"A Plan To Deploy Nuclear Warheads in Japan" by Nisohachi Hyodo, critic and author Tokyo SHOKUN , Oct 96 pp 202-213 You have always had an adventurous bent, and now, with the confidence of your supporters, you just embarked upon a dogsled trip in the Arctic zone, far away from home. On the third day of your trip, while letting your dogs take a short rest on ice and feeling the harsh north wind, you begin to think of such pioneers as Amundsen and Uemura. Just about to heave a long sigh, you notice that the leading dog of the pack suddenly pulls his nose up and begins to bark toward the horizon. What is the matter? Oh, look! As if to weave through a snowstorm, fully armed men in pure-white anoraks are marching stalwartly toward you in a single file. You await there alone, wondering who they can be. Then, a man, who seems to be the leader of the group, appears without a white mask in front of you. To your surprise, he is wearing a million-dollar smile on his snow-tanned face. He is a young second lieutenant. As you listen to him talk with his Boston accent, you learn that they are from the U.S. Army's unit training for winter combats and that they happened to spot your dogsled while practicing skiing. Soon, your exchange with the rugged, good-humored soldiers is over, and they disappear again into somewhere. Then, you wonder if the encounter in this extremely cold and immense region can be a mere happenstance. It cannot be. The fact is that a U.S. military unit in Canada intercepted suspicious wireless communications in the Arctic Ocean, and, in response to this report, the patrol unit was dispatched in a single platoon to see if there were any activities conducted by Russian troops. Adventurers romanticize the Arctic Ocean as the field of ice and snow that belongs to no one. To the U.S. military forces, however, it is their "front yard"; they have been keeping their eye on it for several decades. Not only the Arctic region, but Japan's neighboring waters are likewise considered as their "front yard." Japan's southernmost territorial land is an uninhabited reef island called Okinotori-jima. Let us say that you go out there by boat for diving around the coral reefs. In less than an hour after you anchor there, you will surely notice a patrol plane from the U.S. Navy flying over your head. The pilot looks through the plane's round window, and as soon as he assures himself that you are not a threat to the island, he flies back calmly toward Guam. Even the island, which is clearly the Japanese territory, is guarded in a way by the U.S. Navy. The Senkaku Islands could have shared the same fate as Takeshima's, because the Japanese Government tends to do nothing unless prodded by the U.S. military. The Japanese Government has been thick-skinned and slow in reacting since the time of the feudal government in Edo. Due probably to its stupidity, it let Okinawa fall without having it fortified and gave up the northern territories and Takeshima to foreign countries. As if this stupidity has become too incorrigible to be remedied, the Japanese Government in the postwar period has not only been indifferent to maintaining foreign military bases in Japan proper, but also been bragging by saying, "With this arrangement, we can ensure our security." "The 1985 Crisis" Does anybody remember the "1985 crisis"? As the shooting range of an SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) for the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear missile submarine was extended to over 8,000 kilometers in the late 1970's, it became possible for the Soviet Union to attack the heart of the United States from its inland sea or harbor. To protect its nuclear missile submarines from the U.S. Navy, the Soviet Union reinforced its "Back Fire" and antisubmarine aircraft carriers. Knowing this, the United States felt the need to push its "front yard" further forward and began to publicize the threat of the Soviet Union in Japan. The publicity department of the Soviet Union countered this in earnest. Some people in Japan interpreted all this as an opportune time to increase the defense budget, saying, "Around 1985 the Soviet military forces will land in Hokkaido to secure the Soya Strait." All this happened just about the time when I was studying acting and music in Tokyo after having graduated from a high school in Nagano. Thinking that "I may be able to get some interesting experience," I quit the professional school and enlisted in the Ground Self-Defense Force in Hokkaido. However, when I was assigned to the Second Division (a division in charge of defending the territory in northern Hokkaido to the extent of total annihilation), which was supposed to be a unit on the foremost frontline equivalent to the Kanto Army that had guarded the former Manchurian- Soviet border, I did not observe any sense of emergency that is expected to prevail in a battlefield. In particular, mobilization and communications training exercises all ignored the hypothetical case of the counterpart (the Soviet force) using super weapons (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons). For example, when a nuclear attack is expected, tanks should be quickly dispersed to safety, and machineguns outside vehicles should be stored for a while in anticipation of a bomb blast. Such training exercises were never conducted. As I was also a communications operator, I received in- house training on telegram (the Morse code) and cryptogram (secret code). However, although I was instructed to process telegrams on super weapons as special emergency items, I could not find any sample telegrams concerning super weapons. Everything else was just like the example cited above. Being dumbfounded by the lack of a sense of emergency on the frontline, I tried to think up some reasons for this. Then, I came to a conclusion: "The government and the Self-Defense Agency have a firm belief that there will be no war involving Japan in the future. Therefore, they consider it enough as long as they provide some formal appearance to unit formation, personnel, and training exercises." After completing one term (two years), I left the Self- Defense Forces. What Is the Biggest Threat to Japan? For Japan, the threat from the Soviet Union is not relating to Soya Point or sealanes. It has been a long time since all of the seven seas became the front yard of the United States. The U.S. Navy can detect all seafaring submarines of the Soviet Union and follow them around very closely. Also, as the U.S. military forces maintain a large number of smart mines in their bases in Japan, without any help from the Self-Defense Forces, they will be able to blockade the three straits easily by spreading these mines from their tanker planes. For them, blocking was not an issue; instead, the issue was whether or not their military forces could pass through these straits to attack the Soviet Union. Then, what is the threat from the Soviet Union to Japan? Quite obviously, it is none other than the vast number of nuclear weapons in storage that can be dropped anytime on Japanese cities. Likewise, the nuclear weapons owned by the United States and China always remain as the biggest threat to Japan. As a former self-defense official, I became a college student five years behind my classmates. Then, I began to be utterly offended by Japan's military academism, which considers my way of arguing odd, as well as by the poor level of journalism. So, I tried more than once to publish my articles in newspapers and magazines. When I was a freshman or sophomore, I had already formed my idea on the strategic principle of "direct approach against power," which will be mentioned later. Yet, all of my articles submitted were rejected. This reality made me obstinate. I spent two years at a graduate school to prove that no other strategic theories in the past and present could surpass my viewpoint. Then, with some intended purpose, I joined the editorial department of a monthly magazine called "SENSHA MAGAJIN [Tank Magazine]." When I was writing articles with my byline (I used my real name then), the Gulf war erupted. "SENSHA MAGAJIN" was the only one that was able to point out the following before the operation Desert Storm: "The U.S. Marine Corps' plan to land in Kuwait is a diversionary tactic to mobilize the mass media. The main strike force of the multinational troops will take a long way around from the left to aim at Basrah." My prediction came true a day after the publication of the issue of the magazine that carried my article. Except for a "commentator on military affairs" who quoted my view on TV without permission, there was no other public response. In Japan, no matter how insightful or meaningful an article or an opinion is with regard to military affairs, it will never make the Defense Agency reconsider its position or change the public opinion. As soon as the Gulf war ended, all the "commentators on military affairs" disappeared from TV programs. I realized then that, with no realistic vision of militarism or war in Japan, a career in military journalism is a futile one. As a script writer of original stories, I am now writing scripts for an action comic featuring weathermen, brain surgeons, and employees at the legal department of a chemical manufacturer. In the meantime, I completed and published four research-based books through Ginga Shuppan: Infantry Weapons of the Japanese Army, The Army's Mechanized Weapons, Reevaluation of Japan's Naval Preparedness, and Reevaluation of Japan's Defense Capability. In the last book entitled Reevaluation of Japan's Defense Capability, I attempted to construct a reasonable foundation of military preparedness for nuclear deterrence by eliminating all self-binding restrictions, including the Constitution. The objective of this article is to expand further the contents of this book. "A Direct Approach Against Power" I believe that, as long as we have six SLBM's with nuclear warheads on alert on a 24-hour basis, we will be able to deter nuclear attacks by superpowers on Japan. Why do we need only six SLBM's? In considering a nation's strategy for nuclear deterrence, there is one thing that needs to be remembered. That is a "difference in national character." On this globe, there are countries where any citizen in the middle class can influence national policies and countries where only a limited number of privileged citizens can influence national policies. This, I call a "difference in national characters." The Vietnam war was a war between two completely opposite national characters--the United States and North Vietnam. Each one of the U.S. soldiers who were sent to Indochina was able, through injury or death, to change the national policy at the White House. In North Vietnam, on the other hand, a very limited number of people in leadership in the city of Hanoi were able to influence the national policy. Average citizens on the home front and soldiers in frontlines did not have such power of influence to change their country's national policy through injuries or deaths. The people in the leadership class in the United States had never considered this difference in national characters before 1986 when they decided to bomb Libya to attack Qadhdhafi. Therefore, they avoided bombing the center of Hanoi during the Vietnam war; instead, they killed or injured only common soldiers and farmers. Despite the series of bombings on North Vietnam, as the people in power were never physically threatened, the North Vietnamese policy remained intact. On the other hand, the communist side understood that each one of the U.S. soldiers had the power to influence Washington. Therefore, by killing or injuring these soldiers little by little everyday, the communist forces were able to effect a policy change in Washington. It has been said that the United States has two targeting-policy choices for its nuclear strategy--a "counterforce" and a "countervalue" strategy. Simply stated, the former is to use its own nuclear weapons to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons; and the latter is to use its own nuclear weapons to kill or injure the enemy's people in cities. And, if the countervalue strategy, or the ability to destroy cities, could be assured of being operative after the enemy's first attack, a "nuclear deterrence" was considered to exist. However, even without considering the fact that the failure to kill Colonel Qaddafi in 1986 gave rise to a reckless attempt by Sadam Hussein in 1990, if we review how the Korean war and the Vietnam war proceeded, we can realize that a "deterrence" cannot be achieved so easily. When we are dealing with such nations as North Korea, China, Libya, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union, we cannot achieve a deterrence by killing or injuring soldiers. Even by killing a large number of average citizens, we cannot force changes in national policies of these countries. In other words, to change national policies of these countries, it is necessary to impose physical threats upon the limited number of powerful individuals. This is a case similar to the following: Although the former Japanese Empire had no intention of surrendering even after receiving carpet bombings from the U.S. forces, including one atomic bomb, as soon as the Soviet Union made an advance toward Manchuria, endangering members of the Imperial Household and some leaders of the army so as to become hostages of the Soviet forces, it convened an Imperial conference and accepted the Potsdam Declaration. I call this a "direct approach against power." If we apply this iron rule, we will be able to establish a nuclear deterrence with a surprisingly limited number of nuclear weapons against any opponent, even if it is the United States, Russia, or China. On the other hand, nuclear armaments that go against this iron rule will never become a "safe, inexpensive, or effective" nuclear deterrence. For example, Mr. Hachiyo Nakagawa and former high-ranking officials of the Self- Defense Forces are emphatic about maintaining short-range nuclear weapons that can reach only up to Beijing or Siberia. But, with no matter how many of these weapons we have, how will we be able to deter strategic nuclear attacks from the two major nuclear powers, the United States and Russia? If a deterrence could be possible with such weapons, China would never have attempted to develop an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) with a shooting range of 13,000 kilometers. Nuclear Power With "12 Warheads and 12 Submarines" To deter nuclear attacks from the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and Russia, that maintain large numbers of warheads and currently have the capabilities of directing 20,000 warheads toward Japan at any time, it is necessary to have ballistic missiles with a shooting range of at least 12,000 kilometers each to threaten New York and Moscow. To deter a country like the United States from resorting to a nuclear attack, it is not necessary to target the White House or the Pentagon. It is sufficient to establish a credibility (certainty and reliability) that we are capable of blasting nuclear bombs in one or two cities to be randomly selected from about 10 large cities. In other words, when dealing with the United States, we can use the elementary "countervalue" nuclear strategy as our "direct approach against power." The credibility can be established by having two SLBM's that can be launched anytime from two conventionally powered submarines roaming in separate sea zones. To maintain these "two warheads and two submarines" always on alert, it is necessary to build "four warheads and four submarines," assuming that the rate of operation is maintained at 50 percent as in the case of the U.S. military. When dealing with Russia, as its leaders and intellectuals are extremely concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, "four warheads and four submarines" will produce enough credibility as a "direct approach against power." Like Russia, China is also a country with a limited number of people who have the power to change national policies. However, it has no one "central" city like Moscow in Russia where everything of national importance is concentrated. In dealing with China, therefore, it is necessary to keep constant track of the whereabouts of the specified number of powerful leaders so that SLBM's can be ready to be launched accurately at any time toward these locations. As long as this vigilance can be accomplished, "two warheads and two submarines" seem to be sufficient. In addition to these country-by-country measures, if we are to take into consideration the need to deter all of these three countries--the United States, Russia, and China- -at the same time, at least "six warheads and six submarines" must always be on alert. Therefore, it is necessary to build "12 warheads and 12 submarines." How About the Hardware and Launching Methods? Then, how are we going to quickly procure 12 SLBM's and warheads as well as submarines for launching these warheads? As Mr. Ikutaro Shimizu and other advocates for nuclear armament in the postwar Japan were all unable to explain their plans in concrete terms, they lacked the power of persuasion enough to awaken the public with a deep sense of defeatism toward the former Allied Powers. Now, I am going to work out such a plan. On 4 February 1994, the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) launched an H-II rocket with all of its parts made in Japan. At that time, some mass media, here and abroad, reported their opinions that this would eventually become Japan's ICBM. Such speculation showed the lack of knowledge on the part of the reporters on the "vertical air nuclear launch system." Russia's SS-18, the largest ICBM in the world at present, is 36.5 meters long, and its launch weight is 211 tons. On the other hand, the H-II is 50 meters long, far larger than the SS-18, and its launch weight is 260 tons. It is too big to be an ICBM. Also, the H-II's main engine fuel--liquid hydrogen and oxygen--cannot be kept in the tank for many hours. Before launching, about four hours are needed to go through the procedure of gas replacement, preliminary cooling, and early fueling to fill up 98 percent of the fuel. Then, the remaining 2 percent of the fuel is filled automatically to a countdown from 40 minutes before launching. As soon as 100 percent of the fuel is filled up, the launching begins. Considering that an enemy's first ICBM attack, which is launched from the other side of the globe, is capable of hitting the impact point in 45 minutes, a system that requires five hours to prepare for launching can never become a deterrent. The former Soviet Union had to supplement the low credibility of its liquid-fueled SLBM's with quantity. As Japan needs to avoid the stupidity of competing against superpowers by the quantity of nuclear arms, it must procure rockets that can be launched immediately and reliably with solid propellant. In 1971, the Education Ministry's Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS, Tokyo University's former Aerospace Institute) launched an M (mu)-4S rocket with four- step solid motors that was 23.6 meters long with a diameter of 1.4 meters and a total weight of 43.6 tons. Using a drawing in his book, "Japan's Nuclear Armament" (1975), Mr. Uchihiro Koyama pointed out that the rocket was medium in size, somewhere between an ICBM and a strategic nuclear missile. With a single 450-kiloton warhead, SS-N-18--an SLBM that was made by the former Soviet Union in the late 1970's- -had a range of 8,000 kilometers. Russia has now converted the fuselage into a space rocket for the private sector. Reportedly, the rocket can launch a satellite weighing 130 kilograms into a low orbit at an altitude of 250 kilometers. Once you determine the weight of a satellite (payload) that can be launched into a low orbit, you can estimate the weight of a projectile warhead (slow weight). The latter is a little heavier than the satellite. The M-4S had the power to launch a satellite weighing 180 kilograms into a low orbit at an altitude of 250 kilometers. In other words, it had a power larger than the SS-N-18. Instead of launching into an orbit, if it is used for a trajectory flight of about 12,000 kilometers (the distance between Tokyo and New York), it can carry a slow weight of more than 180 kilograms. (Incidentally, the distance between Tokyo and Moscow is 7,500 kilometers.) The question is whether Japan at that time was capable of manufacturing an atomic warhead with less than 100 kilotons necessary for an elementary level of nuclear deterrence for the M-4S with a fuselage having a 1.4-meter diameter and a slow weight of about 180 kilograms. Stating my conclusion first, I believe Japan was not capable of doing so in the 1970's. Warheads Becoming Lightweight In 1960, the United States mass-produced "W47," a 600- kiloton-level single warhead weighing 408 kilograms (excluding the weight of a reentry body), for its Polaris, the world's first SLBM. As an SLBM is launched underwater from a submarine, requirements for missile design are extremely restrictive. Therefore, warheads always incorporate the most advanced technology to make them lightweight. On the other hand, an "A-11" aerial bomb (an implosive using plutonium 239), which was deployed by France as its first practical atomic bomb in 1963, weighed 1.5 tons, although its explosive power was only 60 kilotons. Still, this clearly showed the advantage of later development because the 23-kiloton "Fatman," which the United States dropped on Nagasaki in 1945, was a plutonium-based implosive bomb and weighed 4.5 tons. Three years later, France experimented with an "AN52," a 25-kiloton strategic nuclear bomb using plutonium 239. This bomb had a diameter of 60 centimeters and weighed 455 kilogram. Another experiment was conducted in 1967 with an "A22" warhead, which became the first missile warhead to be launched from a submarine by France in 1971. This "enriched bomb," which was made of uranium 235, deuterium oxide, and tritium, weighed 1.5 tons initially. But, the weight was successfully reduced in half to 750 kilograms in 1973. Probably, Japan in the 1970's was still incapable of producing such an atomic warhead weighing 750 kilograms. Therefore, the M-4S with a payload of 180 kilograms could never be converted to a nuclear missile. Then, how light can we make a warhead for a strategic ballistic missile that needs to be thrust back to the atmosphere? The United States developed a 100-kiloton warhead called "W76" to be used with an MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) for the SLBM Poseidon C-3. This warhead weighs 164.5 kilograms, and this seems to be the technological limit. (Trident D-5, the latest SLBM, is a more powerful missile but uses a heavier warhead.) The technological limit in weight reduction that was achieved for the "W76" by the United States in 1970 was attained by the Soviet Union in the late 1970's when it produced its SS-N-18. I believe this is beyond the reach of today's Japan because of the lack of experience. It could be possible for Japan in the late 1990's to produce a warhead with less than 100 kilotons, including a reentry body, that weighs about 750 kilograms, which is equivalent to the weight of "A22" developed by France in 1973. The reason is that specific information on how to design a nuclear warhead is now quite well disseminated. In Japan, there is no difficulty in obtaining such specialized items as heavy metals (uranium 238) to make an atomic bomb shell, explosives (triamino, trinitro, benzene, etc.) for implosion, and precise triggering devices. Furthermore, using a supercomputer and computational software programs, we can easily simulate implosions with different combinations of specialized explosives. Therefore, it seems possible to carry out critical experiments economically with an amount of plutonium 239 far less than that used by the United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France when they manually computed and developed their plutonium-based atomic bombs, and thereby to design a powerful atomic bomb that is relatively small in size. Design techniques pertaining to reentry bodies have also been obtained through more than 10 recovered experimental rockets, including TT- 500A's since 1980, TR-1A's since 1991, and the "Ryusei," the first H-II rocket in 1994. M-3SII Rocket Jerico-I, a medium-range ballistic missile that was deployed by Israel in 1973 had a diameter of only 1 meter and a slow weight of about 500 kilograms. However, it was believed to be equipped with a 20-kiloton warhead. Also, when seven Western nations called for a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, they targeted "missiles with carrying warheads weighing more than 1,000 pounds (454 kilograms)." This is merely an official acknowledgment in 1987 that, if a missile has a slow weight of 500 kilograms, it can launch a warhead. As North Korea's Nodon 1, which is currently attracting attention, has a slow weight of 500 kilograms, it is reportedly capable of carrying a 50-kiloton atomic bomb in its fuselage with a diameter of 1.3 meters. Considering all this, Japan today can quite certainly produce its first operational atomic warhead, including a reentry body weighing less than 750 kilograms. The M-4S rocket in 1971 was not capable for long-range launching of a slow weight of 500-750 kilograms. Therefore, it could not be made into Japan's strategic ballistic missile. The first time Japan achieved a slow-weight ballistic missile weighing more than 750 kilograms was when the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science developed the M (mu)-3SII in 1985. The M-3SII is several generations newer than the M-4S rocket. With a fewer number of stages than the M-4S, it had a far stronger payload and was capable of launching a satellite weighing 770 kilograms at a low altitude of 250 kilometer. When a satellite to observe Halley's comet was launched, this rocket became the first one in the world to thrust through the earth's gravitational boundary, using only solid rocket propellant. Its total weight is 61 tons, heavier by about 2 tons than Trident D-5, the proud SLBM of the United States that has a solid three-stage design with a shooting range of 12,000 kilometers. Nissan Motor has already supplied eight of these rockets since 1985. Eleven years ago, therefore, Japan had a home-made solid fuel rocket that could be used to carry a warhead with a strategic shooting range. It is believed that one of the objectives of the MTCR, which was concluded two years later, was believed to prohibit export of this M-3SII. The reason was that K (Kappa)-6 and other three models totaling 19 rockets had been previously exported from Japan to Yugoslavia and Indonesia in the early 1960's. M-3SII is a highly perfected rocket. Since then, the ISAS and the NASDA have not developed any rocket with a completely solid design that is smaller in size than M-3SII and is capable of launching a satellite weighing more than 500 kilograms. They do not even have plans to develop such rockets in the future. In the following, I would like to examine the possibility of developing an uniquely Japanese nuclear deterrent system with M-3SII rockets. How About Nuclear Warheads? Acquiring nuclear weapons anew is the same as developing atomic bombs. A so-called hydrogen bomb creates nuclear fusion by using the energy from the nuclear fission of an atomic bomb. Therefore, it can be considered another form of an atomic bomb. Once an atomic bomb can be produced, it is quite simple in fact to create a hydrogen bomb. What is most difficult for any advanced industrial country to do is to manufacture a practical atomic bomb for the first time. Then, how can Japan manufacture its first practical atomic bomb to be loaded on to the M-3SII? Practically speaking, the raw material to be used for nuclear fission for an atomic bomb is either plutonium 239 or uranium 235. Plutonium 239 can be easily extracted in large quantity and quality good enough to be used for nuclear bombs by chemically treating byproducts from the lightwater reactors at commercial nuclear power plants throughout Japan. As there is no need to build new facilities, this method has a merit of convenience. A demerit, if any, is that plutonium 239 is not suitable for the so-called "gun-barrel method," the simplest critical experiment. It, therefore, requires a complex and precise critical experiment called the "implosion method." On the other hand, uranium 235 has the merit of absolute reliability: If a weapon is made according to the gun-barrel method, its explosion is assured without any experiment. (In fact, the uranium 235, gun-barrel bomb used on Hiroshima was dropped without prior experiment.) However, the facilities in Ningyotoge and Rokkashomura to enrich uranium 235 are not built to military specifications. So, a demerit is the time that it will take to enrich the uranium to the purity for use in making nuclear bombs. With an utmost priority placed on saving time for production and deployment, therefore, the first three bombs will be made of plutonium 235 according to the implosion method. However, to secure the credibility here and abroad of assured explosion without experiment, the fourth and subsequent bombs will be made of uranium 235 according to the gun-barrel method as well as the implosion method and will be included in a mixed inventory of warheads. The number of warheads required to be manufactured for the time being is 12 in total. The reason is that, to maintain six SLBM's with single warheads and six submarines on 24-hour alert all year-round, it is necessary to have at least 12 warheads, assuming that the rate of operation is 50 percent. Conditions of "Safety, Low Cost, and Advantage" These six missiles with single warheads cannot be deployed underground, above the ground, in the air, or on the ocean. Even if they are stored in sturdy underground silos, they can be detected by foreign reconnaissance satellites. If so, they will be destroyed by the enemy's preemptive strike. Once such a possibility is evident, a strategic nuclear system's significance for deterrence becomes dubious. Therefore, England, France, and China have become concerned with the survivability of their land-based nuclear deployment systems from enemies' preemptive strikes, and they are compelled to rearrange their 300 to 500 warheads each and to reconsider their ways of launching them. How about the deployment method that employs the land- based mobilization method using railroads? This may be suitable in Siberia or Alaska, but it is not "safe, low cost, or advantageous" for a country like Japan that has little land. This is self-evident. A unique deployment method was experimented in the past to launch a large ballistic missile from a large tanker airplane to be standing by in the air all the time. Again, for a country like Japan that has a limited space in its territorial sky and airports, such an airplane can be easily spotted for a preemptive strike. Therefore, this method cannot be "safe, low cost, or advantageous." The same can be said about a method of carrying a strategic missile on a floating fortress like a battleship. Undoubtedly the ship will be tailed closely by an enemy's naval warship, and, once it gets a surprise attack, its ability to make a nuclear counterattack will be easily lost. Therefore, it seems clear that the SLBM method, where a long-range ballistic missile of the M-3SII type with an atomic bomb shall be launched from a conventionally powered submarine, is the only way for Japan to have a system of nuclear deterrence that is "safe, low cost, and advantageous." To spread the risk of damage, six submarines will carry one missile each. Then, what should be the size of such a strategic missile submarine? If Japan is to begin designing a nuclear-powered submarine now, it will take too much time. So, we must think of some practical, conventionally powered submarine that can be deployed by the turn of the 21st century. (SS-N-4, the Soviet Union's first SLBM, was loaded onto a conventionally powered submarine and used until 1979.) The submarines now owned by the Maritime Self-Defense Force each have a submerged displacement of less than 3,000 tons. If a submarine is nuclear powered like a hunter submarine (an offensive-type nuclear submarine), and even if it is built in large size like the "Sea Wolf," the U.S. Navy's latest model, weighing close to 10,000 tons, it will be able to move underwater at the speed of 35 knots. On the other hand, a practical size for a conventionally powered hunter submarine cannot exceed 3,000 tons at the present time. Having no nuclear power, such a submarine with a diesel engine cannot navigate continuously around underwater for many minutes. If it moves at the full speed of 20 knots, the battery will run out in a few minutes. Therefore, a conventionally powered submarine must have a compact body so that it will not be easily detected by an enemy's sonar or magnetic search device. The same constraints apply to the production of a conventionally powered strategic missile submarine. In contrast to a hunter submarine, however, a strategic missile submarine places a high priority on the ability to navigate underwater for an extended period of time. The larger the size of the submarine, the better this ability becomes. It is difficult to achieve the right balance, but a practical size for a conventionally powered strategic missile submarine should be 4,000 tons at most. The reason is that, even if it can be made larger than this, it will not be able to extend its "reach," and the cost of production and operation will be higher than that for a nuclear-powered submarine. Limiting the number of crew members to 90, a conventionally powered submarine in the size of 4,000 tons will be able to continuously navigate underwater for two weeks. Combined with the snorkel navigation method, it will be able to extend the submerged navigation to three weeks. But, if the snorkel is not projected out above the surface of the water at all, and if the submarine is operated with the battery only at a slow speed, it can navigate underwater for about four days at most. Incidentally, it has been reported that a U.S. strategic missile submarine returns to port after patrolling in a completely submerged state for 70 days. Of course, it does not have to use its snorkel at all during that period of time, and it can navigate continuously at the maximum speed of 20 some knots for many days. Because of this outstanding navigational ability, naval officers in the world wish to have nuclear-powered submarines. How About Launching Platforms? During the war, Japan even launched a huge submarine named Igo 400, which had a submerged displacement of more than 6,000 tons. Today, it is possible to build six 4,000- ton conventionally powered submarines concurrently at the existing docks for submarines owned by Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Kobe. It will probably take two years at full operation to complete construction of the first six submarines. As a rule, however, as construction of the next six submarines can be shortened to a year and a half, 12 submarines will be ready in three years and a half. At any rate, this 4,000-ton submarine measures less than 20 meters from the bottom of its hull to the top of its sail (or the bridge). On the other hand, the first section of a M-3SII measures 14.8 meters, the second section 8.2 meters, and the third section 2.7 meters, and including the fairing portion that stores a reentry body, the total length becomes 27.8 meters. Compared in terms of the length, the M-3SII is close to Titan I, a large-scale, early-generation ICBM of the United States, that measures 29.9 meters. It is 6.6 meters longer than the Peacekeeper, the leading ICBM at the present time. Although one missile is carried in one submarine, it cannot be loaded vertically. Even the Russian "Typhoon" (29,000 tons), the largest strategic missile submarine in the world, cannot load a 27.8-meter missile on a vertical position. Furthermore, although the M-S3SII has a diameter of 1.4 meters, which is slender compared to the SLBM's used currently by the United States and Russia, 1.9 meters (for the U.S. Poseidon and Trident) and 2.4 meters (for the Russian SS-N-20), respectively, it has a tail wing, which has a diameter of 4-5 meters at the longest subsection. Therefore, to use it as an SLBM, the entire rocket must be placed in an enormous canister with an inside diameter of 5 meters, and this canister must be installed diagonally, stretching from the lower deck at the center of the submarine's hull to the foredeck. A two-step launching method using a canister is employed for cruise missiles in U.S. submarines, and it does not involve much technical difficulty. Of course, the bow of the submarine should be raised upward for vertical launching of a missile. As the depth of water for launching is 20 meters, the canister will come out of the surface of the water immediately, leaving no adverse effect on the accuracy of the SLBM's trajectory. Needless to say, also, that a hot- launch system (internal ignition and self-takeoff) should be incorporated into the design so that a missile can be launched without a canister by thrusting the bow of the submarine up above the surface of the water. The Maritime Self-Defense Force does not have the U.S. Navy's advanced measurement methods for submarine positioning. However, as our strategic submarine will change its position only within our territorial water, which has become like an underwater inland sea because of torpedo netting, it will be able to obtain accurate enough information on positioning for an attack against a city from its internal gyrocompass adjusted at the time of sailing out from a port. When a nuclear attack is made by a foreign country, Japan's prime minister immediately transmits his order for a strategic nuclear counterattack through high-powered, medium-wave broadcasting to the captain of a submarine submerged in nearby waters. So ordered, the captain enters the data on the target for retaliation into the missile's automatic guidance control circuit and raises the bow of the submarine to make a rapid ascension. Then, he opens the door of the launching tube, and, as soon as the submarine reaches a water depth of 20 meters, he lets carbon dioxide expand at the bottom of the launching tube. The canister thrusts its fang-like tip vertically above the surface of the water. At the same time, he ignites the first motor of the M-3SII. The missile bursts through the front of the canister and thrusts up toward the great circle route. As the M-3SII has a completely automatic guidance system (a strap-down system), it does not have to be guided any more from the submarine. The canister is immediately discarded, and the submarine evacuates underwater. 1,044 Billion Yen in Total For the time being, therefore, Japan needs to secure 12 warheads, about 30 missiles, including those for experiment and for reserve, and 12 submarines. Now, let me estimate the required cost. Assuming that a unit cost of a warhead--reportedly it was $40 million to about $300 million in the United States in the 1980's--is 2 billion yen, accounting for the initial cost, the cost of 12 warheads will be 24 billion yen. As one M-3SII costs 6 billion yen, the cost of 30 missiles will be 180 billion yen. As a 4,000-ton submarine costs 70 billion yen at the most, the cost of 12 submarines will be 840 billion yen. Adding 24 billion yen, 180 billion yen, and 840 billion yen will equal 1,044 billion yen in total. Of Japan's fiscal 1995 budget for various subsidies, that for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries alone amounts to more than 1,700 billion yen. The Japanese citizens should stop worrying too much, and, just by taking away the tax money for retiring bureaucrats and investing it over a four-year period, we will be able to have nuclear missiles. These nuclear missiles will enable us to regain "silent neutrality" that we have always wanted since the feudal government was installed 390 years ago. Herewith, I have finished explaining my four-year plan toward Japan's nuclear armament. Yet, as you may be still worrying about reactions from our neighboring countries and divisive public opinions, I would like to explain my reasons why these worries are unnecessary in the next issue of this magazine. Nisohachi Hyodo: Born in 1960. Completed a graduate program at Tokyo Institute of Technology (his master's thesis is appended in his book, Reevaluation of Japan's Defense Capability ). His published books include Reevaluation of Japan's Naval Preparedness, Infantry Weapons of the Japanese Army, and The Army's Mechanized Weapons (all published through Ginga Shuppan). THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS Article Id: dreas227_a_96043 Document Id: 0e1g68f0493jza Insert Date: 11/25/96 Purge Date: 12/09/98 Publish Date: 10/01/96 Publish Region: East Asia Document Number: FBIS-EAS-96-227 Document Type: Daily Report Document Date: 1 Oct 1996 Division: NORTHEAST ASIA Subdivision: Japan