DOCI: DODD 3150.3
TITL: DODD 3150.3 Nuclear Force Security and Survivability (S2) August 16, 1994
References: (a) DoD Directive 3150.3, "Survivability and Security (S2)
of Nonstrategic Nuclear forces (NSNF)," January 23, 1991
(b) DoD Directive 3150.2, "Safety Studies and Reviews
of Nuclear Weapon Systems," february 8, 1984
(c) DoD Directive 3224.3, "Physical Security Equipment
(PSE): Assignment of Responsibility for Research, Development,
Testing, Evaluation, Production, Procurement, Deployment, and
Support," february 17, 1989
(d) DoD Directive 5210.41, "Security Policy for
Protecting Nuclear Weapons," September 23, 1988
(e) through (i), see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
1. Reissues reference (a) to:
a. Add strategic nuclear weapons and forces to the existing DoD
Non-strategic Nuclear forces (NSNF) S2 Program.
b. Update policy and responsibilities for nuclear force S2.
2. Describes the DoD program to develop concepts, procedures,
equipment, facilities, and training programs that ensure the S2 of
nuclear weapon systems (hereafter referred to in this Directive as
"nuclear force S2") throughout the threat spectrum in all plausible
scenarios and throughout the weapon system's life cycle.
3. Requires that applicable Military Services maintain nuclear
force S2 programs, in accordance with the policies in section D.,
below, and that the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) maintain coordinated
research and development (R&D) support programs for nuclear force S2 to
complement the programs of the Military Services.
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE This Directive applies to:
1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified
Combatant Commands with a nuclear mission, and the Defense Agencies.
The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to those Services
(the Army, the Navy, the Air force, and the Marine Corps) that have a
nuclear mission, nuclear forces, and/or responsibilities for nuclear
2. Nuclear weapon systems to include all mission-essential
assets (the nuclear weapon, delivery system and/or platform, support
systems and/or equipment, facilities, and personnel) that are the
operational responsibility of the Department of Defense.
3. Nuclear weapons that are in the custody of the Department
of Defense and could be employed in support of allied forces when
authorized by competent authority.
4. Dual-capable systems (i.e., systems also having a
conventional weapons delivery mission) that are the operational
responsibility of the Department of Defense. The conventional role is
often the primary mission of dual-capable systems. The S2 goals in
this Directive must not unduly hamper the multiple missions of general
5. The entire threat spectrum (electronic; initial nuclear
weapon effects; nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination;
advanced technology weapons such as high power microwaves; and
terrorism or sabotage).
6. All force postures (nondispersed and nondeployed,
dispersing and deploying, and dispersed and deployed).
7. Doctrine, organization, procedures, training, and equipment.
C. Definitions Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
D. POLICY It is DoD policy that:
1. The Nuclear force S2 Programs shall be directed towards the
a. Maintaining S2 of nuclear weapon systems sufficient to
ensure availability during crisis.
b. Ensuring the capability to conduct rapid upload,
dispersal, redeployment, or movement to alert status of nuclear assets
during transition to war with high levels of S2.
c. Denying or degrading an adversary's capability to acquire,
neutralize, or destroy nuclear assets while on alert, during
dispersal, or while being redeployed. Once dispersed or redeployed,
continue denying or degrading the adversary's capability in U.S. or
allied forces' areas of operation.
d. Improving the S2 of nuclear supporting command, control,
communications (C3), and intelligence (C3I), and logistical assets.
e. Improving the capability to assess the full range of
threats to nuclear forces.
f. Ensuring that S2 are among the primary factors in the
planning, design, acquisition, deployment, and operation of nuclear
g. Taking maximum advantage of S2 enhancements in a manner
that does not create undesired perceptions by an adversary.
2. This Directive shall be the focus of the DoD Nuclear force S2
Program and serve to link the various related and supporting programs
and Directives in and outside the Department of Defense to provide
general oversight and synergism while reducing or eliminating
unnecessary redundancies. The DoD Nuclear force S2 Program
complements, but does not duplicate, other existing DoD Directives
that address specific aspects of nuclear safety (DoD Directive
3150.2), physical security equipment (DoD Directive 3224.3), nuclear
weapon security policy (DoD Directive 5210.41 and DoD C-5210.41-M),
transportation of nuclear weapons (DoD Directive 4540.5), S2 of U.S.
nuclear weapon command and control (DoD Directive 5-5210.81), and
Defense acquisition policies and procedures (DoD Directive 5000.1 and
DoD Instruction 5000.2) (references (b) through (i)).
3. Operational commanders shall establish goals and objectives
for the S2 of operational nuclear forces, in accordance with this
4. The requirements for R&D and the implementation of corrective
measures for nuclear force S2 shall be coordinated among the OSD, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the
operational commanders, the DNA, and the other applicable Defense
5. Information on major and nonmajor acquisition programs, or any
other pertinent information that may assist the acquisition process,
shall be coordinated with the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
committees listed in reference (i).
1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
a. Ensure that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic
Energy) (ATSD(AE)) oversee and coordinate the DoD Nuclear force S2
Program and shall:
(1) Constitute and chair a Nuclear S2 Steering Group (NS2SG), in
accordance with the guidance in enclosure 3.
(2) Appoint a senior officer to chair a Nuclear S2 Working Group
(NS2WG) answerable to the NS2SG, in accordance with the guidance in
(3) Maintain oversight of DNA nuclear force S2 R&D programs.
(4) Periodically advise the USD(A&T) on the status of the nuclear
S2 programs of the Military Services and the DNA, and on the activities
of the NS2SG and/or the NS2WG.
(5) Provide advice and recommendations on nuclear force S2 to the
DAB committee for support of major acquisition decisions. Provide
similar advice and recommendations to the Service Acquisition Executives
in support of nonmajor acquisition decisions. Provide information to,
and coordinate Nuclear force S2 Program activities with, the Nuclear
(6) Serve as the DoD focal point for coordination and exchange of
information with the Department of Energy (DoE) on nuclear S2 issues.
(7) Coordinate recommended changes or revisions to this Directive
with the OSD, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the applicable Defense Agencies.
b. Provide representation on the NS2SG and the NS2WG.
c. Ensure that nuclear force security requirements are addressed by the
Physical Security Equipment Action Group.
d. Provide guidance and direction on any overlap in nuclear S2
initiatives between nonstrategic and strategic systems.
e. Support the procurement of systems and facilities required for
nuclear force S2.
f. Ensure that S2 issues are identified and resolved by the DAB
Strategic Systems Committee, and that pertinent recommendations are
developed on the operating and policy aspects of the DoD Acquisition
System for nuclear force S2.
g. Ensure that S2 are considered by the DAB Conventional Systems
Committee in the acquisition of dual-capable systems.
h. Ensure that the Director of the DNA shall:
(1) Appoint a senior program manager to act as the principal point
of contact (POC) for nuclear force S2 matters with OSD, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, and the operational
(2) Conduct and coordinate nuclear weapon security and nuclear
force survivability research programs under the cognizance of the
ATSD(AE). Those programs shall be coordinated with the associated R&D
programs on nuclear systems directed by the USD(A&T), and those on
security directed by the USD(A&T) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for C3I (ASD(C3I)). The DNA program shall be structured to consider the
nuclear force S2 research needs of the Military Services.
(3) Provide technical support on nuclear force S2 matters to the
ATSD(AE), the NS2SG, and the NS2WG.
(4) Provide two copies of program-implementing documents to the
ATSD(AE) within 30 days of initial publication or change.
2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
a. Designate a senior-level representation to the NS2SG, and provide a
representative to the NS2WG.
b. Serve as point of coordination for policy implications on arms
control, deployment considerations, and allied perceptions of nuclear
force S2 issues and initiatives.
c. Identify new and evolving policy and strategy trends that may impact
nuclear force S2.
d. Provide policy guidance, as required, on the use of Special
Operations forces in nuclear force S2.
3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control
Communications, and Intelligence shall:
a. Designate a senior-level representative to the NS25G, and provide
representatives to the NS2WG for both physical security policy and for
b. Serve as the focal point for developing DoD physical security policy
for nuclear weapons and forces. Assess the impact and applicability of
the requirements of DoD Directives 5210.41 and 5-5210.81, and DoD
C-5210.41-M (references (d), (g), and (e)), and other security policies
on nuclear force S2 issues and initiatives.
c. Serve as the focal point for coordinating and issuing the postulated
threat to the security of nuclear weapons, forces, and systems.
d. Serve as the focal point for interfacing with the C3 community for
consideration of implications of or impact on nuclear C3 assets and
programs from nuclear force S2 issues and initiatives.
e. Ensure that nuclear force S2 are considered in evaluating, planning,
developing, and maintaining the DoD portion of the Nuclear Command and
Control System (NCCS).
f. As the Chair of the DAB C3I Systems Committee, ensure that S2 are
considered in the acquisition of nuclear C3I systems.
g. Ensure that the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), shall:
(1) Ensure that collection priorities and requirements reflect DoD
Nuclear force S2 Program requirements.
(2) Provide threat support, as required, to the DoD Nuclear force
(3) Work with the OSD and the Military Departments to support,
produce, review, validate, and/or publish threat environment
projections and system threat assessments for nuclear systems.
h. Ensure that the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA),
(1) Serve as the focal point for considering information flow
connectivity impacts on nuclear C3 assets that evolve from nuclear force
S2 issues and initiatives.
(2) Monitor DoD Nuclear force S2 Program activities for
applicability to, or impact on, current and future C3 programs that
support nuclear operations.
(3) Provide technical support to the ASD(C3I), the NS2SG, and the
NS2WG on nuclear-related information systems used to provide assured
connectivity to the nuclear weapon system throughout the entire threat
(4) Ensure that the nuclear force S2 information-related programs
of the DoD Departments and Agencies do not necessarily duplicate or
conflict with the missions and directives of other Agencies.
(5) Liaison with non-DoD Agencies to ensure that the information-
related requirements do not conflict with, and mutually and adequately
support, the missions of both Agencies.
4. The Comptroller of the Department of Defense shall:
a. Designate a senior-level representative to the NS2SG, and provide a
representative to the NS2WG.
b. Assess the budgetary impacts of nuclear force S2 issues and
c. Ensure that the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, assesses
the programatic impacts of nuclear force S2 issues and initiatives.
5. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air force shall:
a. Maintain a nuclear security program and a nuclear forces'
survivability program with specific goals, objectives, and priorities
responsive to DoD Nuclear force S2 Program goals. At the option of the
Secretaries of those Military Departments, nuclear security and nuclear
force survivability programs may be combined, separate programs, or
embodied in existing programs.
b. Evaluate the S2 of nuclear weapons, associated delivery systems, and
supporting forces and facilities under Military Service cognizance to
ensure maximum S2, identify shortcomings, and develop and implement
c. Ensure that the R&D projects included in the DNA S2 R&D programs are
evaluated for incorporation by the Military Departments during the
Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System cycle.
d. Inform the ATSD(AE) how S2 are being considered for new or
modernized nuclear systems before Milestone I, "Concept Demonstration
Approval," described in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2
(references (h) and (i)). Before Milestone II, "Development Approval,"
provide the security concept of operations to the ASD(C3I), as required
by DoD Directive 5210.41 (reference (d)), and a survivability concept of
operations to the ATSD(AE).
e. Ensure that doctrine and training programs support nuclear
operational S2, and that nuclear force S2 are considered in the
development and fielding of new materiel.
f. Appoint a Military Service single POC for nuclear force S2 who shall
designate a senior-level representative to the NS2SG and a
representative to the NS2WG.
g. Provide two copies of implementing documents to the ATSD(AE) with-
in 30 days of initial publication or change.
6. The Secretary of the Army may designate a Military Service
seniorlevel representative to the NS25G, and provide a representative
to the NS2WG to remain informed of nuclear force S2 activities and
participate in the review of S2 programs and issues.
7. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
a. Appoint a principal POC to coordinate the DoD Nuclear force S2
Program for the operation of forces.
b. Designate a senior-level representative to the NS2SG, and provide a
representative to the NS2WG.
c. Ensure that the policy of the Secretary of Defense on the NCCS is
d. Provide operational guidance and direction on nuclear force S2 to
the operational commands; provide coordination and oversight of nuclear
force S2 initiatives and issues of the Unified Commands; and integrate
multi-Service nuclear force S2 requirements.
e. Ensure that the interests of the Unified Combatant Commands are
addressed during nuclear force S2 concept and policy development, and
during design, acquisition, and fielding of nuclear force S2
f. Identify specific nuclear C2 systems, equipment, and facilities that
are subject to nuclear survivability, reliability, and endurability
standards. Develop means of monitoring the development and readiness of
those systems to ensure compliance with the standards established.
8. The Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands with a Nuclear
a. Consider nuclear force S2 in operational planning and training, and
in the day-to-day conduct of activities for all force postures in the
b. Review and be cognizant of the nuclear force S2 programs and
initiatives of the Military Services and the DNA, and recommend
requirements for R&D and nuclear force S2 enhancements through channels.
c. Ensure that the direction of the Secretary of Defense on the NCCS is
d. Develop and implement a nuclear force S2 program to support the
f. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. forward one copy of
implementing documents to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology within 120 days.
John M. Deutch
Deputy Secretary of Defense
3. Nuclear force S2 Steering and Working Groups
Aug 16, 94 3150.3 (Encl 1)
(e) DoD C-5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)," September
"987, authorized by DoD Directive 5210.41, September 23, 1988
(f) DoD Directive 4540.5, "Movement of Nuclear Weapons
by Noncombat Delivery Vehicles," June 14, 1978
(g) DoD Directive 5-5210.81, "United States Nuclear
Weapon Command and Control (U)," June 18, 1991
(h) DoD Directive 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition,"
february 23, 1991
(i) DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition
Management Policies and Procedures," february 23, 1991
1. Nonstrategic Nuclear forces (NSNf). Those nuclear-capable forces,
located in an area of military operations, with a capability to employ
nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces,
supporting installations, or facilities. Such forces may be employed,
when authorized by competent authority, to support operations that
contribute to the accomplishment of the military commander's mission in
the theater of operations. That term shall be used instead of the term
"Theater Nuclear forces." The North Atlantic Treaty Organization term
for NSNf is "substrategic forces."
2. Nuclear force. A collective term referring to nuclear delivery
units, nuclear weapon systems, and applicable control and support
3. Nuclear Weapon Systems. A nuclear weapon and a means of delivering
it to the target with associated support equipment, noncombat vehicles,
facilities, procedures, and personnel.
4. Security (Nuclear Weapons and forces). The total spectrum of
procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel employed to provide a
secure environment for nuclear weapons and forces.
5. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and forces. Those nuclear weapons,
delivery systems, and forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles,
sea-launched ball istic missiles, and bomber aircraft) that possess
intercontinental range (greater than 5,500 kilometers) and are capable
of striking one or more enemy targets to satisfy U.S. nuclear
6. Survivability (Nuclear force). The capability of nuclear forces and
their nuclear control and support systems and facilities in wartime to
avoid, repel, or withstand attack or other hostile action, to the extent
that essential functions (ability to perform assigned nuclear mission)
can continue or be resumed after onset of hostile action.
Aug 16, 94 3150.3 (Encl 3)
NUCLEAR FORCE S2 STEERING AND WORKING GROUPS
1. A NS2SG shall operate under the Chair of the ATSD(AE) to
accomplish the following:
a. Review DoD nuclear force S2 goals, and evaluate progress made in
achieving those goals.
b. Consider the feasibility of proposed concepts, and review ongoing
nuclear force S2 projects.
c. Ensure that nuclear force S2 receives proper emphasis during the
development of the "Defense Planning Guidance."
d. Monitor the DNA nuclear security and nuclear force survivability R&D
e. Ensure coordination and prevent duplication among the DNA and the
Military Service nuclear force S2 programs and with DISA C3 activities
and programs, which are related to, but outside the scope of this
f. Ease the exchange of information among participants.
g. Refer recommendations of the NS25G for action by the ATSD(AE) to the
applicable DAB committee, the OSD, the Military Service, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Commanders, or other applicable
Defense Agency for consideration and resolution.
2. The following shall appoint a member to the NS2SG:
a. The USD(A&T) (may be represented by the ATSD(AE), Chair).
b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
c. The ASD(C3I).
d. The Comptroller of the Department of Defense.
e. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
f. The Secretary of the Army (optional).
g. The Secretary of the Navy.
h. The Secretary of the Air force.
i. The Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands with a nuclear
3. The following DoD Components, Agencies, and other Government
Departments may be invited by the NS2SG Chair to send representation
to NS2SG meetings or to assist or to support the NS2SG, as required:
a. The DNA.
b. The DISA.
c. The DIA.
d. The NWC.
e. The NCCS Support Staff.
f. The DoE.
g. The Department of State.
h. The federal Bureau of Investigation.
i. The National Security Agency.
j. The Central Intelligence Agency.
4. The NS2SG shall meet at the call of the Chair.