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AEC 226/366

April 12, 1967

This document consists of 27 pages

Copy No. 21 of 29 Series A

27  
NO-5A

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PROJECT CLOUD GAP AND CG-34, DEMONSTRATED  
DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (U)

Note by the Secretary

The General Manager has requested that the attached memorandum of April 11, 1967 from the Special Assistant for Disarmament, with attachments, be circulated for the information of the Commission.

W. B. McCool

Secretary

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BY H.R. SCHMIDT, DATE: 11/13/96

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326 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

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
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AUTHORITY: DOE-OCTP  
RM Carpenter 6-19-96  
11/13/96

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UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

APR 11 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN SEABORG  
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON  
COMMISSIONER NABRIT  
COMMISSIONER RAMEY  
COMMISSIONER TAPE

THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER 

SUBJECT: PROJECT CLOUD GAP AND CG-34, DEMONSTRATED DESTRUCTION  
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Project CLOUD GAP, established in 1963, is jointly financed and manned by the Department of Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The function of CLOUD GAP is to carry out field exercises, using both military personnel and civilian technicians, to test the feasibility of theoretical arms control and disarmament measures.

The purpose of CLOUD GAP field test CG-34 is to develop inspection procedures and to test and evaluate those procedures relative to the US proposal for the demonstration of the destruction of nuclear weapons. The purpose of such destruction would be to obtain fissionable material to be transferred to peaceful uses in connection with the agreement proposed by the US to halt the production of fissionable material for use in weapons. Listed below in chronological order are those events concerning CG-34 which are of particular interest to the AEC.

On October 7, 1965, Mr. Fisher, ACDA, wrote to Dr. Seaborg formally requesting the AEC to conduct studies to determine what classified material might be revealed by a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, and to define the facilities that would be needed should the US enter into an agreement which called for such demonstrated destruction. \*

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\*Secretariat Note: On file in the Office of the Secretary.

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On January 6, 1966, AEC sent Mr. Fisher the results of studies on the selection of batches of weapons to be dismantled in a given time period, the possibility of revealing classified information by the examination of external appearances and weight and gross gamma measurements of those batches of weapons, and the results of a preliminary study on an appropriate facility for the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. \*

On March 18, 1966, AEC sent Mr. Foster the final results of the study on a destruction facility. \* It was estimated that it would cost about \$22.5 million (exclusive of land), take two to three years to build, and have annual operating costs of about \$10 million.

On March 21, 1966, AEC wrote the Co-Chairmen of the CLOUD GAP Steering Committee, (Enclosure 1) stating that a weapons destruction field test, based upon the use of multiple facilities, would provide little information or experience of value relative to conducting demonstrated destruction at a single facility. It was further stated that, in the opinion of the AEC staff, it seemed reasonable not to conduct a field test until a single facility was available.

On March 24, 1966, Mr. Arthur W. Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), who is also one of the Co-Chairmen of the CLOUD GAP Steering Committee, suggested that the tests be carried out, although he recognized that it would not be an optimum one (Enclosure 2). In discussing this matter with Mr. Barber and the ACDA Co-Chairman, AEC staff took the position that, if DoD and ACDA wished to spend the money (estimated to be \$900,000) for such a test, AEC would not stand in their way but that AEC could not endorse the test.

On August 16, 1966, AEC wrote the Co-Chairmen of CLOUD GAP that, if the DoD and ACDA decided that a field test should be conducted, the AEC would cooperate in carrying out the test, consistent with certain considerations (Enclosure 3).

On September 14, 1966, AEC was informed that the CG-34 test had been approved by ACDA and DoD (Enclosure 4).

On September 21, 1966, the Project Manager of CLOUD GAP wrote the General Manager of AEC, asking that the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office be permitted to negotiate directly with CLOUD GAP to have Sandia Corporation assist in planning for and carrying out CG-34 (Enclosure 5).

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\*Secretariat Note: On file in the Office of the Secretary.

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On October 3, 1966, the General Manager informed the Project Manager of CLOUD GAP that the Albuquerque Office had been authorized to negotiate an interagency agreement under which Sandia Corporation would provide assistance in CG-34 (Enclosure 6 ).

By letter dated February 23, 1967, AEC commented upon an ACDA public information release on CG-34. The letter suggested two changes in the draft announcement and included a proposed list of questions and answers (Enclosure 7). The release was made by ACDA on April 3, 1967 (Enclosure 8). AEC was advised on March 29 that the release would be made on April 3, but did not receive copies of the actual release until that date.

A Pilot Test for CG-34 is scheduled to start April 10, 1967 and end on April 21. The purpose of the Pilot Test is to work out security arrangements for test personnel while in exclusion areas, and the best methods for screening-off those areas not involved in the test. The full scale test should start in July and end in September 1967.

*Allan M. Labowitz*

Allan M. Labowitz  
Special Assistant for Disarmament

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Enclosures:  
As stated

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ENCLOSURE 1

UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 21, 1966

Mr. Arthur Barber  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
Arms Control  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Art:

As a result of the recent field trip with Cloud Gap personnel (January 10-January 21 to Burlington, Rocky Flats, Oak Ridge, Paducah), and our recent letter to Mr. Foster reporting on our studies, we question whether a weapons destruction demonstration field test is necessary, at this time, to achieve the stated objectives of the test.

An analysis of the objectives stated in "Test Concepts CG-X34 23 February 1966, and the possible contributions that a field test might make, follows:

Objective 1. To determine whether the proposed methods of demonstrated destruction can sufficiently protect classified weapon data for US weapons.

Even without a field test, as a result of the recent inspection of facilities proposed for the field test and our studies, we have been able to reach specific conclusions. For example, we have concluded that classified weapon data would not be protected if present tools, jigs and facilities are used. Present tools reveal classified characteristics such as size and shape of certain weapons parts. However, special tools could be developed which would not have revealing characteristics. Present facilities contain design integrity measurement instruments which by their function and their dimensions reveal classified information. We believe that new facilities would not need

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Enclosure 1  
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to contain such measurement instrumentation, that non-revealing tools could be designed and that even without a field test, a properly developed procedure can be achieved which would not reveal classified data subject, of course, to an evaluation of the actual batches selected for the program.

Objective 2. To evaluate the credibility of the proposed demonstration.

As a result of the field trip we consider that some degree of credibility can be achieved through the following measures, including weight accountability:

1. Examine visually the external appearance of each weapon in a batch.
2. Weigh each weapon in a batch.
3. Weigh nuclear material removed from a batch.
4. Weigh remains from a batch without examining.
5. Remove HE from remains of a batch and burn. Allow adversary to watch fire, but not weigh or examine HE.
6. Bury other remains from a batch in the ocean without weighing or examining.

Some credibility is achieved by having reasonable weights of nuclear material and remains from each batch and evidencing that the total original weight is accounted for.

We believe that detailed procedures based upon the six steps enumerated above can be devised (subject, of course to our evaluation of the actual batches selected for the program); we wish to emphasize that such procedures would not permit verification that actual weapons are, in fact, being destroyed. Incremental improvement in credibility, beyond those measures, would involve classified information. The minimum classified data which would have to be revealed to reasonably convince a skeptical adversary would be extremely sensitive and its revelation damaging to our security.

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Objective 3. To evaluate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed methods and to suggest and test possible improvements.

On the basis of the field trip, subject to the reservation on convincing adversaries noted above, practical methods of demonstrated destruction can be devised without a full field test. It is possible that newly developed tools, noted under Objective (1) above, would have to be tested, but to do so would not require a full field test.

Objective 4. To identify operational, technical classification, safety, and security problems likely to arise.

Because the exact weapons mix and facility used are such integral parts of the problem, and since the exact mix has at this point not been defined, we believe that as much or more can be gained from studying, on paper, representative possible mixes as from running a full field test on one mix which will differ from the actual weapons mix to be destroyed.

Objective 5. To determine the problems involved in testing demonstrating at multiple facilities that will provide information for comparing the use of single or multiple facilities for demonstrated destruction.

We feel that it would be unrealistic to consider that actual demonstration to an adversary of destruction could be accomplished in plants in widely separated geographical locations (i.e., in several states). A single plant would have to be constructed, or a single existing facility would have to be modified for such use.

As a result of the recent field trip, we believe that the problems of multiple site facilities are obvious and that a field test at such facilities would reveal relatively little about requirements for a demonstration at a single facility.

Objective 6. To obtain experience that will enable Project Cloud Gap to conduct if necessary at a later date, a field test involving nuclear weapons other than those involved in CG-X34 Tests.

If there is a real possibility that a crash program would be needed, a field test would provide data on logistics,  
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personnel requirements, timing, etc. However, any final system involving a separate facility will automatically be proof-tested when the facility itself is proof-tested; this would seem to eliminate the requirement for a field test in advance.

The Cloud Gap draft paper refers to an ACDA recommendation (page 9, paragraph 2) for a field test philosophy as follows:

"During the test teams will observe nuclear weapons immediately prior to destruction processing to verify that they are in fact nuclear weapons, and ..."

The weapons may be inspected as per comments under Object (2) above, but it is open to question whether this will indeed verify the fact that what is being disassembled is in fact a nuclear weapon.

Based upon the foregoing observations, it appears to us that a field test at this time, involving multiple facilities, would provide little information and experience relative to operations at a single facility. It would seem reasonable to us to hold a field test in abeyance, at least until such time as a single facility is established, either by construction or modification of an existing facility, for the purpose of demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. The question of whether such a facility is to be established, and when, seems to be outside the purview of the Cloud Gap Steering Committee.

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Sincerely yours,

/s/ Allan M. Labowitz

Allan M. Labowitz  
Special Assistant for Disarmament

Identical letter sent to:

Lt. Gen. Fred M. Dean, ACDA

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ENCLOSURE 2

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

24 MAR 1966

In reply refer to  
I-22074/66

Mr. Allan M. Labowitz  
Special Assistant for Disarmament  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Al:

I have read your letter concerning CG-34, a test of the demonstration of weapons destruction. While I recognize your concern, I cannot agree with your conclusion that we should not conduct a test. It seems to me that in carrying out the staff work for a test, we have already gained a better understanding of the operational problems which we would have to face if we were ever to implement the existing US proposal. Personally, I tend to agree with you that an actual demonstration would not be accomplished in several facilities in widely separated geographical locations. However, this does not mean that a field test is useless. I believe it would be invaluable in providing us all with a thorough understanding of the problems involved.

The Chiefs have repeatedly made clear their views that field tests should be carried out prior to the negotiation of any US agreement. I agree that we should carry out such tests whenever possible. The suggestion that the testing of a separate single facility at some unknown future date would meet the requirement for a field test appears questionable? I doubt that any government agency is prepared to recommend the design and construction of such a facility at the present time. Certainly we should not delay tests indefinitely while awaiting a facility which may never be built.

I suggest that we proceed to carry out the tests, recognizing full well that the optimum system will probably be a single facility.

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Sincerely,

Arthur W. Barber  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

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Enclosure  
SAACM-94-66(S)

Enclosure 2

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SAACM 94-66  
23 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ARMS CONTROL)

Subject: Transfer of Fissionable Material to Peaceful  
Uses with Demonstrated Destruction of Certain  
Nuclear Weapons (C)

Reference: AEC's confidential letter to the Deputy  
ASD for Arms Control, dated 21 March 1966,  
subject as above.

1. (S) I am concerned with the conclusions and inference  
drawn by the AEC, in the referenced letter, with respect to  
the postponement of Cloud Gap test number CG-34 or a similar  
field test.

2. (S) The results of the recent inspection of facilities  
as outlined in the AEC letter, appear to strengthen the recom-  
mendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the subject  
of a field test of a weapon destruction system made originally  
in JCSM-66-65, dated 29 January 1965 and reaffirmed in JCSM-  
35-66, dated 15 January 1966, as follows:

"The proposed weapons destruction inspection and  
verification system be spelled out in detail and  
thoroughly field tested to determine feasibility and  
to ascertain whether nuclear weapons security would be  
protected."

In addressing the same subject you will recall the SECDEP,  
in a letter to the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency, dated 23 February 1965, stated inter alia:

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"Before the US becomes committed to any inspection  
and verification scheme, it should be reviewed by the  
DOD and other interested agencies to determine feasibility  
and to ascertain whether nuclear weapons security would  
be protected."

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3. (S) If ACDA is to proceed with an arms control proposal involving the destruction of nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again reiterate their recommendation that a field test be conducted. It is considered necessary that the feasibility of an inspection or verification system associated with any arms control treaty be determined prior to US commitment in this area.

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/s/ W. M. McCormick

W. M. McCormick  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Special Assistant to the  
JCS for Arms Control

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ENCLOSURE 3

UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 16, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: ARTHUR W. BARBER, DOD Co-Chairman  
WALTER L. DEEMER, ACDA Acting Co-Chairman

SUBJECT: CG-34 FIELD TEST OF OBSERVATION OF DEMONSTRATED  
DESTRUCTION OF WEAPONS

I have discussed the matter of CG-34 with Gen. Crowson and the General Manager.

If the decision is made by ACDA and DOD to proceed with CG-34 as visualized in the Test Plan described in Mr. Lieberman's memorandum of July 18, 1966, AEC will cooperate in carrying out the test and in making its facilities available, consistent with considerations of security, safety, and programmatic requirements, to the extent outlined in the Test Plan. AEC staff will be available for informal coordination with Cloud Gap staff of the details of the test.

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/s/ Allan M. Labowitz

Allan M. Labowitz  
Special Assistant for Disarmament

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ENCLOSURE 4

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

September 14, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan M. Labowitz  
Special Assistant for Disarmament  
Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: CG-34 Test Plan Approval Documents

Attached are copies of the signed approvals of Mr. Foster (ACDA) and Mr. Vance (DOD) granting authority to Project CLOUD GAP to conduct Field Test CG-34, "Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons." These documents are forwarded in accordance with your recent verbal request to Dr. Walter Deemer (ACDA/WEC).


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A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John R. Wilbraham".

John R. Wilbraham  
Colonel, USAF  
Chief of Staff, WEC

Attachments:

ACDA Memo (25 Aug 66);  
ASD/ISA Memo (24 Aug 66);  
Dep. SecDef Memo for  
Service Secretaries (25 Aug 66).



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

25 August 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director  
FROM: ACDA/WEC - W. L. Deemer *WLD*  
SUBJECT: Request for Approval of CLOUD GAP Test Plan  
CG-34, "Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear  
Weapons"

1. It is the purpose of this memorandum to obtain your approval of subject Test Plan. A synopsis of the test plan and the plan itself are attached hereto. (Tabs A and B).

2. This plan has been staffed in ACDA, AEC, DOD and with members of the CLOUD GAP Steering Committee. Currently a copy of the plan is in the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for his approval.

3. All interested agencies are now in agreement that this plan is a suitable instrument for testing the weapons destruction concept. The cooperation of AEC has been assured. (Tab C).

4. Recommendations:

a. That you approve implementation of the test plan for CG-34.

b. That you approve the expenditure of \$895,000.00 for this test from funds provided jointly by the Department of Defense and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

APPROVED *Nelson C. Fortin*

DISAPPROVED \_\_\_\_\_

DATE 8/25/66

Attachments:

- Tab A. Test Plan Synopsis, CG-34
- Tab B. Test Plan, CG-34, dtd 22 Aug 66
- Tab C. AEC Position Letter, dtd 16 Aug 66

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington, D. C. 20301

In reply refer to  
I-25897/66

24 Aug 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of CLOUD GAP Test

Attached (TAB B) is a synopsis of the Project CLOUD GAP plan to test procedures involving the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. This plan has been reviewed and approved by the Joint Staff, the Military Services, ACDA (Dr. Deemer) and myself. The AEC has agreed to support this project.

This plan is being presented to Mr. William Foster (Director, ACDA) for his approval on Thursday, 25 August. No additional funds are required.

I recommend you approve this test and sign the attached memorandum (TAB A) to the Service Secretaries requesting their support.

/s/ Donald H. Humphries  
for Arthur W. Barber  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

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Attachments

- TAB A - Memo for Service Secretaries
- TAB B - Synopsis

APPROVED CV 25 Aug 1966  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington, D. C.

25 Aug 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY)

SUBJECT: CLOUD GAP Test CG-34

Today, I approved the Project CLOUD GAP test program (CG-34) concerning the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. Copies of the Test Plan for CG-34 have been provided under separate cover.

It is requested that the Department of the Navy undertake primary responsibility for overall support of this test assisted by the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force as necessary. Details of the required support as described in the test plan dated 22 August 1966 should be coordinated directly with Project CLOUD GAP.

Each of the Military Departments is requested to provide approximately one-third of the required temporary duty personnel as specified by Project CLOUD GAP in accordance with the approved plan for conduct of the test.

It is further requested that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy support this effort by providing weapons retirement information and assisting in the procurement of training weapons as required by Project CLOUD GAP.

Project CLOUD GAP is authorized direct communication with each addressee in coordinating the details of this test. Any details which cannot be resolved directly should be brought to the attention of DASD/Arms and Trade Control, the senior DOD representative for Project CLOUD GAP.

Prep by: Col Birdsell/ljr/24Aug66  
Retyped: Col Birdsell/mjg/25Aug66  
Arms Control/4E83L/7667L

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Signed

Cyrus Vance Enclosure 4





UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL  
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ENCLOSURE 5



DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

PROJECT CLOUD GAP  
1901 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20452

CLG 5-34  
SEP 21 1966

TO: Mr. R. E. Hollingsworth  
General Manager  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

SUBJECT: Request for ALO Support on CLOUD GAP  
Field Test CG-34


1. Project CLOUD GAP has been directed by the Department of Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to field test inspection procedures for monitoring the destruction of nuclear weapons. The Special Assistant for Disarmament, Atomic Energy Commission has advised the DOD and ACDA that the AEC will cooperate in carrying out the test.

2. Because of limitations in our manning we will require the analytic and technical assistance of a contractor in conducting the test. We believe the Sandia Corporation would be the most suitable and appropriate contractor to assist us. Sandia Corporation has the background, capability, and clearance status required. Further, utilizing an AEC contractor instead of some other contractor may preclude the proliferation of Restricted Data information as a result of this exercise. We have discussed the project informally with members of Sandia Corporation. They have indicated a willingness to accept the task.

3. We request your approval to negotiate directly with the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office an interagency agreement to procure the support of the Sandia Corporation. Their support would consist of providing assistance

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in designing the field test, planning the field operations, providing technical equipment and assistance in operating the equipment, analyzing the data gathered, and reporting the results. The overall effort will require about 18 months.



D. O. MONTEITH  
Major General, USAF  
Project Manager.

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ENCLOSURE 6

OCT 3 1966

Major General D. O. Monteith, USAF  
Project Manager, Project CLOUD GAP  
1901 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Monteith:

The AEC Albuquerque Operations Office has been authorized to negotiate directly with Project CLOUD GAP an interagency agreement to provide Sandia Corporation assistance in support of CLOUD GAP Field Test CG-34 as requested in your letter to me dated September 21, 1966. ALO has been authorized to negotiate on the basis of AEC policies in providing assistance to other Government agencies.

If we may be of any further assistance, please advise.

Sincerely yours, DOE ARCHIVES

Signed R. E. Hollingsworth

General Manager

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ENCLOSURE 7

FEB 23 1967

Mr. Nedville Nordness  
Public Affairs Adviser  
U. S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
21st St. and Virginia Ave.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ned:

In response to your memorandum of January 13, 1967, subject Draft Press Release on CG-34, we have a number of comments.

In the proposed announcement, please change the first sentence to read: "The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) today announced plans for a field test to evaluate methods for verifying the destruction of nuclear weapons without revealing classified weapon design information." (Underlined words are new.)

Also in the announcement, please change the next to the last sentence to read: "Actual operations will be conducted at the AEC facilities at Paducah; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Golden, Colorado; and Amarillo, Texas.

Because CG-34 involves AEC facilities, we would appreciate advance notice of the timing and final text of the announcement, so that our facilities can issue it simultaneously in their localities. We believe this to be necessary to ward off rumors and questioning which could arise if only abbreviated wire service stories are available.

We are enclosing a number of questions which we believe we might reasonably expect, together with answers. Please let us know if you object to any of these. Otherwise we shall assume that information officers concerned may use them if necessary, after the initial announcement is issued.

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Sincerely,

/s/ John A. Harris

John A. Harris, Director  
Division of Public Information

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Enclosure 7

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Q. When do you expect Project Cloud Gap to get under way?  
A. Pilot tests (all locations) scheduled to begin early April.  
Headquarters to be set up at Paducah mid June.  
Field operations (all locations) scheduled July through September.
2. Q. What plants in Oak Ridge will be involved in the project?  
A. Y-12
3. Q. The announcement says some 80 people will be in the inspection team.  
Does this mean that 80 will be at a given location during the three-month exercise?  
A. No. Paducah headquarters will have about 30 people all the time.  
Other locations, except Paducah, will have a test site group of about 10 persons all the time. In addition all locations will have an additional 6 people (inspectors) at a time during the exercises.
4. Q. Will any local plant people be involved and, if so, in what way?  
A. Yes. Local people will perform normal disposal operations at all locations.
5. Q. Why was Paducah chosen as the headquarters for the operation? Where will the group be based at the plant?  
A. Paducah was chosen for headquarters because classroom and administrative space was available. The headquarters will be in the

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administration building.

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Enclosure 7

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6. Q. How will the actual exercise be carried out?

A. Like the retirement of weapons with limited observation by inspectors.

7. Q. Why were AEC sites chosen rather than military bases?

A. AEC retires weapons.

8. Q. Why are so many AEC sites involved?

A. Rather than build an expensive single facility, several present sites will be used.

9. Q. If the "transfer" proposal ever became a reality, does it mean that any of the exercise locations would become involved as sites where destruction of nuclear weapons would take place?

A. It is too early to say where such work would take place.

10. Q. Does this exercise mean that nuclear weapons would be brought to any of the exercise locations for destruction?

A. In the exercise, the initial presentation of weapons will be at Amarillo. These weapons will contain all components necessary to the exercise, but will not be complete. Lesser parts of the nuclear weapons will be brought to Paducah, Oak Ridge, and Rocky Flats. We cannot elaborate on this.

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"CLOUD GAP" (CG-34) ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) today announced plans for a field test to evaluate methods of verifying the destruction of nuclear weapons. The exercise, to begin later this year and to be completed by September 1967, will be conducted in Tennessee, Kentucky, Colorado, and Texas by personnel of "Project CLOUD GAP," an organization which is jointly manned and financed by ACDA and the Department of Defense.

This field exercise -- called "CG-34" -- is related to what is known as the "Transfer" proposal, which was first presented at the United Nations General Assembly by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg in September 1965 and has subsequently been discussed at the conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. As a means of halting the nuclear arms race, the United States had earlier proposed that there should be a verified "Cut-off" in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The "Transfer" proposal is tied to this "Cut-off",

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but goes a step farther in that it would actually introduce reductions in nuclear weapons inventories. The U.S. Government has said that if the Cut-off proposal is accepted, the United States would be willing to transfer an agreed amount of fissionable material from existing weapons to peaceful purposes, under international safeguards, providing the Soviet Union would do likewise.

While it would thus introduce an actual turn-down in the nuclear arms race, the "Transfer" proposal would not impinge upon the security interests of either side: It does not involve inspection of remaining nuclear weapons inventories; nor does it call for compromising such sensitive elements as weapons design. It is in this latter connection that field exercise CG-34 has an important role to play: It will undertake a thorough evaluation of the various techniques and equipment which have been developed to ensure that the "Transfer" would operate as planned, providing reliable verification that the full measure of

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fissionable materials had been released for peaceful purposes, but without compromising weapons design in the process.

Although planning for CG-34 began in early 1965, the operational phase of the exercise will take approximately three months. To ensure complete realism, actual weapons will be used.

Headquarters for the test will be located at the Atomic Energy Commission's plant at Paducah, Kentucky. Actual operations will be conducted at the AEC facilities at Paducah, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Golden, Colorado; and Amarillo, Texas. The CLOUD GAP inspection teams will be made up of approximately 80 military personnel and civilian technicians.

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CLEARANCE REQUESTED OF: Members of CG Steering Committee  
AEC - Mr. McCaulty  
DOD - Capt. Shillerstrom  
P/SR - Mr. Tully

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ENCLOSURE 8

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

PUBLIC INFORMATION RELEASE NO.

(For Release Monday, April 3, 1967, 12:00 Noon)

"CLOUD GAP" (CG-34) ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) today announced plans for a field test to evaluate procedures contemplated for demonstrating the destruction of nuclear weapons without revealing classified weapon design information. The exercise, to begin later this year and to be completed by September 1967, will be conducted in Tennessee, Kentucky, Colorado, and Texas by personnel of "Project CLOUD GAP," an organization which is jointly staffed and financed by ACDA and the Department of Defense.

This field exercise -- called "CG-34" -- is related to a proposal which was first presented at the United Nations General Assembly by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg in September 1965 and has subsequently been discussed at the conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. As a means of halting the nuclear arms race, the United States had earlier proposed that there should be agreement on a verified "Cutoff" in the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and a transfer of large quantities of these materials to peaceful uses. The "Weapons Destruction" proposal is tied to this "Cutoff" and "Transfer", going a step farther in that it would involve actual destruction of the numbers of nuclear weapons necessary to obtain the fissionable material to be transferred to peaceful uses. The United States has stated its willingness to enter into such an agreement, placing the material obtained from the weapons under international safeguards, providing the Soviet Union would do likewise.

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While it would thus introduce an actual turn-down in the nuclear arms race, this proposal would not impinge upon the security interests of either side: It does not involve inspection of remaining nuclear weapons inventories; nor does

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It call for compromising such sensitive elements as weapons design. It is in this latter connection that field exercise CG-34 has an important role to play: It will undertake a thorough evaluation of the methods and procedures by which the destruction of weapons would be demonstrated to ensure that the operations would go as planned, providing reliable verification that the full measure of fissionable materials had been released for peaceful purposes and submitted to international safeguards, but without compromising weapons design information in the process.

The operational phase of the exercise will take approximately three months. To ensure complete realism, actual weapons will be used.

Headquarters for the test will be located at the Atomic Energy Commission's plant at Paducah, Kentucky. Actual operations will be conducted at the AEC facilities at Paducah, Kentucky; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Golden, Colorado; and Amarillo, Texas. The CLOUD GAP inspection teams will be made up of approximately 80 military personnel and civilian technicians.

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