Chapter 6 -- CFE Treaty Baseline

U.S. BASELINE REDUCTION INSPECTIONS

Under the CFE Treaty, reduction inspections provided the primary means to determine that nations were meeting their obligations to reduce TLE. Western reduction inspection teams were usually multinational, and team leadership varied from mission to mission. The NATO VCC designated which nation would lead reduction inspection teams for the group of 16 states. Rotating team leadership spread the burden of the expense and the difficulty of providing transportation, billeting, and meals associated with the inspection effort. Many nations, however, declined the opportunity to lead reduction teams during baseline, largely because of the cost.

Initially, the Eastern states reduced small sets of equipment over a 30-day period, causing Western inspection teams to deploy frequently. Colonel Smith suggested that the VCC consider decreasing the size of reduction inspection teams to reduce costs. While other nations declined leading reduction inspection teams, the U.S. government's policy dictated that at least one U.S. representative would participate on any reduction mission and that the United States would accept the lead on a mission whenever the VCC offered it. Colonel Smith also recommended that nations lengthen their reduction periods to the allowable 90 days and increase the amount of equipment for reduction, thereby decreasing the number of reduction inspections. During the baseline period, U.S. inspectors led 5 of the 23 NATO alliance reduction inspection teams and participated in 12 others.

The first U.S.-led mission was in Germany.³⁷ Lt. Colonel John D. Pesterfield, USAF, led the first U.S. reduction team to the Capital Repair Plant at Wuensdorf, Germany, on August 6, 1992. Team Pesterfield was composed of five Americans, an Italian, a Belgian, a Canadian, and an inspector from the United Kingdom. While conducting an opening inspection, the team checked and recorded the serial numbers of the 100 ACVs to be reduced over the next 30 days. The team also watched and confirmed the destruction of two ACVs--a BMP-1 and a BTR-60. Lt. Colonel Pesterfield signed the inspection report on August 8th, indicating that his team had confirmed the destruction of two ACVs and recorded the serial numbers of those yet to be destroyed. Team Pesterfield's data were available to the governments involved in the inspection and were submitted to NATO's VCC.

The VCC maintained the information for subsequent use by the closure inspection team that would return to Wuensdorf to confirm the reduction of the remaining 98 pieces of equipment. The Wuensdorf reduction period highlighted the VCC's critical role in scheduling and data collection for reduction missions. The United States did not lead the follow-up team, but that team prepared for the mission based on the information provided by the VCC. During the baseline period, OSIA inspectors led four other reduction inspections, two to Ukraine, one to Poland, and one to Bulgaria. All five reduction inspections were successful multinational efforts and provided evidence that nations were satisfying the treaty's central objective: reducing military hardware in Central Europe.³⁸

At least one U.S. representative would participate on any reduction mission, and the United States would accept the lead whenever offered.

Spanish and Danish inspectors on a multinational reduction inspection team.

Bulgarian escorts stand on a treaty-limited tank converted for static display.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

American inspection teams encountered various difficulties during the CFE baseline. The major problems that arose concerned the definition of a declared site and the resulting difficulties with inspector access. As the baseline ended, however, Western states held a cautious optimism that Russia had resolved these problems. Ukraine and Belarus, however, offered no indication of changing their restrictive approach to the definition of a declared site. The issue of U.S. armored ambulances versus M-113 APCs also remained unresolved. Communications provided the most frequent operational problems that OSIA teams confronted.

During the early stages of baseline, OSIA European Operations occasionally had to modify notification messages because aircrew identification was inaccurate or because treaty-required data had to be changed. European Operations had no control over aircrew identification information, which was the responsibility of the aircrews' wing. In fact, EO could not confirm aircrew data until the crews arrived in Frankfurt. Colonel Smith recognized that late changes to inspection notification messages were an irritant to State Department communications specialists. Yet, he took exception to their insistence that no changes could be made after the initial message submission. On three occasions during July-August 1992, State Department representatives balked at transmitting late message changes. The problem was simple to state, but difficult to resolve. On the one hand, Colonel Smith had to provide mandatory treaty information about the inspections to the treaty states. On the other hand, the State Department had to transmit accurate, standardized message data to foreign nations through the American embassies. When operational pressures created requirements for changing the data, network standards resisted any changes. Friction resulted. The problem was resolved over time by closer coordination on the mandatory CFE Treaty data requirements and by better advance mission planning. By the end of the baseline period, communicating messages over the State Department network had improved considerably.

Another communications problem stemmed from host nations' providing late announcements that they had received intent-to-inspect messages, and sometimes that information came only through informal channels. This problem continued throughout the baseline period. As late as November 12, 1992, 118 days into baseline, Greece notified the United States of a Hungarian inspection that had started two days earlier. In this case, an American LNO was not in place to protect U.S. interests.³⁹ Late notifications frequently put U.S. liaison teams in the position of catching up with inspection teams. These notification problems, coupled with some nations' practice of keeping U.S. liaison teams at a distance, made it difficult for LNOs to gather information and be certain that all U.S. interests were protected during inspections.

The strict "letter of the law" approach to treaty implementation taken by OSIA teams periodically strained working relations, especially when U.S. methods were compared with the "spirit of the law" approach taken by other nations. As directed by the National Security Council, OSIA teams implemented the treaty without deviation. American army field commanders complained to Headquarters USAREUR that OSIA team chiefs were too rigid in their interpretation of treaty timeline requirements; that OSIA team chiefs would not allow time requirements to be relaxed so that inspection could begin in the morning instead of late at night. This would prevent calling civilians into work on overtime and keeping military personnel on duty for lengthy periods. Field commanders pointed out that other nations took a much more casual approach to treaty implementation.

...the "letter of the law" compared with the "spirit of the law"...

"The main goal of the treaty had been accomplished by signing the treaty, and the inspections were merely a formality."

-- Bulgarian Inspector

General Parker "would not apologize for OSIA standards of inspection."

Similarly, Eastern inspectors expressed displeasure that OSIA teams arrived late at night or on weekends, causing difficulties with their work force.⁴⁰ What was not known to Eastern escort teams was the VCC scheduling of inspections and the NATO-imposed three-day inspection time block. When U.S. teams deployed, they had little choice but to execute their plan. An Eastern escort team might have been willing to allow an American team to relax time requirements; however, by agreeing, the American team might have prevented another team, U.S. or allied, from conducting a planned inspection several hours later. The 120-day baseline was a relatively short period in which to complete numerous inspections, and there were bound to be inconveniences associated with any large-scale effort. Illustrative of many states' outlook was a Bulgarian inspector's comment during an inspection in Belgium: "The main goal of the treaty had been accomplished by signing the treaty, and the inspections were merely a formality."⁴¹

Many inspectors from nations in both groups of states cited the "spirit of the treaty" as a guide for implementation. The U.S. experience during INF Treaty implementation, however, indicated that participants adhering strictly to treaty requirements had little doubt concerning their own or their counterparts' responsibilities and rights. OSIA's Director, Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, expressed that view in a letter to USAREUR's Major General Joseph T. Davies, USA, on the issue of inspection teams' late arrivals and briefings at U.S. facilities. Parker pointed out that host state escort teams, not OSIA liaison or escort teams, delivered inspection teams to a site following treaty guidelines. Once at the site, the U.S. government had specific treaty obligations to fulfill. General Parker stated categorically that he "would not apologize for OSIA standards of inspection." He said that OSIA inspectors followed the treaty strictly so that there would be no doubt as to what the requirements were and so that those requirements would be fulfilled. He asserted that in this way everyone's rights were being protected.

Despite communication and perception problems, OSIA inspectors, escorts, and LNOs succeeded in fulfilling their responsibilities and protecting the rights of the United States as outlined in the CFE Treaty. Problems that arose during inspections were discussed and handled in a professional manner by OSIA team members and their counterparts. Even in situations that resulted in declarations of ambiguities, inspection and escort teams maintained an "operational" atmosphere, leaving resolution of problems to their governments.

During baseline, OSIA inspection teams traveled 33 times into Eastern nations to conduct 44 inspections. On one other occasion a team traveled to Moscow only to reschedule the mission because of poor weather conditions at the inspection site. The U.S. completed 98 percent of the 45 missions available to it. Meanwhile, Eastern teams completed only 66 percent of the 34 inspections available to them at U.S. declared sites. OSIA escort teams responded to 9 Eastern inspection missions to 23 inspection sites.