Approval Date:

21 Aug 91



                         (NO. NBC 1.13)

1.  Defense Planning Guidance Element.  This Mission Need Statement (MNS) responds to two of the four foundations of National Defense Policy:  Forward Presence and Crisis Response.  The capability to conduct sustained operations in a chemical environment, and to detect radiological, biological, and chemical hazards and warn personnel is documented in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan (MMP) of 28 June 1991 in capabilities #2 and #24.  This requirement is a result of lessons learned from operations in Southwest Asia, and the Secretary of Defense identifying chemical warfare detection as a Department of Defense development and fielding priority (House Armed Services Committee hearing of 16 April 1991).  

2.  Mission and Threat Analyses.  MAGTFs must be capable of fighting across the spectrum of conflict.  With the spread of offensive chemical/biological capabilities throughout the world, MAGTFs must be prepared to operate and fight in this type of environment.  The capability to precisely define actual and potential hazard areas is required.

     a.  Mission

         (1) The Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) will be issued to the Fleet Marine Force's (FMF) Division, Wing, and Force Service Group (FSSG).  These elements of the MAGTF will use the NBCRS to provide their units with accurate, rapid NBC combat hazard information by verifying the absence of, finding, mapping, and marking radiological, biological, and chemical hazards in support of operations ashore.  The NBCRS will be employed, operated, and maintained by NBC personnel (MOS 57XX) and maintenance personnel (MOS 2147/35XX/ 2811) in support of the MAGTF commander's collection plan.  

         (2) The required initial operational capability is FY97 and the desired full operational capability is FY99.  This MNS responds to the number one deficiency cited in the July 1991 Marine Corps Mission Area Analysis (MAA) of Mission Area (MA) 33 (Assault Support), number three deficiency cited in the July 1991 MAA of MA 23 (Close Combat), and number thirteen deficiency cited in the January, 1992 MAA of MA 22 (Ground Tactical Mobility and Countermobility).  Because NBC is considered an environment which all Marines must be capable of accomplishing their mission, this requirement pertains to all Mission Areas.

         (3) Currently we employ the German FUCHS vehicle to provide this capability.  The German FUCHS has the following deficiencies:                                      

             (a) It is not equipped with a remote sensing (stand-off) capability.

             (b) It cannot provide early warning of windborne hazards and ground contaminants before a supported unit enters a NBC contaminated area.  

             (c) The vehicle's gross weight (19.2 tons) means the vehicle cannot be lifted by CH-53E, and standard cube (almost 2,000 cubic feet) strains the already limited strategic lift resources of a MAGTF.  

             (d) It lacks the capability to locate, or verify the absence of, NBC contaminants at speeds equivalent to the capabilities of USMC ground maneuver elements.

             (e) Lastly, because present systems are foreign produced, maintenance support is quite difficult.
     b.  Threat.  Although signatories to various conventions banning nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare, several third world countries continue to develop, test, and evaluate nuclear weapons and chemical/biological warfare agents, and the means to disseminate them.  The spread of these weapons (and the industrial capability for manufacture) to third world nations, coupled with the potential for U.S. involvement in these areas in an operational or support capacity, raises the probability that the MAGTF may encounter nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons anywhere in the world.  Regardless of an enemy's use of such weapons, the MAGTF may be tasked with the primary mission of finding and destroying such weapons and the means of their production.  Potential NBC threats that U.S. forces could confront are noted in "An Assessment of Global Confirmed and Suspected Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs" (WSSIC 91-1004 CX); "Biological Warfare Capabilities-Warsaw Pact", Mar 90, Defense Intelligence Agency (DST160S-123-890); and "Biological Warfare Capabilities of the Middle East", Defense Intelligence Agency (DST16102-128-890).

3.  Nonmateriel Alternatives.  There are no known nonmateriel alternatives for a NBC Reconnaissance System capable of detecting and warning personnel of the presence, or verifying the absence of chemical or biological contamination while on the move.  

4.  Potential Materiel Alternatives

    a.  Conduct a product improvement program of the German FUCHS vehicles.

    b.  Participate in the U.S. Army's research and development efforts using a Light Assault Vehicle (LAV) variant.

    c.  The Marine Corps continue with its developmental efforts of the LAV/High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) NBCRS variants.

5.  Constraints

     a.  Mobility and Transportation.  The NBCRS will be transportable as a minimum by C-130 aircraft; lift by CH-53E is required.  It will meet the restraint criteria specified in MIL-A-8421F.  It must have lifting and tie-down provisions per MIL STD 209.  It must be water transportable by the LCAV-30 and all larger water vessels.  The NBCRS must be rail transported and will meet the dimensional requirements of the Gabarit International De Chargement (GIC) rail clearance diagram.

     b.  Manpower.  The NBCRS will require a crew of three Marines for operation, which may require a redistribution in force structure of occupational field 5700.  Support manpower requirements will be determined upon final system configuration selection.

     c.  Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability.  The preliminary System Readiness Objective desired is an operational availability of 0.94.

         (1) Logistics.  The NBCRS must be supportable within the existing DoN three-level maintenance concept (Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot) using common tools and general purpose test equipment (GPTE).

         (2) Tools for operator maintenance must be furnished with the system.

     d.  Operational Environment

         (1) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC).  The NBCRS will be capable of being operated by a crew in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level IV.

         (2) The NBCRS will be capable of operating at night, in adverse weather conditions, and during periods of reduced visibility.

     e.  Performance Characteristics

         (1) The NBCRS shall be NBC contamination survivable, and decontaminable with existing decontaminants.

         (2) The NBCRS will be a vehicle mounted integration of advanced NBC detection and analysis equipment suited for MAGTF expeditionary operations.  It will include automated features for hazard sampling, meteorological data collection, detection, warning and reporting, and marking of hazard areas.  
The NBCRS will include the following components:

         (3) A chemical warfare agent munitions detection/identification/warning system capable of vehicle-mounted or dismounted operation.

         (4) A stand-off chemical agent detector capable of vehicle mounted or dismounted operation.

         (5) A hand-held radiacmeter capable of vehicle mounted or dismounted operatons, capable of radiation monitoring (accumulated total dose and dose rate) that is tied into an onboard warning and reporting system.

         (6) A Marine Corps navigation system.

         (7) A sampling system.

         (8) An area marking system.

         (9) A collective protection system.

         (10) Communication systems compatible with Marine Corps systems.
         (11) A Marine Corps standard host vehicle.

         (12) A meteorological system.

         (13) A Marine Corps standard tactical data processing unit.
         (14) Night vision capability.

         (15) The NBCRS must be capable of locating, or verifying the absence of, NBC contaminants with both stand-off and immediate area detectors, at vehicle speeds equivalent to the LAV.

         (16) It is desired that the NBCRS be capable of swimming with speed, ingress/egress and control capabilities necessary to negotiate streams, rivers, etc., (similar to that of the LAV) in all applicable geographical locations.       

         (17) The NBCRS must have the capability to mount a direct fire automatic weapon system for crew security/protection.