position was similar to the early Russian position during mock inspections and baseline. A fence around the OOV delineated the boundary of the declared site, and any other fences beyond that fence served a different purpose. The American team chief noted the ambiguity and finished the inspection.¹⁵

The number of declared site and challenge inspections held steady during the second reduction year. OSIA teams conducted 17 inspections, 14 declared site inspections, and 3 challenge inspections. One of those inspections, led by Lt. Colonel Fiser, offered a unique opportunity for a U.S. CFE inspection team. On April 5, 1994, Fiser's team conducted a challenge inspection of a specified area at Arkhangelsk, Russia. What made the inspection unusual was the coastal defense and naval aviation forces stationed within the specified area: As naval forces they were not subject to declared site inspections because they were not OOVs; they were, however, open to a challenge inspection.

During the second reduction year, U.S. teams declared only two ambiguities. Team Tait declared the first on February 1, 1994, at Slutsk, Belarus, when Belarussian escorts once again cited a nation's exclusive right to determine the borders of an OOV. The other ambiguity arose on August 22, 1994, when Lt. Colonel Kirk E. Murray, USA, led his team to Odessa, Ukraine. Ukrainian escorts limited access, citing the same rationale that Belarussian escorts had espoused.¹⁶

American inspection teams conducted 15 declared site inspections and one challenge inspection during the third reduction year. Lt. Colonel James Jubilee, USAF, documented the only ambiguity during these inspections at Stryy, Ukraine. On March 22, 1995, Team Jubilee inspected the 10th Aviation Base and was denied access to a storage area that was within the outermost fenced area of the base. The Ukrainian site diagram, however, indicated that the declared site stopped at a wire fence that was short of the storage area. The escort team chief enforced the declared site as depicted in the site diagram.

During the reduction years, many OSIA inspectors left the European Operations Command for retirement, change of duty within the agency, or a change of assignment away from OSIA. To offset these losses, new personnel arrived and trained to meet the standards required of OSIA inspectors. Despite this turnover, U.S. inspection teams continued their operations successfully, inspecting 6 specified areas and conducting 45 declared site inspections through the third reduction year.

Naval forces were not OOVs...however, they were open to a challenge inspection.