R W Dellow "Organization and Equipment: Priorities for the Russian Air Force" June 1993 Conflict Studies Research Centre The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Camberley, Surrey GU15 4PQ DISCLAIMER The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT: PRIORITIES FOR THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE Introduction The apparent failure of CIS to produce a coherent plan for its joint armed forces has meant that Russia is now looking to its own military capabilities. The views on the current state of the Russian Air Force of Col General DEYNEKIN its C in C and of Lt General ANTOSHKIN, commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District, its largest formation, deserve particular attention, since they show an awareness of the problems of the present and present a plan for the future. This paper therefore reproduces the views of these commanders, as shown in articles in the Russian press, and in a speech by General Antoshkin at a symposium organised by the Royal Netherlands Air Force in April 1993. The articles and speech are reproduced with minimal comment, as the strength and forcefulness of the language used by both men in outlining their current problems and their plans and priorities for the future speak for themselves. In apposition to their plans, we present a much less hopeful assessment of the future of the Russian helicopter fleet by Col A Novikov. He states the current situation but is much less positive about the future. Contents: 1. "A Time For Decisive Action" 2. "The Russian Air Force Will Have Only The Newest Aircraft" 3. "The Former Soviet Strategic Bombers May Turn Into Scrap Metal" 4. Speech by Lt Gen (Avn) N T Antoshkin, Cdr Air Force Moscow MD, at the Royal Netherlands Air Force Base Leeuwarden on 20.4.93 5. "The Russian Helicopter Fleet - What Will It Be?" 6. CSRC Comment ADVAB 00888 AIK 1.93 p2-4 "A Time For Decisive Action" By Col Gen Petr Stepanovich Deynekin, C-in-C Russian Air Force Much has changed since the last interview with AIK in February 1991. By the time the Russian Armed Forces were formed last May, other sovereign states had grabbed a fair amount of military equipment from the FSU, paying no attention to the collective security needs of CIS, the supply and command needs of the forces, the training of officers or the effects on their families. Our aim was to hold together in the interests of CIS our strategic forces including long range and transport aviation, but in vain. So Russia began the creation of its own armed forces. After the break up Russia had 14,000 pilots and 5,000 aircraft. Our main strategic direction had been westwards. After the break up much of the Air Force's infrastructure was outside Russia's borders. We had large numbers of training aircraft and a corresponding network of aerodromes. To rationalise all of this we intend to concentrate resources on several flying schools and training centres. The Yey'sk and Orenburg Higher Military Colleges will be reorganised into air divisions. Regiments flying combat aircraft will be removed from the training centres and transferred to formations, but, and this is particularly important, without physical relocation. This will not affect training. Recently we have built up a surplus of aircrew and our current needs for training are reduced, thus we can reduce training schools. At the same time training regiments have highly trained staff. By exchanging their training aircraft for combat types, we can at minimal cost change their quality. Thus we can carry out our most pressing task - we maintain the personnel, and man the airfields with their experience. We shall replenish the Air Force by withdrawing equipment from the Baltic, Poland, Germany and Transcaucasus, where we previously had our modern equipment. We are getting rid of the obsolete stuff like MiG-23; MiG-27; Su-17 and Tu-16 and are equipping with multi-engined aircraft like: Su-25; MiG-29; SU-27; Su-24; Tu-22M; IL-76; IL-78; Tu-95 MS and Tu-160. With these types even though numbers are diminished the Russian Air Force can carry out its tasks. There is talk of less flying and an increase in accidents, but this is not true. There are shortages of fuel, spare parts, lubricants and we must recreate a supply system. As to flight safety. Statistics for the last 25 years show that last year was by no means the worst. I must own up to three tragedies: the collision of two 3MS2 tankers, the crash of an AN-12 taking off in Nakhichevan and the AN-22 disaster in Tver. All caused by pilots breaking the rules of flying. As to the supposed flight of officers out of the Air Force, it is not true. The media often do not bother to check their 'facts'. From the Ukraine alone there came to us 1,600 officers, among them 400 pilots. Those who do not want to continue serving, we do not detain. We are short of aviation specialists, not because they have left, but because of commanders' miscalculation. We intend to increase pay and rank structure, improve their living conditions. We want to attract civilian specialists. All of this should improve the prestige of the technical and engineering services. We have the Minister of Defence's support in this. Those who return from Poland and Germany have over the course of time received payment in foreign currency and are therefore better placed than those returning from Transcaucasus, Moldova and the Baltic states, many of whom have lost homes and property. The Air Force cannot provide them with real material support due to lack of funds but we respect their patience and fortitude and try to help. Thus MOD issued a directive by which those who have served more than 3 years in Western Group of Forces are replacing those who in the first instance have suffered due to their unexpected withdrawal. By this means, we hope not merely to offer moral compensation but also material support. In the 'hot spots' round Russia, there are no Russian mercenary aviators, only aircrew of the states involved. We know who they are. If they commit crimes against civilians they must be brought to book. Our people are only involved in supporting Russian peace-keeping (Russ: mirotvorcheskiye) forces. We are not providing aircraft. Local governments provide them or buy them from third parties. Ours evacuate wounded, transport supplies and food, together with medical supplies. Unfortunately people only know of one such heroic episode by which the Russian ambassador was evacuated from Kabul by our assault troops and aircraft, for the loss of one aircraft, under fire. Before the troubles in the Transcaucasus we had brought out military families and only days before the flare up between Armenia and Azerbaijan and before the events in Abkhazia withdrew all our aircraft to Russia. Had we not done so, each side would have laid claim to the planes with a consequent increase in the local temperature. My recent trips abroad as both C-in-C and as the man responsible for reorganisation of Russia's Air Force have shown me much to attempt to introduce in Russia. For instance in training fliers: the selection of young men with the 'right stuff'. They will get 3 years theoretical training then practical skills for a further 1 years and up to 200 hours flying. The right way I believe is to give everyone standard courses and then decide on the type of aircraft for which graduates are most suited - fighter, ground attack, reconnaissance or bomber aircraft. The basics will be the same for all with specialisation dependent on Russian needs. This demands a five year course - four years imposes too great a load on students. Our boys can bear it only because we demand high standards of fliers. We hope to begin in 1993 but it will all take some years to change everything. Thus we hope also to avoid a dramatic loss of trained teaching staff. There are those who think that Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy should have priority. However Gen Grachev, Minister of Defence believes that the Air Force and Air Defence Forces cannot be poor relations when considering problems of manning and equipment. We are all short of men, conscription is a problem for all. We have worked out that there are 20,000 soldiers and sergeants' positions which could be filled by (civilian) employees. A further 22,000 posts could be filled by women, ie, in our laboratories, communication centres, in headquarters and command and control centres, in our catering facilities and hospitals. We are at 97% of strength in long range aviation; I invite our lady readers to join the Air Force!! I am an optimist and believe that Russia is such a rich nation, with its people so spiritually strong that it cannot be brought to its knees. The rebirth of Russia is inevitable. And it is aviation and space research which are among the major sources of progress, well-being and independence for our people. In June 1993 the magazine Aviatsiya i Komonavtika celebrates its 75th anniversary. I wish the editorial staff much creative success and its readers clear skies and good fortune. SSRC/RWD/FP 5.93 ADVAB 00887 IZV 24.3.93 p6 No 54 "The Russian Air Force Will Have Only The Newest Aircraft" By Col Gen of Avn Petr Deynekin, C-in-C Russian Air Force Interviewed by IZV Correspondent Nikolay Burbyga. During his interview, the General made the following points: If the Ukraine does not hand over to the Russians the strategic bombers it now holds they will deteriorate and be fit only for scrap. There now exist more than 160 missile carriers, so-called heavy bombers, 70% of which are the new Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 armed with long range cruise missiles. They can deliver 1,000 nuclear weapons in one go, which does not exceed the limits of the START agreements. More than half of the strategic nuclear force is in the sovereign states of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the remainder is in Russia - the rightful successor to USSR. Even if Kazakhstan hands over what it has, Ukraine will find some reason to decline. Ukraine wanted 2 billion (Russ: milliard) roubles for each Tu-160; it is ignoring the interests of CIS security and also international agreements on its non-nuclear status. The 'privatisation' by the Ukraine of 24 Tu-95 MS and 19 Tu-160 (TN: out of 20) disrupts Russian and CIS defence capability. The formation by the Ukraine MOD of special organs to control strategic forces has led to the disruption of centralised control over them and reduced their combat readiness. The aircraft are not now being used or maintained and crews are wasting their skills. We insist that the regiments and their aircraft be returned, under mutually acceptable conditions, to Russia's long range aviation. If this does not happen, then Russia as the rightful successor to the USSR cannot fulfil its duties in accordance with international agreements on nuclear weapons. Russia now has 45% of the nuclear bomber force of the former USSR. This does not exceed START-1 and START-2. If the Ukraine does not return the aircraft it holds within 2-3 months we shall need to spend billions to rebuild them. It will be like purchasing new strategic aircraft. To the questions: 'What is the role of Russia's strategic aircraft?'; 'Do they patrol the coasts of USA?', Deynekin answered: Recently while patrolling the oceans, our Tu-95 achieved visual contact of the US nuclear powered carrier 'NIMITZ' in international waters 4,000 kms east of the Japanese coast. We found it in the middle of a cyclone. It is not easy to locate a carrier; satellites cannot always do it. We are always professionally interested in such a ship, which is in effect a floating air base. The camera also picked up the new F-18 'Hornet' and A-6 and A-7 aircraft. The US F-18 equipped 'Blue Angels' squadron visited Kubinka in 1992 and appeared at Tushino on Moscow Day together with our 'Russian Knights' and their Su-27s. Older types of aircraft - MiG-21; MiG-23 and Su-17 are being written-off. We can support current numbers so older types are being scrapped. We still have several air armies which will keep their fourth generation aircraft like MiG-29; Su-27; Su-25, Su-24; Tu-95 MS; Tu-160 and AN-124. The Air Force cannot sell off its obsolescent aircraft, that is a state matter. We worked out recently that if we could sell abroad 200 out of the 300 aircraft no longer needed, we could make several hundred billion (Russ: milliard) dollars. All our social problems could be solved with only a portion of that. No officer or ensign without quarters ... However those who should be thus concerned are not. I believe we should have to sell not merely the older types but also the current ones, just as the USA does, if we are to gain a market. I have a proposal. Several dozen MiG-29 which we presented to former GDR have been evaluated by the Luftwaffe and highly praised. Western countries are now wondering 'Why build the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) when the unequalled MiG-29 is available?' I can talk about this as a pilot who has put the MiG-29 through its paces. As for personnel, we have no problems with aircrew but we do have them in relation to technical staff and conscripts. We have only 50% of the conscripts we need. This is because deferments of call-up are increasing. We could overcome this by having both men and women in the Air Force serving on contract. SSRC/RWD/FP 5.93 Uktrans No. 529 21.04.93 NG The Former Soviet Strategic Bombers May Turn Into Scrap Metal by CinC Russian Air Force Petr Deynekin In my opinion you could compare the current situation in the army with the evacuation in 1941: The only difference is that in those days we could transfer to the depths of Russia all our property down to the last split pin. Nowadays, however, our best equipped formations, from the point of view of aircraft, have stayed on the territory of other republics of the former union. We are now obliged to begin laying the foundations of Russia's Air Force. In addition, many aircraft have come to the end of their operational life and there is a reduction in purchases at the same time. And the question of how our air force will look in ten years time, if the aircraft which we so delight in today are the products of the sixties, is still almost insoluble. It is obvious that with the change of opinion on the employment of our armed forces and also the reduction in funds for defence, we cannot maintain that enormous number of aircraft which we had up to December 1985. But let no one be worried by the reduction in our aircraft fleet. After all, having given up the 3rd generation aircraft like the Su-7 and 17, the MiG 21, 23 and 27 and others, we retain in the Air Force only 4th generation aircraft with two or more engines. This substantially raises their reliability and at the same time enables Russia to carry out its international duties. Our equipment will certainly enable us to compete up to the year 2005, and I hope that by that time the laws of the market economy will apply to the government and it will be able to develop our industry. In any case we are not reducing the money for science and research facilities, otherwise we know we could lag behind forever. Series purchases of air force equipment are certainly curtailed. They are only made in sufficient quantities to keep aviation factories as a going concern. As for the redistribution of state grants, of which there always were very little, now in essence they are directed at science and the development of social structures - like building houses for servicemen. This is now our main task. So much the main task that it is now second nature. The question of defining an enemy is outside the competence of the Air Force CinC but is a function of politics. My task is to train the Air Force subordinate to me for modern war. As for a hypothetical enemy, we are working out definite views on waging armed conflict depending on the theatre of military operations and the forces situated there. In evaluating views on training our air force for those tasks peculiar to it there is a creative element. If it is the Far Eastern theatre then one must take into consideration the enormous concept of space. Military operations, obviously, will be carried out on various separate axes. If military operations are possible in the mountains then we must train pilots for actions in these conditions and, it goes without saying, we must have regard to those means of armed conflict and methods available to the air forces of other states best trained in this. As to our own internal "armament" problems, the principal one is nuclear weaponry and its continuing division (among the states of the FSU - TN). A component of strategic nuclear forces is the strategic bombers armed with high accuracy nuclear missiles remaining basically on the territory of the Ukraine. They are the unique strike aircraft: Tu-160 and Tu-95 MS. Russia as the rightful heir to the union naturally cannot carry out its duties to reduce and further destroy the strategic nuclear assets of the former USSR if these missile carriers and their nuclear weapons remain on the territory of other republics. Unfortunately, so far no mutual understanding has been arrived at with the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, even though these aircraft cannot be employed correctly as part of the air force of that republic. It is all to do with the fact that the technical support and documentation for them is located in Russia. If the aircraft are not transferred to Russia in the next few months or if no sort of united aviation force is created, then the planes will simply become scrap, even if the Ukrainian Air Force's engineering service attempts to conserve them - which I very much doubt, bearing in mind our own capabilities. SSRC/RWD 5/93 [The following is the text of a speech given by Gen (AF) Antoshkin in Holland. The script was provided in two parts with no indication of how these parts fitted together. They have been translated and printed one after the other, although they were in fact combined into one speech.] SPEECH BY LT GEN (AVN) N T ANTOSHKIN, CDR AIR FORCE MOSCOW MD, AT THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS AIR FORCE BASE LEEUWARDEN ON 20.4.93 Gentlemen! I am grateful for the invitation to visit the Royal Netherlands Air Force Base at Leeuwarden, and for the opportunity to be the first representative of the Russian Air Force to give a talk to the personnel on the Dutch Weapons Instructors Course, to be able to tell you briefly about the situation in the Russian Federation Air Force, about the problems facing us in the near future and about prospective developments. After the Second World War, attention in the Soviet Union during the cold war era was directed towards the formation of groups of forces in the border military districts and on the territories of former Warsaw Treaty Organisation countries. Two years ago our Air Force had groups in the East European states: in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Germany, and on the territories of the Baltic states, Belarus', Ukraine, Moldova, and Transcaucasus and Central Asia. As you know, following the disintegration of the USSR, a number of sovereign states began to be established, and these immediately set about forming their own (national) armed forces. Naturally this process also involved the Air Force. In implementing the government's decisions, in 1990 we began a planned withdrawal of armies, divisions and regiments of the Air Force from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and in 1991 started the withdrawal of troops from Poland, the Baltic States and the Transcaucasus. In 1992 we began the withdrawal of the Air Force from Germany. In total during this period, around 300 units, more than 30,000 air force personnel, 700 aircraft and 100 helicopters were withdrawn to the territory of Russia alone, of which more than half of these units, and over 500 aircraft as well as helicopters, were withdrawn to the territory of Moscow Military District Air Force. At present the Russian Air Force grouping left after its division among the states of the CIS is combat-ready and able to fulfil its designated tasks. The planned withdrawal of formations and regiments of the Air Force from foreign countries both near and far (from Germany, the Baltics and Belarus') is continuing. The Russian Air Force has in its arsenal modern aviation systems capable of effectively fulfilling missions during the conduct of defensive and offensive military action, using both conventional and nuclear weapons. Frontal Aviation has in its arsenal: Fighter Aviation - the MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker; Fighter Bomber Aviation - the Su-17M Fitter; Ground Attack Aviation - the Su-25 Ram Jay [sic]; Frogfoot; Bomber Aviation - the Su-24 Fencer; Reconnaissance Aviation - the MiG-25R Foxbat and Su-24MR Fencer-D. Long Distance Aviation is equipped with the following modern aviation systems: The Tu-95 Bear; the Tu-160 Blackjack with air-launched cruise missiles; the Tu-22M Backfire; and the new generation tanker aircraft Il-78T Midas. A certain number of the aircraft in the long distance aviation pool (the Tu-95K, K-22 [sic], Tu-22K, Tu-16 and ZMS-2) are obsolete. Military Transport Aviation is responsible for ensuring assault landings, transport of troops, cargo and military and economic material resources using the Il-76 Candid, An-22 Cock and An-124 Condor. You are well informed about the capabilities of our hardware and some of you have seen it in action at various exhibitions and air shows (Le Bourget, Farnborough and Melbourne). This autumn, if you have the opportunity to visit France, Thailand, Malaysia or Dubai, you will once again see and be able to get to know our combat and future aviation hardware at these air shows (on the ground and in the air). I would like to point out, that the combat make-up of our Air Force is closely tied to the requirements of the CFE Treaty (3,450 combat aircraft) and the START Treaty. I can assure you that we intend in the future to adhere strictly to all our obligations concerning the Air Force, under treaties concluded by the leadership of the Russian Federation. Gentlemen! You know very well from the media that, in accordance with the decision of the President of the Russian Federation and the Minister of Defence, the Armed Forces including the Russian Air Force, are undergoing a profound transformation as well as the withdrawal of troops, coupled with the political and economic difficulties in the country. The need for reform of the existing structure of the Armed Forces including the Air Force is conditioned in our view by: * Firstly, the change in the role and place of the Russian Federation as an independent state in the world community and by the changing military political situation; * Secondly, the inadequate number of available forces, capable of effectively fulfilling the tasks of repelling attack and defending our territory in some regions of the country. The complexity of transforming the Air Forces of the Russian Federation is connected with the withdrawal of our Air Force from foreign countries both near and far, and with the reduction in strength of the Air Force within the framework of the Armed Forces to the agreed level according to accepted international practice (1% of the population of the state), and with the necessary reorganisational measures, aimed at bringing the Air Force into line with the requirements of modern military science for this branch of the forces of a sovereign state. Under these circumstances, the main aim of the transformation of the Russian Air Force is the formation of operational task-oriented Air Force groupings in various regions of the country, to maintain security and defend the country's interests. In order to fulfil these tasks we envisage in the near future: * The completion of the withdrawal of the Air Force from foreign states near and far, back to the territory of Russia; * The complete transformation of the existing structure of the forces, command bodies, cadre training systems, manning and support of the Air Force; * A reduction of 20% in the fighting and personnel strengths of the Russian Federation Air Force. During the steps taken to transform the Air Force, we will use the new hardware in our arsenal, taken from withdrawn and disbanded units, to replace obsolete items. This will ensure the solution of characteristic Air Force tasks whilst the reduction in personnel strength and aircraft continues. In concluding my speech, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Russian Federation Air Force, which we have established, is designated first and foremost for the fulfilment of exclusively defensive tasks. However, since we have sources of military conflict directly on our borders and as states of the former USSR and Warsaw Treaty Organisation have not yet determined their foreign or nuclear policy, we consider that our Air Force should be ready both in structure and hardware, when necessary in case of aggression, to inflict a tangible strike on the enemy both in the air and on land. We view this visit as an extremely important one. Fundamental changes and rapid developments in world events have for the first time given us as Air Force officers the opportunity to exchange flying experience. Your "top gun" school teaches young captains (flight lieutenants). We have young captains too, who want to exchange ideas on combat aviation. We will show you the Su-27 in flight, and exchange flights have also been planned for Russian and Dutch crews. The visit by our delegation will enable us to extend further cooperation between the Royal Netherlands Air Force and the Russian Air Force. Thank you for your attention. [The following part of the speech was supplied on a separate sheet of paper, but was read somewhere in the middle of the above speech.] Future Developments in the Russian Air Force The current military political situation in the world demands a necessary and fundamentally different approach to the formation of the Russian Air Force and a review of its place and role in the national security system. The Air Force's objectively distinctive unique combat characteristics [sic] and the high-tech nature of aviation hardware and weaponry determine the leading role of Air Force in increasing the defence capability and combat might of the armed forces of any state. The potential of the Russian aviation industry will enable us to create and further develop a sufficiently powerful Air Force. The plan for the formation of the Russian Federation Air Force can be summed up as follows: in peacetime the Air Force forms a constituent part of the forces of deterrence and prevention of military conflict. In time of war it is a principal means of repelling and inflicting strikes on the aggressor and of ensuring a high level of mobility of groups of forces. Hence the main approaches to the formation of the Air Force have been determined and are summed up as follows: * Firstly, the Russian Air Force is being formed as a branch of the Armed Forces of a sovereign state, designated for the defence of independence, territorial integrity and the fulfilment of Russia's international obligations. * Secondly, The Air Force includes air formations stationed on the territory of Russia, withdrawn from the groups of forces, but not included in the national formations of (other) Commonwealth states, which have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, in accordance with interstate agreements. * Thirdly, it is planned to cut the personnel strength of the Air Force by one third by the year 2000, so that it corresponds to the quota established for the Russian Federation in accordance with the Paris Treaty and the CIS interstate agreement, signed in Tashkent. The numerical strength of the Russian Air Force will be at a level close to that in the military structures of the most important countries of the world, and will constitute up to 17% of the total strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The development of the Air Force will be carried out along the following main lines: The make-up and structure of the Air Force will be established so as to give a balanced ratio between the combat and support components; A qualitative improvement in Air Force groupings will be achieved by re-equipping them with multi-purpose aviation systems with precision and all-weather weapons; Efficient movement of aviation, troop transport and actions by mobile forces will be ensured; Systems of basing and support of aviation and the development of Air Force infrastructure will be improved. The implementation of the above developments in the Air Force will ensure their qualitative renewal and balanced nature at both inter-branch and branch levels. The transformation of the Air Force is expected to be carried out in stages. During the first stage - until the end of 1992 - the concept of the formation of the Russian Air Force was drawn up and approved. During the second stage (1993-95) the withdrawal of forces will be completed and Air Force groupings will be set up on the territory of Russia. There will also be a transition to a mixed (contract and conscript) Air Force manning system. During the third stage, after 1995, there will be further cuts in the Air Force to bring it down to the agreed level (250-270,000 people), and the fundamental reorganisation and construction of the Air Force airfield network will be continued. The implementation of a base-oriented system of aviation support will be started and the transfer to a new system of cadre training will be completed. The transfer to a mixed manning system will be continued. [Translated by Suzette de Banzie and Henry Plater-Zyberk.] ADVAB 00886 KZ 3.2.93 p2 No 25 "The Russian Helicopter Fleet - What Will It Be?" (Rubric: Timely topic) By Col Aleksei Novikov, Honoured Pilot of the Russian Federation, Maj Sergei Prokopenko, KZ Correspondent Creating mobile forces requires many problems to be solved. The current state of Russia's helicopter fleet is among them. No one needs to be told of the part played be helicopters in Afghanistan, Chernobyl', the Armenian earthquake etc. 'Desert Storm' gave a leading role to aircraft in support of ground forces operations. 80% of fire missions were attributed to aircraft, and 25% of these to helicopters. What about Russia's current helicopter fleet? There are Mi-6 and Mi-26 for general transport role, the Mi-8 for combat transport and the Mi-24 for fire support. All except for the Mi-26 date from the 1950s and 60s. But the helicopters are becoming worn out and obsolete. They do not have round the clock operational capability or all-weather capacity and are adversely affected by smoke and dust clouds. They do not fulfil modern operational requirements and our experts believe they lag 15 or more years behind the Americans. More than half of helicopter accidents involving equipment failure are due to poor design and manufacture, and many of these failures are repeat failures. The current fleet by the year 2000 will be reduced by one-third due to aircraft wearing out and there is almost no money for renewal. A particular problem is the Mi-24. This aircraft has been in service for 20 years and now lags considerably behind the US AH-64 APACHE. Forecasts show that write-off of Mi-24 will soon start to snowball and by 2000 the fleet will be reduced by 40-45%. It should be noted that production ceased in 1989. As to the Mi-26 these are the prime source of helicopter lift for infantry vehicles, ammunition and outsize loads. However they are vulnerable to air defence systems and this can be employed only outside their range. Furthermore, there are not enough of them anyway. So the old Mi-8 has to perform a major part of the transport load but it does not answer the demands of capacity or survivability. Their number is reducing by one-third and nor being replaced by a more modern equivalent. It was the intention to upgrade army aviation through the introduction of KA-50 and Mi-28 helicopters but they are already in need of modernisation. Lack of finance has had its effect and if helicopter deliveries remain at 1991-92 levels army aviation might be reduced by more than a third. How can the situation be improved? The Air Force still control the ordering and provision of army aviation equipments and the allocation of funds is not adequate. In all it received only 2.6% of the total allocated for aviation. If one can say that the current Air Force inventory of such types as Su-27; MiG-29; MiG-31; Tu-160 and AN-124 represent fourth generation aircraft then army aviation is still endowed with second generation types only. Its best interests would be represented if procurement were in the hands of those who operate and are truly interested in them, which is really what the designers and builders want also. They know in what a parlous state the current fleet finds itself. In America it was proposed to develop the COMANCHE to replace the AH-64 APACHE, and it had been assumed that the very simplicity of Russian helicopters represented a threat to the COMANCHE programme or even to the European TIGER. Currently, having seen Russian equipments, some experts in the West declared it unnecessary to progress so far so quickly as had been planned. Unless Russia plans correctly it risks being without a helicopter fleet. SSRC/RWD/FP 5.93 CSRC Comment: The realisation that the Russian Air Force needs to sell modern aircraft surely makes more sense than to think that older types would find a ready market. However this will not be easy. During the planning phase for the 1992 Moscow Air Show, P Belyakov, the General Designer of the Mikoyan Design Bureau stated that the aviation industry of FSU had achieved no overseas sales in 1991, because of the perception in the world that Soviet equipment had failed during the Gulf War. General Deynekin's proposal that NATO abandon the European Fighter Aircraft in favour of purchasing the MiG-29, since the Germans already have some, is a splendid example of opportunism, the more so since this aircraft is produced now solely for export. Colonel Novikov's views on the Russian helicopter fleet present a sad picture. In this branch of aviation, as in others, the days of "cheap and cheerful" are over. The worsening financial situation in CIS and Russia in particular must inhibit further development and production. The loss of the captive market represented by the Warsaw Pact is a great one. The proposals for reorganisation and training make sense, but they are only a part of the solution to a great problem. The loss of the air defence "cordon sanitaire" of Warsaw Pact territory and the forward airfields located in the Western states of FSU are a bitter blow, as is the retention by the Ukraine of the strategic rocket carriers Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95MS (Bear). It should be noted that production of both these aircraft has now ceased. The hard words about the Ukraine are obviously part of a continuing argument about ownership and control of former Soviet assets. The problems are many. The proposals outlined show an awareness of the current situation and are a logical plan to reorganise and update the Air Force. The determination of two such senior commanders to implement their plans cannot be doubted. However the enormity of the problems facing Russia in general must have an effect on their feasibility. .