DODM-4540.5-M DoD Nuclear Weapons Transportation Manual

FOREWORD

This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 4540.5, Logistic Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons," 4 February 1998. It provides guidance for the transport of nuclear weapons
by the DoD Components, expands on the transportation polices and responsibilities
established in DoD Directive 4540.5, and describes a range of transportation activities. It also
addresses safety, security, and use control guidance for the transport of nuclear Weapons.

This Manual applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Defense
Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

This Manual is effective immediately and is mandatory for use by all the DoD Components.

Send proposed changes to this Manual to:

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs
Attn: Deputy Assistant for Nuclear Matters
3050 Defense Pentagon, Room 3E808
Washington, DC 20301-3050

The DoD Components may obtain copies of this Manual through their own Publications
channels. Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Authorized registered users may
obtain copies from the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Road,
STE 0944, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218. Other Federal Agencies and the public may obtain
copies from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, 5285
Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Harold P. Smith, Jr.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 2

Table of Contents3

References5

Definitions7

Acronyms and Abbreviations11

CHAPTER 1 - DOD TRANSPORTATION POLICY

C1.1. General12

C1.2. Definitions12

CHAPTER 2 - DOD TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

C2.1. General19

C2.2. ATSD(NCB)19

C2.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff20

C2.4. The Secretaries of the Military Departments21

C2.5. The Secretary of the Air Force22

C2.6. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands23

CHAPTER 3 - TRANSPORT ACTIVITES

C3.1. General25

C3.2. DoD Transportation Activities25

C3.3. Transport Planning Factors26

C3.4. Joint DoD-DoE Transportation Activities28

C3.5. Safe Haven for DoE Transport Convoys28

C3.6. Transportation Training29

C3.7. Transportation Activities for Storage, Maintenance,
and Modification30

C3.8. Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections for Transport
Activites30

CHAPTER 4 - TRANSPORTATION SAFETY

C4.1. General31

C4.2. DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Policy and
Program31

C4.3. Transportation Safety Assessments32

TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

CHAPTER 5 - TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

C5.1. General34

C5.2. DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Policy and Program
34

C5.3. Transportation Security Assessments35

CHAPTER 6 - USE CONTROL DURING TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

C6.1. General36

C6.2. DoD Nuclear Weapons Use Control Policy36

C6.3. Nuclear Weapon Transport Control Requirements36

REFERENCES

(a) DoD Directive 4540.5, "Logistic Transportation
of Nuclear Weapons," January 1998

(b) DoD Directive 3150.2, "DoD Nuclear Weapon System
Safety Program," December 23, 1996

(d) DoD C-5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual
(U)," April 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5210.41,
September 23, 1988

(e) Technical Publication 20-7, "Nuclear Safety Criteria
(U)," Secret, September 1, 1986 1

(f) "U.S. Air Force Special Weapons Overflight Guide
(U)," Secret, August 6, 1989 2

(g) Technical Publication 20-11, "General Firefighting
Guidance (U)," Confidential, July 31, 1995 1

(h) DoD Directive 3150.8, "DoD Response to Radiological
Accidents," June 13, 1996

(i) DoD 5100.52-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response
Procedures (NARP)," September 1990, authorized by DoD
Directive 3150.8, June 13, 1996

(j) Technical Publication 45-51C, "Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons Materiel (Supplement) - Military Criteria
for Shipment," July 15, 1995 1

(k) DoD Directive 5210.42, "Nuclear Weapon Personnel
Reliability Program (PRP)," May 25, 1993

(l) DoD Directive S-3150.7, "Controlling the Use of
Nuclear Weapons (U)," June 20, 1994

(m) Technical Publication 45-51, "Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons Materiel - General Shipping and Limited
Life Component (LLC) Data," March 16, 1984 1

(n) Technical Publication 45-51A, "Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons Materiel Shipping and Identification
Data for Stockpile Major Assemblies (U)," Secret, January
15, 1996 1

(o) Technical Publication 45-51B, "Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons Materiel (Supplement) - Palletized Cargo,"
December 1, 1976 1

(p) Technical Publication 45-51D, "Transportation of
Nuclear Weapons Materiel (Supplement) - Shipment by
Safe-Secure Trailer (SST)," March 16, 1984 1

(q) Technical Publication 45-51F, "Shipment by DoE
(Air)," March 16, 1984

(r) Technical Publication 25-1, "DoD Nuclear Weapons
Technical Inspection System," October 1, 1996 1

(s) CJCSM 3150.04, "Joint Reporting Structure Nuclear
Weapons Reports (U)," Secret-FRD, December 15, 1995
3

(t) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department
of Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration
for Temporary Storage of U.S. ERDA Shipments at Military
Installations, December 24, 1975 1

(u) Technical Publication 100-4, "Custody, Accountability,
and Control of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Materiel,"
December 1, 1993 1

(v) Technical Publication 50-2, "Procedures for the
Use and Control of Logistics and Depot Storage Codes
for Permissive Action Link (PAL) Equipped Weapons (U),"
Confidential, June 14, 1996 1

(w) CJCSI 3260.01, "Joint Policy Governing Positive
Control Materiel and Devices (U)," Secret-FRD, July
31, 1995 3

1 Available from the Defense Special Weapons Agency;
FCDSWA Attn: FCPSP, 1690 Texas Street, SE, Kirtland
AFB, NM 87117-5669.

2 Available from the U.S. Air Force Treaties and Agreements
Branch; HQ USAF/XONP, Rm. 1D373, Attn: Dale Cheney,
1480 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-1480.

3 Available through normal channels and from Defense
Special Weapons Agency, FCDSWA, 1690 texas St., SE,
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669.

DL1. DEFINITIONS

DL1.1. Terms used in this Manual are defined, below:

DL1.1.1. Abnormal Environments. Environments as
defined in a nuclear weapon's stockpile-to-target sequence
and military characteristics in which the weapon is
not expected to retain full operational reliability.

DL1.1.2. Certification. A formal determination by
the applicable DoD Component that personnel, facilities,
organizations, equipment, and procedures may perform
or be used to perform assigned nuclear missions.

DL1.1.3. Command Disable System (CDS). A system internal
to a bomb or a warhead that, when activated, destroys
a weapon's ability to achieve a significant nuclear
yield. Disablement is achieved by nonviolent means.

DL1.1.4. Custody. Responsibility for the control
of, transfer and movement of, and access to, nuclear
weapons. Custody also includes maintenance of accountability
for nuclear weapons.

DL1.1.5. Exclusion Area. A designated area immediately
surrounding one or more nuclear weapons, the boundaries
of which normally are the walls, floor, and ceiling
of a structure or are delineated by a permanent or temporary
barrier.

DL1.1.6. Handling. The process by which weapons are
physically manipulated directly or indirectly by people
(characterized as lifting, sliding, hoisting, or lowering
through the use of manpower, cranes, forklifts, or hoists).

DL1.1.7. Insensitive High Explosive (IHE). High explosive
that requires a shock of more than usual strength to
cause detonation.

DL1.1.8. Life-Cycle Process. The breadth of activities
applicable to a nuclear weapon throughout its lifetime,
which includes development, production, stockpile maintenance,
and retirement.

DL1.1.9. Limited Area. A designated area immediately
surrounding one or more exclusion areas. Normally,
this is between the boundaries of the exclusion areas
and the outer or inner fence or boundary of the perimeter
security system.

DL1.1.10. Limited Life Component (LLC). A component
used in a nuclear weapon whose performance degrades
over time and that must be replaced on a periodic basis.

DL1.1.11. Logistic Transport. The transport of nuclear
weapons associated with peacetime deployment requirements,
maintenance, quality assurance and reliability testing,
and retirement.

DL1.1.12. Military First Destination (MFD). Designated
continental United States (CONUS) military locations
that receive, and accept into the DoD stockpile, direct
shipments of nuclear ordnance materiel from the Department
of Energy contractor plants.

DL1.1.13. Military Requirement. An established need
justifying the transport of a nuclear weapon to accomplish
approved logistic actions such as deployment, maintenance,
quality assurance and reliability testing, or retirement.

DL1.1.14. Normal Environments. The expected logistic
and operational environments, as defined in a nuclear
weapon's stockpile-to-target sequence and military characteristics,
that the weapon is required to survive without degradation
of operational reliability or safety.

DL1.1.15. Nuclear Weapon. A complete assembly (i.e.,
implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in
its intended ultimate configuration that, on completion
of the prescribed arming, fuzing, and firing sequence,
is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction
and release of energy.

DL1.1.16. Nuclear Weapon Movement. The phase of a
transport operation in which a nuclear weapon is physically
conveyed from one location to another. The term "logistic
movement" may be used interchangeably with nuclear weapon
movement.

DL1.1.17. Nuclear Weapon System. A nuclear weapon
and the means to deliver it to its target.

DL1.1.18. Nuclear Weapon Transport Operation. The
process of moving a nuclear weapon from one location
to another location, including the activities necessary
to authorize the movement, plan the movement, prepare
the weapon for movement, move the weapon, and receive
the weapon at its destination.

DL1.1.19. Positive Measures. Design features, safety
rules, procedures, or other controls, including physical
security and coded systems, used collectively or individually
to reduce the likelihood, severity, or consequences
of an accident or deliberate threat involving a nuclear
weapon or nuclear weapon system.

DL1.1.20. Safe Haven. Temporary storage provided
DoE classified shipment transporters at DoD facilities
in order to ensure safety and security of nuclear material
and/or nonnuclear classified material.

DL1.1.21. Safe-Secure Trailer (SST). A modified semi-trailer
that is used for highway transport of special nuclear
materiel, including nuclear weapons. SSTs are armored
and include penetration sensing and deterrent materiels.
They are owned and operated by the DoE.

DL1.1.22. Safety. The positive measures used to protect
public health and the environment from accidental or
inadvertent actions involving nuclear weapons that may
result in detonation (high explosive or nuclear) or
in dispersal or release of hazardous or radioactive
materiels.

DL1.1.23. Security. The prevention of loss of custody,
theft, or diversion of a nuclear weapon system; prevention
of unauthorized access; or prevention of unauthorized
actions, vandalism, sabotage, and malevolent damage.

DL1.1.24. Stockpile-To-Target Sequence. A document
that defines the logistical and employment concepts
and related physical environments involved in the delivery
of a nuclear weapon from the stockpile to the target.
It may also define the logistic flow involved in moving
nuclear weapons to and from the stockpile for quality
assurance testing, modification and retrofit, and the
recycling of LLCs.

DL1.1.25. Transport Carrier. A specific, certified
means of conveying a nuclear weapon from one location
to another location. Air transport carriers include
fixed-wing aircraft. Water transport carriers include
barges of the U.S. Navy. Ground transport carriers
include DoE-owned SSTs and military-owned vehicles.

DL1.1.26. Transport Mode. The type of conveyance
(e.g., air, water, or ground) used to move a nuclear
weapon from one location to another location.

DL1.1.27. Transportation Mission. A movement of nuclear
weapons involving a single transport carrier that may
include interim stops between the origin and the final
destination.

DL1.1.28. Use Control. The positive measures that
allow the authorized use and prevent or delay unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons. Use control is accomplished
through a combination of weapon system design features,
operational procedures, and safety rules.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AL1.1. Acronyms and abbreviations used in this Manual
are provided below:

AL1.1.1. ATSD(NCB)

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

AL1.1.2. CDS

Command Disable System.

AL1.1.3. CONUS

Continental United States.

AL1.1.4. DSWA

Defense Special Weapons Agency.

AL1.1.5. DoD

Department of Defense.

AL1.1.6. DoE

Department of Energy.

AL1.1.7. ERDA

Energy Research and Development Administration.

AL1.1.8. FCDSWA

Field Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency.

AL1.1.9. IHE

Insensitive high explosive.

AL1.1.10. JNWPS

Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System.

AL1.1.11. LLC

Limited Life Component.

AL1.1.12. MFD

Militarty first destination.

AL1.1.13. MTO

Materiel transfer order.

AL1.1.14. NWTI

Nuclear weapons technical inspection.

AL1.1.15. OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense.

AL1.1.16. PRP

Personnel Reliability Program.

AL1.1.17. SST

Safe-secure trailer (DoE).

AL1.1.18. SWOG

U.S. Air Force Special Weapons Overflight Guide

(Reference (f)).

AL1.1.19. TP

Technical publications (DoE and/or DWSA).

AL1.1.20. TSD

Transportation Safeguards Division (DoE).

AL1.1.21. U.S.

United States.

C1. CHAPTER 1

DOD TRANSPORTATION POLICY

C1.1. GENERAL

C1.1.1. The Department of Defense has nuclear weapons
deployed at locations in and outside the CONUS. Transport
operations to support those deployments must be planned
and conducted in a safe and secure manner due to the
nature of nuclear weapons. This Chapter elaborates
on the policy for the logistic transport of nuclear
weapons established in DoD Directive 4540.5 (reference
(a)). 1

C1.1.2. Logistic transport operations include, but
are not limited to, movements to and from MFD, operational
bases, or storage facilities; movements between operational
bases and storage locations; movements between operational
bases and missile silos; and movements between ships
and between ship and shore. Logistic transport does
not include movements in limited areas.

C1.1.3. The policies prescribed for logistic transport
of nuclear weapons apply to operational transport and
emergency logistic movements to the maximum extent possible.
Primarily, operational transport is guided by the
operational plans of the responsible DoD organization
and relevant TP, and will be responsive to the assigned
mission and the exigency of the operational situation.
Operational transport includes, but is not limited
to, aircraft generation; force generation exercises;
ballistic missile submarine deployments; and movements
related to weapon employment.

C1.2. NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSPORTATION POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

C1.2.1. Nuclear weapons require special consideration
because of their political and military importance and
the potential consequences of an accident, incident,
or unauthorized act.

C1.2.2. The DoD Components shall take precautions to
ensure that a nuclear weapon movement has minimal impact
on public health, safety, and the environment.

1 Extracts from reference (a) are denoted in bold type
in the text.

C1.2.3. DoD nuclear weapon system safety policy, DoD
nuclear weapon system safety standards, and DoD nuclear
weapon security policy and criteria shall apply to nuclear
weapon transport operations.

C1.2.3.1. DoD nuclear weapon system safety policy and
the four DoD nuclear weapon system safety standards
are described in DoD Directive 3150.2 (reference (b)).
Also see Chapter 4 for additional detail.

C1.2.3.2. DoD nuclear weapon security policy and criteria
are described in DoD Directive 5210.41 and DoD C-5210.41-M
(references (c) and (d)). Also, see Chapter 5 for
additional detail.

C1.2.3.3. Minimum spacing, numerical limits, and plutonium
limits, as specified in TP 20-7 (reference (e)), must
be observed during the transport of nuclear weapons.

C1.2.3.4. Within allowable safety limits, nuclear weapon
transport operations may be combined. When space is
available, compatible opportune cargo may be carried.

C1.2.3.4.1. Airlifting opportune cargo during nuclear
weapon transport operations is not permitted if doing
so may necessitate additional landings, delaying or
rerouting the mission or additional in-flight refueling
of the aircraft due to the extra weight.

C1.2.3.4.2. Airlifting passengers, except those directly
associated with the transportation operation, is not
authorized.

C1.2.4. Nuclear weapon movements shall be kept to the
minimum consistent with military requirements.

C1.2.5. Nuclear weapon transport operations shall be
conducted through the transport modes and movement routes
that balance safety, security, and military requirements.

C1.2.5.1. A primary consideration in choosing transport
modes and movement routes shall be to ensure that safety
and security are maintained and that neither is unacceptably
degraded at the expense of the other. For any given
transport operation, the safest transport mode may not
be the most secure, and vice versa.

C1.2.5.1.1. The balance of safety and security for
a nuclear weapon transport operation will consider relevant
factors. The most significant of those include number
and type of weapons, transport mode, plutonium dispersal
mechanism, threats, length of movement, and bilateral
agreements with allies.

C1.2.5.1.2. Each transport mode currently in use for
nuclear weapon movements has unique advantages. Different
segments of a movement may require the use of different
transport modes. Different transport carriers pose
different safety and security risks Certain transport
modes are not viable for particular transport operations.
The Department of Defense maintains a variety of transport
carriers to provide a flexible set of transport alternatives.

C1.2.5.1.3. Military Departments shall notify the ATSD(NCB)
of the decertification of a class of transport carriers
no later than 30 days after decertification.

C1.2.5.1.4. The decision to conduct a nuclear weapon
transport operation shall be a specific qualitative
judgment by the responsible official for each movement.

C1.2.5.2. Nuclear weapon movements should be planned
to minimize the number of stops or landings of the transport
carrier.

C1.2.5.3. The balance of safety and security concerns
must be reevaluated when the factors impacting the safety
or security of the operation change significantly.

C1.2.5.4. If an emergency requires an immediate landing
and the aircraft commander must choose between communication
security and flight safety, safety will take precedence.

C1.2.5.5. In planning for nuclear weapon movements,
consideration should be given to known and potential
risks; current intelligence estimates of the general
and local threats to the point of origin, routes, en
route stops, and destination of the transport operation;
the transport mode; the availability of security resources;
the source and availability of emergency assistance;
and operational security.

C1.2.5.6. Planning for ground transport operations
should also include convoy procedures; adequate handling
and support equipment at departure and destination points;
and coordination with Government intelligence Agencies
and law-enforcement Agencies, as applicable.

C1.2.5.7. Minimum essential navigation and communication
equipment, as specified by the applicable Military Department,
must be available and operable aboard the transport
carrier or the transport operation will be terminated.

C1.2.5.8. Aircraft transporting nuclear weapons are
prohibited from approaching in an unsafe distance of
unfriendly borders. Positive measures must be developed
to prevent overflight of or landing in unfriendly territory
or in countries where those actions are prohibited.
The terms "unfriendly border," "unsafe distance,"
and "unfriendly territory" are defined in the U.S. Air
Force SWOG, (reference (f)). Reference (f) is applicable
to all elements of the Department of Defense. The
U.S. Air Force shall maintain reference (f) and make
copies available to the DoD Components.

C1.2.5.9. Technical procedures for fire-fighting operations
are prescribed in TP 20-11 (reference (g)).

C1.2.5.10. For an accident or significant incident
during a nuclear weapon transport operation, emergency
response procedures, in accordance with DoD Directive
3150.8 (reference (h)) and DoD 5100.52-M (reference
(i)) shall be executed.

C1.2.6. The movement by air of nuclear weapons that
contain high explosives other than insensitive high
explosives (IHE) should be approved by the Secretary
of the Military Department or a Commander of the Combatant
Command, or their delegated commanders.

C1.2.6.1. That approval authority may be delegated,
in accordance with subsections C2.4.5. and C2.6.5. of
Chapter 2.

C1.2.6.2. All movement approvals must be accomplished
before a movement is made.

C1.2.7. Procedures, equipment, and facilities involved
in the transport of nuclear weapons shall be certified
for that purpose.

C1.2.7.1. Detailed technical and operational procedures
and all equipment used in transport operations shall
be certified and periodically recertified. The procedures
for certification shall be documented in Military Department
regulations and JNWPS TPs, when applicable.

C1.2.7.2. Properly certified handling and support equipment,
as determined by the Military Department, must be available
at departure and destination points. Equipment certification
must be complete before use in transport operations.

C1.2.7.3. Nuclear weapons must be loaded and unloaded
through nuclear-certified military terminal facilities
only. Certification of nuclear weapon facilities involved
in nuclear weapon transport operations shall be based
on successful completion of an in spection conducted
under the NWTI System.

C1.2.7.4. When previously certified procedures, equipment,
or facilities are modified significantly, re-certification
shall be required before transport operations may resume.

C1.2.8. Personnel and organizations involved in the
transport of nuclear weapons shall be trained and certified
for the activities they perform.

C1.2.8.1. Training should include the subject areas
applicable to individual personnel duties. A partial
list of applicable subject areas is provided in TP 45-51C
(reference (j)).

C1.2.8.2. Certification of personnel involved in the
transport of nuclear weapons shall be accomplished through
formal training, on-the-job training, and evaluations
of individual technical proficiency to meet relevant
Military Department standards, and participation in
the PRP, in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.42 (reference
(k)).

C1.2.8.3. The number of personnel shall be kept to
the minimum necessary for effective operations. Those
personnel accompanying a nuclear weapon movement will
be cross-trained to assume other duties if other personnel
become incapacitated.

C1.2.8.4. National Guard and Reserve air crews shall
not be used for nuclear weapon transport operations
without the specific prior approval of the Secretary
of Defense. In such cases, active duty U.S. military
custody is required.

C1.2.8.5. Certification of organizations involved in
nuclear weapon transport operations shall be based on
successful completion of an inspection conducted under
the NWTI System.

C1.2.9. U.S. custody of nuclear weapons shall be maintained
at all times during logistic movements. That requirement
shall not be waived.

C1.2.9.1. DoD nuclear weapon use control policy will
be followed. (See DoD Directive S-3150.7, reference
(l).)

C1.2.9.2. Movements of nuclear weapons shall be accompanied
by a courier appointed or designated by the applicable
DoD Component. The courier will be responsible for
custody and control of the weapons during the transport
operation.

C1.2.9.3. Courier responsibilities, documentation requirements
for accountability, and other detailed procedures related
to the conduct of ground, air, and water movements of
nuclear weapons are prescribed in TP 45-51C (reference
(j)).

C1.2.9.3.1. Designated couriers shall be responsible
for overall security during a nuclear weapon movement.
Couriers shall execute assigned duties regardless
of any other security measures taken by personnel at
loading or off-loading locations or at temporary stops
en route.

C1.2.9.3.2. When operational necessity dictates, and
in accordance with command directives, the courier shall
be responsible for disabling weapons equipped with a
CDS.

C1.2.9.3.3. During weapon movements by air, the courier
is subordinate to the aircraft commander only in matters
related to flight safety and operations.

C1.2.9.4. A system of communications shall be maintained,
with multi- frequency capability, between the responsible
commander (through a communications control center),
the individual in charge of the specific movement, and
security personnel. Specific communications requirements
are dependent on the transport carrier in use and will
be determined, in accordance with applicable Military
Department regulations.

C1.2.10. A commander may deviate from logistic transport
policy when the loss of a weapon's custody is imminent
or when the weapon may be exposed to an abnormal environment.
In areas outside the continental United States, command
disable procedures shall be used if loss of the weapon
is imminent.

C1.2.10.1. That policy is intended to provide a commander
the flexibility to react to an unanticipated event or
environment.

C1.2.10.2. Command disable procedures shall be conducted,
in accordance with DoD Directive S-3150.7 (reference
(l)).

C1.2.10.3. Maintaining custody should take precedence
over other considerations.

C1.2.10.4. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, or their
specifically designated representatives or Service Component
Commanders, have authority to order emergency logistic
movement of nuclear weapons. Exercise of emergency
movement authority is restricted to situations wherein
the safety, security, or control of nuclear assets is
endangered or emergency logistic movement is dictated
by a pending regional or world crisis, or natural disaster
(e.g., earthquake). Emergency logistic movement is,
as follows:

C1.2.10.4.1. The movement of nuclear weapons between
weapons storage facilities for military contingency
or logistic supply during periods of political or military
tension; or,

C1.2.10.4.2. The emergency evacuation of nuclear weapons
under conditions such that noncompliance with portions
of the nuclear and flight safety regulations is the
only alternative to destruction or loss of the weapon.

C2. CHAPTER 2

DoD TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES

C2.1. GENERAL

The responsibilities of the DoD Components for the logistic
transportation of nuclear weapons are established in
DoD Directive 4540.5 (reference (a)). 2 This Chapter
elaborates on those responsibilities.

C2.2. ATSD(NCB)

The ATSD(NCB), under the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, shall:

C2.2.1. Be responsible for policy and technical matters
associated with the transportation of nuclear weapons
and shall:

C2.2.1.1. Serve as the proponent for reference (a)
and this Manual.

C2.2.1.2. In coordination with the DoD Components,
direct compensatory measures for nuclear weapon transport
operations to address special safety concerns, as required.

C2.2.1.3. When required, provide guidance, in coordination
with the Military Departments and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on prioritization of DoD nuclear
weapon movements.

C2.2.2. Serve as the OSD principal point of contact
for nuclear weapon transportation matters with the DoD
Components, the Department of Energy (DoE), the Department
of State, the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, and the
other Government Agencies, and shall:

C2.2.2.1. Direct, as applicable, the DoD Components
to conduct assessments of nuclear weapon transport operations.

C2.2.2.2. Ensure that nuclear weapon transportation
safety and security are addressed in DoD Directives
3150.2 and 5210.41, and DoD C-5210.41-M (references
(b) through (d)).

2 Extracts from reference (a) are denoted in bold type
in the text.

C2.2.2.3. Ensure that nuclear weapon transportation
use control is addressed in DoD Directive S-3150.7 (reference
(l)).

C2.2.3. Ensure that the Director, Defense Special Weapons
Agency (DSWA), shall:

C2.2.3.1. Provide technical support, advice, and assistance
to the DoD Components on the transport of nuclear weapons,
when requested, and shall:

C2.2.3.1.1 Ensure that guidance and procedures in JNWPS
TPs (TP 45 series, references (j) and (m) through (q))
are consistent with the requirements of references (b)
through (d), and the SWOG (reference (f)).

C2.2.3.1.2. Ensure that NWTI, conducted by DSWA, address
the safety and security of nuclear weapon transport
operations.

C2.2.3.2. Serve as the logistic transport coordinator
between the DoD Components for inter-command movements
and between the Department of Defense and the DoE, and
shall:

C2.2.3.2.1. Prepare and coordinate materiel transfer
orders for the intercommand movement of nuclear weapons.

C2.2.3.2.2. Coordinate custody transfers between the
Department of Defense and the DoE, and the transport
of nuclear weapons by the DoE.

C2.2.3.3. Conduct safety and security assessments related
to nuclear weapon transportation, when requested, and
develop methodologies, as necessary, for assessing the
safety and security of nuclear weapon transport operations.

C2.3. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

C2.3.1. Coordinate directly with the DoD Components
on nuclear weapon transportation matters.

C2.3.2. Ensure that nuclear weapons technical inspections
examine nuclear weapon transport operations. Guidance
for the conduct of NWTI is in TP 25-1 (reference (r)).

C2.3.3. Establish procedures for the maintenance of
accountability during nuclear weapon transport operations.
Specific reporting procedures are in CJCSM 3150.04
(reference (s)).

C2.3.4. Prescribe the reporting procedures to be used
when nuclear weapons are transported.

C2.4. THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

C2.4.1. Implement DoD nuclear weapon transportation
policies and do the following:

C2.4.1.1. Ensure that nuclear weapon transport operations
are addressed in applicable Military Department publications.

C2.4.1.2. Establish criteria for nuclear weapons and
transport equipment that enhance safety, security, and
use control during transport operations.

C2.4.1.3. Execute safe haven responsibilities, in accordance
with the MOA and TP 45-51 (references (t) and (m)).

C2.4.1.4. Ensure that NWTI, conducted by the Military
Department, examine nuclear weapon transport operations.

C2.4.2. Develop procedures for the transport of nuclear
weapons by doing the following:

C2.4.2.1. Establishing criteria for evaluating nuclear
weapon transport procedures where applicable.

C2.4.2.2. Conducting periodic safety studies and operational
safety reviews of transport operations for each nuclear
weapon system, in accordance with DoD Directive 3150.2
(reference (b)). (See section C4.2. of Chapter 4 for
additional detail.)

C2.4.3. Evaluate, authorize, and approve the transport
modes and movement routes that balance safety, security,
and military requirements for nuclear weapons in their
custody.

C2.4.4. Conduct assessments related to nuclear weapon
transport operations, as necessary. Assessments shall
be conducted with consideration of the factors identified
in Chapters 4 and 5.

C2.4.5. Approve all movements conducted by air of nuclear
weapons in their custody that contain high explosives
other than IHE. Approval authority may be delegated
to commanders of major Service commands.

C2.4.5.1. Copies of letters of delegation shall be
provided to the ATSD(NCB), Room 3E808, 3050 Defense
- The Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-3050.

C2.4.5.2. Delegations must be reviewed with the installation
of a new Secretary of Defense.

C2.4.5.3. Approval shall be on an individual weapon
or single transportation mission basis.

C2.4.5.3.1. Written confirmation of a weapon movement
approval, signed by the Secretary of the Military Department
concerned, or commanders of major commands, shall be
provided to the ATSD(NCB) no later than 30 days after
the movement is completed.

C2.4.5.3.2. The written confirmation of a movement
approval shall include the date of move, rationale,
origin and destination, number and types of weapons
moved, and type of aircraft conducting the move.

C2.4.6. Ensure that procedures, equipment, facilities,
and organizations involved in the transport of nuclear
weapons are certified for that purpose. Certification
guidance is provided in subsection C1.2.8. of Chapter
1.

C2.4.7. Ensure that personnel involved in the transport
of nuclear weapons are applicably trained. Certification
guidance is provided in subsection C1.2.8. of Chapter
1, and section C3.6. of Chapter 3.

C2.5. THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

The Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a Prime
Nuclear Airlift Force capability to conduct the logistic
transport of nuclear weapons.

C2.6. THE COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall:

C2.6.1. Implement DoD nuclear weapon transportation
policies.

C2.6.2. Develop procedures, as required for their area
of operations, for the transport of nuclear weapons.

C2.6.3. Evaluate, authorize, and approve the transport
modes and movement routes that balance safety, security,
and military requirements for nuclear weapons in their
custody.

C2.6.4. Conduct assessments related to nuclear weapon
transport operations, as necessary. Assessments shall
be conducted with consideration of the factors identified
in Chapters 4 and 5.

C2.6.5. Approve all movements conducted by air of nuclear
weapons in their custody that contain high explosives
other than IHE. Approval authority may be delegated
to Service Component Commanders.

C2.6.5.1. Approval shall be on an individual weapon
or single transportation mission basis.

C2.6.5.1.1. Written confirmation of a weapon movement
approval, signed by the Combatant Commander concerned,
or Service Component Commander, shall be provided to
the ATSD(NCB) no later than 30 days after the movement
is completed.

C2.6.5.1.2. The written confirmation of a movement
approval shall include date of move, rationale, origin
and destination, number and types of weapons moved,
and type of aircraft conducting the move.

C2.6.5.2. Copies of letters of delegation shall be
provided to the ATSD(NCB), Room 3E808, 3050 Defense
- The Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-3050.

C2.6.5.3. Delegations must be reviewed with the installation
of a new Combatant Commander.

C2.6.6. Ensure that procedures, equipment, facilities,
and organizations involved in the transport of nuclear
weapons are certified for that purpose. Certification
guidance is provided in subsection C1.2.8. of Chapter
1.

C2.6.7. Ensure that personnel involved in the transport
of nuclear weapons are applicably trained. Certification
guidance is provided in subsection C1.2.8. of Chapter
1, and section C3.6. of Chapter 3.

C3. CHAPTER 3

TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES

C3.1. GENERAL

Nuclear weapon transport operations involve many organizations
in the Department of Defense and the DoE and encompass
numerous activities While safety and security are
primary planning considerations, other factors, noted
in section C3.3., below, must also be considered in
the planning of nuclear weapon transport operations.
This Chapter addresses the conduct of transportation
activities by the DoD Components and interactions between
the Department of Defense and the DoE for the planning
and conduct of nuclear weapon transport operations.

C3.2. DOD TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES

C3.2.1. The ATSD(NCB), in coordination with the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the DSWA, monitors the nuclear weapon transportation
process and provides guidance, as applicable, for the
prioritization of nuclear weapon movements.

C3.2.2. The FCDSWA is responsible for the preparation
of MTO, which authorize inter-command movements MTO
are requested by the Services or the Combatant Commands,
as required.

C3.2.3. The JNWPS provides guidance and certified procedures
for conducting activities with nuclear weapons.

C3.2.3.1. The TP 45-51 series provides technical guidance
and detailed information on procedures and activities
for the transport of nuclear weapons. Relevant publications
include TP 45-51C, TP 45-51, TP 45-51A, TP 45-51B, TP
45-51D, and TP 45-51F (references (j) and (m) through
(q)).

C3.2.3.2. Procedures for custody, accountability, and
control are provided in TP 100-4 (reference (u)).

C3.2.3.3. Procedures for specific weapons are provided
by the relevant Military Department JNWPS publications.

C3.2.4. Coordination is routinely conducted between
the FCDSWA, the Military Departments, and the DoE Albuquerque
Field Office to effect the transfer of weapon custody
between the Department of Defense and the DoE, and to
schedule the use of DoE SST for the movement of nuclear
weapons in CONUS. See section C3.4., below, for additional
information.

C3.3. TRANSPORT PLANNING FACTORS

Planning for nuclear weapon transport operations requires
consideration of numerous factors, including the following:

C3.3.1. The military requirement necessitating a movement
(e.g., routine maintenance, political agreement, treaty
obligation, or retirement, etc.).

C3.3.2. The applicable nuclear weapons transport policies
and requirements to include the following:

C3.3.2.1. DoD Directives 4540.5, 3150.2, 5210.41, DoD
C-5210.41-M, and DoD Directive S-3150-7 (references
(a) through (d) and (l)).

C3.3.2.2. Military Department level directives, regulations,
and manuals that implement DoD transportation, safety,
and security policies.

C3.3.2.3. The MOA (reference (t)) (see section C3.5.
of this Chapter, below), or other publications (including
JNWPS TP 45-51 (reference (m)), when applicable.

C3.3.3. Other factors for a specific weapon movement
may include:

C3.3.3.1. Safety, safety risks, available positive
safety measures, and safety factors described in subsection
C4.3.2. of Chapter 4.

C3.3.3.2. Security, security threats, available positive
security measures, and those security factors outlined
in subsection C5.3.2. of Chapter 5.

C3.3.3.3. High explosives associated with the weapon;
e.g., high explosives or IHE. See subsection C1.2.6.
of Chapter 1, and subsections C2.4.5. and C2.5.5. of
Chapter 2 for specific policy and responsibilities associated
with movement of nuclear weapons that contain high explosives
other than IHE.

C3.3.3.4. Potential tradeoffs between safety and security
for each transport segment.

C3.3.3.5. Plutonium content of weapon(s) being transported.
(See TP 20-7 (reference (e)) for further details.)

C3.3.3.6. Abnormal environments that may be encountered
during transport, and available countermeasures to mitigate
those environments.

C3.3.3.7. Accident response measures and the roles
and missions of the DoD Components and other Government
Agencies in responding to an accident involving a nuclear
weapon. (See DoD Directive 3150.8 and DoD 5100.52-M
(references (h) and (i)) for additional details.)

C3.3.3.8. The compatibility of the nuclear weapons
with dangerous materiels or other nonnuclear cargoes.
(See TP 45-51C, reference (j).)

C3.3.3.9. The level and nature of training of personnel
involved in transport-related activities. (See reference
(j).)

C3.3.3.10. The communications capabilities associated
with various transport modes.

C3.3.3.11. The characteristics of the available nuclear
weapon transport carriers.

C3.3.3.12. The availability and location of alternate
or emergency airfields and safe havens.

C3.3.3.13. The availability of certified materiel handling
and support equipment at origin and destination locations.

C3.3.3.14. Resource availability, including the availability
of transport carriers, personnel, containers, funding,
and DoE support (if required).

C3.3.3.15. Schedule and timing of transport operations.

C3.3.3.16. Cost.

C3.3.4. Funding for the transportation of nuclear weapons
between DoD Military Department locations is the responsibility
of the Military Department gaining custody. Incidental
costs of the transport operation will be the responsibility
of the Military Department performing the operation.
TP 45-51 (reference (m)) provides additional detailed
information about funding for nuclear weapon transportation.

C3.4. JOINT DOD-DOE TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES

C3.4.1. The DoE conducts some ground movements of nuclear
weapons in CONUS for the Department of Defense. Those
movements, to and from MFD and from operational bases
to storage and/or dismantlement locations on retirement,
are the responsibility of the TSD of the DoE Albuquerque
Field Office. The DoE may conduct movements from MFD
to operational bases or between operational bases for
the Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis.

C3.4.1.1. The TSD maintains specially designed SST
and escort vehicles to conduct those operations.

C3.4.1.2. Coordination between the Department of Defense
and the DoE for the planning and conduct of those transport
operations is addressed in TP 45-51 and TP 45-51D (references
(m) and (p)).

C3.4.2. Direct communication between the Department
of Defense and DoE personnel engaged in nuclear weapon
transport operations is authorized with an impending
or en route movement, and when necessary to help such
movements.

C3.4.3. While a DoE nuclear weapon transport convoy
is on a DoD installation, the Department of Defense
will provide support, in accordance with reference (m).
The security of DoE convoy vehicles and their contents
is a dual-Agency responsibility while on DoD installations,
except as specified in reference (m). During a declared
safe haven, the DoE retains responsibility for security.

C3.4.4. The DoE retains custody of nuclear weapons
during SST transport operations until such custody is
formally transferred to an authorized DoD recipient.
DoD-authorized personnel will be identified in writing
to the DoE courier by the applicable DoD certifying
official before the transport operation.

C3.5. SAFE HAVEN FOR DOE TRANSPORT CONVOYS

C3.51. A safe haven is a temporary sanctuary for a
DoE nuclear weapon transport convoy at a military installation
in the CONUS when necessary to ensure the safety and
security of the nuclear weapons. Available DoD facilities
are provided to support the authorized DoE courier
The mission, the operational situation, and the capabilities
of the DoD installation will determine the extent of
the support provided. Specific procedures for safe
haven temporary storage are described in TP 45-51 (reference
(m)).

C3.5.2. When a decision is made to seek a safe haven,
the DoE provides all pertinent information related to
the request to the installation involved, either directly
or through the DoD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating
Center operated by the DSWA.

C3.5.3. Under the terms of the MOA (reference (t)),
the Department of Defense shall:

C3.5.3.1. Provide a temporary holding area for DoE
transport carriers and their cargo.

C3.5.3.2. Assume temporary responsibility for the security
of the transport carriers and cargo if DoE couriers
become incapacitated.

C3.5.3.3. Provide security, fire-fighting, medical,
communications, logistic support, and any other emergency
assistance available. In the event of an accident,
DoE retains the lead Federal Agency responsibilities,
since they have custody and accountability of the nuclear
weapons.

C3.5.4. The DoE will remove the shipment from the DoD
safe haven as soon as possible.

C3.6. TRANSPORTATION TRAINING

C3.6.1. Personnel involved in nuclear weapon transport
operations must be trained and certified to perform
assigned tasks, in accordance with Military Department
directives. A partial list of applicable subject areas
is in TP 45-51C (reference (j)).

C3.6.2. Training for personnel involved in nuclear
weapon transport operations shall include both formal
instruction and practical experience. Training shall
be completed, and personnel shall be designated and
certified for proficiency, before assignment to duties
on nuclear weapon transport operations. Personnel
may accompany nuclear weapon movements for training
purposes before their proficiency certification, but
shall not be responsible for the transport operation.

C3.7. TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES FOR STORAGE, MAINTENANCE,
AND MODIFICATION

C3.7.1. When it is necessary to move a weapon outside
its limited area storage facility to another DoD or
DoE site for maintenance or modifications, the transport
operations to effect those movements are governed by
the policies and guidelines in this Manual.

C3.7.2. The handling and other activities conducted
by DoD personnel in the course of routine storage and
maintenance of nuclear weapons, such as movement in
the limited areas from a storage facility to a maintenance
building, are not considered to be logistic transport
operations and are not governed this Manual.

C3.8. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS FOR TRANSPORT
ACTIVITIES

C3.8.1. NWTI ensure that units that store, maintain,
or transport nuclear weapons conduct their activities
in a safe and secure manner according to requirements
established in DoD Publications and in joint and Military
Department TPs. NWTI are the basis for certifying
facilities and organizations for operations with nuclear
weapon systems.

C3.8.2. The procedures for conducting NWTI are developed
jointly by the DSWA and the Military Departments, and
are delineated in TP 25-1 (reference (r)).

C4. CHAPTER 4

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY

C4.1. GENERAL

The DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program is addressed
in DoD Directive 3150.2 (reference (b)). That Program
integrates safety policy, organizational responsibilities,
and formalized procedures throughout a nuclear weapon's
life-cycle, including transport operations. This Chapter
highlights key elements of the safety program that impact
weapon transport. It also identifies factors to be
considered in the conduct of independent safety assessments
for transport operations.

C4.2. DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM SAFETY POLICY AND PROGRAM

C4.2.1. Nuclear weapon transport operations are governed
by the following four DoD nuclear weapon system safety
standards, which specify that:

C4.2.1.1. There shall be positive measures to prevent
nuclear weapons involved in accidents or incidents,
or jettisoned weapons, from producing a nuclear yield.

C4.2.1.2. There shall be positive measures to prevent
deliberate prearming, arming, launching, or releasing
of nuclear weapons, except upon execution of emergency
war orders or when directed by competent authority.

C4.2.1.3. There shall be positive measures to prevent
inadvertent prearming, arming, launching, or releasing
of nuclear weapons in all normal and credible abnormal
environments.

C4.2.1.4. There shall be positive measures to ensure
adequate security of nuclear weapons, pursuant to DoD
Directive 5210.41 (reference (c)).

C4.2.2. Safety is evaluated throughout the life-cycle
of a nuclear weapon, from concept development through
retirement and return of the weapon to the DoE. Safety
studies and operational safety reviews, performed, in
accordance with DoD Directive 3150.2 (reference (b)),
are one of the methods used to assess nuclear weapon
system safety. During safety studies, the Military
Department's Nuclear Weapons System Safety Group recommends
safety rules to apply during all operations with that
system, including transport operations. Safety rules
are coordinated within the Military Departments, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoE, and
the OSD before approval and signature by the Secretary
of Defense.

C4.2.3. Detailed procedures for the safe transport
of nuclear weapons and additional information on safety-related
considerations in the planning and execution of nuclear
weapon transport operations are also identified in JNWPS
TPs and Military Department regulations and TPs.

C4.3. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ASSESSMENTS

C4.3.1. Safety assessments, other than those described
in section C4.2. above, of nuclear weapon transport
operations are conducted as applicable by the DoD Components.
In some circumstances, safety assessments will be
conducted with security assessments to evaluate tradeoffs
between safety and security considerations.

C4.3.2. Nuclear weapon transportation safety assessments
require detailed consideration of a number of factors.
The following subparagraphs outline suggested considerations
when conducting transportation safety assessments:

C4.3.2.1. Data. No major nuclear-related accidents
have occurred with any carrier currently in use for
nuclear weapon movements. Transportation safety assessments
may include data from the nonnuclear operations of those
transport carriers to estimate accident probability.
Screening the data for applicability, using statistical
and other analytical methods, may reduce the uncertainty
in those estimates.

C4.3.2.2. Transportation System and Transport Operation
Features. That includes the number and types of weapons
being transported, number of trips required, physical
features of transport carriers, safety procedures, and
communications. Additionally, the specific safety
features of the transportation system should be considered.

C4.3.2.3. Causes of Accidents. Each Military Department
should identify potential hazards relevant to their
unique operating environment.

C4.3.2.4. Transportation Requirements. Logistic transport
of nuclear weapons from origin to destination may require
movements over intermediate route segments, and may
involve more than one type of transport carrier as well
as multiple trips. Each route segment of a nuclear
weapon transport operation shall be evaluated, as well
as the length and number of segments.

C4.3.2.5. Accident Event Sequences. A generic event
sequence for a nuclear weapon transport accident will
consist of the initiating event; the occurrence of a
specific accident environment (e.g., fire, impact, crush,
puncture, electrical, or combinations of those); the
involvement of a weapon or weapons in the accident environment;
the severity of the environment; and the response of
the transport carrier and weapons to the environment.
Each event in the sequence should be evaluated for
its potential impact on weapon safety.

C4.3.2.6. Response of Weapons to Specific Accident
Environments. This may be dependent on the characteristics
of the weapon, on the severity of the environment, or
on both. Further, the response of nuclear weapons
may be different at different severity levels of the
same environment.

C4.3.2.7. Probability of Combined Environments. Transportation
safety assessments shall consider the potential for
combined accident environments, such as simultaneous
crush and fire, or for a sequence of environments, such
as impact followed by fire.

C4.3.2.8. Potential Accident Consequences. Transportation
safety assessments shall consider both the radiological
consequences of a plutonium dispersing accident and
nonradiological consequences, as indicated in TP 20-7
(reference (e)). Those assessments should take into
account population density, topography, wind direction
and other meteorological conditions, as applicable at
arrival and departure points, weapon high explosive-charge-to-plutonium-mass
ratio, presence of high explosives other than IHE, administrative,
operational, cost, regulatory, and other impacts on
the Department of Defense resulting from Government
and/or public reaction to an accident.

C4.3.2.9. Mitigating Measures. Applicable positive
safety measures and accident-mitigating measures should
be taken into account, including special nuclear weapon
procedures and precautions (e.g., special maintenance
practices, crew selection, preparation of the transport
carrier, and operating restrictions); weapon design
features; and safety features organic to the transport
carriers (e.g., associated fire-fighting capabilities).

C5. CHAPTER 5

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

C5.1. GENERAL

DoD nuclear weapon security requirements are addressed
in DoD Directive 5210.41 and DoD C-5210.41-M (references
(c) and (d)). Those references (c) and (d) specify
DoD security policy and the DoD Nuclear Weapon Security
Program and identify security requirements for nuclear
weapon transport operations. This Chapter highlights
key elements from those references (c) and (d) and it
also identifies factors to be considered in the conduct
of security assessments for transport operations.

C5.2. DOD NUCLEAR WEAPON SECURITY POLICY AND PROGRAM

C5.2.1. DoD security policy is addressed under major
topics in reference (d) that include nuclear weapon
protection; custody and control; access; personnel;
assessments, evaluations, and inspections; weapon storage
areas and facilities; and structure and building security.

C5.2.2. The objectives of the DoD Nuclear Weapon Security
Program are to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear
weapons; prevent damage or sabotage to nuclear weapons;
prevent loss of custody of a nuclear weapon; prevent
an unauthorized nuclear detonation; and prevent, to
the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination
caused by unauthorized acts or damage, emergency destruction
actions, or security operations necessary to recapture
or recover a nuclear weapon.

C5.2.3. Nuclear weapon transport security requirements
are specified in Chapter 8 of DoD C-5210.41-M (reference
(d)). Topics addressed include transportation protection
system components, policy, planning considerations,
command and control, information control, malfunctions,
hazardous conditions, accidents, incidents, personnel
(courier and security force), and movement security
requirements.

C5.2.4. Personnel selected to perform nuclear weapon
transport duties must demonstrate individual reliability
in terms of allegiance, trustworthiness, conduct and
behavior, and responsibility. Those personnel, assigned
to designated PRP positions, are evaluated for adherence
to PRP standards, as described in DoD Directive 5210.42
(reference (k)).

C5.3. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

C5.3.1. Reference (d) defines responsibilities for
the conduct of threat and risk and/or vulnerability
assessments under the DoD Nuclear Weapons Security Program.

C5.3.2. Transportation security assessments, other
than those required in paragraph C.5.1. above, may also
be conducted, as applicable by the DoD Components.
In some circumstances, those assessments may be conducted
with safety assessments to evaluate tradeoffs between
safety and security considerations. Those nuclear
weapon transportation security assessments will need
to consider various factors, many of which are similar
to safety assessment considerations in planning a specific
transport operation. A partial list of considerations
is provided in subsections C5.3.2.1. through C5.3.2.9.
below:

C5.3.2.1. Adversary group objectives.

C5.3.2.2. Adversary group tasks.

C5.3.2.3. Adversary group capabilities.

C5.3.2.4. Transportation system and transport operation
features.

C5.3.2.5. Presence or absence of insider.

C5.3.2.6. Consequences of successful attack or incident.

C5.3.2.7. Transportation requirements.

C5.3.2.8. Weapon configuration.

C5.3.2.9. Mitigating measures.

C6. CHAPTER 6

USE CONTROL DURING TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

C6.1. GENERAL

DoD nuclear weapons use control requirements are addressed
in DoD Directive S-3150.7 and TP 45-51C and TP 50-2
(references (l), (j), and (v)). These documents specify
policy and responsibilities. This Chapter highlights
key elements of control that impact on transport operations.

C6.2. DOD NUCLEAR USE POLICY

C6.2.1. Protection for all nuclear weapon systems shall
incorporate policies, procedures, and equipment in a
layered approach of physical security, information security,
personnel actions, procedures, and weapon design features.

C6.2.2. Positive measures shall be taken to maintain
control of all U.S. nuclear weapons during all phases
of their life cycle. The implementation of such measures
shall do the following:

C6.2.2.1. Prevent unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.

C6.2.2.2. Prevent unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

C6.2.3. While in transit, individual weapons equipped
with coded control devices, or multiple weapons loaded
on launchers applicably equipped for coded control,
shall be locked at all times except for authorized maintenance,
testing, and operations.

C6.2.4. Jettisoning of nuclear weapons during transport
shall be done, in accordance with the SWOG, DoD Directive
S-3150.7 (references (f) and (l)), and system safety
rules.

C6.2.5. Use control measures include, but are not limited
to, storage facilities, equipment and devices, communication
systems, personnel, and procedures.

C6.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON TRANSPORT CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

C6.3.1. Use control equipment and devices should not
be deactivated during transport operations unless specifically
authorized by the Combatant Commander. Remote controllers
are not required for CONUS operations. Elsewhere,
remote controllers will be connected to associated weapons
during transport operations only when threat assessments
indicate such action may be prudent.

C6.3.2. Shipping organizations will ensure that nuclear
weapons or associated CDS controllers have a classified
shipping or operational CDS code for transport.

C6.3.3. Knowledge of the CDS codes shall be restricted
to the minimum number of personnel required to produce
the codes or code the weapons or controllers. No other
personnel will be provided access to the codes before
receipt of an order to disable.

C6.3.4. When operational necessity dictates, and in
accordance with command directives, the courier shall
be responsible for disabling weapons equipped with a
CDS.

C6.3.5. Detailed information on the CDS are in TP 45-51C,
TP 100-4 (references (j) and (u)), and in individual
weapon TP. Command disable code preparation and security
are done using CJCSI 3260.01 (reference (w)).