| Reduction notifications
included quantities and type of equipment.
Polish technicians presented disassembled, stacked TLE for opening a reduction inspection. |
Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher,
II, USA, Chief of the Inspection and Escort Branch at
OSIA's European Operations Command, led a three-day
reduction inspection of Dabrowa Gornicza, Poland. Team
Gallagher arrived at the site on October 26, 1992, and
remained there until October 29-from opening to closing
of the reduction. Lt. Colonel Gallagher declared the
first U.S. ambiguity of a reduction inspection because
"the 43 T-55 main battle tanks were not presented as
complete assemblies." Gallagher's comments reflected
the U.S. position that "complete assembly"
meant an assembled piece of TLE. Inspectors could not
determine whether the disassembled parts on the site came
from TLE or from a collection of spare parts. The Poles
responded that disassembling some tank components and
stacking them allowed for more efficient transportation.
They added that separating components improved the
results of the smashing destruction method. Despite the
ambiguity, Gallagher's team recorded component serial
numbers and observed the smashing of tanks for three
days, confirming that the Poles had reduced all 43 tanks.
Later in the reduction year, Poland changed its
presentation practice and presented assembled TLE. On two other reduction inspections Lt. Colonel Gallagher encountered circumstances that warranted notation on inspection reports-one was only a comment, the other an ambiguity. On March 17, 1993, Gallagher led an opening reduction inspection team at Szabadszallas, Hungary. During the inspection, the team recorded the serial numbers of 53 items of TLE scheduled for destruction by severing. The 18 T-34 tanks presented for reduction did not have breech blocks. The escort team, however, provided documentation indicating that technicians had destroyed 86 breech blocks at the Csepel Iron Works on July 19, 1989, prior to treaty signature. Gallagher accepted the explanation and ended the American inspection after recording a comment describing the situation in the inspection report. |
| Lt. Colonel Gallagher recorded an
ambiguity during an opening inspection at the Military
Repair Works in Trencin, in the Slovak Republic, on
November 24, 1993. In this case, technicians presented 38
OT-62 APCs for reduction by severing, but 10 did not have
machine gun turrets. Gallagher cited the treaty's
provisions for presenting a complete assembly. The Slovak
escort team chief responded that the OT-62 was also
produced in an "A" model and that only the A
model had a turret. Gallagher countered that the
exchanged data photos for the OT-62 showed a turret. The
inspection concluded after Team Gallagher confirmed the
destruction of three APCs to include two of the APCs that
did not have turrets, leaving the rest for a future
closing inspection. The JCG later approved a new piece of
TLE, "OT-62, without turret."9 Major Marc C. Lieber, USMC, also encountered problems at Trencin, a reduction site used jointly by the Czech and Slovak Republics, involving turrets on APCs during his team's opening inspection on September 1, 1993. In recording serial numbers for 50 OT-64 APCs, Major Lieber noted that six of the units were actually OT-64A models that had no turrets. The data exchange photos indicated that they should have turrets. Czech escorts responded that technicians had removed the turrets prior to treaty signature as part of a modification program for BMP-1 armored infantry fighting vehicles.10 Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, USAF, declared the last of four ambiguities. During his opening reduction inspection on March 30, 1994, at Novy Jicin, in the Czech Republic, he cited the requirement for complete assembly when presenting TLE for destruction. Czech technicians had already disassembled 15 T-55 tanks and had begun disassembly on 14 other tanks. The required components were present and colocated, but not assembled. The Czechs, like the Poles, responded that all components were available in one place and that complete assemblies were on hand but not assembled.11 All in all, during the 110 reduction missions, U.S. team chiefs declared only four ambiguities, all of which dealt with the standards of presentation. |
EASTERN INSPECTIONSOne U.S. mission highlighted a problem that other NATO reduction inspection teams had encountered earlier. Major Henry T. Storey, USA, led a multinational reduction inspection team to Trencin, in the Slovak Republic. He intended to conduct a closing inspection of 50 OT-64s. However, upon arrival, he learned that a Hungarian team had already inspected and confirmed the reduction of 44 of the APCs nine days earlier, on September 28, 1993. The NATO team had no definite proof that the Slovaks had reduced the equipment. This situation had cropped up several times earlier in the reduction period. NATO state inspection teams were unable to confirm the reduction of TLE because Eastern teams had already inspected and confirmed the reductions. The inspected nations had scrapped the destroyed TLE. This presented a problem because the treaty does not prohibit intra-group reduction inspections, nor does it place quotas or limits on reduction inspections. Some of the Eastern states in the post-Cold War era were just as interested in the military capabilities and holdings of neighboring states as they were of most of the NATO states. These inspections, however, ran counter to what the NATO states viewed as a basic tenet of the treaty, that each group of states would complete its reduction obligations within 40 months and that members of the opposite group of states could confirm all reductions. The NATO states, however, could not verify all reductions when Eastern states conducted reduction inspections within their group of states. |
| NATO allies were concerned about
lost inspection opportunities because Eastern nations
were conducting reduction and declared site inspections
within their group of states. In an attempt to curtail
these East-on-East inspections, the VCC sponsored a
meeting of all CFE states in January 1993 to discuss the
intra-group inspections and to propose a plan for
Cooperation Partners. Under this plan, the VCC would
continue to schedule CFE inspections for the NATO states
but, based on requests from Cooperation Partners for
specific inspections, the VCC would also coordinate the
placement of Eastern inspectors on Western-led teams.
NATO states would open slots on their inspection teams
for Eastern inspectors in return for their cooperation in
not leading inspections within their group of states.
This would allow the NATO states to conduct as many
inspections as possible, while providing the Eastern
states with inspection opportunities without the expense
of leading an inspection. The NATO states also agreed to
share all reduction inspection data maintained in a
database known as VERITY. In addition to leading reduction inspection teams, individual U.S. inspectors, known as "singletons," participated in reduction inspections led by other NATO nations. This allowed U.S. inspectors to participate in approximately 70 percent of the reduction inspections. Their participation in these inspections provided the U.S. government a presence and firsthand view of the majority of the reduction inspections. |
 Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, USAF, confirms serial numbers read by Senior Master Sergeant David Schmitz during a reduction inspection. |
