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A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the US Armed Forces through the combined efforts of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. The following chart displays an overview of the development process for these publications.
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy. Joint Pub 3– 04 .1 is located in the operations series of joint publications.
Joint Pub 1– 01, "Joint Publication System, " provides a detailed list of all joint publications. Joint pubs are also available on CD– ROM through the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) . For information, contact : Joint Doctrine Division, J- 7, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon Washington, D. C. 20318– 7000 .
1. This publication has been developed under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and military guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States.
2. Recommendations for changes to this publication should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J- 7), Joint Staff, Washington, D. C. 20318- 7000.
3. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.
4. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J- 7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.5. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.
6. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1- R.
H. L. SHEFFIELD Captain, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff
Enclosure
Joint Staff OSD NSA CIA JWC USELMNORAD FEMA DISA DIA DLA DMA DNA NDU MCCDC JEWC AFSC JDC DISA-JIEO CIO
Additional copies may be obtained from the Secretary, Joint Staff (Documents Division).
Five copies each to: Offices of CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, USCG Copies each to:USLANTCOM (25) USCENTCOM (25) USEUCOM (25) FORSCOM (25) USPACOM (25) USSOUTHCOM (25) USSPACECOM (25) USSOCOM (25) USSTRATCOM (25) USTRANSCOM (25)Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, "Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified and Subordinate Joint Commands." By Military Services: Army:
CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKSIn accordance with the procedures contained in Joint Pub 1- 01, change recommendations to this publication will be forwarded to: Urgent: Joint Doctrine Division Operational Plans and Interoperability_____________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
b. Provides the US Government position for combined doctrine, consistent with existing security procedures.
c. Provides a basis for joint training. d. Provides instructional material for the military education system.e. Informs US Government agencies concerning the joint employment of US nuclear forces.
b. The doctrine in this publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine should be followed, except when, in the judgement of the commander, exceptional
circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.
c. Support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commanders, component commands, joint task forces, and Chiefs of the Services).
a. Joint Pub 1- 02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."
b. NUWEP, "Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons"
c. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan-- Annex C (Nuclear).
d. National Military Strategy Document-- Annex B (Nuclear).
e. Joint Pub O- 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces."
f. Joint Pub 3- 0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
g. SIOP-( YR) (Basic).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE I OBJECTIVES............................................I-1 General..............................................I-1 The Spectrum of Potential Conflict...................I-2II EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES.................................II-1 Fundamental Considerations..........................II-1 Considerations in Force Planning and Employment.....II-2 Targeting Considerations............................II-4 Operations in a WMD Environment.....................II-7 III INTEGRATED OPERATIONS...............................III-1 Strategic Force Integration........................III-1 Nonstrategic Nuclear Force Integration.............III-2 Offense/Defense Integration........................III-6 APPENDIX A TREATY OBLIGATIONS....................................A-1 B USER EVALUATION REPORT................................B-1 GLOSSARY Part I-- Abbreviations and Acronyms....................GL-1 Part II-- Terms and Definitions........................GL-2
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dictates of given situations. Although nations posses-sing WMD have largely refrained from using them, their continuing proliferation and the means to deliver them increases the possibility that someday a nation may, through miscalculation or by deliberate choice, employ those weapons. This assumption does not rule out the possibility that an opponent may be willing to risk destruction or disproportionate loss in following a course of action based on perceived necessity, whether rational or in a totally objective sense. In such cases deterrence, even based on the threat of massive destruction, may fail.
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(a) Survivability. US forces must be able to survive a first strike and endure conventional and escalatory attrition with sufficient retaliatory strength to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in a counterstrike.
(b) Credibility. The potential aggressor must believe the United States could and would use nuclear weapons to attain its security objectives. (c) Safety. The risk of failure through accident, unauthorized use, or miscalculation must be minimized. (d) Security. Secure manufacture, transpor-tation, and storage that are free from terrorist threat, theft, loss, and unauthorized access must be provided.(2) Regional Contingencies. WMD deterrence should be the first priority. The proliferation of WMD technologies and industrial capabilities in the world may allow a potential aggressor to develop a WMD arsenal capable of being employed against US forces deployed to a regional crisis. WMD used on US forces would cause a significant tactical or operational loss; greatly change the character of the war, putting the outcome in doubt and threatening escalation; leave the United States with a difficult choice: to retaliate or not to retaliate. A selective capability of being able to use lower- yield weapons in retaliation, without destablizing the conflict, is a useful alternative for the US National Command Authorities (NCA).
(3) Conventional Threats. Because nuclear forces also serve as a hedge against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat, the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons extends to enemy calculations concerning conventional conflict as well. The potential employment of nuclear weapons at theater level, when combined with the means and
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resolve to use them, makes the prospects of conflict of any type more dangerous and the outcome more difficult to assess. The resulting uncertainty could reduce a potential aggressor's willingness to risk escalation by initiating conflict. At the same time, a credible defensive capability that includes the means to threaten to employ nuclear weapons could bolster the resolve of allies to resist enemy attempts at political coercion.
(4) Conflict Avoidance. Conflict can often be avoided by pursuing alternative mechanisms and disincentives to conflict such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation, arms control and verification, and confidence building measures during peacetime operations. These measures make conflict or war less likely by improving communication, reducing opportunities for miscalculation, providing ways to resolve crises, and reducing the destructive capacity of available arsenals.
(5) Readiness. Increased readiness levels may be necessary to deter aggression. Consequently, an increased risk of attack, prompted by enemy war readiness measures, may require that US forces be maintained at visibly increased states of alert. Certain types of delivery systems can be postured to send a clear warning. Alert posturing of nuclear delivery systems to dispersal locations can send a forceful message that demonstrates the national will to use nuclear weapons if necessary. For example, the generation of nuclear forces to higher alert levels during the October 1973 Mideast Crisis sent a strong signal. However, the danger also exists that the enemy may perceive either an exploitable vulnerability or the threat of imminent use. Therefore, increased readiness postures intended to signal national resolve must be accompanied by measures that would allow for deescalation. Public affairs measures must also be taken to minimize the possi-bility that public concern over the conflict might develop into mass panic upon implementation of US readiness measures. (6) Escalation. Should a crisis become so severe as to prompt the United States to place all its nuclear forces at a high level of readiness, the United States must also be prepared to posture its nuclear forces as quickly as possible. Nuclear forces should be generated and managed to ensure a sustained high
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level of readiness. Conventional forces and intell-igence activities would have to be prudently managed to ensure avoidance of inadvertent escalation or mistaken warnings of nuclear attack. In the event the crisis is successfully resolved without employ-ment of nuclear weapons, reductions in the alert posture of nuclear forces must be carefully managed, taking into account enemy force readiness. This would ensure that no destabilizing military advantage accrued to the enemy during the de- escalation phase of the conflict.
(3) Controlling Escalation. Nuclear weapons may influence the objectives and conduct of conventional warfare. Additionally, conventional warfare may result in attrition of nuclear forces and supporting systems (through antisubmarine warfare, conventional attacks in theater, sabotage, or antisatellite warfare), either unintended or deliberate, which
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could affect the forces available for nuclear employ-ment. If this attrition results in a radical change in the strategic force posture by eliminating intermediate retaliatory steps, there may be a rapid escalation. The ability to precisely gauge the attrition of conventional and nuclear forces will directly effect calculations on the termination of war and the escalation to nuclear war.
(2) Termination Strategy. The objective of termination strategy should be to end a conflict at the lowest level of destruction possible, consistent with national objectives. However, there can be no assurances that a conflict involving weapons of mass destruction could be controllable or would be of short duration. Nor are negotiations opportunities and the capacity for enduring control over military forces clear. Therefore, US nuclear forces, supporting command control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems (e. g., sensors, communications, command facilities), and employment planning must provide the capability to deny enemy war aims, even in a conflict of indefinite duration.
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(3) Reserve Forces. Adequate nuclear reserve forces reduce opportunities for another nation to dominate or coerce behavior before, during, or after the use of WMD. Such forces provide the US with the capability to continue to deny enemy war aims, influence other nations, and exert leverage for war termination.
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nuclear weapons against enemy combatants and other military objectives is lawful. The nation that initiates the use of nuclear weapons, however, may find itself the target of world condemnation.
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to execute a variety of nuclear and nonnuclear options. The flexible application of responses tailored to the provocation would afford greater control over the possible escalation of conflict. Flexibility is also essential in escalation management because available nuclear and conventional weapons can be tailored for specific military and political outcomes without destablization of the conflict.
(3) Survivability and Endurance. US nuclear forces and C4I must be able to survive enemy attacks to convince potential aggressors that, in any scenario, sufficient US capability will remain to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike. Nuclear forces and C4I must also be able to survive enemy attacks for both warfighting utility and deterrence purposes. Survivability is enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, number of weapons, hardened sites, and employment concept. (For example, mobility, increases survivability, because the forces cannot be attacked with any certainty of destruction due to the unpredictability of the location of the weapon at the time of attack.) Survivability also strengthens deterrence by providing nuclear forces for continued retaliation against the enemy.
(4) Responsiveness. Some targets must be struck quickly once a decision to employ nuclear weapons has been made. Just as important is the requirement to promptly strike high- priority, time- sensitive targets that emerge after the conflict begins. Because force employment requirements may evolve at irregular intervals, some surviving nuclear weapons must be capable of striking these targets within the brief time available. Responsiveness (measured as the interval between the decision to strike a specific target and detonation of a weapon over that target) is critical to ensure engaging some emerging targets.
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decisive military advantage (in peacetime military operations or in hostilities other than war) or to initiate conflict. Such stability is a function of relative capabilities at all potential levels of conflict and requires the constant assessment of nuclear and conventional forces.
(2) Centralized Control. Centralized control ensures that US national policy decisions directly affect deployment or employment of nuclear forces. Militarily, centralized control provides clarity of purpose and unity of command while ensuring nuclear forces are responsive, properly used, and integrated. It guides a broad plan of action while providing the flexibility for subordinate commanders to plan authorized attacks in the most operationally effective manner. (3) C4I. C4I must support the employment of nuclear weapons through all phases of a conflict. C4I must be able to provide the appropriate political and military authority with a survivable, secure, and endurable C4I capability through which execution, direction, assessment, and termination of nuclear operations can be ensured during all phases of a conflict, especially in its termination. Reporting residual capability assessment information through C4I systems is essential to providing the NCA with an understanding of the military capabilities remaining in a post- attack environment. Because of their central importance to US response capabilities, the destruction or degradation of C4I systems will likely be a primary enemy objective. Consequently, such systems must be robust, redundant (where essential to guarantee continuity of operations), and rapidly recoverable.
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(1) Countervalue Targeting. Countervalue targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected enemy military and military- related activities, such as industries, resources, and/ or institutions that contribute to the enemy's ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy need not be as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because countervalue targets generally tend to be softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.
(2) Counterforce Targeting. Counterforce targeting is a strategy to employ forces to destroy, or render impotent, military capabilities of an enemy force. Typical counterforce targets include bomber bases, ballistic- missile submarine bases, ICBM silos, antiballistic and air defense installations, C2 centers, and WMD storage facilities. Generally, the nuclear forces required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy are larger and weapon systems more accurate, than the forces and weapons required to implement a countervalue strategy, because counter- force targets generally tend to be harder, more protected, difficult to find, and more mobile than countervalue targets.
(3) Prioritization of Targets. Targets are normally prioritized based upon the overall targeting strategy. Further refinement of target priorities will be made within each target category (e. g., industrial, military, energy facilities, storage facilities, weapon storage areas) based on the operational situation and the objectives established by the appropriate command authority. (4) Layering. Layering is a targeting methodology that plans employing more than one weapon against a target to increase the probability of its destruction or to improve the confidence that a weapon will arrive and detonate on that target and achieve a specified level of damage. (5) Crosstargeting. At the same time it incorporates the concept of "layering," crosstargeting also uses different platforms for employment against one target to increase the probability of at least one weapon arriving at that target. Using differentII-5 Page II-6 II-7 Joint Pub 3- 12
delivery platforms such as ICBMs, SLBMs, or aircraft-delivered weapons increases the probability of achieving the desired damage or target coverage.
(6) Preplanned Options. Preplanned options are a means of maintaining centralized control while minimizing the impact on response time. These options should be capable of being executed individually or in combination with other options to expand the attack either functionally or geographically.(7) Emergent Targets and Adaptive Planning. Even after the initial laydown of nuclear weapons, there may be a residual requirement to strike additional (follow on and/ or emerging) targets in support of retaliatory or war- termination objectives. Commanders must maintain the capability to rapidly strike previously unidentified or newly emerging targets. This capability includes planning for and being able to perform "ad hoc" planning on newly identified targets and maintaining a pool of forces specifically reserved for striking previously unidentified targets. It is important to recognize that success in engaging emerging targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and struck.
(8) Collateral Damage. US forces will limit collateral damage consistent with employment purposes and desired effect on the target (see JSCP, Annex C, for a more detailed discussion).
(9) Damage Criteria. Damage criteria are standards identifying specific levels of destruction or materiel damage required for a particular target category. These criteria are normally levied on the executing commander by higher authority, in accordance with national strategy and policy. These criteria vary for the intensity of the damage and also vary by particular target category, class, or type. Commanders must estimate the number and characteristics of the weapons and delivery systems that will be needed to achieve the level of desired damage to designated targets while minimizing undesirable collateral effects. Damage criteria, based on the nature of the target (size, hardness, mobility) as well as its proximity to military or nonmilitary assets, provide a means by which to determine how
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best to strike particular targets and, following the attack, to evaluate whether the target or target sets received the amount of damage required to meet operational objectives.
(1) Plan in advance and warn personnel. Planning and warning, in conjunction with systematic, precautionary survivability measures (such as dispersal of vital combat and support assets, increased force mobility, concealment, deception, individual protective measures, and nuclear hardening) can reduce the physical and psychological trauma. (2) Partially offset long- term degradation of effectiveness produced by nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare through comprehensive force training, preconditioning, and protection.
(3) Establish and carefully assess operating procedures to avoid disproportionate or unacceptable loss of personnel, units, or equipment and to ensure continuity of operations during the initial and subsequent phases of a conflict involving WMD.
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(3) Strategic nuclear forces may also be used to target and hold regional targets at risk.
(1) A decision to use nuclear weapons.
(2) The number, type, and yields of weapons.
(3) Types of targets to be attacked.
(4) Geographical area for employment.
(5) Timing and duration of employment.
(6) Damage constraints.
(7) Target analysis.
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(2) Theater combatant commanders are responsible for defining theater objectives, selecting targets, and developing plans required to support those objectives. Detailed mission planning, when required, is generally accomplished at the theater combatant commander level, with USSTRATCOM assistance where appropriate. Combatant commanders may also be tasked to develop adaptively planned options to strike previously unidentified targets. Because the strike is meant to be decisive, it takes precedence over other missions.
(3) After conflict occurs, combatant commanders may also be tasked to develop adaptively planned options to strike targets not previously identified. Nuclear
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weapons planning is continuous and is fully integrated with planning for conventional weapons. Each commander with a nuclear planning capability identifies and requests authorization to strike any targets necessary to accomplish his mission. Individual nuclear target requests are further refined, approved, or disapproved and combined at each command echelon into an option or sub- option. Ad hoc planning can also use preplanned options as starting points and modify the preplanned option or sub- option given the situation actually experienced. When recommendations from combatant commanders and the situation result in a Presidential decision to escalate the conflict to employment of nuclear weapons, specific guidance, including target identification, refinement, and constraints, along with selected number of weapons are released to the theater combatant commander for employment. If the decision is to disapprove escalation or employment of nuclear weapons, the planned strikes may be retained as a basis for further target planning or for strike by other weapons.
(4) Joint nuclear operations are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the combatant commander. Component commanders also plan and coordinate execution of their portions of the joint operation. The possibility that conventional theater operations may escalate to use of nuclear weapons within the theater must be a key planning consideration. Planning should consider enemy capabilities and intentions and the vulnerability of US forces to those capabilities. Planning should also encompass recommendations for response to an enemy first use of any weapon of mass destruction, a battlefield asymmetry, or an operational- level situation offering potential for conflict termination. (5) The planning and coordination of multinational military operations is extremely complex, owing to differences in tactical and operational doctrine and the diversity of kinds of combat and combat support systems employed by the various national forces. Nuclear operations will compound the complexity inherent in coalition operations. Standard combined nuclear operational procedures and terminology, organization of liaison teams, and combined training must be developed and its use encouraged. Commanders must anticipate that combined NSNF operations will prove difficult to plan, coordinate, and execute but must be prepared to carry out these operations as directed by the NCA.III-4 Page III-5 III-6 Joint Pub 3- 12
(6) Theater- level combined and joint planning of nuclear resources must include consideration and evaluation of certain basic parameters:
(a) The quantity of nuclear weapons available (NSNF generation and reconstitution capabilities of the Services), characteristics of these weapons, and the delivery requirements to place them over approved targets at the correct time. (b) The trade- off considerations on selection of delivery systems for nuclear weapons for specific targets; i. e., flexibility, mobility, mission survivability, availability, and competing mission requirements. (c) Weapons and delivery systems that should be kept in reserve.(d) The expected survivability and vulnerability of remaining and reserve assets.
(e) Deconfliction criteria and measures to prevent or reduce fratricide. (f) Collateral damage restrictions consistent with target damage criteria. (g) The magnitude and nature of follow- on conventional, nuclear, or mixed operations. (h) The expected retaliation-- conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical. (7) Basic employment considerations are closely tied to the capabilities of assigned nuclear weapons systems (assigned forces are those weapons, delivery systems, and supporting systems under the combatant command (command authority) of the combatant commander). Dual- capable aircraft can strike a variety of targets in the battle area as well as deep targets. Sea- and air- launched cruise missiles also provide the capability for nuclear strikes against targets of known location.III-5 Page III-6 III-7 Joint Pub 3- 12
or to support a "top- down" release, the NCA must have the most current and available situation information and intelligence and must be familiar with the commander's plans and options. Top- down communication does not mean the NCA should directly target nuclear weapons or conduct a piecemeal, weapon- by- weapon release. Top- down communications ensure critical orders are received for execution and can also be helpful in reducing survivability and vulnerability problems of C4I systems.
(1) In a strategic application, strategic defensive systems offer the potential of improving US deterrent posture by increasing the enemy's uncertainty of achieving its attack objectives.
(2) In regional conflicts, missile defense offers protection against potential adversaries acquiring ballistic- missile technology. Although offense is necessary for retaliation and conflict control, defense may also play an important, complementary role in nonstrategic applications (e. g., irrational actor scenarios).
(3) In a synergistic application, defenses allow a regional commander to consider employing offensive counterforce strikes on the enemy, while enjoying some sense of security from catastrophic results if the enemy launches under attack. (4) Early warning forces include an integrated tactical warning and assessment capability, providing the NCA with enough warning to maximize the survivability of USIII-6 Page III-7 III-8 Joint Pub 3- 12
and allied forces. Deterrence is, therefore, enhanced because of the increased survivability of US retaliatory force.
(5) Air defenses against an air breathing threat also serve to enhance our deterrent capabilities by increasing the enemy's uncertainty that weapon systems will arrive at their targets.
(2) Land, Air, and Sea Forces. The employment of land, air, and sea forces into or through an area that has a high probability of having enemy nuclear warheads or nuclear delivery systems must be avoided to the maximum extent practical. These areas may be high- priority targets and, therefore, have the greatest potential for nuclear detonations (NUDETs), as the result of attack operations or defensive intercepts.
(3) Utilize Impact Point Prediction Information. Ground and space systems can provide the commander near- real- time IPP information following the launch of enemy missiles. Dependent on the location of forces, the commander can use the IPP data to move threatened forces or other targets, execute intercept of enemy missiles, or allow a missile to reach its predicted impact point when it is expected to detonate in a nonthreatening area (e. g., desolate, uninhabited land or waters).
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(4) Defended Assets and Enemy Targets. A priority list for defended assets and enemy targets must be maintained. This list should help commanders in their decision process for employment of forces as resources are reduced over time in a conflict including execution of passive protection measures. (Based on these priorities, active defenses should be deployed near the highest priority resources to maintain effective execution of offensive forces). Priority lists for defended assets should include protection of C4 nodes, supply points, and population centers.
(5) Decision Timelines. The decisionmaker may be required to review and select defensive and offensive actions within severely compressed timelines. Consideration must be given to procedures and equipment allowing informed decisions in this environment. Predelegated defensive engagement authority should be considered under certain conditions to permit efficient engagement of ballistic- missile threats. The commander must evaluate the situation, weigh the options, and execute the optimum offense- defense force in a relatively short period of time. The time is limited because of the relatively short flight time of tactical missiles (TM) and potential increased uncertainty of mobile offensive force target locations. Deployment of air defenses against an air- breathing threat should be accomplished early enough to send an unmistakable signal of NCA concern and resolve, thereby maximizing the deterrent potential of these forces.(6) Employment Concepts
(a) Command. Normally, unity of command is greatly desired. However, strategic offense or defense integration may be a case where the United States must promote integrated operations without requiring absolute unity of command. Very short timelines impact decisions that must be made. In a matter of seconds for the defense, and minutes for the offense, critical decisions must be made in concert with discussions with the NCA. It may be beyond the capability of one commander to do this for both strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces. However, force commonalities must be considered and conflicts avoided. Nevertheless, the joint force commander should have access to near- real- time tradeoff analysis when considering the execution of any forces.III-8 Page III-9 III-10 Joint Pub 3- 12
(b) Independent Operations. Independent operations should be employed to maximize the output of the offense and defense. Under situations where the offense and defense are not utilizing the same flight corridors or airspace, independent operations will allow both forces freedom to execute operations without restriction. (7) C4I linkages. C4I linkages assets may be shared by both offense and defense to acquire information and get the execution orders to the forces. The offense and defense C4I nodes should maintain survivable (robust and redundant) communications with each other and be able to operate independently if enemy attacks eliminate individual nodes (for this reason, collocation of offense and defense nodes should be avoided). In addition to providing warning of a nuclear attack and the data necessary to initiate a defensive response, defensive C4I systems also provide valuable information to update the offensive commander regarding counterforce targeting options. C4I systems and processing nodes: Near- real- time data receipt and processing will be necessary to target the TM threats and their launchers (for counterforce actions). Adequate surveillance systems and associated C4I systems are required to provide timely warning of a bomber or cruise missile and ballistic- missile attack. Certain processing nodes will be required to analyze the proper intercept locations of launched enemy TMs and provide tradeoff information to the decisionmaker if deconfliction is required between offensive and defensive forces.
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warheads and launchers and to lessen the danger of miscalculation that could trigger nuclear conflict. Among these agreements are the:
a. Direct Communication MOU of 1963.A- 2 41
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1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to directly submit comments on this pub. Please fill out and send in the following: Users' POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.
2. Content a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic?3. Writing and Appearance
a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use?B-1 Page B-2 GL-1 Joint Pub 3- 12
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TM tactical missile
USSTRATCOM US Strategic Command WMD weapons of mass destructionconflict. An armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. While regular forces are often involved, irregular forces frequently predominate. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other elements of national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of force. (Identified in Joint Test Pub 3- 0 as a term and definition for Joint Pub 1- 02.) crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Identified in Joint Test Pub 3- 0 as a term and definition for Joint Pub 1- 02.)
residual forces. Unexpended portions of the remaining United States forces that have an immediate combat potential for continued military operations, and that have been deliberately withheld from utilization. (Joint Pub 1- 02)withhold (nuclear). The limiting of authority to employ nuclear weapons by denying their use within specified geographical areas or certain countries. (Joint Pub 1- 02)
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