Role
The Department of Energy's national security mission is based on the Manhattan
Project, the development of nuclear weapons during and following World War II.
The legacy includes independent design capabilities, redundant design teams,
competition, and intense efforts to achieve the highest standards of safety,
surety and reliability. The three weapons laboratories - Lawrence Livermore,
Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories - have evolved over a period of
more than fifty years. It is clear that they played a key part in the
successful outcome of the nuclear standoff with the former Soviet Union. For
this, the entire nation owes a debt of gratitude to the women and men of these
laboratories, past and present, who gave their talent to this successful
endeavor.
The end of the Cold War has brought substantial change. Weapons modernization,
arms control agreements, the fear of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and the significant decline in defense spending require a
restructuring of the laboratories' support for the national security mission.
Today, these laboratories represent an extraordinary national resource of
people, facilities, and experience. Every attempt should be made to use this
resource as missions change.
The requirements for the DOE and the weapons laboratories are based on
Presidential direction as approved in the Nuclear Stockpile Document and other
Presidential Decision Directives. Congress provides direction in laws and
committee reports. The Department of Defense (DOD) determines specific weapons
requirements and the Department of Energy determines how to fulfill those
requirements. The weapons laboratories then are assigned specific
responsibilities and funding to carry out DOE direction.[1]
The President stated in the National Security Strategy (July 1994) that a safe,
secure and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent remains a cornerstone of U.S.
national security policy. The President announced a moratorium on underground
nuclear testing with a goal of establishing a comprehensive test ban. He
instructed the DoD and DOE to explore means other than nuclear testing to
maintain confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of the weapons
stockpile. He also directed strong efforts to support the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and counter weapons of mass destruction. This direction is the basis
for DOE and DoD planning for the future and the Task Force's consideration of
alternate futures for the weapons laboratories.
The maintenance of a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, contributions to
critical proliferation and treaty issues, and participation in other national
priorities related to this mission are essential parts of the nuclear weapons
laboratories' future and require adequate facilities, motivated and capable
people, and the requisite budget. This future will require new types of
management, different technical personnel, and a mode of operation that is
closer to industry's than the laboratories have practiced in the past.
The Department of Defense conducted a Nuclear Posture Review[2], approved by the President, to determine future
nuclear forces and weapons requirements. Implementation of the START I and
START II protocols will result in a total nuclear weapons reduction of 79% by
the year 2003. As a unilateral action (Presidential Nuclear Initiatives I and
II), the U.S. will reduce by 90% non-strategic nuclear weapons. These steps
will result in a required stockpile of around 5000 weapons.
The Nuclear Posture Review identified the need for flexibility either to
accelerate the drawdown if both sides implement START II more quickly, or the
ability to return inactive weapons to service if the Russians suspend or delay
START II implementation. The weapons laboratories need the capability to
respond to either circumstance.
Over the past two years, the Department of Energy has established the
Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, replacing a test-based stockpile
stewardship, to maintain confidence in nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.
The focus of the new program includes improving experimental capabilities,
enhancing computational capabilities, advanced stockpile surveillance, advanced
manufacturing and materials capability, maintaining system engineering and
infrastructure and preserving a nuclear design and experimentation
capabilities.
Specific recommendations regarding the future of the weapons laboratories fall
into broad categories of mission, key personnel, configuration, peer review,
basic science, research facilities, and weapon production (including research,
production, tritium, and management). The Task Force believes that these
recommendations are consistent with Presidential Directives,[3 ] the Nuclear Policy Review, and the Science-based
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
The national security mission of the weapons laboratories has been
rearticulated to emphasize maintaining credibility in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile in the absence of explosive testing of nuclear weapons. The primary
mission of the weapons laboratories must be a safe, secure, and reliable
stockpile. Science-based stockpile stewardship (in comparison to a test-based
stockpile program) is the approach chosen by the Department of Energy to
achieve this mission. It requires the following rank-order priorities for the
core functions of stockpile stewardship as follows:
- Attracting and retaining skilled scientists, engineers, and managers over
the years ahead with the expertise required for the complex and demanding
stewardship role;
- Enhancing surveillance of weapons in the stockpile[4], during dismantlement, and of the nuclear materials
that accumulate as a result of that dismantlement;
- Continuing hydrodynamic testing as required to cope with problems;
- Assessing problems, reanalyzing previous data through numerical
simulations,
and developing appropriate data bases; and
- Sustaining the scientific process of inquiry through experimentation.
In today's world, proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction remains a major threat to U.S. national security. Because of this
threat the DOE laboratories' work in non-proliferation, counter-proliferation,
verification, and intelligence support has become a major mission as well as an
extension of their stewardship of the nuclear stockpile. These activities are
supported by the expertise maintained within the entire nuclear weapons
infrastructure. It is important that their funding be included within the core
infrastructure support. The Task Force notes that organizational
compartmentalization within the Department complicates and makes difficult the
appropriate inter-relationship and funding balance between stockpile support
and non-proliferation, and recommends that the Department's organization
reflect their importance and interdependence.
The weapons laboratories' management has an important responsibility to
identify the critical skills required for their national security mission and
to manage the hiring and retention of key personnel accordingly. The Task
Force recommends that management continue to sustain a stimulating intellectual
environment that will attract and retain the very best research and engineering
staff. This will require:
- Providing appropriate rewards for high performers;
- Weeding out weaker performers; and,
- Engendering in the research and engineering staff a sense of achievement,
based on personal responsibility and personal accountability.
The current structure of the three nuclear weapons laboratories should be
examined in light of the recently revised, official U.S. Nuclear Posture. The
Department of Energy should size its nuclear weapons laboratories support
efforts over time to match DoD requirements. The restructuring must be
accomplished in ways that preserve capabilities both for reduction to lower
levels of support and for an expansion of support should the resumption of a
threat to national security demand it. In addition, the restructuring must
support the requirement to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile in a
comprehensive test ban or under an extended moratorium. The restructuring will
affect primarily weapons design capabilities, where the largest functional
redundancy exists, and specifically Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL); LLNL supports only four of eleven weapons designs currently in the U.S.
stockpile.
The Task Force believes LLNL should retain enough nuclear weapons design
competence and technology base to continue its activities in non-proliferation,
counter-proliferation, intelligence support, and verification, to provide
independent review for several years while alternative approaches to peer
review are developed (see "Peer Review"), and to participate in weapons
relevant experiments on the National Ignition Facility (NIF). LLNL would
transfer, as cost-efficiency allows, over the next five years its activities in
nuclear materials development and production to the other design laboratory.
LLNL would transfer direct stockpile support to the other weapons laboratories
as the requirements of science-based stockpile stewardship, support of the DoD
nuclear posture, and the status of test bans allow. Under these conditions,
the Task Force believes that the transfer can be made in five years. The Task
Force notes that if the NIF is built at LLNL, this will reinforce the weapons
design capability at that laboratory.
The Task Force believes that the development of independent assessment of the
safety and reliability issues within an aging stockpile will be an ongoing
requirement of stockpile stewardship. It also believes, however, that there are
many ways in which this peer review function can be served, and that peer
review, in and of itself, does not justify the existence of two nuclear design
laboratories.
As new facilities are developed at the weapons laboratories for performing
science-based stockpile stewardship, the Task Force recommends that these
facilities be managed in as open and collaborative a fashion as national
security constraints will permit.
The Task Force recommends the following:[5]
- Continued funding support for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic
Testing
(DARHT) facility;
- Continued near-term support for Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Experiment/Los
Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LANSCE/LAMPF);
- Continued pursuit of advanced computing, including computing through
workstation networks; and,
- Proceeding with the National Ignition Facility (NIF) as a research facility,
prioritized with respect to other major research investments.
In its favor, NIF will provide a unique means for doing very important
experiments involving extremely high temperatures in condensed matter physics
and it thus will make it possible to maintain expertise in one of the areas of
physics fundamental to modern nuclear weapons design. Similarly, the data and
theory it will produce will contribute uniquely to science generally and to
astrophysics in particular. On the other hand, there is some possibility that
NIF will inadequately simulate secondaries, although this is already a lower
priority than understanding primaries. There is a low probability that
inertial fusion will become a useful source of energy in the foreseeable
future. NIF may not attract the scientists and engineers that stockpile
stewardship really needs. NIF may also complicate discussions at the
Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference and negotiations of a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. In short, NIF is a risk (as are most major research projects),
but on balance the Task Force supports its construction. An important
consideration is that the question of whether or not NIF is built at LLNL, when
combined with other recommendations for change given in this report and
elsewhere that could define the future of that laboratory.
The Task Force recommends that non-nuclear research activities continue at the
weapons laboratories as long as a paying customer requires them, as they are
rooted in nuclear weapons research, contribute to core R&D, and pay their
fair share of overhead and basic research support.
There is no need for nuclear weapons production at this time nor is start-up of
production envisioned for problems expected in the stockpile. Capability-based
deterrence requires, however, the potential for weapons production in the event
of increased threat that may arise in the future. The current world situation
and the existing production capability do not mandate investment in additional
production capability. The Task Force recommends that future production should
be based on the residual capabilities of Pantex, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories, and believes that no further
investments in production capability are needed at this time.
Accelerator-based production of tritium looks attractive, given today's
understanding of the technology. The Task Force, however, does not make a
recommendation relative to replacement, or to the mode of production, but
rather supports continued R&D in accelerator-based production of tritium.
As requirements for national security change, DoD and DOE must size their
organizations and improve their coordination for maximum effectiveness. The
DoD must act as an intelligent and prudent customer regarding nuclear weapons.
The separation, within the U.S. government, of nuclear weapons development and
operations is a long tradition and has recently been challenged in the interest
of efficiency. The Task Force, however, agreeing with most previous studies of
this issue, sees no compelling reason for DoD to manage the national security
activities at the weapons laboratories. Indeed, the Task Force believes that
there is much value at this time in maintaining an independent and technically
expert organization to focus on nuclear stockpile issues and to continue to
ensure that decisions regarding the safety, control, and stewardship of nuclear
weapons are raised to the high policy level that they deserve. The
corporatization proposal contained in Section VII in the Task Force report
could eliminate the management issues for both DoD and DOE and give a customer
focus to the weapons programs.
- The primary mission of the weapons laboratories must be a safe, secure
and reliable nuclear stockpile in the absence of explosive testing.
Science-based stockpile stewardship is the approach chosen be the Department to
achieve this mission. It requires the following rank-order priorities:
- Attracting and retaining skilled scientists, engineers, and managers over
the
years ahead with the expertise required for the complex and changing
stewardship role;
- Enhancing surveillance of weapons in the stock pile, during dismantlement,
and of the nuclear materials that accumulate as a result of the
dismantlement;
- Continuing hydrodynamic testing to cope with problems;
- Assessing problems, reanalyzing previous data through numerical simulations,
and developing appropriate data bases; and
- Sustaining the scientific process of inquiry through experimentation.
- Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, verification, and intelligence
support have become a major mission along with stewardship of the nuclear
stockpile. The Task Force notes that organizational compartmentalization
within the Department complicates and makes difficult the appropriate
inter-relationship and funding balance between support and non-proliferation,
and recommends that the Department's organization reflect their importance and
interdependence.
- The Task Force believes Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory should
retain enough nuclear weapons design competence and technology base to continue
its activities in non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, verification, an
intelligence support, to provide independent review for several years while
alternative approaches to peer review are developed, and to participate in
weapons relevant experiments on the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory would transfer as cost-efficiency allows over the
next five years its activities in nuclear materials development and production
to the other design laboratory. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory would
transfer direct stockpile support to the other weapons laboratories as the
requirements of science-based stockpile stewardship, support of the DoD nuclear
posture, and the status of the test bans allow.
- The Task Force recommends continued funding support for the Dual-Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT) facility; continued near-term support
for the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Experiment/Los Alamos Meson Physics
Facility (LANSCE/LAMPF); continued pursuit of advanced computing, including
computing through workstation networks; and proceeding with the National
Ignition Facility (NIF) as a research facility, balanced with respect to other
major investments.
- The Task Force recommends that future production needs should be based
on
residual capabilities of Pantex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia
National Laboratories, and believes that no further investments in production
capability are needed at this time.
To Section III, The
Energy, Environment, and Related Sciences and Engineering Role
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