SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS

INDEX

U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C. DOE O 452.2A

Issue Date: 1-17-97
Review Date: 1-17-99

SUBJECT: SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS

1. OBJECTIVES.

a. To establish the applicability, requirements, and responsibilities for ensuring the
safety of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities and facilities, and for protecting the environment and the
health and safety of workers and the public.

b. In the context of this Order, to address safety in two broad areas: nuclear
explosive safety (NES) and environment, safety, and health (ES&H).

c. To integrate portions of a number of Orders or their corresponding Rules, in order
to integrate NES and ES&H and to require the same level of safety assurance for
DOE defense nuclear facilities and DOE facilities in which nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities are conducted. The Orders or their
corresponding Rules shall be used to the extent specified in this Order for nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities and facilities. Responses to
unplanned events (e.g., Accident Response Group activities) are addressed in the
5530-series Orders and DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, dated 9-25-95.

2. CANCELLATION. DOE O 452.2, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
OPERATIONS, dated 4-29-96, is canceled. Cancellation of the above Order does not,
by itself, modify or otherwise affect any contractual obligation to comply with the Order.
Canceled Orders that are incorporated by reference in a contract shall remain in effect
until the contract is modified to delete the reference to the requirements in the canceled
Orders.

3. APPLICABILITY.

a. DOE Elements. This Order applies to DOE Headquarters and field elements
that manage, oversee, or conduct nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities.

b. Contractors. This Order applies to contractors and subcontractors that manage,
oversee, or conduct DOE NEWS program as provided by law and/or contract, as
implemented by the appropriate contracting officer. Responsibilities are
delineated for contractors and Federal employees within the Orders, referenced
Rule, Technical Standards, and Implementation Guide. Responsibilities are in
sufficient detail such that an additional document, such as a Contractor
Requirement Document, would not be beneficial, and may hamper
implementation.

c. Exclusions. None.

4. REQUIREMENTS.

a. General.

(1) Nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and facilities shall
be comprehensively reviewed and evaluated to identify hazards and
potential accidents and to establish design, construction, and operational
means to protect the public and worker health and safety and the
environment. Facility safety analysis shall be prepared using hazard
category 2 nuclear facility guidance unless (i) a different hazard category
is determined by DOE using applicable hazard classification guidance, or
(ii) a different hazard category is justified for a facility within the context
of an approved integrated safety management program. Additional
guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A, IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE FOR USE WITH DOE O 452.2A, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS, dated 1-17-97.

(2) Operations Offices shall have a comprehensive safety program for nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities under their purview and
assure contractor implementation.

(3) The safety program shall integrate NES requirements from the 452- and
applicable 5610-series Orders and ES&H requirements from other Orders
if applicable under their own terms or invoked in this Order. Many of the
ES&H Orders are directly applicable, and others exclude nuclear
explosive operations. This Order adopts specified requirements from the
excluded Orders to provide a complete safety program for nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities and facilities. Requirements
within or invoked by this Order are implemented by the contractor
through means proposed by the contractor and become binding through
approval and authorization by DOE line management.

(4) Implementation of a requirement to prevent or mitigate one hazard shall
be assessed to ensure that the likelihood of a significant safety incident
involving another hazard is not increased. If any such instance is
identified, alternative methods shall be investigated to attempt to
implement the requirement without increasing the risk associated with
other hazards. Guidelines, best management practices, or other
nonmandatory implementation guidance shall be similarly assessed for
potential impact on another hazard before being implemented.

(5) The requirements in this Order may be implemented using a DOE-
approved integrated safety management approach as described in DOE P
450.4, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM POLICY, dated 10-15-96.
A "graded approach" to the requirements in this Order is not permitted
unless in the context of an approved integrated safety management
program.

b. Operational Safety Program. The safety program shall include the following
elements, tailored for the operations.

(1) Experience Feedback. DOE and DOE contractors and laboratories shall
evaluate the safety lessons to be learned from critical evaluations of
operating experience and other sources of evidence, such as research
results and analyses, that bear upon the validity of the safety analyses and
safety bases under which nuclear explosive operations are authorized. In
the event that evidence is found that may affect the validity of the safety
basis of one or more ongoing nuclear explosive operation, then it should
be treated as a potential unreviewed safety question (USQ) under the
terms of DOE 5480.21, UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS, dated
12-24-91, as modified by paragraph 4c(3) of this Order.

(2) Conduct of Operations. DOE 5480.19, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
REQUIREMENTS FOR DOE FACILITIES, dated 7-9-90, provides DOE
policy and requirements for conducting operations at DOE facilities. The
guidelines in Attachment I to DOE 5480.19 shall be applied in a graded
approach commensurate with their potential ES&H impact and their
potential NES impact.

(3) Administrative Controls. Nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities shall be conducted in accordance with the applicable Technical
Safety Requirements (TSRs), Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules (NESRs),
and operational safety controls (OSCs). Nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities shall have safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
requirements, limiting conditions of operation, and administrative
controls, as necessary, that shall be specified in OSCs and NESRs.

(4) Training and Qualification of Personnel. Each organization responsible
for and/or involved in nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities shall implement a training and qualification program for their
respective personnel that manage, oversee, perform, or directly support
these operations and activities. These personnel include DOE and
contractor management and technical support personnel, Personnel
Assurance Program (PAP) supervisors, PAP medical personnel, and
operations and maintenance personnel.

(a) Requirements for selecting, training, and qualifying personnel
involved with nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities and for assuring their continuing fitness for duty shall be
applied as contained in this Order and Interim Personnel
Assurance Program Procedures and Standards.

(b) Training for DOE personnel involved in nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities shall comply with applicable
portions of DOE O 360.1, TRAINING, dated 5-31-95.

(c) DOE contractor and laboratory training and qualification programs
shall comply with DOE 5480.20A, PERSONNEL SELECTION,
QUALIFICATION, AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR
DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, dated 11-15-94, except Chapters
II and III (Reactor Operations), and develop requirements
equivalent to those in Chapter IV. Training and qualification
requirements shall be commensurate with the particular
responsibilities assigned.

(5) Maintenance of Facilities, Tooling, and Equipment. A maintenance
program shall be developed and implemented for facilities, tooling, and
equipment used for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
in accordance with the nuclear facility requirements in DOE 4330.4B,
MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, dated 2-10-94.

(6) Configuration Management (CM).

(a) The appropriate design laboratories and/or operating contractors
shall develop and implement a configuration management program
for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
facilities.

(b) The program shall be documented in appropriate plans that shall
be approved by the cognizant Operations Office. Guidance is
provided in DOE-STD-1073-93, Guide for Operational
Configuration Management Programs, of 11/93.

(c) These plans shall address the measures for managing the
configuration of nuclear explosive assemblies; the configuration of
tooling, equipment, and procedures used in nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities; and the interface with the
facilities in which these operations and activities are conducted.
Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

(7) Quality Assurance (QA).

(a) DOE contractors and laboratories shall develop and implement a
quality assurance program for nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities and facilities that satisfies the criteria in
paragraphs (b)(1) and (c) of 10 CFR Part 830.120, "Quality
Assurance Requirements."

(b) The QA program shall be approved by the cognizant Operations
Office. Guidance is provided in G-830.120, Implementation
Guide for use with 10 CFR Part 830.120, Quality Assurance.

(8) Issues Management. DOE and DOE contractors and laboratories shall
develop and implement corrective action and commitment tracking
systems to assist in identifying, tracking, and monitoring required actions
related to the safety of nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities and facilities. Additional guidance is provided in
DOE G 452.2A-1A.

(9) Occurrence Reporting. Operational occurrences shall be reported and
processed in accordance with DOE 0 232.1, OCCURRENCE
REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION,
dated 9-25-95, and DOE M 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-95.
Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

(10) Performance Indicators.
(a) A performance indicator program for nuclear explosive operations
shall be implemented in accordance with the requirements of
DOE O 210.1, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND
ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, 9-27-95, and
the guidance of DOE-STD-1048-92, Performance Indicators
Guidance Document of 12/92.

(b) The program shall include NES performance indicators, as
appropriate, in addition to ES&H performance indicators.
Contractors shall identify NES performance indicators and submit
them to the cognizant Operations Office for approval before
incorporating them into the performance indicator program.
Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

c. Safety Analyses.

(1) Process and Documentation.

(a) This section clarifies terms and issues employed in the nuclear
safety community concerning the interface between nuclear
explosive operations and conventional nuclear safety.

(b) Safety analyses shall be performed for all DOE nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities and facilities. The results of
facility safety analyses shall be documented in a Safety Analysis
Report (SAR). The results of operation- and associated activity-
specific safety analyses shall be documented in an operation
Hazards Analysis Report (HAR). The HAR shall include a
Nuclear Explosive Hazards Assessment (NEHA), as described in
DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department
of Energy Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosive
Operations.

(c) This Order, the guidance in DOE G 452.2A-1A, and the guidance
and requirements in DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96 establish a process
for safety analysis of nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities and facilities. Processes that illustrate the interactions
between the NES Study process, the weapon specific operation
hazard analysis, and the facility safety basis are shown in Figure 1
and discussed in the following sections.
Figure 1. Safety Analysis and Evaluation of Nuclear Explosive Operations and Associated
Activities and Facilities.
(d) A safety analysis for nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities is an iterative process, performed in parallel with
development of the operation being analyzed, so that the operation
design benefits from the safety analysis results. Each Operations
Office shall comply with the following safety analysis
requirements.

1 A safety analysis of facilities used for nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities shall be performed and
shall be documented in a SAR. The facility safety analyses
shall address nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities in general and shall address a spectrum of
potential accidents based on bounding hazard conditions.
The SAR shall be prepared and processed in accordance
with the requirements of DOE 5480.23, NUCLEAR
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS, dated
4-10-92, and the guidance of its Attachment I, and DOE-
STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis
Reports of 7/94. Additional guidance for preparing SARs
is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

2 TSRs for facilities in which nuclear explosive operations
and associated activities are conducted shall be developed
and implemented in accordance with the requirements of
DOE 5480.22, TECHNICAL SAFETY
REQUIREMENTS, dated 2-25-92. Facility related
requirements shall be derived from the SAR.

3 A hazard analysis shall be performed and formally
documented in a HAR for each nuclear explosive operation
and its associated activities in accordance with DOE-DP-
STD-XXXX-96. The HAR shall include a determination
of whether or not the operation is within the facility safety
basis. HARs for ongoing operations shall be reviewed
annually and updated as necessary to ensure that the
information in each HAR is current. These reviews shall
be comparable to and coordinated with the annual SAR
reviews that are required by DOE 5480.23.

4 Those aspects of the operation-specific hazards analysis
that involve nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation
and deflagration, and fire shall be assessed using a
systematic accident sequence analysis and documented in
an HAR and NEHA in accordance with DOE-DP-STD-
XXXX-96. The NEHA document shall be submitted to the
Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group (NESSG) for
review and evaluation and included in the NES Study
report.

5 The Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards focus on
precluding those actions which could lead to high
consequence events. The primary purpose of the NEHA is
to identify those operations or activities which should be
carefully controlled to reduce the possibility or eliminate a
specific accident scenario which could result in a NES
incident. These actions are focused on the following.

a Precluding high-explosive detonation to preclude
nuclear detonation.

b Precluding high-explosive detonation, deflagration
or fire situation to preclude fissile material
dispersal.

6 OSCs and NESRs shall be iteratively derived from the
hazard analysis in the HAR. OSCs shall be reviewed and
recommended in DOE HAR reviews; and NESRs shall be
reviewed and recommended in the NES Studies. OSCs are
approved with the HAR and NESRs are approved with the
NES Study report. The criteria for OSCs and NESRs are
described in DOE G 452.2A-1A and DOE-DP-STD-
XXXX-96.

7 Nothing can be clearly stated prior to conduct of the HAR
analysis, but it should be recognized that administrative
controls for nuclear explosive operations (NESRs and
OSCs) are not normally linked to facility TSRs. If an OSC
is linked to a TSR, the TSR should be stated.

(2) Criticality Safety. Nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
and facilities shall comply with the criticality safety requirements of
DOE 5480.24, NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY, dated 8-12-92, or
DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, dated
10-13-95.

(a) Criticality safety analyses of the facility and general nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities shall be documented
in the SAR in accordance with the criticality safety requirements
of DOE 5480.23 and DOE 5480.24 or DOE O 420.1.

(b) Criticality safety analyses of specific nuclear explosive operations
and associated activities shall be documented in accordance with
DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-95.

(c) Criticality safety of a specific nuclear explosive and its
components is evaluated in the design process and need not be
discussed in the SAR.

(3) Change Control. Operations Offices shall establish a change control
process for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
facilities. The USQ process shall be used, augmented by the additional
NES evaluations listed below. NES evaluations shall be completed prior
to implementation of the change. All proposed changes to nuclear
explosive operations and associated facilities shall be evaluated against
applicable nuclear explosive safety documents by operating contractor
personnel assigned nuclear explosive safety responsibilities. The
responsible laboratory performs this function at the Nevada Test Site.

(a) Proposed changes of a trivial or strictly administrative nature with
no likelihood of significance to nuclear explosive safety may be
approved by the operating contractor and shall require no further
NES evaluation.

(b) For those changes determined by the operating contractor to
require a DOE NES evaluation, change documentation shall be
evaluated and concurred with by the responsible design
laboratories personnel and DOE nuclear explosive safety
personnel. Operations Offices shall specify the process for
performing such a NES evaluation. This evaluation may result in
a determination of the need for a NES Study.

(c) The change control process shall include provisions for
incorporating approved changes into the appropriate safety
documents.

d. Nuclear Explosive Safety Program. Nuclear explosive operations require
additional special safety consideration because of the potential high consequences
of an accident or unauthorized act. Operations Offices shall implement a formal,
comprehensive Nuclear Explosive Safety Program that includes the following.

(1) DOE Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards. All DOE nuclear explosive
operations shall meet the following qualitative Safety Standards to prevent
unintended nuclear detonation or fissile material dispersal from the pit.
There shall be positive measures to:

(a) minimize the possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or
authorized activities that could lead to fire, high-explosive
deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation;

(b) minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive deflagration, or
high-explosive detonation given accidents or inadvertent acts; and

(c) minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts that could
lead to high-explosive deflagration or high-explosive detonation.

(2) General NESRs. The general NESRs set forth in this paragraph are
mandatory for all DOE nuclear explosive operations. Exemptions from
these rules shall be approved in advance by the Assistant Secretary for
Defense Programs (DP-1).

(a) Nuclear explosive operations shall not be performed until a NES
Study or Survey is approved, and prestart recommendations have
been closed.

(b) Operations on nuclear explosives or collocated main charge high-
explosive and pit shall be performed in accordance with approved
written procedures.

(c) Operations involving a nuclear explosive not known to be one-
point safe shall be conducted only at the Nevada Test Site.

(d) Production plant operations shall not be started on a nuclear
explosive until it is certified by the design laboratory to be one-
point safe.

(e) If it is determined that a nuclear explosive no longer meets the
one-point safety criteria, all production plant operations and offsite
transportation with that nuclear explosive shall be discontinued.
Before operations can be resumed with that nuclear explosive, a
NES Study shall be conducted and approved.

(3) Supplemental NESRs. Additional safety rules shall be developed as
needed to supplement the general NESRs for specific operations or to
address specific characteristics of an individual design of a nuclear
explosive, a specific test, or an operation.

(4) NES Studies, Surveys, and Revalidations. The manager of the Operations
Office responsible for a proposed nuclear explosive operation shall
determine the type of independent nuclear explosive safety evaluation and
shall convene the NESSG to evaluate the proposed operation. These
evaluations shall meet the requirements in DOE-STD-3015-97, Nuclear
Explosive Safety Study Process, dated 1-97.

(a) A NES Study shall evaluate proposed operations to ensure that
there are adequate positive measures to minimize the possibility of
unintended nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation or
deflagration, or fire. NES Studies are valid for 5 years.

(b) A NES Survey may be conducted as necessary for a proposed
nuclear explosive operation that is essentially the same as a
previously studied and approved operation. NES Surveys are valid
for 5 years.

(c) A NES Study Revalidation may be conducted to determine
whether a nuclear explosive operation has significantly changed
since the NES Study was approved. A NES Study may be
revalidated for a maximum of 5 years, not to exceed 10 years from
the date of the original approval.

(5) Personnel Assurance Program (PAP). Personnel assigned nuclear
explosive duties shall meet the PAP requirements contained in Interim
PAP Procedures and Standards.

(6) Two-Person Concept. The Two-Person Concept requires that a minimum
of two authorized people shall be present during all nuclear explosive
operations and during other operations designated by the Operations
Office. Managers of the Operations Offices responsible for nuclear
explosive operations shall establish implementing instructions for the
Two-Person Concept. The two people must be in a position to detect
incorrect or unauthorized acts and:

(a) be certified in the DOE PAP;

(b) have technical knowledge of the task being performed; and

(7) Reader Worker Procedure and Check-off. Reader worker procedures and
check-off shall be used for those nuclear explosive operations specified by
the cognizant Operations Office manager.

(8) Control of Electrical Testers/Equipment. Managers of Operations Offices
responsible for nuclear explosive operations shall establish safety
requirements for electrical testers/electrical equipment used in nuclear
explosive areas (NEAs).

(a) Testers that introduce electrical energy into a nuclear explosive or
high-explosive subassemblies in an NEA shall meet the following
requirements as a minimum.

1 Each tester shall have independent safety characteristics
that do not rely on the nuclear explosive's safety features.

2 A single-point failure within a tester shall not result in the
application of unintended stimuli.

3 Testers shall use the lowest practical values of internal and
output currents and voltages that will adequately perform
their intended functions.

4 A comprehensive safety analysis shall be performed and
documented for each electrical tester and its interface with
a nuclear explosive or HE.

5 Procedures shall be established to control, store, maintain,
calibrate, and operate testers.

6 Each model of electrical tester and its interface with a
nuclear explosive or high explosive shall be evaluated by
an NESSG.

7 Operations Offices shall establish and maintain a record of
approved electrical testers.

Computer-controlled testers shall have positive measures
that preclude inadvertent or unauthorized actuation of
nuclear explosive safety critical components (e.g., strong-
link switches).

(b) The process used to evaluate and approve any electrical energy
source or electrical equipment intended for use within an NEA
shall be evaluated in a NES Study.

(9) Offsite Transportation of Nuclear Explosives. The Manager, Albuquerque
Operations Office, is responsible for all DOE offsite transportation of
nuclear explosives in accordance with DOE 5610.14,
TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM
OPERATIONS, dated 5-12-93. Offsite transportation operations begin
when the loaded conveyance is closed and ends with the opening of the
conveyance at its destination. The following requirements shall be met.

(a) Nuclear explosives shall not be transported offsite in the same
conveyance with any other cargo.

(b) Nuclear explosives shall be transported offsite in safe-secure-
trailers (SSTs) or other conveyances specifically reviewed and
approved through the nuclear explosive safety study process.
Nuclear explosive conveyances shall be validated as acceptable for
conveying hazardous material in conformance with applicable
Department of Transportation regulations.

(c) Nuclear explosives shall be transported and restrained in
compliance with the general instructions of Technical Publication
(TP) 35-51, General Instructions Applicable to Nuclear Weapons;
the specific procedures, equipment descriptions, and restraint
requirements specified in TP 45-51, Transportation of Nuclear
Weapons Material, General Shipping and Limited Life
Components, TP 45-51A, Transportation of Nuclear Weapons
Material (Supplement), Shipping and Identification Data for
Stockpile Major Assemblies, and TP 45-51D, Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons Material (Supplement), Shipment by Safe-
Secure-Trailer (SST); and TP 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria.

(10) Onsite Transportation of Nuclear Explosives. Managers of Operations
Offices responsible for nuclear explosive operations shall establish
requirements and procedures to ensure safe onsite transportation of
nuclear explosives at their respective sites. Onsite transportation
operations shall be reviewed and approved through the nuclear explosive
safety study process.

(11) Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA) Requirements.

(a) Technical criteria for NELA requirements shall be established and
issued by the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, in
coordination with Headquarters and the Nevada (NV) and Oakland
(OAK) Operations Offices. These requirements shall support the
following qualitative NELA Standards.

1 There shall be positive measures to minimize the
possibility of accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate
unauthorized assembly of a nuclear explosive in place of a
NELA configuration.

2 There shall be positive measures to minimize the
possibility of accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate
unauthorized transfer of a nuclear explosive in place of a
NELA configuration.

(b) Managers of Operations Offices responsible for NELA operations
shall implement the NELA requirements.

(12) Marking Instructions. Marking nuclear explosives and NELAs is intended
to provide a rapid and accurate method to distinguish between
configurations capable of a nuclear detonation and those that are not.

(a) NELAs that are routinely assembled and disassembled for training,
development, testing, evaluation, or demonstration purposes need
not be permanently marked provided the NELA is not shipped
offsite; however, temporary markings shall be applied.

(b) Permanent and temporary marking instructions shall be established
and issued by the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office.
Managers of Operations Offices shall implement these marking
instructions.

(13) Reporting Nuclear Explosive Occurrences. DOE O 232.1 and
DOE M 232.1 provide requirements for categorizing and reporting nuclear
explosive occurrences under Group 9, Nuclear Explosive Safety. The
detailed classification for emergencies and the emergency responses to be
taken are provided in DOE O 151.1. Additional guidance is provided in
DOE G 452.2A-1A.

e. Process Design (Defense-in-Depth).

(1) Multiple layers of protection shall be used to prevent accidents and/or to
mitigate the consequences of an accident. Configuration management
shall be implemented to ensure that no changes are made that could
adversely affect the safety of operations. A positive verification process
shall be implemented to ensure use of correct equipment, qualified
personnel, operationally ready facilities, and current procedures.
Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

(2) Equipment used in nuclear explosive operations (including tooling,
mechanical equipment, and electrical equipment) shall be designed,
fabricated, tested, and maintained to standards commensurate with the
safety importance of the function to be performed. Existing Technical
Standards may be adopted or new Standards developed, as appropriate,
considering the unique application to nuclear explosive operations.
Design criteria shall be maintained for tooling and equipment. Human
factors requirements shall be included in the design criteria
documentation.

(3) Requirements for selecting, training, and qualifying personnel involved
with nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and for
assuring their continuing fitness for duty shall be applied as contained in
this Order and the Interim PAP Procedures and Standards.

(4) Facilities in which nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
are performed shall be operationally ready. Interfaces between those
facilities and nuclear explosive operations shall be controlled.
Appropriate preventive maintenance programs shall be established to
ensure reliability of facility equipment.

(5) Procedures governing nuclear explosive operations and associated
activities shall be developed, controlled, reviewed, and approved. Human
factors shall be considered in the development of procedures. Procedures
shall be written and formatted to facilitate the safe accomplishment of the
task (e.g., cautions, hold points, illustrations).

(6) The configuration and condition of a nuclear explosive and its
components shall be known or determined during any planned operation.
In case of unknown conditions, appropriate contingency plans shall be
available.

(7) Requirements and guidance appropriate for nuclear explosive operations
contained in DOE M 440.1-1, DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL,
dated 9-30-95, shall be followed.

f. Internal Safety Reviews. DOE contractors and laboratories shall perform
internal, objective, and independent safety reviews of nuclear explosive
operations and associated activities. The safety review system shall include items
of potential safety significance from the perspectives of both NES and ES&H.
Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

g. Readiness Reviews.

(1) Facility Readiness Reviews.

(a) Readiness reviews for facilities shall be performed in accordance
with DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1, STARTUP AND RESTART
OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, dated 9-29-95, and Operations
Office implementing directives and procedures.

(b) Requirements for hazard category 2 nuclear facilities stated in
DOE 5480.31 and DOE O 425.1 shall be used for this purpose.

(c) A facility readiness review is generally not required when a new
nuclear explosive operation is introduced and there are no changes
to the facility or its safety basis.

(2) Nuclear Explosive Operation Readiness Reviews.

(a) A readiness review shall be performed for startup of a nuclear
explosive operation, restarting an operation following a shutdown
greater than one year, after a significant change to the operation, or
after an unplanned shutdown due to significant safety concerns.

(b) Operations Offices shall develop and implement an operations
readiness review process that addresses nuclear explosive
operations. The process shall incorporate the attributes of facility
readiness reviews from DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1 by
adopting appropriate requirements from the Orders. Requirements
unique to nuclear explosive operations shall be specified.
Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

h. Occupational Safety and Health Program.

(1) Nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and facilities shall
comply with DOE 5483.1A, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH PROGRAM FOR DOE CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES AT
GOVERNMENT-OWNED CONTRACTOR-OPERATED FACILITIES,
dated 6-22-83; or DOE O 231.1, ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND
HEALTH REPORTING, dated 9-30-95; DOE O 440.1, WORKER
PROTECTION MANAGEMENT FOR DOE FEDERAL AND
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES, dated 9-30-95; DOE 5480.11,
RADIATION PROTECTION FOR OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS,
dated 6-17-92; 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection; DOE
N 441.1, RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION FOR DOE ACTIVITIES,
dated 9-30-95; and DOE M 440.1-1.

(2) Several references are being revised at this time. Until such time as all
contractual documentation is adjusted to reflect changes in the DOE
directives system, implementation plans should include the most current
applicable directive(s) and an assessment of the possible impacts of
anticipated changes from the specific reference used. When the word "or"
is used, several references may apply; when the word "and" is used, the
intent is that all references apply.

i. Exemptions.

(1) Exemptions shall be requested when release is sought from a requirement
in this Order or in a referenced mandatory Manual or Standard. DOE M
251.1, DIRECTIVES SYSTEM MANUAL, dated 10-16-95, shall be used
to prepare, process, and approve exemption requests. The approval
authority is as follows.

(a) The cognizant Operations Office manager responsible for the
activity when an equivalent level of safety has been demonstrated.

(b) The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and
Stockpile Management (DP-20) when the exemption would ensure
adequate protection, but would not result in an equivalent level of
safety. The Operations Office manager shall concur with these
exemption requests and forward them to DP-20 for approval.

(2) Release from a requirement that has been adopted by reference into this
Order shall be processed as relief from this Order and not from the
referenced Order.

j. Implementation. Within 12 months after this Order is issued, Operations Offices
shall develop an implementation plan to describe how the requirements of this
Order will be implemented. The implementation plan shall be submitted to DP-
20 for approval and shall do the following:

(1) identify the programs, plans, practices, procedures, and other actions to be
used in complying with the requirements;

(2) establish a schedule for actions necessary to achieve compliance;

(3) identify needed resources; and

(4) identify those compensatory measures deemed necessary to provide for
adequate protection during the period of noncompliance.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1).

(1) Ensures that safety programs are implemented.

(2) Adjudicates any appeals of the Operations Office manager's decisions to
deny or revoke PAP certifications.

(3) Approves requests for exemptions from general NESRs.

(4) Authorizes sites for the assembly, disassembly, and storage of nuclear
explosives.

b. Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health (EH-1) assists DP-1 in
ES&H disciplines concerning the safety of nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities and facilities.

c. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management
(DP-20).

(1) Approves NES Study Reports and resolves minority opinions.

(2) Approves revalidations of NES Study Reports.

(3) Approves administrative extensions to NES Studies.

(4) Approves exemptions to the requirements of this Order in accordance with
the provisions of 4i, above.

(5) Evaluates reported nuclear explosive occurrences and corrective actions
for safety implications.

(6) Interfaces with EH in the future development of ES&H Orders to ensure
that the requirements are integrated with the requirements of DOE O
452.1A, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY
PROGRAM, dated 1-17-97, and that divergence does not occur.

d. Managers of Operations Offices.

(1) Ensure that responsibilities and authorities are clearly defined and
delegated at appropriate management and supervisory levels.

(2) Authorize nuclear explosive operations in accordance with the
requirements of this Order.

(3) Approve HARs.

(4) Integrate ES&H requirements into nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities while maintaining appropriate focus on nuclear
explosive safety.

(5) Approve NES Survey Reports.

(6) Designate PAP certifying officials.

(7) Approve exemptions to the requirements of this Order in accordance with
the provisions of 4i, above.

6. REFERENCES.

a. DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,
dated 9-25-95.

b. DOE O 210.1, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND ANALYSIS OF
OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-27-95.

c. DOE O 231.1, ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH REPORTING,
dated 9-30-95.

d. DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF
OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-95.

e. DOE O 360.1, TRAINING, dated 5-31-95.

f. DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, dated 10-13-95.

g. DOE O 425.1, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES,
dated 9-29-95.

h. DOE O 440.1, WORKER PROTECTION MANAGEMENT FOR DOE
FEDERAL AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES, dated 9-30-95.

i. DOE O 452.1A, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY
PROGRAM, dated 1-17-97.

j. DOE G 452A-1A, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR USE WITH DOE O
452.2A, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS, dated
1-17-97.

k. DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, dated 9-28-95.

l. DOE 4330.4B, MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, dated 2-10-94.

m. DOE 5480.11, RADIATION PROTECTION FOR OCCUPATIONAL
WORKERS, dated 6-17-92.

n. DOE 5480.19, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR DOE
FACILITIES, dated 7-9-90.

o. DOE 5480.20A, PERSONNEL SELECTION, QUALIFICATION, AND
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, dated 11-
15-94.

p. DOE 5480.21, UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS, dated 12-24-91.

q. DOE 5480.22, TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS, dated 2-25-92.

r. DOE 5480.23, NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS, dated 4-10-92.

s. DOE 5480.24, NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY, dated 8-12-92.

t. DOE 5480.31, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES,
dated 9-15-93.

u. DOE 5483.1A, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM FOR
DOE CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES AT GOVERNMENT-OWNED
CONTRACTOR-OPERATED FACILITIES, dated 6-22-83.

v. DOE 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM
OPERATIONS, dated 5-12-93.

w. DOE P 450.4, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM POLICY, dated 10-15-96.

x. DOE M 232.1-1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF
OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-95.

y. DOE M 251.1-1, DIRECTIVES SYSTEM MANUAL, dated 10-16-95.

z. DOE M 440.1-1, DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL, dated 9-30-95.

aa. DOE N 441.1, RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION FOR DOE ACTIVITIES,
dated 9-30-95.

bb. DOE-STD-1048-92, Performance Indicators Guidance Document, dated 12-92.

cc. DOE-STD-1073-93, Guide for Operational Configuration Management
Programs, dated 11-93.

dd. DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy
Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, dated 7-94.

ee. DOE-STD-3015-97, Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Process, dated 1-97.

ff. DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy
Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosive Operations, TBD.

gg. Interim Personnel Assurance Program Procedures and Standards, published on
10-02-96.

hh. 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Section 120, "Quality Assurance
Requirements."

ii. 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection.

jj. G-830.120, Implementation Guide for use with 10 CFR Part 830.120, Quality
Assurance, dated 4-15-94.

kk. Joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense (DOE/DoD) Technical
Publication 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria, dated 9-1-86.

ll. Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 35-51, General Instructions Applicable to
Nuclear Weapons, dated 11-27-89.

mm. Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 45-51, Transportation of Nuclear Weapons
Material, General Shipping and Limited Life Components (LLC), dated 3-16-84.

oo. Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 45-51A, Transportation of Nuclear
Weapons Material (Supplement), Shipping and Identification Data for Stockpile
Major Assemblies, dated 2-1-80.

pp. Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 45-51D, Transportation of Nuclear
Weapons Material (Supplement), Shipment by Safe-Secure-Trailer (SST), dated
7-14-89.

7. CONTACT. DP-20, Office of Weapons Surety (DP-21), 301-903-3463. DEFINITIONS

This attachment provides the definitions pertinent to DOE O 452.2A.

1. Access. The proximity to a nuclear explosive that affords a person the opportunity to
tamper with it or to cause a detonation.

2. Certified Personnel (for nuclear explosive duties). Operations personnel who are current
with respect to Personnel Assurance Program (PAP) certification and the training and
qualification program for the specific nuclear explosive operation to which they are
assigned.

3. Custody. Responsibility for control of and access to nuclear explosives.

4. Defense-In-Depth. Multiple layers of protection (e.g., equipment design, procedures,
and training) to prevent accidents and/or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

5. Electrical Equipment. Custom designed and fabricated devices or commercial devices
(both modified and unmodified) used in performing operations on a nuclear explosive
that do not connect to the electrical circuitry of the nuclear explosive.

6. Electrical Testers. Custom designed and fabricated devices or commercial devices (both
modified and unmodified) used in performing operations on the electrical circuitry of a
nuclear explosive.

7. Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H). The application of risk reduction measures to
control or mitigate the possibility of exposing the public, workers, and environment to
hazardous materials or hazardous energy. This includes, for example, environmental
protection, nuclear safety, criticality safety, occupational safety, fire protection, industrial
hygiene, health physics, occupational medicine, industrial safety, and radioactive and
hazardous waste management.

8. Facility. Any equipment, structure, system, process, or activity that fulfills a specific
purpose.

9. Fissile Material Contamination. Release of fissile material in excess of that controlled
and monitored by DOE radiological protection programs.

10. Fissile Material Dispersal. The aerosolization and transport of fissile material by a
driving force, such as fire, high-explosive deflagration, or high-explosive detonation.

11. Graded Approach. A process by which the level of analysis, documentation, and actions
necessary to comply with a requirement in this Order are commensurate with the relative
importance to safety and the magnitude of any hazard involved.

12. Hazard Analysis. The determination of material, system, process, and plant
characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences, followed by the assessment of
hazardous situations associated with a process or activity.

13. Hazard Analysis Report (HAR). A report that documents the systematic evaluation of
hazards to workers, the public, and the environment for a specific nuclear explosive
operation and its associated activities.

14. High-Explosive Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in which the output of heat is
sufficient for the reaction to proceed and be accelerated without input of heat from
another source. Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the reaction products
flowing away from the unreacted material along the surface at subsonic velocity.

15. High-Explosive Detonation. A violent chemical reaction within a chemical compound or
mechanical mixture evolving heat and pressure. A detonation is a reaction that proceeds
through the reacted material toward the unreacted material at a supersonic velocity.

16. Main Charge. The high explosive whose explosive energy implodes the pit.

17. Nuclear Detonation. An energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of
time on the order of one microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by
detonating four or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

18. Nuclear Explosive. An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials and
main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear
detonation (e.g., a nuclear weapon or test device).

19. Nuclear Explosive Area (NEA). Any area that contains a nuclear explosive or collocated
pit and main charge high-explosive parts.

20. Nuclear Explosive Duty. Work assignments that allow custody of a nuclear explosive or
access to a nuclear explosive area.

21. Nuclear Explosive Hazards Assessment (NEHA). A systematic evaluation of hazards
that could lead to a nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire
in nuclear explosive areas.

22. Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA). An assembly that is not a nuclear explosive
but that represents a nuclear explosive in its basic configuration (main charge high
explosive and pit) and any subsequent level of assembly up to its final configuration, or
which represents a weaponized nuclear explosive such as a warhead, bomb, reentry
vehicle, or artillery shell. A NELA does not contain an arrangement of high-explosive
and fissile material capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

23. Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a nuclear explosive, including
activities in which main charge high-explosive parts and pit are collocated.

24. Nuclear Explosive Operation-Associated Activities. Activities directly associated with a
specific nuclear explosive operation, such as work on a bomb nose or tail subassembly,
even when physically separated from the bomb s nuclear explosive subassembly.

25. Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES). The application of positive measures to control or
mitigate the possibility of unintended or unauthorized nuclear detonation, high-explosive
detonation or deflagration, or fire in a nuclear explosive area.

26. Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules (NESRs). Safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
requirements, safety boundaries, and management and administrative controls that
significantly contribute to minimizing the possibility of nuclear detonation,
high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire in nuclear explosive operations.

27. Nuclear Explosive Safety Study. A formal evaluation of the adequacy of positive
measures to meet the DOE Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards.

28. Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Revalidation. A formal evaluation to determine whether
a nuclear explosive operation has significantly changed since its Nuclear Explosive
Safety Study was approved.

29. Nuclear Explosive Safety Survey. A formal nuclear explosive safety evaluation based on
a comparative analysis of the operation with the nuclear explosive operation evaluated in
a current and approved Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Report.

30. Nuclear Weapon. A nuclear explosive configured for DoD use.

31. One-Point Safe Nuclear Explosive. A nuclear explosive that, in the event a detonation is
initiated at any one point in the high-explosive system, presents no greater probability
than one in a million of producing a nuclear detonation.

32. Operational Safety Controls (OSCs). Safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
requirements, safety boundaries, and management and administrative controls that
significantly contribute to protecting workers, the public, and the environment from
hazards other than nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation and deflagration, and
fire (which are addressed by Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules) for specific nuclear
explosive operations and associated activities.

33. Permanent Marking. A durable method, normally by metal deformation, of indicating on
an external area of an assembly whether it is a nuclear explosive or a nuclear explosive-
like assembly.

34. Personnel Assurance Program (PAP). A program that establishes the requirements and
responsibilities for screening, selecting, and continuously evaluating employees assigned
to or being considered for assignment to nuclear explosive duties.

35. Pit (Live). A fissile component, or set of fissile components, designed to fit in the
central cavity of an implosion system and which if placed therein will create a nuclear
explosive.

36. Positive Measures. Design features, safety rules, procedures, or other controls used
individually or collectively to provide nuclear explosive surety. Positive measures are
intended to ensure a safe response in applicable operations and to be controllable. Some
examples of positive measures are strong-link switches; other safety devices;
administrative procedures and controls; general and specific nuclear explosive safety
rules; design control of electrical equipment and mechanical tooling; and physical,
electrical, and mechanical restraints incorporated in facilities and transport equipment.

37. Reader Worker Procedure and Check-Off. A procedure used during specified nuclear
explosive operations in which one person reads the description of the operation to be
performed, the operation is performed, and the reader checks off on a list that the
operation has been performed.

38. Readiness Review. A disciplined, systematic, documented, performance-based
examination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and management control
systems to ensure that a facility will be operated within its approved safety envelope as
defined by the facility safety basis.

39. Risk. The qualitative or quantitative expression of possible loss that considers both the
likelihood that an event will occur and the consequence of that event.

40. Safety Analysis. A documented process to: (1) provide systematic identification of
hazards within facilities in which nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
are conducted and within specific nuclear explosive operations and associated activities;
(2) describe and analyze the adequacy of measures taken to eliminate, control, or
mitigate identified hazards; and (3) analyze and evaluate potential accidents and their
associated risks.

41. Safety Analysis Report (SAR). A report that documents the results of safety analysis to
ensure that a facility can be constructed, operated, maintained, shut down, and
decommissioned safely and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

42. Safety Basis. The collection of information related to controlling the hazards of an
operation used to determine that operations can be conducted safely within the facility.

43. Safety-Class Structures, Systems, and Components (safety-class SSCs). Structures,
systems, or components including primary environmental monitors and portions of
process systems, whose failure could adversely affect the environment or safety and
health of the public as identified by safety analyses.

44. Safety Critical Equipment. Any equipment that upon failure may cause a significant
safety vulnerability.

45. Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components (safety- significant SSCs).
Structures, systems, and components not designated as safety-class SSCs but whose
preventive or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense-in-depth (i.e.,
prevention of uncontrolled material releases) and/or worker safety as determined from
hazard analysis.

46. Significant Safety Incident. An incident that results in serious injury or abnormal
radiation exposure to personnel, initiation of any explosive or pyrotechnic, rupture of a
high-pressure vessel, or abnormal release of radiological contamination. This list is not
meant to be all inclusive; reasonable judgment is expected.

47. Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). Those requirements that define the conditions,
the safe boundaries, and the management or administrative controls necessary to ensure
the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and
facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials or from radiation
exposures due to inadvertent criticality. TSRs consist of safety limits, operating limits
(limiting condition for operation and limiting control setting), surveillance requirements,
administrative controls, use and application instructions, and the basis thereof. TSRs
were formerly known as "operational safety requirements" for nonreactor nuclear
facilities and "technical specifications" for reactor facilities.

48. Temporary Marking. A nondurable marking method on an external area, attached to an
assembly, or otherwise marked, indicating the configuration of a nuclear explosive-like
assembly.

49. Use Control. The application of systems, devices, or procedures that allow timely
authorized use of a nuclear explosive while precluding or delaying unauthorized use
(nuclear detonation).