RUSSIA'S NEW DOCTRINE: TWO VIEWS

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July 20, 1994
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FOREWORD

The future direction of Russian security and defense policies is a fundamental issue in contemporary world politics. Future Russian policies will have a major impact on all nuclear issues; on bilateral relations with the United States; and on European, Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Far Eastern security. One primary indicator of the direction of Russian policies is the new Defense Doctrine published in November 1993. This document has aroused much controversy and diverging assessments as to its significance. However, since it encompasses all the major issues in Russia's security and defense agenda, it is a major statement that is crucial to any understanding of Russian trends and policies.

Because of the controversy over Russian doctrine, the Strategic Studies Institute, as part of its ongoing coverage of Russian defense and security policies, presents here two very different assessments of that doctrine to contribute to the debate over its meaning. The Institute is not offering an official interpretation of the new doctrine. While both authors work for the Defense Department, they differ in their assessments and are expressing only their personal opinions, not those of any government agency. We hope that our audience will find these presentations stimulating and thought provoking.

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SUMMARY

In the past decade, Soviet/Russian military doctrine has experienced startling changes both in content and in the role such doctrine will play in protecting the vital interests of the state. This report focuses upon efforts during and after the Gorbachev era to establish clear national security priorities and to enumerate the ways in which military doctrine might ensure protection of the Russian national interest.

Since 1987, when the Soviet Union switched to an ostensibly defensive military doctrine, the nature of this doctrine has been a contentious issue in both Soviet/Russian policies and Western perceptions of these policies. This controversy has persisted. The most recent iteration of Russia's defense doctrine was published, with President Yeltsin's signature, in November 1993. It immediately aroused controversy in the West as being a restatement of old Soviet themes, a document for an imperial conception of defense policy, an enshrinement of military superiority over civilians in defense policy, and so forth. On the other hand, a rival current of opinion argued for its novelty and recognition of new, more realistic positions on a broad range of policy issues. As this debate continues, the Strategic Studies Institute presents two independent and differing assessments of the published doctrine.

LTC Holcomb's assessment sees in this document a conservative, even traditional approach that does not, in many cases, offer radical departures from previous policies and perspectives. The concept of doctrine is, he claims, no different than what preceded it, and the habit of worst case planning that characterized Soviet policy is also displayed here. Thus the overall perspective is shaped by an outlook that is skeptical of the West and on guard for military dangers, if not threats.

Dr. Boll, on the other hand, argues that while disagreements may flourish among Russian analysts in the West as to the relative offensive and defensive aspects of both the new doctrine and its 1992 draft predecessor that was not formally approved, there is no question that both documents are firmly integrated with the overall Russian notion of identified national interests and preferred means for their protection. Accordingly, he contends that, for the first time, modern Russian military doctrine responds to a purely national concept of self-interest and threat assessment that is not ideological in nature. Therefore, Russia now has a truly national doctrine that is set out before the world for consideration. The changes in the content of Russian military doctrine are historic in nature. But the alteration in the form of doctrine is truly revolutionary!
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY DOCTRINE

James F. Holcomb

Introduction.

On November 2, 1993, the Russian Security Council and President Yeltsin finally approved the draft "Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." This long-awaited development deserves examination to determine the implications of its adoption for Russia, its neighbors and the West. Several characteristics make this document unique. First, the need for a military doctrine can be found embedded deep in the Soviet military-scientific psyche. The definition of Military Doctrine itself derives directly from the Soviet era. In the accepted draft, Military Doctrine is defined as:

A system of views officially adopted by the state on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on military organizational development, on the country's defense preparation, on the organization of countermeasures to threats to the state's military security, and on the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops for the defense of the Russian Federation's vitally important interests.

Virtually nothing distinguishes this definition from its Soviet predecessors with one exception; that is the addition of "other troops" in the defense of Russian interests. This is a reference to internal and border troops and serves to satisfy a practical detail.

Second, the timing of the release of the doctrine lends credence to suspicions that this was one of Yeltsin's "payoffs" to the military for their "support" during the crisis in October. Indeed, a first draft Military Doctrine was published in May 1992 and was "under discussion" since that time. General Staff officers repeatedly expressed their frustration that they could not get the doctrine approved by the government due to the political turmoil in Moscow. It is interesting, then, that the first agenda item at the first Security Council meeting on October 6, after the crushing of the Parliamentary rebellion was the Military Doctrine. It also was apparently hastily done. The approved doctrine is substantially different from the May 1992 draft and there was probably little input from ministries or agencies outside of the Ministry of Defense.

Third, as the Minister of Defense, General Grachev, and others point out, it is the first time that an approved Military Doctrine has been laid down in written form. The impetus for this began in the late 1980s with the announcement of the "defensive" Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine. Originally ideologically motivated with important propaganda objectives, this impetus led to the
publication in November 1990 of a draft Soviet Military Doctrine. Although never officially accepted, the precedent was set. However, the publication of the current "provisions" has different objectives and target audiences. First, it is intended to provide a compass bearing for the Russian Armed Forces, currently undergoing tremendous disruption. It is also intended to make clear to the West and the former Soviet republics what Russia considers in its interests in the "near abroad" (former republics) and the prerogatives it feels it enjoys in that regard; in short a prescription for military activities in its own sphere of influence. Finally, it serves as a warning to groups within Russia hostile to the Yeltsin regime or the Federation that the military is now prepared and capable of performing an internal role.

A final point concerning the document is that it makes clear that the Military Doctrine is an inherent part of an overall Russian Security Concept and is applicable for the "transitional period." This provides some built-in flexibility in dealing with internal and external security challenges as they arise. It is important to note that the "transitional period" is not described either in character or duration. According to General Manilov, deputy secretary of the Security Council, this was done intentionally so that "the `theses' can be adjusted to possible changes in the political, military and economic situation as well as the international situation."

There has been substantial analysis already of the content of the provisions of the Military Doctrine itself. My intention is to concentrate on the implications of some of the most important tenets as they apply to internal and external Russian policy.

**Russian Citizens Abroad.**

The provisions make it clear that the issue of Russian citizens abroad is still at the forefront of Russian foreign policy. The doctrine states that among the sources of external military danger to the Russian Federation is included "the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states." However, this is not a new provision. It was included in the May 1992 draft as well and in even stronger language:

The violation of the rights of Russian citizens and those ethnically and culturally identified with Russia in the former republics of the USSR could be a serious source of conflict.

The implication of this, however, remains the same. It provides justification for the introduction of Russian forces into newly sovereign states if perceived "suppression" of Russian minorities occurs. Such a provision must be alarming to Latvia
and Estonia, both with large Russian minorities and currently involved in difficult negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian forces. It can be no less alarming to Moldova which already has Russian forces on its territory in the Transdniester region which has a large Russian minority. Parenthetically, such a provision could also be used as a pretext for retaining or establishing a strategic presence in the near abroad in support of Russian imperial pretensions. This has special implications for other former republics as well, notably in the Transcaucasus, Ukraine and Central Asia.

Direct Military Threats.

Although the possibility of world war has been reduced, the doctrine acknowledges that it is still possible. Such a development could occur as result of the expansion of "local wars and armed conflicts" especially if an external power is involved. This is a traditional General Staff assessment and mirrors the 1992 draft doctrine.

External threats to the Russian Federation grow out of potential military dangers. Two are significant for consideration. First, the doctrine defines as a potential military threat "the buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian Federation sufficient to disrupt the prevailing correlation of forces." This reflects a traditional General Staff capabilities-based methodology for determining potential military threats. The result of using such a methodology is a consistent tendency toward the worst case with little political (or other) consideration. That this should appear in the political section of the doctrine implies that the General Staff's correlation of forces methodology could be the basis of a political assessment of a potential military threat. This in turn nurtures traditional Soviet and Russian overestimation of potential threats based purely on military capabilities and the suspicion and distrust that would derive from such a process. Recently, for example, military sources leveled serious complaints about NATO's harmonization process whereby old Turkish equipment is replaced with more modern equipment cut from West European inventories under CFE.

Along the same lines, "the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states" also constitutes a direct military threat to the Russian Federation. This is a carry-over from the 1992 draft, as well, with an important exception: Peacekeeping forces deployed under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council or a regional organ of collective security with the agreement of the Russian Federation (emphasis mine). This constitutes a Russian veto on collective peacekeeping operations in states bordering the Russian Federation and by extension arrogates that role to Russia itself. It also technically precludes stationing of nonindigenous NATO forces in any future new member state sharing a border with Russia. This again
reflects the vulnerability currently felt by the General Staff and the perceived requirement to maintain a security buffer zone around the periphery of Russia.

Nuclear Issues.

Initial Western reports on the Military Doctrine reacted with alarm to the dramatic reversal of the traditional Soviet "no first use" policy. What the doctrine reflects in reality is acknowledgement by the Russian military of what was always true, that the primary role of nuclear weapons is deterrence. Contributing to this point is the increased vulnerability Russian military thinkers feel as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dismal state of Russian conventional forces. Added to that is uncertainty over Ukrainian motives and intentions with regard to the weapons located on their territory. It also serves as a marker to China and other potential nuclear states in the Far East.

Strangely enough, even though the General Staff recognizes the deterrent role of nuclear weapons, they (in the doctrine) still advocate the ultimate reduction of nuclear weapons to zero, a long-held Soviet position. This rejects, at least in principle, any form of appreciation for "minimal deterrence," that is, a dramatically lower level that still is sufficient for deterrence purposes.

Implicit in this is the provision for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack on strategic systems. This is a carry-over as well from the 1992 draft and clear recognition of the threat of highly accurate long range conventional weapons, a lesson taken from the Gulf War.

Within the doctrine there also is a thinly veiled warning to Ukraine concerning the systems on its territory. Included among the "direct military threats" to Russia are actions of other countries which hinder the functioning of Russian systems for the support of the strategic nuclear forces and of state and military command and control of, above all, their space component.

The doctrine therefore legitimizes the use of military force in response to a perceived attempt by an inheritor state to actually gain control over nuclear systems. This is an implicit warning to Ukraine to desist from attempting to gain operational control over strategic systems still located there.

Internal Use of Armed Forces.

In a major departure from the 1992 draft doctrine and previous public statements by the military leadership, the armed forces now have an expanded role for internal use within Russia.
This is an obvious justification for the employment of the armed forces against the Parliament in October and a thinly veiled warning to other groups that could possibly oppose Yeltsin and his regime. In fact, the draft doctrine, in contrast to its predecessor, actually breaks "military threats to Russia" into external and internal categories. The definition of potential threats is wide ranging:

Illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations which is aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out using armed violence; attempts to overthrow the constitutional system by force or to disrupt the functioning of organs of state power and administration.

In addition, organized crime, contraband activity and narcotics trafficking fall into this category. Identified as a "considerable danger" are "internal armed conflicts which threaten the vitally important interests of the Russian Federation and may be used as an excuse for other states' intervention in its internal affairs." The Russian Armed Forces are explicitly charged with assisting the internal affairs organs and troops in localizing and suppressing outbreaks of internal unrest and in efforts against organized crime, smuggling and narcotics. In addition, they can be used to reinforce the Border Guards (as in Tadzhikistan) in securing the state border. This is a much wider role for the armed forces than previously acknowledged; it remains to be seen what kind of constitutional mechanism (if any) will be employed to govern such internal use.

Force Structure.

The argument over future Russian force structure has apparently been resolved in Grachev's favor. His concept of large, rapidly deployable mobile forces based on an airborne forces model initially met resistance within the military establishment, notably the General Staff and the ground forces which wanted to build on the former Soviet infrastructure and unit basis. The doctrine now codifies the development of mobile forces as a separate category within the Russian Armed Forces. This will mark a fundamental shift from the traditional Soviet model of a large number of cadre units filled with mobilizable reserves to a smaller force with fewer divisions at higher readiness.

There is no fundamental change to the system of manning the armed forces which combines conscription with voluntary contract service. Currently about 15 percent of the armed forces are contracted servicemen with a target of 50 percent to be reached by 2000. The concept of extraterritorial stationing of conscripts also remains. Retention of the conscription system recognizes two
factors: first, the need to maintain a mobilizable reserve, and, second, simple costs. What has changed is the anticipated end strength of the armed forces. The former Supreme Soviet codified in the Law on Defense a manning level approximating 1 percent of the population. It also expanded the number of categories of allowable draft deferrals; this put extreme pressure on the manning system resulting in tremendous shortfalls. The legislated endstrength objective was to be 1.5 million by the year 2000. Due to the conscription shortfall, General Grachev stated they would not even be able to make that and 1 million was closer to the truth. Since publication of the provisions, General Grachev and others have revised those figures upward to 1.9 million. Some of that may reflect the reduction in deferral categories after the events of October and anticipation that the conscription system can be fixed; more likely, it was a compromise with those in the General Staff who want larger standing peacetime forces and a larger trained mobilizable reserve. In any event, acquiring funding to maintain the larger aggregate contract manning will be difficult; General Grachev has recently complained that the Duma is only prepared to provide 47 percent of the defense funding requested for 1994. This certainly makes rapid professionalization problematic. Overall, however, it appears that the Russian Armed Forces are intended to be smaller, more mobile and maintained at higher readiness.

**Future War Concepts.**

The 1992 draft doctrine went into considerable detail on the characteristics of future war. Much of that was influenced heavily by Russian military perceptions of the coalition success in the Gulf War and their own military scientific analysis. That analysis did not carry over into the new doctrine. What does appear, however, is the militarily correct and obvious statement that

> the forms, methods and means of conducting combat operations which best accord with the prevailing situation and ensure that the initiative is seized and the aggressor is defeated must be chosen.

This has put the old debate over defensive/counteroffensive operations to bed. Russian forces must be capable of both offensive and defensive operations in all circumstances. The provisions also allow for the continued possibility of a world war arising out of a local war. However, "the main danger to stability and peace is posed by local wars and armed conflicts. The likelihood of their arising in certain regions is growing," notably in the regions to the south of Russia. What is missing here is the hostile rhetoric of the previous draft doctrine. General Grachev and others are quick to point out that this doctrine does not address a "probable enemy" as in the past. It clearly recognizes the immediate security challenges to Russia arising on the periphery while acknowledging the danger of not
containing them rapidly.

**Peacekeeping.**

Peacekeeping operations occupy a significant place in the new doctrine. This is to be expected. In addition to the reference to U.N. sanctioned operations, the provisions allow for peacekeeping operations in accordance with "international obligations," notably under CIS auspices. Specific reference is made to operations in the near abroad in coordination with internal and border troops. The detail in describing the peacekeeping mandate serves to legitimize ongoing "peacekeeping" operations in Transdniestria, the Caucasus and Tadzhikistan while allowing similar provisions for potential operations in other states in the future. Peacekeeping serves as a legitimate pretext for Russian forces operating in the near abroad and could satisfy other perceived strategic requirements at the same time. It should be noted that Russian efforts to gain a U.N. or CSCE mandate and financial backing for their operations in the near abroad have so far failed. Without such a mandate, the U.N. and CSCE also sacrifice any control over Russian peacekeeping operations. The result is that CIS-mandated operations take on a distinctly Russian character; the difference between the near abroad and a Russian sphere of influence becomes potentially narrow indeed.

**Military-Technical and Economic Issues.**

In clear reaction to the tremendous effect that economic disruption has had on military production and acquisition, the entire third section of the provisions is devoted to this theme. The provisions argue for constant and significant support for research and development, production and fielding of the most modern military equipment. This section also argues implicitly for Russian independence and self-sufficiency in this regard. For example, "ensuring the military-technical and economic independence of the Russian Federation in the conditions of transition to a market economy" and "improving the system of state management of the development and production of weapons, military and special hardware in conditions of changing forms of ownership." In other words, market economies and private ownership are acceptable as long as they do not impact on military production. Further evidence of this is seen in the argument for the organization of research and development of advanced technologies "to replace imported ones, including dual purpose technologies." Most of all, the provisions argue for the funding to support a robust development program. This is an important marker and commits the government to rebuilding the system of funding, research and development, defense orders and production which has been so seriously disrupted by the collapse of the old system and the reforms. Some of this figures prominently in current debate on the overall budget in general and the military budget in particular. It may be that the
Russians are truly discovering that one way to control militaries is through the budgeting process. However, it is difficult to separate military issues, procurement issues and the political, economic and social impact of underfunding the defense industry. In other words, budgetary decisions that affect the military and defense industry can have a profound effect as well on those charged with taking them, especially in the volatile political and social environment that is Russia today.

Conclusions.

The adoption of the Russian Military Doctrine marks an important watershed in the development of the Russian armed forces and military policy. It serves as a barometer of current thinking and a compass bearing for further development. It also serves as a legitimizing document for recent past phenomena and current operations with open ended provisions for future possibilities. Internally, it identifies a role for the armed forces and warns potential challengers to the regime. The scope and scale of the described potential internal dangers and threats present the possibility of liberal interpretation. It remains to be seen what kind of limiting mechanisms will be established with regard to the use of the armed forces internally.

Militarily, the doctrine is a rational reflection of military reality without the ideological baggage of the past. Military scientists can now deal with theoretical challenges without the constraints of no first use, nonrecognition of deterrence and strategic and operational defense. We would expect to see wide ranging development of concepts for mobile forces, rapid reaction, crisis management and peacekeeping. We should also see the end of the debate over future force structure; the character, size and capability of the future force should become clearer.

Much of the doctrine was designed for external consumption. It serves as an important indicator of Russian military views with regard to its neighbors. The emphasis is clearly on a closer "relationship" with the former republics using the CIS as a legitimizing forum. Peacekeeping serves and will serve as the short-term pretext for military operations abroad.

We can only guess at ultimate Russian objectives in the near abroad. Suffice it to say that whatever they are, covering a possible spectrum from re-imperialization to bonafide security operations at the request of peripheral states, the military doctrine provides the fundamental precepts by which the military can support those objectives and at the same time satisfy their own perceived security requirements that were so seriously disrupted with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The doctrine also serves as a message to the rest of the world, especially the West, that Russia regards the near abroad as within its sphere of influence and has legitimate national security interests to
pursue in that regard.

The doctrine is described as "transitional." This allows a somewhat liberal interpretation of its contents and implies that many of these issues are still up for discussion. It is a "living" document and more akin to a "white paper" than to a Military Doctrine in the traditional Soviet sense, which is understandable as everything in Russia is currently "transitional." This implies that Russia, its military doctrine and, by extension, its military are moving from one place to another. The problem now is that there are many possible paths to take and many variables affecting the decision. It remains to be seen in which direction they go.

ENDNOTES

1. Quotations from the doctrine are taken from "Osnovnye Polozheniya Voennoi Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsiya" (Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation). In addition to the official 23-page release, numerous publications have presented the text in full. See for example, Izvestia, November 18, 1993, and Rossiiskie Vesti, November 18, 1993. A complete translation appeared in Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report, January 1994.
In the spring of 1987, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee announced an apparent radical shift in its approach to future conflict. With Soviet Party Chief Gorbachev in attendance, the Pact reported that henceforth its military preparations would be informed by a strictly defensive orientation. As the resulting communique asserted:

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is strictly defensive and proceeds from the fact that in today's circumstances the use of the military way for resolving any disputed questions is inadmissible. Its essence is as follows: Warsaw Pact member states will never, under any circumstance, begin military action against any state or alliance whatsoever unless they themselves become the target of an armed attack.¹

Pact forces, the statement continued, would never use nuclear forces first, and Pact members had no territorial claims against any states within Europe or without.²

This emphasis upon defense was subsequently augmented by a fuller description of precisely what this new doctrine entailed in both theoretical and practical terms. An authoritative article in the journal Kommunist stressed the notion of "Defense Sufficiency" as the guiding rule for present and future military reforms:

Defensive sufficiency is the most important element of the military doctrine of socialism [and] functions in essence as the foundation of all our military construction, assuming in its turn, the refusal to be the first to initiate war, preservation of military-strategic parity at the lowest levels possible, mutual weapons' reductions up to the point where no side possesses the physical possibility to undertake an attack . . . .³

Past disregard for such limiting principles, another article argued, had led the Soviet Union to undertake an arms race which rebounded to the harm of both the economic development and the international position of the state.⁴ A third article offered four different models for reconstructing East Bloc forces in accord with the 1987 doctrinal pledge.⁵

Despite the clear assertions of major changes in military orientation and copious discussions in the Soviet press of Secretary Gorbachev's "New Thinking," many Western observers remained unimpressed. In an official conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Schultz in October 1987, Secretary Gorbachev took the Americans to task for not appreciating the dramatic
changes which had recently occurred. In his reply, Schultz gave emphasis to the continuing uncertainty in Washington: "The aspiration to achieve improved U.S.-Soviet relations is mutual. That skepticism which many among us, as in the past, feel in relation to the USSR reflects the experience of certain of your actions. And this experience is disturbing to many." When challenged to abandon his "old" approach to East-West relations, Schultz could only respond: "It is necessary to construct our relations on the basis of reality."

This sharp exchange between the two leaders occurred after the Warsaw Pact had announced its new doctrine, after Gorbachev and Reagan had held their meetings at Geneva and Reykjavik and less than 2 months before the signing of the treaty banning intermediate and shorter-range missiles. And while numerous reasons might be advanced to account for continuing Western mistrust of East Bloc intentions, a crucial cause lay in continuing intelligence reports that observable change had yet to occur in Pact military structure or planning. This author remembers a 1988 talk by then NATO commander General Galvin which noted that the only apparent change in Pact strategy, as measured by their regular military exercises, was that a brief defensive delay occurred before the mobilized Pact forces began simulation of their time-honored, grinding offensive into Western Europe.

Since that time, Pact military documents for this period have become available due to the unity of East and West Germany. We now know that as late as 1989, Pact forces exercised an offensive strategy which included use of 76 tactical nuclear weapons targeted against the small West German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein. Such an unprecedented assault would be on behalf of the northern-most tier of a 6-front attack aimed at conquering all of central and western Europe to the Channel, and reaching the Bay of Biscay by the 30th day. Money was already printed as occupation currency to be used by East German, Polish and Czech troops and clearly demarcated areas were assigned to East German and Soviet troops in a future conquered West Berlin. And as late as the summer of 1990, after the Berlin Wall had ceased to divide the city, East German forces conducted a simulated nuclear strike against NATO positions. Given this pattern of behavior as opposed to a "declaration" of defensive intent, Western anxieties appear more than justified.

To date, the reasons for this obvious disconnect between announced doctrine and actual behavior remain clouded. The facile answer of either mutual deception involving Soviet political and military leaders or efforts by Pact leaders to confound Secretary Gorbachev seems inadequate. And while it is true that available evidence suggests significant resistance within the top Soviet military to Gorbachev's reforms, Gorbachev himself must have had at least some inkling of how slowly his plans were being implemented.

The answer to this apparent dilemma lies in the
philosophical and doctrinal inability of the traditional Soviet military to accept the key principles of Gorbachev's "New Thinking"; a result of the persistence of past and increasingly inappropriate Marxist categories of thought. This conservative reaction was facilitated by the equally strong military tradition of separateness, a belief that formulation of an adequate defense was the sole province of military leaders. As an article in the authoritative journal of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations noted, military reform on behalf of the alleged doctrinal changes announced in 1987 long remained closed to contribution from civilian experts.

The very nature of the Ministry of Defense's official plan for military reform which has been in motion since 1987 without any discussion with the public and despite the Minister's just observation that these tasks are matters for the entire government calls forth mistrust and serious anxiety. Among the 'dilettantes' and specialists there is the fear that once again, as with all military programs of the past, this one is being composed without taking into account the diverse points of view. [This program] is practically being foisted upon the higher leadership of the state under the pretext that its authors are professional and this, according to the logic of the military, guarantees it from error.12

Whenever civilian experts and proponents of a new approach challenged this closed circle of military thought, the answer always was the same.

The key thesis of the "answer" of the armed forces was put rather sharply--"an attack" upon the army is nothing less than a basic part of a campaign to "restore capitalism" by shattering the foundations of the socialist state, by the most extreme injury to the authority of the communist party and the army under its direction . . . .13

The traditional assumptions and prejudices of Soviet military thought which called forth such civilian anxiety arose from a sound grounding in both Marxist thought and Soviet experience. Basic to this approach was the tenacious belief that international conflict was the result of antagonistic class formations not competition among nation-states. Nationalism and the nation-state were phenomena relating to the emergence of capitalism in the 18th century--a stage of socioeconomic growth whose eventual demise was heralded by the Russian workers and peasant revolution of 1917. By 1936, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared in its new constitution that the domestic environment finally was free of antagonistic classes. Continuing disputes and purges now reflected hostile leaders and classes residing abroad and manipulations on behalf of foreign bourgeois interests. Thus, threat to the Soviet way of life was
formulated in terms of a strict internationalist ideology and not in terms of particular national values and goals.

To be sure, Stalin's USSR always took pains to protect itself, but always within the rationalization of being the motherland and bastion of the world's working class. Such an approach necessarily affected military assumptions and planning. In the first place, it clouded military judgment as to the nature of future conflict; witness the false assumptions of the early Russian military and government leaders as to the likelihood that Polish workers would join Russian troops in 1921 in a common struggle against the Polish bourgeois government. Stalin's refusal to give credence to British and American warnings of a German attack in 1941 reflected his belief in a Western imperialistic desire to undermine the existing Berlin-Moscow axis.

Equally important, acceptance of class struggle as the key principle of social organization left the international arena as the sole realm from which a threat might emerge since classes had ceased their direct pernicious influence upon domestic Soviet politics. Later calls by the Gorbachev government to subordinate class interests to the more general task of ensuring universal values challenged the specific theoretical underpinnings which lay at the basis of Soviet military doctrine since the revolution, while doing little to subordinate military doctrine to actual and identifiable Soviet national interest.

In brief, Moscow's traditional emphasis upon Marxist categories precluded military leaders from focusing upon national interests and national security even in the face of Gorbachev's demand for an entirely new approach to defense planning. The entire notion of national security as practiced in the West lacked clear understanding. As Nikolai Kosolapov noted in 1992, when discussing the need to create a Russian conception of national security, "in the USSR such a conception did not, and was not able to exist, for the Soviet Union as a state was constructed around an ideology and a party as the means of its power . . . ."14

A second debilitating aspect of the Soviet military tradition, combining Marxist preconceptions with the early experiences of the Soviet republic, was the continued accent upon the offensive.

In the period of the civil war, the foundations of military doctrine were formulated concerning the laws governing defense of the socialist Fatherland. Following the repulsion of the enemies' attacks by the new state, not all the leaders were able to calm down and to limit themselves to the defense of revolutionary achievements. This was natural, since offensive tasks stood exclusively at the top rank of the doctrinal positions of the Red Army, being in accord with the
"revolutionary" spirit of the first proletarian state.\(^{15}\)

By the 1920s, Bolshevik theorist Mikhail Frunze could augment this ideological inclination toward the offensive with a report to the Eleventh Party Congress arguing that "the [existing] shortcomings in material means could be, and must be compensated for by active partisan and other methods of struggle which would be able to secure success in difficult and unequal conditions of armed struggle only in the presence of a single aim, will and deed."\(^{16}\) As the Russian authors of this study confirm, this tradition, reinforced by the experiences of World War II predominated until the end of the 1980s.

Among the most extreme examples yet revealed of this pernicious combination of ideological interpretation of proletarian (not national) interests and offensive doctrine is the detailed plan for a Warsaw Pact conquest of Western Europe mentioned above. In the past several years, some 25,000 files containing over 500,000 documents have been discovered in the document center for the former East German army. These reveal how "... in an unambiguous fashion, by means of political decisions made by the highest officials, the forces of the former Eastern bloc were so organized that a single option was given for an offensive and how, through regular exercises, [this plan] was refined."\(^{17}\)

As practiced until the end of the 1980s, Pact doctrine was aimed at a massive offensive operation, accompanied by nuclear barrages, designed to insure the conquest of all Western Europe. Five axes of operation would pass through Western Germany, with a sixth axis to the south possible under certain circumstances. These were not simply contingency plans since the participating units already were assigned, the goals specified and the potential nuclear targets identified. The sole remaining requirement was the order to mobilize and move out.\(^{18}\)

The first axis of advance consisted of a two-pronged assault along the Baltic coast designed to conquer Schleswig-Holstein, and gain control of the Baltic Sea. Between 78 and 90 tactical nuclear weapons with kilotons ranging from 3 to 100 stood in support of this assault. South of the Jutland offensive three additional axes of advance would take Pact troops into the Netherlands, the Ruhr, and via the famous Fulda Gap into Frankfurt, with possible expansion into northern France. A fifth axis passed through Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, over the Rhine and into France. A sixth, apparently not fully worked out, foresaw the invasion of neutral Austria and Switzerland, with continuation into France. A follow-on stage of the fifth and sixth axes would take Pact forces through France to the Atlantic, and, via Spain, to the Bay of Biscay.\(^{19}\) As noted above, elements of this plan complete with nuclear employment were exercised as late as 1989 and 1990.
The inflexible nature of traditional Soviet military doctrine and its inability to preserve the integrity of the state against threats not directly associated with world capitalism became obvious in the fall of 1991. The creation of a military system considered by many to be second only to that of the United State proved totally inadequate to surmount disintegrative forces which arose within Soviet society itself. Even the rigid system of domestic control which reduced the number of active dissidents to a few thousand was incapable of maintaining Soviet power. To Soviet analyst N. Kosolapov, this was the inevitable result of the persistent Soviet inability to develop a national security concept adequate to prescribing means necessary for continuation of the Soviet state and society.

The security of any living system, whatever might be its peculiarities, nature, type or forms of cooperation, is guaranteed in the last resort not only by protection, but first of all by the vitality (zhiznesposobnost') of its subjects, their concrete possibilities in the struggle for survival and development. The CPSU and the USSR collapsed independent from their urgently standing guard for three quarters of a century, independent from the intrigues of foreign foes and independent from the machinations of internal disruptive forces. They collapsed from the absence of a system [ensuring] vitality. From this one concludes that in practice, evaluating the vitality of the social organism in a historical perspective, one must consider and take account of the most important factors of security of this organism. A system ensuring security should be oriented not only on the defense of the organism and its continuing vitality, but also on the development of the latter.20

In the modern era, the author continued, "... security demands an analysis of its economic, informational, ecological and others aspects."21

In retrospect, the inability of traditional Soviet military doctrine to adequately protect the Soviet state should have called forth major changes long prior to the 1991 dissolution of the USSR. The defects of Soviet security planning became evident in the late 1970s and 1980s. The procurement of a series of new weapons systems including the infamous SS-20 and renewed Soviet interference in the Third World gave rise to a concerted U.S. and NATO response. Reviewing this period, a Soviet author cautioned that the search for "absolute security for one state is possible only under conditions of absolute insecurity of the others."22 Once military parity had been achieved with the West, this critic continued, "we did not always make use of ensuring the security of the state by political means. The result was an arms race which unavoidably affected the social-economic development of the state and its international position."23 In short, near exclusive
emphasis upon the doctrine of inevitable class struggle, excessive military preparedness and an emphasis upon the offensive had rebounded to the harm of the very entity, the Soviet state, which it promised to protect.

The inability of the Soviet Union to develop a broad-based national security doctrine in which military means would be but one part of a comprehensive defense of national interests impacted negatively in ways other than calling forth a self-defeating arms race with the West. To Soviet thinking, crucial for the preservation of the socialist way of life was retention by Moscow of its long cherished reputation as the acknowledged center of Marxist thought. And yet as the recently published memoirs of former First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Yuli Kvitsinsky reveal, this prestigious position had been under challenge for decades prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Recalling his posting to East Berlin in the 1970s, Kvitsinsky notes that:

[East German Party Leader] Honecker was firmly convinced that the center of creative Marxism had moved from Moscow to Berlin, and that the economy of the DDR was the best within the socialist block. The password "from the Soviet Union to learn means to learn how to be victorious" had not been seriously accepted by anyone for a long time and among the functionaires of the SED (Socialist Unity Party) a cause for biting ridicule. From the Soviet Union there was nothing more to learn, neither in the realm of industry nor agriculture nor ideology.\(^2\)

The impact of growing East German disrespect for the USSR and its ideals became evident in the manner that Soviet diplomatic entreaties were rejected at the very moment the USSR was engaged in a massive arms buildup. According to Kvitsinsky, East Germany refused to inform Moscow of its secret talks with Bonn during the 1970s and rejected Soviet advice not to fall too deeply in debt to Western banks. East German efforts to re-export materials received from the USSR as a means to improve their own economy continued despite Soviet protests, and Soviet requests to address the East German politburo were refused with thinly veiled comments which suggested that such appearances would reveal the incompetence of the Soviet comrades.\(^25\)

The significance of the growing separation from its key Warsaw Pact ally was not lost on the Soviet foreign ministry. After an extensive review of policy in 1978, Foreign Minister Gromyko and the heads of the KGB (Soviet Secret Police) concluded that East Germany, and by implication a key aspect of the Soviet defense perimeter, was on the road to ruin.

The report predicted that which would occur in 1989. It warned that the evangelical church in all probability would become the focal point of oppositional forces and
pointed to the fact that the apparently so stable structures of the [East German] party, army and security system would find themselves, in fact, in a rapid erosion process.\(^{26}\)

With Soviet security efforts concentrated so heavily upon military means, no solution to the East German problem seemed possible.

Soviet negotiations with West Germany at the end of the decade confirm the inability of Moscow's long-standing emphasis upon military might as adequate defense against a world of class enemies to advance Moscow's true national interest. A reading of the copious discussion concerning German unification clearly reveals that the long-neglected Soviet domestic economy played the key and commanding role in Gorbachev's approach to this sensitive issue. \(^{27}\)

Perhaps the clearest indication that misperceived notions of where the Soviets' true interests lay and confusion as to how they might best be achieved lies in recent revelations concerning the 1981 Polish crisis. Documents from Soviet Politburo meetings allow one to follow the debate as to the wisdom and efficacy of the application of military force within this key member of the Warsaw Pact. And the decision was unanimous. Not only was military force deemed unlikely to resolve the dispute between the Polish government and the trade union movement, Solidarity, but the long-term result would be a serious blow to badly-needed reforms of the Soviet economy. With Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov in agreement, the Politburo concluded that Moscow's economic ties with the West--ties central to the continued functioning of the already imperiled Soviet economy--would be severed. The central issue for Soviet security had ceased to be a hostile, class-divided international reality. Rather, economic failures within the state itself made at least some forms of class collaboration with the West essential. Apparently unnoticed by the aging heads of the CPSU, reality once again had revealed the total inadequacy of past assumptions and actions concerning perpetuation of the Soviet way of life. \(^{28}\)

In the waning days of the Soviet state, a final attempt was made to draft a more comprehensive security doctrine which might identify the main threats and the possible means for averting catastrophe. But the summer 1990 meeting of the Communist Party Twenty-Eighth Party Congress confirmed continuing problems in identifying Moscow's true national interests. As the official report on foreign policy noted:

The absence of a clear-cut conception of state interests capable of providing a direct link between the country's internal requirements and its actions in the international arena is showing up more and more clearly in our policy. . . . The definition of exactly what constitutes the country's fundamental state
interests today is by no means an academic problem. Due to the absence of such a definition and, closely connected with this, a definition of national security, our foreign policy is essentially deprived of a stable foundation both for the elaboration of a long-term international strategy and for the formation of a broad democratic consensus in support of it. Due to the absence of a clear conception of state interests, the notion of just what national security is remains incomplete and distorted.

The confusing blend of ideals and suggestions advanced by the Gorbachev government provided little basis for drafting a military doctrine which would detail exactly how and in what circumstances the Soviet armed forces would protect the as yet ill-defined national interests. Gorbachev's insistence upon emphasizing the survival of man in place of the class interests of the world's proletariat, or creating a "common European House" merely substituted one set of international values for another. And while all might agree that no war was better than a war, this prescription provided little guidance as to possible situations in which armed intervention or its threat might be required if the state's interests came into conflict with interests of another.

As a result, the much-awaited revised military doctrine finally published in draft form in November 1990 placed near exclusive stress upon the reactive uses of military power. One searches this doctrine in vain to discover under what circumstances force or the threat of force might be employed to achieve positive goals identified as crucial to the Soviet national interest. Still devoid of a comprehensive notion of national interest or national security, the 1990 draft doctrine necessarily laid emphasis upon the general principles announced by Mikhail Gorbachev during the preceding 4 years. The prevention of war was declared the overriding goal of both the Soviet state and its armed forces. "Never, under any circumstances, will it (the Soviet Union) be the first to began military action against any state if it or its allies are not the object of armed aggression."\textsuperscript{30} Soviet forces were to be reorganized according to the rules of "sufficiency" which would preclude large scale offensive action, and their main task was to repel aggression. By its very tenets, the new draft doctrine assumed henceforth the Soviet military would play essentially a passive role, seeking to prevent conflict and, in case of failure, aiming at return to the situation anti-bellum.\textsuperscript{31} Within a year of this document's publication, the USSR ceased to exist, being replaced by a series of successor states loosely welded together in the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The abortive August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, followed in 4 short months by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a Russian republic, set the stage for an accompanying revolution in military doctrine. For the first time
since 1917, civilian and military leaders were released from the
dead-hand of traditional Soviet doctrine, and were able to began
the difficult task of formulating national interests in whose
service the military could expect to play a major role. To be
sure, this formulation did not come easily since most of the
Russian leaders had received their formative education and
experience under the ancien regime. As the new Russian Foreign
Minister, Andrey Kozyрев, stated 2 months after the Russian
republic was born:

It is particularly difficult for us to return to
"normality." Our country was hostage to messianic ideas
before, especially in the 20th century, ideas which
eclipsed and replaced our national interests. The
communist idea led to expansion and instinctive
confrontation with the surrounding world and imposed
ideological models on it.32

Further complicating the task of identifying both the
national interests and the means for their preservation was the
unclear relationship among the post-Soviet republics. Initially,
it appeared that a common armed force composed of units from the
CIS would replace the Soviet military during a 3-5 year
transition period. But by May 1992, disputes, especially with
Ukraine, led Moscow to create its own national army. Plans for a
broader defense, however, were not abandoned. Rather, a
collective security treaty was signed by those CIS states which
wished some, as yet unclear degree and form of coordination among
the emerging national forces. The result of this confusion was
that the initial military planning in the new Russian republic
retained numerous assumptions as to a CIS-wide defense which,
time would show, had little correspondence to reality.33

If the relationship between Russian and CIS forces remained
clouded in early 1992, the subordination of Russian forces to the
more general goals of national security and national interests
received its first, clear formulation. On May 5, 1992, President
Yeltsin signed the federation law "On Security," which defined
the very notion of national security, identified the major
threats to the new state, and described the diverse forces
available for Russia's defense. In sharp contrast to earlier,
communist days, the notion of security was anchored firmly to
individual and national values:

Security is the situation whereby the vital interests
of the individual, society, and state are secure from
internal and external threat. The following are ranked
as fundamental objects of security: the individual--his
rights and freedoms; society--its material and
spiritual assets; the state--its constitutional system,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.34

The notion of "threat" was consistent with the interests to be
defended, expanded to include "dangers to the vital interests of
the individual, society and state," which could arise "from internal and external sources. . . ."35

Lest there be any uncertainty as to the role of the Russian military as but one component of the overall means to defend the new Russian order, the Security Concept clearly noted that:

Security is secured by the implementation of a unified state policy in the sphere of ensuring security by a system of economic, political, organizational and other means commensurate to the vital interests of the individual, society, and the state.36

And the resulting list of forces deemed necessary, while giving prominence to the military, listed such diverse groups as tax services, organs to ensure the effective running of industry, public health organs, and information services.

To guarantee that the overall demands of national security would remain dominant over the means for their realization, the new law also created a National Security Council among whose principal tasks would be "formulating the main avenues of Russian Federation strategy for ensuring security and organizing the preparation of federal programs."37 Chaired by the Russian President, and including representation from both the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, this new organ would discuss modifications of both doctrine and means. It would debate the ways by which the national interest best could be preserved.38

In October 1992, the Russian parliament passed legislation which both codified and broadened the key role of civilian officials in determining the means and ends of national defense. Entitled simply "On Defense," the law (Zakon) entrusted the Supreme Soviet with the responsibility to "determine the military policies and accept the fundamental propositions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation." The President of the Republic, in turn, would present the military doctrine to the parliament for its consideration—undoubtedly following extensive consideration by the Security Council. The Defense Ministry, in contrast, was limited to "participating (uchastvuet) in the working out (razrabotke) of proposals [intended] for the Supreme Soviet [and] President of the Russian Federation concerning military policies and military doctrine." The General Staff also was to "develop proposals with respect to military doctrine. . . ."39

The dominance of the Russian political authorities in determining the preferred future status and policies of the military was not to be executed in a vacuum. After all, the law "On Defense" clearly stated that the military played an important role in formulating proposals for defense policies. As a result, numerous consultations followed between political and military authorities. In November 1992, Yeltsin chaired an "expanded" session of the Ministry of Defense Collegium seeking input as to
desired changes in existing policies. Flanking the Russian President were other civilian officials responsible for defense doctrine including the President of the Supreme Soviet, the Vice-President of Russia, and other "responsible" members of the parliament and cabinet. The subsequent, wide-ranging discussion raised numerous suggestions and identified pressing problems which ran the gamut from difficulties in recruitment to inadequate attention to military doctrine. Such meetings typified the new relationship between the civilian and military authorities.40

The following July, the Ministry of Defense hosted a major conference prepared by the Security Council designed to elicit additional suggestions on the very notion of national security. The government received criticism for not elaborating further upon the Security Concept published the preceding year. And yet there was clear agreement that the over-arching concept of security played the central role in coordinating the various policies aimed at ensuring the survival of the Russian Republic. "The fundamental doctrinal document, in the opinion of the participants, ought to be based on the constitution, on accepted laws and be, by its very nature, a basis for concepts and doctrines of all spheres of security: economic, political, social, military, ideological, etc."41 The conference concluded by offering an extensive list of potential threats for future consideration. These challenges to the continued survival of the republic were by no means restricted to those in the military domain. "External" threats included problems in the political sphere such as ethnic and religious disputes and instability of governments in surrounding lands. Problems in the economic area listed degradation of Russia's technological potential and uncontrolled exports of capital. Military threats included local warfare on Russia's border and the unclear status of Russian troops on foreign soil. Interestingly, a section also was devoted to ecological problems as well as threats arising internally such as organized crime. Among the means necessary to meet these problems, in addition to military, one found such things as organs of conservation and institutions designed to protect the health of the Russian population.42

In May 1992, the first Russian effort to draft a military doctrine consistent with the new and rapidly changing realities of Eastern Europe made its appearance. Cleared for publication a scant 3 weeks after the announcement of the Security Concept and formation of the Security Council, this new draft retained a few of the earlier notions as to an augmented sphere of military activity. Thus military doctrine was defined as an "historical category," although the draft document later emphasized that "The SUPREME goal of Russia's policy in the sphere of national security is to ensure favorable peaceful conditions for socioeconomic and spiritual development and the creation of adequate living conditions for all its people" and that "Russia's military doctrine is a component part of the concept of national security. . . ."43
Appearing in the same month as the creation of the national Russian military, and assuming future cooperation with other CIS forces, the draft doctrine soon became outdistanced by the rapidly changing political situation. Still, in its entirety it represented a major step forward in defining actual threats to the new Russian state. International challenges were identified as likely to arise from a series of provocative actions including: (1) efforts by some states to dominate the world community, (2) the presence of powerful armed forces in a number of states, and especially their basing near the Russian frontier, (3) instability of the international military-political situation, and 4) efforts to use economic or military blackmail against Russia.

Two additional threats were discerned in this initial formulation. The violation of the rights of the estimated 25 million Russian citizens now residing outside the motherland was identified as "a serious source of conflict." Additionally, "Russia will view the introduction of foreign troops on the territory of contiguous states . . . as a direct military threat." To meet such threats, the Russian military would include permanent readiness forces, mobile reserves, and strategic reserves.

The force structure foreseen by the doctrine would deploy when needed within the larger defense plans of the still-existing combined CIS force. The central position of the CIS was enumerated in several places, making it obvious that some form of combined defense was anticipated.

Russia proceeds from the assumption that its security is inseparable from that of the other Commonwealth states. The defense of Russia and of the Commonwealth as a whole can be ensured with greatest effectiveness by the joint efforts of the CIS countries with centralized operational leadership of their collective defense.

As late as the fall of 1992, retired Colonel-General A.A. Danilovich could devote a 21-page article to the various means of drafting a CIS military doctrine adequate to combined defense. Unfortunately, the combined CIS force was officially dissolved 6 months later.

Despite the provisional if revolutionary nature of this draft doctrine, its contents were subject to serious criticism by analysts in the West. Contrasts were drawn with the earlier, 1990 Soviet draft to the detriment of the Russian version. A new sense of aggressiveness was inferred from alterations in wording, more detailed depiction of potential threats, and likely responses which suggested that Russia might use force in protection of her own national interests. As British analyst Charles Dick reflected in his comparison of the 1990 and 1992 drafts:
The new draft doctrine, like the old, views the world through the distorted prism of ideological hostility towards the West, though this is implicit rather than explicit. It persists in exclusively worst case analysis and fails to recognize that this approach, which was a major cause of the collapse of the Soviet economy, will, if persisted in, do the same for Russia's.48

Similar negative appraisals were offered by American analyst Mary FitzGerald who concluded:

Finally, the 1990 doctrine emphasized that the Soviet military art was based on a defensive strategy and that the USSR excluded the option of a preemptive strike. Defense was to be the main type of military action at the outset of war. In 1992, however, these provisions were deleted. Instead, the Russian armed forces will conduct "all forms of military action," will conduct defense and offense equally, and will seize the strategic initiative to destroy the opponent.49

It is difficult to know what one should make of such criticism. For the first time in decades, a Russian military doctrine was specifically subordinated to a general Security Concept which emphasized national and not ideological interests. To be sure, the 1992 Doctrine was more assertive than its 1990 predecessor. Perhaps most worrisome was the implication that in identifying the introduction of foreign troops on the territory of contiguous states as a direct military threat, the Russian General Staff had relegated to itself determination of what constituted cause for war. If such were the case, one can only hope that the continuing evolution of democratic processes in the Russian political system would one day remedy such usurpation. But aside from this point, the Doctrine in general appeared proper for one of the world's major military powers. Surely, no one would fault other states, such as the United States or Great Britain if they identified buildups of forces on their frontier as actual threats. Few would object if the resulting military planning included offensive options or stated that in case of conflict the aim would be to "repel aggression and defeat the opponent." Yet it was precisely these formulations that brought charges of reactionary thought in the West. One can only wonder who it was that truly remained a prisoner of "Old Thinking."

Where the 1992 Doctrine most deserved criticism was in its incomplete identification of the full range of threats to Russia's national interests. And this lack, in part, resulted from the still incomplete civilian analysis of the likely events within the tumultuous CIS and in the border states of Eastern Europe long regarded as a buffer against potential invaders. Equally important, the 1992 Doctrine failed to include a section as to military responsibility in case of domestic violence and
unrest—situations which were almost unknown in the recent past. To remedy these flaws, the new Russian government (only independent for 4 months when the 1992 draft appeared) needed time to examine the situation and environment in which it now found itself. As we now know, these issues were under active consideration in several parts and bureaucracies of government, including the Security Council.

In the summer of 1993, the former Secretary of the Russian Security Council gave a lengthy interview detailing work completed on a new military doctrine. As expected, a sharp contrast was drawn between the way such doctrines had emerged in the past, and present efforts. In the Soviet period, Yuri Skokov noted, the state designed its doctrine to defend an ideology; today, doctrine aimed at ensuring national security. And when challenged as to whether such a new military doctrine existed, Skokov quickly responded: "It does."50

The delay in offering the completed document, Skokov hinted, stemmed from the complex task of assessing the major changes which had occurred since the demise of the Soviet Union and creation of a national Russian state.

It was said [in the past] that we have an enemy and we must deliver a first strike against the aggressor. Then there was some kind of invention during Gorbachev's time—about defense doctrine. But this was not a military doctrine, merely a declaration. Work on the military doctrine was based on the following fundamental arguments. The political situation has changed. Yesterday it was a matter of us and them. Today we have no potential enemy and there is no point in saying that there is a specific enemy who poses a threat and we are forming a group to repulse him. On the other hand we are faced with all too many factors representing a threat, and these may in theory shake the foundations of the state and territorial integrity.51

In November 1993, the new and lengthy Russian Military Doctrine was signed by President Yeltsin following extensive consideration by his security council. The actual document remained classified, perhaps awaiting some revision prior to submission to Parliament as required under law. Still, its basic provisions received detailed discussion and summarization in the daily press. Acknowledging that the new doctrine was designed to guide Russia during the new transition period, its first sentence confirmed that "The fundamental provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation are a constituent part of the conception of security of the Russian Federation. . . ."52 The doctrine itself was divided into a series of subsections covering key issues such as (1) political aspects of the military doctrine, (2) the basic sources of military threat, (3) the fundamental directions for ensuring the military security of the
Russian Federation, (4) means needed to ensure military security, plus a number of chapters relating to the structure, support, and commitment of the military in the future. 53

Appraisals of the new doctrine naturally varied as diverse critics focused upon one or another section of this lengthy compilation. Some analysts emphasized the implicit offensive threat contained in the doctrine's acceptance of the use of nuclear weapons against states allied with or assisting powers attacking Russia. Among the more judicious and insightful assessments were the conclusions of veteran political observer Theo Summer of the German weekly Die Zeit:

In the West, three points in particular in the twenty three page document prompt suspicion. The first is the removal of a decree that the size of the armed forces was limited to one percent of the population (about 1.5 million soldiers). The second concerns the roll being assigned to the military as a guarantor of Russian integrity--in harmony with the laws and alongside the troops of the Interior Ministry. The third lies in the expressed claim of a right to intervene in the "Near Abroad." 54

Speaking to this last, perhaps most disturbing change, Sommer concluded that even the most democratic, most pro-western Russia possible still would demand the right to protect its compatriots abroad:

We should not fool ourselves: When it concerns the fate of 25 million Russians who, as flotsam of history remain in the adjoining republics, a democratic, open-to-the-west with respect to military and economic cooperation, Russia would neither wish to abrogate its protective role nor be able to do so. 55

The sole alternative to conceding Russia a preeminent position in safeguarding the external Russian minority would be for the United Nations to assume this burden: a most unlikely prospect.

A clause-by-clause, painstaking examination of each section of the Military Doctrine far exceeds the purpose of this monograph. Rather, it is the scope and the comprehensive nature of the document which deserve comment. For the first time, domestic problems which might promote disorder were accorded importance equal to threats which might arise abroad. Many of the same foreign threats were enumerated as in the 1992 Doctrine, and the need for stability along Russia's extensive frontier received expected stress. And once again, the suppression of the rights of Russians remaining outside the Federation was identified as a major source of military threat. An extensive, concluding section listed the forms of economic and technical support required if the military was to carry out its proposed security function. And yet if the doctrine itself was lengthy and complex, the reasons
for its existence were succinctly summarized in the document itself.

The main goal of the construction of the Armed Forces and other services of the Russian federation is the creation and development of military forces capable of ensuring the defense of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, the security of its citizens and of other vital interests of society and the state, taking account of the military-political and strategic situation in the world and the real possibilities of the Russian Federation.56

In this central paragraph, as well as in the doctrine itself, lay convincing proof of the revolution in Russian military doctrine which had transpired over a 10-year period. To be sure, Western critics might again object that under certain situations Russia could apply military force in resolution of pressing problems, and conclude that a more aggressive spirit dominated Russian thought than a few years before. But this was to be expected in a nation which sought to take its rightful place as one of the world's great powers. By the early months of 1994, the coincidence of proclamations emanating from the Russian Foreign Office as to Moscow's special interests in states along the frontier coincided nicely with the potential threats identified in the Military Doctrine. Demands that the rights of Russians still residing abroad be respected matched perfectly with military proclamations that such issues remained a potential threat. Involvement of Russian troops in the Georgian civil war facilitated the signing of economic and political agreements between Tbilisi and Moscow. In short, Russian military doctrine finally was part and parcel of an overall national strategy designed to preserve and promote Russian national interests. The West might debate whether Russia would become a threat or not, but the interests which Russia was pledged to defend were, for the first time in decades, clear for all to see. And interests which were identifiable were always fair game for diplomatic discussions and compromise. Only a pessimist would view this situation as more threatening than what had gone before.

ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.


4. Iu Kirshin, "Politika i Voennaia Strategiaia v Iadepnyi

6. "Iz Archiv Gorbacheva (Beseda M.S. Gorbacheva s Gusudarstvennym Sekretarem SShA Dzh Shult'sem 23 Oktiabria 1987 g.)," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 11/93, pp. 75-76.

7. Speech by General Galvin before members of the Atlantic Council, U.S. State Department, June 1988.


13. Ibid., p. 6.


16. Ibid.

17. Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentralraeuropa, p. 4.

18. Boll, p. 3.

Militaire Suisse, 137, October 1992, pp. 5-12.


23. Ibid., p. 42.


25. Ibid., pp. 261-264.

26. Ibid., p. 265.

27. See Kwizinskij, pp. 11-136. The author was the main Soviet negotiator during the unification talks. See also Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, trans. from Russian by Heddy Pross-Weerth, Munich: Droemer Knaur Verlag, 1993.

28. For a discussion of these Politburo minutes, see Die Zeit, January 7, 1994, p. 5.


35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


42. Ibid., see the blocks entitled "Ugrozy bezopasnosti Rossii," and "Sily i sredstva dlia reshenia zadach obespecheniia bezopasnosti."


44. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

45. Ibid., p. 2. Emphasis in original.

46. Ibid., p.3.


51. Ibid.

53. Ibid., pp. 1, 4.


55. Ibid.
