IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE for DOE ORDER 452.2A, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS

INDEX

DOE G 452.2A-1A

1-17-97

IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE

for

DOE ORDER 452.2A,

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

U.S. Department of Energy

DISTRIBUTION INITIATED BY:
All Department Elements Office of Defense ProgramsDOE G 452.2A-1A i
1-17-97
CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
a. Authorization and Applicability . . . . . . . . 1
b. General Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
a. Configuration Management. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(1) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(2) CM Program Elements. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(3) Applicable Standards . . . . . . . . . . . 5
(4) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
b. Issues Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
(1) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
(2) Corrective Action and Commitment Tracking. 6
(3) Applicable Standards . . . . . . . . . . . 7
(4) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
c. Occurrence Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
(1) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
(2) Emergency Occurrences. . . . . . . . . . . 7
(3) Unusual Occurrences. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
(4) Off-Normal Occurrences . . . . . . . . . . 8
(5) Applicable Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(6) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
d. Performance Indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
(1) Use of Performance Indicators. . . . . . . 9
(2) Addition or Deletion of Performance Indicators 10
(3) Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 10
(4) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
e. Safety Analysis - Facility/Operations Interfaces 10
(1) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
(2) Facility SAR Content . . . . . . . . . . . 11
(3) Operation-Specific HAR Content . . . . . . 13
(4) Safety Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(5) Safety Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
(6) Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 17
(7) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
f. Process Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(1) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
(2) Tooling and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . 19
(3) People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
(4) Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
(5) Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
(6) Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 22
(7) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
ii DOE G 452.2A-1A
1-17-97

CONTENTS (continued)

g. Internal Safety Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
(1) Internal Safety Review Program . . . . . . 23
(2) Applicable Standards . . . . . . . . . . . 24
(3) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
h. Readiness Reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
(1) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
(2) Essential Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 25
(3) Additional Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . 26
(4) Additional Considerations for Nuclear Explosive
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
(5) Applicable Orders and Standards. . . . . . 27
(6) References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271. INTRODUCTION.

a. Authorization and Applicability.

(1) This Department of Energy (DOE) Implementation Guide for use with
DOE O 452.2A is approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Military Application and Stockpile Management. It is applicable to DOE
components and contractors responsible for nuclear explosive operations
and associated activities and facilities.

(2) Implementation Guides are used to identify government and non-
government standards for implementing the Department's requirements.
Applicable DOE directives are included as a list following each section of
this Guide. In addition, each section includes a list of references, which
provide other sources of information.

(3) Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any
pertinent data that may improve this document should be sent to:

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application
and Stockpile Management
Office of Weapons Surety
(DP-21, GTN)
U.S. Department of Energy
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, MD 20874-1290
Phone: (301) 903-3463
Fax: (301) 903-8628

(4) DOE Implementation Guides are part of the DOE directives system and
are issued to provide supplemental information regarding the
Department's requirements as contained in Rules, Orders, Notices, and
Regulatory Standards. Implementation Guides may also provide methods
for implementing these requirements. Implementation Guides are not
substitutes for requirements, nor do they replace Technical Standards that
are used to describe established practices and procedures that implement
requirements.

(5) This Implementation Guide addresses some of the safety programs
discussed in DOE O 452.2A. Other programs are addressed in other DOE
Orders, Standards, and Guides, as referenced in DOE O 452.2A. Except
as mandated by a regulation, contract, or administrative means, the
provisions in this Implementation Guide are DOE's views concerning
acceptable methods of program implementation and are not mandatory.

(6) Where appropriate, the scope and depth of the application of the methods
and guidelines in this Guide are to be determined by the use of a graded
approach. The level of rigor necessary to meet the requirements should be
based on grading factors, such as the relative importance to safety and the
magnitude of hazards involved. The graded approach shall not be used to
obtain relief from requirements.

b. General Information.

(1) Many safety programs prescribed for DOE nuclear facilities have
application to nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
facilities. For some of these programs, the existing standards and
guidelines for nuclear facilities are sufficient; these documents are
identified in DOE O 452.2A. For other programs, DOE standards specific
to nuclear explosive operations provide the necessary standards and
guidelines. This Guide does not duplicate any existing material, but
provides additional guidance for implementing DOE O 452.2A.

(2) The following general hazard types may be present.

(a) Nuclear explosive.

(b) High explosive.

(d) High-pressure vessels, with and without radioactive gases.

(e) Criticality.

(f) Occupational hazards (industrial, radiological, and chemical).

(3) Implementation of requirements to prevent or mitigate one hazard shall
ensure that the likelihood of a safety significant incident involving another
hazard is not increased. If any such instance is identified, alternative
methods should be investigated to attempt to implement the requirement
without increasing the risk associated with other hazards. Requirements
that are not fully implemented because doing so would increase the
overall risk of the operation will be identified and documented in the
Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the facility or the Hazard Analysis
Report (HAR) for the operation.

(4) Guidelines, best management practices, or other implementation guidance
that is not mandatory will be similarly treated, but justification for not
incorporating non-mandatory guidance need not be documented in the
SAR or HAR.

(5) Several references are being revised at this time. Until such time as all
contractual documentation is adjusted to reflect changes in the DOE
directives system, implementation plans should include the most current
applicable directive(s) and an assessment of the possible impact of
anticipated changes from the specific reference used. When the word "or"
is used, several references may apply; when the word "and" is used, the
intent is that all references apply.

2. PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES.

a. Configuration Management.

(1) Introduction. DOE O 452.2A requires design laboratories and operating
contractors to develop and implement a configuration management (CM)
program for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
facilities. The purpose of the CM program is to establish and maintain
consistency among design requirements, physical configuration,
processes, and documentation.

(2) CM Program Elements.

(a) The CM program for nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities should be coordinated with the facility CM program.
The facility CM program may address CM activities for nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities rather than establish
separate CM program plans. The CM program plan should serve
as an integrating document, identifying where specific elements of
the program are addressed. DOE-STD-1073-93, should be used in
developing the CM program and in preparing the CM plans. As a
minimum, the CM program plan should include the following
elements.

1 Program management.

2 Design requirements.

3 Document control.

4 Change control.

5 Assessments.

(b) General CM program elements for nuclear explosive operations
and associated activities and facilities should include measures to
do the following.

1 Control the physical configuration of the equipment and
systems so they are consistent with design requirements,
documentation, and the safety basis.

2 Ensure that only proper, authorized equipment is used.

3 Review proposed changes to facilities, equipment, and
operations in accordance with an approved change control
process that identifies revisions in safety documentation.

4 Incorporate approved changes into all affected documents
(such as design documents and procedures) and programs
(such as the maintenance and training programs).

(c) DOE-STD-1073-93 provides acceptable methods and practices for
implementing CM and also provides guidance on applying the
graded approach.

(d) A unique consideration for nuclear explosive operations is to
ensure that all proposed changes are reviewed for potential impact
on nuclear explosive safety. In addition to changes to obvious
items, such as tooling and the operating procedures, the change
control process must also capture changes that are not obviously
related to nuclear explosive safety but may have an adverse
impact. Examples include changes to facility support systems,
security procedures, and personnel training programs. CM
program plans should specify responsibilities for reviewing
proposed changes.

(e) CM controls for tooling and equipment should include the
following.

1 Applicable controls specified by the criteria of paragraph
(c) of 10 CFR Part 830.120.

2 Interfaces between CM controls for tooling and equipment
and those for the facility.

3 Documentation and control of authorized tooling and
equipment; a formal layout scheme can facilitate these
controls.

4 Uniquely marked tooling and equipment.

5 Positive identification of tooling and equipment in a
calibration/performance testing control program.

(3) Applicable Standards.

DOE-STD-1073-93, Guide for Operational Configuration Management
Program, of 11/93.

(4) References.

(a) 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Section 120,
"Quality Assurance Requirements."

(b) G-830.120, Implementation Guide for use with 10 CFR Part
830.120, Quality Assurance, of 4-15-94. b. Issues Management.

(1) Introduction. DOE and DOE contractors shall develop and implement
corrective action tracking and commitment tracking systems. These
systems are key management tools to manage, plan, and assign work
priorities, trend information to identify generic problems, and assess the
effectiveness of safety programs. These objectives can be met with
separate or combined tracking systems.

(2) Corrective Action and Commitment Tracking.

(a) A corrective action tracking system should monitor and track all
safety-related corrective actions, including actions from Nuclear
Explosive Safety Studies and Surveys; internal and external audits,
appraisals, assessments, inspections, and reviews; and corrective
actions resulting from reportable occurrences.

(b) Corrective actions should be based on root cause analyses to
identify the underlying causes. Findings and corrective action data
should be periodically reviewed to identify adverse trends or
opportunities for improving safety.

(c) A corrective action tracking system should be formally established
and implemented to ensure that all corrective actions are entered
into the system and that their status is current. A formal system
should have features that will do the following.

1 Identify the initiating source for the action, an assignment
of a responsible organization or individual, and a scheduled
completion date.

2 Identify significant or priority actions (e.g., actions that
address prestart findings from a readiness review).

3 Report corrective action data to responsible managers in a
manner that assists them in completing their assigned
activities and also informs them of related actions being
completed by other organizations.

4 Track corrective actions to closure, with follow-up
verification.

(d) In addition to corrective actions, other commitments important to
safety should be tracked. Examples are commitments to
implement new requirements, upgrade programs, and incorporate
new Technical Standards. A commitment tracking system should
consider the applicable features listed above.

(3) Applicable Standards.

None

(4) References.

None

c. Occurrence Reporting.

(1) Introduction. DOE O 232.1 establishes a system for reporting operations
information related to DOE-owned or -operated facilities and for
processing that information to provide for appropriate corrective action.
This section provides guidance for categorizing occurrences related to
nuclear explosive safety.

(2) Emergency Occurrences. An emergency occurrence is the most serious
type of occurrence and shall be reported immediately in accordance with
DOE O 151.1. An emergency occurrence requires an increased alert
status for onsite personnel and, in specific cases, for offsite authorities. In
addition to the situations described in Chapter V, DOE O 151.1, the
following are categorized as emergency occurrences.

(a) Unplanned nuclear or high-explosive detonation, or high-explosive
deflagration.

(b) Dispersal of fissile material from a nuclear explosive.

(d) Inadvertent or deliberate unauthorized arming of a nuclear
explosive.

(e) Safeguards or security event, or a transportation accident,
involving nuclear explosives that is a credible threat to DOE
operations, facilities, or personnel, and results or could result in
significant effects on the public health and safety and/or national
security.

(3) Unusual Occurrences. An unusual occurrence is a significant unplanned
occurrence involving a nuclear explosive and shall be categorized and
reported in accordance with the provisions of DOE M 232.1-1 for Group
9, Nuclear Explosive Safety. The following are categorized as unusual
occurrences.

(a) The unauthorized introduction of electrical energy into a nuclear
explosive.

(b) The unauthorized compromise of a nuclear explosive safety feature
when installed on a nuclear explosive.

(d) Inadvertent substitution of a nuclear explosive for a nuclear
explosive-like assembly (NELA) or vice versa.

(e) A violation of a nuclear explosive safety rule (NESR).

(4) Off-Normal Occurrences. An off-normal occurrence is an abnormal or
unplanned event or condition that adversely affects nuclear explosive
safety but is not in the emergency or unusual occurrence category. It shall
be categorized and reported in accordance with the provisions of DOE M
232.1-1 for Group 9, Nuclear Explosive Safety. The following are
categorized as off-normal occurrences.

(a) A "near miss," a situation that could (but did not) result in a
credible threat to nuclear explosive safety.

(b) A violation of the two-person concept of operations.

(d) Damage to a training unit during training operations indicative of a
hazard to a nuclear explosive.

(e) The use of uncertified personnel or unauthorized
equipment/tooling during a nuclear explosive operation.

(5) Applicable Orders.

(a) DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, dated 9-25-95.

(b) DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-
95.

(6) References.

None

d. Performance Indicators.

(1) Use of Performance Indicators. Contractors and laboratories are required
to implement a Performance Indicator Program in accordance with DOE
O 210.1 and the guidance of DOE-STD-1048-92. Operations Offices,
contractors, and laboratories should develop nuclear explosive safety
performance indicators tailored to the specific operations and unique site
facilities and conditions. The following are examples of performance
indicators for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
facilities.

(a) PAP immediate removals.

(b) Two-person concept violations.

(d) Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) and Operational Safety
Control (OSC) violations.

(e) Radiation dose to personnel.

(f) Occupational Safety and Health Administration recordable
injuries.

(g) Nuclear explosive area reportable occurrences.

(2) Addition or Deletion of Performance Indicators. Based on a review of
operations, appraisal results, and management assessments, performance
indicators should be added or deleted as appropriate.

(3) Applicable Orders and Standards.

(a) DOE O 210.1, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND
ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-27-95.

(b) DOE-STD-1048-92, DOE Performance Indicators Guidance
Document, dated 12-92.

(4) References.

None

e. Safety Analysis - Facility/Operations Interfaces.

(1) Introduction.

(a) DOE O 452.2A requires safety analyses of all nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities and facilities. A facility safety
analysis, documented in a SAR, generically addresses nuclear
explosive operations that are expected to be performed in the
facility. The HAR is a detailed hazards analysis involving a
specific nuclear explosive operation. Taken together, the facility
SAR and the operation HAR constitute the safety analysis for the
nuclear explosive operation in a specific facility. The HAR
documents the systematic evaluation of hazards to workers, the
public, and the environment. The Nuclear Explosive Hazards
Assessment (NEHA) is the portion of the HAR that contains a
systematic evaluation of hazards that could lead to nuclear
detonation, high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire.
NESRs are those safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
requirements, safety boundaries, and management and
administrative controls that minimize the possibility of nuclear
detonation, high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire, and
are included in the NEHA for review and consideration by the
Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group (NESSG). OSCs are safety
limits, operating limits, surveillance requirements, safety
boundaries, and management and administrative controls that
protect workers, the public, and the environment from hazards
other than nuclear detonation, high-explosive denotation and
deflagration, and fire. OSCs are documented in the HAR and
approved by the Operations Office manager. NESRs are
documented in the NESSG report and must be approved by
Headquarters.

(b) For facilities in which nuclear explosive operations are performed,
SARs shall be prepared and processed in accordance with DOE
5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94. DOE 5480.23 specifies that a
graded approach shall be used for analyzing, documenting, and
providing for the safety of facilities. The rigor of the safety
program should correspond to the level of the hazards. Section
2e(2), below, provides specific guidance for using DOE-STD-
3009-94 to prepare SARs for facilities in which nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities are performed.

(c) Facility TSRs shall be developed and implemented in accordance
with DOE 5480.22. Similar operation-specific controls are
specified in NESRs and OSCs. Section 2e(4), below, describes the
roles and interrelationships of NESRs and OSCs, and provides
guidance on developing, documenting, and implementing them.

(2) Facility SAR Content.

(a) DOE-STD-3009-94 should be used for preparing SARs. Each
chapter contains a section titled, "Application of the Graded
Approach." For some chapters, this guidance is keyed to a nuclear
facility hazard category. For the purpose of preparing SARs for
facilities in which nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities are conducted, the graded approach guidance for a hazard
category 2 nuclear facility should be used.

(b) Specific supplementary guidance for the referenced chapters of
DOE-STD-3009-94 is provided in the following paragraphs.

1 Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analyses. DOE O 452.2A
requires the facility SAR to describe the analysis of the full
spectrum of hazards involved in nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities. The SAR should
contain hazards analyses, in general, and an accident
analysis for potential bounding hazards for each accident
type. Definition of a bounding accident should be based on
the expected worst-case nuclear explosive operation or
associated activity characteristics associated with the
accident type. The goal is to identify and analyze hazards
that will bound future operations.

2 Chapter 5, Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements.
TSR information is based on material detailed in Chapters
3 and 4 of the SAR and is developed and maintained in
accordance with DOE 5480.22. TSRs address facility
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and
administrative controls related to plant programs. NESRs
and OSCs address operation-specific controls (see Section
2e(4), below). NESRs and OSCs should complement
TSRs, not overlap them.

3 Chapter 6, Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality. Maximum
inventory limits for fissile material shall be specified in the
TSRs based on guidance contained in DOE O 420.1 or
DOE 5480.24 and appropriate Joint DOE/Department of
Defense Technical Publications (e.g., TP 20-7).

a The SAR addresses the criticality protection policy
and program for the general handling and staging of
single and multiple nuclear explosives and
components. However, the SAR is not required to
address the criticality safety of a specific nuclear
explosive and its components since it is addressed
in the design process, certified by the design
laboratories, and documented in the HAR.

b The safety analysis in the SAR shall document
bounding events to identify and describe control
measures and limits.

4 Chapter 13, Human Factors. SARs should address human-
to-machine interfaces that affect facility safety-class SSCs
and safety-significant SSCs. Human factor aspects of
specific nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities are addressed in HARs.

(3) Operation-Specific HAR Content. Refer to DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96 for
detailed requirements on operations-specific HAR content.

(4) Safety Measures.

(a) TSRs are facility limits and/or controls that apply to all operations.
Facility safety limits, requirements, and controls contained in
TSRs are derived from analyses in the SAR. NESRs and OSCs are
derived in the HARs employing methods similar to those used to
derive TSRs in the SAR. DOE 5480.22 and DOE 5480.23 provide
an acceptable model for developing, documenting, and
implementing NESRs and OSCs. The purpose of NESRs is to
minimize the possibility of accidents involving nuclear detonation,
high-explosive detonation or deflagration, and/or fire. OSCs are
focused on worker health and safety and are directed toward
minimizing the frequency and/or consequences of accidents not
involving nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation or
deflagration, and/or fire. For example, in order to minimize
personnel exposure from an uncontrolled tritium release, an OSC
might be established for the operability of a gas exhaust system
collector hose positioned directly over the nuclear explosive during
tritium reservoir removal. This would provide a capability to
collect and control the tritium gas that might be involved in an
accidental tritium release.

(b) NESRs and OSCs consist of the following.

1 Safety Limits. Bounding process limits to prevent release
of radioactivity or other hazardous material, or explosive
detonation/deflagration. Safety limits are normally
associated with safety-class SSCs and any controls
associated with non safety class SSCs.

2 Operating Limits. Limiting Control Settings (LCSs) on
safety systems are control process variables to prevent
exceeding safety limits. Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCOs) are the lowest functional capability or performance
level of safety SSCs and their support systems required for
normal safe conduct of operations. Such limits may
include restricting the number of hazardous components
present in a work area, the quantity of components or
hazardous material present, or the temperature of a fluid
system.

3 Surveillance or Status Verification Requirements. Test,
calibration, inspection, or verification requirements that
ensure operability and quality of safety-related systems or
components, or the status of a safety feature.

4 Administrative Controls. Organization and management
procedures, reviews, and other administrative elements that
ensure safe operation.

(c) As appropriate, the operating contractor and/or the responsible
design laboratory shall propose NESRs and OSCs, as derived from
the safety analysis in the HAR/NEHA. Additional NESRs and
OSCs may be proposed during preoperational safety reviews, such
as the operation-specific readiness assessments or Nuclear
Explosive Safety Studies. The Nuclear Explosive Safety Study
includes review of all recommended NESRs and provides final
recommended NESRs in the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study
Report.

(d) NESRs and OSCs shall be recorded in controlled documents and
maintained current. Revisions should be approved by the same
authority that approved the original NESR or OSC. For ongoing
operations, NESRs and OSCs should be reviewed annually,
concurrent with the annual HAR review.

(e) NESR or OSC violations include the following.

1 Exceeding a safety limit.

2 Failing to take the actions required within the required time
limit following: (1) exceeding an LCS, (2) failure to meet
an LCO, or (3) failure to successfully meet a surveillance
or status verification requirement.

3 Failing to perform a surveillance or status verification
when required.

4 Failing to comply with an administrative control
requirement.

(f) A violation of a NESR is an occurrence as listed in DOE M 232.1-
1 and is subject to the reporting requirements of DOE O 232.1.
Although not specifically listed, a violation of an OSC should be
reported as an occurrence in accordance with DOE O 232.1.

(g) An acceptable format for specific NESRs and OSCs is depicted in
Attachment 1 of DOE 5480.22. Other formats may be used,
provided the required information is presented clearly.

(h) As stated in the guidelines of DOE 5480.22, TSRs are not based
on maintaining some acceptable level of worker safety; rather, the
risk to workers is controlled by reducing the likelihood and
potential impact of a significant event (one that can cause serious
personnel injury or an acute fatality). This is accomplished by
developing TSRs for those systems and components that are
barriers preventing uncontrolled release of radioactive or other
hazardous materials, or that mitigate such releases.

(i) In a similar fashion, NESRs and OSCs should also establish
barriers to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive or other
hazardous material, or to mitigate the releases. Specific to nuclear
explosive operations, NESRs and OSCs should also establish
measures that prevent uncontrolled release of energy from
explosives (i.e., main charge high-explosive or other explosive
devices present in the nuclear explosive). The objective is for
NESRs and OSCs to implement limits and controls that will
reduce the likelihood or consequences of a significant event. Plant
safety programs are relied on to contribute to the safety basis of
the facility and its operation by providing worker safety for other
events.

(5) Safety Basis.

(a) DOE 5480.23 defines the safety basis as the combination of
information relating to controlling hazards at a nuclear facility,
including design, engineering analyses, and administrative
controls. While the safety basis of a facility typically includes all
operations performed in the facility, the nature of nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities requires an
operations-specific safety basis in addition to a general safety
basis. A graphic depiction of the safety basis development for
nuclear explosive operations and associated activities is shown in
Figure 1.

(b) For facilities used for nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities, the facility safety basis includes the Nuclear Explosive
Safety Master Studies required by DOE-STD-3015-97, the generic
accident analysis documented in the facility SAR, and the
derivative TSRs. A generic accident is a synthesis of accident
factors related to one or more nuclear explosive(s) that contain the
largest quantity of explosives and nuclear materials expected to be
resident in the facility. This enables the facility SAR to be
developed for any nuclear explosive operation(s) likely to be
performed in the facility. Specific nuclear explosive operations
and technical details may (or may not) have been developed when
the SAR is being produced. The facility safety basis also includes
facility safety programs described in the SAR.

(c) The operation safety basis for nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities includes the Nuclear Explosive Safety Studies
required by DOE-STD-3015-96, the operation-specific hazard
analysis documented in the HAR, and the derivative NESRs and
OSCs. The safety basis for performing a specific nuclear
explosive operation in a specific facility is the combination of the
general facility safety basis and theoperation-specific safety basis.
This is depicted in Figure 1.

(d) A nuclear explosive operation considered for introduction into a
facility must be evaluated to ensure that the operation is within the
facility safety basis. DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96 specifies the
process for evaluating whether the operation safety basis is within
the facility safety basis.

(6) Applicable Orders and Standards.

(a) DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-
95.

(b) DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, dated 10-13-95.

(d) DOE 5480.23, NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS,
dated 3-10-94.

(e) DOE 5480.24, NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY, dated 8-12-
92.

(f) DOE M 232.1-1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-
95.
(g) DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, dated
7-94.

(h) DOE-STD-3015-97, Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Process,dated 10-96.

(i) DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96, Preparation Guide for U.S.
Department of Energy Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear
Explosive Operations, TBD.

(7) References.

TP 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria, dated 9-1-86.

f. Process Design.

(1) Introduction. Defense-in-depth is a safety management concept for
process design that considers the synergistic effects of multiple layers of
protection (e.g., equipment and facilities design, procedures, training),
which collectively contribute to accident prevention and/or consequence
mitigation. These layers of protection include equipment, people,
facilities, and procedures.

(2) Tooling and Equipment.

(a) The following design criteria guidance applies.

1 Safety critical equipment should be designed to remain in a
safe condition should a system or component fail.

2 Tooling, equipment, and layout should be designed and
used in a manner that precludes introduction of unintended
energy to nuclear explosives, including mechanical,
thermal, electrical, radiation, and chemical energy.

3 Tooling and equipment should not include or otherwise
introduce hazardous chemicals that could create hazardous
or mixed (radioactive and hazardous) wastes.

4 The layout design should preclude the possibility of the
tooling or equipment from making unintended contact with
or striking the high explosive.

5 All tooling and equipment that apply energy to the nuclear
explosive should have documented design criteria.

6 The tooling and equipment design process should
incorporate human factors engineering to:

a minimize the likelihood of accident initiation from
human interactions and to enhance worker safety;

b protect workers from serious injury caused by
industrial or radiological accidents; and

c apply industry standards and guidelines, where
appropriate, as early as practical in the tooling and
equipment design process.

7 Safety-critical tooling and equipment should be designed to
contain two or more independent physical safety features
with no common mode of failure.

8 Tooling and equipment should be designed, fabricated,
tested, approved, and available for credible contingencies
and alternate processes.

9 Tooling, equipment, and layout should be designed to
minimize exposure of personnel to hazards.

(b) Reliability measures provide a layer of defense against equipment
failures that may have an adverse impact on safety. The following
guidance applies.

1 Reliability of tooling and equipment should be optimized
by applying appropriate standards to their design,
fabrication, installation, testing, inspection, maintenance,
storage, and use. The use of industry standards criteria
should be based on their applicability to nuclear explosive
operations.

2 Preventive and predictive maintenance programs should be
established for tooling and equipment.

3 Post-maintenance testing procedures should be established
for safety class and safety significant tooling and
equipment.

(c) A checkout on a trainer with the actual tooling and equipment
should be considered where possible to verify that potential human
interactions with significant safety impact are not overlooked in
the design process.

(3) People. Personnel selection, training, and qualification requirements
provide a layer of defense that ensures that personnel performing nuclear
explosive operations are reliable and adequately qualified to carry out
operations. A system should be established to verify that personnel are
qualified and, as appropriate, certified to perform their functions. The
fitness for duty requirements of the PAP along with a personnel
management system that can effectively process derogatory information
and reach decisions concerning acceptability/removal of personnel
assigned nuclear explosive duties are key factors to ensure personnel
reliability.

(4) Facilities. The facility safety basis requirements provide a layer of
defense that ensures the facilities are designed, built, modified, and
maintained in a manner that recognizes and controls the hazards
associated with expected operations. Safety envelope control
requirements ensure that facilities are maintained and controlled in a
manner consistent with the requirements of the SAR and TSRs. A formal
program for tracking SAR/TSR surveillance requirements and status and a
system for positive verification of compliance should be established.

(5) Procedures. A rigorous approach to preparing and adhering to procedures
provides a layer of defense in conducting nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities. Procedures should have the following attributes.

(a) Comply with design specifications and technical requirements.

(b) Clearly state cautions and warnings.

(d) Place proper emphasis on preventing an accident, detecting
abnormal conditions, and protecting the worker, the public, and the
environment.

(e) Identify appropriate points to safely interrupt work.

(f) Consider and incorporate waste minimization practices.

(g) Include sufficient information to perform the operation.

(h) Be organized so that operating personnel are not required to
consult more than one document to accomplish a single process.

(6) Applicable Orders and Standards.

(a) DOE M 440.1-1, DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL, dated
9-30-95.

(b) MIL-STD-1472D, Human Engineering Design Criteria for
Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities.

(7) References.

None

g. Internal Safety Reviews.

(1) Internal Safety Review Program. As required by DOE O 452.2A, DOE
contractors and laboratories must establish an internal, objective, and
independent safety review program. The safety review program normally
functions in an advisory capacity to line management. An internal safety
review program should do the following.

(a) Be defined and delineated in writing (e.g., purposes, objectives,
functions, authority, responsibility, composition, quorum, meeting
frequency, and reporting requirements).

(b) Allow for the safety review function to report to a designated
official at a sufficiently high level of management who will take
necessary corrective action.

(d) Be performed by personnel with technical discipline competence
in the areas being reviewed.

(e) Be performed by independent personnel, i.e., those who did not
perform or direct the work.

(f) Provide an opportunity for group discussions among safety
reviewers.

(g) Serve as an independent determination of whether a proposed
activity involves an unreviewed safety question (USQ), violation
of a TSR/OSC/NESR, deviation from a safety analysis premise, or
any other safety concern.

(h) Include the following.

1 Proposed modifications to facilities and equipment
affecting safety;

2 Administrative, operating, maintenance, repair, testing,
quality assurance (QA), immediate-action, and emergency
procedures;

3 Training programs, qualification and certification
requirements, and associated procedures;

4 Reports of occurrences, root cause analyses, and corrective
action plans;

5 Safety analyses and evaluations;

6 Nuclear Explosive Safety Study input documents;

7 CM program plans and procedures;

8 QA program plan;

9 Maintenance implementation plan;

(i) Be reviewed for adequacy by management at least once every 3
years.

(2) Applicable Standards.

None

(3) References.

None

h. Readiness Reviews.

(1) Introduction.

(a) The essential attributes of DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1
readiness reviews should be applied to nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities to establish readiness review
requirements for startup and restart of specific nuclear explosive
operations. Some facility-based requirements do not apply to an
operations-based activity. Also, there are additional requirements
for readiness reviews that are specifically relevant to nuclear
explosive operations.

(b) This section identifies the attributes of DOE 5480.31 or DOE O
425.1 readiness reviews that are considered essential and are
expected to be included in the readiness review process for nuclear
explosive operations. This section also provides examples of some
features of nuclear explosive operations that require special
consideration.

(2) Essential Attributes.

(a) Both the organization responsible for the operation and DOE
perform independent readiness reviews.

(b) The readiness reviews provide independent reviews of readiness
and will not be used as management tools to achieve readiness.

(c) The readiness review is formally documented in a manner
equivalent to the specifications of DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1
(plan-of-action, implementation plan, final report, and finding
resolution).

(d) Contractor line management certification of readiness is a
prerequisite for beginning the independent contractor readiness
review.

(e) Certification of readiness by contractor management to DOE line
management and by DOE line management to the operation
approval authority is a prerequisite for beginning the DOE
readiness review.

(f) Readiness reviews are conducted by qualified personnel with
assessment expertise, who are independent of the operation being
reviewed. Independent in this context means that personnel will
not review their own work or work for which they were
responsible. Senior members should not be from the line
organization responsible for the operation; variance from this
requirement may be granted by the appropriate approval authority.

(g) The breadth of readiness reviews includes applicable core
requirements derived by the cognizant Operations Office from
DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1, plus any review areas unique to
the operation.

(h) The readiness review team develops and documents the criteria
and reviews approaches prior to beginning the review.

(i) DOE readiness review findings are categorized as prestart or post-
start.

(j) All prestart findings are corrected prior to startup or restart of the
operation and verified as closed by DOE.

(3) Additional Guidance. Refer to DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1 and DOE-
STD-3006-93 for additional guidance.

(4) Additional Considerations for Nuclear Explosive Operations.

(a) DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1 requirements do not specifically
address the startup or restart of an operation within an operating
facility. A comparable process for startup and restart of nuclear
explosive operations is needed to fulfill DOE O 452.2A
requirements. In addition, there are nuclear explosive safety
requirements that must be satisfied prior to authorizing the
operation.

(b) The following are some of the aspects of nuclear explosive
operations that should be considered in the readiness review
program for these operations.

1 DOE O 452.2A and Operations Office-specified criteria for
when a readiness review is required.

2 Grading of readiness review requirements for startup or
restart of operations where a full scope readiness review is
not necessary (e.g., startup of an operation that is
essentially the same as a fully reviewed and approved
operation).

3 Interfaces between the operation and the facility, facility
support systems, and facility environment, safety, and
health programs.

4 A conditional startup authorization based on reviewing the
operation conducted on a trainer, followed by a final
authorization based on reviewing the operation conducted
on a nuclear explosive.

5 Integrating the expertise of the design laboratories into the
review process.

6 Additional nuclear explosive safety activities that are
required prior to authorizing the operation (e.g., the
Nuclear Explosive Safety Study).

(5) Applicable Orders and Standards.

(a) DOE 0 425.1, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR
FACILITIES, dated 9-29-95.

(b) DOE 5480.31, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR
FACILITIES, dated 9-15-93.

(6) References.

None