Chapter 2 -- Initial Preparations

There were other changes as well. Perhaps the most decisive change came in the projected number of CFE Treaty baseline inspections that the U.S. would conduct. American planners anticipated that the level of inspection activity would be at its zenith during baseline, the treaty's first 120 days. This assumption was decisive in determining manning authorizations. Two factors affected all U.S. projections for baseline inspections: the number of inspections to be conducted by the NATO states, and the United States' portion of the NATO inspections.

During October-November 1990, the number of inspections to be conducted by the NATO states decreased significantly from previous projections. Two events contributed: Germany's unification in October 1990, and the Soviet Union's first official treaty data exchange. In the first event, East Germany's CFE Treaty sites-the designated military bases, depots, and installations-became German sites. NATO allies had agreed that there would be no inspections within the alliance. Further, the NATO states agreed that following unification, only Germany would inspect Soviet forces still stationed on the territory of the former East Germany.¹⁴^.

Dual-qualified OSIA teams -- Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an escort team in Germany.

Dual-qualified OSIA teams -- Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an inspection team in Romania.

NATO states agreed that there would be no inspections within the alliance.

Second, there was a decrease in the total of Soviet CFE Treaty objects of verification (OOVs). At treaty signature, the Soviet Union exchanged data that indicated one-third fewer OOVs subject to inspection than their senior representatives had disclosed during treaty negotiations.¹⁵This was a major surprise for the NATO states despite the fact that in the two months before treaty signature, satellite reconnaissance had revealed that the Soviet Army was moving thousands of pieces of equipment out of Central Europe to areas east of the Ural Mountains.¹⁶Since the treaty was not yet signed, these large-scale redeployments were legal, but they raised questions of treaty circumvention. In addition to having substantially fewer forces and equipment in the treaty zones and flanks, the Soviet High Command had reassigned some forces to naval infantry and coastal defense units. The Soviets interpreted the treaty as not applicable to naval forces, including naval infantry. The Soviet position followed that there was no obligation to report naval forces as inspectable units under the CFE Treaty. Treaty experts would wrestle over these Soviet issues for months following treaty signature.¹⁷In fact, these issues became so contentious that they delayed ratification. The more immediate issue for OSIA, however, was how to revise manning projections. In order to identify, train, and relocate people to Europe, it was vital to know how many inspectors, escorts, and support personnel would be needed. Clearly, the number of inspections available to the NATO states had decreased; but so too had the United States' proportion of those inspections.¹⁸

The treaty did not address the allocation of inspection quotas within each group of states-that process rested with each group. Under the CFE Treaty, each Eastern group state was subject to a specific number of inspections per treaty period.* The allocation of inspections among the NATO allies was a give-and-take process. A Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) handled this allocation process at Headquarters NATO. The VCC was a new organization, established in 1990 specifically to coordinate the alliance's implementation of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document.¹⁹Initial U.S. planning had American inspection teams conducting at least 20 percent, and perhaps as many as 50 percent, of all the CFE baseline inspections available to the NATO states. This estimate proved too high because most of the other NATO nations asserted their treaty rights to conduct CFE inspections. After considerable internal discussion among the NATO nations and within NATO's VCC and its staff to determine a fair share of the inspections, the committee allotted the United States 18 percent of NATO's active inspection quota for the CFE baseline period.²⁰As a consequence of the decrease in the total number of inspections to be conducted by the NATO states and the decrease in the United States' portion of NATO's baseline inspection quota, the United States reduced its projections for conducting inspections from an estimated 60-150 to approximately 44-45 inspections. This new figure proved to be quite accurate.²¹

^*^{Under the CFE Treaty,
there were four treaty periods: baseline, reduction,
residual level validation, and residual}

As discussed in the next chapter, Ratification Delayed, the Soviet movement of TLE east of the Urals and its reassignment of forces to the naval infantry seriously threatened treaty ratification and entry into force. Resolution of these issues required seven months of negotiation before a political-military-diplomatic solution emerged that addressed the other parties' apprehensions. In the interim, OSIA's European Operations Command had to redefine its manpower requirements based on the projected figure of 44-45 baseline inspections. Ultimately, the command was authorized 112 people to conduct the CFE Treaty's baseline period. This authorization specified 15 team chiefs and deputies, 18 linguists, 14 weapons specialists, and 65 other personnel responsible for planning, communications, logistics, transportation, command and control, and administration. From this number, the United States would man, equip, and train seven complete CFE Treaty inspection teams and one partial team.²²

The VCC coordinated the NATO alliance's implementation of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document.