KCNA 'Detailed Report' Explains NPT Withdrawal
P'yongyang KCNA
January 22, 2003
[FBIS Translated Text]
To cope with the grave situation where our state security and
national sovereignty are being threatened due to the United States and
forces following the United States and the US tyrannical nuclear crushing
policy toward the DPRK, the DPRK Government took an important measure to
immediately withdraw from the NPT.
KCNA [Korean Central News Agency] issues the following detailed
report relating the circumstances where the Republic government declared
its withdrawal from the NPT.
Details on becoming a NPT member
Our country's purpose for entering the NPT lay in removing the US
nuclear threat and importantly, in smoothly resolving the country's
energy issue with nuclear power [haekdongnyok].
We have actively encouraged hydroelectric and thermoelectric
generation capabilities to meet the increasing energy demand in the
people's economy. However, this was limited in its potential power.
Accordingly, we decided to develop the nuclear power industry
[haekdongnyok kongop], which is the best method for resolving the
electricity issue in our country's conditions. Thus, we adopted the
atomic power law [wonjaryok pop] in 1974 and legally restricted the usage
of atomic power to only peaceful purposes.
We promoted scientific research tasks to develop our country's
nuclear power industry. At the same time, we exerted efforts to receive
an atomic power plant on a turnkey basis from other countries. This is
because at that time, the worldwide trend for nuclear power plants was on
LWRs, based on low-enriched uranium, and [a nuclear power plant] was too
much [arumch'an gosiotgi ttaemunida] for us to [build] by ourselves due
to the technological complexity.
We decided to introduce LWRs and make them the pillars in our
country's energy production, so we negotiated with some developed
countries. However, this project did not develop smoothly, and no
country wanted to sell us LWRs.
The only countries that were exporting atomic power plant facilities
in the 1960s and 1970s were Western countries, including the former
Soviet Union and the United States, and some countries in West Europe.
First, we tried to purchase developed LWRs by paying money to the Western
countries, including Canada, Sweden, and France. However, this could
not be realized due to hampering by the US COCOM [Coordinating Committee
for Export Control to Communist Areas].
Thus, we negotiated the LWR supply issue with the former Soviet
Union, although it was not as technologically developed as the Western
countries. At that time, the Soviet Union said that if we were to
receive nuclear-related technologies, we must enter the NPT and sign
safeguard agreements [tambo hyopchong] with the International Atomic
Energy Agency [IAEA].
We prudently studied the issue of entering the NPT. In particular,
the basic spirit of the NPT drew our, who are receiving the US nuclear
threat under conditions where the state land is divided, natural
attention. The NPT's basic spirit notes that countries possessing
nuclear weapons should not threaten or use nuclear weapons on other
countries, should not create an emergency situation that endangers the
basic interests of non-nuclear countries, and should exert all efforts to
avoid a nuclear war.
On 12 December 1985, we entered the NPT with the purpose to realize
international cooperation in the nuclear power industry sector, remove
nuclear threats toward us, and make the Korean peninsula a non-nuclear
zone.
Details on the postponement of the signing of the safeguard agreement
According to the NPT, non-nuclear countries without nuclear weapons
are supposed to sign a safeguard agreement with the IAEA within 18 months
after entering the NPT. However, after we entered the treaty, the
United States continuously heightened its nuclear threats against us.
Thus, we were faced with a grave situation where we could not sign the
safeguard agreements even if we wanted to.
The United States recklessly violated its international legal
obligations as a nuclear weapons possessing country, brought all kinds of
nuclear weapons to South Korea on a massive scale, and escalated the
joint exercise "Team Spirit," a nuclear-test war exercise, against us.
In order to sign the safeguards agreement, we proposed the following
to the United States: withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea,
removing the US nuclear threat to us, pledging legally-binding security
safeguards for us and simultaneous inspections.
The United States finally responded to our demands because the
assertions we proposed were just and supportive international opinions
spread.
On 17 January 1991, the US deputy assistant secretary of state said,
"[the United States] will not pose a nuclear threat on North Korea" and
the US guarantee of not using nuclear weapons "applies to all countries
that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], including
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."
On 27 September 1991, US President Bush announced the withdrawal of
short-range tactical nuclear weapons from US territory and sea bases.
On 8 November and 18 December 1991, the South Korean person in
authority [tanggukja] (No T'ae-u) announced the Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Declaration of No
Nuclear Weapons [in South Korea].
On 7 January 1992, the South Korean "Defense Ministry," the US
Department of Defense, and the South Korea-US "Combined Forces Command"
jointly declared a halt to the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise. On
22 January 1992, high-level talks were held between the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and the United States.
In a situation where the conditions and climate for signing the
agreement were created because the United States and South Korea
promised, although verbally, we signed the safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on 30 January 1992.
On 9 April 1992, the third session of the DPRK Ninth Supreme People's
Assembly approved the safeguards agreement "on the premise that none of
the NPT member countries will deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean
peninsula and pose a nuclear threat to us." The next day, 10 April, [the
DPRK] notified the IAEA of this fact.
Accordingly, the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA
entered into force on 10 April 1992.
Background of Our Withdrawal from the NPT
After signing the DPRK-IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement, the United
States created a "nuclear crisis" by spreading the rumor of "suspicions"
over our graphite-moderated reactors and nuclear activities in related
facilities.
We opted for a graphite-moderated reactor for the following reasons:
In 1985, after we joined the NPT, we signed an agreement with the
former Soviet Union on economic and technical cooperation in building a
nuclear power plant.
According to this agreement, the former Soviet Union was to supply a
nuclear power plant with three pressure LWRs -- 635 MW in power output
respectively -- each to start operation successively each year starting
toward the end of the 1990s.
Nevertheless, this agreement ended with just a land survey to build a
power plant.
Therefore, we announced, as policy, the creation of the atomic energy
industry suitable for our situation in order to keep living in our own
way and started to buckle down to develop an atomic energy technology of
our own.
In building a self-reliant atomic power industry, we selected "a
natural uranium -- graphite-moderation -- carbon dioxide cooler" reactor
type for the type of nuclear power plant after comprehensively taking
into account the country's industrial foundation, its technical
standards, and nuclear fuel cycle to be formed in the future.
This type of reactor is called a graphite-moderated reactor.
Graphite-moderated reactor means natural uranium is used for fuel,
graphite for moderation, and carbon dioxide as a cooling agent.
We selected the graphite-moderated reactor because of advantageous
conditions. Although it is inferior to the LWR in terms of technical,
economic aspects, and safety, it is technically simple. It takes natural
uranium, which requires less funds and labor, and we could easily obtain
graphite, which is used as the reactor's moderating agent, by slightly
upgrading the graphite refining technology because our country had
maintained an artificial graphite industry since the 1930s.
More importantly, abundant uranium and graphite are buried in our
country.
Therefore, in developing the atomic energy industry, we opted for a
graphite-moderated reactor in order to develop it with our technology,
relying on abundant native raw materials without having to depend on
other countries' raw materials.
Those days, we faithfully fulfilled our obligations in accordance
with the safeguards agreement.
We sent an initial nuclear inventory report and a design notification
for our nuclear facilities on 4 May, ahead of schedule. These reports
were to be sent to the IAEA Secretariat in 1992 according to Article 42
and Article 62 of the safeguards agreement.
From 11 to 16 May 1992, IAEA representatives, led by the IAEA
director general, visited our country, and we showed them all the objects
of our nuclear facilities that they demanded to see and the objects about
which they were suspicious.
We extended active cooperation to the work of irregular inspection
teams on six occasions.
The first inspection took place from 25 May to 6 June 1992; the
second inspection from 7 to 20 July 1992; the third inspection from 31
August to 12 September 1992 (visits to two "suspicious facilities" were
held on 12 and 14 September); the fourth inspection from 2 to 14 November
1992; the fifth from 14 to 19 December; and the sixth from 26 January to
6 February 1993.
Nevertheless, the United States and some circles in the IAEA
Secretariat following the United States abused the inspections held in
compliance with the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement as a way to spy
on our interior and crush our socialist system.
From the outset, the IAEA inspections were not conducted in
compliance with the agency's rules and safeguards agreement, but under US
manipulation.
In Article 5 of the safeguards agreement, the obligation is specified
to strictly protect all data obtained in the process of inspecting other
countries' nuclear facilities.
Nevertheless, some IAEA Secretariat circles systematically delivered
the inspection results of our country to the United States, and the
United States came forward demanding "special inspections" of our
military facilities with the excuse of some "inconsistencies" or other,
which the United States created, complicating the nuclear issue on the
Korean peninsula.
Despite the fact that the so-called "inconsistencies," created in the
process of inspecting our nuclear-related facilities, were scientifically
and technologically clarified, the IAEA demanded "special inspections"
over two of our "facilities" on the basis of intelligence data provided
by the United States. This was strictly the result of US manipulation.
The data also clearly shows that the United States called the IAEA
director general to a US House of Representatives' "joint hearing" on 22
July 1992 to receive notification on our nuclear program and forced him
to conduct a "special inspection," a "surprise inspection" of us.
In addition, a US Central Intelligence Agency report submitted to the
National Security Council at the time says, "The United States must lead
North Korea to accept special inspections immediately, and it must
establish a North Korea policy in accordance with the nuclear inspection
results."
Bringing up non-existent "suspicions of our nuclear development," the
United States manipulated some circles of the IAEA Secretariat and
certain member countries, making the IAEA adopt, in an IAEA Board of
Governors' meeting in February 1993, an unjust "resolution" that coerced
inspections over our military facilities that had nothing to do with
nuclear activities.
As for these military facilities, they had nothing to do with the
nuclear facilities that were supposed to comply with the safeguards
agreement, and, besides, inspections for them was not an issue that fell
under the IAEA authority.
Accepting unjust IAEA inspections based on US manipulated
"intelligence data" meant we would make the act of reconnaissance
legitimate for the United States, the counterpart of our war.
Furthermore, it was impossible to imagine we would open the military
bases to our enemies under the special circumstances in which the country
was divided, and we were constantly under the US nuclear threat.
It was a violent infringement on our Republic's sovereignty and an
intention to crush our socialist system by disarming us. It became a
serious military and political issue that threatened our country's
supreme interests.
The resolution, artificially created by the United States and its
followers, was a part of the maneuver to crush the Republic and nothing
could justify it, not from an international law perspective nor from a
science and technology perspective.
In time, with the adoption of the unjust IAEA resolution, the United
States resumed once again the "Team Sprit" joint military exercise, which
had already been stopped, threatening our sovereignty and our right to
survive in a grave manner.
In the end, the United States thwarted our efforts -- joining the NPT
from the mid-1980s and signing the nuclear safeguards agreement in a bid
to develop an atomic energy industry to solve the country's power
problem, and remove the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula -- every
step of the way.
The basis of our economic hardship in the 1990s originated from this,
and we began to firmly believe that until the United States abandoned its
hostile policy toward us, our country's economic development would be
curtailed, not to mention the issue of peace and security on the Korean
peninsula.
During this period, because of our demands, talks were held between
the DPRK and the United States regarding the "nuclear issue," but they
broke down due to longtime hostility and mistrust between the two
countries.
We could not help but enhance, as much as possible, the awareness
that the NPT and the IAEA -- which internationally have the sacred goal
and mission of preventing the diffusion of nuclear weapons and
guaranteeing the peaceful use of atomic energy -- were being appropriated
to realize the impure US political goal of eliminating our system when it
came to their relations with us.
To defend the country's sovereignty and security in response to the
created situation, we entered a semi-war situation and on 12 March 1993,
took a measure to withdraw from the NPT to defend our supreme interests.
Article 10 of the NPT clearly states that each treaty participant may
withdraw when a special situation is created in which its supreme
interests are threatened. Therefore, our measure was an exercise of our
legitimate right, which no one could contradict.
On 13 June 1994, we took the measure of withdrawing from the IAEA in
the aftermath of the adoption of the "resolution" that stated "IAEA
cooperation" with us "would be suspended," and demanding, in the 10 June
1994 Board of Governors meeting, the opening of our military facilities
with regards to our "nuclear issue."
From then on, all the unjust IAEA "resolutions" taken in connection
with us became nullified, and we were not bound by any IAEA rules and
decisions.
The DPRK's Unique Status
When our statement on the withdrawal from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] was announced, the world expressed grave
concerns about the creation of a dangerous touch-and-go situation on the
Korean peninsula due to the United States' arbitrariness and demanded a
peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula's nuclear issue through
dialogue and negotiations.
Our Republic's sincere efforts to prevent the danger of the outbreak
of a war on the Korean peninsula and to ensure regional peace and
stability, and the strong demands of the peace-loving people of the world
compelled the United States to come to the negotiating table for a
peaceful resolution of the Korean peninsula's nuclear issue.
The DPRK-US Joint Statement was adopted on 11 June 1993, after
several rounds of bilateral negotiations.
In the Joint Statement, the United States promised not to use or
threaten us with force, including nuclear weapons, but to respect our
sovereignty and refrain from interfering in our internal affairs. We
decided to temporarily suspend the effect of our withdrawal from the NPT
as long as we deemed necessary.
And thus, we came to be placed in a unique status regarding our
relations with the NPT.
As for the Safeguards Agreement, because it had been concluded in
accordance with Paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the NPT, its legal validity
came to be placed in a state of virtual suspension from 12 June 1993,
simultaneously with our withdrawal from the treaty, as long as no special
agreement is reached between the organization and the DPRK.
Accordingly, we only had to receive inspections for ensuring the
continuity of the safeguards measures but not the full-scale inspections
under the Safeguards Agreement.
The United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]
Secretariat also recognized our unique status.
On 10 December 1993, Thomas Hubbard, then US deputy assistant
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said "the United
States expresses its understanding of Korea's unique status caused by the
temporary suspension of the effect of its withdrawal from the NPT."
On 24 March 1994, IAEA General Director Hans Blix, while reporting
the results of the IAEA's March inspection of our country to the UN
Security Council, said: "Because the DPRK is in a unique situation, it is
necessary to only ensure the continuity of the safeguards. In this
respect, the DPRK accepted the agency's inspections in May and August
1993 to replace the recording tapes and storage batteries in the
monitoring equipment."
This was recognition of the fact that the inspections for ensuring
the continuity of the safeguards measures were not the regular and
irregular inspections under the Safeguards Agreement, but inspections to
ensure the continuity of the safeguards for the purpose of simply
confirming that our nuclear material had not been misappropriated, from
February 1993, when inspections under the Safeguards Agreement were
frozen.
After the announcement of DPRK-US Joint Statement, three-phased talks
took place between the United States and our country, and they resulted
in the adoption of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994, which
pledged to fundamentally resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean
peninsula.
As our obligations, the DPRK-US Agreed Framework stipulated we would
come into full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA
only when a significant portion of the LWRs, or the non-nuclear
components, including turbines and generators, were delivered. This made
our unique status even clearer.
Circumstances Of the DPRK's NPT Withdrawal Placed on Temporary
Moratorium Taking Effect
From the beginning, the United States had no will to implement the
DPRK-US Agreed Framework, and it has systematically violated the
agreement, staking their hopes on our "alleged collapse."
First of all, it did not faithfully honor its commitment to provide
the LWRs. The key point in the DPRK-US Agreed Framework is the US
provision of LWRs, in return for our nuclear freeze.
Under the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the United States was to
organize, under its leadership, an international consortium to guarantee
the funds and facilities for the LWRs to be provided to the DPRK. The
United States, representing the consortium, was to serve as the principal
point of contact with the DPRK and conclude a supply contract with the
DPRK within six months of the date of concluding the Agreed Framework for
the provision of the LWR project.
The United States, however, even though four or five countries in the
world at that time were fully capable of constructing LWRs and also had
plenty of experience in exporting them, deliberately delayed the
conclusion of a contract to provide LWRs, while urging us to receive
South Korean-type LWRs, which did not even actually exist at the time and
whose safety and technology had yet to be verified.
As a result, the agreement between the DPRK and the US-led Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to provide LWRs was
concluded on 15 December 1995, almost eight months after 21 April 1995,
the deadline specified in the Agreed Framework.
As for the construction of the LWRs, the first groundbreaking
ceremony only took place in August 1997, more than a year after the
schedule. Using the pretext of one or another "circumstances" within the
KEDO, it did not actively pursue the construction.
As a result, only basic site preparations have been made thus far in
the LWR project, which the United States committed itself to provide to
the DPRK by 2003 under the DPRK-US Agreed Framework.
If the LWR construction schedule had been pursued smoothly as
promised, a significant portion of the facilities, including turbines and
generators, would have been delivered around 2000, and we would have
accepted the full IAEA inspections. As a result, electricity would have
been generated from the LWRs starting this year, and we would have
returned to the treaty.
Due to the LWR construction delay, however, we had to suffer a huge
loss of electricity and also experienced a grave economic crisis, as a
result of which even our right to existence is being seriously threatened
today.
What is more, the United States did not faithfully honor its legal
obligation to supply 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil [HFO] to us every
year in compensation for the energy loss caused by our freeze on the
graphite-moderated reactors and their related facilities until No. 1 LWR
power plant is completed in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of
the DPRK-US Agreed Framework.
They attempted to unfairly use the HFO supply as a pressure means to
obtain some kind of concession from us.
The United States agreed with us to deliver the annual supply of
500,000 tonnes of HFO in equal installments of about 40,000 tonnes each
month, but it never once kept this promise. Finally, it misled public
opinion as though the HFO supply to us is based on some type of "good
will" on its part, while causing great economic confusion in our country
by suspending the HFO supply for a long time and then delivering great
quantities all at once.
The United States should have devised countermeasures to compensate
for our loss of 2 million kilowatts of electricity beginning in 2003, due
to the delay in the LWR construction.
The 500,000 tonnes of HFO to be supplied annually by the United
States until the completion of the No. 1 LWR, under the Agreed Framework,
were to be delivered as payment for freezing the 50,000 kilowatts and two
million kilowatts of power generating capacity graphite-moderated
reactors, which were capable of producing electricity right away if we
had begun operations at the time of adopting the Agreed Framework.
Accordingly, the annual supply of 500,000 tonnes of HFO could not
replace the loss of the two million electricity kilowatts caused by
freezing the construction of the nuclear power plants, which we had
planned to have built by 2003.
During the DPRK-US talks held in New York in March 2000, we presented
a proposal to the United States on compensating for the loss of
electricity caused by the delayed construction of the LWRs.
In relations among countries, compensating for the loss caused by one
party's failure to fulfill its obligation is an officially recognized
norm, and this cannot change just because there has been an
administration transfer.
On 14 November last year, the United States decided to suspend the
supply of HFO to us beginning in December, and thus it abandoned the last
and the only commitment it had been honoring thus far under the DPRK-US
Agreed Framework.
This compelled us to unavoidably re-activate our nuclear facilities,
which had been frozen under the Agreed Framework, in order to make up for
the vacuum created in the power generation due to the US decision to stop
the HFO supply.
Article 2 of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework stipulates that the two
sides shall move toward full normalization of political and economic
relations. As a part of these efforts, it stipulates that within three
months of the document's date, both sides shall reduce barriers to trade
and investment, including the lifting of restrictions on
telecommunications services and financial transactions.
Accordingly, the DPRK Government decided to lift the measures on
restricting US goods from entering our country and on prohibiting US
trading vessels from entering our country's ports when involved in trade
between the DPRK and other countries, beginning from mid-January 1995,
three months since the adoption of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework.
They were all the restrictions we had been applying in the economic
and trade relations with the United States.
The United States, however, lifted only part of such highly symbolic
sanctions applied against our country in travel, telecommunications,
finance, and territorial air passage, and it refused to take any
substantial measures to ease sanctions in such fields as trade and
investment barriers.
It was only on 17 September 1999 that the Clinton administration, as
a result of the DPRK-US talks in Berlin, announced the easing of a series
of economic sanctions applied against us for several decades under the
Trading with the Enemy Act, Export Administration Regulations, and the
Defense Production Act by stipulating our country as an "enemy."
This, however, was no more than the rudimentary obligation the United
States was committed to meet under Article 2 of the DPRK-US Agreed
Framework, and the United States' hostile policy against Korea and
economic sanctions have continued ceaselessly.
Under Article 3 of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the United States is
committed to giving us formal assurances against the use or threat of
nuclear weapons.
Instead of providing such assurances, however, the United States
continued to build up the armed forces of a nuclear attack in South Korea
and have annually raised the commotion of conducting military exercises
aimed at northward aggression, whose name was simply changed from "Team
Spirit."
In 1993 when DPRK-US talks were underway for a peaceful resolution of
the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the United States mapped out a
"new operation plan 5027" for crushing us through a preemptive nuclear
attack behind the curtain of negotiating with us and systematically
stepped up preparations to put the plan into practice.
Stockpiling countless nuclear weapons and up-to-date offensive
weapons in South Korea, the United States increased nuclear war exercises
against our Republic every year.
From early 1995, "Foal Eagle 95," "Hoguk 96," "RIMPAC 98," "Hwarang
98," and "Ulchi Focus Lens" joint military exercises and other nuclear
war exercises targeting our Republic were frantically staged on the land,
sea, and in the air in all parts of South Korea almost every day, every
year.
In February 1997, the United States moved depleted uranium shells,
which are globally recognized as inhuman weapons, from its Okinawa base
in Japan to South Korea to deploy them there for an actual war. Then on 8
June 1994, it issued an "interim report" on the re-examination of the
"US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines" in Honolulu.
The report newly specifies the US use of all the Japanese territory
as a base for assaults and logistics "in case of an emergency in areas
surrounding Japan," as well as Japan's "Self Defense Forces" sharing of
overseas combat duties, including minesweeping activities, vessel
inspections, and supply of military intelligence.
No sooner was this "interim report" announced than the world and even
news media in the United States pointed out that the US-Japan defense
"cooperation guidelines" were aimed at the Korean peninsula.
That the United States, while on one hand was discussing dialogue and
negotiations with us, but on the other hand was legally settling a plan
to share offensive combat actions, proved they had established our
Republic as a primary target and were attempting to make a preemptive
strike.
In January 1999, the US defense secretary and the chairman of the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff crawled into South Korea to hold the 20th meeting
of the "Military Commission" and the 30th "annual Security Consultative
Meeting" with South Korean military heads and released a "Joint
Statement," in which they claimed we remained a "constant threat to their
national interests" and they would "strongly retaliate against us with
nuclear weapons and all other means in the case of emergency."
The harsh US remark on "nuclear punishment" is a flagrant violation
of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework that assumes as a core provision not
using or threatening to use nuclear weapons.
Since the Bush administration came to office, anti-DPRK stifling
maneuvers have reached an extreme and DPRK-US relations have fallen into
the worst situation.
As soon as the Bush administration officials took power, they made it
a policy to crush the DPRK with force of arms, and completely blocked the
already-begun DPRK-US dialogue.
Even before they faced us, they labeled the DPRK a "dictatorial
state," "rogue state," and the like, and openly declared they would
"break down" our system. Moreover, they threw cold water on progress in
North-South relations.
In February 2001, the new US administration's diplomatic and security
team went so far as to say North Korea dragged around the former Clinton
administration, only giving in charity, and that unlike the Clinton
administration's intent, the new administration would implement a "policy
of strength," openly raving about its so-called "hard-line stance" toward
the DPRK.
Bush even spoke ill of our supreme leadership. Not content with that,
he went so far as to make harsh remarks, describing us as part of "axis
of evil" in his "State of the Union Address" to Congress on 30 January
2002.
There is no such case in the history of recent DPRK-US relations as
the US President personally making an open aggressive threat against our
nation, an independent and sovereign state, through his policy speech.
This is, in fact, little short of declaring war against us.
In connection with KEDO beginning to pour the concrete structure of
the basic nuclear reactors in August 2002, the US administration claimed
that now we must accept IAEA nuclear inspections. Otherwise, it can no
longer support the LWR project.
US Undersecretary of State Bolton, making a junket of South Korea in
August 2002, let loose a string of vituperation that the DPRK possesses
"the most powerful offensive biological weapon program in the world,"
that the DPRK is a "nation that threatens with the development of weapons
of mass destruction and exports missiles and related technology," that
the DPRK "must accept nuclear inspections," and the like. Thus, he
viciously slandered the DPRK.
In particular, in listing the DPRK as a target for its nuclear
preemptive attack, the Bush administration completely destroyed the basis
of the Agreed Framework. As such, it flagrantly infringed on the basic
spirit of the NPT.
In March 2002, US media revealed the Bush administration designated
seven nations, including Russia, China, the DPRK, Syria, Libya, Iran, and
Iraq, as targets of its nuclear attack, and decided to develop small
tactical nuclear weapons for "limited nuclear attacks."
The Bush administration's nuclear attack plan showed that the United
States, paying no attention to any international agreement, is pursuing
world domination with force of arms and that the United States is not
hesitant in launching a nuclear attack on any nation if it is regarded as
an obstacle to this end, even by reversing a bilateral agreement.
Through the US Presidential special envoy's visit to P'yongyang in
early October 2001, we came to realize the Bush administration's
antagonistic attempt has now reached the summit, and again confirmed that
the judgment we have made so far was right.
The Bush administration blamed us without any evidence and facts,
stating we violated the Agreed Framework by pushing ahead with the
nuclear weapons program, and pressured us. It insisted that if we do not
suspend this program, there will be no dialogue between the DPRK and the
United States. In addition to this, it claimed that DPRK-Japan relations
and North-South relations would fall into a catastrophe. As such, the
Bush administration, taking a high-handed attitude, completely severed
DPRK-US relations, which had been narrowly maintained so far.
Moreover, Bush designated our republic as an attack target following
Afghanistan and Iraq, and frantically staged nuclear war exercises
intended to crush the DPRK. By making a junket in South Korea, he
personally toured the foremost front-line and US military bases and
incited a war fever against us.
Recently, a nuclear attack scenario designating our republic as a
nuclear attack target was recently distributed in the United States.
Such US military moves are extremely dangerous war provocation
maneuvers aimed at igniting the blasting fuse of nuclear war by all means
by putting its "preemptive attack plan" against our republic into
practice.
The Bush administration, which even discarded the pledge for a
nuclear non-use guarantee, which has been observed by previous
administrations, rashly threatened it would eradicate our people from the
earth even by using nuclear weapons. In this regard, we repeatedly warned
that this is, in fact, little short of declaring war against us.
Therefore, we were forced to draw up measures to cope with this
situation, without being stuck in the DPRK-US Agreed Framework.
The United States, however, did not listen to our warnings. Instead,
it put forward brigandish logic, urging us to accept nuclear inspections
despite the fact that we are subject to inspections only after
"non-nuclear parts, including turbine and generators" for the LWRs are
completely delivered, pursuant to Article 4 in the DPRK-US Agreed
Framework and to Clause 7 of the closed memorandum of understanding
provided in the Agreed Framework. As such, the United States drove the
situation into an even more perilous state than the early 1990's.
The United States again incited the IAEA to adopt a "resolution"
against the DPRK on 6 January 2003, following 29 November 2002.
Thus, the United States undisguisedly abolished the DPRK-US Agreed
Framework and internationalized its anti-DPRK stifling maneuvers by
mobilizing even the IAEA. The United States began executing a declaration
of war against us. As this was the case, we were forced to withdraw from
the NPT, which has been used as a tool for implementing the United
States' anti-DPRK hostile policy, in order to cope its declaration of
war, and defend and safeguard the nation's sovereignty and right to
existence.
As we can see from the aforementioned facts, the nuclear problem on
the Korean peninsula is a product of the US anti-DPRK hostile policy. At
the same time, it is thoroughly an issue between the DPRK and the United
States and a problem that should be resolved between the DPRK and the
United States by sitting face to face with each other.
Therefore, the most realistic measure for basically resolving the
nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and peacefully breaking through
the prevailing grave situation is only to conclude a non-aggression
treaty between the DPRK and the United States.
In the event that the United States legally pledges non-aggression,
including the non-use of nuclear [weapons] against us, through a
non-aggression treaty, we will disperse the US security worries.
Although we withdrew from the NPT, our nuclear activities will be
limited to the peaceful purpose of electricity production at the present
stage.
If the United States discards its hostile policy against the DPRK and
discontinues making nuclear threats, we will be ready to prove, through a
separate verification between the DPRK and the United States, that we
will not make nuclear weapons.
It is a consistent stance of the DPRK Government to peacefully
resolve the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula on equal footings
between the DPRK and the United States through just and fair negotiations
that will simultaneously dispel the two sides' worries.
[Date] 21 January 2003, Chuch'e 92, P'yongyang
[Description of Source: P'yongyang KCNA (Internet version-WWW) in Korean
-- WWW home page of official DPRK news agency, provided by Tokyo-based
Korea News Service. Root URL on filing date: http://www.kcna.co.jp]