DOD Doctrine
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Department of Defense |
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DIRECTIVE |
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NUMBER 5230.16
December 20, 1993
Certified Current as of November 21, 2003
ATSD(PA)
SUBJECT: Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance
References: (a) DoD Directive 5230.16, subject as above, February 7, 1983 (hereby canceled)
(b) Federal Preparedness Circular 8, "Public Affairs in Emergencies," June 22, 19891
(c) DoD Directive 5100.52, "DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving Radioactive Materials," December 21, 1989
(d) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
(e) through (h), see enclosure 1
1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive:
1.1. Reissues reference (a) to update DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures for the prompt release of information to the public in the interest of public safety, and to prevent public alarm in the event of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components, radioactive material, nuclear weapon launch or transport vehicles (when a nuclear weapon is aboard), or nuclear reactors under DoD control.
1.2. Updates DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures during an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident.
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1 Available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20429.
2. APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components"). The term "Military Departments," as used herein, refers to the Airy, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
3. DEFINITIONS
Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
4. POLICY
It is DoD policy:
4.1. To establish efficient and effective procedures for the release of information to the public in the event of nuclear accidents, IND incidents, or nuclear weapon significant incidents. These procedures include exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any specified location.
4.2. That in a nuclear weapon accident occurring in the United States, its territories or possessions, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) and the On-Scene Commander (OSC) are required to confirm to the general public the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components, when necessary, in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. Notification of public authorities is also required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components.
4.3. That in a nuclear weapon significant incident that has the potential of escalating to an accident, the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO), National Military Command Center (NMCC), may confirm to appropriate authorities, or the ATSD(PA) may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm.
4.4. That during a nuclear weapon accident overseas, the ATSD(PA) or the theater Commander in Chief (CINC), with concurrence of the foreign government through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission, may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the interest of public safety. Notification of public authorities is also required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components.
4.5. That in a nuclear weapon significant incident overseas having the potential to escalate to an accident, the ATSD(PA) or the theater CINC with concurrence of the foreign government, through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission, may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm.
4.6. That information releases relating to improvised nuclear devices will follow the same general guidelines as for accidents or significant incidents. However, the Defense Senior Representative must have the concurrence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as lead Federal Agency (on U.S. territory or possessions) or of the foreign government and Department of State as lead Federal Agency through the appropriate chief of U.S. Mission.
4.7. With the exception of releasing information in the event of nuclear accidents and nuclear weapon significant incidents, to respond to any public requests about the location of nuclear weapons as follows: "It is U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location." This response shall be provided even when such location is thought to be known or obvious. Regarding the release of information on nuclear capable ships, submarines, and naval aircraft, the following statement shall be used: "It is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines, or aircraft." There is no exception to policy governing release of information about IND incidents.
4.8. That if asked why the United States has a "Neither Confirm Nor Deny" policy, the response should be as follows: "The basis for the security requirement inherent in the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons is to deny militarily useful information to potential or actual enemies, to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and contribute to the security of nuclear weapons, especially against the threats of sabotage and terrorism."
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall:
5.1.1. When notified of an accident or significant incident involving nuclear weapons, nuclear components, nuclear reactors or radioactive materials in the custody of or under the physical control of the Department of Defense do the following:
5.1.1.1. Establish communications, as appropriate, with public affairs officers (PAOs) of the Unified Commands, the Military Departments, Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), Department of Energy (DoE), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The U.S. Chief of Mission and the U.S. Department of State (DoS) PAO shall be notified and consulted on accidents overseas or on accidents and significant incidents near a U.S. border.
5.1.1.2. Provide initial PA guidance, make news releases, respond to news media inquiries, and hold news conferences at the national level in coordination with appropriate DoD officials (to include the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) and the Director, (DNA), the DoE, the FEMA, and if overseas or near a U.S. border, with the DoS.
5.1.1.3. Ensure that the DoD OSC is advised immediately of all news releases and news conferences held at the national level addressing accident response or recovery operations.
5.1.1.4. Delegate, when appropriate, overall PA responsibility to the Military Department or Unified Commander having primary responsibility for the DoD accident response.
5.1.2. Issue, as necessary, a DoD PA regulation and other discretionary instructions and guidance to ensure timely and uniform implementation in the Department of Defense of approved exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in a specific location.
5.1.3. When notified of an IND incident:
5.1.3.1. Establish communications with PAOs of the lead Federal Agency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for incidents in the United States, its territories and possessions. The DoS is the lead agency for acts not under FBI responsibility.
5.1.3.2. Establish communications with PAOs of the Military Departments, the DNA, the DoE, the FEMA, the applicable Unified Command, and other appropriate Federal Agencies.
5.1.3.3. Act in support of the lead Federal Agency PAO by ensuring DoD PAO representation in the joint information center (JIC) established by the lead Federal Agency. Such support shall include jointly coordinating all press releases and media events.
5.1.3.4. Ensure the Defense Senior Representative (DSR) is advised immediately of all news releases and press conferences held at the national level addressing IND incident response operations.
5.1.3.5. Delegate, when appropriate, overall DoD PA responsibility to the Military Department or Unified Command having primary responsibility for the DoD response to an IND incident.
5.1.4. Coordinate with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, as appropriate, when litigation is likely due to the conditions surrounding a nuclear accident or incident.
5.2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the Unified Commands, and the Directors of the Defense Agencies shall implement this Directive and shall ensure that the following PA aspects are included in their contingency planning:
5.2.1. Comprehensive PA planning for DoD nuclear accident, IND incident and nuclear weapon significant incidents, and comprehensive PA operations, including adequate personnel and administrative, communications, and logistical support for a potential DoD response force.
5.2.2. Procedures to be followed by potential OSCs under the DoD Component's command in the United States, its territories and possessions. These PA procedures shall be in the form of a checklist and shall include the subjects in the example in enclosure 4.
5.2.3. Pre-coordinated contingency releases for nuclear weapon accidents. Examples of contingency releases in enclosure 5 are appropriate for inclusion in PA plans. Actual releases shall pertain to the area and situation where they are needed; however, they should follow the examples in enclosure 5.
5.2.4. News media support at a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident site. If the DoD OSC designates the site a national defense area (NDA), news media representatives shall be supported as on a military installation. Briefings shall be given to news media representatives informing them of the appropriate information that can be disclosed during a nuclear accident and the procedures to be followed. A handout that provides the same information as the briefing shall be given to news media representatives.
5.2.5. Periodic training or at least annual briefings that include the PA aspects of a nuclear accident or incident. Briefings shall cover this Directive and implementing instructions of the applicable DoD Component, command, and unit. Such training is recommended for personnel who are directly involved in operations or events or have the potential of becoming involved. However, training shall include members from the Military Department police agencies, base, or station security personnel; nuclear weapons security force; and intelligence, operations, and PA personnel. In areas outside the United States, its territories, and possessions, members of the U.S. diplomatic mission, DoS, shall be invited to attend the annual briefings.
5.2.6. Provision for informing emergency response personnel, key local leaders, civilians, and State officials on radiation and other hazards that may or may not exist. For nuclear weapon or nuclear component accidents, IND incidents, and nuclear weapon significant incidents, notification may be accomplished early in the response process through telephone calls from or visits by the OSC or designees. As the response force increases, this may be accomplished with a Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT) comprising PA, medical, legal, security, communication, administrative, logistics, or other appropriate personnel from DoD and civil resources. s these resources become available, they shall function under the direction of the OSC or the DSR, or the lead Federal Agency. The CEAT shall be physically located in the JIC to facilitate coordination. Activities of the CEAT shall be coordinated through the senior FEMA official (SFO), under relationships established by Federal Preparedness Circular 8 (reference (b)), with similar activities of other Agencies to ensure a unified approach in working with the community. In overseas areas, the OSC or DSR may constitute a CEAT that shall coordinate through the appropriate Unified Commander, or designee, and Chief of U.S. Mission and host-government authorities. For military nuclear reactor or radiological material accidents, State and local officials can be informed via the FEMA in the United States, its territories and possessions, as appropriate; or through the Unified Commander, or designee, and Chief of U.S. Mission in overseas areas with host-government authorities who have this responsibility.
5.2.7. Expeditiously inform the ATSD(PA) on the PA aspects of military nuclear reactor or radiological material accidents.
5.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
5.3.1. Notify the ATSD(PA), in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference (c)), to provide timely, accurate information on the progress of an accident response.
5.3.2. Invoke exceptions to the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of a nuclear weapon before the OSC arrives at a nuclear weapon accident site in accordance with procedures in enclosure 3 when it is necessary immediately to implement public safety actions or to reduce public alarm. This action shall be taken with available information and the Chief, or designee, of the responsible Military Department shall be informed. Pre-coordinated information required by local and State officials to ensure public safety and health, and necessary to aid law enforcement personnel to secure the weapon, shall be retained in the NMCC. The DDO shall give this information to State and local officials (if time permits, via the FEMA) when required to reduce the hazard to life, health, or property before the initial response force arrives.
5.3.3. Refer news media inquiries received at the NMCC to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs duty officer.
5.4. The Commanders of the Unified Commands shall implement this Directive and develop nuclear weapon accident, IND incident, nuclear weapon significant incident, and nuclear reactor or radiological accident PA planning guidance, including:
5.4.1. Provisions and procedures to expeditiously inform the ATSD(PA); Chief of U.S. Mission, DoS; and the host government of emergency news releases; and the use of the host government's public release facilities.
5.4.2. Contingency plans, announcements, and methods of release developed by Unified Commanders, or designees, in consultation with the Chief of U.S. Mission in the country concerned.
5.4.3. Provisions for clearing contingency announcements and methods of release with host governments, when required by international agreement. This process shall be accomplished by the theater CINC through the Chief of U.S. Mission in the country concerned.
5.5. The Heads of the DoD Components shall comply with this Directive and shall establish notification procedures as required by DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference (c)).
6. PROCEDURES
DoD-prescribed procedures on nuclear weapon accidents and significant incidents, nuclear components, radioactive material, and DoD nuclear reactor and radiological accidents are in enclosure 3.
7. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of implementing documents to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs within 120 days.
Enclosures - 5
E1. References, continued
E2. Definitions
E3. Procedures on Accidents and Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Components, Nuclear Reactors, or Radioactive Materials
E4. Model PA Checklist for DoD OSC or Designee at an Accident Involving Radioactive Materials
E5. Contingency Releases for Nuclear Weapon Accidents
E1. ENCLOSURE 1
REFERENCES, continued
(e) Public Law 93-288, "Disaster Relief Act of 1974," May 22, 1974, as amended
(f) Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," December 1, 1989
(g) Section 142 of Public Law 83-703, "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," August 30, 1954, as amended
(h) Executive Order 12148, "Federal Emergency Management," July 20, 1979
E2. ENCLOSURE 2
DEFINITIONS
E2.1.1. Area Commander. A Military Service-designated commander with authority in a specific geographical area.
E2.1.2. BENT SPEAR. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff term used in the Department of Defense to identify and report a nuclear weapon significant incident involving a nuclear weapon or warhead, nuclear components, or vehicle when nuclear loaded. This term includes a significant incident as defined in DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference (c)).
E2.1.3. BROKEN ARROW. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff term to identify and report an accident involving a nuclear weapon or warhead or nuclear component. (See definition E2.1.23., below, nuclear weapon accident.)
E2.1.4. Classified National Security Information. Information or material subject to the control of the U.S. Government encompassing both U.S. national defense and foreign relations that has been determined under E.O. 12356 (reference (d)) to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated.
E2.1.5. Combined Information Bureau (CIB). A facility established in a foreign country near the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident and staffed by U.S. and host-nation PA personnel. Space may also be allocated for the media. Normally, press briefings will be conducted at the CIB.
E2.1.6. Community Emergency Action Team (CEAT). A team comprising PA, medical, legal, security, communication, administrative, logistics, or other appropriate personnel from DoD and civil resources whose function is to inform emergency response personnel, key local leaders, civilians, and State officials on radiation and other hazards that may or may not exist. A team of response and local experts that operates out of the JIC and is available to assist the local community.
E2.1.7. Coordinate. To bring into common action so as not to duplicate unnecessarily or omit important actions. The act of coordination does not involve direction of one agency by another.
E2.1.8. Custodial Commander. A commander responsible for maintaining custody, guardianship, and safekeeping of nuclear weapons and their components and of source and special nuclear materials.
E2.1.9. Defense Senior Representative (DSR). A general or flag officer provided by the responsible Military Department or CINC who acts as the DoD single point of contact on-site in the event of an IND incident. The DSR exercises operational control over all responding DoD assets unless otherwise specified. The DSR provides assets, advice, and assistance to the lead Federal Agency, and coordinates actions with the DoE senior official.
E2.1.10. EMPTY QUIVER. A reporting term to identify and report the seizure, theft, or loss of a U.S. nuclear weapon.
E2.1.11. FADED GIANT. A reporting term to identify an event involving a nuclear reactor or radiological accident.
E2.1.12. Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Federal official appointed by the President upon declaration of a major disaster or emergency under Public Law 93-288 (reference (e)) to coordinate the overall Federal response.
E2.1.13. Formerly Restricted Data. Information removed from the restricted data category upon a joint determination by the DoE (or antecedent agencies) and the Department of Defense that such information relates primarily to the military use of atomic weapons and that such information can be adequately safeguarded as classified defense information. (For foreign dissemination, however, such information is treated in the same manner as restricted data.)
E2.1.14. Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). A device incorporating radioactive materials designed to result in either the dispersal of radioactive material or in the formation of nuclear yield. Such devices may be fabricated in a completely improvised manner or may result from the sabotage, seizure, theft, or loss of a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon.
E2.1.15. Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incident. An event resulting from a deliberate act, involving nuclear weapons or nuclear materials that included the sabotage, seizure, theft, loss of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component, or the fabrication and employment of an IND or a credible threat of either.
E2.1.16. Initial Response Force (IRF). An element (whose capabilities are delineated in the Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities Listing), belonging to DoD or DoE installations, facilities, or activities, that would take emergency response actions necessary to maintain command and control on-site pending arrival of the Service or Agency response force. Functions that the initial response force is tasked to perform (within its capabilities) are rescue operations; accident site security; fire fighting; initiation of appropriate explosive ordnance disposal procedures; radiation monitoring; establishment of command, control, and communications; and PA activities.
E2.1.17. Installation. See Joint Pub. 1-02 (reference (f)). For PA purposes, any Federal installation in active status.
E2.1.18. Joint Information Center (JIC). A facility established at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident to coordinate all PA activities. The JIC shall include representation from the Department of Defense, the DoE, the FEMA, and other Federal Agencies, as well as State and local governments.
E2.1.19. Lead Federal Agency. The Federal Agency that owns, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the radiological activity causing the emergency and that has the authority to take action on site.
E2.1.20. National Defense Area (NDA). An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories for safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment and/or material. Establishment of an NDA temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of the Department of Defense and results only from an emergency event. The OSC or DSR at the scene shall define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.
E2.1.21. National Security Area (NSA). An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for safeguarding classified information and/or restricted data, equipment, or material belonging to the DoE. Establishment of a national security area temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of the DoE and results only from an emergency event. The senior DoE representative having custody of the material at the scene shall define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation shall be obtained whenever possible; however, operational necessity shall dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the national security area.
E2.1.22. Nuclear Reactor Accident. An uncontrolled reactor criticality resulting in damage to the reactor core or an event such as loss of coolant that results in significant release of fission products from the reactor core.
E2.1.23. Nuclear Weapon Accident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components that results in any of the following:
E2.1.23.1. Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by U.S. Forces or U.S.-supported Allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapons system.
E2.1.23.2. An accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation.
E2.1.23.3. Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
E2.1.23.4. Radioactive contamination.
E2.1.23.5. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
E2.1.23.6. Public hazard, actual or perceived.
E2.1.24. Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident. An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons, nuclear components, or a nuclear weapon transport or launch vehicle when a nuclear weapon is mated, loaded, or on board that does not fall into the nuclear weapon accident category but that:
E2.1.24.1. Results in evident damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component to the extent that major rework, complete replacement, or examination or recertification by the DoE is required.
E2.1.24.2. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety or nuclear weapons security.
E2.1.24.3. May result in adverse public reaction (national or international) or inadvertent release of classified information.
E2.1.24.4. Could lead to a nuclear weapon accident and warrants that senior national officials or agencies be informed or take action.
E2.1.25. On-Scene Commander (OSC) for Nuclear Accidents. The flag or general officer designated to command the DoD response efforts at the accident site.
E2.1.26. On-Site. That area around the scene of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident that is under the operational control of the installation commander, facility manager, or DoD OSC or DoE team leader. The on-site area includes any area that has been established as an NDA or NSA.
E2.1.27. Photograph. Any plate, negative, print, videotape, live television transmission, or other form of graphic representation, including any sketch or drawing.
E2.1.28. Primary Commander. The Unified Commander in Chief whose forces have possession of nuclear weapons.
E2.1.29. Radiological Accident. A loss of control over radiation or of radioactive material that presents a hazard to life, health, or property, or that may result in any member of the general population exceeding exposure limits for ionizing radiation.
E2.1.30. Radiological Assistance. That assistance provided after an accident involving radioactive materials to:
E2.1.30.1. Evaluate the radiological hazard.
E2.1.30.2. Accomplish emergency rescue and first aid.
E2.1.30.3. Minimize safety hazards to the public.
E2.1.30.4. Minimize exposure of personnel to radiation or radioactive materials.
E2.1.30.5. Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination.
E2.1.30.6. Minimize damaging effects on property.
E2.1.30.7. Disseminate technical information and medical advice to appropriate authorities.
E2.1.31. Responsible Military Department. See DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference (c)).
E2.1.32. Restricted Data. All data (information) on the following:
E2.1.32.1. Design, manufacture, or use of nuclear weapons;
E2.1.32.2. Production of special nuclear material; or
E2.1.32.3. Use of special nuclear material in the production of energy. The term does not include data declassified or removed from the restricted data category under Pub. L. No. 83-703, Section 142 (Section 11w, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended) (reference (g)) (Joint Pub. 1-02, reference (f)).
E2.1.33. Senior FEMA Official (SFO). A person appointed by the Director of the FEMA to coordinate the Federal response to a civil emergency. (See E.O. 12148, reference (h).)
E2.1.34. Service Response Force (SRF). A DoD response force appropriately manned, equipped, and able to perform and coordinate all actions necessary to control and recover from the effects of an accident or significant incident. The specific purpose of a Service response force is to provide nuclear weapon accident or significant incident assistance. Service response forces are organized and maintained by those Services or Agencies that have custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon components.
E2.1.35. U.S. Chief of Mission. The senior DoS official permanently assigned to represent the U.S. Government within a foreign country, often the U.S. ambassador to that country.
E3. ENCLOSURE 3
PROCEDURES ON ACCIDENTS AND SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR COMPONENTS, NUCLEAR REACTORS, OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
E3.1. NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS AND SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS
E3.1.1. The ATSD(PA) retains initial PA responsibility for nuclear weapon accident and significant incidents in the United States, its territories and possessions. In overseas areas, the appropriate theater CINC, in coordination with the ATSD(PA) shall retain initial PA responsibility for nuclear weapon accidents and significant incidents.
E3.1.2. The presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components at any specified location may not be confirmed nor denied except as follows:
E3.1.2.1. In the interest of PUBLIC SAFETY in the United States, its territories and possessions, confirmation of the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components must be made by the OSC. The DDO, NMCC, or the ATSD(PA) may invoke this exception to policy before the OSC arrives, based on available information and in coordination with the Chief, or designee, of the responsible Military Department. Any statement confirming the presence of nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of injury from high explosive weapon components and/or potential radiation exposure. If necessary, the statement may list the radiation hazards that are unclassified, such as uranium or plutonium, but may not reveal classified technical data about the weapon(s). The amounts of explosive or radioactive material are examples of classified technical data. If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should also be stated. Public authorities shall be notified immediately in a candid manner to enable them to take public safety actions. Notification of public authorities confirming the presence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components is required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or any other danger posed by the nuclear weapon or nuclear components. Confirmation shall be made promptly when actions in the interest of public safety must be taken, particularly when protective action or evacuation of civilians may be required. These actions will include releasing statements to the news media to expedite public safety procedures. The ATSD(PA) shall be advised as soon as practical when confirmation has been made directly by the OSC or DDO.
E3.1.2.2. To reduce or prevent widespread PUBLIC ALARM in the United States, its territories and possessions, the OSC may issue an official statement of reassurance to the public that confirms or denies the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear components. Before the OSC arrives, the ATSD(PA) may invoke this exception to policy with available information and inform the Military Department responsible. The DDO shall implement this policy through the appropriate local officials or by authorizing the DoD initial response force commander to issue a statement in an emergency. The DDO shall notify the responsible Military Department or Unified Commander if this authority is granted. Any statement confirming the presence of nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of injury from high explosive weapon components and/or potential radiation exposure. If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should also be stated. The confirmation may state also that the use of explosive ordnance disposal teams is only a precautionary measure, and the evacuation of DoD personnel is only a precautionary measure designed to limit the number of personnel at the accident scene. A denial should characterize the accident or incident as a non-nuclear event. The ATSD(PA) shall be notified in advance if practical, or as soon as possible thereafter, if this exception to policy is initiated to enable the ATSD(PA) to continue initial PA responsibilities and to ensure the release of timely, accurate information at the national level.
E3.1.2.3. In overseas areas outside the United States (and its territories and possessions), the ATSD(PA) or the Unified Commander or representative, with concurrence of the foreign government through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission, may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components at the scene of an accident or significant incident in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent public alarm. The ATSD(PA) shall be advised in advance, when practical, if exception to policy is necessary. Notification of civil authorities of foreign governments, through the Chief of the appropriate U.S. Mission, is required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by the weapon or its components. Notification of foreign governments is not considered an exception to the neither confirm nor deny policy. It is U.S. Government policy to notify foreign governments promptly of any U.S. incident that may create a hazard to public health and safety.) Any statement confirming the presence of nuclear weapons should contain information about the possibility of injury from high explosive weapon components and/or potential radiation exposure. If injury or radiation exposure is unlikely, it should also be stated.
E3.1.2.4. In a nuclear weapon significant incident, the DDO, NMCC, or the ATSD(PA) and the Unified Commander or his representative may confirm the presence of nuclear weapons in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent public alarm. Confirmation must be with the concurrence of the foreign government through the appropriate Chief of U.S. Mission.
E3.1.3. The DoD OSC, or designee, at a nuclear weapon or nuclear component accident or significant incident site in the continental United States shall expeditiously establish communication with the ATSD(PA) by ANY means available, if an accident or incident affecting the public requires implementation of public safety measures. Direct communication between the ATSD(PA), or designee, and the OSC, or designee, ensures appropriate coordination of PA policy matters for the Department of Defense and provides timely, accurate information for public release at the national level until the Military Department responsible for the weapon is delegated PA responsibility by the ATSD(PA).
E3.1.3.1. If a nuclear weapons accident or significant incident results or appears likely to result, a JIC shall be established near the scene as a focal point for public release of information in a timely, accurate manner, guided by Federal Preparedness Circular 8 (reference (b)). The OSC, or designee, shall establish the JIC in coordination with the DoE, the FEMA, and State and local authorities without delay. If the SFO, or designee, arrives at the accident scene before the DoD OSC, or designee, the SFO, or designee, may establish and supervise a JIC until the OSC, or designee, arrives. JIC capabilities shall be expanded when additional personnel and resources arrive. The JIC shall have dedicated administrative, communications, and logistical support for use by all participating agencies. The JIC shall include a press center for media use and press briefings.
E3.1.3.2. The OSC, or designee, shall assume primary leadership and direction of the JIC until such time as transition of JIC responsibility may occur, as described in subparagraph E3.1.3.3. of this enclosure, below. To provide a coordinated Federal response to the public, the OSC, or designee, shall ensure that on-scene DoD PA activities, such as news releases, briefings, or interviews, are coordinated in advance with the DoE, FEMA, and other Agencies represented in the JIC. Other DoD Components will advise the OSC. Other Agencies also are obligated to coordinate PA activities in advance with the OSC, or designee.
E3.1.3.3. The ATSD(PA) and the Director of Public Affairs for the FEMA, by mutual agreement, may transfer JIC responsibility and authority from the OSC to the SFO at any time. However, when a presidentially declared emergency or disaster exists, the appointed FCO, or designee, shall assume leadership and direction of the JIC. In all cases, the Department of Defense, through the OSC, shall retain authority on security classification matters. When JIC responsibility and authority are delegated to the SFO or FCO, all PA matters about the Federal technical response shall be coordinated in advance with the OSC, or designee.
E3.1.4. If an accident or significant incident, with the potential to evolve into an accident, happens outside the continental United States, the Unified Commander or the OSC, or their designees, shall expeditiously establish communication with the appropriate Chief of Mission and the ATSD(PA), or their designees, by ANY means available if an accident or incident requires implementation of public safety measures. In the absence of international agreements that provide specific guidance, the OSC, or designee, shall establish the CIB in coordination with the Chief of Mission, the foreign government military and civilian national and local authorities, and the DoE. The OSC or designee shall ensure that on-scene DoD PA activities, such as news releases, briefings, or interviews, are coordinated in advance with the Chief of Mission, the foreign government, and the DoE.
E3.1.5. Policy and responsibilities about DoD programs that provide information to appropriate Federal, State, and local officials and news media on radiological safeguards, emergency plans, and other unclassified nuclear matters are outlined in DoD Directive 5100.52 (reference (c)).
E3.1.6. In the event of losses, seizures, or thefts of nuclear weapons, materials, or components by terrorists or other dissident groups, or in the case of seizures of nuclear storage sites, or any site or location having a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system, the ATSD(PA) shall approve and handle release of information for the Department of Defense. However, this does not apply in overseas areas outside the United States, its territories and possessions, where governmental agreements exist for the release of this information.
E3.1.7. Most information on nuclear weapons and their storage is classified restricted data or formerly restricted data and is very sensitive; e.g., information about the design of nuclear weapons and components, disclosing its physical state and chemical form, and the specific location of nuclear weapons. The OSC and other responsible persons at the scene shall follow the contingency releases to prevent compromise of classified information. If declassification of other information is needed, it shall be referred to the Department of Defense for consideration and coordination with the DoE, as required.
E3.2. DoD NUCLEAR REACTOR AND RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS
E3.2.1. Detailed PA planning and guidance shall be incorporated in the DoD Components' nuclear reactor and radiological accident plans and shall be in effect for the United States, its territories and possessions, and in overseas areas. This planning shall include provisions for notifying the ATSD(PA) through the chain of command to ensure PA coordination for the Department of Defense.
E3.2.2. Within the United States, its territories and possessions, the appropriate DoD commander (area, on-scene, or custodial):
E3.2.2.1. Shall immediately notify public authorities in the United States, its territories and possessions, when a DoD nuclear reactor or radiological accident presents an immediate danger to the public, particularly when the evacuation of civilians is considered prudent. If time permits, the appropriate DoD commander should issue to State and local officials any recommendations on the need to take shelter or to evacuate. In cases of imminent peril, it may be necessary for the DoD commander to issue, directly to the public or through the news media, a warning for individuals to take shelter or evacuate in those areas in immediate danger of exposure. The ATSD(PA) and other PA components shall be advised immediately of this notification.
E3.2.2.2. May issue a public statement confirming a DoD nuclear reactor or radiological accident to reduce or prevent widespread public alarm. This confirmation may be beneficial when the accident requires a special team that attracts public attention or when evacuation of DoD personnel is necessary to prevent injury from radiation exposure.
E3.2.2.3. When a nuclear reactor accident occurs outside the United States, its territories and possessions, the commander shall immediately inform the Chief of the U.S. Mission in the country (or its territory) where the accident occurs, as well as the Chiefs of U.S. Missions in countries whose populations might be affected. He or she also shall inform the authorities of the host-country's government through the Chief of U.S. Mission when the local population is in immediate danger and public announcement is necessary for public safety. Coordination procedures for these eventualities shall be established in advance. The ATSD(PA) shall be kept advised in all cases.
E4. ENCLOSURE 4
MODEL PA CHECKLIST FOR DoD OSC OR DESIGNEE AT AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
E4.1.1. Expeditiously contact the ATSD(PA) by any means available. The ATSD(PA) duty officer phone numbers are DSN 227-5131 or commercial (703) 697-5131 and are maintained on a 24-hour basis. As a backup, communication also may be established through the NMCC.
E4.1.2. If actions have not been taken by the FEMA or the DoE to establish a JIC, immediately establish a JIC near the scene of the accident, but outside the NDA and the OSC operational location. A press center shall also be established. Notify the ATSD(PA) of the locations of the JIC and press center and phone numbers. Also advise the ATSD(PA) how to contact the PAO at the OSC operational location. PA representation in the JIC shall include the Department of Defense, the DoE, the FEMA, other Federal Agencies, and State and local governments. Ensure that all public information is coordinated in the JIC before release.
E4.1.3. When an accident occurs in overseas areas, immediately establish a CIB near the accident site if the foreign government has not already done so. The CIB should include representatives from the appropriate U.S. Embassy, the Department of Defense, the DoE, and foreign national and local military and civilian organizations. Ensure that all public information is coordinated in the CIB before release. (Before CIB establishment, ensure all information is coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, which will ensure coordination with the foreign government.)
E4.1.4. Activate a CEAT, as appropriate.
E4.1.5. Immediately provide dedicated administrative, communications, and logistical support to the JIC. Communication support to the JIC shall include adequate dedicated telephone lines, fax capability, and copiers.
E4.1.6. Immediately provide the press center with dedicated communications and logistical support.
E4.1.7. Do not disclose classified information, unclassified controlled nuclear information, or critical nuclear weapons design information.
E5. ENCLOSURE 5
CONTINGENCY RELEASES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENTS
CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 1
To notify the general public
"No Radiological Danger to the Public"
(Confirms to reduce public alarm)
(Format of sample release to be used initially when no danger to the public from contamination or blast exists, but when confirmation of the presence or absence of a nuclear weapon or nuclear components significantly prevents or reduces widespread public alarm that will result from unusual activity at the incident site.)
A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying hazardous material, classified cargo, or unarmed nuclear weapon(s)) crashed (or other circumstances) at approximately (location and time).
The public is requested to stay out of the area (add, if true: under surveillance by guards) to prevent any remote possibility of hazard from the accident (or conventional high explosives detonation) and to avoid hampering removal operations. There is no need for evacuation. (There is no danger of nuclear detonation.)
The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be provided as they become available.
CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 2
To notify the general public
"When Public Is Possibly in Danger"
(Confirms possibility of contamination in a nuclear weapon accident)
(Format of sample release to be used when nuclear weapons or nuclear components have been involved in an accident and the possibility exists for contamination due to fire or explosion, and details are unknown. The release to the general public should only be used after the area has been secured. Release can be modified as indicated below depending on audience.)
Minimum Announcement
A U.S. (type) aircraft (other type of transportation) carrying unarmed nuclear weapons or nuclear components crashed (or other circumstances) at (location) at approximately (time).
The public is asked to stay out of the accident area in the interest of safety due to the possibility of hazard from the accident (or conventional high-explosives detonation) and to avoid hampering recovery operations. (There is no danger of nuclear detonation.)
Add the following for appropriate officials:
Fire, rescue, and other emergency services personnel should approach the area with caution from upwind and be equipped with protective clothing and breathing apparatus. Any local official at the scene of the accident or who has left the site who can provide details on the situation should call this number: ( ). Current information from the accident scene will assist response personnel in responding to the accident and providing additional public safety guidance. If contact with the accident scene is established, determine the following: condition of aircraft and/or vehicle (such as burning, evidence of explosion, or extent of damage); condition of accident site (such as fire or blast damage); or evidence of obvious cargo (such as shapes or containers). Avoid handling any debris at the crash site.
If the aircraft is transporting nuclear weapons containing insensitive high explosives or weapons over-packed with accident resistant containers, there is a much lower probability of a detonation and the fire should be fought as long as there is a reasonable expectation of saving lives or containing the fire. The weapons, or containers, if exposed, should be cooled with water.
Law enforcement officials should prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the site and picking up fragments of the plane (vehicle) or its cargo. If any fragments already have been picked up, avoid further contact or handling. Notify (authorities) for retrieval and proper disposition.
A U.S. (Military Department) team from (name of installation) is en route to (has arrived at) the accident scene.
We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties or property damage.
The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be provided as they become available.
CONTINGENCY RELEASE NUMBER 3
To the General Public
"When Public Is Probably in Danger"
(Does Confirm)
(Format of sample release to be used when a nuclear accident occurs. Public safety considerations require this announcement because of the likelihood of fire or conventional high-explosive detonation of the weapon. The following statement should be made locally or by appropriate higher authority if no local authority is available:)
An aircraft (other type of transportation) accident occurred (or other circumstances) approximately (location and time). The accident involved a nuclear weapon that contains conventional explosives and radioactive material. There is no danger of a nuclear detonation, but there is a danger from the conventional explosives that (are burning, may detonate, have detonated). The public is requested to stay out of (indicate the area) (under surveillance by guards) in the interest of safety and to avoid hampering operations at the accident scene. An experienced response team has been ordered to the scene.
(If appropriate, the following WILL be included in the release:) Radioactive material in the form of dust may be scattered as a result of the accident. The dust poses little risk to health unless taken into the body by breathing or swallowing, although it is unlikely that any person would inhale or swallow an amount that would cause illness. As a precautionary measure, you are asked to remain calm and indoors. Turn off fans, air conditioners, and forced-air heating units that bring in fresh air from the outside. Use them only to re-circulate air already in the building. Eat and drink only canned or packaged food and drinks that have been inside. If you must go outside, cover your nose and mouth and avoid stirring up and breathing any dust. It is important to remember that your movement could cause yourself greater exposure to any radioactive dust, should it be present, and you could possibly spread contamination to others.
(If plutonium is involved) One of the materials involved is plutonium, which is both a toxic and radiation hazard and chemical poison if ingested. The radiation given off consists of alpha particles that do not have sufficient energy to penetrate buildings, clothing, or even the outer skin. Therefore, short-term exposure to contamination outside the body poses a negligible health risk. The precautions mentioned earlier should be carefully followed to prevent ingestion.
(If uranium is involved) One of the materials involved is uranium. Uranium, depending upon the type, may be a radiological hazard or a chemical health hazard, similar to lead poisoning. Uranium gives off alpha particles that cannot penetrate skin and pose no health risk when outside the body.
The public is asked to stay out of the area (under surveillance or closed off by guards) (and if true) until a monitoring team, now en route to the accident site, can survey the ground and determine the exact area affected by the accident. Any fragments found near the scene may be contaminated and should be left in place. If fragments have been picked up, avoid further handling and notify (authorities) for proper retrieval and disposition.
Periodic announcements will be made as more information is known. It is expected that these precautionary actions will be modified as more information becomes available. A U.S. (Military Service) team from (name of installation) is en route to (has arrived at) the accident scene.
We have no details yet on civilian or military casualties (or give the number only of civilian and military casualties) or property damage.
The cause of the accident is under investigation. Further details will be provided as they become available.
IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ONLY:
Question: "Are nuclear weapons stored at (name of facility) or (name of facility)?"
Answer: "It is U.S. policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any specific location."
If asked whether nuclear weapons are aboard a specific surface ship, attack submarine, or naval aircraft:
"It is general U.S. policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircraft."
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